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Jacques Delors and European Integration, by G. Ross

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ing the potential global implications of the democratic peace.

Although succeeding chapters address a somewhat eclectic collection of topics, Ray skillfully manages to weave them together into a single fabric. For example, early on he concedes that the democratic peace may indeed be vulnerable to the charge that wars between democracies are rarely observed in history simply because both democracies and wars are themselves so exceedingly rare. Yet, this concession is a strategic one, for once made it immediately elevates the significance of any possible exceptions to the strict claim that democracies have never waged war against one another. Ray then considers a long list of reported exceptions, all of which fail to qualify as wars or democracies (or both) under his carefully stipulated definitions. Definitions are the crux of the matter, of course, and while Ray admittedly crafts his definitions to produce the desired outcome, the definitions he devises are in the end neither strained nor unreasonable.

The case studies in chapter 5 are also tied to the statistical rarity of wars and democracies, albeit in a somewhat different manner. It is precisely because democratic wars are not very likely under any circumstances that aggregate statistical evidence must be supplemented “with insights and persuasive power that can be generated only by intensive analyses of individual cases” (p. 207). The cases under analysis have been cleverly chosen to form a most similar systems comparison of two international disputes from 1898, one involving two democracies (France and Britain) that narrowly avoided war (Fashoda) and the other involving a democracy (United States) and a marginally nondemocratic opponent (Spain) that did result in war. Ray structures his comparison as a “pseudo-experiment” in order to fix attention on the numerous factors other than democracy that might plausibly account for the differing outcomes. There is much to admire in Ray’s deft handling of his two cases. Here, as elsewhere, he carefully considers all sides of the available historical evidence and prudently qualifies his assertions where necessary. This chapter also stands as a methodological exemplar of how case studies and statistical findings can mutually reinforce each other.

Not every chapter is quite so tightly integrated to the theme, however. The most transparent example is chapter 4, which is devoted entirely to the methodological justification of case studies. Few will quarrel with Ray’s treatment of this issue—it is a superbly integrated statement of the widely held view that judiciously constructed case studies and statistical analyses are complementary. In fact, this chapter stands virtually on its own and could well serve as a valuable methodological resource for students and others employing case studies in their own research. Still, one wonders whether so extensive a treatment was really necessary in this particular context.

Questions of relevance may also arise with regard to Ray’s analysis of regime transitions (chap. 2). Here Ray employs an innovative procedure to disentangle state-level from systemic-level effects on global regime changes. The main point about regime change is plain enough: If democracy implies peaceful relations with other democracies and if more states are turning toward democracy, then the world should become a more peaceful place. This is indeed a profound statement, with implications of immense proportions, which is obviously relevant to the democratic peace and surely is one reason why the issue has so captured the attention of scholars and policymakers alike. What is not quite so plain, at least in the context of the democratic peace, is why it matters whether regime transitions are governed by system-level or state-level forces. Ray seems to be suggesting that the global ramifications of the democratic peace are on a more precarious footing if state-level factors dominate. Yet, why this must be so is never made entirely clear.

This is a book with something of genuine value for anyone seriously interested in democracy or international conflict and should be essential reading for those conversant in the contemporary debate over the democratic peace. The questions Ray addresses are among the most important of our time, and, while he does not provide all the answers, he does offer us many fresh insights and new ways of thinking intelligently about them. Those who have already made up their minds on the democratic peace may well find certain of his arguments disconcerting, but in the end this is a small price to pay for the book’s rich rewards.


Leon Hurwitz, *Cleveland State University*

Five hundred years after the Europeans discovered and began to form a New World in the Americas, they have set out to rediscover and reorganize their Old World at home. The 1957 Treaty of Rome, building upon the 1951 Treaty of Paris (the European Coal and Steel Community), established the European Economic Community (the predecessor of the European Community/European Union). As refined by subsequent treaties (most notably the Single European Act of 1987 and the Treaty on European Union [the “Maastricht Treaty”]) and combined with the current intergovernmental conference, this initiative shows that Western Europe represents the best example of regional interdependence, the enhancement of the management of international cooperation, and the harmonization of certain public policies. Although there have been many management failures in the past, it is the European Community/European Union that has enjoyed the most success in regional economic—and political—integration and the management of international cooperation.

George Ross’s study of Jacques Delors and European integration could not have appeared at a more timely moment. The intergovernmental conference, with its year-long deliberations over the operationalization of the Maastricht Treaty, opened in Turin in late March 1996. The final decisions reached at this conference will no doubt be a surrogate measure of Jacques Delors’s legacy.

The book is a rather detailed account of the author’s six-month sojourn as a “participant observer” in the cabinet of European Commission President Jacques Delors at (the now nonfunctional) Berlaymont in Brussels and places elsewhere during the first half of 1991. Unfortunately, and the following comments are the only negative ones offered, Professor Ross appears to have fallen prey to the flaw endemic to this methodology: the participant-observer arrives home with so much material that it is usually very difficult or even impossible to discard even one notecard or cassette. The trivial for the outsider becomes the significant for the researcher; the amusing but unnecessary anecdote becomes empirical analysis; the mundane becomes a matter of state and high politics. It is as if the researcher believes that if seen (or heard or recorded or thought), the information must therefore be published.

This book does not escape this criticism; a few examples will suffice: people “bark” orders; the seating arrangements around a table are described along with the wine service;
states of mind and motives are imputed; lunches are characterized as "gloomy" (the food? the people? the conversation? the bill?); even the weather does not go unnoticed (it was a "cold and foggy" day). Perhaps the best (worst) example of this occurs when Professor Ross describes some intellectual (or lack thereof), physical, and personal characteristics of some former commission members: "Manuel Marin, the Commission matinee idol (he was a young and handsome man), was unpredictable and moody." (p. 160). Would that participants refrain from publishing such observations!

These comments aside, the book is a fascinating treasure for those among us who care about international integration, the European Union, decision-making processes, and the individuals who are involved. Although Professor Ross is quite respectful of Jacques Delors, the book is not hagiography—some of the warts and pimples are revealed. The author writes that Jacques Delors "is the most successful Commission leader in the history of the Community" (pp. 14-15). I agree, but I would go one step beyond George Ross. Jacques Delors’s success transcends the commission, and he will join the select group of those who rediscovered Europe (e.g., Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Walter Hallstein, Paul-Henri Spaak, Maurice Faure, Gaetano Martino, Joseph Bech, and J. W. Beyen).

Jacques Delors arrived at the European Commission at a time of "Euro-pessimism" and "Euro-sclerosis" but through several bold initiatives (e.g., the Single European Act, Maastricht, the Common Security and Foreign Policy, enlargement, European Monetary Union) he reinvigorated the process through economic liberalism while maintaining and strengthening Europe’s social uniqueness. The union that Jacques Delors left to his successors is different—vastly different—from the one he found in the mid-1980s: a union of 15 with as many as 25 additional countries camped on Brussels’s doorstep.

There still remains a host of unresolved issues—issues that the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference has on its agenda: widening versus deepening; relations with the rest of Europe; the Common Security and Foreign Policy; a new institutional framework; voting procedures; common or harmonized policies regarding police cooperation, immigration taxes, and welfare; European Monetary Union with its "Euro-Fed" and a single currency; the democratic deficit.

But perhaps even more crucial to the future of Europe than these issues and having a link to how the future will assess the contributions of Jacques Delors is the very nature that the integration process will assume. There are at least three models:

(1) Europe "a la carte"—each member state can pick and choose the specific public policies to which it will adhere and from which it will opt out (or, as the British claim with monetary union, the ones it will opt into). This model by its very nature denies the longstanding tradition of accepting the acquis communautaire.

(2) Europe "at different speeds"—certain core countries will be the vanguard of achieving new levels of integration (e.g., the monetary union and a single currency) with the laggards slowly, but eventually, catching up.

(3) Europe "on a bicycle"—all 15 (or 20 or 30 or 40) must pedal together at the same speed in a forward direction or the entire infrastructure will crash.

George Ross writes (p. 16) that Jacques Delors was an aficionado of cycling in his youth.

Towards a New Europe: Stops and Starts in Regional Integration. Edited by Gerald Schneider, Patricia Weitsman, and Thomas Bernauer. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. 240p. $55.00.

Robert Leonardi, London School of Economics

This book tries to break new ground in the study of the European Union (EU). In the past, studies of the EU have either been extremely descriptive in nature (based on the assumption that the reader knew nothing about European integration) or bogged down in the debate between intergovernmentalists and comparativists over how the EU should be studied. The contributions contained in Towards a New Europe break through this intellectual logjam by advocating and showing how the study of the politics and policies of the EU can be grounded in more rigorous, mathematical formulations of spatial models. As the editors state in the concluding chapter, the study of the EU needs to be placed on more rigorous research ground if we are ever to move toward a future when research will become cumulative and the assumptions behind the research will be rendered explicit.

The authors have done a superb job in illustrating the types of models that can be used to study the decision-making process associated with the issues of expansion of members as the European Union contemplates its future after the year 2000 (the Cederman, Pahre, and Mattli chapters), the role in the overall decision-making process in which the European Parliament plays an increasingly important part (Tserebes), and the logic associated with the future selection of Europe’s central bankers (Martin). These chapters are combined with two chapters dealing with issues tangential, but complementary, to the study of the EU: the nature of Swiss federalism ("Switzerland—Still a Paradigmatic Case?" by Hug and Sciarini) and the future of NATO ("Full Membership or Full Club? Expansion of NATO and the Future Security Organization of Europe" by Bernauer).

Despite the innovative approach, the book is less successful in producing genuinely new research results. It is not clear how the models proposed can be used, above and beyond the few cases and the limited period cited in the chapters. What can the proposed models tell us about other periods when decisions at the European level were taken under a different set of rules and when the alternatives available to national governments in the realm of sectoral policies were based on a significantly different set of assumptions? A model is of value when it allows us to understand a wide variety of cases, rather than only the few cases discussed in these chapters.

In reading the book I was reminded of the vast literature on modeling in the field of econometrics and evaluation studies. The theoretical work is illuminating in its formal, mathematical structure, but it is much less satisfactory when one tries to use the models to understand the empirical reality. Either the models are so complex that they take into account everything (thereby making it difficult to elaborate parsimonious conclusions) or the operationalization of the models is so narrow that very little is added to our knowledge of empirical reality.

The lack of a thorough empirical testing of the models proposed here is one of the shortcomings of the book. Scholars of the EU will pick up this book with the expec-