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Volunteer Activism and Professionalism in Social Movement Organizations*

ROBERT KLEIDMAN, Cleveland State University

The effects of professionalism on volunteer activism within social movement organizations (SMOs) are more complex than generally recognized. Professionalism can inhibit or erode, substitute for, or facilitate volunteer activism. Most studies identify one of these patterns as typical of SMOs or dominant in a particular case. This article argues that some combination of the three, rather than a single pattern, is probably more typical of SMOs. To identify such combinations two analytic tools are needed: a more complex concept of volunteer activism than is generally used, and, a broader understanding of the means by which professionals influence volunteer activism. This article develops these tools through a comparative case study of the umbrella organizations of three major peace campaigns — the Emergency Peace Campaign (1936-1937), the atomic test ban campaign (1957-1963), and the nuclear weapons freeze campaign (1979-1986). The umbrella organizations are then shown to incorporate different combinations of the three basic patterns of professional-volunteer relations.

Introduction

The use of paid professionals in social change organizations including unions, parties, and social movement organizations (SMOs) has long been an important feature of political life. Since Michels's (1962 [1915]) formulation of the "iron law of oligarchy," the effects of professionals on volunteer activism have been debated by scholars and activists. More recently, the rise of resource mobilization perspectives on social movements has led to extensive analysis of movement professionalism and its relationship to volunteer activism in the civil rights (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Jenkins and Eckert 1986), women's (Staggenborg 1988), environmental (Cable 1984) and other movements.

Taken together, these and other studies find three basic patterns of influence: professionals inhibit or erode volunteer activism; they replace it; or they facilitate it. Most studies either claim that one of these three patterns is typical of SMOs or identify only one as dominant in a particular case. It is my contention that SMOs are more likely to incorporate some combination of the three effects, at the same time or over time, than to include only one pattern. However, recognition of combined and complex effects is inhibited by two problems — analyses rarely attend to the complexity of volunteer activism, and they do not examine the various means by which professionals influence volunteer activism.

In this article I propose to analyze the concept of volunteer activism into its key qualitative and quantitative dimensions and to identify the major means of influence of professionalism on volunteer activism. I will do this through a comparative case study of the umbrella organizations of the peace movement's major peacetime mobilizations since World War I: the Emergency Peace Campaign (1936-1937); the atomic test ban campaign (1957-1963); and, the nuclear weapons freeze campaign (1979-1986). I will then show that using a complex conception of volunteer activism and recognizing several means of professional influence on

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volunteer activism. I can identify different combinations of the three basic patterns of influence in the campaign organizations.

I proceed in three basic steps. First I discuss social movement professionalism and volunteer activism, emphasizing major findings and debates about the relations between the two. Second I present my findings about the peace campaigns. This section is the most extensive. Here I give a brief overview of the peace movement and peace campaigns, discuss data and methods, and present a brief history of each campaign. I use these histories to develop a typology of volunteer activism consisting of several quantitative and qualitative variables. Next I examine how professionalism affected these different dimensions of volunteer activism. The discussion is organized by the four key means of influence I find, and shows that in each campaign organization professionalism had mixed effects on volunteer activism, involving different combinations of inhibition/erosion, substitution, and facilitation. Finally, in the third step, I discuss the implications of my findings for social movement theory.

Social Movement Professionalism and Volunteer Activism

McCarthy and Zald (1973) introduced the concept of the professional social movement organization (PSMO) as one that is founded and run by paid staff members who raise money rather than recruit volunteers. PSMOs typically rely upon resources raised from outside any active membership. I use the term “professionalism” more broadly, meaning the use of paid staff supported by either outside or internal resources or both. While it is customary in this literature to refer to all paid staff as “professionals,” most analyses, including this one, actually focus on staff members in leadership and decision-making roles rather than clerical or other support staff. This does not imply, however, that these staff members possess particular skills and credentials that might be typical of professionals outside the social movement sector.

Discussions of professional-volunteer relations are pitched at both organization and movement levels. This article focuses on the internal dynamics of SMOs but translates movement-level claims into organization-level arguments. The implications of my findings for movement-level issues are examined in the final section of the article.

Inhibition or Erosion

Within organizations, the best known analysis stems from two classic accounts, Max Weber’s theories of bureaucracy and the routinization of charisma, and Robert Michels’s iron law of oligarchy. In this “Weber-Michels model” (Zald and Ash 1966), social change organizations become dominated by oligarchical leaders who chart a cautious and conservative course to ensure organizational survival, minimize elite opposition, and maximize their career chances inside and outside the organization. This model suggests that professionals inhibit or erode volunteer activism by discouraging participation by members in the internal affairs of the organization and by avoiding political strategies that require grassroots mobilization. This pattern of inhibition and erosion may reflect tendencies that do express themselves in many organizations (Jenkins 1989). However, it is not, according to Zald and Ash and other critics, an inevitable outcome. Studies have shown cases of organizational democracy in which rank-and-file participation does not decline dramatically over time (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956) and in which paid leaders tend to be more radical than volunteer members (Jenkins 1977).

At the movement level, Piven and Cloward (1979) claim that for movements of the poor, the construction of formal organization leads to mass demobilization. Organization-building diverts grassroots energy from unruly protest, the most effective tactic. This is partly
an argument about professionalism, as paid staff are particularly vulnerable to elite efforts at cooptation. Despite criticism on historical and theoretical grounds (e.g., Jenkins 1979; Mas- sad 1980) this analysis remains influential.

A less sweeping argument is that the outside funding that often accompanies professional-
ism may lead to the erosion of volunteer activism. SMOs dependent on elite sponsorship
may moderate their goals and tactics, turning more often to lobbying and publicizing than to
protest (Jenkins 1987, 1989). At the movement level there is the possibility of a "channeling"
effect. Jenkins and Eckert (1986) claim that elites responded to the civil rights movement by
funding moderate, relatively-professionalized organizations rather than more radical grass-
roots groups. This contributed to the moderation of the movement as a whole and to the
demobilization of volunteer activists.

**Substitution**

A second net effect is substitution. McCarthy and Zald (1973) claim that PSMOs may
represent the interests of deprived constituencies and marginalized voices. Their assertion
that PSMOs are becoming more dominant within movements means that at the level of
movements, professionalism may substitute for volunteer activism. Lost in the debates over
which, if any, movements have become more professionalized (and when) is the important
insight that professionalism, under some circumstances, can substitute for some of the func-
tions of volunteer activism. One can make a similar analysis of SMOs themselves — within
organizations, the actions of paid staff may substitute for the actions of volunteer activists,
provided funds can be raised to support the paid staff. Of course, a few staff members cannot
do the same things as masses of activists, but they can both sustain organizations during times
of limited political opportunity (Morris 1984; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989) and take
advantage of expanded opportunities to build public support and generate political pressure
(McCarthy 1987; Staggenborg 1988). The effects of such substitution are debatable. The argu-
ments about channeling, demobilization, and cooptation cannot be ignored. Where volunteer
mobilization is difficult to catalyze or maintain, however, professionalism is often seen as a
viable way of promoting a campaign (Cable 1984) or of sustaining a movement or organiza-
tion (McCarthy and Zald 1973).

**Facilitation**

A third effect is that professionalism may facilitate volunteer activism. This may happen
more or less deliberately and directly at the movement level and within organizations. Indi-
rectly and almost accidentally, by helping to maintain the ideals and goals of a movement
during times of limited political opportunity and little volunteer activism, professionals may
contribute to an upsurge in activism when opportunity expands. Rupp and Taylor (1987)
describe the women's movement in the "doldrums" between World War II and the resur-
gence of activism in the 1960s as partly "elite-sustained."

In other cases facilitation is more direct and deliberate. "Movement halfway houses"
(Morris 1984:139-173) are small and socially marginal organizations, such as the pacifist Fel-
wellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), that include paid staff and a small group of volunteers.
They help to sustain oppositional cultures and ideals, but they also bring together and train volun-
teer activists. The FOR, the Highlander Folk School, and other groups were instrumental in
training indigenous civil rights leaders in the philosophy and tactics of nonviolent mass pro-
test and in other aspects of organizing. Halfway houses are one variety of "movement
mentoring organization" that inspire volunteer activism but rarely incorporate it within its
organizational boundaries (Edwards and McCarthy 1992). Professionals play key roles in
many of these organizations.
Within SMOs professionals may facilitate volunteer activism during both movement doldrums and upsurges. Staggenborg’s (1988) analysis of pro-choice groups shows how professionals increased both the effectiveness and the duration of volunteer activism through coordination, training, and the formalization of organizational structure. Many SMOs, labor unions, and other organizations employ professional organizers whose job is to recruit and train volunteer activists.

To avoid going too far outside the scope of this article, I would simply suggest that to understand more fully the dynamics of professional-volunteer relations within organizations, it is helpful to differentiate the concept of SMO, which, like the concept of volunteer activism, is often treated as a simple one. For example, it might be fruitful to distinguish sustaining from mobilizing organizations. When professionals facilitate volunteer activism within organizations, this may create tensions between paid staff and volunteers (Kleidman 1993). For this and other reasons, some SMOs are poorly equipped to incorporate an influx of volunteer activists. The transition from a sustaining structure to a mobilizing structure may be difficult or impossible. That is one reason that the core peace organizations established separate campaign organizations. (Ironically, the campaigns eventually suffered from the difficulties encountered by the umbrella organizations in sustaining volunteer activism long enough to achieve success in the face of political setbacks.) Beyond the distinction between sustaining and mobilizing structures, it is important to recognize the role of mentoring organizations, which may be outside of what is usually considered the social movement sector.

Facilitation involves more than just numbers. Staggenborg’s and Morris’s studies identify dimensions of volunteer activism such as skill level, and means of influence such as training, that will be included in the analysis below.

Of the three basic patterns — inhibition/erosion, substitution, and facilitation — existing models or studies tend to demonstrate or emphasize only one. This tendency is caused in part by treating volunteer activism as a simple unitary concept. Even with such a concept, it is reasonable to expect changes over time in how professionalism affects volunteer activism within a single SMO or within a movement. For example, as suggested above, substitution may eventually lead to facilitation, as organizations and movements dominated by professionals catalyze volunteer activism when political space expands. However, professionals may react to new opportunities by stepping up professional activism rather than turning to new volunteer activists — substitution is different from facilitation, even over the long term. Professionals may even discourage new volunteer activism that does not fit their model of change or that threatens their dominance of a movement or organization (Ratcliff 1985) — substitution may lead to inhibition or erosion.

Scholars have rarely examined such changes over time in professional-volunteer relations. However, if one breaks down volunteer activism into several variables, not only would one expect mixed effects over time, but one would also expect that at any given time professionalism might have different effects on the different dimensions of volunteer activism. Professionalism may facilitate some aspects of volunteer activism while inhibiting others and substituting for still others.

Professionalism has been recognized as a complex concept. McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) acknowledge that their model of the PSMO is an ideal type. The two basic variables, the use of paid staff and reliance on outside resources, are separable although they tend to go together (Oliver 1983). They also vary both qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitatively, SMOs range from total reliance on paid staff to completely volunteer driven, and from full dependence on outside funding to use of only indigenous resources. Qualitatively, Oliver (1983) notes that paid staff includes a variety of positions with varying interests. Entrepreneurs establish organizations, staff run them, and organizers seek to recruit and train volunteer activists and leaders. Similarly, Oliver shows, there are differences in outside resources.
They may be raised in small or large amounts from a variety of sources, with concomitant changes in constraints imposed on the SMOs that mobilize these particular types of resources.

Volunteer activism, as I will show, is likewise a complex concept. If one sees both professionalism and volunteer activism as multidimensional, then one is more likely to find mixed effects. It is also easier to locate different ways in which professionalism affects volunteer activism. Existing studies have identified some. For example, the Weber-Michels model suggests that professionals may influence, if not control, organizational structure. While SMOs may tend toward oligarchy for various reasons, the actions of professionals may accelerate this tendency and discourage volunteer activism. Alternatively, staff may try to minimize oligarchy and encourage volunteers. A second means of influence involves training. The previously-mentioned studies by Morris and by Staggenborg, and discussions of the staff role of organizer (e.g., Oliver 1983), suggest that training provided by staff has important effects on volunteer activism. In the next section, I identify systematically the major means by which professionalism affected the various dimensions of volunteer activism within peace campaign organizations. I will then revisit the debates about how professionalism affects volunteer activism, with a greater ability to identify complex patterns of influence.

The Peace Movement and Peace Campaigns

Since World War I, the peace movement in the United States has been sustained by a core of a few organizations, pacifist and nonpacifist, that have relied on paid professionals and a small group of volunteer activists. Three times these organizations have succeeded in launching major peacetime campaigns. In 1936, fearing the approach of World War II, they created the Emergency Peace Campaign (EPC) to promote United States neutrality and international economic cooperation. In 1957, as the dangers of atmospheric testing received great publicity, they initiated an atomic test ban campaign. In 1979 and 1980, as cold war tensions escalated, they started the nuclear weapons freeze campaign. Each time, staff members of the peace groups formed a coalition, developed basic goals and strategies, and created umbrella organizations to coordinate the campaigns: the EPC; the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE); and the Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA) during the test ban campaign; and the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC).1

Data and Methods

This analysis is based on examination of documents generated by the campaign organizations and the sponsoring peace organizations,2 interviews with key informants, observations of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (I was active within the organization at local, state, and national levels) and secondary sources.

The method used is that of the comparative case study (George 1979; Ragin 1987) or comparative history (Goldstone 1990). In analyzing similar processes in different historical contexts, these methods attempt to develop not universal laws but specific explanations grounded in general variables. The ultimate goal is the development of "typological theory"—rich, differentiated theory that identifies both the variety of possible causal patterns.

1. In the EPC the central organization was almost coextensive with the broader campaign, and both are typically capitalized. The nuclear weapons freeze campaign extended far beyond the bounds of the NWFC organization and is typically referred to in lower-case while the organization is capitalized.

2. Campaign documents include the Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pa.: Emergency Peace Campaign (EPC); Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA); SANE, A Citizens' Organization for a Sane World [formerly The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy] (SANE); and the Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri - St. Louis: Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC).
and the conditions under which each might occur (George 1979). This article stresses the first of these two: the second, identifying conditions likely to produce each pattern, requires further research in other cases.

Typological theory building requires concept development and the identification of causal patterns. Both involve a combination of deductive and inductive logic. In this research, concept development starts with existing notions of volunteer activism, hypothesizes that it is a complex concept, and then examines the cases to identify its different dimensions. My use of the term "variable" to refer to these dimensions implies only that they are concepts that may take on a range of values. It is not meant to imply a model of linear causation. Comparative historical analysis recognizes that causation may be multiple and conjunctural (Ragin 1987) and dependent on historical context and temporal issues such as the pace, duration, and trajectory of events (Aminzade 1992). Causation may also be reciprocal — while I emphasize the effects of professionalism on volunteer activism, it is also true that the actions of volunteers shape and constrain those of professionals.

The identification of causal patterns followed a similar process of reconstruction of existing ideas (Burasworsky 1991). Here I began with a few hypotheses, discussed in the preceding literature review, about how professionalism affects volunteer activism. I then looked at the cases individually and together to discover how and when these and possibly other effects occurred. The identification of cause-and-effect relations depends upon constructing a plausible historical account from the existing traces of evidence (Goldstone 1990).

Plausibility typically involves combining a credible narrative and the construction or use of sound theory (George 1979; Goldstone 1990). In this article the historical accounts must be somewhat brief; a more detailed analytic narrative of each campaign can be found in Kleidman (1993). In terms of theory, I show in this article that the causal patterns identified — the means of influence and their effects (inhibit/erode, substitute, or facilitate) — are consistent with existing understandings of professional-volunteer relations, even though they combine in ways more complex than usually recognized.

To develop the key concepts and identify important causal patterns, I compare similar cases — the umbrella organizations of the three major peace campaigns in the United States since World War I. These campaigns represent the peaks of peacetime mobilization of the peace movement in the United States since World War I. Their umbrella organizations were given identical mandates by the coalition members — to catalyze and coordinate a major campaign that would achieve one or two key goals in a limited time period. They faced similar political opportunities — widespread public fears during peacetime and an elite divided over policy. They followed similar trajectories — a rapid start, early success, political and organizational problems, a quick decline. There were also important differences in the state of the peace movement and in political and social context. However, the differences in volunteer activism and professional-volunteer relations are not merely reflections of differences in context. Within each organization, the plans and practices of professionals shaped volunteer activism.

I exclude from this analysis antiwar protests. While they also are grounded in the peace movement, such protests differ in many ways that would, at least initially, make comparative study of both antiwar protests and peace campaigns difficult. Among these differences are: political opportunity (only rarely are elites divided once war breaks out); constituencies (potential draftees, for example, may be more important during antiwar movements than peace campaigns); and, organizational dynamics (few antiwar movements center on one or two organizations in the ways that peace campaigns do).
The Peace Campaigns

This section presents brief narratives of the campaigns, highlighting issues relevant in the analysis section, which will also add some further descriptive data.

The Emergency Peace Campaign

The Emergency Peace Campaign was launched in 1936 to promote U.S. neutrality and international economic cooperation. The umbrella organizations' top leaders and staff members were mostly staff members from the pacifist organizations, along with a few from liberal internationalist groups. The EPC had a large budget — almost $2 million for each of its two years (in 1984 dollars, a standard I use for all three campaigns). Funds came mainly from wealthy Quaker families. At its peak in early 1936 the EPC employed a national and regional staff of 200. Many staff members were serving at subsistence wages, understanding that the Campaign was a brief emergency mobilization and wishing to devote full time to it before returning to jobs, mostly outside social movement groups. At the local level, the Campaign generated almost 1,700 chapters. Most of these, however, consisted of one or two activists who helped run programs such as mass meetings that were planned by the national office.

The Atomic Test Ban Campaign

The test ban campaign also began as a coalition between pacifists and liberal internationalists. Catalyzed by evidence of health risks from atomic fallout and inspired by a small but visible international movement for a test ban, peace leaders in the United States established two organizations. The Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA, first known as Nonviolent Action Against Nuclear Weapons) began and remained a handful of pacifists who participated in small but often dramatic direct actions, such as sailing ships into the Pacific testing sites and demonstrating at missile factories and launch sites, sometimes breaking the law to go inside or to blockade these sites. Except for a paid staff member, all CNVA activists were volunteer.

SANE, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, was to be a liberal organization engaged in high-level lobbying and public education with a small outreach effort to involve local activists. From the start of the test ban campaign in 1957 until the signing of the limited test ban treaty in 1963, the professional component of SANE was smaller than that of the EPC, never exceeding 12 paid staff or a budget of more than $760,000 (in 1984 dollars) in any year. However, local response to the campaign was much greater than its founders expected. One hundred seventy-five chapters were formed by local activists, giving the organization a group of between 4,000 and 7,000 volunteer activists (figuring between 20 and 40 activists per local chapter). Local chapters were mostly self-directed and local leaders soon played a major role in national SANE’s policymaking. After the treaty was signed, the organization declined sharply in size (number of chapters and volunteer activists), activity, visibility, and influence. SANE was kept alive by a few paid staff at the national level and a handful of volunteer-sustained chapters, and went on to form part of the liberal wing of the protest movement against the Vietnam War.

The Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign

The nuclear weapons freeze campaign started in 1979 at both local (western Massachusetts) and national levels. It was the major U.S. component of the next wave of international protests against the nuclear arms race. The national organization, the NWFC, was established

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by a group of peace movement leaders along with dozens of local activists from community, environmental, religious, and other groups. It began with the stated intention of combining an extensive network of grassroots activists with a small national clearinghouse devoted to facilitating local work. The grassroots component spread quickly, coming to include 1,800 chapters with some 45,000 to 72,000 volunteer local activists. These chapters sponsored local and then state-level ballot referenda and legislative resolutions, almost all of which passed, as part of a strategy of building pressure from the ground up for a freeze.

The clearinghouse began to attract foundation and major donor funding, raising its budget to $1.3 million per year and the number of paid staff to 25. In addition, local and state chapters hired 55 paid staff (or the full-time equivalent). After the House of Representatives passed a nonbinding freeze resolution in 1983 and Ronald Reagan's re-election in 1984, the campaign and its leading organization declined in size (paid and volunteer activists and number of chapters), activity, visibility, and influence. In 1987 the NWFC merged with SANE to form an organization renamed Peace Action in 1993.

Variations in Volunteer Activism

By comparing the four organizations, one can see both obvious and subtle dimensions of volunteer activism. The most obvious are quantitative differences. These include number of activists, duration of activism, and intensity of activism. Both the EPC and SANE included between 3,000 and 4,000 volunteer activists, while the NWFC was much larger with perhaps ten times as many. Both antinuclear groups maintained varying numbers of volunteer activists for more than five years, while the EPC lasted only two. Any assessment of volunteer activism would start with these salient facts, to which I will return in assessing means of influence and overall impact. Both number of volunteer activists and duration of volunteer activism increased over time across the campaign organizations. Unfortunately, there is no reliable data on intensity of volunteer activism. Researchers rarely attempt to measure this, although they are aware of the difference between devoting every waking hour to a cause, typical of core activists during peak mobilization, and spending a few hours a month or less, typical of peripheral members and of non-peak periods.

The more subtle variations in volunteer activism differences are qualitative. I examine four: the degree of voluntariness of activism (from uncompensated to full-time paid); its autonomy; its rootedness in local communities; and its efficacy. See Figure 1.

Voluntariness

The notion of voluntary labor is not as simple as it first appears. Rather than treating paid and unpaid labor as a dichotomy, it is better to consider a range of voluntariness that varies by amount of compensation and sacrifice. The people who worked full time for the EPC in return for subsistence wages cannot be considered pure volunteers, but neither were they career movement staffers. Recognizing this puts a different face on what appeared to be a largely professionalized organization. Similarly, many local NWFC staff members were poorly compensated, worked long hours, and had little or no job security. Some worked as office staff, some as door-to-door canvassers. They took these positions for a mix of motives, not surprisingly. Oliver (1983) found that paid activists do not necessarily differ from volunteers in their commitment to a cause. Some local Freeze staffs hoped to make activism a career, and some succeeded. Those who saw this poorly-paid activism as a break from their ordinary careers or pursuits were similar to the EPC staff members — i.e., they can be seen as quasi-volunteers. Differences in degree of voluntariness may be related to the quantitative variable
of intensity — one way activists manage to devote long hours for some period of time to a movement is to find some position within an SMO that provides subsistence compensation.

**Autonomy**

The autonomy of local activists also varied. This variation is related to the distinction made by McCarthy and Zald (1977) between federated and isolated organizations. SANE and the NWFC were federated organizations in which local activists worked mainly in chapters, developing programs, building organizations, and cultivating local leaders. The EPC was closer to an isolated organization, one in which little if any face-to-face interaction occurs among local volunteer activists, who relate upward to an office rather than horizontally to peers. The local chapters of SANE and the NWFC were highly autonomous, guided but not directed by national offices. Although some federated organizations are more centralized and give local chapters less freedom than did SANE and the NWFC, it is probably the case that activists in most federated organizations enjoy more autonomy than those in isolated organizations. Local chapters both require and create more freedom to innovate than is found in isolated structures. Isolated structures also are less likely to promote the rise of indigenous leaders or to develop roots in local communities.

**Rootedness**

Rootedness is another qualitative variable. The terms “grassroots” and volunteer activism are sometimes used interchangeably, but they are not the same, nor are they identical to local activism. Local activism may be paid, although local groups tend to rely more on volunteer activism than do national organizations (Oliver and Furman 1990). Volunteer activism may be more or less grassroots. Grassroots implies a base in a community, whether residential or occupational. Of the four campaign organizations, CNVA had the highest proportion of volunteer to paid activists and the greatest propensity to use disruptive protest, both hallmarks of grassroots activism. It had no local chapters or other community links, however. Activists traveled to symbolically-important locations and then returned (one protest involved a longer-term presence but still did not establish links with the local community).

However one chooses to use the term grassroots (Alger and Mendlovitz 1983 discuss several meanings), it is important to recognize the rootedness variable of grassroots activism. It may, for example, be linked to the issue of duration, particularly if one takes a long-term view of movements and activism. Campaigns and other mobilizations affect movements and politics by changing activists’ beliefs and identities, and by developing leaders, networks, and organizations (Gusfield 1981; Marwell, Aiken, and Demerath 1987; McAdam 1988; Meyer and Whittier 1992; Taylor 1989; Whalen and Flacks 1989; Whittier 1994). Many of these effects operate at the community level and are strongest when SMOs establish deep roots.

**Efficacy**

Finally, volunteer activism varies greatly in efficacy. This is the most difficult variable to measure. Movement outcome is notoriously hard to determine, and the contribution of volunteer activism to outcome is equally difficult to establish. Nevertheless it is important to recognize this variable and to make some informed speculations about how professionals may affect it. I do this below in discussing training as an intangible resource. Like intensity of activism, there are little data available concerning the efficacy of activism in the campaign organizations. Of the three campaign organizations, the NWFC put the greatest emphasis on volunteer training and may have had the greatest facilitating effect on efficacy.
Volunteer activism is a complex concept. It includes quantitative dimensions — numbers, intensity, duration — and qualitative dimensions — degree of voluntariness, autonomy, community rootedness, and efficacy. By recognizing these dimensions and treating them as variables, one can better understand both the consequences of volunteer activism and how it is affected by professionalism.

**Effects of Professionalism on Volunteer Activism**

Professionalism may inhibit or erode, substitute for, or facilitate volunteer activism. Each core peace campaign organization showed some combination of the three. Some of these effects are only apparent if one looks at both quantitative and qualitative aspects of volunteer activism. I organize this analysis by identifying four key means by which professionals influence volunteer activism: leadership, planning, and coordination; development and implementation of strategies and tactics; shaping the structure of SMOs; and the mobilization and deployment of resources within SMOs. See Figure 1.

For each means of influence, I look at effects (inhibit/erode, substitute, facilitate) on both quantitative and qualitative measures of activism. Rather than systematically assessing the effects of each mechanism on each variable for all three organizations, I will examine the strongest or most interesting effects. The goal here is to identify the various mechanisms of influence and their effects, it is not to try to give a full account of the course of each organization or to develop hypotheses about when professionalism has each effect. I will analyze only the three core campaign organizations — the EPC, SANE, and the NWFC. The fourth, CNVA, did not have any substantial level of professionalism. The overall model is shown in Figure 1.

**Leadership, Planning, Coordination**

In all three organizations, professionals increased the number of volunteer activists in the peace movement by devising and initiating the campaigns. They focused the campaigns on one or two key goals that were popular or potentially popular. They framed key issues in ways that were simple, compelling, and favorable to the peace movement. They provided to potential activists an effort that appeared both short-term and winnable. They attracted enough elite support to legitimate the campaigns. They provided coordination so that the work of activists in different locales was focused on similar goals and so that there was some relatively efficient division of labor within the larger campaigns.

Professionals also inhibited or eroded potential or actual volunteer activists. In the EPC, very strong staff leadership along with a highly centralized structure and a strategy that avoided mass tactics (discussed below) inhibited any greater increase of grassroots activism and limited the autonomy of those activists who were mobilized. SANE’s top staff responded to Congressional red-baiting in a way that many volunteer activists saw as timid and capitulating, leading many to leave the organization and some to drop out of the movement (some moving into civil rights and other work). They also instituted chartering requirements that reduced the autonomy of local chapters. Sympathetic critics of the NWFC (e.g., Solo 1988; Meyer 1990) argue that the staff of the NWFC failed to provide sufficient leadership and coordination to keep a sense of momentum after political setbacks in 1983 and 1984. In essence they handed over symbolic and strategic leadership of the freeze campaign to politicians, leading to the institutionalization of the campaign and the demobilization of the volunteer base of the freeze organization and other groups.
Development and Implementation of Strategies and Tactics

The campaign's paid staff were instrumental in devising initial campaign strategies and tactics. As the test ban and freeze campaigns progressed, volunteers played an increasing role, but staff remained important. Staff members' actions, of course, are constrained by factors external and internal to movements and organizations, including the structure of political opportunities, the availability of resources and cooptable networks, and dynamic tendencies of movements and organizations. Their preferences and choices are shaped by their purpose, career, and other interests. They are also affected by their goals, values, assessments of strategic options and choices, and the tactical repertoire they draw upon and perhaps change.

The top staff of the EPC believed that public opinion was on their side and that an intensive two-year campaign focused on Congress could maintain and strengthen U.S. neutrality. Consequently, EPC strategy, shaped entirely by top staff, did not call for mobilizing large numbers of activists. Sponsoring organizations also were not willing to commit to more than a two-year campaign, but pacifist groups did make available their major donors who contributed large startup funds. Leaders used this money to hire a large staff to conduct most of the work of the campaign — lobbying, publicity, and mobilizing existing networks such as clergy for limited tasks such as public speeches. The basic tactics of the EPC included use of professional lobbyists and publicists and holding local public meetings, many featuring prominent
speakers on national tour. These strategies and tactics involved the substitution of professional staff, supported by outside resources, for volunteer activism. Consequently the amount and intensity of volunteer activism remained below what was probably the potential of the campaign, given the popularity of the issue and other favorable factors including some elite support. The EPC did, however, mobilize a group of quasi-volunteers to help implement the Campaign's professional-style tactics.

The test ban leaders had fewer initial resources available and a less-favorable political climate, one still shaped by McCarthyism and the cold war. They planned a campaign based mainly on high-level lobbying and some publicity to generate public pressure. Pacifist leaders added a direct-action protest component to the campaign. The rapid and large grassroots response to the campaign was unexpected, but leaders eventually welcomed and nurtured it, although their resources and grassroots experience were limited and some of them tended toward autocratic leadership.

Freeze leaders began with a local, grassroots strategy, believing that national policy could not be reformed from the inside or by quiet lobbying. Many were influenced, directly or indirectly, by the participation ethic of social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. They started with some money for paid staff and an extensive local network of movement and religious activists. The general strategy of the freeze and its early tactics emphasized the development of this grassroots base and proved quite successful. The campaign was envisioned as a "broad front door" whose moderate goals and loose structure would encourage new activists to enter the peace movement.

The early stages of the NWFC provide a sharp contrast to the EPC's substitution of staff for volunteers. The general strategy, devised by staff members of the major peace organizations along with leading volunteers, centered on widespread grassroots mobilization to pressure first local elites then national elites into supporting a nuclear freeze. The key early tactic, the local referendum, proved instrumental in recruiting and motivating volunteer activists. It was unusual but not unprecedented to place matters of foreign and military policy on local ballots. This tactic was introduced to the campaign by a staff person, Randy Kehler. Kehler, who was appointed the first National Coordinator of the NWFC in 1981, had been a draft resister in the Vietnam era (when some local ballot campaigns occurred) and then a staff member of the Traprock Peace Center in western Massachusetts. In 1980 Kehler ran a freeze referendum campaign that passed in 59 of 62 towns in the region despite simultaneous support for Ronald Reagan's successful run for the presidency. This victory for the freeze campaign was one of the few bright spots in the 1980 election for peace and other progressive activists, and helped to attract volunteers who replicated the campaign in their own communities. In Lofland's (1992) terms, the referendum victory was a key focusing event that contributed to the escalation of the citizen surge of the freeze campaign. Freeze campaign strategy and tactics helped raise the number of volunteer activists and the intensity of their work — early successes inspired people to work on their own local efforts. Many of them worked quite intensively until and beyond when the referenda passed.

The grassroots strategy and tactics of the NWFC also increased the rootedness, autonomy, and efficacy of volunteer activism. National staff and leaders encouraged autonomy, stressing to local activists the need to adapt referenda appeals and campaigns to the specificities of local conditions. By working on the local campaigns, activists broadened and deepened existing networks and established new ones, building community roots. They also became, at least temporarily, effective political actors, passing resolutions and referenda and influencing local elites.

Organizational Structure

Organizational dynamics are complex and often reflect tendencies such as those described by Weber and Michels toward bureaucracy and oligarchy. Nevertheless, actors may shape organizational structure, especially at key junctures that help determine future trajectories (Aminzade 1992). This structure, in turn, influences the opportunities for volunteer activism and its shape, scope, and duration.

The campaign organizations were mobilizing structures intended to help maximize rapidly the amount and intensity of peace activism, whether professional or volunteer. The EPC, because of strategy, organizational rivalries, and political differences, was created as a top-down organization with little room for local initiative. Leaders planned the campaign as a fast, emergency mobilization with no time for local base-building. Pacifists feared creating an organizational rival with a greater potential constituency than that for pacifism, while internationalists were ambivalent about neutrality and did not want to create a permanent lobby for it. Consequently, top staff, all of whom remained on the payrolls of their respective core organizations, retained control of the EPC and dissolved it even before its planned two-year run.

The centralized structure of the EPC, with a strong national office, several regional offices, and local contacts whose work was tightly coordinated by these offices, did allow national staff to reach into many communities without having to mobilize large numbers of volunteer activists. This structure did not encourage an increase in volunteer activism in any variable except possibly efficacy, which may have increased because of greater coordination and concentration (although some EPC leaders doubted even that outcome).

SANE and the NWFC experienced organizational trajectories similar to each other but on different scales. Both began as loose networks of local activists coordinated by a national office. SANE actually started as only a national office but quickly developed a local network when activists, some of whom had already started local organizing, responded to early publicity. The loose structure of the NWFC was deliberately designed to accommodate and encourage a quick increase in local volunteer activism. Local activists were encouraged to identify with the NWFC and to draw on its national visibility, but were not burdened with formal affiliation processes or dues. Local volunteer activists contributed to creating this weak federation by resisting any tendencies or efforts toward even moderate levels of hierarchy and centralization. Some local groups did contribute funds to the clearinghouse but others either could not or would not. They enjoyed the advantages of affiliation without bearing the burdens which Oliver and Furman (1990) suggest puts local chapters of federated organizations at a disadvantage relative to freestanding local organizations.

Both SANE and the NWFC changed from a network-like structure into a more formally federated organization, mainly because local activists demanded greater participation in the national campaign’s decision making and leadership selection. This created tensions between the local activists and the coalition founders. The tensions were resolved in favor of the local activists. Both organizations moved closer to a federated model in which local chapters, rather than founding coalition members, dominated decision making. The NWFC moved further in this direction. The NWFC’s leaders were more democratically oriented than were those of SANE and its local activists were more numerous.

The federated structures of both SANE and the Freeze seem to have encouraged the growth (in numbers and intensity) of volunteer activism and its rootedness in local communities. This is similar to the findings of Barkan, Whitaker, and Cohn (1988) that activists in a federated organization were more likely to feel strong commitment to a cause and to participate than were activists in isolated organizations. Running local chapters required that at least some volunteers develop new skills that may have contributed to increased efficacy of activism. Federation also appears to have helped extend the duration of volunteer activism, as hypothesized by McCarthy and Zald (1977). They argue that federated structures are more
stable than isolated ones because of the ties formed among local volunteer activists. Even after the national offices of SANE and the Freeze were in decline, many local chapters remained strong and even grew in number of volunteer (and, in the Freeze, paid) activists. In contrast, when the national office of the EPC, an isolated organization, closed, so did all the local chapters.

**Mobilization and Deployment of Organizational Resources**

The peace groups' staff members raised funds to start the campaigns. The EPC had substantial startup funding, raised by a few pacifist staffers who enjoyed the trust of major Quaker donors. The initiators of the test ban and freeze campaigns had a harder time raising money at first. They did put together enough funds and other support from peace groups and elsewhere to hire a small staff and to publicize the campaign.

Outside resources are often but not always spent to hire professionals. Both the EPC and the NWFC national staff had large amounts of outside resources — the EPC from wealthy Quakers at the start of the campaign, the Freeze from foundations and major individual donors after the campaign gained momentum. EPC leaders used the funding in a traditionally professional way, mainly to hire staff at the national and several regional offices. Freeze staff and leaders emphasized nurturing grassroots activism. While some funds were used to hire new staff at the national office, many of these staff were involved in grassroots mobilization. They mailed informational and organizing material to local chapters and worked directly with local leaders by phone and in person. The mobilization and deployment of resources by the national NWFC seemed to encourage volunteer activism in numbers and in efficacy. Once leading Democratic politicians embraced the freeze proposal, however, the national office of the NWFC directed increasing attention to the national arena and devoted fewer resources (money and staff time) to supporting local groups. After the campaign met with key defeats including Reagan's re-election, foundation and major donor funding dried up and the support for local work from the national office further declined. Many locals had established community roots, however, and survived this period.

SANE's patterns of resource mobilization and allocation were similar to those of the NWFC. The national office for a time managed to bring in outside resources and so did not depend on local groups for financial support. In this way both SANE and the NWFC allowed local chapters to flourish, ultimately at the expense of national offices once outside funding declined. This was not a deliberate decision. Both national offices tried to get local chapters to make greater contributions, but neither was able or willing to act against those that did not or could not. Consequently volunteer activism was facilitated along several dimensions including numbers of activists and duration of activism, and, because of the strength of local chapters, rootedness and autonomy. However, while efficacy was at first strengthened by the rise of local chapters, it was also weakened by the decline of the national organizations, which was caused in part by unstable patterns of resource mobilization.

One cause of this instability was dependence on outside resources. SANE relied on small contributions — what Oliver (1983) calls an “external market.” These markets operate somewhat like commercial markets. The “producers” — organizations and movements — compete with each other to attract “consumers,” but consumer preferences change, often quickly (McCarthy and Zald 1977). SANE always had to struggle to find funding, but after the limited test ban treaty was ratified contributions dried up almost completely.

Both the EPC and the NWFC were less reliant on markets, as they had access to major donors. The EPC began with large contributions from wealthy Quakers, but EPC staff members feared these sponsors would resist any long-term commitment to the EPC on top of existing commitments to the core pacifist organizations. Even though sponsorship came from within the movement, it was not a stable source of funds over the long term. The Freeze,
after its takeoff, received major funding from foundations and individuals not usually part of the peace movement. This created two problems for volunteer activism. Like those coming from external markets of small contributors, the funds from external sponsors were unstable, declining dramatically after 1984. Second, they may have contributed to the campaign's moderation and institutionalization, which led to some demobilization of volunteer activism. This was not a simple effect — outside funds also enabled the NWFC clearinghouse to increase its help to local groups. However, Cockburn and Ridgeway (1983), Meyer (1990) and others argue that elites affiliated with the Democratic Party and with businesses adversely affected by the Reagan administration's policies became important sponsors of the campaign in key states like California, and nationally. They claim that this sponsorship contributed to the NWFC's increasing moderation of demands and focus on institutionalized strategies and tactics, including a de-emphasis on vigorous grassroots activism. This fits a pattern described by Jenkins (1987), who notes that elite sponsorship stems from a variety of motives, including attempts by segments of the elite to weaken rival elites through temporary alliances with movements. Professionals mediate this process by seeking out and attracting outside funding and then deploying it in ways that do not encourage, and may even discourage, volunteer activism.

Nonmaterial resources are also important. Training, mentioned previously, can be considered an intangible resource that staff can provide to volunteers. Training in organizational and political skills has a direct impact on volunteer effectiveness and has indirect effects on other aspects of volunteer activism. When organizations are effective, they are more likely to attract new volunteers, retain old ones, and motivate more intense activism. The EPC did not invest staff time in volunteer training. SANE's small national staff did not include any organizers, but several national staff members spent part of their time working with local groups and leaders on political and organizational skills. NWFC staff emphasized the importance of volunteer training. The organization employed a small organizing staff including two full-time traveling organizers and two clearinghouse-based field coordinators. Plans to expand the field program were frustrated by limited funds and by decisions to expand Washington, D.C. offices to manage Congressional lobbying. Both the NWFC and Freeze Voter, its associated political action committee, offered a variety of training workshops locally and at national meetings. The national organizations also encouraged local chapters to develop connections with other local activists and experts.

Conclusions

The picture of professional-volunteer relations that emerges from this analysis is more complex than that offered by the Weber-Michels oligarchy/bureaucracy model, Piven and Cloward's institutionalization scenario, the McCarthy and Zald substitution argument, or studies that find only substitution or facilitation. In all three campaign organizations, professionals in some ways facilitated volunteer activism in quality, quantity, or both. Peace movement professionals planned and initiated the campaigns, bringing new activists into the peace movement. In the antinuclear campaigns, volunteer activism was substantially autonomous and locally rooted, partly because of the plans and practices of national staff in terms of strategy, tactics, and resource allocation and distribution. However, through various means at different times in the campaigns, paid staff inhibited or helped erode volunteer activism.

The EPC did not bring many new activists into the peace movement, but it did motivate and enable some to increase the intensity of their activism. The quasi-volunteers who worked in the national office were movement activists who took subsistence jobs so that they could work full time for the EPC. Because of a desire to mobilize rapidly and a fear of creating
new organizational rivals, however, staff members constructed a top-down campaign organization that limited volunteer activism in numbers (new activists were not encouraged to join the campaign); autonomy and rootedness (local chapters were discouraged); and duration (the isolated EPC structure made it unlikely that local activism would continue once the national office closed).

Both SANE and the NWFC did mobilize thousands of volunteers new to peace activism, in part because movement professionals seized upon expanding political opportunities, developed campaigns with wide appeal, and mobilized startup resources. The freeze (as both organization and larger campaign) incorporated a much larger grassroots component than did SANE and the test ban campaign for several reasons. Some involve political opportunity and the state of the social movement sector. Some involve the actions of movement professionals. The peace movement professionals who founded and led SANE did not expect to head a grassroots-based campaign or organization and did not quickly adopt or adapt to grassroots-oriented strategies, tactics, or organizational structures once local activism increased. The founders and leaders (staff and volunteer) of the NWFC had a grassroots strategy from the start and they quickly developed facilitating tactics, organizational structures, and resource flows.

In both SANE and the NWFC, however, staff as well as volunteer actions contributed to an organizational structure best described as an incomplete and weak federation. The fragility of these structures was exposed after the campaigns encountered political setbacks. The ensuing organizational problems contributed to a lack of political efficacy that demoralized and demobilized many volunteer activists. Here, staff actions indirectly led to a loss of numbers and a decline in intensity and ultimately duration. They also had similar effects in more direct fashion — SANE’s response to red-baiting, the NWFC’s willingness incorporation into legislative and electoral politics. Note, however that the decline in numbers, intensity, and duration of grassroots activism was not caused by the rise of organizational oligarchy and bureaucracy, as the Weber-Michels model suggests is usually the case. Nor did volunteer activism decline in autonomy, as one would find in this scenario. After the campaigns peaked, local chapters of the NWFC and SANE (to a lesser extent because of chartering arrangements) were still highly autonomous. In both groups, the network of local chapters provided some check on centralization and bureaucratization.

Paid staff also substituted for volunteer activism, most obviously in the highly-professionalized EPC but to some extent with SANE and the NWFC. In each organization, for example, paid staff did much of the research, publicity, and lobbying. These are tasks that are suited to professional skills and work schedules, but they are not always done by professionals. Some organizations lack the funds to hire staff, others believe that grassroots activists are empowered by learning how to research issues, generate publicity, and lobby policymakers, and that they are ultimately more effective than professionals.

Understanding the complexities of volunteer activism and the variety of ways it is affected by professionalism strengthens the claim that it is more useful to talk not of universal laws but of tendencies and alternatives. In discovering and explaining patterns of professional influence on volunteer activism, one must look not just at organizational tendencies and political constraints but also at the plans and practices of professional and volunteer activists.

Discussion

The preceding observations focus on the dynamics of individual SMOs over single cycles of rising and falling mobilization. The analysis can be extended over both space and time. Spatially, the boundaries between different SMOs and between organizations and the non-organizational elements of social movements are often loose. While certain interactions only
occur within organizations, others go beyond. As discussed, the planning and leadership provided by professionals can have facilitating or inhibiting effects on volunteer activism outside of their specific movement organizations and outside of organizations altogether. This did happen in the peace campaigns, most strongly in the freeze campaign. The NWFC was the central organization of the larger nuclear freeze campaign, but activism went far beyond its bounds. The campaign peaked in the mid-1980s with as many as 10 million participants in 6,000 organizations, and still counted a half-million activists in 7,500 groups by the end of the decade (Lofland, Colwell, and Johnson 1990). From 1980 to 1988, more than 5,000 new peace organizations were established in the United States (Colwell 1989). Not all of this activism can be attributed to the actions of staff members of the peace groups and the NWFC, of course, but along with a favorable political opportunity structure and other factors, these actions certainly had some influence.

The effects of professionalism on volunteer activism may extend over time both within and outside of SMOs. As discussed, many studies have shown that whether or not volunteer activists leave a particular organization or movement, there may be long-term effects in their identities, beliefs, skills, networks, and on the larger culture that may lead to or inhibit future activism. Volunteer and quasi-volunteer activists with the EPC formed the core of the postwar generation of pacifists. Many students who left SANE and the Student Peace Union (SPU) became active in civil rights and student movements in the 1960s. The long-term effects of the nuclear freeze campaign, if any, are yet to be seen. In all these cases, the influences of professionals on volunteer activists extend beyond the decline of the specific campaign.

Because these campaigns represent the peacetime peaks of a movement during a fifty-year period, comparative analysis can also identify continuities and changes over time in professional-volunteer relations. Two key changes across the campaign organizations are the quantitative increase in volunteer activism and a qualitative increase in autonomy and rootedness. Changes in these trends in the plans and practices of professionals account for some part of these changes. From the EPC to the test ban campaign, the key facilitating changes in professionalism were in the sense negative ones — those aspects of professionalism that inhibited grassroots activism in the EPC were diminished or absent during the test ban campaign. Peace groups in the mid-1950s were simply too weak to sponsor and to tightly control a major campaign, and so movement professionals left the field open to emerging grassroots activists. From the test ban to the freeze, however, the major facilitating change in professionalism was more positive — professionals were more interested in mobilizing grassroots activism.

McCarthy and Zald (1973) were probably right in noting the growth of outside resources and social movement professionals when they observed an increase in PSMOs. However, another set of trends taking place simultaneously may have contributed to the increased vitality of grassroots activism, which, as this and other studies have shown, is not inimical to a rise in professionalism. A key theme found in the civil rights, New Left, women’s, antinuclear, community organizing, and other movements of the 1960s was the importance of individual empowerment and participation. A generation of activists was strongly influenced by this theme. Some became movement professionals and continued to look for ways to promote grassroots activism. Some wound up in the core peace groups such as the American Friends Service Committee (Pagar 1988) and helped shape the NWFC (Price 1990). Others became active in continuing efforts at community organizing, efforts that Boyte (1980) and others claim may slowly lead to major changes in patterns of political participation and efficacy. A growth in movement professionalism does not necessarily produce a decline in grassroots activism; it may even facilitate an increase along several dimensions of volunteer activism.

5. James Mullin (former Assistant Director, Emergency Peace Campaign), May 5, 1989, Iowa City, Iowa, personal communication.
As these comparisons show, the relations between professionals and volunteers are governed not just by resources or political opportunity, but also by the values and strategies of movement professionals. It is important to identify trends in the numbers of movement professionals and the resources available to them. It is equally important to analyze what they do with these resources and why, and with what effects on volunteer activism. All of these analyses will require recognition of both professionalism and volunteer activism as complex, multidimensional phenomena connected by several means of influence.

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