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The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups, by T.M. Moe

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defined and discussed. In the remainder of the book Mezey attempts a "more detailed assessment of the way in which the five legislative types are involved in policy making." (47) His thoughtful and challenging comparative analysis of the five types is organized around two major concepts: policy-making phases and policy-making arenas. Policy-making phases include formulation, deliberation, and oversight. A policy-making arena is a physical setting within which policy-makers interact—i.e., plenary session, party caucus, legislative committee, cabinet, etc. In addition to the policy-making function, the legislative types are examined in terms of two other "expectations" or functions: representation and system maintenance. Concluding his comprehensive survey and analysis of the literature on legislatures, Mezey argues that legislatures will tend to serve the representation function in the future, in contrast to the policy-making and system maintenance "expectations."

These books are well worth reading. Each presents a wealth of detail, interesting theoretical insights, and challenging propositions about legislative behavior. Minor shortcomings could be mentioned, but these would be in terms of evaluations and judgment rather than of fact.

JOEL G. VERNER, Illinois State University


The Organization of Interests is a welcome addition to the body of literature devoted to political interest groups. Moe addresses two central questions. Why do people join organizations? Once they have become members of an organization, what sustains their membership? Earlier, group theorists might have sought an explanation for these decisions in the putative values of the membership of the organization. (I say "might have" because it is not clear that the decision to join was then a serious issue.) Individuals are members because their interests are identical to those articulated by the organization. Thus, common interests gave rise to collective (group) action.
Mancur Olson's subsequent work, *The Logic of Collective Action*, introduced the concepts of collective good and selective incentives to show that the bonding material of organizational behavior was not shared values, but rather selective incentives as they serve to satisfy the personal goals of members of the organization. Rational self-interest contributes to a concern for material well-being, and political incentives (whether collective goods or purposive incentives, such as an ideology), are subordinate considerations in the individual's calculus of costs and benefits associated with such decisions.

The purpose of Moe's book is to suggest a middle ground between the two positions. The author seeks to determine whether or not the political objectives of an interest group are more salient than Olson's model suggests. To this end he examines both case studies of interest groups abroad and in the United States and questionnaire data from five interest groups in Minnesota.

*The Organization of Interests* is worth reading. It is unique in its effort to examine Olson's model of organizational incentives and contains some provocative ideas about the role of organizational leadership. Moe's discussion of the Entrepreneur (the leader) has a quality that reminds one of Nicolo's advice to his Prince. The Entrepreneur is, according to Moe, principally devoted to the maximization of a surplus in the exchange of costs and benefits so that the organization can survive. Organizational survival is necessary for the career of the Entrepreneur. But the surplus is not necessarily the same as profits or the attainment of other collective goods. It means that the Entrepreneur will maximize his surplus—even at the expense of organizational goals—through the selection of an incentive structure that combines both collective goods and selective incentives. The potential of material self-interest and personal aggrandizement is clear, and an examination of this possibility would seem to have been in order. One might ask, if the Entrepreneur is also susceptible to the siren temptation of self-interest, then where are those persons who will hold high the standards of principle and cause on behalf of the group?

The first half of this book, the chapters dealing with the logic of individual decisions and intra-organizational politics, provides stimulating reading. I regret that the latter half is less rewarding. I expected that more would be said of the role of the Entrepreneur, whom the author admits to be the pivotal figure for understanding organizational incentives, but no effort is made to develop this role
beyond chapter 4. Chapter 6 treats pluralism as the traditional background for such efforts. But it seems to be a weak transition between the micro analysis of the first half of the volume and the statement of mixed motivations and the broader treatment afforded interest groups of the second. The studies of interest groups cited in chapter 7 consistently reveal support for the greater importance of economic self-interest as an incentive, evident even among the class-conscious British workers. And the data collected by the author, from five interest groups in Minnesota, would seem to add a final fillip to the pervasiveness of self-interest as an imperative of the organization, rather than evidence of a concern for collective goods.

Moe may very well be correct in his belief that there is a mid-field position between the group theorists and Olson. His data, however, hardly allow him to make a compelling case for his charting of this ground.

RONALD J. BUSCH, Cleveland State University


In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court fashioned a constitutional right-of-privacy, a term not mentioned in the Constitution and unknown to its framers. The right was alleged to be implied, via "emanations" and "penumbras," in a host of constitutional guarantees. In more recent cases this pretense has been dropped, and in a revival of substantive due process, the concept of privacy has been nebulously sheltered in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as an aspect of the individual's "liberty" which government may not invade.

To the extent that privacy received recognition as a constitutional value prior to Griswold, it was limited to certain specifically defined constitutional contexts and was not treated as a right per se, handily available for general judicial deployment. The Fourth Amendment, for example, grants a "right to be let alone," in Justice Brandeis's felicitous phrase, but only from unreasonable search and seizure. Even there, protection of privacy was not necessarily the only, or even principal, motivation of the framers. Justice Frankfurter—who, except where considerations of federalism intervened, generally construed search and seizure restrictions more