1981

Cities Within a City : On Changing Cleveland's Government

Burt W. Griffin

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On Changing
Cleveland's Government

By Burt W. Griffin

College of
Urban Affairs
Cleveland State University
Special Reports in Urban Affairs Series

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Mike:
Best wishes in all
your endeavors.

Burt Griffin

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Foreword

Cities Within A City: On Changing Cleveland's Government is the first in a series of Special Reports in Urban Affairs to be published by the College of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State University. The publication series is designed to stimulate public discussion on urban issues that have particular timeliness and relevance for the Greater Cleveland community.

Burt W. Griffin, Judge of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, sets forth in this book one proposal for improving the efficiency and responsiveness of Cleveland city government. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author. Publication of this book does not constitute endorsement by either Cleveland State University or the College of Urban Affairs of those views and opinions. Rather, it represents a judgment that the ideas contained in this book deserve to be tested in the marketplace through broader dissemination and discussion of them.

By initiating publication of urban affairs issues papers, the College of Urban Affairs hopes to establish an effective means of exchanging information, experience, and knowledge between the academic community and urban practitioners. This is certainly in keeping with its role of fostering public awareness and discussion of issues of importance to our urban community.

David C. Sweet
Dean
College of Urban Affairs

A Practical Focus

Judge Griffin has put forward a practical political analysis of Cleveland's city government that is long overdue. During the 33 years that I have served as mayor of the suburb of Brooklyn, I have watched Cleveland steadily decay within an arm's reach of the border of my own city.

Many Cleveland residents have moved from their homes to Brooklyn and other Cleveland suburbs in search of the basic services they could not find from their own city administration. In talking to many of these "transplanted Clevelanders," it becomes obvious they left the city to regain a control over their life-styles.

They want a mayor they can talk to about dogs and trash. They want clean and quiet streets. They want places to shop, neighbors and landlords who maintain properties, and convenient recreation for both themselves and their children.

They want efficient management of public servants and a city council who will work to keep taxes low and services of high quality. They want an independent city council that looks to the mayor for leadership to achieve these priorities.

All too often, the importance of business in a city's implementation of these priorities is overlooked. Without a healthy business base, taxes would be higher and services less efficient. And in a successful city government, business interests will reinforce these residential priorities.

The challenge of a mayor today is to build a working coalition of these forces – residents, elected officials, city employees and business leaders. And the key to such a coalition is communication.

The development of this communication rests usually in the office of the mayor. My 33-year tenure has taught me that communication is most efficiently fueled with an open door. The door to my office remains open during business hours to any constituent – resident, council member or businessman – and I have found this to be valuable in airing community opinion feelings. Through this effort, I am able to hear and then see that these complaints are corrected.

This close working relationship with the city lends itself most efficiently to a small government unit and thus I personally can testify to the proposals that Judge Griffin puts forth in this book.

Judge Griffin has done a great service by focusing on these practical problems of time, talk, oversight and power. My hope is that this book will not become just another adornment on the political bookshelf. Those who look towards a regional or a restructured county government as a solution for the City of Cleveland's problems will be interested in the many innovative outlooks in this book. Judge Griffin argues that smaller government units – not larger units – will provide the direction for the future of Cleveland. And this makes all too much sense.

The direction that Judge Griffin outlines provides a framework that Cleveland and all major urban cities should take to heart if we ever expect to get our money's worth from government.

John M. Coyne, Mayor
City of Brooklyn, Ohio
January 1981

Introduction

The central idea of this book is that, for a large, decaying, century-old core city within a metropolitan population of a million and a half, a centralized governmental authority is inherently unable to render efficient and effective service. For such a central city, smaller units of government are more efficient, more responsive, and more democratic. That idea arose out of personal experiences from 1966 to 1975 when I was a Legal Aid Society lawyer representing community organizations in Cleveland's inner city neighborhoods. As I have listened to the proponents of regional government, I have been unimpressed that regionalization would deal with the realities of life or public administration in the City of Cleveland as I observed them during those years.

In the spring of 1979, I had occasion to challenge the popular panacea of regional government. I was pleasantly surprised to find my ideas endorsed by Richard Knight, an urban economist at Cleveland State University. His encouragement caused me to read Lewis Mumford. From Mumford's work and Knight's support, I gained the confidence to put on paper what at first I thought would be regarded as an absurd idea.

In June of 1979, I delivered the basic ideas of this book as a speech to the annual meeting of the Area Councils Association of Cleveland. A week later a revised version of that speech was published in the *Cleveland Press*. The response to the speech and article led me to realize that I was not alone in thinking that restructuring the City of Cleveland into a federation of smaller cities might be a genuine step toward better government for the central city. Radio Station WCLV carried a week-long editorial endorsing the idea; the General Manager of the Sun Newspapers wrote to me in support of the concept; and the editor of the *Cleveland Press* wrote a column urging serious inquiry into the idea.

When Prof. Everett Cataldo of Cleveland State University's Political Science faculty and Dr. David Sweet of Cleveland State University's College of Urban Affairs invited me to state my views at a seminar on various government reorganizational alternatives, I embarked seriously on the research reflected in this book. I searched the academic and public affairs literature dealing with

decentralization of municipal government. I visited Cleveland's neighborhoods and personally spoke with the Cleveland residents mentioned in the following chapters. I put all of that together with my twenty years in local public and civil service and with my recollections of growing up in Cleveland to produce the factual data about Cleveland reported in this book.

I am indebted to a host of people for their insights, comments, and information. I will name a few: Judge Joseph McManamon, former Safety Director of the City of Cleveland; Clarence L. James, Jr., former Law Director of the City of Cleveland; Kenneth McGovern, former Assistant Director of Community Development for the City of Cleveland; William Silverman, Jr., a consultant on urban problems to Cleveland Mayors Ralph Locher, Carl Stokes, and Ralph Perk; Norman Krumholz, former Director of City Planning for the City of Cleveland; Claude Banks, President of the Hough Area Development Corporation; Cleveland City Councilmen Terence Copeland, Leonard Danilowicz, and James Rokakis; Assistant Cleveland Law Director Stuart Friedman; Nancy Cronin of the Women's Political Caucus; John Armstrong and Raymond Danilowicz of the Area Councils Association; Joseph Piggott, President of University Circle, Inc.; Mayor Walter Kelley of Shaker Heights; Professors John Burke, Thomas F. Campbell, Everett Cataldo, and Richard Knight of Cleveland State University; Dr. Ralph Brody of the Federation for Community Planning; Mark H. Masse, former Project Administrator for the Greater Rochester Intergovernmental Panel; Fred McGunagle of the *Cleveland Press*; Ted S. Hiser of Cleveland State University's Urban Recovery Project; and Gerald H. Gordon, General Manager of the Sun Newspapers.

Support from people such as Brooklyn's Mayor John Coyne and Cleveland Press Editor Tom Boardman has encouraged me to publish these ideas in book form.

Basic statistical information has been supplied to me by the Governmental Research Institute in Cleveland, although the calculations and any attendant errors are mine. To Errol Kwait I owe thanks for the opportunity to discuss London's city government with a member of London's Westminster Common Council. I am also grateful to Kenneth Whitfield, Assistant Director of Planning for the City of Toronto, who spent part of a day explaining to me the social and political environment for Metropolitan Toronto's two-tiered municipal government. Staff of the Cleveland Public

Library have been extremely cooperative in directing me to the library's materials on Cleveland history and in securing inter-library loans.

Cleveland State University has been generous in its staff assistance. Susann Bowers's and Emily Mirsky's editorial and design skills have been provided. Linda Berger has coordinated the seemingly infinite details of publication. Others at CSU have helped with maps and line drawings.

Michael Andrzejewski, who has spent hours photographing sites for this book and who has also contributed from his personal collection of prize winning photographs, deserves a special commendation.

To Mary Jo Maloney and Kathleen Jacobs, I am indebted for assistance and indulgence in typing the final manuscript and its various preliminary drafts.

Funds to publish this book have been supplied by Cleveland State University, College of Urban Affairs. To all I express my gratitude.

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Burt W. Griffin
January 1981

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St. Stanislaus as seen from Osmond Court.

A view of Cleveland industry from the Tremont area.

A young Near West Side resident.

Looking east at East 105th and Euclid.

Chapter 1

Big City Neighbors in Action

"In the last few years, we have learned one thing clearly – no one is going to do anything for us. If we want to have a cleaner, safer, more livable neighborhood, we must do it ourselves. The federal government won't do it for us, and City Hall won't act without pressure from us."

More than 500 Near West Side neighbors listened to this outspoken criticism and bitterly agreed. The speaker was Tom Wagner, president of Near West Side Neighbors in Action, a community organization on Cleveland's Near West Side. The date was March 29, 1980. The recent election of a new mayor had not altered the conviction of Tom Wagner that, for Clevelanders, neighborhood revival and neighborhood survival depended more on sustained resident action than on a change in local politicians.

Wagner reminded the gathering that their organization had already outlived the political tenure of two mayors and five local councilmen since it had first emerged as the Ohio City Block Club Association. He praised the audience for the successive wars they had waged to rid the neighborhood of rats, dogs, arsonists, and abandoned cars. Then he grimly reminded them that continued neighborhood improvements required continual effort by every last resident of the area.

The Near West Side Neighbors in Action were meeting to consider policy resolutions for the ensuing twelve months. The resolutions sounded like a work program for a small city government:

- trees should be planted along I-90 to shield adjacent homes;
- police should improve the pick-up of abandoned cars, drunks in neighborhood parks, and debris in alleys;
- scooter patrols should be placed on local streets;
- vacant and vandalized houses should be torn down;
- a neighborhood-wide "Spring Clean Up" campaign should be organized in which city government should participate;
- potholes should be filled;
- street lighting and street signs should be added;

- trees should be planted on tree lawns; and sidewalks should be repaired;
- certain businesses which emit noxious odors should be prevented from polluting the neighborhood;
- the Dog Warden should institute a patrol to remove stray dogs.

Although this was an agenda for a city council, the Near West Side is not a city. Its boundaries are not printed on any city map. The Near West Side contains all of Ward 8 and parts of Wards 3 and 5. No councilman or state representative serves all of the Near West Side. No city department acknowledges its boundaries. Yet its residents know its dimensions.

The Near West Side begins at the west base of the Cuyahoga Valley and extends farther west to West 65th Street. On the south, it is bounded by Interstate 90, and on the north by Lake Erie. Within its boundaries live nearly 40,000 people of diverse backgrounds—many of Latin descent, Appalachians, American Indians, Italian-Americans, Polish-Americans, Blacks, Catholics, Baptists.

Lately, young white gentry have been moving into Tom Wagner's neighborhood, Ohio City. But nearby live the poor in public housing—high rise units for the elderly at Riverview and low rises for families at Lakeview Terrace. Despite their own diversity Near West Siders have more in common with each other than with the 550,000 Cleveland residents spread out over the city's many square miles. They share a common physical environment. Their dependence on common institutions for recreation, retail goods, and cultural activities binds them together.

Their physical environment is a product of Cleveland's prosperity before World War I. Manufacturing plants abound in the Near West Side, but houses are not protected from industry. Many of these houses were built before Henry Ford created the family car. At that time, few thought to build buffer zones to separate areas of industrial, commercial, institutional, or residential use. In large sections of the Near West Side, 75 percent or more of the houses lack garages. Many do not even have driveways. Cars are parked, repaired, and abandoned on residential streets. As many as three or four single or two-story frame houses are situated on thirty-foot-wide lots, one directly behind the other. Front doors open almost directly onto sidewalks. These houses have no noticeable front yards, back yards, or side yards.

A view of West 38th Street, south of Lorain.

In other parts of the Near West Side, the houses might once have been called mansions. They are remnants of the Near West Side's affluent turn-of-the-century past. Three stories tall, they boast beveled and stained glass doorways and spacious front porches. Some even have coach houses. In these neighborhoods, there are still beautifully designed, richly appointed churches to remind residents of the area's fleeting era as a community of the rich.

The Near West Side was built before zoning was a factor in city development. Now its houses without yards or garages, its many stores without parking lots, and its many alleys impose a lifestyle on both rich and poor, newcomer or lifelong resident that is almost totally unknown to the blacks in Lee-Harvard or those of Slovenian descent near Neff Road. A Hough resident, faced with the physical obsolescence of the Near West Side, would be certain that he was the victim of racial discrimination. Many Hough families can still strive for a suburban life style in a central city setting.

Not so, however, on the Near West Side. There, it is physically impossible for most families to have outdoor swing sets for children. Schools do not have grass-covered playgrounds. For most residents, churches and settlement houses, not schools or city facilities, are the only sources of culture and recreation within easy walking distance.

Some of the Near West Side neighbors for whom Tom Wagner and his organization have attempted to speak live in a block bounded on the north by Lorain Avenue, on the south by Brough Avenue, on the east by West 38th Street, and on the west by West 41st Street. Probably none of the houses in that block had a market value in 1978 in excess of $25,000. Some were worth as little as $10,000. Most were valued between $12,000 and $17,000.

The houses were typically constructed between 1880 and 1900 when the area was part of Old Brooklyn. Most front doors are virtually on the sidewalk. There are few front yards, and back yards, if any, are usually quite small. Side yards are often just narrow strips. Lots range irregularly from 30 to 60 feet in width, and only an occasional lot has a garage. Alleyways lace the block.

Near the Lorain end of the block is a factory building occupied by Arrow Publicity Company and Ray-Craft, Inc. The building faces on no street, although its address is listed as 2067 West 41st Street. Access to the building is from an alley that passes the homes of Delphine Dotson and Albert Kish. Altogether, ten residences are on properties that bound this factory on three sides. It is easily seen above the tops of the houses.

Tom Wagner and his friends are concerned about the needs and aspirations of the residents near that factory. Delphine Dotson, Albert Kish, and Mark and Bernice Mikolic are representative of the range of needs and aspirations of people who lived near the factory in the summer of 1980.

Albert Kish is the oldest. He is a retired Great Lakes fishing captain. Divorced, he was born in the neighborhood and has lived there for over twenty years on the alley that leads to the factory building. His mother came from Hungary. Mr. Kish is a renter living on Social Security. His home is clean but spartan.

Actually, Mr. Kish lives in one part of a long one story frame dwelling. Another single man has the other end. Mr. Kish's portion is no more than twenty by thirty feet. He has three rooms — a living room, kitchen, bedroom and lavatory without a bath. He keeps clean by sponge bathing and by using his neighbor's bathtub. Every spare inch of land is devoted to his garden in which he grows carrots, beans, tomatoes, cabbage and other vegetables. Mr. Kish says his garden is important to meeting the cost of living. He cannot afford a rent increase or any other addition to his cost of living.

Albert Kish at his garden gate with factory building in background.

Not far from Albert Kish live Mr. and Mrs. Delphine Dotson at 2055 West 41st Street. The Dotsons own the largest home on the block – an attractive three story, ten room brick house on a 60 x 125 foot lot, that, if it had a garage, might be worth $80,000 or more in most suburbs.

Mr. Dotson was born in West Virginia but came to work in Cleveland nearly 30 years ago. He has lived near his present home during most of his years in Cleveland. In 1978, at age 50, he retired based on accumulated seniority from factory work at the Ford Motor Company.

The Dotsons are the largest residential land owners on West 41st Street. Besides their ten room home, they own two houses on a single lot immediately adjacent to their home and another house farther south on the street. Mr. Dotson's mother lives in one of the houses and a son lives in another. Mr. Dotson plans to remodel the houses next to him.

He has no intention of returning to work as someone else's employee. He fully intends to enjoy life by tending to a large vegetable garden in the rear of his home and improving his properties. He loves the neighborhood, considers himself a Clevelander, would not live in any other neighborhood, and fully expects the neighborhood to improve.

Mr. and Mrs. Dotson live immediately north of the Arrow Publicity Company's factory building. Mr. Kish lives immediately west of it. Immediately to the south of the factory are three houses on a single lot fronting on West 38th Street. The three houses contain five families – some related. The buildings are owned by a Lakewood resident; all occupants are renters, but some have been there over 20 years. Across the street, a few houses toward Lorain Avenue, live Mark and Bernice Mikolic.

The Mikolics are in their 20's and have two daughters. The youngest was five in 1980 and ready for kindergarten.

Bernice Mikolic was born in Georgia but grew up in the Collinwood area when her parents moved to Cleveland. She met her husband, Mark, while in high school. At that time, Mark lived near East 71st and St. Clair Avenue.

In 1978, the Mikolics bought their house on West 38th Street for less than $15,000. Theirs is one of the few lots with enough rear yard for a swing-set. They expect to send their children to Orchard Elementary School, three blocks away, which, because of the Spanish and black population in the neighborhood, is integrated. They hope that the Federal Court will accept the natural integration of the neighborhood and not impose unnecessary busing of school children.

What most concerned the Mikolics in 1980 were neighborhood rowdies, unsupervised children, and the misuse of vacant lots. The lot next to them has been empty because the house on it burned. That fire damaged their own home. They would like to acquire the lot, which is tax delinquent. They can't do it because the City of Cleveland has not completed legal proceedings on the delinquency.

The problem of parental supervision of children extends to the very young as well as to teenagers. The block club to which the Mikolics belong wants Cleveland City Council to enact an ordinance that would permit the police to ticket parents whose children are in violation of Cleveland's curfew ordinance. There is a belief that if parents were fined for not controlling their children, children would be off the streets at night and better behaved.

Perhaps the greatest toll taken by uncontrolled children is seen at the Greenwood swimming pool two blocks away from the Mikolics on their own street. Mrs. Mikolic is concerned both about rowdy children and about broken glass at the pool.

The owners of Greenwood Pool.

In the summer of 1980, Greenwood pool was surrounded by debris and minor destruction. This is distinctly a neighborhood pool. It is approximately Olympic size – not one of the mammoth outdoor pools that one sees in the suburbs or at the large Cleveland parks. Its location makes it invisible except to those who live in the Mikolics' neighborhood. If neighborhood residents could control the pool and those around it, they would enjoy the comfort of a country club.

Instead, the young rowdies have wreaked destruction upon the pool, and adults tend to stay away. There is a gaping hole in the cyclone fence surrounding the pool. The hole is wonderful for freebooters but could cause a liability problem to the City if someone were to be injured in the pool after hours. Since anyone can enter the pool area through the hole at night to socialize, the bottom and deck of the pool often have broken glass – another safety hazard.

The block shared by the Mikolics, the Dotsons, and Mr. Kish is one on which many residents work hard to preserve and improve their own property and neighborhood. The City of Cleve-

land's most valuable asset has become an eyesore and a safety hazard. Orchard School is surrounded by paved land and is not geared toward play. The responsible residents are hard pressed to gain public support so that civilized standards can be enforced on all residents.

In 1965, the neighborhood was designated by Cleveland's anti-poverty agency—the Council for Economic Opportunity in Greater Cleveland—as one of Cleveland's poorest areas. At the time when the agency's main west side office was located at West 35th and Lorain Avenue, the area was lily white, crime ridden, and declining. Today it is integrated, and the neighborhood is favorably situated directly adjacent to the West 41st Street entrance to I-90. Successful antique stores have opened nearby on Lorain Avenue. There are noticeable signs of commercial re-investment in that sector of Lorain Avenue.

What no resident can predict or immediately affect is the future of the Arrow Publicity Company's factory building. When the factory becomes economically useless to its present occupants—a virtual certainty over time—what will its re-use be? Will it revert to a residential use? Or will the proximity to I-90 and prosperity on Lorain Avenue bring a new business venture? Will the new use enhance or detract from the investments of the Dotsons and the Mikolics? Does anyone at City Hall care? Does anyone at City Hall even know that the factory building directly touches the residential life of a dozen families?

Mr. Kish, the Dotsons, and the Mikolics very much need the help of groups like Near West Side Neighbors In Action. The Dotsons and Mikolics, in particular, are investors. They are not community activists. They have made relatively low cost investments which they don't want to lose and which could increase greatly if their neighborhood improved. They are essentially enthusiastic about their neighborhood. Life on the Near West Side provides many highly desirable amenities at a low investment. They have vegetable gardens, tree-lined streets, proximity to shops, jobs and downtown, a public swimming pool, churches, and a neighborhood elementary school. They need Near West Side Neighbors in Action to help keep their life improving and their investment increasing. They are not certain that they can count on city government to share their views. They need a strong spokesman for their residential interests.

Community Organizations and Neighborhood Leaders

The Near West Side Neighbors is one of at least five such coalitions of street clubs, tenants associations, home owners associations, and neighborhood civic associations that have arisen in Cleveland since 1974. The historic Slovenian-Croatian community between East 40th Street and Liberty Boulevard is the domain of the St. Clair-Superior Coalition. From East 80th to Shaker Square and from Woodland to Kinsman, the Buckeye-Woodland Community Congress has staked its turf. Further to the south is the territory of the Union-Miles Coalition. Closer to downtown along the industrial valley, the Citizens to Bring Back Broadway are similarly engaged.

Utilizing many of the principles of Chicago's famed Saul Alinsky, these organizations focus on very local issues and employ confrontation as a primary technique to command action from government and businesses. Although their membership encompasses many low-income residents and their style is aggressive, their leadership is decidedly middle-class. All share the Near West Side's conviction that local government will not address special neighborhood needs without strong pressure. They have adopted the philosophy of the anti-poverty organizers of the sixties and put it to use on behalf of all residents in a particular neighborhood.

These Alinsky-like community organizations are the most recent array of neighborhood associations that began evolving in Cleveland before World War II. The oldest associations are less strident but not quiet. Their names are known to many – the Euclid Park Civic Club, the Glenville Area Council, the Hough Area Council, the Forest City Park Civic Association, the Lee-Harvard Community Council, the Mt. Pleasant Community Council, the Southwest Civic Association, the Waterloo Beach Homeowner's Association to mention a few. For decades they have pushed for better city services, and many city council representatives first gained supporters by service in those organizations.

With the growth of federal funding for neighborhood development in the 1960s, a third family of neighborhood organizations has also emerged in Cleveland. These call themselves community development corporations. The Old Brooklyn Community Development Corporation, the Hough Area Development Corporation, the Detroit Shoreway Development Corporation, and the Southeast Economic Development Corporation are in that

number. They are not confrontational. They build alliances between businesses and homeowners. A primary purpose is to construct and rehabilitate buildings. Their leadership, nonetheless, is like those of the old neighborhood associations and the new confrontation groups. It is resident leadership.

The Real Cleveland

All of those organizations serve the real Cleveland. The real Cleveland is the Near West Side, Hough, Euclid Park, and the multitude of other residential areas within the city limits. The residents of the real Cleveland are people like Delphine Dotson, Albert Kish, and the Mikolics. The civic leaders are citizens like Tom Wagner. The civic organizations for real Clevelanders are the many neighborhood coalitions, neighborhood associations, community development corporations, and street clubs that few suburbanites know.

Downtown is a symbol for the Cleveland metropolitan region, but it is only a small part of the real Cleveland. Downtown may belong more to suburbanites than to real Clevelanders. Real Clevelanders do not own the land downtown. The Citizens League, the City Club of Cleveland, and the Greater Cleveland Growth Association are not the civic structures for real Clevelanders.

City government as viewed by real Clevelanders is mostly concerned with delivering municipal services to their doorsteps or neighborhoods. Unless those functions are performed reliably and efficiently, no city government will be deemed a success.

For nearly two decades, the message real Clevelanders have been sending about their city government is that it is a failure. They have delivered that message by protests and sit-ins at City Hall, by electing five different mayors in 15 years, by regularly defeating incumbent council representatives, by refusing to work for any tax levies, and by voting for increased taxes only when city government has reached the brink of bankruptcy.

This book is about how the real Cleveland evolved to such a state, how its municipal government actually functions, and how city government might be better structured to earn the support and meet the needs of real Clevelanders.

Chapter 2

A Century of Cleveland Local Government

What is the governmental structure of Cleveland with which city residents must deal? Constitutionally, Cleveland has had a mayor elected at large every two years, 33 council members elected every two years from single member districts, nine municipal court judges each elected city-wide to six year terms, and a clerk of court who is also elected by the city voters as a whole.

The mayor and council oversee and make policy for a vast array of facilities and services – an electric power distribution facility, a water purification and distribution system, two airports, a convention hall, music hall, municipal stadium, swimming pools, over 50 parks and playfields, a nursery for trees and shrubs, health clinics, maintenance garages for vehicles, a corrections facility for alcoholics and minor offenders, retail markets, a dog pound, more than 200 different buildings, 1800 police officers, and hundreds each of firemen, waste collectors, and maintenance personnel. In the private sector, nearly every one of those functions is often performed by some organization for profit, but no private sector organization attempts to combine them all. Indeed, few for-profit conglomerates of any sort are as diverse in their functions as the Cleveland city government.

Understandably, Cleveland's governmental functions are, in fact, managed through a variety of department heads. Some are like chief executive officers in their own mini-conglomerates. For example, in 1980 the Properties Director had indirect responsibility for operation of the municipal stadium which is under contract to a private business. He also had direct supervisory responsibility over maintenance of all other city buildings in addition to management of the city's parks and operation of its recreation programs. A Safety Director managed both the police and fire departments. The various chief executives were political appointees of the Mayor.

Reporting to each director are two, three and sometimes four or more levels of supervisors who hold office under civil service protection. The director and the highest level of civil service su-

pervisors work either at City Hall or at another downtown location. Most of the ultimate workers, those who pick up trash, repair streets, or respond to calls for help, are based at decentralized offices and are supervised directly by people who do not work at City Hall.

No two departments have the same subdivision of service areas. The police department has divided the city into six districts with a headquarters building in each district. The fire department has many more fire stations, each servicing its own area. Health clinics are fewer than police stations and serve yet different areas. Sanitation, streets, and park services also have their own areas.

None of those service areas corresponds to the wards from which Cleveland's 33 council representatives are elected. Since the ordinary resident would not necessarily know even the location of the local headquarters for a particular service function, it becomes the responsibility of the council representative to know who is in charge of various services for each ward and to build communication between the local supervisor and the resident.

The constant political struggle in municipal administration is over how many men and how much money to allocate to what subsection of the city. Priorities for major capital expenditures of a particular kind in a ward are worked out in negotiations involving the council representative, administrators within a particular department, other council representatives, neighborhood organizations, and the mayor. Where capital expenditures are involved, the political process works to equalize in a rough and tumble fashion gross expenditures among wards.

Decisions as to how many police or other service workers to allocate to a particular ward are usually made by departmental supervisors. There is, however, neither a general service nor a capital budget for a particular ward. Thus, it is not possible for any subsection of the city to establish a priority for recreation supervisors rather than housing inspectors or for police rather than street repair personnel or vice versa. Those priorities are established only on a city-wide basis. Thereafter, administrators with service specialties make the decisions about geographic priorities, but there is no mechanism for a shift of funds from one service category to another within wards.

The task of getting better service for a local area out of departmental budgets fixed at the city-wide level falls to the council

representatives, street clubs, and groups like Near West Side Neighbors in Action. By exerting sufficient pressure, they establish priorities for their area. But their success is limited by the total budget allocation on a city-wide basis for any particular service.

Genesis

How did Cleveland arrive at the form of local government that requires local priorities to be approached so often with main force by council members and citizens' groups? Six times since 1853 and four times in the last century the City of Cleveland has fundamentally altered its constitutional structure. The present structure was adopted in 1932.

The six changes between 1853 and 1932 occurred during a period of rapid population growth, industrial expansion, and tensions between life-long residents and recent immigrants that the city may never again experience. In that period, every large city in America was struggling to devise a system of effective, efficient, sensitive and honest municipal administration. Government in most large American cities was a disgrace.

Between 1870 and 1930, the City of Cleveland grew from under 100,000 to nearly 900,000 residents. In 1870, there were no electric lights, telephones, or automobiles. The only foreign language or dialect frequently heard was German, and only a handful of faces were black. By 1930, the gas lights were gone, only a few horses were on the streets, and at least a dozen foreign languages were widely spoken in neighborhood stores and churches. The new technology and the new residents forced the government of the old residents to change both in personnel and in structure to meet new needs.

Cleveland's first population spurt resulted when the Ohio River-Lake Erie Canal changed Cleveland in 1833 from a center for farmers and a way-station west to a genuine commercial city. Still, even with railroads and a canal, Cleveland had fewer than 50,000 people in 1860. Steel-making and European immigration between 1870 and 1930 created the houses, the street patterns, the churches, and the neighborhoods that we know as Cleveland today. The city's territory grew through repeated annexations of adjacent communities. The rapid growth of the period resulted in mounting pressures, and the first real step toward forming Cleveland's present governmental structure occurred in 1891.

Cleveland in 1835.

The half-century after 1833 was the period during which the city first began to take on the functions which today are such a burden. At the beginning both the city and its services were small. In 1835, for example, the city extended from the Cuyahoga River to about East 14th Street and only as far south as Huron Road. Trash collections, tree maintenance, parks, water supply, and entertainment facilities were not municipal services. As those functions were assumed by city government, they first became the separate responsibilities either of certain elected officials or appointed boards and commissions. Before 1836, a ward system of representation did not exist, and afterward neither the mayor nor city council had control over all municipal functions.

In the decade before 1891, the city was governed, in part, by an eight-member board of trustees elected from four districts. The trustees shared power with a plethora of special purpose boards and commissions and with a host of popularly elected administrators. In the 1880's Cleveland's elected officials included the mayor, town marshal, solicitor, treasurer, market superintendent, civil engineer, auditor, police court judge, court clerk, and prosecutor. The city trustees had limited policy-making functions.

The various commissions, some elected and some appointed, made policy decisions for streets, bridges, parks, water, fire, health, and sanitation.

For a growing industrial city, the system suffered greatly from the absence of central or coordinated decision-making.

In 1891, the network of policy-making boards and commissions was eliminated, and the number of elected administrators was reduced. All powers of the boards and commissions were transferred to a city council of 22 members, elected two each from 11 districts, serving a total of 40 wards. Mayor Tom L. Johnson who headed the flourishing city from 1901 to 1909 called it "a better system than any other city in the United States had at that time."

In 1903, as a result of an Ohio Supreme Court decision, the council composition was increased to 32 members elected from single member districts (wards). That system prevailed until 1924.

The thirty years from 1890 to 1920 were years of immense growth of population, technology, and wealth. From 1890 to 1900 the city added 100,000 people; nearly 200,000 between 1900 and 1910; and 236,000 between 1910 and 1920. In 1890, Cleveland had 261,000 residents. In 1920 there were 806,000.

In the 1890s Cleveland's politics did not differ markedly from those in other large cities excoriated by such journalists as Lincoln Steffens. From 1895 to 1899, Cleveland had a Republican mayor in his early thirties, Robert McKisson, who built a municipal patronage machine typical of the era. At the same time, Mark Hanna, the most powerful politician in America, called Cleveland his home. Businessmen bribed local politicians to obtain licenses for franchises. Opposition to control of public services by private businessmen was the issue upon which Tom Johnson rose to power.

Tom Johnson believed his mission was to clean up a corrupt police force which allowed prostitution to flourish in downtown saloons and to curb the many business interests who corrupted city officials. Johnson saw the battle against corrupting influences as more fundamental than the need to provide efficient city services. He believed: "If fraud and graft are kept out, there is not apt to be much unwisdom in public expenditures..."

Johnson appointed a remarkable group of reformers to city government. Harris R. Cooley, Johnson's pastor, helped create the now decayed workhouse—an institution which was, at its inception, a model of enlightened penology. Frederic Howe joined

Euclid Avenue at the turn of century.

One of the last Euclid Avenue mansions, 1949.

the tax commission which, to the limit of its authority, shifted the real estate tax from buildings to land after the single tax philosophy of Johnson's friend, Henry George. Newton D. Baker – later to be Secretary of War under Woodrow Wilson and Mayor of Cleveland – was Johnson's Law Director. Together these men fought the special interests of private business.

Johnson and his colleagues believed that municipal ownership of public service and public facilities was the best means of preventing the corruption associated with the municipal power to grant franchises and licenses. To stymie the various private street car companies that controlled public transportation, Johnson created a city-owned trolley line and charged a three cent fare to offer price competition. Cleveland's municipally owned electric company was created for similar purposes. The newfound vision of municipal ownership saw Cleveland extending its water system, creating a greenbelt of parks around the settled portions of the city, and building public markets, bathhouses, playgrounds and swimming pools. Commonplace in city government today, municipal operation of such facilities was a new American concept in Johnson's day. Johnson and Cleveland were heralded nationwide as pioneers in governmental reform.

Johnson's goals were only partly achieved and those that were reached were short-lived. Moreover, in shifting Cleveland's government from a deliverer of basic services toward an owner and manager of public buildings and business enterprises, Johnson

Territorial Growth

of the

City of Cleveland

City of Cleveland
City Plan Commission

Legend:
- 1850
- 1870
- 1892
- 1924
- 1932
- 1946

LAKE ERIE

LAKE

BRATENAHL VILL.

HH
FF
1913
EUCLID
KK
1910
1926
RICHMOND HEIGHTS VILL.
1814
'52
1943
HIGHLAND HEIGHTS VILL.
LAKE CO.

CC
W
QC
1905
X
1896
O
1873
1902
S
EAST CLEVELAND
S. EUCLID

CLEVELAND HEIGHTS
LYNDHURST VILL.

L
1872
MM
GG
1912 '05
SHAKER HEIGHTS
UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS

A
1874
D
C
F
1829
G
B
1835
E
1850
K
1870
N
II
SS (1919)
BEACHWOOD VILL.

1854
H
1867
1867
1873
RR
1917
XX
TWP.

1873 M
R
1880
V
P
1913
LL
1917
QQ
50
1922
1925

PP
1894
OD
T
1851
EE
VV
1917
50
NORTH RANDALL

NN 1919
1905
BB
1873
1909
1932

1916
PP
WW
1927
GUYAHOGA HEIGHTS VILL.
SCLON

1917
BROOKLYN HTS. VILL.
GARFIELD HEIGHTS

PARMA
MAPLE HEIGHTS
BEDFORD

TABLE I
Changes in Cleveland's Governmental Form

Year	Population of Cleveland	Governmental Form
1800	Estimated at 7	Ohio governed with territorial legislature under Northwest Ordinance; "Cleveland" part of Cleveland Township under Trumbull County.
1803		State of Ohio created.
1810	Estimated at 57	Cuyahoga County created.
1814		Cleveland recognized as a village; elected president, recorder, treasurer, marshal, two assessors, and three trustees.
1830	1,075	
1836	5,080	Inaugurated as a city; elected mayor, treasurer, marshal, twelve member council with three members each from four wards, and three aldermen at large
1850	17,034	
1852		Elected mayor, six other executives, judge, clerk of court, prosecutor, superintendent of markets, council (with two members per ward), a Board of Commissioners (with responsibility for streets and bridges).
1860	43,838	
1865		Police commission created by state legislature with one member appointed by mayor and four by governor.
1870	92,082	Elected mayor, solicitor, treasurer, clerk of court, police judge, prosecutor, and city council (two members per ward); appointed civil engineer, police chief, fire engineer, superintendent of markets, and various commissions pursuant to Ohio General Code.
1872		Police Commission changed from appointed to elected membership.
1878		General Code revision; mayor, councilmen, treasurer, police judge, and prosecutor elected; numerous boards for corrections, health, infirmary, parks, improvements, etc; composed variously of elected officials and persons appointed by them.
1880	160,146	
1890	261,353	
1891		Federal system adopted by state legislature providing elected mayor, council, and judges, but ending most boards and commissions including police commission.
1900	361,768	
1910	560,663	
1914		Home rule charter adopts Federal plan similar to 1891 form with 32 wards.
1920	806, 368	
1924		City manager appointed by council; council elected from four wards by proportional representation under nonpartisan ballot.
1930	902, 471	
1932		Return to Federal plan with 33 wards.

Sources: Elroy M. Avery, *A History of Cleveland and Its Environs* (1912); Samuel P. Orth, *A History of Cleveland, Ohio* (1910); William G. Rose, *Cleveland: The Making of a City* (1950).

fundamentally diminished the mayor's ability to manage the basic services needed by neighborhood residents.

By World War I, many resident civic leaders continued to perceive Cleveland's government as corrupt and inefficient. After Johnson left office, pressure mounted even among Johnson's former supporters to replace the mayor with a professional administrator and to structure the city council to represent more fairly the different constituencies that had emerged through immigration and industrial growth.

In 1921, the city responded to those suggestions by adopting a radically new form of government, and in 1924 it went into effect. All elected positions were eliminated except for municipal judges, court clerk, and council members. Executive power was given to a city manager appointed by the city council. The council itself was reduced to 24 members. The number of wards was reduced to four, and the 24 council representatives were allocated to the four wards in relation to population but were selected by a system of proportional representation.

In 1924, the city's boundaries were substantially identical to its present ones. One council ward covered the entire West Side. A second ward was on the East Side, south of Kingsbury Run. A third was east of the Cuyahoga River from Kingsbury Run to the lake but ending at Liberty Boulevard. The fourth ward was all of Cleveland east of Liberty Boulevard to the Heights and to the City of Euclid. Five to seven representatives were elected from each ward under a system which saw all candidates from a ward run on a non-partisan ballot against each other. Each voter ranked the candidates in order of preference; the preferences were then tabulated; and the candidates with the highest total of weighted votes in any ward were elected to the allotted council positions from that ward.

The system was predicated on the concept of a non-political executive and a policy-making council that was above partisanship. The four wards were conceived as logical and practical subdivisions for practical municipal administration. The system failed to achieve either a non-political executive or a non-partisan council. The city returned in 1932 to the earlier discredited mayor-council system of wards but with one more councilman than the previous 32. (See Table I for chronology of governmental changes in Cleveland.)

Although the constitutional structure of Cleveland has remained substantially the same since 1932, it has been beset by pressures. The national crises of war and depression and the national postwar prosperity helped mask from 1932 to 1962 the weaknesses which had spawned Cleveland's experiment with city managers and proportional representation. Since 1962, however, tensions have mounted in the central city, and the weaknesses apparent before 1924 have resurfaced in an atmosphere of relentless political confrontation. Politicians of black, Italian, Croatian, Slovenian, Polish, and Irish heritage have vied for dominance as the mayorship became a symbol of ethnic admission to the citadels of power.

While the mayor's office has held prominence as a symbol of success, no mayor has been able to distinguish himself as an effective city manager. From the late 1930's to the late 1960's, the city enjoyed a succession of mayors whose roots were in the diverse ethnic population of the city and whose hallmarks were personal honesty. During this same period, however, repeated studies revealed that the city's administrative structure was long on personnel, short on service, and clinging to outmoded management practices. Since 1950, three different study commissions composed of outside experts from business and management consulting fields have detailed a litany of municipal management failures. Each successive report has found uncorrected many of the deficiencies noted in similar studies made a decade or more earlier.

Whatever the good intentions of the mayor, the realities of government for the central city of Cleveland have either prevented significant management reforms from being adopted or, if the reforms were instituted, their life was short or ineffective.

The Suburbs: A Political Alternative for Many

Those were the political structures for individuals who chose to remain as central city residents over the last century. At the same time, however, other Cleveland residents were abandoning the city to work different political solutions in the adjacent suburbs. The suburbs maintained the mayor-council or council-manager forms but applied them to much smaller areas, to many fewer people, and to substantially fewer functions. They have worked remarkably well when not overburdened by people and responsibilities.

In the late 1800s the very wealthy moved to Bratenahl, East Cleveland, and Cleveland Heights. Between the two World Wars, professionals and small business owners created new white collar suburbs in such places as Shaker Heights, Rocky River, and Fairview Park. After World War II, blue collar suburbs emerged on an equal footing with the prewar suburbs of the rich and the white collar middle class. Each of these suburbs has developed a special, albeit changing, ethnic mix.

In 1914, when Cleveland adopted its home rule charter, few could anticipate the growth of suburbia. In 1920, Cleveland had 806,000 residents, while the suburbs had only 137,000. But thirty years later, the suburbs had added nearly 340,000 residents to reach 474,000, while Cleveland added slightly more than 100,000. By 1990, it is projected that the 1950 relationship of city and suburbs will be reversed. The suburbs are expected to have 980,000 residents, and Cleveland will have 470,000 (see Table II).

One reason was that after the turn of the century, the state legislature lost substantial control of municipal government, and

TABLE II

Population of Cuyahoga County, the City of Cleveland, and the Suburban Remainder of the County 1910-1970 with Revised Projections for 1980-1990

Year	County Total	City of Cleveland	County Suburbs
1910	637,425	573,872	63,553
1920	943,495	806,368	137,127
1930	1,201,455	902,471	298,984
1940	1,217,250	878,336	338,914
1950 April	1,389,532	914,808	474,724
1960 April	1,647,895	876,050	771,845
1970 April	1,720,835	750,879	969,956
1980 April (proj.)	1,512,600	560,000	952,600
1990 April (proj.)	1,450,000	470,000	980,000

Sources: 1910-1970 from U.S. Bureau of the Census; 1975-1977 and 1978 county estimates from *Current Population Reports* Series P-26, No. 78-35 and earlier issues. 1980-1990 derived from Regional Planning Commission with adjustments by E. A. Weld. Prepared by Institute of Urban Studies, Cleveland State University, December 1979.

incorporated municipalities were permitted to adopt home rule charters. Cleveland's charter was adopted in 1914.

It was not always clear that these new communities would survive as independent cities. Prior to World War I, the typical pattern was for people employed in Cleveland to move outside of the city limits into adjacent townships such as East Cleveland, Newburgh, and Brooklyn but eventually to vote for annexation to the City of Cleveland. Nineteen twenty-four was a turning point for the suburbs as well as for the central city. After that year, when inner-city residents were establishing a new form of government, not a single major outlying community ever again voted to be governed by the City of Cleveland.

Another reason was the new-found tool of zoning. In the years before World War I, zoning was either nonexistent or ineffective in Cleveland, and the demands of business and industry over-rode residential land uses. Indeed, it was not until 1916 that the nation's first comprehensive citywide zoning ordinance was enacted in New York City. Thereafter, zoning became the legal tool for implementing the concepts of garden cities that the best city planners in Europe and America were suggesting.

As central city and suburbs began to experiment with zoning, its constitutionality was in doubt. In 1925, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled zoning to be constitutional in Ohio; and in 1926, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed zoning for the nation by upholding the constitutionality of Euclid's zoning ordinance in the historic opinion of Ambler Realty Company. Thereafter the suburbs – with their immense acreage of unimproved land – had a secure legal tool to control industrial and commercial growth and to protect residential interests. While land use patterns in the central city had already been determined by private business considerations, the newly developing suburbs could use zoning codes to channel business and residential growth into patterns which fit residential priorities. Greater political power thus gave suburban residents a supervening reason to reject annexation and to reach for the garden city dream despite the central city's larger tax base. By 1980 the suburbs had met the test of survival and in surviving had proved themselves fiscally sound and politically manageable.

Chapter 3

A Comparison of City and Suburban Government

In recent years, it has been fashionable to decry the growth of independent suburbs as a hodgepodge of disconnected, confusing, inefficient political entities. Suburban residents, however, have demonstrated by their votes on Metro government and in professional polls, that they are extremely reluctant to relinquish the local government that is closest to them. Suburbanites tend to believe that smaller is better.

Not every urban analyst has been critical of suburbanization. Lewis Mumford, perhaps the most influential American writer on urban culture, made this observation in 1961 in his landmark book, *The City in History*:

> The suburban town ... with a limited constituency, a homogeneity, a type of civic attitude, and an amount of leisure time ... put small town democracy into practice for more people ... than has been possible for a hundred years (quoting Robert Wood) ... Thus, though the motive for the suburban exodus was largely an escapist one ... not the least of its gains was political. Politically, the suburb might be described as an attempt to reduce the functional urban community to a size small enough for an individual to cope with.

Mumford further observed:

> ... every city, every organ of the community, indeed every association and organization, has a limit of physical growth ...
>
> The first step toward handling this situation ... is to regroup in units that can be effectively handled. Until we understand the function of the smaller units ... and can bring them under discipline, we cannot ... deploy (the urban masses) as a whole over the larger area.

Government in Cleveland Suburbs

Let us, then, examine how suburbs have functioned in Greater Cleveland, and let us compare them to governmental operations in the City of Cleveland. The suburbs to be examined are those immediately contiguous to the City of Cleveland. Those include the suburbs that, at one time or another, faced the issue of annexation

27

by the City of Cleveland and opted for independence. Many have social and economic characteristics similar to portions of the City of Cleveland. For example, the suburb of Brooklyn has a population similar to that of Cleveland's Wards 2, 7, and 9. East Cleveland's population compares in many respects to that of the four Cleveland wards called Glenville. Euclid's population bears similarities to much of Cleveland Wards 23 and 32. And Garfield Heights has a population comparable to Cleveland Wards 14 and 15. Table III is a chart showing the populations, tax bases, public revenues, and expenditures of those suburbs as well as for the City of Cleveland.

The comparison reveals five important facts. First, suburban governments, even where tax bases are similar to each other, have demonstrated widely *different expenditure priorities.*

Second, suburban governments have responded *with greater speed and effectiveness* to social change and economic deterioration than has the City of Cleveland.

Third, *political stability* and *community unity* are predominant factors in suburban politics. Mayors of suburban communities have substantial longevity, and suburban councils show an orderly change of personnel without usually producing a sharp change in a single election.

Fourth, some suburbs with lower tax bases than the City of Cleveland are providing *higher levels of basic service* to their residents. (See Tables III, IV, and V.)

Fifth, ethnicity, i.e., the religious and cultural traditions of individuals from common national or racial backgrounds, is more important to stability, unity and municipal priorities than personal income levels; and *shared geographic interest tends to overcome ethnic differences.*

Expenditure Priorities.   Although a city's problems seem obvious to outsiders, there is no such thing as a single right answer to city problems. Nor is there a single, proper set of priorities. There are legitimate differences on priorities and honest, fair-minded people often have widely divergent views about the allocation of municipal government expenditures. This can be seen if one examines the differences in how suburbs of similar tax bases raised and allocated money during 1976, as can be examined in Table III.

TABLE III
Comparison of Population, Local Taxation, Income, Expenses,
for Cleveland and Some Adjacent Municipalities
for the Year 1976*

City	1970 Population	Per Capita Real Estate Valuation	Levy (Mills)	Local Tax Receipts	Government Aid	Per Capita Expenses						
						All Safety	Police	Legis-lation	Parks	Recrea-tion	Waste Col-lection	Debt Service
Cleveland	750,900	$4,163.44	15.2	$121,588,790	$54,715,810	$101.39	$50.38	$1.40	$2.36	$2.84	$9.24	$23.89
Parma	100,216	4,282.47	6.0	8,540,310	679,125	40.97	17.72	1.17	5.00	6.01	11.54	5.03
Euclid	71,552	5,267.00	17.0	13,141,407	1,844,956	71.76	29.83	1.22	4.98	13.21	56.46	16.77
Cleveland Heights	60,767	3,150.37	15.2	7,051,108	1,021,010	57.42	27.26	.50	3.29	11.45	33.23	23.95
East Cleveland	39,600	2,360.02	14.5	3,978,857	1,062,767	64.35	29.11	.52	2.76	.73	37.33	1.80
Garfield Heights	41,417	3,040.84	9.9	3,473,850	227,425	45.31	18.18	3.09	.11	1.66	16.51	10.14
Brooklyn	13,142	11,949.89	6.7	2,520,262	226,190	100.68	42.28	2.30	5.63	7.44	61.95	.74
Shaker Heights	36,300	4,787.91	15.0	6,811,880	428,437	115.28	46.41	.70	4.55	2.92	31.86	7.70
Lakewood	70,173	2,859.71	17.1	8,213,420	1,320,120	48.58	19.29	.66	8.76	.36	32.39	25.48

*Based upon *Financial Report for Ohio Cities, Auditor of State*, 1976.

In 1976, Cleveland Heights, Garfield Heights, and Lakewood, for example, each had similar tax bases and each had been in existence for a comparable length of time. The per capita real estate tax valuation in 1976 in Cleveland Heights was $3,150; in Garfield Heights, $3,041; and in Lakewood, $2,860. (These compared, incidentally, to a per capita real estate value of $4,163 in the City of Cleveland.) The real estate tax levy in Lakewood for municipal government was 17.1 mills, in Cleveland Heights 15.2 mills, and in Garfield Heights 9.9 mills. Obviously, citizens in Garfield Heights placed a much higher priority on low taxes than did those in Lakewood or Cleveland Heights.

Per capita expenditures for certain services also differ noticeably from suburb to suburb. In 1976, Cleveland Heights spent $60.49 per person for direct police protection and waste collection. Lakewood spent $51.68 per person for such services while having almost identical per capita receipts from local taxes as Cleveland Heights — $136.12 in local taxes per person in Lakewood and $139.61 per person in Cleveland Heights.

The greatest contrasts in expenditure policies are between suburbs with large populations of central or eastern European heritage and suburbs with large black populations. In 1976, white ethnic Parma, with a per capita real estate valuation of $4,282, levied only 6.0 mills on real estate for municipal services and levied total taxes of only $97.88 per person, while predominantly black East Cleveland, with a lower per capita real estate valuation of $2,360 and a lower per capita personal income, raised $127.52 per person from all local tax services and levied 14.5 mills on real estate.

Among the 550,000 residents of the City of Cleveland who live in different neighborhoods and have different backgrounds, differences of opinion also exist on how high taxes should be or on how public funds should be spent. These differences often have geographic identities. Thus, councilmanic attitudes and electoral returns confirm that there is a predominant sentiment in the white ethnic Wards 14 and 15 on taxation and public spending which differs from that in black Wards 17 and 18. Those four wards also perceive spending priorities differently from the heavily Irish far West Side Wards 4 and 33.

The differences stem from the people and from the patterns of land ownership. Little Warsaw, the area of Wards 14 and 15 along

Fleet Avenue, has been home for Clevelanders of Polish and other central European backgrounds for nearly 100 years. Saint Stanislaus Church is a center of culture. Imposing public halls for Polish men and women are part of the neighborhood. Many merchants either live or attend church in the community. Home ownership is at a high level. Many of the men work together in the nearby mills and belong to the same union. And parochial school tuition is a self-imposed burden that many families gladly accept. Little Warsaw is well-kept almost without exception. Along Fleet Avenue, many of the old buildings are being refurbished and some new construction is apparent. The city owns the streets and little else.

Cleveland's Hough area, comprising parts but not all of Wards 17 and 18, stands in stark contrast to Little Warsaw. Land ownership is spread among three groups – the residents, absentee landlords, and the city or other public agencies. Vast areas are simply expanses of vacant lots. The open spaces increase almost daily as apartment houses and other buildings owned by non-residents become abandoned.

Since 1972, the city, through acquiring more and more tax delinquent land in Hough, has had no apparent strategy either to rebuild the area or to care for the area in a way to protect the property values of those who are owner occupants. The residents of Hough are 99 percent black. The incidence of single parent families on welfare is high. No religious or cultural institution is a center of life for the community.

Four private groups—the Famicos, the Hough Area Development Corporation, HOPE, Inc., and Neighbors Organized for Action in Housing (NOAH)—have been engaged in efforts to build or rehabilitate housing, but their efforts have not significantly affected the behavior either of private landowners, the city, or tenants in private housing. With the incidence of home ownership low and residents highly dependent on public assistance, the Hough area is a consistent supporter of tax levies and councilmen who will vote for higher levels of public expenditures.

Those differences of people and problems make it inevitable that Hough (Wards 17 and 18) and Little Warsaw (Wards 14 and 15) are in constant disagreement over what the priorities of government should be. Even if each community received equal amounts of money, expenditure priorities would be different. Compromise between Hough and Little Warsaw on expenditure decisions is

extremely difficult, not because Hough residents are black and Little Warsaw's residents are white, but because each area has very different needs and an expenditure in one area has very little demonstrable benefit for the other area.

In the suburbs, residents with common priorities on taxation and municipal expenditures and of similar cultural heritage have tended to live together in separate suburbs. Consequently, in suburbia, the necessity for political compromises among neighborhoods having divergent priorities has been less intense than in the central city. Conflict and acrimony have been the trademarks of central city government, while cooperation has tended to be a prevailing value in suburban government.

Governmental Stability. Suburban governments reflect the philosophy that it is more important for similarly minded people to unite around common governmental priorities than it is to seek compromises among people with differing priorities. In Greater Cleveland, that philosophy arose, in part, because the suburbs initially attracted residents of like backgrounds – Slovenians moved to Euclid and farther; Italians to areas around Mayfield Road; WASPS and Jews to the areas from South Euclid to Warrensville Heights; Central Europeans to the Southside; and the Irish everywhere. Initially, a sense of pioneering and common heritage contributed to a suburban community spirit which encouraged suburbanites to tax themselves in order to create new schools, recreation facilities, libraries, and public services. As differing ethnic or racial groups have moved into these suburbs, those new groups have been assimilated into the political structure so that shared interests based on residency have generally prevailed over differences in cultural heritage.

The social unity of the suburbs has produced political stability to a remarkable degree. In most, mayors serve a decade or more. In Parma Heights, with a Democratic majority, Republican Paul Cassidy has been in office for more than twenty years. John Coyne in Brooklyn has served thirty years. And in Warrensville Heights, great racial change in the last decade has not prevented Raymond Grabow from serving fifteen years.

When suburban mayors leave office, it is usually because they are tired or because they have not done a good job repairing the streets, picking up the trash, and catching the dogs. Political defeats of incumbents occur relatively infrequently.

Moreover, the mayors themselves adopt long-term commitments to their job. A suburban mayor never leaves office to become governor or senator or a federal cabinet officer. Seldom does a suburban mayor use his position even to seek county office.

Neighborhood organizations exist in many suburbs, but their posture toward their city government is different from that of inner city groups such as the Near West Side Neighbors in Action. If a few hundred people gather for an event sponsored by a suburban neighborhood association, their purpose is not to draw up fifty demands upon city government. Suburban neighborhood associations do not have a continuing agenda of confrontation with suburban government.

Suburban neighborhood associations sponsor social events to build a sense of community. They call public meetings to permit public officials to explain city needs and programs. When the suburban neighborhood association confronts city government, the confrontation often occurs with association officers privately discussing the problem with the mayor and other city officials around a conference table at city hall. Rarely does the discussion fail to produce a result acceptable to the residents.

Most importantly, when the mayor needs a tax increase in suburbia, he turns primarily for help to leaders of those suburban neighborhood organizations rather than to nonresident business owners. In the last analysis, suburban neighborhood leaders and elected suburban officials have a strong tradition of mutual support.

Adjustment to Demographic Change. The greatest test of the suburbs, however, has been their ability to accommodate the new groups of blacks, elderly poor, and welfare families that have resided in their communities in recent years. Suburban governments have been strikingly more attentive to the needs of these groups than has the City of Cleveland to comparable populations in its wards bordering those suburbs. For example, in Brooklyn, directly adjacent to Cleveland's Ward 2, the elderly can get their driveways shoveled and lawns cut by the city service department if they are unable to do it themselves. At the same time, Brooklyn spent $220.62 per capita for municipal government in 1976, while Cleveland spent $234.92 for each of its residents.

When the Moreland Elementary School District of Shaker Heights became largely black, the Shaker Heights School Board,

without federal litigation, turned Moreland School into a magnet elementary school and instituted a successful program of voluntary busing of both blacks and whites. A similar program to prevent racial segregation is underway in the suburb of Euclid.

A Cleveland *Plain Dealer* article in the spring of 1979 remarked with glowing commendation on how the East Cleveland School Board responded quickly to growing violence and restored peace and learning to largely black Shaw High School while nearby high schools in the City of Cleveland were still dominated by fear of young toughs.

Since 1960, East Cleveland has gone from a largely white middle income community to a predominantly black community with numerous welfare families. East Cleveland, unlike Cleveland, rapidly became sensitive to the need to integrate its city hall staff, to provide help to the poor, and to protect against deterioration. Through its period of change, East Cleveland has elected both black and white public officials, including a white municipal judge who has served for approximately a decade.

In all of the older suburbs which border the City of Cleveland, response to change has been much quicker than in Cleveland, and differences of opinion have not immobilized municipal government. Distrust, accusations, and fears of corruption have never been allowed to override the essential task of municipal government – to deliver the basic services of police and fire protection, refuse collection, street repair, snow removal, and protection of real estate.

Meeting Basic Needs. Suburbs seem to place a higher priority on providing basic services than does the City of Cleveland. A comparison of expenditures between Cleveland and eight adjacent suburbs reveals that Cleveland spends the lowest percentage of its municipal income for basic services. Cleveland in 1976 spent 25 percent of its total income for police protection and waste collection, while Brooklyn, East Cleveland, Euclid, and Cleveland Heights all spent over 40 percent. Only Parma spent less than 34 percent. That financial analysis also confirms the prevailing public impression that basic services are better in the suburbs than in Cleveland (see Table V).

Ethnicity and Urban Politics. In the great wave of European immigration from 1875 to 1925, America was viewed as a melting pot in which old world immigrant traits were supplanted by a new

American language, dress, and habits. A similar image prevailed
for blacks until the urban upheavals of the 1960s.

In truth, there was a melting of dress and other outward styles,
but there remained in the children and grandchildren of each
national group deeply felt identification with the cultural and
religious traditions of their immigrant or enslaved forebearers. For
more than fifty years now, those feelings of ethnic identity have
been predominant factors in urban politics. Today, no candidate
for public office – be it inner city, suburban, or county – can accu-
rately assess the possibilities of success without measuring his or
her ethnic base and developing a strategy to bridge ethnic gaps.
The contemporary struggles for recognition of historic ethnic mi-
norities within countries all over the world suggest that ethnicity
is not unique to this country and is a permanent feature of Amer-
ican politics.

It is, perhaps, the comparison between how ethnicity is ac-
commodated in the suburbs and in the central city that best ex-
plains the relative success of suburban governments. In
Garfield Heights, for example, persons of black, Italian, and Polish
heritage share political power and often live in neighborhoods
with distinct ethnic identities; but no neighborhood is so far
from any other that residents do not perceive their common de-
pendence on parks, schools, playgrounds, and public facilities.
That perception of common interest and close personal acquain-
tanceships enables leaders, even when ugly incidents arise, to
overcome ethnic differences and distrust.

Similar recognitions exist among WASPS, Jews, and blacks in
Shaker Heights, among Jews and Italians in South Euclid, among
blacks and Hungarians in Warrensville Heights, among Slovenians
and Irish in Euclid, among Irish, Poles, Ukrainians, and Germans
in Parma Heights, and among Poles and Irish in North Olmsted.

This same pattern of ethnic cooperation is apparent in the
neighborhood coalitions of Cleveland. Most of these have been
formed to solve neighborhood problems. Near West Side Neigh-
bors in Action brings together Puerto Ricans, Italians, Poles, Irish
and Appalachians. In the Buckeye-Woodland Community
Congress – a group encompassing parts of three Cleveland
wards – blacks, Hungarians, and Italians have worked in a united
fashion since 1973. The St. Clair-Superior Coalition – serving parts
of three other wards – has brought blacks, Slovenians, Croatians,

and Irish into similar cooperation. These organizations, like sub-
urban governments, are structured so that no substantial group
ever lacks real power within the organization.

Not so, however, the political structure of the City of Cleve-
land. It is extremely difficult for the Irish on the West Side to
perceive their common interest with the Poles on the Southeast
Side or with the blacks on the East Side. The West Side Market is
not a center for black customers, and Luke Easter Park is not a
playground for West Siders. Blight can abound in Hough, but life
in West Park will not be noticeably touched.

Within Cleveland wards, the principle of single member rep-
resentation perpetuates ethnic differences. With only one coun-
cilperson to be elected for each 17,000 residents, many ethnic
residents who feel unrepresented look to each municipal election
as a new opportunity to regain fairer representation at both the city
council and the executive levels.

The genius of suburban politics has been to leave no substan-
tial ethnic groups without real participation in government while
preserving a general perception that all ethnic groups share a
common interest.

Size, Governmental Efficiency, and the Political Process

Size has been a vital factor in effective suburban government.
Cities under 50,000 are inherently easier for human beings to
manage than cities over 500,000. And in cities of a few square
miles, it is easier for residents to recognize their common interest
than for residents who live five miles apart.

The service director of a city of 35,000, for example, knows all
of his workers personally. He knows who is genuinely ill and who
fails to report because of drugs or alcohol. When a resident leaves
for vacation, the police watch the house. If something is wrong, the
mayor either sees it or hears about it. And, if the mayor won't
respond, the suburban resident often has friends on city council
who can make the city's employees perform.

Suburban politics is also different. A councilman may spend
$10,000 or more to run a successful contested campaign in the City
of Cleveland. In wealthy Shaker Heights, a councilman can wage
a successful campaign for $2,000 or less. Friends, reputation, and
door-to-door handshaking count more than money. Indeed, it is
remarkable how a handshake can overcome prejudice.

Mayoral politics offer even greater contrasts between city and suburb. Although business people sometimes contribute substantial sums in suburban politics, they can seldom pick or elect a mayoral candidate. Nor is it the function or the interest of the daily news media to select a candidate to save South Euclid. An important consequence of that diminished power of large contributors and the media is that suburban mayors build their popular base through municipal performance, and they rise or fall on their popular base. Again, personal acquaintanceships between the suburban mayor and a greater percentage of city residents give him or her greater ability to build personal trust than is possible for a big city mayor.

With their real base squarely among resident community leaders and grass roots citizens, suburban mayors do not run as "champions of the people" because the people don't feel they need a champion. The people know that they are the champion. As residents, they have the ability, when needed, to touch and talk directly to the mayor. That ability gives the suburban resident power—both real and perceived.

When suburban mayors or councilmen have problems to resolve, they don't look to the daily news media for public support. The dialogue with constituents is more personal and less distorted by the need to make headlines. The daily news media, at the same time, cover suburban government differently. If corruption and vilification exist in suburban government, the news media are less inclined to bring government to a halt because of it.

Governmental Functions and Politics in the Central City

While the differences in stability and harmony which distinguish central city from suburban government may be largely undisputed, some will claim that the comparison is inappropriate. The conventional wisdom is that the public problems to be solved by municipal government in a large central city are either substantially different or more costly than those in suburbia. After all, the central city is populated by the poor, the elderly, the afflicted, and the oppressed, while suburbanites are rich or middle income, of child-rearing age, healthy, and powerful.

Those facts are substantially accurate but largely irrelevant to the real problems of big city government. None of those differences significantly affects or explains the greater per capita cost of

Cleveland's city government. In 1976, for example, Cleveland spent $234.92 per capita, Shaker Heights, $224.95 per capita, Brooklyn $220.62 per capita, Cleveland Heights, $139.61 per capita, Lakewood, $136.12 per capita, East Cleveland, $127.52 per capita, Parma, $97.88 per capita, and Garfield Heights $93.42 per capita (see Table V).

The poverty of a central city's residents is not a significant factor in the greater cost of central city government. Municipal government, for example, does not now provide welfare payments – that is the function of the county, state, and federal governments.

Municipal government also does not provide low cost housing – that is done by an independent public housing authority and independent nonprofit corporations.

Medical care for the poor is largely financed by the federal and state governments.

Although in 1976 the City of Cleveland's basic municipal services cost $107 more per capita than similar per capita expenses in East Cleveland, the percentage of residents at a poverty level in East Cleveland was comparable to that in Cleveland. For example, the Cleveland *Plain Dealer* (January 6, 1980, page 3AA) reported that in December 1979 East Cleveland had 25.1 percent of its residents receiving either general relief, Aid to Dependent Children, or federal food stamps, while 23.4 percent of Cleveland residents received those benefits. Moreover, there is no evidence that Cleveland's residents receive more from city government than do East Clevelanders.

In 1979, the primary responsibilities of municipal government in the City of Cleveland were not significantly different from those in East Cleveland, Brooklyn, or Garfield Heights. Those responsibilities were to put out fires, collect waste, protect against crime, inspect houses, issue licenses, patrol for traffic, clean streets, repair sidewalks, plant trees, maintain parks, provide recreation programs for the young and elderly, clear abandoned property, and regulate land use.

The poverty where Delphine Dotson, Albert Kish and Mark Mikolic live near the Arrow Publicity factory at West 41st Street on the Near West Side does not impose a burden on the City of Cleveland sufficient to explain the difference between the per capita expenses of Cleveland and Garfield Heights. Albert Kish, with his

small vegetable garden and bathless house, gets nothing special from the city. And the improvements being made by the Dotsons and Mikolics add to the city's tax base. When the house next to the Mikolics' burned, the cost of removal was assessed against its absentee landlord. No analysis is available to determine if the number of fires in Cleveland require firefighters for Cleveland who are not needed in Garfield Heights. Only the hole in the fence at Greenwood Swimming Pool seems clearly to be a special municipal cost of poverty; but until that hole is repaired, it is simply a nuisance and an eyesore – not a financial burden. Even the repair cost would not add more than a dollar to the per capita cost of the residents who might use the pool.

Of course there is a statistical relationship between poverty and crime in child-rearing families and young adults. The financial statistics in Table IV confirm a much higher per capita expenditure in Cleveland for police than in adjacent suburbs; however, the difference of $21 between Cleveland and East Cleveland, for example, does not explain Cleveland's $107 per capita larger expenditure for all basic services. Only in comparison to such high spending suburbs as Brooklyn and Shaker Heights, where service breadth is unusually great and quality high. would Cleveland have lower per capita expenditures if it did not have to shoulder an additional burden because of resident poverty.

If there are differences in the functions performed by the central city and suburbs, it is that the central city undertakes a second level of services not generally performed by the suburbs. The convention facilities, airports, electric utility, workhouse, and public markets are some examples. To the extent that those facilities divert the time of political officials or money from more basic services, they undermine the quality and efficiency of the more basic functions. In the historic growth of city functions they came last. However, in the demands they now make on the time of top city hall leaders, they frequently come first. Their relative priority is the continuing subject of public debate when budgets are to be approved, when newspaper investigations are undertaken, and when mayoral elections are held. By contrast, residential priorities seem secondary.

Cleveland residents often recognize more clearly than do those who write about them what are the important functions of big city government. For example, at a meeting of the Buckeye-

Woodland Community Congress in the spring of 1979, over six hundred residents were entreated by their leaders to seek removal of the city's dog warden (does anyone know his name?) unless a better job was done of catching stray dogs. Dogs are a real problem of daily life on East 116th Street. But the proposed removal of the city's dog warden is not page one news for a mayoral press conference.

The case has never been made that the cost of collecting garbage, repairing streets, catching dogs, or performing any of the other primary municipal functions is inherently greater in the central city than in the suburbs. It is remarkable that, despite the interest in metropolitan government for Greater Cleveland during the last twenty years, no study has ever been done analyzing the cost of waste collection, street repair, or other primary municipal responsibilities of Cleveland compared with those functions in well-managed suburbs adjacent to the central city.

The meager evidence available seems to indicate that inner-city residents pay substantially more per ton for waste collection, more per officer for police protection, and more per mile for street repair than do suburbanites. Yet, it is difficult to understand why the poverty, ill health, or age of inner-city residents should make it more expensive to pick up a ton of trash and garbage from residents on East 79th than from residents on Wellesley Road in East Cleveland or more costly to repair West 80th Street than a nearby residential street in Brooklyn.

Cleveland City Government from a Resident's Perspective. Since ordinary problems like waste collection, dog catching, and police protection are the problems that most concern inner-city residents, it is important to understand the efforts which individual Cleveland residents must expend in seeking redress from municipal malfunctions in those areas. A 1978 lawsuit involving the City of Cleveland, a local business owner, and residents of a middle-income East Side ward illustrates the inner-city resident's perspective on government.

In that case, the residents of East 176th Street were greatly disturbed by traffic congestion on their street and by accidents which had resulted from that congestion at the intersection of their street with Harvard Avenue. The congestion arose because knowledgeable motorists had discovered that East 176th Street was a through route to the newly opened Randall Mall. These

motorists used East 176th Street to avoid traffic lights on Harvard and Warrensville Center Road. The residents of East 176th persuaded their councilman to sponsor legislation that would establish their street as a one-way street.

The owner of an ice cream carry-out stand at the affected intersection brought suit in November 1978 to enjoin the City of Cleveland from implementing the one-way street plan. The carry-out owner alleged that the new traffic pattern would hurt his business.

Through court mediation, the business owner, the residents, and the city Law Department agreed to delay implementing the proposed one-way street plan until a traffic survey could be conducted. Based on the traffic survey, a traffic engineer for the city's Safety Department recommended a modified one-way street plan. The business owner still objected to the modified plan and threatened to continue his lawsuit for money damages.

Thereupon, an assistant safety director, becoming involved for the first time in the dispute nine months after suit was filed, ordered that the modified plan not be implemented and questioned whether the traffic engineer had made an honest traffic evaluation or had merely acquiesced to the complaints of the residents. In June of 1979, nearly a year after the councilman first agreed to secure the one-way street, an assistant city law director (acting on instructions from the assistant safety director) and the private business owner agreed to dismiss the lawsuit and not to proceed with the one-way street.

The mayor of Cleveland and residents of East 176th Street had never discussed the traffic problem. Their councilman was powerless. The crucial decisions had been made entirely by appointed officials. The assistant safety director, who made the controlling decision, had never talked to the complaining residents or their councilman and had never seen the intersection in question.

After nearly a year of litigation, studies, and conferences, the residents were no further ahead in solving their traffic problem than when they had originally gained the support of their councilman. Considerable time and money had been expended for traffic engineers, traffic counters, and a councilman. Yet, the residents' complaints had not only gone unresolved, but the heat of their frustration had been greatly increased by the delay and the rebuff of an invisible assistant safety director. After nearly a year

of effort, the residents had yet another mountain to climb before reaching someone with power to solve their problem.

The entire conflict was a monument to waste, frustration, and unresponsive government.

City Government from a Council's Perspective. As the case of the one-way street illustrates, ordinary citizens in Cleveland find their council representative, not the mayor or the daily newspapers, to be their first line of attack in seeking satisfactory municipal services. If the one-way street problem had arisen in most suburbs, more than one councilperson together with the mayor and a senior technician or administrator would probably have become personally involved at an early stage. In most suburbs, the ombudsman role of the council representative is so shared with other council representatives that few feel solo responsibility for a constituency greater than 10,000, and often the ratio is one councilperson for 5,000 residents. In many suburbs, the mayor is so closely involved with day to day operations and citizen complaints that the council plays only an infrequent role as ombudsman.

But in Cleveland, the council representative's job and city government cannot be understood if council's role as ombudsman is not placed in proper perspective. Except for a few tenured and politically powerful individuals in council, the ombudsman function for Cleveland City Council is its most difficult and most time-consuming responsibility. One city councilman has estimated that approximately 60 percent of his time is spent as ombudsman, 15 percent as legislator, and 25 percent in peripheral politics.

The honest and conscientious councilman or woman in Cleveland easily becomes overwhelmed in attempting to advocate on behalf of his or her ward for better trash collection, rat control, sewer maintenance, and snow removal. The sheer number of resident requests is mountainous. Most representatives receive an average of 30 phone calls per day from constituents. The task of competing for scarce resources against the claims of other wards is nearly insurmountable.

At the same time, the council person must also become knowledgeable about the city-wide problems of fiscal management, tax abatement, utilities management, and the various newsworthy issues that keep the mayor in the public eye. Unfortunately

many of those problems transcend the council persons' daily knowledge gleaned from residence in their own neighborhoods, from personal work experiences, and from their own contacts with the city government.

The magnitude of Cleveland's municipal bureaucracy, the geographic scope of the city services, the multiplicity of special city-wide functions such as the airport or convention center, and the size of the council member's own constituency (now averaging 17,000) make it virtually impossible for an individual in council to have either the knowledge or time to function effectively both as an ombudsman and as a policy-maker.

The council member must choose daily which role to emphasize. In emphasizing policy-making, justifiable demands of constituents are likely to be frustrated. Concentration on the ombudsman role results in the risk of being accused of provinciality by the news media and the area-wide good government critics.

The tension between those two roles encourages demagoguery in some and party loyalty in others. That few members of council accommodate successfully the conflict is reflected in the high turnover rate in the Cleveland City Council's membership, where only three of the 33 members in 1978 had served ten or more years and half had served six years or less.

City Government from a Mayor's Perspective. An inescapable characteristic of any mayor of the City of Cleveland is political ambition. Every mayor of Cleveland in the last 40 years has either viewed or experienced the mayor's post as a stepping-stone to higher office. Harold Burton became a U.S. Senator and Supreme Court Justice. Frank Lausche became Governor and U.S. Senator. Thomas Burke served briefly in the U. S. Senate. Anthony Celebrezze was appointed U. S. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Ralph Perk ran unsuccessfully for U.S. Senate. Only those who have been defeated as Cleveland's mayor have not gone on to a political position of higher pay and greater geographic scope.

Either to achieve that greater ambition or to retain the office of mayor, an incumbent Cleveland mayor needs to address issues that will attract attention from the mass media. To qualify for media coverage, it is helpful to find an issue which appeals to the media's multi-county constituency. One-way streets and stray dogs are not the political fare of either the mass media or a big city mayor.

Ambition, however, is not the only factor which keeps a Cleveland mayor from becoming intimately involved in small neighborhood concerns. Again, the geographic scope of the city, the magnitude of its population, the multiplicity of its functions, and the size of the municipal bureaucracy make impractical more than a token number of such involvements. Even in an eighteen-hour working day, the mayor of necessity must delegate responsibility for solving individual problems and must focus personal energies on the broader matters of budget, overall policies, councilmanic relations, cabinet level personnel, major interest groups, and public ceremonies.

Even a mayor whose primary concern is governmental administration finds it difficult to ensure the sound execution of policies. Municipal policies must be implemented by political subordinates through two, three, or more layers of civil service bureaucracy. No accounting system exists to determine if the ultimate workers – the zone car police, the housing inspectors, or the waste collectors – are working up to capacity. The output of such workers cannot easily be measured in units of production as in a factory or in volume of sales as in retailing. And there is no real profit and loss sheet on municipal performance except at the ballot box.

At the same time, the mayor finds that the civil service bureaucracy functions overwhelmingly, like every bureaucracy, to conceal its failures, to obscure responsibility, and to pursue its own policies. The civil service employee most often serves the mayor's interest simply by avoiding controversy. In government, there are few rewards for the administrator who identifies problems and initiates reform. Thus, even the mayor who wants to change and improve governmental practices finds it difficult to identify the weak programs and the defective personnel in the governmental apparatus.

For decades now, the primary approach of the typical Cleveland mayor has, therefore, been to select an image to project and to engage through the media in the image-making process without intensive attention to the day-to-day problems that concern residents and inundate council representatives.

City Government from the Perspective of Civil Service Employees. The civil service employee is the real decision-maker for most of the fundamental municipal services that touch residents. A political crisis or a vital mayoral priority is usually necessary to

bring the day-to-day work of civil service employees to the attention of the mayor or his or her immediate political associates. The civil service employee has a vested interest in the status quo, in freedom from supervisory interruption, and in higher wages. Often conscientious, usually honest, and nearly certain to outlast the political members of government, the civil service employee frequently has his or her own agenda and own policies. Those agendas and interests are protected for nearly all municipal workers by unions, and the municipal union leaders are important policy-makers who negotiate with the mayor and the appointed cabinet.

In the process of executing programs and addressing resident concerns, the civil servants and council members curry favor with each other. A successful councilperson is one who makes friends with or exercises power over key members of the civil service bureaucracy. Similarly, a successful civil servant has the same relations with council.

Perhaps the most striking example of civil service power in Cleveland was the waste collection disaster that occurred in the spring of 1979. A series of newspaper articles reported that uncollected trash had been accumulating for weeks in many city neighborhoods so that yards were severely littered and some streets nearly impassable. A City Council hearing revealed a major cause of the failure was that the absenteeism rate in the Waste Collection Department was 50 percent. In what suburb could such employment practices have prevailed or have so long gone undetected? Only where the civil service employees are stronger than the politically appointed supervisor can such a situation exist.

Even when the civil service employee reports for work, serious questions often exist as to the worker's production standard. For example, in Cleveland's waste collection department during the 1970s, waste collectors were paid for an eight-hour day but required only to service a specific route. When the route was completed the collector could go home with a full day's pay. The system gave highest priority to speed and lowest priorities to quality of performance and a full day's work.

A visit by the author to a Cleveland playground in the course of gathering material for this book revealed another kind of production problem. An unmarked city truck was observed at about

Uncollected litter on a
Cleveland playground.

E. MIRSKY

Accumulation of trash and garbage
in spring of 1979.

10:30 a. m. parked in the middle of the playground unattended. Its crew, assigned to pick up trash, was nowhere near. After a five minute search the crew was spotted some seventy-five yards from the truck concealed and seated in a grandstand. A later conversation with the crew leader revealed that he lived in a nearby suburb but owned four houses in the general vicinity of the playground. One would be justified in speculating from that experience on how much of the crew leader's paid time was spent on city work, how much on personal business, and how much resting. The appearance of the playfields for which the crew was responsible suggested that city work got low priority from the crew leader.

The nature of politics and civil service in Cleveland city government has afforded such extraordinary power to lower level city employees. Hiring is, in fact, the starting point for such power. As long as anyone can remember, hiring at nearly every level outside of the safety forces has been almost entirely political. Work in the mayor's campaign, friendship with a cabinet officer or member of council, or family ties to an existing employee have been prerequisites to employment. Minimal qualifications may be required for hiring, but seldom does the city compete in the job market at the civil service level for the most qualified. Through that hiring process, entire city departments have become fiefdoms of particular ethnic groups based upon an accumulation of contacts and ties which have given many employees near immunity from supervisory discipline. A supervisor who tries to impose standards that contravene the prevailing work ethic or that threaten a particular employee finds that the employee may work for the supervisor in theory but, in fact, the employee has such a multitude of ties to council members, influential relatives, friends, or union leaders that the employee can set his or her own standard of performance.

The Interplay of Political Forces in Big City Government. It must be apparent that the real process of government in the City of Cleveland, as in any large city, operates on two levels. One level addresses the day-to-day concerns of those who are the intended recipients of services. That level features the political interplay of resident, councilperson, and civil servant. Most municipal activities occur at that level. In that process, individual council members and selected civil servants make nearly every crucial decision

that affects a particular ward. It is invisible and often autocratic; but none of the participants in that process has substantial control over budget allocations.

The other level addresses city-wide policy including budget decisions. It enjoys the most publicity but only a few councilpersons, the mayor, top level administrators, and union leaders engage on that level. The overriding visible issues for years in Cleveland government have tended to be taxes, wages, and job security; but the resolution of those issues has seemed to have little bearing on the actual quality of service at the neighborhood level. A major reason is that those who have power to control policy and allocate funds in fact exercise only infrequent or insignificant power over the individuals who actually spend the budgeted money, police the streets, collect the garbage, or perform other basic city services.

Events in Cleveland over the last fifteen years and longer have demonstrated that Cleveland's municipal government has not been working well on either the level of local service delivery or on the level of city-wide policy making. City-wide policy making has long been characterized by confrontation and acrimony – good for the politicians and the media but not good for the people. Neighborhood service delivery has been characterized by excessive costs, low productivity, and unresponsiveness.

Viewed overall, Cleveland's political process has been historically torn asunder by four inherently competing factions – residents pushing council representatives and civil servants for services; overworked council representatives struggling to comprehend the totality of city operations while responding to the service demands of their constituents; entrenched civil service employees, each claiming his or her function is most important and having substantial independence; and a mayor devoting only minimal attention to service delivery problems while operating through political deputies who find themselves often frustrated by residents, government workers, and council representatives who often do not share the mayor's values.

Chapter 4

City Size and City Management

The largely wasteful and unproductive way in which Cleveland's government functions can be better understood if city government is compared to a single retail shoe business attempting to serve the shoe needs of all Cleveland's residents. That shoe business would need to operate from fifteen or twenty locations even if it did not have a monopoly on shoes for Cleveland. Shoes of satisfactory quality would have to be stocked; and courtesy and honesty of employees would have to be closely monitored. Performance standards would have to be established. The ultimate monitor would be the profit and loss statement for each retail outlet.

The company's president would have a single goal – to maximize profits by selling shoes. There would be a need to have close control over purchasing and sales personnel either directly or through trusted personnel. Stock would have to be modified to meet the tastes of the local community. Each retail outlet would not have an identical merchandise mix.

Unless operations were firmly established, the president would have to attend single-mindedly to the shoe business. The board of directors would receive financial reports to evaluate the business's performance. The management of such a business is difficult even with a clear goal (profits), a good shoe, a sound training program, careful supervision, and an adequate accounting system to measure performance and ultimate results.

What most differentiates city government from the hypothetical retail shoe business is that there is no accounting system to measure performance. Quality depends on the reliability of thousands of independent workers whose product is delivered directly without prior inspection or on-site supervision. Even the most conscientious mayor could not measure and control the ultimate output of municipal waste collection without a system of citizen feedback either directly or through council representatives. If that feedback occurs but the mayor's time is primarily devoted to personal interests and other city problems, the basic delivery of services cannot be managed by the chief executive.

Similarly, if the councilperson receives a complaint about services but is unable to pursue it because of the press of other complaints or the need to participate in general policy-making, services cannot be effectively monitored. Moreover, if there is no accounting system to measure the quality of performance by city workers, the council member cannot know if the complaint against a particular employee is justified or if it is a common failure; without an accounting system to measure performance, a councilman cannot monitor city services effectively unless there is personal knowledge of the individual municipal service employees or their supervisors, time to pursue particular citizen complaints, and basic agreement between the mayor and councilman on municipal priorities. In Cleveland, few of those essential ingredients ever exist, and they certainly never exist on a city-wide basis.

Those deficiencies stem primarily from the quantity of individual complaints, the frequent turnover in mayors and ward representatives, and the geographic and ethnic differences as to priorities in Cleveland. So long as those factors preclude effective executive control of the labor force, prevent effective consumer monitoring of service delivery, and forestall prompt or longlasting resolutions as to policy differences, Cleveland's municipal government will continue to function like a bankrupt shoe chain. At the core of all of those causes is Cleveland's size – both geographic and in the number of the city's residents – and the number of functions it attempts to perform.

A Closer View of Two City Services

A more detailed examination of two basic municipal functions – police protection and park preservation – reveals more fully how governmental size relates to efficiency, responsiveness, and initiative.

Police Protection. Repeated recent studies of urban police departments show that the dramatic activities of T.V. police officers in pursuing big-time crime or fleeing felons occupy a very minor portion of the work efforts of real-life, big city policemen. Much higher percentages of police time are spent in responding to domestic disputes, complaints about disruptive neighbors, reports of stolen cars, vandalism, and juvenile misbehavior. Even the most responsive police officers usually arrive when the criminal is far

from the scene. Courtesy, tact, and persistence are more significant than a fleet foot or a quick draw for a successful police officer in those situations. Those qualities are not glamorous and do not sell media advertising, but they are of high importance to a city resident's evaluation of police functioning.

When inner-city residents are concerned about the crimes which are publicized in the media—vice, narcotics, and other forms of organized crime—many regard their councilman, not the chief of police, as the first line of defense. For many Cleveland neighborhoods, it is often the councilman who receives the first tip on a house being used for prostitution or narcotics. Inner-city residents often do not trust the police to respond without political pressure. To overcome that suspected resistance, inner-city residents expect the councilman to pass their tips on to the police and, thereafter, to police the police.

When a burglary, robbery, or rape occurs, the police usually do not play an arresting function but discharge largely information-gathering and hand-holding roles. Most burglars and robbers are caught not because the police respond quickly but because the criminal bungles or the victims protect themselves or recognize the offender. Nine times out of ten even a quick police response is too late. Courtesy, tact, and persistence plus a thorough crime scene investigation and cooperation from possible witnesses again are essential to effective police work.

Effective police work requires base line officers who respect the residents they serve and who receive respect from those residents in return. In Cleveland, the failure of some police officers to show concern, courtesy, and tact in dealing with local residents is a common complaint. The failure of the police to display those qualities was of major importance in exacerbating the urban riots of the sixties. Contrary to the alarms of some politicians and writers, riots most frequently have arisen not from unemployment or outside agitators, but from an insensitive criminal justice system—especially the police. Although Cleveland police have improved in sensitivity since the sixties, many Cleveland residents who are victims of crime and call for police help still find the responding police officers rude or uncaring.

Cleveland's large population and large police force have created a constant conflict between the interests of neighborhood responsiveness and strong supervision. The size of the city and its

police force has required the police department to be decentralized into six districts, each commanded by an inspector or other high officer. The districts are subdivided, in turn, into zones often supervised by lesser grade officers.

Leadership of a particular district has often lacked responsiveness to the police chief downtown. At the same time, the district's commander has had a large population (100,000 to 150,000) to serve and a large body of personnel to supervise (250-400). The district commander's supervision has been diluted through a layer of lieutenants and sergeants. The base line patrolman and detective—insulated from the district commander and police chief, protected by their union, and functioning on a buddy system of two-man patrols—have had great freedom to adopt their own police styles and ethics.

The ethical problem may even affect those responsible for honesty. For example, during a 1970s trial of a police bribery case, the officer in charge of the investigation testified that he conducted surveillance of the suspected bribery from a car belonging to a major police towing contractor. The car had been given to him for his permanent personal use. It never occurred to this investigating officer, responsible for ferreting out police dishonesty, that the car he was driving was a form of graft. No superior officer or civilian official had approved the officer's receipt of that gift from a city contractor; but the officer evidenced no embarrassment in testifying about it, and no action was taken against him for it.

To maintain some control at the top of the police hierarchy, a dominant concern for years of the police chief in Cleveland has been to break up cliques and entrenchments of power at the district and zone level. When the famed Eliot Ness became Cleveland's Safety Director under Mayor Burton, Ness took control by consolidating Cleveland's 16 police districts with their separate station houses and jails into the present six districts. More recently, cliques have been prevented by frequent transfers of all police personnel from district to district and between the district and the central police headquarters. A five- to seven-year turnover of personnel at the district level is not unusual in the Cleveland Police Department.

Frequent transfers are essential in a large police department even if loyalty and honesty are not significant worries. Knowledgeable police leadership at central police headquarters requires

top commanders who have worked in a variety of positions and geographic sectors. Thus, there are positive as well as negative reasons which force a large police organization into a policy of personnel assignment that is incompatible with the best service to consumers of police service.

While the transfer system has preserved a semblance of top-level control that has prevented gross inefficiency and widespread corruption, it has also prevented large numbers of dedicated police officers from providing their highest level of esprit de corps. The kind of close cooperation and respect between officers and residents that stems from long-standing relationships, professional pride, and community loyalty is lost when policemen are moved from zone to zone and when district teams are broken.

Also dominant factors in the Cleveland Police Department are the two police unions. Although the union strength is necessary to protect the men from hostile residents, politicians, and arbitrary supervisors, unionism undermines the co-operation among politicians, police supervisors, base line officers, and residents that is necessary for an effective public safety program.

The combined interaction of conflicting union loyalty among police officers and the impotence of big government have produced in Cleveland a police department that is tolerant of inefficiency, minor corruption, and discourtesy to citizens. It is doubtful that a single police officer has been released from the Cleveland police force in four decades because of discourteous treatment of civilians. Brutality may bring only a transfer.

By contrast, in suburban police forces both discourtesy and brutality to residents typically bring forced resignations, if not legal action. The example of suburban police departments is that they tend, on the whole, to have a high level of morale, respond quickly and courteously to complaints, perform at a high level of professionalism in investigating crime, and have low levels of corruption.

There are exceptions to be sure. But those exceptions, because they are isolated in separate municipalities, are not likely to become the rotten apples that will ruin an entire barrel of suburban police departments in the Cleveland metropolitan area, and where problems become apparent, either the civilian government or electorate is sufficiently strong in the overwhelming number of suburbs to correct the deficiency. The reputation of suburban police

departments is high among those county officials who see them on a daily basis in the criminal justice system.

The fears of some political theorists that the smaller suburban police forces would be financially inefficient and would be impaired by jurisdictional limitations have not been borne out by experience. The primary police investment is in personnel, not in equipment. Thus, effective personnel management is more important to cost effectiveness than the ability of a typical suburban police department to spread capital costs over a large tax base.

Similarly, experience has demonstrated that geographic boundaries do not limit the ability of suburban police to pursue the perpetrators of crime in their areas. The legal doctrine of "hot pursuit" enables suburban police to pursue across municipal boundaries and arrest in other jurisdictions; professional courtesies are also extended by neighboring police departments so that they often assist each other in investigating crimes after the suspect has eluded police and concealed himself or evidence in another city; and many suburbs have signed written cooperation agreements by which one police department agrees to respond to calls for help by residents in another suburb or in which detective activities are pooled.

The lesson of police departments in those suburbs having a certain minimum population – approximately 10,000 – is that they are able to perform every essential police function of the large central city at a per capita and per officer cost that is lower than in the central city or at a performance level that is equal to or higher than that of the central city police department. Two studies – one published in the book *Policing Metropolitan America* by Ostrim, Parks and Whitaker and the other entitled *The Economics of Scale and Municipal Police Services* by Norman Walzer support this conclusion.

A comparison of available ratios of police officers to population for the City of Cleveland as a whole, for one Cleveland Police District, and for certain adjacent suburbs in May, 1980 reveals that while the City of Cleveland as a whole has a substantially better ratio of police to residents than do suburbs, Cleveland's neighborhoods have a worse ratio than the suburbs. If Cleveland were to have the same ratio of officers to residents as there are in East Cleveland, it would have 909 police officers – less than half of its present complement.

One reason for this greater number of total Cleveland police officers is the extensive use of two-man police cars in Cleveland. But two-man police cars are not the sole explanation. Another reason is that neighborhoods, even with two-man cars, receive less than their proportionate share of the assigned officers. The disequilibrium is caused by large numbers of officers being assigned to the downtown area, where resident population is low, and to central police headquarters. The obvious conclusion is that city-wide resources are being used to subsidize downtown needs and to maintain central control while neighborhood needs and decentralized control receive lower priority. If neighborhood priorities were emphasized, the Fourth District might have enjoyed in 1980 the 1-616 ratio of police to residents the East Cleveland experienced instead of its 1-850 ratio.

Parks. One of the great tragedies in Cleveland since World War II has been the decline of its park system. Once heralded as the "Forest City," most of Cleveland's parks were in place by 1900. From 1950 to 1975, however, the city lost many acres of parkland. In the period from 1965 to 1975, annual expenditures for parks (not counting recreation activities and shade trees) declined from over $2,000,000 to $741,000.

Parks are not a governmental frill. They enhance surrounding property values because they enhance life. Just as waste collection, a component of sanitation, is vital to a resident's physical health and police protection relates to personal safety, so parks play an important part in human mental health. They are the places where children play, lovers embrace, and older persons stroll. The rural poor are exhilarated by the entire outdoors; but poor urban dwellers add nothing but depression to their lives if we offer dilapidated parks to their already sparse homes. And if parks are lost or allowed to deteriorate or become unsafe, the livability of the surrounding area declines.

The loss of Cleveland's park acreage since 1950 and the deterioration of remaining park property are directly related to political will. Compared to improved land, the market value of parkland is low; and it is the first target of road builders, other municipal departments, and expanding industry. Cleveland's parkland was lost not because of the city's mounting fiscal burdens but because the residents most affected by the threatened parkland lacked the

political clout to resist those who wanted to divert the land to other uses.

That conclusion is illustrated by comparing a successful suburban battle to protect the Shaker Lakes from highway acquisition in the 1960s and 70s and Cleveland's response to the same demand for highway rights of way. The political battle in each community was over the Lee and Clark Freeways – an enterprise that most greatly benefits residents of the outer suburbs. Land for the Clark Freeway through Cleveland involved substantial loss of parkland. Acquisition of that property brought little resistance from Cleveland officials. However, when it was revealed that the eastern extension of the Clark Freeway, together with a proposed northern spur from Interstate 480, would virtually obliterate one Shaker Lake and other Shaker Heights parkland, affected Shaker and Cleveland Heights residents revolted.

Initially, those residents were opposed by the mayors and city councils of both suburbs, who felt that resistance to interstate highways was futile. However, within the relatively small constituencies of those suburbs, the affected residents were able to make their small numbers felt. Ultimately, the mayors and councilmen joined them in a political march to the county engineer's office, the governor's office, and to Washington. In Washington, the freeway fighters found some allies in the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads. They gained support of their congressmen and state representatives. Throughout this entire effort, the mayor and council of Cleveland were virtual bystanders, but thousands of residents in Cleveland's East Side neighborhoods benefited from the suburban endeavor to stop the eastward extension of the freeway.

Although Shaker and Cleveland Heights residents tend to possess wealth and influence not available to inner-city residents, none of the suburban leaders in the Lee-Clark Freeway conflict possessed prominent wealth or influence. Indeed, at the outset, the mayors and city council representatives were reluctant to offend state officials by opposing freeway extensions that might not occur for six or ten years. The primary strength of the residential freeway fighters was that their numbers and contacts were more effective in constituencies of 60,000 or less than in a city of over a half million. They had fewer city officials to influence and closer ties to them than they would have had in a much larger city.

An example of the comparative impotence of Cleveland residents to oppose loss of parkland was seen in 1973 when residents of East 93rd and Kinsman sought to prevent the building of a police station on the western portion of Woodland Hills (now Luke Easter) Park. An adequate, cleared alternative site existed close-by on private property, but its acquisition cost was considerably higher than the land zoned for park use. The councilperson for the area did not support the residents because she believed that the lower cost justified diversion of the parkland to the Police Department. The residents who fought the proposed police station lived close to the intended site, and they were simply portrayed as selfish individuals trying to thwart public safety to protect their own property. As a result, a large part of the only portion of Woodland Hills Park suitable to undisturbed play by small children was destroyed, private houses abutting it were diminished in value, but there is no evidence to date that the new police station has reduced the crime rate.

Consider how different the result might have been if land use at East 93rd and Kinsman had been controlled by any suburb, rich or poor, but having a small constituency. Is it not likely that one or more of the council members would have taken up the cause of the residents, especially when it became apparent that the new police station contained a port for landing helicopters in that residential area? Is it not likely that important modifications would have been made in many aspects of the police station's design even if its location was not changed?

As it was, the residents near Woodland Hills Park learned of the proposed station only at the last minute. The city officials refused to delay construction while resident complaints were under discussion. The parkland was destroyed and trees demolished by a ground-breaking before the residents even consulted a lawyer. No significant design changes were made.

The lesson seems clear – in battles to preserve residential assets, residents in smaller political units have greater political power than residents in larger political units.

Size and Corruption. When governments violate the private work ethic or fail to provide services or protection, voters withhold taxes. When public failures involve dishonesty, governments often fall. Size and corruption have so long been associated in municipal politics that a discussion of the topic may seem trite.

Nearly every large city in America, including Cleveland, has had its era of corruption at the very top. After Cleveland adopted the city-manager form of government in 1924, the finger of corruption shifted to lower levels. Despite decades of mayors respected for their integrity, Cleveland has never been able fully to restore public trust to its other public officials.

Between 1975 and 1980, three significant scandals scarred City Hall. Two involved council members. Seven council members, altogether, were indicted for alleged acceptance of bribes. One was convicted and imprisoned. Three were acquitted, and charges against the others were dismissed. A third scandal involved a scheme of embezzling city fire hydrants which was uncovered among middle management and basic employees. Indictments and convictions were returned. A fourth, perhaps minor, scandal budded in 1980 when a study of Cleveland's municipal bureaucracy by private business executives disclosed corruption in, of all places, the municipal dog pound. Prize animals seized as strays were being sold for personal gain by city dog wardens and keepers. The total of corrupt activities uncovered in suburban government during this same period was minute by comparison.

Dishonesty has many sources. Sometimes the employee is inherently dishonest. Even the best system will make mistakes by hiring inherently corrupt individuals. All that can be expected is that the system, itself, will uncover and discard the dishonest employee. In Cleveland, the governmental system has not been notably successful in discovering and uprooting dishonesty on its own.

The worst system is one that tempts corruption even from the honest citizen, businessman, political official, or public employee. That failing for Cleveland was revealed in the mid 1970s when the Cleveland Clinic – world renowned as a medical center – became embroiled in bribing a Cleveland city councilman.

Successful institutions like Cleveland Clinic often appear to their poorer residential neighbors to prevail where the poor cannot. But their success is only partial and at unnecessary cost. Cleveland Clinic, for example, has had a reputation in its neighborhood of being aloof. Its land development strategy has been to wall out the surrounding neighborhood – in part because the city was too unresponsive for it to join in a common effort. In the early

1970s its officials participated in a bribe of the local councilman to secure a zoning approval.

One reason that bribery became an acceptable choice to Cleveland Clinic officials was that even an institution with its power and prestige was not confident it could communicate with the mayor and the warring factions at City Hall. Cleveland Clinic did not, in fact, have the necessary network of friends at City Hall to believe it could resist the solicitation of money by a councilman. Bribing only one councilman was sufficient because in a council of 33 members, each of whom serves an area sufficient to be a subcity, no other council representative will question a colleague's preference on zoning matters in the colleague's ward.

Cleveland Clinic's strategy over the years has been perceived by many residents as buying land, then using its power to force the city government to accept its land planning scheme. Any prior discussions that, in fact, have occurred with city officials have historically been invisible to and distrusted by many nearby residents. Because the problems of communication in a big city have seemed so difficult, Cleveland Clinic often has found itself at war with the adjacent community.

If Cleveland Clinic were obliged to deal with a smaller government, communications might seem easier to its leaders; and the bribery its agents employed in the 1970's would have seemed far less practical to its decision-makers. With a more localized government to solicit, Cleveland Clinic would probably have found ways to establish positive communication and publicly to invest more extensively in neighborhood projects that create community goodwill. Although the corruption of a city official by anyone is not to be excused, it is nonetheless important to understand how the complexity and concentration of power in a big city government tempts corruption even from those who hold themselves out to be above such perfidy.

The Missing Ingredients in Large Cities. In summary, size would seem to have the inherent capacity to cripple large cities in four ways. First, it makes communication difficult between the consumers of public service and the managers of the service. Second, poor communication with the service consumers undermines the ability of top management to evaluate and correct the performance of those who directly render service. Next, the sheer number of problems renders superficial the attention to individual

problems of even the most dedicated top manager. Finally frustration and temptation then conspire to enhance opportunities for dishonesty. In such an environment, distrust and conflict easily reach extreme proportions.

Studies conducted in the 1970s by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, the National Academy of Public Administration, and scholars such as Elinor Ostrom, Roger Parks, and Gordon Whittaker have confirmed that economies of scale in service delivery do not result once a city exceeds 25,000 residents. Practical and historical analyses seem to suggest further that excessive size is, in fact, an administrative liability.

Chapter 5

In Search of a Solution

The most popular wisdom calls for solving the problems of the City of Cleveland either through some form of regional government, through a smaller city council, through a four year term for mayor, or a combination thereof. Many thoughtful and well-intentioned leaders see Cleveland's primary problems as ones of unity between the mayor and the city council and lack of money. They overlook the inherent disunity of over a half-million people from strikingly different backgrounds and the incapacity of even a well-financed and harmonious city government of such size to function effectively. The supporters of a larger government, a smaller council, or a stronger mayor forget that as long ago as 1920 the central city's government did not meet most residents' view of effective government and that since 1924 suburbanites have voted consistently against annexation to Cleveland.

Political reality is that the City of Cleveland will not in our lifetimes be incorporated into a regional government. The residents of the City of Cleveland will not permit it, nor would suburbanites relinquish their power to such a super-municipality.

A smaller council will make residential concerns less likely to be perceived. A longer term for mayor will diminish the mayor's need to focus on headline issues but it will not significantly increase his ability to focus on or identify the myriad of service delivery failures and investment needs that are known only to civil service level management. One need only examine other older American cities with four-year mayors to find that they, too, fail to match the record of their adjacent suburbs for honesty, cost efficiency, and service quality.

A clear lesson of history is that police and fire protection, waste collection, snow removal, street repair, dog catching, and real property protection cannot be administered well by a government whose primary leaders are overwhelmed by the number of problems they must face, who are unable to maintain close personal observation of the particular individuals that must do the city's work, and who are unable to talk personally and regularly with individual residents about the problems which munic-

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ipalities were originally created to solve. In delivering traditional municipal services, smaller may be better.

Some may argue that larger government will produce economies of scale or provide a larger real estate tax base for the City of Cleveland's needs. Neither argument is well founded.

In 1976, for example, Cleveland's per capita real estate base ($4,163) was about the same as Parma's ($4,282) and substantially more than Cleveland Heights ($3,150), Garfield Heights ($3,040), Lakewood ($2,860), and East Cleveland ($2,360), but each suburb provided a higher level of service at a lower per capita cost.

Nor is the real estate tax base as important to municipal finance as it once was. Since 1950 there has been a dramatic change in the sources both of a central city's operating income and funds for capital improvements. In 1976, more than 30 percent of total income for Cleveland came from the federal or state government. More than 25 percent of Cleveland's total income was derived from the local income tax, and much of that came from non-residents. Less than 45 percent was collected through real estate taxes.

There is no reason to believe that federal and state financing of local government is a temporary phenomenon. It is the predominant financing pattern for most big cities of the world. With the availability of federal funds and municipal income taxes, a city government which maintains or expands its role as an employment center can retain its local financial base even with a declining, aging, or dependent residential population.

Analysis also leads to the conclusion that economies of scale do not necessarily result from increasing the size of municipal government. The fundamental ingredients of sound management that produce such economies in private business do not always exist in the public sector. For example, large service enterprises may produce profits for shareholders or top-level management, but they are difficult to manage effectively without decentralization and often require that local managers share in both the risk and the profit. Thus, in fast-food retailing, where profits depend on repeat business based on customer satisfaction, the franchise arrangement offers ownership, profit-sharing, and risk assumption to the local manager. That ownership arrangement goes hand in hand with effective delivery of service and satisfied managers.

A basic principle of modern management of large businesses is that responsibility for decision making including expenditures, hiring, and firing should be fixed as low as possible in the management structure. In many large businesses, performance standards are set at the top but hiring, firing, and expenditure decisions are made in the subsidiaries, branches, or districts.

The same management principles apply to local government, but the pattern of ownership and risk taking is different. In local government, it is the voter who has the most significant ownership interest. It is the voter who bears the brunt of the risk, and who benefits if there is a profit. The evidence seems to confirm that because the resident's control over his or her government is greater in the smaller suburban government, service delivery in suburban government is more efficient compared to central city government.

The conclusion is supported by comparing expenditures by the City of Cleveland for certain services with costs of the same services in the suburbs. Cleveland in 1976 spent more per resident for services to residents ($234.92) than any city in Cuyahoga County including Shaker Heights ($224.95), Brooklyn ($220.62). Euclid ($210.66), and Brook Park ($195.44). It spent more for direct police protection per capita ($50.38) than any suburb including the adjacent suburbs of Brooklyn ($42.28) and East Cleveland ($29.11); yet Cleveland provided its residents with less police service than those suburbs (see Table IV).

It is noteworthy also that Cleveland's per capita receipts from local taxes in 1976 were $161.92 – significantly more than Garfield Heights ($85.22), South Euclid ($94.75), East Cleveland ($100.45), Cleveland Heights ($116.04), and Lakewood ($117.05), all of which have reputations for delivering a better quality of municipal service than the City of Cleveland.

Cleveland raised and spent those relatively large amounts of money while having by far the poorest residential population in the area. Per capita income in 1974 for Cleveland residents was $3,925.00 compared with $4,841.00 per person in East Cleveland, the next city in per capita wealth. Cleveland seems to be able to raise municipal revenue despite the poverty of its residents (see Table V).

Before one determines that availability of funds is Cleveland's major problem, one should consider seriously how effectively those funds are being managed, and if they are ineffectively used,

TABLE IV
Comparison of Total Per Capita Governmental Expenses and Per Capita Expenses for Police and Waste Collection in Cleveland and Adjacent Municipalities for the Year 1976*

	Per Capita Expenses for All Basic City Services**	Per Capita Expenses for Police and Waste Collection	Percent of Basic Service Expended for Police and Waste Collection
East Cleveland	$127.52	$66.44	52.10
Cleveland Heights	139.61	60.49	43.33
Brooklyn	220.62	91.78	41.60
Euclid	210.66	86.29	40.96
Garfield Heights	93.42	34.69	37.13
Shaker Heights	224.95	78.27	34.79
Lakewood	136.12	51.68	34.12
Parma	97.88	29.26	29.89
Cleveland	234.92	59.62	25.37

*Based upon *Financial Report for Ohio Cities, Auditor of State, 1976.*
**See note to Table V.

TABLE V
Comparison of Per Capita Income* of Residents in Cleveland and Adjacent Municipalities with Governmental Income and Expenses for Basic Services** in the Year 1976***

	Personal Income	Local Tax Receipts	Government Expenses for Basic Services
Cleveland	$3,925	$161.92	$234.92
East Cleveland	4,841	100.45	127.52
Garfield Heights	4,927	82.67	93.42
Parma	5,257	85.22	97.88
Brooklyn	5,274	191.73	220.62
Euclid	5,799	183.66	210.66
Lakewood	5,863	117.05	136.12
Cleveland Heights	6,289	116.04	139.61
Shaker Heights	9,651	187.66	224.95

*Information supplied by the Regional Planning Commission.
**Government Expenses for Basic Services are the following expense categories listed in the Auditor of State's 1976 Financial Report for Ohio Cities: Security of persons and property (but not the sub-category "other"); Public Health and Welfare services; Leisure Time Activities; Community Environment and Basic utilities (but not the sub-category "Electric Utility"); Transportation Facilities (but not the sub-category "Airport").
***Population assumption is 1970 census figure.

why? Could it be that with so many constituencies in Cleveland wanting a piece of the pie, everyone gets a little, but no one gets enough of what she or he most desires?

The *Lessons of Experience.* Is there a lesson for the City of Cleveland to learn from its own past experiences and from other municipal experiences? The first lesson is that well-managed city governments should concentrate on their primary obligations. The primary obligations of municipal government have historically been to provide for the safety, sanitation, property maintenance, and recreation of its residents. If changing times have left Cleveland with responsibilities that are no longer appropriate to city government, that serve the needs of nonresidents more than residents, or that divert needed resources from the areas of primary municipal responsibility, then the control and financing of those other municipal functions should be reexamined.

Divestiture and Reduction of Secondary Responsibilities. Operating programs which do not relate to primary municipal obligations must be reduced or divested to balance the city's present or anticipated income against its anticipated expenses. Even General Motors must sometimes relinquish Frigidaire to enhance Chevrolet. The hypothetical shoe retailer mentioned in a previous paragraph might discontinue selling jogging shoes and hiking boots if he found that others could market them better and that they were unprofitable for him.

Some municipal services were originally undertaken by the City of Cleveland in its heyday of growth from 1890 to 1930 because no other entity existed to perform them. Public markets, public bathhouses, the zoo, the workhouse, and Metropolitan General Hospital are just a few of the public facilities which were built or flourished in that period when no other governmental entity or public revenue source existed to meet those important needs. Some have been discontinued and others transferred to other management.

For any public service, it is less important who performs it than that it be performed adequately, cheaply, and without impairing more primary obligations of the City of Cleveland. The City of Cleveland may well find it desirable to shift some of its functions to other entities.

For example, perhaps the city's few remaining health services and its house of corrections should be transferred to the county.

Cleveland in 1976 spent $3.46 per person for care and treatment of the ill; East Cleveland spent $2.43 per capita; and Garfield Heights spent nothing. Metropolitan General Hospital was transferred from city to county responsibility a number of years ago. The remaining health service delivery functions might well be relinquished to the county. Experience shows that suburban residents have been willing to vote taxes for county-run health services.

The workhouse, conceived at a time when today's suburbs were farmland and few crimes were committed outside Cleveland, is now a mere shadow of its former self. Yet the concept of a work program for criminal offenders is as viable today as it was in 1913 when the workhouse was created. The city has already placed the financial needs of the workhouse near the bottom of its priority list, although in 1976 it spent $1,185,422 on that facility.

Meanwhile both the state and county have a primary interest in criminal justice, and crime has moved to the suburbs. Plans are now being considered at the state level for the development of state correctional facilities close to urban areas. Perhaps the future of the workhouse is as a facility operated by the county, financed largely by the state, but available to offenders from Cleveland, suburban, and county courts.

Muny Light—the "bete noire" of recent political confrontation—presents another case for possible divestiture. The commitment to preserve Muny Light as a competitive force with which to challenge the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company has been clearly established. However, the documented inability of Cleveland to manage this enterprise properly is even older than the documented skulduggery of CEI. Perhaps Muny Light should be removed permanently from "muny" politics?

One solution might be to convert Muny Light to a consumer cooperative. Consumer electrical co-ops have functioned for years to serve poor rural consumers. Perhaps there is a new form of urban electric cooperative which might better serve the people who use it than does municipal ownership of Muny Light?

Cities Within A City: The Vehicle for Delivering Primary Municipal Service

The divestiture of secondary programs that would be better operated by other entities still would not solve the inability

of Cleveland simultaneously to provide satisfactory primary municipal services to Glenville, Buckeye-Woodland, Broadway, Ohio City, Old Brooklyn, Westpark, and the Tremont areas. The difficulty in delivering police protection, refuse collection, snow removal, and the other services received directly by all of Cleveland's 573,000 residents is only partly financial. In truth, 2,000 policemen, 1,000 trash collectors, and 100 housing inspectors serving more than 500,000 people represent departments too large to be managed effectively through a political organization.

Why not consider creating within the City of Cleveland 15 or 20 smaller cities the size of Cleveland's more harmonious and unified suburbs? Those sub-cities could be part of a federated Cleveland within the historic city's existing boundaries just as the 50 states are part of the United States.

What is contemplated is a two-tiered system of municipal government in which matters of common city-wide impact would be controlled by a central government or top tier, and matters of local concern which admit of legitimate local differences would be decided and administrated by sub-cities constituting a lower tier. To the sub-cities would be given complete administrative control over primary municipal services—police, fire, refuse collection, snow removal, street repair, local parks, recreation, and real property protection and improvement. However, control of taxation, accounting, central purchasing, and revenue distribution would be a function of the central government. The City of Cleveland would not change its boundaries, but functions would be reallocated within the existing boundaries (see Tables VI and VII).

Most of the taxes now collected by the City of Cleveland would be distributed by the central government to the sub-cities according to a formula to be devised when the sub-cities were established. The new sub-cities would then utilize that money to deliver primary services according to their own priorities.

Allocation of money by formula from the federal government is not unusual. Formulas govern the present federal revenue sharing system and are used by state government to allocate funds for education. In England, the Local Government Act of 1966 allocates funds from the national to local government by a formula that considers, among other factors, the number of people in different age groupings, the population density, the miles of roads per 1,000 people, and changes in rates of economic growth. There are obvi-

TABLE VI
A Possible Structure
of
Two-Tiered Municipal Government

Top-Tier City Government

| Council (9 Members) | Mayor | Civil Servants |

Boards and Commissions

Sub-City No. 1

| Council (7 Members) | Mayor | Civil Servants |

Boards and Commissions

Sub-City No. 2

| City Manager | Civil Servants |

| Council (9 Members) | Mayor |

Boards and Commissions

Sub-City No. 3

| Council (5 Members) | City Manager |

Boards and Commissions

Civil Servants

Constituency of Voters

ous relationships between waste collection costs and populations, between street or sidewalk repair and distance, between park maintenance and acreage, and between housing inspection and dwelling units.

Typical of functions performed by the central city government would be tax collection and distribution, payroll, central purchasing, auditing, management consulting, and enforcement of equal opportunity hiring. The advantages of computerization could also be retained by the central government. However, actual hiring and firing of sub-city employees and decisions to purchase for sub-city use would be made by the new lower tier governments.

The existing Cleveland City Council could be reduced to a manageable number – perhaps as few as nine. That central council would vote city-wide taxes and would make policy for the retained functions of the central city government. Those council representatives would be legislators, not ombudsmen for complaints about barking dogs or poor trash collection. ·

The new sub-cities could have a variety of structures and sizes to conform with natural affinities of people within a realistic area for delivery of services. Ethnic identity would not be ignored in determining these sub-city boundaries, but each sub-city would have boundaries which permitted the ultimate development of recreational, educational, commercial, and other business sites suited to the needs of its inhabitants. Populations might vary from 10,000 to 60,000 individuals so long as they were administratively viable. Thus, a sub-city of Glenville might serve 60,000 people with a mayor-council form of government which would include seven councilmen elected partly at large and partly from the old wards.

The Superior-St. Clair area from the Inner Belt to Liberty Boulevard might be its own sub-city containing less than 20,000 people. The area served by Near West Side Neighbors in Action could have its own mayor and city council rather than no access to the mayor and service from portions of three council representatives. Existing Wards 6 and 9 might be reconstituted into their historic identity as a new Old Brooklyn, and Wards 14 and 15 (Old Warsaw) might share their ethnic heritage as a sub-city. Old West Park might be restored as a new entity. Downtown might be its own sub-city.

TABLE VII
Possible Allocation of Functions.
in a
Two-Tiered Municipal Government

Functions of the Top Tier (Central Government)	Functions of Lower Tier (Sub-cities)	Possible Shared Functions of the Central Municipal Government and the Sub-cities
Taxation and Revenue Allocation to Sub-cities	Zoning	Police
Supportive Services	Street Repair	Fire
Payroll	Housing Code Enforcement	Emergency Medical
Accounting	Waste Collection	Repair and Clearance of
Central Purchasing	Traffic Control	Arterial Roads
Scientific Police Investigation	Off-street Parking	Sewers
Budgeting	Elderly Services	Commercial Development
	Neighborhood Park	Industrial Development
Management of City-wide Facilities	Maintenance and Development	
Airport	Housing Development	
Convention Center	Municipal Legal Services	
Greenhouse	Street Light Maintenance	
Markets	Rodent and Animal Control	
Workhouse	Tree Planting	
Waste Disposal	Snow Removal	
Major City Parks	Accident Investigation	
	Recreation	
Adjudication of Damage Claims and	Land Clearance	
Criminal Cases	Adjudication of Traffic and Housing Code	
	Violations	
	Prosecution of Misdemeanor and	
	Minor Offenses	

Within these sub-cities, the mayors, city managers, and council representatives would perform functions much more appropriate to the needs of their constituents. The mayor or city manager would have day-to-day responsibility for waste collection, police, and the other traditional municipal functions. In contemporary Cleveland, residents expect the councilman to solve a problem if the police don't respond. Under a system of sub-cities, the sub-city mayor or manager would have the responsibility for redressing such service complaints, but the chief executive would also have the power which the councilman now lacks.

With real power to respond to citizen complaints about service in the hands of the sub-city's chief executive, council members would play a policy-making role – studying, planning and approving the sub-city's future. However, the policy making would be more democratic since five or more representatives would serve the area of a sub-city instead of the single councilman who now exercises both veto and command for a Cleveland ward.

Governmental continuity within the sub-city would also be enhanced. Only an occasional sub-city mayor would rise to mayor of the entire city, and it would be rare when a single election removed an entire council. Thus, sub-cities could have continuity of policy-making personnel to develop and implement long-term policies for their development.

The natural alliances and capacities of the new sub-cities to generate new resources and deliver services is immediately apparent. In Hough-Fairfax, for example, there would be a sizable institutional base. Industries like White Motor, Warner and Swasey, and the Cleveland Clinic would be joined with black and white residents; but the residents would have the voting power. Political trade-offs would inevitably result, but the existence of the new sub-city would increase the possibility that the residents would be aware of the magnitude of and need for such a trade-off.

Supportive volunteerism – an essential component of any thriving municipal community – would be substantially restored by creating these sub-cities.

A recent study by Dr. George Gallup concluded that large cities today contain a vast reservoir of untapped volunteer talent. The poll showed that 57 percent of central city residents said they were willing, without pay, to serve on boards and commissions, to maintain parks and conduct recreation activities, to work as police

auxiliary – even to collect trash and garbage. The average person polled was willing to contribute 9.3 hours per month; but there was much greater willingness to volunteer work on neighborhood problems than on city-wide problems.

In modern suburbia many vital municipal services are rendered by volunteers. Many depend on parent volunteers to lead their youth programs. Most suburban zoning, planning, or other boards offer nominal pay at best to board members. Brecksville still has a volunteer fire department. And in all but a few suburbs payments for service on councils, boards, and commissions are more token than compensatory payments. No suburb pays a councilperson enough to justify full-time service.

Groups like Near West Side Neighbors would work in concert with rather than in confrontation to city government; and volunteerism would probably be greatly increased.

In the City of Cleveland, however, few services are rendered today except for a handsome price. Councilmen in the City of Cleveland earn $18,000 per year. But in Shaker Heights, a city with more people than any Cleveland ward, the total of salaries for seven councilmen was only $9,000 in 1978. Similar budget levels are true in Berea, East Cleveland, Beachwood, Brooklyn Heights, and Newburgh Heights. The highest council salary in any suburb in 1978 was $5,900 for the council president in Parma. Most suburban councilmen in 1978 were paid under $3,000 per year.

If 17 new sub-cities each elected seven councilmen at salaries of $2,500 each, the combined cost of those legislative branches would be half that of Cleveland's present City Council for a savings of $295,000 – enough still left to provide the top-tier's City Council 16 members at their present $18,000 annual salary.

Volunteerism would be restored in another part of the political process as well. In the suburbs, tax levies rise and fall with resident volunteers. In the City of Cleveland, levies are now promoted largely by city workers, the news media, and suburbanites. It has been decades since a truly citizen-based effort was mounted in Cleveland to raise needed municipal revenues.

The present problem of volunteerism in Cleveland is that when Cleveland residents now volunteer their efforts on city problems, the efforts are channeled to resist or overpower the central city government rather than to organize support and implement agreed programs. Is there any doubt that such misdirection of

human energy is inherent in the size and distance of the central city's government? A federated Cleveland, composed of cities within a city, would be a major instrument in restoring a new spirit to the inner city that is essential to its forward progress.

The spirit would focus on uniting people around needs that they perceive to share with others. The new sub-cities would also become stronger advocates for local needs in the financial halls of the greater federal, state, and county governments. Indeed, each new sub-city should be free to devise its own plan and market its own needs to public and private funding sources.

The new sub-cities might also be expected to develop programs to attract new residents. In Hough, for example, the Hough Area Development Corporation is already engaged in a program to build single-family homes for ownership by middle-income families. As a particular new sub-city gained a reputation for offering decent municipal services, its population might be expected to stabilize and grow in affluence.

Only a detailed analysis could reveal whether the creation of sub-city mayors or managers would increase or decrease the number of managerial positions. Since service delivery jobs would simply be redistributed geographically, no increase in service delivery jobs would result. Some functions would be eliminated. For example, why would the police need special community relations officers, or why would the new central government for Cleveland maintain a community relations staff?

A Cleveland of federated sub-cities would also offer a real possibility that black-white political confrontation would be reduced in the new Cleveland. The experience of racial integration in existing suburbia has not been easy; but, politically, it has been far more successful than in the City of Cleveland. The sharing of common interests among people as neighbors has served both in suburbia and in existing Cleveland neighborhoods greatly to overcome ethnic and racial differences. There exists a real spirit of racial cooperation in both the Buckeye-Woodland and Superior-St. Clair neighborhood organizations that stands as eloquent testimony that people who are neighbors can bury their racial or ethnic prejudices to work together in the common good. But the historic clash between East and West in Cleveland over more than a century is support for the further proposition that distance breeds conflict even among individuals who are racially or culturally similar.

Sub-Cities of Cleveland

1. Downtown
2. Near West Side
3. Tremont-Clark Fulton
4. North West
5. Mid West
6. West Park
7. Old Brooklyn
8. Superior-St. Clair
9. Near East Side

10. Hough-Fairfax
11. Glenville
12. Waterloo Beach
13. Collinwood
14. Buckeye-Woodland
15. Broadway-Miles
16. Mt. Pleasant
17. Southeast Cleveland

Chapter 6

The Shape of the Sub-Cities

What would be the shape of the new sub-cities within the existing City of Cleveland? Let us again examine the suburban experience. Suburban boundaries have been largely determined by three factors—physical barriers such as main streets, rivers or ravines; the political boundaries of other cities; and the boundaries of the farms, country estates or other large land parcels that once existed at the peripheries of the intended suburbs. They create realistic limitations for cohesive management of the financial, physical and political ingredients of effective local government.

Boundaries for sub-cities within a city would take into account similar considerations. Many of those features inside the City of Cleveland now represent almost insurmountable barriers to continuity of municipal service. At Cleveland's beginning, natural barriers were the lake, rivers, ravines and hillsides. Some sections of Cleveland, such as Old Brooklyn (south of Brookside Park and Riverside Cemetery) and Old Newburgh (the Broadway area) developed unique feelings of separateness because of physical barriers.

In the late 1800's, railroads were placed near the shore of Lake Erie and along all the major river beds and ravines. Industry was given priority for development along those rights of way. A few connecting rail lines were added to create new manmade barriers of track and industry. In the intervening years, we have added freeways and cemeteries adjacent to those same barriers.

The suburbs have grown around Cleveland, and industry has filled the valleys in such a way that the residential area of Cleveland is like a four fingered hand. The Cuyahoga River divides those fingers in two, and railroad tracks and freeways sub-divide each group further. Cleveland's residential areas have been largely separated on the north from the region's major natural asset—Lake Erie. Cleveland is quite unlike the adjacent suburbs of Euclid, Bratenahl, and Lakewood, which have exquisite residential areas along the lake. Only small sections to the east off Neff Road and on the west along Edgewater Drive are enhanced by the lake. The rest

75

of Cleveland's residents are separated from the lake by freeways, railroads, an airport, and industry. Even Gordon Park and Edgewater Park have not been integrated with residential areas to enhance the beauty or serenity of the homes closest to those parks. Residential Cleveland is essentially land-locked, although the political boundary on the north is mostly a lakefront.

A map of Cleveland, with only railroads, freeways, rivers, industrial belts and adjacent suburbs apparent, reveals the many internal barriers to delivery of municipal services. The Cuyahoga River bisects the city. On the west side of the Cuyahoga River various other barriers mark off seven land areas the size of suburbs such as Shaker Heights which can be entered by road from only a few disparate points. They are virtually self-contained service areas. The east side of the river has eleven such areas, including downtown. The barriers to residential development provided by downtown, Hopkins Airport, railroads and freeways have divided Cleveland into numerous land-locked residential enclaves, each surrounded by commerce and industry.

With only a few exceptions, then, any sub-city would be bounded by barriers of freeways, rail lines, industry, parks, cemeteries, waterfronts, and adjacent suburbs. Within those boundaries would be the residential areas of the new sub-cities. The commercial and industrial uses that adjoin the barriers virtually assure that no residential area within a sub-city would be far removed from places of employment. The focus of the sub-city's government, however, would be to utilize the natural barriers to enhance the residential core.

The suburb of Brooklyn on Cleveland's southwest side is, in fact, an example of how a residential community surrounded by commerce and industry can use business areas on the periphery to create an attractive residential core. It is distinctly a blue-collar suburb. In 1970, Brooklyn had slightly more than 13,000 residents. Its northern, western, and southern boundaries are commercial-industrial strips. Its eastern boundaries are Ridge Road and a few residential blocks east of Ridge. Memphis and Biddulph Roads run east and west dividing the residential center of Brooklyn into thirds. Brooklyn contains fewer than 100 residential blocks. Because of the industrial and commercial uses that ring its residential core and line Memphis and Biddulph Roads, few travelers-through are aware of its residential quality.

No grand-planner would have deliberately created such a suburb; but its reputation in 1980 was as a city that was a model for providing high quality services and an attractive environment for its residents. In 1976, Brooklyn accomplished that with lower per capita expenditures for basic city services than the City of Cleveland. The lesson of Brooklyn is that a small suburb bounded by industrial belts can support a high quality of residential amenities without the wealthy residents of green-belt suburbs.

Possible Cities Within A City

Using rail lines, freeways, waterways, industrial and commercial belts, and parkland as factors of political subdivision, some obvious boundaries for sub-cities appear within the City of Cleveland. The downtown, bounded by the lake, the Cuyahoga River, and the inner belt, is now the natural core of the entire City of Cleveland. On the west side, at least six cities seem to have natural boundaries of water, rail, freeway, lake or other municipalities and are sufficiently populous to justify separate administration. Ten such natural sub-divisions seem apparent on the east side of Cleveland outside of the downtown area. Within those sub-city areas, populations range from 10,000 to 60,000 people. Most are in the 20,000 to 40,000 range. They are:

1. *Downtown*: Follow east bank of the Cuyahoga River from Lake Erie to Minkon Street on the south; follow northeast from that point in a direct line to East 22nd Street at Orange Avenue; then follow East 22nd Street north to innerbelt; and follow innerbelt north to the lake.

2. *Near West Side:* West bank of Cuyahoga River from Lake Erie south to west side rapid; west side rapid transit tracks west to I-90; I-90 west to West 65th Street; West 65th Street north to RTA tracks; RTA tracks west to west 74th Street; West 74th Street north to Detroit Avenue; Detroit Avenue west to Lake Avenue; Lake Avenue north to Edgewater Park.

3. *Tremont-Clark Fulton:* West bank of Cuyahoga River at west side rapid transit tracks south to Clark Avenue; Clark Avenue west to Holmden Avenue; Holmden Avenue west to I-71; I-71 west to first railroad underpass; railroad lines west to Ridge Road; Ridge Road north to CCC & St. Louis Railway tracks; tracks east to West 65th Street; West 65th Street north to south boundary of Near West Side.

4. *North West:* West boundary of Near West Side along Lake Erie west to Lakewood at West 117th Street; south Lake Erie at West 117th Street along West 117th Street to Linndale boundary; then follow Cleveland boundary east to West 65th Street and return along west boundaries of Tremont-Clark Fulton and Near West Side.

5. *Mid West:* From RTA station at Brookpark Road north along RTA line to West 117th Street station; West 117th Street south along Linndale and Brooklyn boundaries to Parma boundary; Parma boundary west to rapid transit line.

6. *West Park*: From east boundary of North West Side follow the Lakewood boundary west to the Rocky River; Rocky River south to Brookpark Road; Brookpark Road east to I-71; I-71 and west side rapid north to the Lakewood boundary.

7. *Old Brooklyn*: Along Cuyahoga River from south boundary of Tremont-Clark Fulton area to Brooklyn Heights boundary; west along Brooklyn Heights boundary to Brookpark Road; Brookpark Road and south boundary of Cleveland west to east boundary of Brooklyn; east boundary of Brooklyn north to I-71; I-71 east along Tremont-Clark Fulton boundary to Cuyahoga River.

8. *Superior-St. Clair*: Lake Erie from the innerbelt to Liberty Boulevard; Liberty Boulevard south to Superior Avenue; Superior Avenue west to East 55th Street; East 55th Street south to Chester Avenue; Chester Avenue west to innerbelt.

9. *Near East Side:* East 55th Street south from Chester Avenue to old Pennsylvania Railroad tracks; south along Pennsylvania Railroad tracks to Erie Railway tracks; Erie Railway tracks west to East 22nd Street; north on East 22nd Street to innerbelt; innerbelt north to Chester Avenue; Chester Avenue east to East 55th Street.

10. *Hough-Fairfax:* From south boundary of Superior-St. Clair area at Liberty Boulevard south along Liberty Boulevard to East Boulevard; East Boulevard to University Circle rapid transit station; west along RTA tracks to boundary of Near East Side at Pennsylvania Railroad tracks; Pennsylvania Railroad Tracks north to south boundary of Superior-St. Clair area.

11. *Glenville:* From Liberty Boulevard at Bratenahl line follow Bratenahl boundary east to the railroad tracks east of East 131st Street; railroad tracks south to East Cleveland boundary; East Cleveland boundary and Cleveland Heights boundary south to RTA intersection with Cedar Road; Cedar Road west to East Boulevard; East Boulevard North to Liberty Boulevard; Liberty Boulevard north to Lake Erie.

12. *Waterloo Beach:* From east Bratenahl boundary follow along Lake to west boundary of Euclid; west boundary of Euclid south to Conrail tracks; Conrail tracks west to east boundary of Bratenahl; east boundary of Bratenahl to Lake Erie.

13. *Collinwood:* From Glenville boundary on west along Conrail tracks to City of Euclid boundary; south along Euclid boundary to South Euclid boundary; South Euclid boundary west and along East Cleveland boundary to Glenville boundary; north along Glenville boundary to Conrail tracks.

14. *Buckeye-Woodland:* From University Circle rapid station east on Cedar Road to Cleveland Heights boundary; south east along Cleveland Heights boundary to Shaker Heights boundary; Shaker Heights boundary south to Kinsman Road; Kinsman Road west to Conrail tracks; Conrail tracks north to RTA tracks; RTA tracks northeast to University Circle rapid transit station.

15. *Broadway-Miles:* Follow east bank of Cuyahoga River south from Bower Road to Newburgh Heights; boundaries of Newburgh Heights, Cuyahoga Heights, and Garfield Heights east to East 131st Street; East 131st Street north to old Erie Railroad (Conrail) tracks; Conrail tracks west to border of Downtown for north boundary.

16. *Mt. Pleasant:* From intersection of Kinsman Road and Conrail tracks south and east to East 131st Street; East 131st Street north to Kinsman Road; Kinsman Road west to Conrail tracks.

17. *Southeast Cleveland:* Along Kinsman from East 131st Street to Shaker Heights boundary; Shaker Heights and Warrensville Heights boundaries south to Maple Heights boundary; Maple Heights and Garfield Heights boundary lines to East 131st Street; East 131st Street north to Kinsman Road.

The shared interest of the residents within each of those sub-cities is not too difficult to discern. The Near West Side, predominantly white, is characterized by 70-year-old houses built before the auto age. Homes are encroached upon by factories and lack play space for children. The Near East Side is dominated by massive public housing projects. Much of Old Brooklyn, Superior-St. Clair, Collinwood, Broadway-Miles, and Tremont-Clark Fulton are areas that have maintained the nearly century-old strength of their ethnic churches and nationality institutions. Waterloo Beach, West Park, and Southeast Cleveland are communities built between 1920 and 1960 which have strong middle-income orientations.

Many of the suggested boundaries are, in fact, recognized by the people who live within them today even though they are not recognized politically. The New York Central tracks created and the Lakeland Freeway has preserved the Waterloo Beach area as a heavily Slovenian community. Similar barriers have created a Polish haven in the Broadway area, an Italian enclave in Collinwood, black neighborhoods in Glenville and Hough-Fairfax, and an Irish bastion in West Park. The proposed sub-city boundaries would, thus, recognize what are actually the natural divisions for planning, public administration, economic activity, and leadership that already exist within the City of Cleveland.

Although 17 sub-cities are postulated in this proposal, the number is not immutable, and some boundaries might be disputed. The Mid West Area, for example, is bisected by I-71. It might be divided into two sub-cities. A persuasive case can be made for separating from Broadway-Miles the area east of East 93rd Street which is north of Broadway. All or most of the Tremont-Clark Fulton Area east of West 25th Street might be its own sub-city. But even if such alterations were made, the basis for boundaries would still be real topographic features that affect city management.

Leadership in the Sub-Cities

Whether or not any sub-city can administer itself depends in large measure on the quality of its local leaders. The leadership needed for a sub-city would be different from that now needed for mayor of Cleveland or president of city council. Those offices demand men or women who can rule disparate personalities from

greatly different backgrounds and serve very divergent constituencies. The mayor and council president must have command of power more than of detail. The leaders of the sub-cities will be less concerned with welding together people of divergent backgrounds. Their mastery must be more over the details of city services and city needs.

Affluence is not a prerequisite to effective local leadership. Strong resident leaders exist today in every one of the possible sub-cities. Some neighborhood leaders now hold political office. Many do not. Waterloo Beach (the home of Mayor Voinovich), Buckeye-Woodland (containing Shaker Square), the West Park area (long a base for Irish politicians), and the North West Side (containing Edgewater Drive) would not lack for talented personnel to serve in both elected and appointed positions.

Even areas without noticeable sections of upper middle income prosperity have substantial leadership bases. The Tremont-Clark Fulton area, for example, contains St. Rocco's Parish—a pillar of cultural strength known to every politician who has coveted a citywide job. Recently, one of the area's council representatives was elected to Congress. Lawyers and others with substantial business or academic backgrounds have been candidates for council from that community. Although some have made their records as relentless critics of the so-called establishment, it is reasonable to expect that, with real power and the actual responsibility for local problem solving, many of those same individuals or their supporters would turn their enormous energies from protest to the less strident task of building a better neighborhood.

In the very poorest neighborhoods, Hough-Fairfax and Near East Side, a different base of leadership potential exists. Each has a few strong resident leaders. Some have been nurses or graduate students, and a greater number are experienced in business. Others gained prominence in the anti-poverty programs of the 60s and 70s. But even those areas, with their vast aggregations of subsidized housing can point to resident professionals who lead public and private agencies.

Amidst the poverty of Hough-Fairfax and the Near East Side are some of the strongest institutions in the City of Cleveland—St. Vincent's Charity Hospital, Cuyahoga Community College, Warner & Swasey, Premier Industries, International Ladies Garment Workers, Olivet Institutional Baptist Church, Karamu House, Cleveland

Clinic, Mt. Sinai Hospital, The Temple, University Hospitals, Case Western Reserve University. The talent that is capable of being recruited from those institutions in the interests of neighborhood betterment and effective sub-city government for those very poorest of communities is immense. None of those talents are now utilized in any substantial respect by the existing city government of Cleveland.

Sub-Cities and Neighborhoods

Sub-cities are not neighborhoods. Sub-cities are groups of neighborhoods which have geographic interdependence and which, over a long period, have demonstrated that they recognize that interdependence.

Neighborhoods are smaller than sub-cities. They are areas in which residents have a walking relationship with each other. Until recently, some Cleveland neighborhoods were areas in which residents shared a local public elementary school or church. Today in Cleveland, Catholic parishes and church schools still define neighborhoods.

In parts of Cleveland, neighborhoods are often much smaller than elementary school districts or parishes. What has established them as neighborhoods are such barriers as transit lines, industrial belts, main commercial arteries, or parks which separate one cluster of residential streets from another. Cleveland is dotted with such clusters.

Broadway-Miles: An Example of Neighborhoods Within a Sub-City

The proposed sub-city of Broadway-Miles typifies how neighborhoods inter-relate in order to have a sense of common interests. Historically, the major cultural center of the Broadway-Miles area has been St. Stanislaus Catholic Church on Foreman Avenue near East 65th and Broadway. Broadway and Fleet Avenues have been the commercial centers of that sub-city. Around those two axes, separated by other thoroughfares, and focused upon churches and elementary schools, have evolved at least a dozen neighborhoods north of the Broadway-Miles intersection. Another six or more can be identified to the south and the east of that intersection. Four of these neighborhoods serve to illustrate the diversity of interests and range of demands that exist even within a sub-city. They are

the Forest City Park neighborhood, the Willow School neighborhood, the St. Hyacinth Church neighborhood, and the St. Stanislaus neighborhood.

Forest City Park. Heavy industry is the dominant factor on the western side of Broadway-Miles. The smoke from heavy industry in the Cuyahoga Valley is a well-known sight to every suburban commuter or occupant of a downtown office building. The prevailing winds carry that smoke daily through the northern part of the Broadway-Miles area. It first strikes a few streets between the valley and Interstate 77. This area is called Forest City Park.

In the 1930s, residents of that area closest to the Cuyahoga Valley organized Cleveland's first incorporated neighborhood association, the Forest City Park Civic Association. It still meets monthly in a small Protestant church on Kimmel Avenue. For years, the Association's primary objective has been to reduce air pollution and to fight other incursions from industry in the Cuyahoga Valley. Through all of those years, the City of Cleveland has never had a reliable policy of protecting those residents from the adjacent industry. Indeed, in the 1970's, City Hall permitted Republic Steel to destroy substantially a wooded valley adjacent to the homes by filling it with slag.

The commercial and cultural focus of the residents in Forest City Park is along Fleet Avenue and onto Broadway. For recreation, they use a park, Washington Park, that is partly in Newburgh Heights. Many residents attend St. Stanislaus Church. Their biggest demand upon Cleveland City Hall is for protection from industry.

Willow Neighborhood. At the northern-most end of the proposed sub-city of Broadway-Miles is a different neighborhood with less than fifteen streets centered around Willow Elementary School. It would be difficult to find a neighborhood in Cleveland with older or lower cost housing. Lots are thirty feet wide. There are almost no driveways or garages. Homes are one or two stories. Some lots have two houses. Only a few brick structures exist. Some of the houses have been there for over a hundred years. Nonetheless, there are few vacant or abandoned units.

The area is a triangle. Broadway Avenue borders it from north to south on its west side. One short block to the east are the Erie-Lackawanna tracks and Track Avenue, which form the other long leg of the triangle. To the south is Pershing Avenue, forming

A Willow neighborhood meeting place.

the base of this triangular neighborhood. The neighborhood was larger a few decades ago before a massive interchange from I-77 to East 55th Street destroyed many streets.

When the trains are not operating, this is a quiet neighborhood. The residential streets are too obscure for any except those who live there. Although the industry that dominates the area is in the heart of a big city, the Willow School neighborhood reminds one of the working class life-style along a railroad track in a country town.

At Victory and Track Avenue is John's Track Inn. It is the neighborhood tavern both for residents and the industrial workers along Track Avenue near the south end of the neighborhood. Young children play on the front step of John's Track Inn.

Next to the tavern is one of the few houses with a front yard. One of its residents keeps two geese in the front yard where she also hangs her laundry to dry. The residents of Track Avenue have a magnificent vista of steel, stone and concrete along the tracks to downtown and the Terminal Tower. But the Tower is not part of their neighborhood. Their neighborhood is Willow School, John's Track Inn, St. Alexis Hospital, the railroad tracks, and the commercial establishments extending south on Broadway.

In walking through the Willow Elementary School neighborhood near Track Avenue, it is difficult to discern what special costs this relatively poor neighborhood imposes on city government or what benefits the city has given it. Shaker Heights planted trees along its rapid transit tracks to shield its wealthy residents from the sight of the trolleys. Not even a fence has been erected by the City of Cleveland to protect the children in the Willow neighborhood from railroad trains.

None of the streets has a tree lawn that is maintained by the city. There is no city playground, church yard, or other public grassy area for children. Yet most of the homes are carefully maintained. Many of the residents have lived there over twenty years and at least one has been there a half century Though quite poor, this neighborhood would contradict the assertion that poverty makes city government more expensive. Its residents can ask instead, what the city gives them for their taxes.

St. Hyacinth Neighborhood. To the south and east of the Willow School neighborhood is the St. Hyacinth neighborhood. The homes in St. Hyacinth appear slightly more substantial than those near Willow School. The St. Hyacinth neighborhood gets its name from St. Hyacinth's Church at 6114 Frances Avenue. Its commercial focus, like the Forest City Park and Willow School neighborhood is on Broadway.

The St. Hyacinth neighborhood extends from west to east between East 55th and East 65th. The Erie-Lackawanna tracks are its southern boundary. Conrail and RTA are on the north. Part of the Conrail and RTA property form a green ravine which could be a source of beauty and recreation. Instead, the City of Cleveland has allowed it to become an unlicensed dumping ground for industrial debris and residential trash.

St. Stanislaus Neighborhood. Still farther south and west, the neighborhood around St. Stanislaus Church is at the cultural heart of the Broadway-Miles sub-city. Although always a Polish parish, St. Stanislaus Church was designed and built in 1883 by an Irish architect and an Irish contractor. Church property now occupies an entire city block from East 65th to East 66th between Foreman and Baxter. On church property are an elementary school and a branch of Central Catholic High School.

At one time the streets near the parish property abounded with retail business. Typically, the merchants also lived in

The Slavic Village renovation on Fleet Avenue.

the buildings. Much of the retailing has disappeared; but rather than vacate the buildings, the commercial portion has often been included in the residential parts of the structures. This is an area with a century-long history of private investment and reinvestment.

The most recent example of local reinvestment may be seen three blocks south of St. Stan's along Fleet Avenue. There the initiative of local merchants and professionals has led to renaming the area Slavic Village. Without federal or city funds, the merchants are remodeling their storefronts in an Old World motif and planting trees and flowers in sidewalk beds.

The contrast between city and private investment in the St. Stanislaus neighborhood is striking. For example, yards abound with flowers, shrubs, trees, and neatly kept grass. On Osmond Court, a homeowner has taken over a vacant lot owned by the city and has planted it with attractive shrubs and trees. The city's property is being preserved by a neighborhood resident.

The most significant city investment is Morgana Playfield. Morgana has four play areas situated between the St. Stanislaus residential area and the commercial uses on Broadway Avenue. The playground was a ravine in the early 1930's. Since then city government has turned it into a lighted baseball diamond with bleachers, two softball fields, and a play area for small children.

It is immediately clear from a visit to Morgana Playfield that this property belongs to the residents although it is owned by the city. Regular softball leagues composed mostly of Broadway-Miles residents have made semi-permanent postings of their current standings on attractive plaques that they have placed on the fences separating the fields from the parking area. Broadway and Fleet Avenue merchants who sponsor the teams have added their own signs to the outfield fences.

Although the city has responsibility for maintaining the Morgana playfields, its employees lack the care that the rest of the neighborhood exhibits. On the day that the photographs were taken that accompany this chapter, the two Morgana softball fields were strewn with beer cans, broken glass, and waste paper. A city service department truck, loaded with trash but without a visible worker, was parked nearby at the hardball field. One of the softball spectators pointed to a press box high above the hardball diamond. There, enjoying an unobtrusive siesta, was the recreation department's work crew. Meanwhile, two teams of young girls were obliged to practice softball on a littered field.

The spectator commented that the incident was a common occurrence–that maintenance of the Morgana Playfields fell by default as much on the residents as on the paid city employees.

Littering of playfields is an operational risk in every community. The difference between the litter at Morgana fields and litter at a typical suburban play area is that a typical suburb would not tolerate a work crew's persistently neglecting its responsibilities. Politically, suburban leaders could not long endure a reputation of neglect at a municipal facility if the facility were a frequently used, valuable part of a neighborhood.

The common interests of Forest City Park, Willow, St. Hyacinth, and St. Stanislaus neighborhoods are shopping on Broadway and Fleet Avenues, playing at Washington Park and Morgana Playfield, attending the Catholic high schools, South High and the churches, the Polish and Czech Nationality associations, and

working in the nearby mills. An entire world separates them from West Park or Waterloo Beach. Their greatest sources of pride are in institutions which they privately support.

The Broadway-Miles area has a reputation in City of Cleveland elections for voting consistently against tax increases. Its record also is for placing low demands on the city for services, and it has received relatively small amounts of capital investment from City Hall over the years. Yet Broadway-Miles needs recreational open spaces, it needs buffer zones from industry, and it needs enforcement of pollution and litter laws. All of these have taken low priority for years in Cleveland's City Hall.

Would a structure of sub-cities be an improvement for Broadway-Miles in meeting the needs of the Forest City Park, Willow School, St. Hyacinth and Morgana areas? There is reason to believe that Morgana Playfield would not have a reputation of neglect if Broadway-Miles had its own mayor. Such a mayor would also be inclined to enforce the litter laws and to clean the trash from the St. Hyacinth area. The contrast between the high levels of maintenance in privately owned property and the low levels of public investment and maintenance in Broadway-Miles suggest that Broadway-Miles residents would be willing to raise taxes for capital improvements if they knew the funds would be used in their neighborhoods and were confident that the improvements would be well-maintained.

Neighborhood Clout in a Big City

Cleveland has hundreds of small neighborhoods such as those in the Broadway-Miles sub-city. Many are remarkable in the care residents take of their homes compared to the decay along the commercial streets, the debris left by some heavy industries, and the neglect of city property. The contrast between the tidy residential streets and the blight of adjacent commercial, industrial, and public property is part of what evokes conflict among the residents, the businesses, and City Hall.

Typically, these small residential neighborhoods in Cleveland are ignored by the downtown civil servants. A playground, once built for the neighborhood, may be neglected by the downtown administration when the neighborhood undergoes racial change. Even stable neighborhoods with strong ties to downtown have difficulty being heard.

In the Shaker Square area, for example, there is a one square block neighborhood bounded by North Moreland, Larchmere, Coventry, and Shaker Boulevard. Within these boundaries are four streets with single family residences. For more than twenty years, residents of the four interior streets fought a battle against commuter traffic from Shaker Heights to downtown and parking by patrons of Stouffer's restaurant on Shaker Square. Even though the affected residential streets had been occupied for years by city judges and cabinet level administrators, the residents were unable to solve their traffic problem through the city bureaucracy. Their only success came in blocking expansion of Stouffer restaurant parking.

A solution came only when one of the city's lesser civil servants, then a member of the city planning commission staff, moved into the neighborhood. The planning staff member devised a one-way street plan to stop through traffic and suggested that Stouffer's might gain its desired parking space by building a wall around the parking lot. Cars could not enter the lot through the residential streets, and auto lights would not disturb the homeowners at night. As a final benefit to the residents, the planning staff resident suggested that a pedestrian walkway be created through the walled Stouffer parking lot for homeowners who needed walking access to Shaker Square. The plan was implemented, and the twenty-year conflict ended.

It is essential to understand that success did not come to the Shaker Square neighbors simply because powerful politicians lived there. Even the politicians were impotent until a properly placed civil servant moved into the neighborhood. Although he provided technical skill, it was the coalition of neighbors, politicians, and the civil servant that produced the solution.

A sub-city structure, with properly drawn boundaries, can make it possible for all neighborhoods to use their politicians effectively so that the City of Cleveland can control its bureaucracy. A properly structured sub-city should function so that the civil servants work for even the smallest neighborhood. With residents, council members, and the sub-city mayor more closely linked to common goals, the frustration experienced by the residents of East 176th Street should not occur. A civil servant's plan for a one-way street should not be over-ruled by a political official who knows neither the street nor the residents who seek help.

The strength of the suburbs has been the ability of those smaller units to respond quickly to small problems. The City of Cleveland has big problems, most of which started small. If sub-cities are, themselves, not made too large, the sub-cities should be able to prevent the small problems from reaching a dimension that requires major surgery.

At the same time, the sub-cities should be able to tackle the more massive problems in their midst. Many of those massive problems can only be corrected by chipping away at them in a sustained manner over many years. With the prospect of the same kind of stable, long-term executive leadership that suburbs enjoy, sub-cities of proper size could develop such a strategy.

If the large problems required large doses of capital, the sub-cities need not fail because of their size. Now and in the future, the federal government must be a primary source of major municipal capital investments. There is no practical reason why such capital cannot be provided to the smaller sub-cities to the same extent that the City of Cleveland would receive it. Moreover, the bonding authority of the overall city would not be lost simply because sub-cities were created, for the sub-cities would remain a part of a still existing City of Cleveland.

The ultimate task in creating sub-cities is to select natural boundaries which in fact encompass commercial, cultural, educational, and religious institutions that establish common bonds among the diverse neighborhoods and ever-changing population within each sub-city. Although size, itself, is a factor to be considered in selecting boundaries, sizes can vary substantially, as existing suburbs indicate, without establishing units that are either too unwieldy or too small. Within those limits of size and using boundaries that have natural validity, the determining factors will be non-governmental institutions that contribute to a greater sense of unity.

Out of those private institutions, in most instances, will come the resident leaders who will hold political office in the sub-cities.   Through their ties to the various constituencies within the sub-city will come the co-operation between government and private citizens that is essential to a sound political environment. Only through such a sound political environment is it possible to secure effective political leadership and sensitive, efficient government.

Chapter 7

Hough-Fairfax:
A Sub-City in Action

Mayor John Coyne of Brooklyn has aptly observed that "transplanted Clevelanders" have left the city for the suburbs "to regain control over their life-styles." Controlling one's life-style is also the central question for Cleveland's neighborhoods and the proposed sub-cities. Let us speculate briefly on how that might occur by examining one proposed sub-city, Hough-Fairfax.

The Hough-Fairfax sub-city suggested in Chapter Six is bordered on the north by Superior Avenue from East 55th Street to Liberty Boulevard. Its proposed eastern boundary follows Liberty Boulevard from Superior Avenue to East Boulevard to the University Circle rapid transit station. Its southern boundary is that rapid transit trackage from University Circle to the Pennsylvania Railroad lines on the west. The western boundary follows the railroad tracks north to East 55th Street and East 55th Street back to Superior Avenue.

Since rail lines form most of the Hough-Fairfax southern and western boundaries, almost all of those border areas are now devoted to commerce and industry. A greenbelt formed by University Circle and Liberty Boulevard abuts Hough-Fairfax on the east. The rail lines and greenery should control land uses on those fringes.

Euclid Avenue is the central boulevard of Hough-Fairfax. Carnegie Avenue and Chester Avenue, one block on either side of Euclid Avenue, carry commuter traffic to downtown. They form a two block wide area on either side of Euclid Avenue which once was a major office, commercial and manufacturing complex, as well as a cultural center. Although the nature of its commerce and industry has changed greatly since 1950, the future of the Carnegie-Euclid-Chester corridor from University Circle to East 55th remains commercial, industrial, and institutional. Five medical institutions—Cleveland Clinic, Mt. Sinai Hospital, University Hospital, Ohio Podiatric College, Women's Hospital, and a proposed State Rehabilitation Center—foretell a medical center with few rivals in the world.

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Hough

Hough is the area of Hough-Fairfax north of Chester. In the 1920s and 1930s, it was a choice neighborhood for the most powerful and fashionable Clevelanders. The best private preparatory schools once were located in Hough. Until the mid-1960s, Wade Park Avenue boasted Cleveland's finest steak house. The past grandeur of the Hough section may be seen even today in some of the apartment buildings that remain on Ansel Road. The future of Hough is still residential.

Hough has lost fully 50 percent of its population and nearly as many buildings since 1960. Hough ranks near the top in all of Cleveland's disagreeable statistics – welfare recipients, crime, abandoned buildings, rate of illegitimate births, and school dropouts.

Hough Avenue and Wade Park Avenue traverse the Hough area between East 55th Street and Liberty Boulevard. Once lined with neighborhood stores, they are now nearly devoid of commerce. As owner-occupancy continues to dwindle in Hough, more vacant land will be created. Indeed, today so many buildings have been abandoned and razed that there are, in some places, many acres of contiguous fields. Hough awaits a new residential face.

There is no reason for Hough to be anything except a residential community. The greenbelt on Hough's eastern boundary is a natural buffer for family life. Existing large lots and the abundance of vacant land offer an unmatched opportunity to create new housing supported by mini-parks, tot lots, and other recreational amenities. No home in Hough is more than a ten minute car ride from an employment center. To realize its residential promise, however, Hough first needs personal safety for its residents and the ability to protect existing real estate investments. The City of Cleveland has so far been able to offer neither.

With Hough unattractive to private investors and lacking municipal leadership, four indigenous organizations have arisen in Hough since 1965 to deal with its problems or decay. All are not-for-profit. As crime and violence have pursued a course of destruction in Hough, those resident led organizations have worked to preserve and restore the community.

In the mid-1960's, there were more people with the courage to tackle Hough's problems than there are today. Then there were at least four other organizations attempting to rebuild parts of

Developers provide special security for new construction in Hough.

Hough. They were composed of nonresident civic leaders or en-
trepreneurs. All of those outsiders have abandoned the area; and,
in one case, two blocks of their remodeled buildings have actually
been removed. The only leadership active today on behalf of
Hough is based in the community either through residency or
through management of enterprises located in the area.

Essentially, all of the planning for a future Hough neigh-
borhood now derives from those four indigenous Hough or-
ganizations. One is known as Famicos. Headed by a steadfast
Catholic nun, Sister Henrietta, Famicos develops and rehabilitates
housing in eastern Hough. HOPE, Inc. is another organization that
develops and manages housing in eastern Hough. Founded by a
white Protestant minister, its staff and board are today primarily
Hough residents and black. NOAH (Neighbors Organized for Ac-
tion in Housing), also having a church genesis, develops housing
in central Hough. The development organization with the greatest
financial base is the Hough Area Development Corporation. Fund-
ed by the federal government, it has built an enclosed mall shop-
ping center in western Hough and new single-family and multi-
family residences. Its board and leadership also either live or work
in Hough.

Fulfillment of Hough's residential destiny will be a 50-year project. Such a project requires the continuous and undivided attention of leaders with real power to affect the supporting structure of the community – its street patterns, its open spaces, its police and fire protection, its street lights, its housing code enforcement, its sanitation service, and its recreation programs. All of those are traditional functions of municipal government. Hough's problems are so great that it needs a chief municipal executive with loyalties and time that are not diverted to problems remote from Hough.

Fairfax

The Fairfax section of Hough-Fairfax is the area south of Carnegie. Fairfax is not yet a wasteland of vacant lots; but its residential structures are old, and vacancies are increasing. Home ownership is common, but its population is heavily in the upper age ranges. The higher incidence of owner-occupancy and the older population make crime a less dominant though not a less serious problem than in Hough. Cedar and Quincy Avenues, its streets for neighborhood retailing, are in substantial decay because of Cleveland's inability to protect against criminals.

One might say that Fairfax is twenty years behind Hough in its stage of deterioration. Fairfax residents are greatly concerned that, as deterioration grows around them, they will be moved out or encroached upon by wealthy businesses located on the borders of the neighborhood. At the same time, the decay on Cedar and Quincy diminish the attractiveness of their neighborhood to new residents and their own property values. For nearly 15 years resident leaders have sought, without success, to persuade City Hall to devise a plan to make Cedar and Quincy a credit to their own better-cared-for homes.

The Fairfax area shares the need of Hough for better police protection and a municipal strategy for revival, but it does not need a massive program of redesign or renovation. The neighborhood needs a program to assure property maintenance and to stabilize the value of residential property.

There are numerous major businesses and institutions with roots in or near Fairfax. Olivet Institutional Baptist Church, Karamu House, the YMCA, Cleveland Clinic, and Warner and Swasey are either in Fairfax or adjacent to it. They can support and assist

Euclid Corridor.

such programs but they cannot, for the most part, lead them. Again, the missing ingredient is sustained municipal leadership to draw together in common programs the residents and organizations that now have a stake in Fairfax.

The Euclid Corridor

The main street of Hough-Fairfax—Euclid Avenue and the corridor between Carnegie and Chester—does not lack for local leadership or private enterprise. Cleveland Clinic has expanded at a rapid rate in the western part of the corridor, and University Circle, Inc. has developed a land use plan for the area. But these are private plans, created by private developers, and without a supportive municipal vision.

The central public questions for the Euclid corridor are what should Euclid Avenue, from East 55th Street to University Circle, look like in the year 2000 and how can it support and gain sustenance from the adjacent neighborhoods? Those questions must be resolved soon or the year 2000 will be dictated entirely by the private developers in the Euclid corridor. Unlike Hough and Fairfax, those developers are now much at work, and time is short for public policy-making.

Should Euclid Avenue from East 79th Street to University Circle be a broad boulevard with a center strip of grass, flowers,

shrubs, and trees? Should the Euclid corridor be the major commercial center for Hough and Fairfax? Should Hough and Fairfax be bedroom communities for those who work in the Euclid corridor? If they were, the residential real estate markets in Hough and Fairfax would be buoyed.

Should an express transit system be created in the Euclid corridor from University Circle to Public Square? That is what the Regional Transit Authority proposes. At major stops, RTA planners would develop commercial and apartment complexes. How should such a development be designed to benefit Hough and Fairfax?

Suburbs affect the answers to those questions through city planners and political leaders. They are the spokesmen by whom residential interests are promoted and protected. The sub-city of Hough-Fairfax could exercise comparable control with a full-time effort from a chief municipal executive and a professional planning staff. The energies of those people should not be spread thin by worries about Hyatt Hotels downtown, industrial development along Woodland Avenue, trash collections on Train Avenue, and a one-way street at East 176th and Harvard.

The Small Investor

To a passing motorist, the visible leaders and institutions of Hough appear to be lonely beacons of hope in a wasteland of decaying buildings, broken glass, and vacant lots. In truth, there is hardly a residential block in the Hough section of Hough-Fairfax that does not have a group of residents who are continuing to invest in Hough's rebirth. While the larger, more visible institutions seek government subsidies for new construction projects, the invisible resident investors rely on personal savings, conventional loans, and sweat equity. What they seek from government to protect their investments are good housekeeping and faithful law enforcement at the local level.

The 1300 block of East 65th Street (between Superior and Wade Park), the 7000 block on Zoeter (situated between Wade Park and Lexington), and the 1800 block on East 79th Street (between Hough and Chester) demonstrate the range of resident investors and their needs in Hough.

Helena Poloma has lived at 1359 East 65th Street since 1946. Her home is the original one and one-half story farmhouse in that

Mrs. Gowdy.

19th century subdivision. The original farm property was sub-
divided into lots 30 feet wide and nearly 200 feet deep. Fruit trees
bearing apples, cherries, and peaches still dot the back yards. Like
many older sections of Cleveland, some lots contain two
houses – one behind the other. From Mrs. Poloma's perspective,
the neighborhood has been improving for 35 years.

Only a few vacant lots exist, and Mrs. Poloma points with
pride to her newer neighbors who have made substantial im-
provements in their properties. Some of the single family units
were purchased by resident-owners in the 1970s for less than
$5,000 – one reputedly for one dollar. In the summer of 1980, they
gleamed with fresh paint, aluminum siding, and well-kept yards.

From Mrs. Poloma's perspective, the good citizen award for
her block should go to Louise Gowdy, an apartment tenant across
the street. If Mrs. Gowdy spots broken glass on the block, she has
been known to leave her own apartment with broom and dustpan

to clean her neighbor's sidewalk across the street. In the spring of 1980, Mrs. Gowdy and her husband decided to clear the brush and debris from a nearby vacant lot to plant a vegetable garden. When the clearings were placed on the tree lawn, they called Cleveland's waste disposal department for a pick-up crew. Weeks passed without response. Finally Mrs. Gowdy got the removal job done herself by recruiting members of her church to help load and cart away the clearings.

In mid-August of 1980, the City of Cleveland was a major threat to peace and safety on the block where Mrs. Poloma and Mrs. Gowdy live. A small cave-in had occurred in the center of the street. The city surrounded the cave-in with flashers but did not repair it. After a week, the cave-in had been extended by the pressure of passing cars. Finally, the entire street had to be barricaded. But proper warning signs and detour markers were not placed at the nearest cross streets. As a result, traffic continued to confront the barricades, and some motorists by-passed them by driving onto the sidewalks. The residents, themselves, then barricaded the sidewalks and their lawns. What the neighbors of Mrs. Gowdy and Mrs. Poloma needed was a street department that could promptly and properly barricade the defect, detour traffic, and repair the cave-in, together with a police department that could continue to monitor the warning signs and detour markers.

On Zoeter Avenue in Hough, a few blocks south and east of Mrs. Polomas, neighborhood stand three small frame houses on small lots that would be appropriate for Ohio City's restoration program. These lots are 30 feet wide but less than 75 feet deep. Garages are unfeasible and driveways barely accommodate American cars. Samuel and Lucille McKinney and their immediate neighbors have nonetheless turned their small residences into showpieces. With railroad ties as borders, they have transformed the treelawn into carefully manicured receptacles for shrubs, small flowering bushes, and flowers. The shallow front and back yards have become formal gardens. The exteriors of the houses are tastefully painted.

Mr. McKinney has earned his investment capital from years of work at Sohio. One of Mr. McKinney's neighbors is a former Glenville resident who acquired his house for a nominal price from an absentee suburban landlord. A year of sweat equity has brought that house close to the example of the McKinneys.

The McKinneys in their formal garden.

The McKinneys and their neighbors on the south side of Zoeter have continued their investment despite the near total neglect of the residences and buildings on the opposite side of the street. There the tenants and absentee landlords have disregarded even minimal standards. One vacant lot, almost directly across from the McKinney property, was long a parking and dumping ground for junk cars and other metal. What the south side resident investors needed was a city government that would strictly enforce the code against those who violate the laws designed to protect property.

Farther south and east from the McKinneys is the intersection of East 79th and Hough Avenue. Before the summer of 1966, that intersection was the center of night life in Hough, and one corner housed Addison Junior High School. In July of 1966, the intersection exploded in a riot. Anti-poverty agencies operated closeby until the early 1970s. Today not a single commercial or public enterprise exists for 300 yards in any direction from the intersection. The buildings have been leveled, and the land is now open fields.

The ben Ez investment in the Hough Area.

In 1971 Ahara ben Ez acquired a vacant apartment building that the Hough Area Development Corporation had once used as its offices. Since 1971, Mr. ben Ez has purchased at distressed prices four other buildings on the 1800 block of East 79th Street, immediately south of the site where the 1966 riot began. Unmarried, he lives in one of the buildings and rents units to the elderly and the mentally ill.

Mr. ben Ez is a member of no organized church but is motivated by a deep religious conviction that God's will and neighborhood restoration go hand in hand. He has painted white the curbs on the entire block that he occupies. He has planted grass and trees in the treelawns. He has placed white bricks on the edge of the grass to discourage parking. His buildings are painted in white, yellow, and blue which for him symbolize the sun, moon, and steps to heaven.

Mr. ben Ez obtains tenant referrals from the Hough Multi-Service Center and the local community mental health center. His goal is to create an apartment block for the elderly and mentally ill. He is preparing a garden and yard behind one of the residential buildings, and he is also rehabilitating the only commercial structure still standing on the block.

Mr. ben Ez lives entirely off rents from his buildings. He has never received a government grant or loan. He is his own police force, sometimes patrolling the sidewalk at night.

Unless the Hough section of Hough-Fairfax is to be entirely leveled and rebuilt, its rebirth depends heavily on the Polomas, the Gowdys, the McKinneys, and the ben Ezes. They have their own plans for Hough. They need a city government to which they can talk, that understands them, and that will respond favorably.

The present government of the City of Cleveland has difficulty doing that. Neither Mr. ben Ez nor Mrs. Poloma feels comfortable at City Hall. When they have complained about conditions to city workers, they have been told to move to a better neighborhood. But economics, faith, and a love of their neighborhood keep them in Hough.

What a sub-city government would do for the Polomas, Gowdys, McKinneys, and ben Ezes is to increase the likelihood that those who enforce housing codes, fix streets, and patrol the streets would share their love and faith in the community. It would increase the likelihood that the public workers who are supposed to serve them would understand that their goal was to improve the neighborhood—that non-performance would not be acceptable and telling a resident to move to a better neighborhood would be intolerable.

Government in a Sub-City

The central task in Hough-Fairfax is to have a comprehensive and coordinated program of basic services that shape the lifestyle of the community—police protection, recreation, housing development and rehabilitation, business and institutional development, transportation, street design, street lighting, and supportive public services. As long as sufficient money and management are allocated for such needs in Hough-Fairfax, what happens in the rest of Cleveland is at best of secondary importance to the life-style in Hough-Fairfax.

Under a two-tiered system of government, revenues for both capital improvements and operations would be allocated to Hough-Fairfax according to formula by the upper tier of government at City Hall. Allocation by formula would be a major improvement for planning and development in Hough-Fairfax. No longer would money for improvements and services depend upon how well a councilman for the area got along with the mayor, council president, council colleagues on the west side, or a downtown department director. Planners and developers for Hough-

Fairfax could have reasonable expectations that the money to be received would be related to economics and not to outside politics.

The ability to devise and implement a development plan with modest annual amounts of money over the necessary period of development is more important than receiving infusions of large amounts of money in uncertain intermittent spurts. That has been one of the major lessons of the Great Society programs of the sixties. Allocation of municipal funds to sub-cities according to revenue sharing formulas would assure long-term commitments of funds around which sub-cities could create their plans for public improvements and public services. At the same time, the greater certainty of local programs would lend confidence to private investors – whether business, institutional, or residential.

With a small planning staff and the ability to make medium-range projections on funds, the chief executive of Hough-Fairfax could then focus on the task of welding a political coalition for use of the money in an equitable way to benefit the Hough neighborhood, the Fairfax neighborhood, and the Euclid corridor. A sub-city plan would be created in consultation with Hough-Fairfax council members and leaders from the local development organizations. If the Hough-Fairfax plan conflicted with plans for expansion of a mass transit system, negotiations would take place among the sub-city, the central city's planners, and the transit system. The necessary trade-offs would then reflect the interests of each of these groups.

Crucial figures in any development project would be the chief executive and planning commission of Hough-Fairfax and its council members. With power to make planning and budget recommendations, the chief executive would be the dominant figure in negotiations with prospective developers and planning agencies. The chief executive could encourage the developers to provide help for residents beyond the developers' most immediate needs.

The Hough-Fairfax council would have to approve decisions on where to spend money for development in the sub-city. Major decisions about planning in the Euclid corridor, Hough, or Fairfax communities could not be made by one or two individuals in private as now occurs in Cleveland under the prerogative of councilmanic veto. These important decisions would be made in a

wider, more open meeting of a full sub-city council attended by interested residents. The power of both arbitrary politicians and isolated neighborhood activists would be reduced. Balanced views would be more likely to prevail. Policy leadership would come from the mayor or city manager, but those officials would have to maintain support of a majority of the other elected officials. It would be a requirement that no longer exists in Cleveland when decisions are made about neighborhood matters.

Top priorities for any Hough-Fairfax mayor or city manager would be to keep the sub-city safe, clean, in decent repair, and moving forward. Those are not problems of one city department or for city employees alone. It takes civic leadership to generate citizen attitudes which encourage respect for property and people. Elected officials in a Hough-Fairfax city government would be in powerful positions to recruit support for such citizen practices. By controlling the safety and service forces of the sub-city, they could better assure residents that the residents' own good habits would not be undermined by public neglect of sub-city property or by a refusal to enforce standards against recalcitrant private parties.

Since protection of people and property requires that police, building inspectors, and clean-up personnel cooperate around common priorities, local political leadership could better focus the efforts of all of those city employees on neighborhood trouble spots. When a particular area or problem is designated as a local priority, it is less easy in a smaller sub-city for one city department to ignore a street or neighborhood without arousing criticism from workers or supervisors in other city departments. In a sub-city the size of Hough-Fairfax, city employees who are required to keep streets clean would be more inclined to bring pressure for more effective law enforcement by other city employees against those who litter the local streets.

When a cave-in occurs on East 65th Street, Mrs. Poloma and Mrs. Gowdy could reach the mayor of Hough-Fairfax to complain of poor barricading. Mrs. Gowdy could call the mayor when the service department failed to collect the trash she cleared from a vacant lot. Mr. and Mrs. McKinney could reach the Hough-Fairfax mayor to secure code enforcement across the street, and Mr. ben Ez might not have to be his own policeman on East 79th Street.

The person of pivotal importance in the Hough-Fairfax government would be the individual who, in fact, controls the civil

service employees. In suburban government, that individual wears various hats. Some suburbs have a city manager. The top elected official in those circumstances often is a member of council who also holds the title of mayor or council president. The city manager – a professional administrator – is expected to assure that the remaining employees render a full day's work for a full day's pay and that funds are managed efficiently.

If Hough-Fairfax did not expect to find strong management talents among its residents who would run for office, it might adopt a city manager form of government or it might adopt some hybrid form which many suburbs follow. Often, under a hybrid system, the elected mayor is paid as a part-time employee but the city also employs a full-time, professional manager as city administrator. A third system, of course, finds the elected mayor as the full-time chief administrator. Whatever the system, someone must supply political leadership and managerial skill. The choice of system is a matter to be decided according to the assets, needs, and political preferences of the particular sub-city.

The quality of leadership of the Hough-Fairfax mayor or city manager would, of course, depend upon the person selected. Undoubtedly, some sub-cities would select poorly. But others would select well. If Hough-Fairfax made a poor choice, a variety of factors would be at work to correct the situation. First, the functions assigned to the Hough-Fairfax government would permit the executive's performance to be measured in terms that could be evaluated by all residents. Second, performance of executives in some other comparable sub-cities would be apparent to Hough-Fairfax residents. Third, successes of other sub-cities might be observed and copied by a faltering Hough-Fairfax mayor or manager. Fourth, one function of the top tier of Cleveland's government might be to offer management consulting services to sub-city executives. Any failures of the sub-city mayor or manager should, therefore, not be a long-term experience for the residents.

Where the sub-city executive was a success, there would be every reason to expect that person to remain in command for an extended period. That would provide what is so sorely lacking in Cleveland's present governmental structure – continuity of public leadership and policy at the neighborhood level.

In this proposed structure of government, the Hough-Fairfax city government would not displace the existing neighborhood

development organizations, the street clubs. or the area councils. Those organizations, however, could be expected to perform some new roles more effectively. If the formula for allocating funds to Hough-Fairfax were fair but did not produce sufficient funds to meet the greater plans for the area, it would be reasonable to expect those organizations to work for tax increases. If the formula were unfair, they would work to change it. If volunteers were needed to supplement city services, they could recruit volunteers. Increasingly, annual agendas such as that of the 1980 convention of Near West Side Neighbors in Action would shift from agendas of governmental criticism to agendas for governmental cooperation and neighborhood self-help.

The relationship between Hough-Fairfax and the top tier of Cleveland city government would be important. If the top tier had a council elected from districts, those council members would become advocates for the needs of their constituent sub-cities. Their primary concern would be taxation and devising the formulas for allocating funds. Their role would be comparable to the Ohio legislature in public school financing. The Hough-Fairfax mayor would need to develop a favorable relationship with the central council representative for Hough-Fairfax's district and with other Cleveland officials concerned with taxation and formula-making.

The Period of Transition

Perhaps the most difficult period in the evolution of Hough-Fairfax or any other sub-city would be in the initial years of its administrative autonomy. Could Cleveland change in one fell swoop from a unitary city government to a system of federated sub-cities? Probably not. There would have to be a period of transition. That transition might be effected in discrete stages.

Stage One might be that of allocating city personnel to administrative districts that corresponded to the sub-city boundaries. Such a step would not require a change of the city's charter and might not even necessitate legislation. Allocation of personnel and budgeting for administrative purposes could be done within the existing central city government before any functions were, in fact, transferred to the sub-cities.

A more far-reaching form of administrative reorganization would be to create a chief administrator for each administrative

"sub-city". Just as the military has a separate commander for separate theaters of operation, so the City of Cleveland might designate a deputy mayor for each "sub-city". That deputy would be the commander in chief of all city service departments within the yet to be created sub-city. The city in that way would administratively function as a two-tiered government even though the sub-city political structure had not been established.

By initiating such administrative reforms in advance of political reform, the city could test some of the administrative problems of restructuring without altering the basic political structure. If administrative problems proved themselves to be excessive, the altered structure could be changed again with less difficulty. If the expected administrative benefits were apparent, administrative success would signal readiness for political restructuring.

In Stage Two, the political restructuring would occur. Sub-city councils and boards would be created and a chief executive not answerable to the Mayor of the City of Cleveland would be established. This stage would require a change in the city charter. Planning for it could begin in Stage One, and even during Stage One citizens advisory boards could be established at the neighborhood level.

In Stage Three, the sub-cities would assume all or part of the contemplated functions of the lower tier of government, depending upon their readiness. At a minimum, the sub-city would assume planning, zoning, and certain law enforcement functions. In this stage, each sub-city might acquire a staff of housing and building inspectors, officials empowered to issue permits and licenses, a legal staff for handling prosecutions and advising the sub-city government, and a record-keeping and clerical staff.

Stage Three might cover the period in which specific service functions such as waste collection, police protection, road repair were assumed by the sub-city. The sequence in which these functions would be assumed would await further analysis. Factors that might have a bearing could be the availability of work or storage facilities, union contracts, and the difficulties of selecting administrative personnel.

In the final stage, the sub-city would be managing all functions according to the ultimate scheme of two-tiered city government.

Chapter 8

Models for a Federated Cleveland

The suggestion of redesigning Cleveland as a federation of smaller cities within the existing city boundaries may sound radical, but if one looks outside of the United States to examine how local governments in other large cities are structured, one discovers that the American system is antiquated. Cleveland's system of a core city government, serving a population that has ranged in this century from less than 500,000 to nearly a million people, is not the preferred system for large cities in Canada, Europe, or Asia that have reorganized since 1945. In many countries, a two- or more-tiered structure for municipal government has evolved. It allocates to a series of small sub-municipalities those functions which serve the most local needs and consigns to an area-wide municipality functions from which all subordinate areas receive a common benefit.

Belgrade, Berlin, Cairo, Calcutta, London, Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, Toronto, and Warsaw are examples of multi-tiered municipal governments. Each has grown from its own governmental tradition, reflects its unique social customs and political dynamics, and is related to the peculiarities of public finance in the particular country. Nonetheless, all of those cities have found it advantageous to allocate to smaller sub-municipalities such functions as waste collection, street repair, housing development, fire protection, traffic regulation, local parking facilities, social services, local parks, and recreation while handling waste disposal, mass transit, arterial roadways, and area-wide planning through a greater municipality of which all of the sub-municipalities are a part.

It is noteworthy that the population of the City of London (as distinguished from Greater London) is barely 10,000 and that metropolitan Paris is divided into over 1,000 sub-districts (called communes and arrondissements) ranging from less than 10,000 to more than 200,000 people. The size of the core city whose name characterizes a metropolitan region seems not to determine either the power or the vitality of the central city in those countries.

The multi-tiered governmental structures of Canadian, British, and European cities have evolved under national political systems where local government was once subject to strong national or, in the case of Canada, provincial control. The strong national or provincial government has imposed a two-tiered system on local urban areas. In those countries, both municipal policies and municipal funds have been derived in substantial part for many years from the national or provincial level of government Historically, the people who now live in London or Toronto or Paris have settled in boroughs or towns which ultimately have grown until their populations touched to form a contiguous metropolis. Thereafter, the national or provincial government periodically reviewed the local governmental structure and initiated changes on its own.

London.   For London, the national parliament has from time to time restructured the metropolitan area. Over the years, the small Corporation of London has retained its historic boundaries in the center of London; but modern metropolitan London now contains 32 boroughs plus the historic city of London with its small population. All 33 sub-cities in Greater London have their separate councils and mayors which administer such purely local functions as land development and control, road maintenance, waste collection, and social services. The boroughs send representatives to the Greater London Council which establishes and maintains arterial roads, waste disposal systems, water purification, and other central functions.

The boroughs within Greater London have political features that are distinctly British. The London borough of Westminster, for example, which contains about 200,000 people and houses Buckingham Palace and Westminster Cathedral, is divided into 20 wards of from 6,000 to 12,000 people. Each ward elects two to five members to a Westminster council of 60. The candidates run under national party labels and receive only nominal pay.

The Westminster council itself meets fewer than six times per year. Policy, in large part, is made by the leadership group of whichever party has a majority on the council. Because council members often consider their service on the borough council to be a stepping stone to membership in Parliament, party loyalty and the goodwill of the party leadership are important on policy matters.

Not unlike any Cleveland councilman, a local council member's time in Westminster is devoted less to policy making and more to acting as an ombudsman for constituents who seek services through the bureaucracy of the local Westminster government. Because the council members are not elected from single member districts, no individual member exercises a veto over administrative action in his or her ward, but if members from the same ward are in agreement on a ward problem, they obviously have great influence.

Initially, each London borough was fiscally independent. More recently, London has developed a revenue-sharing system under which revenues raised by the Greater London Council are redistributed to the boroughs according to a formula reflecting population, miles of streets, and other factors of need.

Toronto. In Canada, the province of Ontario has recently structured its entire system of local government after the experience of Metropolitan Toronto. Toronto adopted a two-tiered system of municipal government in 1954. Thirteen of the existing cities and towns in the metropolitan region were recognized as contiguous municipalities responsible for fire protection, waste collection, education, social services, street maintenance, and many other local services. Those thirteen municipalities sent representatives to the council for Metropolitan Toronto (known as Metro) which had responsibility for public transportation, regional planning, regional parks, waste disposal, water supply, and other services requiring regional interconnection.

Each sub-city in Metro Toronto depends for its funds upon real estate taxes levied by the sub-city and upon provincial contributions. Unlike London, there is no revenue-sharing between Metro Toronto and the constituent municipalities. That fiscal system was an important reason for reducing the number of constituent municipalities to six in 1966.

The political structure of Toronto must be viewed in relationship to the city's economy. In the 25 years since 1954, metropolitan Toronto has experienced phenomenal growth. This growth is related to Toronto's role as a provincial capital and the dominant city in English-speaking Canada. The province of Ontario, of which Toronto is capital, occupies an immense area from the Great Lakes to Hudson Bay – perhaps equal to 20 percent of the land mass of the continental United States. The post-World War II

industrial growth of Ontario was concentrated heavily in Toronto. Twenty-five percent of all immigrants to Canada in this period settled in Toronto. All but a few came with marketable skills, good health, and ambition. Toronto is not only the provincial capital, seaport, and commercial center for Ontario, but it is also the prime port of shipment for exports from the central agricultural and mineral regions of Canada and a headquarters city of American businesses operating in Canada.

Modern Toronto's new two-tiered government has obviously functioned in an environment of continuing private and public prosperity. Neither the economic nor social life of Toronto in these years has been characterized by poverty. The physical aspect of Toronto has been one of continuing new construction and rehabilitation of older structures.

Ethnic and racial divisions also do not significantly characterize Toronto. The few blacks live nearly everywhere in Toronto. Until very recently the immigration has been overwhelmingly European – Italian, Portuguese, Eastern European – but Anglo-Saxons still predominate both numerically and in the political structure. Very little about the social, economic, or political life of Toronto resembles a politically divided or physically decaying older industrial city of the United States.

Amidst such prosperity, the two-tiered government of Toronto has been a widely heralded success. In 1974, it became the model for reorganizing all municipal structures in Ontario. It has been the upper or regional tier that has gained most attention for Toronto's form of government. That tier has had the more conspicuous responsibility for extending transportation lines and planning regional development. The lower tiers of government have handled the day-to-day, less glamorous tasks of collecting trash, clearing snow, and putting out fires. Since nearly all of Ontario has enjoyed and anticipates continued economic growth, the advantages for regional development of the two-tiered system justified its extension to the remainder of Ontario.

Despite economic and cultural differences, there are, nonetheless, lessons to be gleaned from the Toronto system which may be relevant to a city such as Cleveland which is struggling with physical decay and political divisiveness. One lesson is in comparing the policy focus of the City of Toronto (the older core city) with that of the surrounding municipalities in Metro Toronto.

Conflicts have existed between the core City of Toronto and those
newer surrounding cities that comprise Metro. It has been a con-
flict of life-styles.

The surrounding cities are suburbs in the American
model – residents with larger houses, larger lawns, and needing
road access to central Toronto. In the last six years, the central City
of Toronto has succeeded in blocking the extension of new free-
ways into the heart of town so that transportation priorities have
begun to shift to mass transit. At the same time, the central City of
Toronto has prevented the building of office and institutional
buildings in clusters which would clear existing residences. For a
number of years, city planners in central Toronto have attempted
to assign priority to protecting the life-style of those who want to
reside in the inner city.

The contrast with Cleveland is striking. In no respect can it be
said that Cleveland residents have been able to protect their resi-
dential interests from the encroachments of business expansion or
suburban transportation needs.

A second lesson to be learned from Toronto is found in the
1977 Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto.
Recognizing that the urban zone of Metropolitan Toronto was con-
tiguous to other urbanized regional municipalities that stretched
from the U.S. border at the western end of Lake Ontario eastward
to Toronto, the Commission considered whether Metro should be
expanded so as to assume jurisdiction over one or more of those
nearby urban areas. The Commission answered:

> A single government would be too large and impersonal
> to suit the tastes and traditions of the area.

Indeed, the Commission noted that there was beginning to arise
some pressure "for some formal structure of citizen involvement
for local neighborhoods."

The American Tradition of Local Autonomy

While British and European municipal tradition began with
the agent of the crown, American municipal tradition began with
the town meeting – independent settlements in which all citizens
participated in making local policy. Nearly 150 years ago, Alexis
de Tocqueville, struck by this American tradition, observed:

> Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are
> to science; they bring it within the people's reach, they
> teach men how to establish free government but without
> municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty.
>
> Municipal institutions constitute the strength of free
> nations...without power and independence, a town
> may contain good subjects, but it can have no active
> citizens.

De Tocqueville observed a nation of small towns. The 1790
census showed only thirteen American cities with more than
5,000 people. None exceeded 40,000. In 1840, only 8.5 percent of
the population lived in cities of over 8,000 residents. In 1880, only
twenty cities had more than 100,000 inhabitants. For nearly 100
years after the founding of the republic, the large cities were sad-
dled with small town governments.

The town meeting tradition produced Cleveland's nineteenth-
century government with more than twenty elected officials. By
1910, however, all of America's large cities had outgrown the town
meeting tradition. Where municipalities of 10,000 or less were
once governed by ten or more elected officers, city wards of more
than 30,000 residents had only a single elected official. Cities of
500,000 or 1,000,000 or 7,000,000 could offer to their residents no
more than the token participation of voting every other year on
election day. The remaining 729 days, residents were largely anx-
ious and suspicious observers, not the free and active citizens that
de Tocqueville observed learning and exercising the powers of
self-government.

In 1915, Frederic Howe, an ally of Tom L. Johnson, recounted
the then prevailing view of America's large cities in his book, *The
Modern City and Its Problems*:

> The city is assumed to be our most conspicuous politi-
> cal failure. Municipal office has rarely attracted men of
> conspicuous talent. There is no permanence of tenure in
> the higher offices and no provision for the expert. We
> have had few municipal standards...there has been lit-
> tle thought of beauty or comfort; little planning for the
> future. The boss and privileged interests have con-
> trolled the party and, through the party, the city itself. In
> addition, up to very recently the spoils system has pre-

vailed in the appointment of employees whose alle-
giance has been to the person who appointed them
rather than to the city itself. As a consequence there
has been much inefficiency and dishonesty.

In fact, the twentieth century ushered in a period of radical
reform in municipal affairs. Patronage was attacked through civil
service laws. Greater voter control was attempted through pro-
visions for referendum elections, recall, and initiative petitions.
Some cities, like Cleveland, Dayton, and Cincinnati, experi-
mented with city manager forms of government. Those were the
primary innovations in local government from 1900 to 1950. They
introduced an element of professionalism and helped to reduce
corruption and control by party bosses. Lack of responsiveness to
resident demands and inefficiency continued, however.

As American cities continued to grow after World War I, their
size was not viewed as a liability. Indeed, size was considered a
virtue. It was the standard by which municipal achievement was
measured. The largest city, New York, was considered the
best – even by non-New Yorkers.

American city dwellers were confident that if corruption
could be winnowed and experts hired, any short-comings of size
could be eliminated. By 1950, political scientists were more dis-
turbed by the proliferation of small units of local government and
single-purpose agencies than by the inefficiencies of the larger
units. Not bothering to ask how these units really worked in com-
parison to larger units, the political analysts preferred to label
them with such unflattering adjectives as "fragmented" or
"uncoordinated". The political scientists assumed, without gen-
uine analysis or data, that the smaller units were more wasteful
than the larger ones.

The larger units appealed especially to the planners and the
planning mentality. There was an understandable desire to impose
an order on the urban sprawl. It seemed logical and served the
planners' need for power to create a super-government with area-
wide authority. Thus, the reform pressures of the 1950s were
aimed toward reducing the powers of small city governments and
creating a new all-encompassing local government.

Few stopped to ask why nearly every American industrial city
had ceased, for the most part, to grow in area after 1920. Few

inquired about the legitimate needs that the nation's suburbs fulfilled or about their governmental effectiveness.

The experience of Cleveland in growing from a village in 1832 to a metropolis in 1932 was replicated in at least twenty other large American cities between the Civil War and World War II. As industrialism and immigration coalesced, the political structures and geographic size of industrial cities resulted from the interplay of power and finance. Structure and size were not dictated by principles of sound management.

Money has been the paramount determiner of the political structure that American cities of the industrial North have inherited. As these cities grew, they needed to build water systems, sewer systems, bridges, harbors, hospitals, jails, and other major works. Civic pride called for stadiums, convention centers, opera houses, libraries, and public markets. The municipal tax base was the primary source of funds. Cities of 5,000 could not amass the capital for such projects, but cities of 500,000 could.

Political power was also a factor in how large a city desired to grow. In the 1800s, most states (including Ohio) did not allow cities to determine their own political structures. Instead, the state legislatures enacted general statutes establishing required political structures for cities of particular sizes. The larger cities lobbied the state legislatures for special powers and governing structures. What naturally resulted was a compromise between local politicians and state-level politicians. Greater size helped win greater local freedom, although home-rule and full freedom from statehouse domination did not come until after 1900.

Finally, a large city was seen by many as essential to protect residents from the unbridled ambitions of private industrialists. From 1890 to 1920, a dominant issue in urban politics was municipal ownership. Were water, electric light, heat, and mass transportation to be supplied by private industry or by public bodies? Since these services tended to be delivered by monopolies, many believed not only that public ownership of monopoly profits was economically just but that fair prices and adequate quality could not be assured without such ownership. Municipal ownership seemed best achieved through a large city.

It was nearly 1960 before Americans had any real awareness that their large cities might be failing. The initial post-war sense was only that the children of immigrants were moving to suburbia

and that new immigrants from the countryside were replacing them. This shift caused new social problems, and the new native-born immigrants to the city were more assertive of their rights than prior waves of the foreign-born. By 1955, the decay of downtown retailing and older neighborhoods was apparent.

The first inkling that political trouble might be brewing amidst the physical decay came in the late 1950s. Scores of urban renewal and public housing programs being initiated by big city governments were blocked by irate neighborhood residents throughout the nation. In response to that citizen reaction, federal urban renewal legislation began to mandate that project advisory committees must be formed of residents from affected neighborhoods whenever a renewal project was contemplated.

Later, believing that local elected officials could not be trusted to allocate money to the needs of the poorest local residents, Robert Kennedy and others devised an administrative structure for Economic Opportunity Act programs which bypassed local government and provided that anti-poverty funds be administered through non-governmental boards on which one-third of the members represented the poor. Subsequently, the mandate for citizen participation in federally funded programs required tenant councils in public housing projects and neighborhood hearings for the use of Community Development Block Grants.

No one should forget that the underlying pressure for citizen participation in federally funded local programs was citizen unrest. In the 1960s, unrest in the black urban ghettos meant riots. The riots were the ultimate evidence that local government, especially the local police, was out of touch with a substantial number of its constituents.

The election of President Nixon in 1968 quelled the rhetoric of citizen participation and perhaps also the riots; but even President Nixon did not end the federal requirements of citizen participation in planning the local use of federal funds. Those requirements were continued and expanded in the 1970s.

More importantly, the Nixon years saw recognition that local revenues were no longer sufficient to finance large cities. It was President Nixon who gained enactment of a massive program of distributing federal funds on a formula basis to local governments. Although all local governments were eligible, the greatest per capita need was in the large cities. In 20 years, from 1952 to 1972, the

cities had shifted from fiscal autonomy to an almost narcotic dependence on federal revenues.

By 1975, federal aid notwithstanding, the nation's largest city, New York, was on the verge of bankruptcy and others were not far behind. The success of the large American city was for the first time in serious doubt.

Recognizing that New York's city government was not working well, Governor Nelson Rockefeller appointed a commission in 1971 to study and recommend a possible restructuring of New York City government. Known as the Scott Commission, but chaired by Edward Costikyan, a New York lawyer and Democratic politician, the commission recommended that New York City be divided into approximately 60 sub-cities which would function under a federated form of government similar to that in London. Each sub-city was to have an elected council and mayor, would receive much of its funds from the larger city of New York under a revenue-sharing formula, would also have some minor taxing power, and would have exclusive power to administer matters like those handled in Greater London by the local councils and in Metro Toronto by the regional municipalities.

The Scott Commission proposals were not adopted in New York City. Instead, in 1974 New York's charter was amended to require that the city be divided into 58 administrative districts. Every administrative department of New York City is now structured with service areas coterminous with those 58 districts and headed by a district administrator.

Each district has a citizens' advisory council of up to 60 members. The advisory council has a staff and staff director. The staff director serves as chairperson of an administrative cabinet composed of the district administrator from each city department. The cabinet meets monthly to discuss policies, report to the chairperson, and hear complaints and suggestions. By 1980, it was required that each city department prepare its budget to show services and expenses in each district.

New York did not adopt such changes to avert bankruptcy but rather to regain the confidence of its residents and to improve the quality of services. What is significant, however, is that, when bankruptcy came, New York did not abandon those reforms or claim that the centralized, older system was more efficient.

St. Paul, Minnesota.   St. Paul has also experimented with

municipal decentralization. St. Paul is a city of about 295,000 residents. In 1970, the Citizens League of St. Paul recommended that the city be divided into "suburbs in the city," because "suburban governments do seem able to secure enough consent from their constituents to make and implement decisions." Thereafter, in 1975, the St. Paul City Council authorized but did not require community councils to be created for each of 17 districts covering the entire city. Population within the districts ranged from 15,000 to 24,000. In May 1978, most districts had community councils in operation.

The initial role of the councils has been to work with the city planning staff on comprehensive district plans. Each district council also appoints one member to four task forces which work under the city's Capital Improvement Budget Committee. Notice is also given to the community councils of proposed zoning changes, street improvements, and park improvements. Community Development Block Grant monies are used to staff the community councils.

National Interest in Two-Tiered Government. While New York City and St. Paul, Minnesota have moved under purely local initiative to create citizen structures which could evolve into lower-tiered governments in a two-tiered city, the idea of two-tiered municipal government has been fostered from the national level by the National Academy of Public Administration with financial support from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The National Academy's interest derived, in part, from a report issued in 1970 by the Committee for Economic Development, a New York based research group, that proposed local governments be decentralized in a two-tiered structure. In 1972, the National Academy received a three-year grant from HUD to develop plans for "Neighborhood-Oriented Metropolitan Government." The National Academy then subcontracted planning funds to interested local groups.

One recipient of those funds was the Greater Rochester Inter-Governmental Panel. Interest in two-tiered government was influenced in Rochester by the proximity of its successful neighbor, Toronto, and by Dean Alan Campbell of Syracuse University, one of the nation's recognized experts in public administration.

After two years of study, the Rochester group (GRIP) recommended that the city of Rochester, with 280,000 people, be

subdivided into nine sub-cities of from 20,000 to 40,000 plus the central business district as a separate sub-city with 3,900. The Rochester recommendation, however, was in fact a recommendation for metropolitan government in Monroe County, of which Rochester is a part. The GRIP report contemplated that Rochester would cease to exist as a separate entity. Perhaps because GRIP foreshadowed the demise of historic Rochester, its recommendations have not been approved by the political structure of Rochester.

Other American Experience with Urban Decentralization. The St. Paul and New York experiments and the Rochester study are outgrowths of other experiments in neighborhood control which became most prominent in Great Society programs of the 1960s. Despite the rhetoric of President Nixon's administration, most of the Great Society programs have survived. In 1975, Robert Yin and Douglas Yates concluded in their book, *Street-Level Governments,* that the neighborhood control mechanisms produced greater responsiveness to resident needs.

Even cities such as Indianapolis, Miami, and Nashville—examples of strongly centralized regional governments—have found it essential to decentralize basic service functions under the more powerful central structure. But the most surprising large city to explore municipal decentralization may be Chicago. Under Mayor Richard Daley, Chicago was reputed to be ruled with a heavy hand from on top while delivering good service at the local level. In part, Chicago's responsiveness was because of the strength of its political officials at the ward level. Moreover, even while Mayor Daley reigned, seven neighborhoods tried forms of administrative decentralization. When Jane Byrne became Mayor of Chicago she promised to devolve even greater power to the neighborhoods. Her failure to deliver was, in 1980, one source of her political insecurity.

Chapter 9

The First Step Toward a Better Governmental Structure

If history is a teacher, one observation about the structure of Cleveland's government 50 or 100 years hence seems certain — it will be different from today. In 1988, Cleveland will be obliged by its own city charter to re-examine its fundamental structure. It is neither premature nor radical to reflect on what changes are now appropriate.

First principles are important in designing political systems. One first principle is derived from inquiring whether Cleveland is to be primarily a place to work, shop, and be served or whether it is to be primarily a place to live and be educated. Those who built the government that Cleveland knows today did not clearly choose among those priorities. Many would contend that when push has come to shove, Cleveland's municipal government has not given residential needs the highest priority. After 1900, the city and suburbs chose different goals.

The suburbs emphasized the priorities of residence and education. Using zoning and restrictive covenants in deeds, the wealthiest suburbs established use districts, lot sizes, and building restrictions that attracted residents who could support city services, parks, and schools with only moderate help from taxing complementary retail facilities. Other suburbs with less affluent residents admitted office and industrial uses but never by sacrificing residential priorities. In the suburbs, business and industry were deliberately recruited as the handmaidens of municipal governments that served and were controlled by residential interests.

By 1900, the City of Cleveland had already demonstrated that only its most wealthy residents could protect themselves against the claims of commerce and industry. Starting in 1832, the city's industrial and commercial center grew from a small number of streets at "gravity point" in the flats until, after 1920, it surrounded the wealthy mansions between East 20th and East 40th Streets on Euclid Avenue. Those mansions were originally built on high land with unencumbered views of the lake. For a while, their occupants protected their residential preferences by assuring that the Euclid

streetcar line turned south at East 20th Street before heading past Prospect Avenue and not returning to Euclid Avenue until after East 40th Street. Eventually they deserted Euclid Avenue for Bratenahl, Cleveland Heights, East Cleveland, and other locations remote from the soot, noise, and ugliness of Cleveland's heavy industry.

So long as the central city was attractive for business expansion, only the blue collar and other non-managerial classes suffered from the preferences that Cleveland extended to business over residential interests. Even in 1980, when business expansion does not characterize the central city and when the central city is being abandoned as home even by blue collar families, the most audible concerns still are about Cleveland's future as a place for business. Much less is heard about Cleveland's future as a home for residents – the city's only enfranchised class.

Yet, the type of future government Cleveland chooses may well depend on where it places the relative priorities of residential and business interests. A city government that decreases the number of popularly elected representatives and centralizes its planning will be less responsive to residential concerns. A government that places its primary emphasis on downtown redevelopment, lakefront expansion, and industrial development in the Woodland-East area will be less able to create and implement a residential strategy for the Near West Side, Broadway-Miles, Hough-Fairfax or Old Brooklyn.

The suggestion that Cleveland restructure its municipal government into a federation of cities within a city is designed to allow residential interests to gain preference over industrial and commercial interests. So structured, the residents of those sub-cities might well see Cleveland's diminishing population as a blessing for successful residential living. They might devise municipal strategies that would allow for a permanent reduction of population density, preservation of existing dwellings and open spaces, and the re-creation of Cleveland more in the character of the urban villages elsewhere within the county.

This new Cleveland would have advantages not enjoyed, however, by Shaker Heights or Lakewood or East Cleveland. It would have the tax base of a still thriving central office and financial district, of relatively immobile and still viable heavy industry, and a growing industry built around medical care and

higher education. As occurs in the successful industry-laden City of Brooklyn, Cleveland's reduced population could harness its business assets to residential needs. The new Cleveland would be able to enlist the simultaneous energies of 15 or 20 sub-city mayors, more than 100 council representatives, and thousands of resident volunteers so that tax benefits from those businesses could enhance Cleveland as a better place to live.

It would, indeed, be a long-range strategy; but only by creating a stronger residential market in the central city will deterioration of its neighborhoods be abated, will retailing be restored, and will Cleveland continue to be an attractive home for industry. It seems remarkable that few analysts give prominence to the fact that successful businessmen do not tend to locate stores, plants, or offices near cities where employees or customers don't like to live. A long-range residential strategy may, moreover, be a necessary foundation for short-range tactics. The observation made by others seems entirely valid that, where a socio-economic problem is concerned, it takes as long to solve the problem as it did to create it. Cleveland's governmental problems have been apparent for more than six decades. They may require as long to solve.

The suggestion that the historic City of Cleveland be reconstituted within its existing boundaries as a two-tiered federation of new, smaller cities is offered as a starting point in a long-range strategy for restoring Cleveland as an attractive place to live as well as work. The idea is not intended as a definitive answer cast in bronze.

Instead, it is offered as a new way of thinking about an old problem. It does seem clear that, insofar as Cleveland's struggling neighborhoods and its warring politicians are concerned, the old arguments and the old analyses are wrong.

Cleveland's governmental problems will not be substantially solved by changing faces, reducing council representation, lengthening the term of mayor, or transferring primary municipal services to a larger government. Instead, Cleveland needs political stability, increased participation and representation of residents, a greater priority to residential interests, and executive strength to deal responsively with neighborhoods' requests. The proposal for restructuring a new Cleveland as a federation of smaller cities within the old Cleveland is merely one possible way of achieving those goals.

Only recently, in November 1980, Cleveland voters adopted four-year terms for the mayor and council representatives. Without question, longer terms will promote governmental stability and strengthen the mayor's powers. But will the mayor or council representatives have significantly more time to address localized problems in the neighborhoods? The experience of other cities with four-year terms suggests that there will be improvements but that the need for decentralization of power will still exist if neighborhood needs are to be addressed satisfactorily. Longer terms of office aim primarily to reduce the pressure of electioneering on official decision-making. Longer terms are not directed toward better serving localized needs of constituents.

What is most needed now is for those with knowledge and responsibility for Cleveland's government to begin to explore seriously how they can create a municipal government for Cleveland that delivers basic municipal services in a way that is more responsive to differing neighborhoods' needs and priorities, is more efficient, and has less city-wide conflict.

In exploring how Cleveland can reach those goals, it is important to have both a sense of history and a sense of the future. It is vital that we be practical about what has worked or failed and why.

Our sense of history should remind us that the problems of conflict, inefficiency, corruption, and unresponsiveness are not new. They have beset our city in a severe way for nearly a century. Reports documenting inefficiency have been made repeatedly, but no mayor has had the power to institute the most fundamental recommendations or to assure that implemented changes would be long maintained. The reason for failure lies not in the personalities but in the politics of city government.

Our sense of history should tell us that in the central city the old politics have undergone a great change. The city's ward structure emerged from an era when political parties were strong, mayors controlled their party (or vice versa), and ward leaders and precinct committeemen had real influence and great patronage. But in Cleveland a party mayor has not been elected in 40 years, and the ethnic politics has produced a sequence of mayors beginning with Frank Lausche who were above and, often, separate from party. There is today in Cleveland no ward leader who has real influence to wield or largess to dispense unless she or he is a paid or elected city official.

Our sense of reality should cause us to look closely at the strengths and philosophies of other governmental structures both in suburbia and in foreign countries. We should ask if the environment of municipal finance and economic growth which produced, nearly a century ago, what is essentially today's Cleveland government are the same considerations of finance and local economics which will govern Cleveland's future.

In 1900, Cleveland may have needed a broad base of public capital harnessed by a powerful mayor to protect residents against aggressive business monopolists. Today and tomorrow, Clevelanders may need a local government that can efficiently and effectively police its streets, fill its chuck holes, and catch stray dogs.

Our sense of reality should force us to examine closely whether in government bigger is always better and more efficient or whether smaller units are, in fact, superior for some purposes.

In considering the future, we should ask about the many neighborhood organizations which, since the 1930s, have grown to fill the gaps left by government. Are neighborhood identity and neighborhood organization a political factor which will in the future share an equal if not superior position to party, religion, and ethnicity? If party power has vanished and if ethnicity divides us, is it possible that neighborhood identity provides the political focus for greater cohesiveness and for more effective and responsive governmental action? Is the neighborhood, indeed, the foundation stone of local government that Lewis Mumford said was essential to managing the urban mass?

Lastly, in assessing proposals for change, we should ask how the power of the Tom Wagners, the residents of East 176th Street, or the Near West Side Neighbors in Action will be affected by any proposed change. If the change does not close the communications gap and build bridges of cooperation between such residents and the elected political officials having power to solve residential problems and if the change does not vest in the political officials real power to meet the resident's needs, any solution will be transient if not cosmetic.

Solutions which deal only in personalities, identify only managerial failures, and ask mainly for more money will be ineffective. The root problems are not personalities, and the managerial failures do not arise because of people with narrow minds or limited intelligence. The financial problem is as much one of how money

is managed as how much is raised. The root problems of Cleveland's city government are in the magnitude and variety of the services to be delivered, the number of individuals required to deliver them, the difficulties such delivery factors produce, and the way in which political power is allocated. In Cleveland, as in nearly every large city, the greatest power over local service delivery rests with the civil service bureaucracy, much less with elected officials, and least with city electors.

The first step toward a solution is to understand the practicalities of identifying the most localized problems, establishing priorities and procedures for their correction, and supervising performance of city personnel.

If, as I have attempted to demonstrate, we understand that the real failures are in the way resident needs are communicated upward through the elected political structure and the way elected officials establish priorities and monitor the performance of subordinate employees, we will at least know where to look in fashioning solutions to the continuing complaints about Cleveland's city government. If we understand that the root problems of Cleveland's city government are not ones of finance, management technique, race, or personality but are ones of politics, we will then ask the root questions about municipal politics – who talks to whom about solving what problems and who exercises real power?

It may be that serious examination of the issues I have raised will produce a solution that is different from the two-tiered structure I have proposed. That is not important. What is important is that the root problems be understood and that Clevelanders be unafraid to think boldly about the future.

In thinking boldly about the future, we must not be petty about the past. Cleveland is a great city – still abounding with resources and still populated by diverse people of many talents with demonstrated commitment to sound government. But Cleveland's present governmental structure permits only a handful to participate, fosters conflict when cooperation is necessary, and fails to deliver basic services at an acceptable level of quality or efficiency. An honest look at root questions, stripped of personalities and considering broadly Cleveland's past, is a necessary first step for fashioning Cleveland's municipal government into a workable democracy.

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● "A smaller rather than bigger government makes total sense for Cleveland. Our suburbs have good government because their size is manageable. Cleveland would benefit from pursuing Judge Griffin's suggestions." **Tom Boardman,** Former Editor, *The Cleveland Press.*

● "Judge Griffin knows the diversity of Cleveland's neighborhoods, rich and poor, as well as any elected official. His years of experience in local affairs require Clevelanders to give careful attention to the ideas he has expressed about municipal reorganization." **Rep. Mary Rose Oakar,** U.S. House of Representatives.

● "Judge Griffin has hit the mark in describing the difficulties and frustrations of a Cleveland councilman. Decentralization of Cleveland city government is worth a hard look." **Councilman Terence E. Copeland,** Cleveland City Council Ward 13.

● "Neighborhoods are the life blood of Cleveland. I am unimpressed from my own experience that county-wide or regional government will help Cleveland's neighborhoods. This book suggests a more fruitful approach. It deserves to be widely read and discussed." **Harry Fagan,** Director, Commission on Catholic Community Action.

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