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TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES IN NATIONAL POLITICS:
THE SPD AND THE GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENTS, 1921-1966

BY

SHELLEY E. ROSE

BA, Western New England College, 2003
MA, State University of New York at Binghamton, 2005

DISSERTATION

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Jean H. Quataert, Chair
Department of History, Binghamton University

Wulf Kansteiner
Department of History, Binghamton University

Gisela Brinker-Gabler
Department of Comparative Literature, Binghamton University

Rosmarie T. Morewedge, Outside Examiner
Department of German and Russian Studies, Binghamton University

ABSTRACT

This dissertation problematizes the relationship between the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and pacifists on the non-Communist Left between 1921 and 1966. It breaks from traditional master narratives by using gender, transnational, and biographical analysis to reveal under-studied continuities and shifting political spaces in German politics. Part I demonstrates the usefulness of a core/penumbra model for understanding gendered political spaces on the Left and the merits of using biographical analysis to reveal important continuities over the constructed historical divides of 1933 and 1945. Furthermore, this part explores the foundations of “masculine” characterizations of party politics and the tensions created by common perceptions that ethical pacifism, originally promoted by Bertha von Suttner’s powerful influence, was “feminine.” Part II highlights case studies of individual activists, what I term cooperative activists, who drove the relationship between the SPD and pacifist initiatives by participating in both party and peace activities throughout this timeframe. In particular, these case studies illustrate three main types of transnational interaction in Germany between 1921 and 1966: awareness, intermittent contact, and direct, interpersonal, reciprocal contact. This focus reveals that although the SPD maintained its reputation as a “peace party” during this period of investigation and beyond, party leaders’ conception of peace changed over time. By 1961, during Willy Brandt’s Chancellor candidacy, party rhetoric shifted to a more “masculine” understanding of peace, marking an alternative turning point to party programmatic reforms in 1959. For pacifists, SPD sponsorship of

antinuclear activities in the 1950s helped open new political space for extra-parliamentary movements like the Easter Marches during the 1960s. These connections also set the stage for the development of the Green Party in the 1980s which capitalized on the blurred boundaries between extra-parliamentary and party politics.

Dedicated to

T

In Memory of

Elizabeth Bruce, Edward Bruce, & Katharine McIntire

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ABBREVIATIONS

AdsD	Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn
APO	Ausserparlamentarische Opposition (Extra-Parliamentary Opposition)
BArch	Bundesarchiv (Berlin)
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
DFD	Demokratische Frauenbund Deutschlands (Democratic Women's League of Germany)
DFG	Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft (German Peace Society)
DFK	Deutsche Friedenskartell (German Peace Federation)
DFU	Deutsche Friedensunion (German Peace Union)
DPSt	Deutscher Pazifistischer Studentenbund (German Pacifist Student Union)
EZAB	Evangelisches Zentralarchiv in Berlin
GVP	Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei (All German People's Party)
IdK	German Branch of War Resisters' International
KdA	Kampf dem Atomtod (Campaign Against Atomic Death)
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (German Communist Party)
MdB	Member of Parliament (Bundestag)
MdL	Member of Local Government (Landtag)
MdR	Member of Parliament (Reichstag)
SAJ	Verband der Sozialistischen Arbeiterjugend (Socialist Workers' Youth Association)
SAP	Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (Socialist Workers' Party)
SI	Socialist International
SOPADE	SPD Executive Committee in Exile
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party)
USPD	Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany)
WFFB	Westdeutsche Frauenfriedensbewegung (West German Women's Peace Movement)
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Introduction:
**“Socialism was Always the Core of the Left; and
the Left was Always Larger than Socialism”¹**

This dissertation problematizes the relationship between peace and Social Democracy on the German non-Communist Left. Historian Tony Judt argues that the post-World War II period saw a “withering away of the ‘master narratives’ of European history: the great nineteenth-century theories of history, with their models of progress and change, of revolution and transformation.”² Judt’s claim that master narratives like Marxism lost credibility after 1945 is particularly poignant for the history of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and its relationship to pacifist supporters. The non-Communist Left in general was characterized by “a Social Democracy increasingly shedding the Marxist tradition, increasingly nervous about the class struggle, and increasingly skeptical about transforming capitalism by revolution,” according to historian Geoff Eley.³ Like many SPD historians, Eley marks 1959 as a moment of abrupt change in German Social Democratic political strategies. SPD leaders dropped “all talk of ending capitalism” at this pivotal party meeting and party leaders focused on the “desire to govern after winning an election.”⁴ Social Democrats reoriented their sights on party

¹ Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 8. Hereafter cited as Eley, *Forging Democracy*.

² Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 7. Hereafter cited as Judt, *Postwar*.

³ Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 314.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 317.

political power within German democracy as the most effective way to evince social change.

1959 does not represent a hasty about-face in party history or the history of the relationship between pacifism and Social Democracy. Cooperative activism practiced among pacifists and Social Democrats between 1921 and 1966 complicated party leaders' attempts to restructure the party program after 1959. These structural changes led to an uneasy coexistence between party reform and party experiments in the extra-parliamentary realm headed by prominent Social Democrats. Programmatic changes initiated by SPD reformers in 1959 were the culmination of a long process of internal rethinking which began in earnest after 1945. Two moments of unrealized revolution sparked discussions about the practicality of party strategies that closely adhered to Marxist thought. The first moment occurred in 1918 in the incomplete attempt at Socialist revolution after World War I. The second instance coincided with the hopes of exiled Social Democrats for a revolution from below which would defeat Hitler's regime in the 1940s. These detours in Marxist understandings of progress ultimately led some historians and politicians to posit National Socialism as the end result of an errant path of German modernization. They took comfort in the idea of 1945 as a "zero hour" in the German national narrative. This dissertation, through transnational and gender analysis, reveals important continuities over these critical turning points in the narrative of German national politics.⁵ Social Democrats and pacifists participated in transnational networks;

⁵ Historians continue to grapple with the ramifications of traditional nationalist and modernization narratives for their work. Jarausch and Geyer problematize this issue in *Shattered Past*, ultimately calling for new studies which rethink the frameworks of German history. In their book-length discussion, they hope to "offer clues" to the nature of potential new frameworks. In my dissertation, gender, transnational, and biographical analysis combine to offer a new approach to German political history, building on Geyer and Jarausch's call. See Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer, *Shattered Past: Reconstructing German*

their influence carries through from the Weimar Republic, the Nazi era, and into the postwar era. In addition, gendered characterizations about pacifism and political space, including the stereotype of pacifists as feminine, endured from the nineteenth century into the 1960s.

German social historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler was one of the leading scholars who advocated a Sonderweg, or special path, thesis for German historical developments before 1945. Wehler assigned some of the blame for an incomplete bourgeois revolution, and therefore dysfunctional modernization, on the shoulders of SPD leaders who did not follow through with the revolutionary activities sparked by the sailors' mutiny in Kiel in November 1918.⁶ According to Wehler the ramifications of this "failure," and others in German history which he argued enabled Hitler to come to power, were catastrophic. For Wehler, SPD leaders and social elites had become in part the "stirrup-holders for Hitler."⁷ During the 1970s and 1980s, German historians reached the height of a heated debate on the existence of a Sonderweg. They challenged advocates of "grand narratives" and turned to emerging methods which problematized alternative frameworks such as women's history.⁸

Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 40. Hereafter cited as Jarausch and Geyer, *Shattered Past*.

⁶ Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire, 1871-1918*, trans. Kim Traynor (Dover, NH: Berg Publishers, 1985), 224-226. Hereafter cited as Wehler, *The German Empire*.

⁷ Wehler, *The German Empire*, 231. See also Jarausch and Geyer, *Shattered Past*, 87-97 for their discussion of Wehler, the Bielefeld school, and modernization narratives.

⁸ Georg Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge* (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1997), 7. Hereafter cited as Iggers, *Historiography*. Iggers notes that "transformation in consciousness" sparked interest in new narratives, such as those of women and ethnic minorities. These new "histories" were critical of master narratives focusing on class struggle or modernization yet they did not rewrite them. Instead they remained on a critical, yet parallel path. Iggers, *Historiography*, 6-7.

In 1980, historians David Blackbourn and Eley endeavored to save German history from “the tyranny of hindsight.”⁹ The pair challenged Wehler’s conclusion that German development had followed a dysfunctional path to modernization in European history distinct from other national contexts. Wehler based his study on some of the national master narratives Judt asserts fell short during the twentieth century.¹⁰ Eley and Blackbourn critiqued Wehler’s assumption that historical events had to conform to a “normal” model of industrial development, including a proper bourgeois revolution. In the German case, Wehler repeatedly called attention to the absence of such a revolution.¹¹ Importantly, Blackbourn and Eley’s argument reveals cracks in the meta-narrative of impending social revolution which had driven much of Social Democratic institutional history through the end of World War II.

In his recent project, *Forging Democracy*, Eley summarizes the century between the 1860s and the 1960s as one where Socialism and Socialist parties maintained a constant presence: as a type of keystone for the Left. This expansive work argues that the “historic” Left, “doggedly and courageously constructed the foundations for democracy in Europe.”¹² Indeed, the SPD played a formative role in national politics, at times preserving the boundaries of party politics while at others challenging the limits of what was traditionally accepted as political. Social Democrats’ relationship to pacifists is key

⁹ David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1984), 33. Hereafter cited as Blackbourn and Eley, *Peculiarities*. Blackbourn and Eley were considerably younger than Wehler.

¹⁰ Wehler used the British example of industrialization and modernization as a benchmark for “normal” development, a true “master narrative” in both Alan Megill’s and Claude Levi-Strauss’ usage. See Jarausch and Geyer, *Shattered Past*, 38-9.

¹¹ Blackbourn and Eley, *Peculiarities*, 52. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 81, 224, 226.

¹² Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 8-10, 10.

to understanding this dynamic. Individuals who participated in both party and extra-parliamentary activities promoted the longstanding association between Social Democracy and peace, creating connections between the two political agendas through their own activism. These links constitute the cooperative activism which fueled the SPD's construction and its leaders' understanding of political spaces between 1921 and 1966.

The SPD's relationship to the German peace movements provides an alternative lens beyond grand narratives into the history of the party and the non-Communist Left. Through transnational, gender, and biographical analysis, this dissertation reveals important continuities across the constructed periods of Weimar, Nazi, and postwar Germany. Based on a Marxist understanding of historical progress, World War II represented an ideological break in the linear narratives. Historians in Wehler's generation were comforted by the fact that the Nazi dictatorship had been an aberration on an otherwise "normal" path to democracy.¹³ Since Blackbourn and Eley's critique, however, many historians have questioned the viability of national, modernization, and Marxist historical narratives for understanding the trajectory of German historiography and politics, creating new measures for progress and political success.

This study investigates the often cooperative relationship between pacifists and Social Democrats starting in 1921 which is a marker of heightened organized pacifist activity and increasing unofficial Social Democratic participation in these events during the Weimar Republic. It follows individual Social Democrats and pacifists who

¹³ For an analysis of Wehler as part of the 1920-1931 age cohort (Hitler Youth Generation) see Wulf Kansteiner, *In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics after Auschwitz* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press), 77-78. See also page 92 where Kansteiner articulates that 1945 for this cohort "remained an absolute limit, a barrier of emplotment that divided the tragedy ending in Nazism from the comic or even romantic return of the Federal Republic into the Western world."

preserved party and movement institutions and networks throughout the turmoil of the Nazi Regime and the party's renewed quest for political purpose after 1945. The analysis ends in 1966 when the SPD finally achieved partnership in a coalition government, the ultimate expression of political power in German democracy, and attempted to sever ties with pacifists in the extra-parliamentary realm. Although 1945 indeed represented a reorganizational moment for German Social Democrats, the party's relationship to pacifism demonstrates that important structural continuities from Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic influenced political behavior on the Left during and after the National Socialist dictatorship. The story of cooperation between pacifists and Social Democrats and its legacy for the period between 1921 and 1966 can be traced back to the nineteenth-century origins of organized pacifism in Germany.

Pacifist and co-founder of the German Peace Society (Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft-DFG), Bertha von Suttner did not envision a "red ribbon around the white flag."¹⁴ She wanted to avoid Social Democratic appropriation of the peace movement yet she acknowledged the tremendous potential in a truly cooperative relationship with Social Democrats and the broader labor movement by the 1890s. Suttner was delighted, for instance, when editor Wilhelm Liebknecht published her pacifist novel *Die Waffen Nieder (Lay Down Your Arms)* in the premier Social Democratic newspaper, *Vorwärts* in 1892.¹⁵ Dreams of cooperation between Social

¹⁴ Suttner to Alfred Fried, April 24, 1898. Quoted in Brigitte Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner: A Life for Peace*, trans. Ann Dubsky (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 248. Hereafter cited as Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner*.

¹⁵ Class served as one of the biggest barriers between cooperation of Social Democrats and pacifists before WWI. Historian Wolfram Wette grounds the tradition of peace politics with Social Democrats like Wilhelm Liebknecht who did not vote for war bonds during the Franco-Prussian war in 1870. Wolfram Wette, *Militarismus und Pazifismus: Auseinandersetzung mit den Deutschen Kriegen*

Democracy and organized pacifism were not limited to pacifists. As historian Wolfram Wette stipulates, “Social Democrats have understood themselves to be advocates of the politics of preventing war and promoting peace since time immemorial.”¹⁶ In 1893, Socialist theorist Friedrich Engels felt that disarmament was possible and necessary in Europe. According to Engels, the preservation of peace was therefore a “task for the present.” This task remains at the center of the SPD’s reputation as a “peace party” to this day.¹⁷

Suttner died seven days before the catalyst which led to the outbreak of World War I: the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914. Shortly after, pacifists and pacifist Social Democrats encountered their first great disappointment with the SPD over peace. On August 4, 1914 the SPD faction voted for war credits to support German troops and party leader Hugo Haase spoke the now-famous words, “We will not abandon our fatherland in its hour of need.”¹⁸ The SPD’s reputation as the parliamentary representative of peace politics, however, was already ingrained in political culture. The cost of Social Democratic support of the war credits was an internal party breakdown over the issue of peace, resulting in a split between majority Social Democrats and pacifist, left-wing Social Democrats. This division would last from 1917 until 1922.

(Bremen: Donat Verlag, 1991), 12-13. Hereafter cited as Wette, *Militarismus und Pazifismus*. All translations from German are my own unless otherwise noted.

¹⁶ Wette, *Militarismus und Pazifismus*, 12.

¹⁷ Wette, *Militarismus und Pazifismus*, 14. Peace is seen as a *Gegenwartsaufgabe* as opposed to the product of Socialist revolution in this context. See also Friedhelm Boll, *Frieden durch Revolution? Friedensstrategien der deutschen Sozialdemokratie vom Erfurter Programm 1891 bis zur Revolution 1918* (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1980), 24- 31 for additional discussion of the early relationship between peace and Social Democracy.

¹⁸ Heinrich Potthoff and Susanne Miller, *Kleine Geschichte der SPD 1848-2002* (Bonn: Dietz, 2002), 74. Hereafter cited as Potthoff and Miller, *Kleine Geschichte*.

Left-wing Social Democrats formed an opposition party, the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) in 1917. “[The opposition] calls for the willingness to accept a peace that has neither winners nor losers, to accept a peace based on understanding without gross penalties (*Vergewaltigung*),” soon-to-be Independent Social Democrat Karl Kautsky wrote in the “Peace Manifesto” presented at a preliminary conference of the USPD in 1917.¹⁹ Social Democrats, especially those with pacifist convictions, showcased World War I as an utter breakdown in SPD party doctrine, discipline, communication, and tradition again and again.²⁰ Members fostering different interpretations of party doctrine on peace clashed in the face of war.

After 1918 and the establishment of Germany’s first democracy under Social Democratic leadership, individual activists resumed contact between the SPD and reconstituted extra-parliamentary peace organizations. These individuals drove the relationship between peace party and peace movements, practicing cooperative activism by participating in activities in both political realms. Official cooperation between the two groups continued to be limited by SPD responsibilities in the political core and the duty to protect the new democracy.²¹ Careful study of the intertwined narratives of peace and Social Democracy reveal new pivot points in the story of the German Left, diverting attention from the traditional structural historical narratives marked by 1918, 1933, and 1945. Social Democratic tensions over peace and rearmament also flared, for instance, in

¹⁹ Hartfrid Krause, *USPD: Zur Geschichte der Unabhängigen Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands* (Frankfurt a.M.: Europäischer Versalgsanstalt, 1975), 282. See also 58 and 81.

²⁰ For an example see Lothar Wieland, “Wieder wie 1914!” *Heinrich Ströbel (1869-1944) Biografie eines vergessenen Sozialdemokraten* (Bremen: Donat Verlag, 2009), 15. Hereafter cited as Wieland, *Ströbel*.

²¹ See Chapter 1 for a full discussion of political space between 1921 and 1966, including the core/penumbra analytical model.

1928 with a controversy over the construction of new battleships or *Panzerkreuzer*; in 1956 over the issue of a conscription army; and in 1960 with the emergence of the extra-parliamentary Easter March movement and the establishment of a new pacifist party, the German Peace Union (Deutsche Friedensunion-DFU).

This project builds on two primary historiographies: rich scholarship on the SPD and a growing body of research on the history of German peace movements. Although there are notable exceptions in each field, most studies focus on isolated timeframes during the period between 1921 and 1966, limiting scholars' ability to see the long term effects of continuity and conflict on the Left. In addition, few studies directly address the question of the relationship between peace and Social Democratic politics as well as the implications of the SPD's experimental forays into the extra-parliamentary realm.

Heinrich Potthoff and Susanne Miller collaborated on the extensive party history *Kleine Geschichte der SPD, 1848-2002 (A History of German Social Democracy)*, documenting SPD history from early attempts at organization to the present day.²² Both members of the party themselves, Miller and Potthoff present a primarily institutional history necessarily focusing on party leaders, programmatic reforms and debates, and election cycles. Although Miller in particular acknowledges SPD attempts to participate in the extra-parliamentary realm with the 1950s Paulskirche movement and *Kampf dem Atomtod* (Campaign against Atomic Death-KdA), she classifies them generally as political failures.²³ Ultimately, Potthoff and Miller present a history of the SPD which mirrors the party's public face, concluding with the triumphal knowledge that by 2002

²² Potthoff and Miller, *Kleine Geschichte*.

²³ *Ibid.*, 206. Here Miller measures success by parliamentary political power.

the SPD had attained the highest level of political success by postwar standards: the party was once again a governing party and wielded political power.

A foil to Potthoff and Miller's party narrative, sociologist and journalist Theo Pirker offers a critical perspective on the postwar SPD in *Die SPD Nach Hitler: Die Geschichte der Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 1945-1964* (The SPD after Hitler: The History of the German Social Democratic Party, 1945-1964). As a "contemporary of Hitler, Adenauer, Schumacher, Ollenhauer, and Brandt," Social Democrat Pirker's own lived experiences include the tumultuous transition period between 1961 and 1966.²⁴ The sociologist frankly starts his book with the statement, "this is a political book." Disillusioned by SPD reform efforts in 1959, Pirker suggests that the party, and its leaders, practiced a kind of "political amnesia," not only "forgetting" party traditions before 1945, but breaking with party activities since World War II. This amnesia enabled party leaders to focus wholeheartedly on the goal of becoming a governing party.²⁵ A left-wing Social Democrat, Pirker belongs to the same disenchanted group who published the critical newspaper *Die Andere Zeitung* (The Other Newspaper) from 1955 to 1969. Though Pirker correctly gauges the party's shift from Marxist ideology to the goal of parliamentary representation after 1945, his criticism of the party must be filtered carefully through the recognition that he writes as both a party member and contemporary critic of SPD policies.

Historian and political scientist Michael Longerich's study of the postwar SPD reads as an answer to Left-wing critics of Pirker's generation. In his work, *Die SPD als*

²⁴ Theo Pirker, *Die SPD nach Hitler: Die Geschichte der Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 1945-1964* (Bad Godesberg-Leichtenstein: Karl Wienand, 1965), 7. Hereafter cited as Pirker, *SPD nach Hitler*.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

“Friedenspartei”- mehr als nur Wahltaktik? (The SPD as ‘Peace Party’ - More Than Just an Election Strategy?), Longerich targets the SPD’s official position in political debates on peace issues. He concludes that party support of extra-parliamentary initiatives like the Paulskirche movement and the KdA in the 1950s were not simply party strategies to garner votes. Indeed, Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation reveal that the complicated relationship between peace and Social Democracy during the 1950s and 1960s was fostered by individuals who practiced cooperative activism on the Left, participating in both the party and peace movements.

Longerich grounds his analysis in introductory chapters on the Weimar Republic, but uses the party’s reputation as a peace party and cooperation within Weimar politics as a foundation for his rebuttal to skeptics like Pirker that the party indeed advocated peace as a political goal out of moral or Socialist convictions as opposed to a political façade. SPD leaders struggled with the implications of an extra-parliamentary strategy for their own political goals, experimenting with cooperation in the extra-parliamentary sphere. Party officials only withdrew support for pacifist initiatives after it became apparent that they did not enhance party popularity at the polls. Longerich posits the 1960s as a pivot point in the story of Social Democratic and pacifist cooperation, arguing that the SPD leaders had to consider tactical decisions more carefully after 1966 when the party joined the Great Coalition.²⁶ Longerich’s conclusion is intriguing because it directly contests SPD critics like Pirker, and even Potthoff and Miller, who dismiss party forays into extra-parliamentary peace activities as pure election strategies.

²⁶ Michael Longerich, *Die SPD als “Friedenspartei”- mehr als nur Wahltaktik?* (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Peter Lang 1990), 163. Hereafter cited as Longerich, *SPD als “Friedenspartei.”*

Like Longerich, Christoph Butterwegge and Heinz-Gerd Hofschien examine the issue of peace through the lens of the Social Democratic Party. Indeed, very few historical or political science projects focus primarily on the dynamic relationship between the peace movement and the SPD in national politics.²⁷ Butterwegge and Hofschien's edited volume *Sozialdemokratie, Krieg, und Frieden* (Social Democracy, War, and Peace) is a compilation of primary documents which describe the Social Democrats' political actions concerning war and peace. Though the volume impressively contains many important primary documents on the SPD from 1863 to 1984, the authors' commentary is limited to viewing issues of peace through the lens of official SPD party policy, not necessarily accounting for the perspectives of rank and file members. Confined to a strictly structural plane, Butterwegge and Hofschien's analysis is useful, but leaves personal agency unproblematicized. I seek to enhance understandings of SPD structural history in this dissertation, employing a hybrid approach to the relationship between pacifists and Social Democrats through transnational, gender, and biographical analysis.

Gender analysis provides a new perspective on accepted SPD history. Historians Jean Quataert, Christl Wickert, and Gisela Notz laid the groundwork for the historical study of women's roles in the SPD.²⁸ This dissertation builds upon that foundation as

²⁷ Christoph Butterwegge and Heinz-Gerd Hofschien, *Sozialdemokratie, Krieg und Frieden* (Heilbronn:Distel Verlag, 1984).

²⁸ Jean Quataert, *Reluctant Feminists in German Social Democracy 1885-1917* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). Hereafter cited as Quataert, *Reluctant Feminists*. Christl Wickert, *Unsere Erwählten: Sozialdemokratische Frauen im Deutschen Reichstag und im Preußischen Landtag 1919 bis 1933, Band 1 & 2* (Göttingen: SOVEC, 1986). Hereafter cited as Wickert, *Unsere Erwählten*. Gisela Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft: Sozialdemokratinnen im Parlamentarischen Rat und im Deutschen Bundestag 1948/49-1957* (Bonn: Dietz, 2003). Hereafter cited as Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*. Notz, *Mehr als Bunte Tupfen im Bonner Männerclub: Sozialdemokratinnen im Deutschen Bundestag 1957-1969* (Bonn: Dietz, 2007). Hereafter cited as Notz, *Mehr als Bunte Tupfen*.

well as Karen Hagemann's understandings of gendered spaces for political activism in her study of the Hamburg SPD during the Weimar Republic, *Frauenalltag und Männerpolitik: Alltagsleben und gesellschaftliches Handeln von Arbeiterfrauen in der Weimarer Republik* (Female Everyday Life and Male Politics: Everyday Life and Social Action of Working Class Women in the Weimar Republic).²⁹ Each of these studies illustrates female agency in a predominantly male political realm and the tensions created when women attempted to participate in male-dominated political and public spaces. I trace the origins of gendered assumptions about political space in Germany, shedding light on traditional political roles of both men and women as well as the tensions created when members of either sex deviated from accepted political trajectories. Biographical analysis highlighted in Chapter 2 brings this examination to a new level, illuminating the roles of individual members and carefully historicizing their activism as it shaped and was shaped by SPD and peace movement strategies.

Historical study of the German peace movement has enjoyed increased attention since the 1980s and 1990s. Until recently peace movement scholarship has been dominated by sociologists and political scientists like Alice Holmes Cooper. Her book, *Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements since 1945* calls much-needed attention to the early antinuclear movements in 1950s Germany, challenging previous examinations which discounted the decade's impact compared to the larger extra-parliamentary peace movements of the 1960s and 1980s in Germany. Cooper challenges studies which relied on social movement theories closely linked to ideas on

²⁹ Hagemann, *Frauenalltag und Männerpolitik: Alltagsleben und gesellschaftliches Handeln von Arbeiterfrauen in der Weimarer Republik* (Bonn: Dietz, 1990). Hereafter cited as Hagemann, *Frauenalltag*.

modernization and generational change.³⁰ The 1950s antinuclear movements, Cooper argues, can be better understood through a “political process” theory which essentially historicizes the political environment, organizational networks, and transformations in collective consciousness.³¹ Her methodology represents an important step towards a combination of structural and personal analysis. I draw on her insights in this dissertation, including Cooper’s assertion that the SPD moved towards the political center after 1959.³²

Nonetheless, peace historiography is as susceptible, if not more so, to the trend of contemporary observers participating in academic debates as the historiography of Social Democracy. In 1960, sociologist Karl A. Otto wrote, “the fight against militarism is political duty.”³³ Otto was not writing his monograph on APOs (Ausserparlamentarische Opposition) or making an historical argument. He was writing an article for *Die Andere Zeitung* that critiqued the lack of political awareness in Germany. Otto’s article exemplifies one of the key problems with scholarship on peace history: many peace scholars are themselves active pacifists and therefore very close to the subject matter.

Nevertheless, Otto’s *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO: Geschichte der ausserparlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesrepublik 1960-1970* (From Easter March to APO: The History Extra-Parliamentary Opposition in the Federal Republic) remains the definitive text on the rise of the Easter Marches and the foundations of APO

³⁰ Alice Holmes Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements since 1945* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 9. Hereafter cited as Cooper, *Paradoxes*.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 15.

³² *Ibid.*, 85.

³³ Karl A. Otto, “Kampf gegen Militarismus ist politische Pflicht” *Die Andere Zeitung* (July 4, 1960).

politics in Germany. The term APO is highly contested among scholars. Otto applies the label only to the groups located within the extra-parliamentary realm which stood in opposition to established party politics, namely in the late 1960s.³⁴ Hans Karl Rupp, who wrote one of the only detailed histories of the KdA campaign, applies the term retroactively to this 1958 collaboration between Social Democrats, pacifists, and other activists. According to Rupp, the term APO applies to any organized opposition to an established parliamentary position.³⁵ I employ the term APO as Otto does, understanding extra-parliamentary opposition as groups or individuals who oppose established parliamentary positions, such as support of NATO or rearmament. These groups pressure agents of political power from outside parliamentary channels.

Political scientist Stefan Appelius is a scholar-activist like Otto, though he began his involvement in the SPD and peace movements in the late 1980s. Appelius authored a two-volume study of the DFG in 1991 which remains one of the definitive works on the post-1945 peace society, *Pazifismus in Westdeutschland: Die Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft 1945-1968* (Pacifism in West Germany: The German Peace Society, 1945-1968).³⁶ The scholar's investment in the peace movement itself is evident in the proclaimed purpose of his project. "[H]ow much would military or political conflicts

³⁴ Karl A. Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO: Geschichte der ausserparlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesrepublik 1960-1970* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1977). Hereafter cited as Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*.

³⁵ Hans Karl Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer: Der Kampf gegen die Atombewaffnung in den fünfziger Jahren* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1970), 21. Hereafter cited as Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*.

³⁶ Stefan Appelius, *Pazifismus in Westdeutschland: Die Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft 1945-1968* (Aachen: Verlag G. Mainz, 1991). Hereafter cited as Appelius, *Pazifismus*.

have escalated if there had been no peace movement?”³⁷ Appelius’ thesis is not uncommon for scholar-activists. American historian Lawrence Wittner’s argument in his expansive study of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement echoes Appelius’ claims for the DFG. Wittner argues that while the international disarmament movement did not provoke official political change, it at least prevented large-scale nuclear proliferation in the long term.³⁸ Both Wittner and Appelius measure peace movement success by influence in the national or transnational political realms, however indirect. Indeed, their underlying question, in what ways and to what extent did extra-parliamentary movements influence party politics, is one of the main themes of this dissertation.

Appelius focuses on the post-1945 period, yet he reaches back to the origins of the peace society in the nineteenth century as well as World War I and the Weimar period in his opening chapters. His effort to trace the origins of the, at times, largest peace organization in Germany notably bridges the Imperial, Weimar, Nazi, and postwar periods. Longerich embraces a similar technique in his study. Both scholars attempt to explain post-1945 events by looking back to previous decades: Longerich traces party behavior in political debates on peace and Appelius grounds the narrative of the postwar peace society in its own rich history despite postwar struggles to maintain membership numbers. Although the postwar peace movements and their origins are the subjects of

³⁷ Appelius, *Pazifismus*, Foreword.

³⁸ Lawrence Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), Preface. Hereafter cited as Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*.

increased academic attention, many recent projects, notably several articles by historian Belinda Davis, focus on the large 1980s protest movements.³⁹

Peace historiography for the Imperial and Weimar periods provides a rich foundation for this dissertation but few books span the divides of constructed periodizations in German history. Dieter Riesenberger, for example, focuses his seminal work on the pre-World War II peace movements.⁴⁰ His analysis stops with the rise of National Socialism in 1933. Roger Chickering frames his study *Imperial Germany and a World Without War: The Peace Movement and German Society, 1892-1914* between the establishment of the DFG in the nineteenth century and the outbreak of World War I.⁴¹ In both cases the historians grounded their work within the German nation-state and were reluctant to pursue the study of peace through turbulent periods of war which often forced pacifists into foreign exile.

Transnational analysis, as demonstrated in Chapter 1 and 2 of this dissertation, allows historians to examine networks which preserved pacifist and Social Democratic institutions even during wartime.⁴² The Women's International League for Peace and

³⁹ Belinda Davis, "Europe is a Peaceful Woman, America is a War Mongering Man? The 1980s Peace Movement in NATO-Allied Europe," CLIO-Online, http://www.europa.clio-online.de/site/lang_en/ItemID_409/mid_12208/40208772/Default.aspx. Hereafter cited as Davis, "Europe is a Peaceful Woman." Davis, "What's Left?" *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 2008). Hereafter cited as Davis, "What's Left?"

⁴⁰ Dieter Riesenberger, *Geschichte der Friedensbewegung in Deutschland von den Anfängen bis 1933* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985). Hereafter cited as Riesenberger, *Friedensbewegung*.

⁴¹ Roger Chickering, *Imperial Germany and a World Without War: The Peace Movement and German Society, 1892-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). Hereafter cited as Chickering, *World Without War*.

⁴² Leila Rupp's *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) is an important early example of how transnational history allows historians to transcend accepted periodizations. Hereafter cited as Rupp, *Worlds of Women*. See also Kathryn Kish Sklar, Anja Schüler, and Susan Strasser, eds., *Social Justice Feminists in the United States and Germany: A Dialogue in Documents, 1885-1933* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) for an

Freedom (WILPF) highlighted throughout this dissertation is a key example. Historian Leila Rupp's excellent study of international women's networks provides important background information on the transnational aspects of the first wave of the international women's movement.⁴³ Grounded outside the nation as a study of transnational women's networks, *Worlds of Women* is an important early example of how transnational history, as well as gender analysis, allows historians to transcend constructed periodizations in national historiographies.

The SPD's enduring reputation as a "peace party," is grounded in the turbulent, yet largely interdependent relationship between Social Democrats and pacifists which began in the nineteenth century. This relationship not only represents continuity in German politics, it provides a unique lens into the construction of democratic political space on the Left from the Weimar Republic until 1966. In particular, careful study of the relationship between pacifists and Social Democrats yields important insights into the development of APO in the late 1960s which cannot be adequately historicized without an understanding of individual and organizational experiences during the Weimar Republic, Nazi Regime, and immediate postwar periods.

Focusing on the relationship between Social Democrats and pacifists on the German Left, this project demonstrates the value of an analytical perspective that breaks away from compartmentalized studies in German history. The construction of democracy included many intertwined factors, such as transnational interaction, gendered perceptions of peace and politics, and individual agency, which complicate a clear path

excellent collection of documents regarding transnational women's networks, particularly in the United States and Germany.

⁴³ Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, 3.

towards political success. As historian Holger Nehring argues, subtle changes in the political landscape should not be taken for granted.⁴⁴ Careful historicization of transnational interaction and moments of heightened gender tension over a long durée, explored fully in Chapter 1, reveals that political space on the Left underwent important transformations during this timeframe, driven by the individuals who identified with both pacifist organizations and the SPD.

Part I, “Problematizing Continuity and Change on the Left, 1921-1966,” takes the long durée model and employs transnational, gender, and biographical analysis as interpretive strategies for this timeframe. As Chapter 1 demonstrates, transnational interaction and gendered understandings of political space and politics represent two rich areas for historical analysis in the period under investigation. Transnational analysis breaks from national narratives which are bound to constructed periodizations. In addition, transnational interaction remained a historical constant between 1921 and 1966 although the intensity of these activities varied over time. I identify three main types of transnational interaction within German politics: awareness, intermittent interaction, and direct, reciprocal contact which often occurred through established networks. Dynamic exchanges between transnational and national arenas reveal the extent of Social Democratic and pacifist interaction beyond German borders as well as gendered tensions between the national realm dominated by masculine party politics and transnational networks which defied national classification.

⁴⁴ Holger Nehring, “National Internationalists: British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons, the Politics of Transnational Communications and the Social History of the Cold War, 1957-1964” *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 4 (2005): 560-1. Hereafter cited as Nehring, “National Internationalists.”

Gender analysis further complicates historical understandings of political space between 1921 and 1966 and reveals continuities over this abbreviated long durée. Political spaces took on gendered meaning in nineteenth-century Germany. Men, the only citizens permitted to participate in party politics or vote before the turn of the twentieth century, dominated the party political sphere. This characterization, reinforced by party political rituals which seldom included women, set the tone for a male-dominated political sphere even after women were granted suffrage in 1919. Chapter 1 illustrates the ways in which this “masculine” realm was gradually breached by women who became increasingly active in party politics. In addition, extra-parliamentary space took on a “feminine” identity as an arena reserved for informal political actors. This chapter articulates the relationship and exchanges between “masculine” core party politics and the “feminine” extra-parliamentary penumbra.⁴⁵ The efforts of ethical pacifists like author Bertha von Suttner, who felt that opposition to war was a moral responsibility, were commonly branded as feminine and weak by critics.⁴⁶ This stereotype endured, resurfacing during the Weimar Republic and in the SPD in the early 1960s.

Despite continuities in the predominantly male political core and feminine penumbra, each of these moments of heightened gender tension must be thoroughly historicized. Suttner keenly understood nineteenth-century gender relationships and attempted to manipulate them to her advantage in her 1889 antiwar novel *Lay Down Your Arms*. During the Weimar Republic, frustrated antimilitarist Carl von Ossietzky attacked

⁴⁵ See Chapter 1 for a full discussion of the core/penumbra model beginning on page 4.

⁴⁶ I use the label “ethical pacifist” to describe Bertha von Suttner’s moral pacifist beliefs. See Roger Chickering’s extensive discussion of various forms of pacifism in Chickering, *World Without War*, 14-29.

Suttner's ethical pacifism as feminine and potentially harmful to a politically effective peace movement. In the 1960s, pacifist groups like the Easter Marches came under fire as particularly vulnerable to Communist infiltration and the SPD gravitated toward a more masculine understanding of peace after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. This reconceptualization of peace allowed party leaders to utilize pacifist rhetoric in their campaigns while grounding party activities firmly within the political core, blending gendered strategies and ultimately facilitating the SPD's transition from postwar opposition to coalition party.

Chapter 2 demonstrates the importance of biographical analysis for understanding the place of both structure and agency in this long *durée*. Individual biographies transcend constructed periodizations in national narratives, especially those which spanned the National Socialist regime. Simone Lässig argues for a “biographical turn” in history as a “reaction to the fact that structural history has shown too little appreciation for, and often entirely excluded, the individual human being and thus also the factor of individuality.”⁴⁷ Biographical analysis emphasizes the need to incorporate individual experiences into transnational networks and gendered political structures. Individual agents “render [structural frameworks] contingent and permeable,” according to historian Kathleen Canning.⁴⁸ Chapter 2 explores the extent of Social Democratic and pacifist institutional continuities between 1921 and 1966, recognizing their effect on individual agents who attempted to participate in both party politics and extra-parliamentary arenas.

⁴⁷ Volker Berghahn and Simone Lässig, eds., *Biography between Structure and Agency: Central European Lives in International Historiography* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 3. Hereafter cited as Berghahn and Lässig, *Biography between Structure and Agency*.

⁴⁸ Kathleen Canning, *Gender History in Practice: Historical Perspectives on Bodies, Class, and Citizenship* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 77. Hereafter cited as Canning, *Gender History*.

To be sure, this biographical analysis also takes the impact of individual behavior on institutional structures into account. Kurt Schumacher, for example, solved structural tension between exiled and domestic leaders in the SPD in 1945. He acknowledged the role of exiled SPD leaders during World War II as important, although implicitly less significant. Schumacher implied that he and his colleagues had fought on a “masculine” battlefield while exiled leaders waited patiently on the “feminine” homefront for peace. While Schumacher’s reconciliatory words smoothed over internal party tensions, his speech placed exiled leaders in a diminished role within the reestablished party. Some party leaders would find it difficult to achieve postwar political power that matched that of their Weimar political experiences. Weimar and World War II experiences, therefore, shaped the way individual activists reacted to the postwar political arena.

Part II provides a series of empirical case studies in cooperative activism, expanding upon the experiences of individual activists within the structural boundaries of the SPD, peace organizations, and transnational networks. Each chapter consists of a series of historicized moments of cooperation or conflict between Social Democrats and pacifists which characterized the relationship between peace movements and peace party between 1921 and 1966. Through a combination of transnational, gender, and biographical analysis described in Part I, these moments shed light on changing perceptions of gendered political space, growing transnational awareness, and the impact of individual agency on party and pacifist networks.

Chapter 3 explores the relationship during the Weimar Republic. Historians of this period are caught in a seemingly endless paradox: the overwhelming tendency to look back at Weimar events from 1933 and the need narrate a history that inevitably ends

with the rise of the Nazis. Even in the recent *Short Oxford History of Germany* volume on Weimar, editor Anthony McElligott remarks that the idea of a “doomed” republic is hard to escape, even among younger scholars.⁴⁹ In an effort to avoid such teleology and retrospective analysis, this chapter highlights the presence of transnational interaction during the Weimar Republic which had lasting effects on individual Social Democrats and pacifists as they faced the uncertainty of a new government or exile. For example, pacifist and Social Democrat Walter Fabian participated in several Weimar pacifist networks. When Fabian was forced into foreign exile during World War II, he relied on his Weimar connections to support him emotionally and financially through this turbulent period.

This chapter centers on three main themes. First, cooperation between pacifists and Social Democrats during the Weimar Republic was not a given circumstance. Lacking official collaboration between the party and movement, the relationship between Socialism and pacifism was driven by individuals who participated in activities in both the party political and pacifist arenas. Second, it investigates gendered critiques of peace during the Weimar Republic, such as Carl von Ossietzky’s gendered critique of ethical pacifism and feminist pacifist ideologies advocated by members of WILPF, placing both debates within the context of nascent Weimar politics and developing transnational awareness on the Left. Third, Chapter 3 explores the existence of transnational contact on the German non-Communist Left, focusing on the three main types of interaction laid out in Chapter 1. Although abruptly interrupted by the rise of National Socialism, the Weimar Republic remained a critical seedbed for transnational networks which would

⁴⁹ Anthony McElligott, ed., *Weimar Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 5. Hereafter cited as McElligott, *Weimar Germany*.

sustain individual participants through World War II and into the postwar. In addition, gendered understandings of peace debated during the Weimar era continued to resonate after 1945, demanding the attention of activists who attempted to overcome gendered political boundaries.

Chapter 4 illustrates the blending of political spaces and gendered pacifist strategies on the Left after 1945. Lines between the party program and calls for peace blurred as 1946 election posters touted the Weimar slogan “No-More-War!” The slogan represented just one example of a political continuity that survived the turmoil of the Nazi Regime. Against the background of official SPD opposition and party reform, individual pacifists and Social Democrats revived Weimar traditions of cooperative activism and participated in both party and pacifist initiatives. SPD experiments with extra-parliamentary activism blended transnational and national networks as well as strategies previously gendered as masculine or feminine. The 1950s were characterized by non-partisan antinuclear movements with close ties to either “masculine” party politics through the SPD or the “masculine” realm of science represented by academics like Bechert. Social Democratic participation in the 1950s Paulskirche movement paired with scientific appeals for non-proliferation and peace created confidence that pacifism might become a viable tactic in the party core. Sponsorship of the KdA in 1958 created explicit links between feminine notions of peace, normally relegated to the political periphery, and the party political realm. When the SPD failed to gain a majority through election campaigns which touted peace, the party began to turn inward for political strength, bring the KdA committee with it. The KdA movement dwindled as a consequence and the completely extra-parliamentary Easter Marches filled the peripheral

space once occupied by cooperative efforts between the Social Democrats and pacifists which blended “masculine” and “feminine” realms of politics. Connections between core and penumbra politics fostered during the 1950s laid important foundations for pacifist extra-parliamentary activism in the 1960s.

The final chapter examines the transformative period on Left between 1961 and 1966 through the lives of individual activists who found themselves at odds with the structural changes of SPD party reform and emerging APO movements like the Easter Marches. SPD party leaders decisively drew extra-parliamentary antinuclear efforts into the party political realm in a bid to achieve governing political power. Individual pacifists maintained ties to transnational networks and Easter March leaders were directly inspired by the British CND, fostering continued activism in the German penumbra. While the extra-parliamentary groups gained momentum and transnational legitimacy, the party sought a smooth transition from its position as an impotent opposition party to governing power.

This transition was threatened, however, by the DFU. The new party attempted to enter party politics as the only political party to explicitly call for ethical pacifism, often gendered as feminine, in this predominantly masculine realm. SPD leaders reacted venomously, protecting their claim on the position of “peace party” by accusing the DFU of collaboration with Communist agents. At the same time, the construction of the Berlin Wall brought the Cold War to the German front, pushing SPD leaders, who were already moving away from the stigma of feminine ethical pacifism, to embrace paternalist understandings of peace associated with personal and national security.

This dissertation utilizes transnational, gender, and biographical analysis to write the history of the relationship between Social Democrats and pacifists through constructed periodizations of Weimar, Nazi, and postwar Germany. Transnational analysis complicates narratives focusing primarily on the nation-state, which Cooper has demonstrated limit political space for activities such as political protest. Established pacifist networks, such as WILPF, as well as those fostered through organized peace activities and cooperative activism during the Weimar Republic, represent important structural continuities over the timeframe under consideration. Gender analysis applied to the non-Communist Left also reveals underlying dynamics in the SPD/peace relationship which are obscured by traditional institutional narratives. Gendered understandings of peace and political space, such as core and penumbra, were critical to the SPD's understanding of party political success between 1921 and 1966. Although closely linked to pacifist ideologies through its association with International Socialism, the SPD could not find political stability or electoral success until it harnessed peace as a tool within the masculine political realm. SPD leaders have continued to resurrect the peace party image and all its symbolic trappings in moments of renewed pacifist activity on the Left since 1966. These trappings are part of the party's legacy as a peace party and critical markers of continuity for individual activists who served as mediators between core and penumbra politics, peace and Social Democracy, and masculine and feminine conceptions of space.

Part I

“We Say We Are Against War, But We Are Still Ready to Lead the Next One.”⁵⁰
Problematizing Continuity and Change on the Left, 1921-1966

⁵⁰ SPD Vorstand, *Protokoll Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag Magdeburg 1929 vom 26. bis 31. Mai in der Stadthalle* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1974), 130-131.

Chapter 1:
“A Source of Energy for New Action!”⁵¹
Transnational and Gender Analysis on the German Left

This project employs a long *durée* in German history, to draw on *Annales* terminology, taking as its framework the years between 1921 and 1966.⁵² Traditionally, historical projects from this period are marked by the dramatic intrusion of the Nazi Regime causing a problematic rupture in German history between 1933 and 1945. The relationship between pacifists and Social Democrats on the non-Communist Left, however, reveals a different story. The SPD represents strong institutional continuity through this timeframe. Individual actors fueled the party, and especially its relationship to pacifists, as they navigated a complex political environment including transnational interaction and gender tensions that accompanied the party’s resilience.

Individual Social Democrats and pacifists looked beyond German borders for political strategies, building upon existing transnational networks as well as creating new connections between individuals and organizations in other nations. Over this timeframe, transnational interaction represents another pillar of structural continuity on the Left

⁵¹ Gertrud Baer, “Die Internationale Sommerschule in Salzburg,” *Die Frau im Staat* (October, 1921): 8.

⁵² I use the term “long *durée*” to emphasize that this dissertation framework extends beyond the traditional periodizations in German history which are punctuated by events such as the rise of the Nazi Regime. Fernand Braudel’s two-century timespan in *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Volume I & II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966) certainly dwarfs the forty-five year period between 1921 and 1966, but his classic effort to overcome accepted temporal and geographical boundaries informs my reconsideration of German history through the lens of cooperative activism between peace movements and Social Democracy. The project begins in 1921 because this year holds more meaning for the narrative of peace and Social Democracy than the beginning of the Weimar Republic in 1919. Hereafter cited as Braudel, *Mediterranean*.

while perceptions of specific political arenas as masculine or feminine are closely linked to specific historical contexts.⁵³ Throughout this period, transnational activity has increased in proportion to global developments in technology and communication. Inside national borders, activists encountered gendered perceptions of political issues and spaces, such as the characterization of peace and pacifism as feminine, which complicated organizational affiliations between the SPD and pacifist organizations. The SPD remained grounded in party politics, which Anne McClintock and Paula Baker have demonstrated can be characterized as a primarily masculine realm.⁵⁴ Party members and activists who participated in both party and extra-parliamentary politics encountered tension between the masculine party realm and peace politics gendered as “feminine.”

In 1921 young pacifist and member of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Gertrud Baer stood at the crossroads of a transnational structure and a moment of highly gendered pacifist political activity. Baer gave an enthusiastic account of her participation in a WILPF-sponsored international school which fostered transnational peace networks in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany. She wrote, “International? The world today scoffs at the term and drags it through the mud- but for us it has a lighter, warmer tone; a source of energy for new

⁵³ I understand transnational interaction as contact or awareness between individuals and organizations which transcends national borders. See 40-42 ff.

⁵⁴ Anne McClintock, “‘No Longer in a Future Heaven’: Gender, Race, and Nationalism” in *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives*, ed. Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti, and Ella Shohat, 89-112 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 89. Hereafter cited as McClintock, “No Longer in a Future Heaven.” Paula M. Baker, *The Moral Frameworks of Public Life: Gender, Politics, and the State in Rural New York, 1870-1930* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). Hereafter cited as Baker, *Moral Frameworks*.

action!”⁵⁵ WILPF summer schools in the 1920s are an excellent example of the nascent connections between politics, gender, and transnational interaction that lie at the center of this project. German WILPF members embraced opportunities to bring feminist understandings of pacifism and international cooperation into the German political arena, frequently collaborating with Social Democrats on the local level to heighten transnational awareness among Germans. Indeed, between 1921 and 1966 activists, like Baer, took advantage of expanding understandings of “political” to experiment with activism that defied straightforward political labels as well as national boundaries. These experiments included drawing transnational ideas into the national, and as McClintock has shown, masculine, arena.⁵⁶

This cooperative activism, defined here as informal or formal cooperation between pacifists and Social Democrats on the Left, led to widely perceived affinities between the SPD and peace movements. It creates a sense of coherence on the Left much like *Annaliste* Fernand Braudel demonstrated in his seminal study of the Mediterranean world, “the Mediterranean has no unity but that created by the movements of men, the

⁵⁵ Gertrud Baer, “Die Internationale Sommerschule in Salzburg,” *Die Frau im Staat* (October, 1921): 6, 8. It is important to note the difference between the term international as understood by contemporaries like Baer and international as a term for historical analysis. Baer understood international cooperation as interaction between individuals and organizations from different nations. She and her WILPF colleagues participated regularly in events which encouraged regular interpersonal contact. Jo Vellacott describes this level of intense interpersonal contact across and beyond national borders as transnational, employing the term retroactively to describe a phenomenon which is not implicitly understood under the current analytical rubric of “international.” International in the present context is most frequently understood as interaction between nations and their appointed agents. See Konrad Jarausch “Reflections on Transnational History” in H-German, “Forum on Transnationalism” http://www.h-net.org/~german/discuss/Trans/forum_trans_index.htm and Vellacott, “Putting a Network to Use: Formation and Early Years of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom,” in *Politische Netzwerkerinnen. Internationale Zusammenarbeit von Frauen 1830-1960*, ed. Eva Schöck-Quinteros, Anja Schüler, Annika Wilmers, and Kerstin Wolff, 131-54 (Berlin: Trafo Verlag, 2007). Hereafter cited as Vellacott, “Putting a Network to Use.”

⁵⁶ Baer and WILPF also reveal an implicit tension between the transnational arena and national spheres traditionally understood as masculine. McClintock, “No Longer in a Future Heaven,” 89-90.

relationships they imply, and the routes they follow.”⁵⁷ For Braudel, the Mediterranean as a spatial concept was defined through these relationships rather than limited by politically or geographically constructed boundaries. Braudel and his *Annales* colleagues transformed the way historians conceptualize analytical categories, highlighting the interrelationship between structures and human agency which informs this project. Over forty years later, Braudel’s work continues to remind historians that definitions of space are not always confined to political and geographical structures, but in fact characterized by the lived interactions of the individuals who navigated those arenas.

In my dissertation I consider the German political Left from this perspective. Though political institutions like the SPD represent continuities in German politics, political actors who moved fluidly between Social Democratic, pacifist, and transnational networks, as well as constructed masculine and feminine spaces, created an eclectic unity on the non-Communist Left. This coherence was constantly challenged by changing understandings of peace, gender, and the parameters of political structures between 1921 and 1966.

I draw on the ideas of French historians, in particular Colin Jones and Laurence Brockliss, to create a methodological model for German political space and culture. The social and political upheaval of eighteenth-century France and the French Revolution provided rich material for historians to break free from standard structural history. According to the Jones and Brockliss model, the medical world of early modern France consisted of two main spheres, the institutional core and groups in the penumbra, or

⁵⁷ Braudel, *Mediterranean*, 276.

periphery, surrounding it.⁵⁸ The historians emphasize permeability between the spheres as a key characteristic of their concept. This model can be usefully transferred to the realm of modern German politics: formal party politics forms the institutional core and informal political actors occupy the peripheral space. All elements of society, therefore, are political or politicized in varying degrees. In addition to magnifying political power relationships, the core/penumbra model facilitates the historicization of gender tensions during this timeframe.

Seen through the core/penumbra model, political power lay in the hands of those individuals who comprised and informed the government: in this case, political parties and their members. Participants who remained outside the core, whether by law or by choice, were then subject to the power wielded by these core actors.⁵⁹ Historically, male identity has been intimately linked to party politics. “Political campaigns were male rituals celebrating participants’ identities both as party members and as men,” according to American historian Gail Bederman. Formal party politics, Bederman argues, was a

⁵⁸ I draw on a core/penumbra model to better understand the complicated political relationship between pacifism and Social Democracy. In Brockliss and Jones’ understanding, the core represented formal medical institutions in early modern France and the penumbra was formed by various healers, quacks, and other social actors at the edge of the institutional core. The authors employ the term “penumbra” instead of “periphery” to emphasize permeability and exchange between the core and marginalized participants in the medical world. See Laurence Brockliss and Colin Jones, *The Medical World of Early Modern France* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1997), Introduction. The core/penumbra model, furthermore, compliments Anna D’Souza and Tom McDonough’s argument that “[g]ender ... would need to be seen not only as mapped *on to* the divide between public and private, but *across* it,” in historical and literary analysis. In this way, gender analysis not only helps historians to understand the constructed political realms, but the ways in which gender relationships work across these accepted boundaries. *The Invisible Flanuese: Gender, Public Space and Visual Culture in Nineteenth Century Paris* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2006), 4.

⁵⁹ Here I draw on gender theorist Chris Weedon’s understanding of power relationships. See Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 139 for her discussion “Gender, Power, and the Institution.” Bederman also stresses that, “electoral politics dramatized and reinforced men’s connection, as men, to the very real power of government.” Gail Bederman, *Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 13. Hereafter cited as Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization*.

“proving ground for male identity” in the nineteenth century, reinforcing widespread characterizations of party politics as a male realm.⁶⁰ Women were barred from membership in political parties in Germany until 1908 and not granted the right to vote until 1918.⁶¹ Restricted from participation in the political core, women represented a significant group relegated to the political penumbra during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. When Germans “practiced” democracy during the Kaiserreich, they reinforced boundaries of political participation between men and women.⁶²

Despite intrinsic divisions, masculine and feminine political spaces did not form a fixed gendered dichotomy. Party politics, for instance, was a predominantly masculine realm yet some aspects of this realm could be considered feminine. Baker argues that while, “party politics spun an imaginative vision of manly virtues and roles” it also fostered “expressions of emotion” characterized as feminine.⁶³ Likewise, women participated in and influenced party politics in realms traditionally considered public and private.

⁶⁰ Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization*, 13. Paula Baker is an American historian. Her study *The Moral Frameworks of Public Life* problematizes party politics as a male realm as well as the broader implications of gender relationships for upstate New York politics. Baker, *Moral Frameworks*.

⁶¹ For more on women who joined the SPD in 1908 see Jean Quataert, *Reluctant Feminists in German Social Democracy, 1885-1917* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 14. Hereafter cited as Quataert, *Reluctant Feminists*. For an excellent study on women voters after 1918 see Julia Sneeringer, *Winning Women's Votes: Propaganda and Politics in Weimar Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). Hereafter cited as Sneeringer, *Winning Women's Votes*.

⁶² See Margaret Lavinia Anderson, *Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) for a discussion of political culture in Imperial Germany. Although Anderson does not explicitly conduct a gender analysis of different political spheres, she highlights the intrusion of women into the party political realm as well as party leaders' efforts to use women for political purposes. See especially pages 128-131 and 421-22. Hereafter cited as Anderson, *Practicing Democracy*. Quataert also notes the tendency to relegate men and women to “corresponding ‘proper’ spheres of activity” during the Kaiserreich. Quataert, *Reluctant Feminists*, 23.

⁶³ Baker, *The Moral Frameworks*, 37. A traditionally feminine and private realm, the family provided an avenue for women to transgress gendered political lines before suffrage. See McClintock, “No Longer a Future Heaven.”

Exchanges between constructed political realms of men and women were common. German women participated in party activities and party political debates even before 1908. Historian Margaret Anderson's analysis of Catholic women during Imperial elections and historian Jean Quataert's study of early female Social Democrats provide two excellent illustrations from Imperial German politics. Catholic women actively brought political speakers to their towns and in some cases attended political meetings. Priests were accused of encouraging women to manipulate their husband's vote by withholding sex and political opponents feared Catholic wives would indeed influence their spouses in other ways at the polls.⁶⁴ On the Left, Quataert reveals that Social Democratic women conducted political "reading sessions" and disguised themselves as men to attend political gatherings. Leading female activists like Clara Zetkin also spoke at secret political meetings, defying accepted limits for female political participation.⁶⁵ Each example attests to the permeable boundary between party politics and periphery political actors.

German Social Democratic women adapted their political activism to the margins of the pre-1918 political system. At the same time, however, they engaged in wider debates on female suffrage. During election campaigns in 1911 and 1912 Social Democratic women organized silent demonstrations to highlight their political silence as

⁶⁴ Anderson, *Practicing Democracy*, 126-129.

⁶⁵ Quataert, *Reluctant Feminists*, 24, 67, 193-5. Much of the suspicion surrounding Catholic women was conceived by political opponents worried about the extent of their influence over their husbands. These criticisms often originated in the party core and reached out to women who were not allowed to be party members. The Social Democratic women in these examples tended to be more proactive as they sought participation in party politics from outside that realm.

a sex.⁶⁶ Women were not alone in their advocacy for suffrage on the Left. The SPD prided itself on its longstanding support of suffrage. In the midst of political upheaval after World War I SPD leaders declared universal suffrage for all “male and female persons over the age of twenty,” on November 12, 1918.⁶⁷ Although women were now legally invited to partake in party politics, space previously reserved for men, they continued to face discrimination and resistance from their male counterparts into the 1960s.⁶⁸ The rituals of elections and party politics dominated by men remained a hard perimeter to breach.

The constructed boundaries between national and transnational are permeable and the nation, like the political realm which exercises control over it, is also a “masculine” construction.⁶⁹ Gender analysis adds new perspective to the debates on transnational methodologies occurring on both sides the Atlantic. Expanding transnational networks set the stage for individual cooperative activism on the German Left between 1921 and 1966. Social Democrats and pacifists participated in transnational networks and drew on ideas which originated outside of the nation-state for their activism. This investigation reveals three main levels of analysis for transnational interaction that clarify the use of

⁶⁶ Christl Wickert, *Unsere Erwählten: Sozialdemokratische Frauen Im Deutschen Reichstag und im Preussischen Landtag 1919 bis 1933* (Göttingen: Sovec, 1986), 59. Hereafter cited as Wickert, *Unsere Erwählten*.

⁶⁷ Quataert, *Reluctant Feminists*, 94. Wickert, *Unsere Erwählten*, 76.

⁶⁸ This resistance lasted into the postwar period. A party leader suggested that Alma Kettig and another female representative give up their newly-won seats in favor of male candidates in 1953. Edith Laudowicz and Dorlies Pollmann, eds., *Weil Ich das Leben Liebe: Persönliches und Politisches aus dem Leben Engagierter Frauen* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1981), 61. Hereafter cited as Laudowicz and Pollmann, *Weil Ich das Leben Liebe*. In her work on New York politics, Baker declares, “[w]oman suffrage severed the remaining connections between politics and manhood,” because politics were not exclusively male although she admits that female participation was severely limited. Baker, *Moral Frameworks*, 149.

⁶⁹ McClintock, “No Longer a Future Heaven,” 89.

the concept as a method and demonstrate its merit. Historian Patricia Clavin warns that a pre-established definition of the term “transnational” can become “an intellectual straitjacket.”⁷⁰ Therefore, I ground my study in evidence of cross-border awareness and interaction among Social Democrats and pacifists that reflects the lived experiences of historical subjects and the institutions they navigated. My empirical foundation for this analysis is a response to historians who lament the lack of transnational projects solidly grounded in historical evidence and which flesh out practical applications for transnational analytical perspectives. Social historian Jürgen Kocka commented on the dearth of such transnational work in German history as recently as April 2010.⁷¹

The development of transnational historiography followed different paths in the United States and Germany according to German historian Kiran Klaus Patel. Scholars from diverse fields have grappled with the task of defining the term “transnational” for empirical studies and practical use of transnational methods is a key topic in academic forums on both sides of the Atlantic, including the *American Historical Review*’s 2006 conversation “On Transnational History.”⁷² Historians working on American history, Patel claims, were more apt to “[roll] up their sleeves and [get] things done” as opposed to holding extended debates on the nuances of global, transnational, international, and

⁷⁰ Patricia Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism” *Contemporary European History*, 14 no. 4 (2005), 433. Hereafter cited as Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism.”

⁷¹ Jürgen Kocka, “Historians, Fashion, and Truth: The Last Fifty Years,” (keynote lecture, Fourth American-Canadian Conference in German and European History, Canisius College, Buffalo, NY, April 9, 2010).

⁷² C.A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia Seed, “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History” *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (December 2006): 1441-1464. Akira Iriye noted in a 2004 review article on transnational history that he relied on works by political scientists in his review due to the lack of empirical work by historians. Akira Iriye, “Transnational History” *Central European History* 13, no. 2 (May 2004): 211-222.

comparative history.⁷³ Transnational projects authored by former American Studies Association President Shelley Fisher Fishkin and American historian Ian Tyrrell demonstrate this tendency well, each challenging accepted geographic and ideological boundaries of the United States.⁷⁴ By contrast, discussions among respected German historians as Michael Geyer, Konrad Jarausch, and Ronald Granieri yielded a plethora of definitions and perspectives on the term transnational and the potential of transnational analysis.⁷⁵ These discussions will continue to form an intellectual cul-de-sac, however, until historians demonstrate practical uses of transnational analysis in German history through their empirical work.

While American historians like Fishkin and Tyrrell had been experimenting with transnational methods for decades, 2004 represented a watershed year for scholarly debates on the use of the term “transnational” among German and European historians. Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel brought the analytical term to the forefront with their volume *Das Kaiserreich Transnational*. In September of the same year French and German scholars created *geschichte.transnational* (history.transnational), a tri-lingual

⁷³ Kiran Klaus Patel, “‘Transnations’ Among ‘Transnations’? The Debate on Transnational History in the United States and Germany” *Harvard Center for European Studies Working Paper Series* #159 (2008), 10.

⁷⁴ Shelley Fisher Fishkin, “Crossroads of Cultures: The Transnational Turn in American Studies- Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, November 12, 2004,” *American Quarterly* 57 no. 1 (March 2005):17-57. Ian Tyrrell, “American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History” *American Historical Review* 96, no. 4 (October 1991): 1031-1055 and “Ian Tyrrell Responds” in the same issue, 1068-1072. See also Tyrrell’s new book in the Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series *Transnational Nation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Although his work in the 1990s was obscured by debates on American exceptionalism, Tyrrell continued to pursue a transnational perspective. It is worth noting that Tyrrell is a native Australian and teaches at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. “Ian Tyrrell: Biography” Blog: Ian Tyrrell, <http://iantyrrell.wordpress.com>.

⁷⁵ See especially Michael Geyer, “Where Germans Dwell” and “Forum on Transnationalism” H-German, http://www.h-net.org/~german/discuss/Trans/forum_trans_index.htm. “Transnationale Geschichte-eine Zwischenbilanz: Editorial” and “Redaktionsnotiz-Artikelserie ‘Transnationale Geschichte,’” H-Soz-und-Kult, <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/type=revsymp&id=810> and <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/index.asp?id=584&pn=texte>.

forum which understands transnational history as “a broad range of methodical approaches devoted to the analysis of encounters [and exchanges] across borders.”⁷⁶ This open conceptualization of transnational history and methodological debates on these forums reinforce the fact that the merits and limits of the emerging field will be defined by forthcoming studies. To this end, this dissertation employs transnational analysis in tandem with gender and biographical methods, focusing this new perspective on the masculine realms of the nation-state and party politics.

As an analytical method, the concept of transnational has received mixed reviews. The greatest intellectual hurdle lies in the emergence and growing popularity of several methodologies which embrace contacts or connections across national borders such as world, global, cosmopolitan, or international frameworks in the last two decades. The differences between these models may be subtle, but there are distinct advantages to a transnational method. Transnational analysis allows for greater analytical flexibility than global or cosmopolitan perspectives which are often tied to very specific academic or political agendas.⁷⁷ Co-editor of the 2009 *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History*

⁷⁶ See Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel eds., *Das Kaiserreich Transnational* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004). Hereafter cited as Conrad and Osterhammel, *Kaiserreich Transnational*. Especially David Blackbourn “Das Kaiserreich transnational. Eine Skizze,” 302-324. “history.transnational” in geschichte.transnational ><http://geschichte-transnational.clio-online.net/transnat.asp?lang=en><, March 23, 2010, archived at <http://geschichte-transnational.clio-online.net/transnat.asp?pn=about>. These developments are also the result of renewed debates on the characteristics and limits of global and world history.

⁷⁷ Cosmopolitanism is restricted by an intellectual agenda which can be avoided through the open conceptualization of transnational. Literary theorist Rebecca Walkowitz quotes “specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitively is an uncosmopolitan thing to do,” yet individual social actors stand at the center of a cosmopolitan perspective, initiating and interpreting transnational interaction. In short, cosmopolitanism is more a worldview than an analytical perspective. Walkowitz describes critical cosmopolitanism as “emphasiz[ing] adverse or quotidian experience of transnational contact,” yet cosmopolitan social actors, often authors themselves, actively reflect upon their experiences and constantly reinterpret their circumstances. For historians, a cosmopolitan analytical framework places unnecessary limits on the characterization of past transnational events. A transnational historical perspective, as I employ it, carefully considers the actions of social actors but also the transnational interaction which occurs beyond direct, individually-initiated, conscious contact. See Rebecca Walkowitz, *Cosmopolitan Style*:

Pierre-Yves Saunier posits transnational history not as a new term but as a perspective adopted gradually by historians over the past few decades.⁷⁸ Indeed, the enthusiastic responses of scholars to academic forums on the applications of transnational history attest to rising historical interest in methodologies that transcend and challenge the nation. The editors of the dictionary take the concept of a loosely-defined transnational history to an extreme in an effort to encourage scholarship that connects the rich theoretical discussions with empirical evidence of transnational interaction.⁷⁹

The 2005 *Contemporary European History* special issue on transnationalism represents one of the first attempts by European historians to empirically demonstrate practical applications of transnational methods. Here, Clavin reemphasizes “openness as a historical concept” as a key characteristic of transnationalism. In her article, “Defining Transnationalism” Clavin ironically avoids a clear definition of the term in order to encourage open interpretations by the volume’s contributors and future transnational scholars.⁸⁰ Transnational, by its very nature encompasses a range of historical events,

Modernism Beyond the Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), Introduction, especially 4, 14-15.

⁷⁸ Saunier, “Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History*,” in *Journal of Modern European History* 6, no. 2 (2008): 159-180. Quotation from page 24 of electronic copy accessed at Hyper Articles en Ligne (HAL), ><http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/><, article archived at http://hal-univ-lyon3.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/32/81/38/PDF/JMEH_learning_by_doing_FINAL.pdf. Saunier claims there have been several “transnational turns.” See also Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier eds., *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History: From the mid-19th century to the present day*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1047-1054. Hereafter cited as Iriye and Saunier, *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History*.

⁷⁹ The *Dictionary* has a broad entry on the term “transnational,” including its general and interdisciplinary academic uses. Saunier does provide an interesting historiographical reflection in his separate article “Learning by Doing.” The absence of an entry on “transnational history” or an explicit historiographical analysis of transnational methods in the more than 1000-page volume reinforces the editors’ statements that the field will be shaped ultimately by projects which apply transnational analysis to reevaluate dominant, in most instances national, historiographies. Iriye and Saunier, *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History*, 1047-1054.

⁸⁰ Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism,” 438.

from the flow of ideas over national boundaries to physical acts of border crossing that occur during human migrations. True to the words of Saunier, transnational analysis will be “learned by doing” as historians apply transnational perspectives to diverse processes extending beyond the nation.

Clavin critically engages with what she perceives as a problem in transnational historiography: the absence of people. “[T]ransnationalism... is first and foremost about people: the social space they inhabit, the networks they form and the ideas they exchange,” she asserts.⁸¹ This observation is essential to my own understanding of transnational interaction as awarenesses, actions, and networks that transcend constructed national borders.⁸² I employ a combination of Clavin’s people-centered perspective, which lends itself well to gender analysis, and historian Akira Iriye’s more structural definition of transnational history. As historian Kathleen Canning demonstrates, gender history is also a relational history.⁸³ In addition, Clavin’s focus on the interaction between people combines well with Iriye’s understanding of transnational history as “the study of movements and forces that cut across national boundaries” in order to expose different varieties of transnational interaction on the German Left.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Ibid.,” 422. Here Clavin references emerging transnational scholars like Saunier and the popular H-Soz-u-Kult forum “Transnationale Geschichte” which started in 2005.

⁸² Series editors Akira Iriye and Rana Mitter call attention to need for “systematic” studies of “the way in which ordinary men and women relate to one another across national boundaries” in the foreword to Erika Kuhlman’s monograph in the Palgrave MacMillan Transnational History Series. Kuhlman, *Reconstructing Patriarchy after the Great War: Women, Gender, and Postwar Reconciliation between Nations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), xi.

⁸³ Kathleen Canning, *Gender History in Practice: Historical Perspectives on Bodies, Class & Citizenship* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 4. Hereafter cited as Canning, *Gender History*.

⁸⁴ Iriye, “Transnational History,” 211-213.

The relationship between Social Democrats and pacifists provides a unique lens for the different levels of transnational interaction in the space between formal party politics and periphery political culture. Groups like the German Pacifist Student Union (*Deutscher Pazifistischer Studentenbund-DPSt*) featured in Chapter 3 demonstrate that simple awareness of organizations, networks, and people beyond national borders is a potential subject for transnational analysis. Direct mutual communication across borders may comprise the most obvious instances of transnational interaction but such a narrow definition obscures the broad spectrum of transnational influences within national politics. Transnational awareness should not be discounted because the relationships under consideration do not conform to expectations of direct, reciprocal contact as an integral part of transnational interaction. Activities that flourished in the space between party and periphery political groups highlight the contribution of varying levels of transnational interaction to developing transnational awareness on the German political Left. Nonetheless, pre-existing networks fostered by cooperative activism, remained the most effective foundations for direct transnational contact during this timeframe.

I coin three analytical levels of transnational interaction in this dissertation: awareness, intermittent contact, and regular, reciprocal interpersonal contact through established networks. The presence of pre-existing transnational networks proved decisive in the development of direct cross-border contact between Social Democrats and pacifists yet transnational interaction was not restricted to mutual contact between individuals. At the same time, the three levels reinforced each other. Individual awareness of other national movements inspired incidental and intermittent contact between activists, such as an American Quaker who stumbled upon a No-More-War

demonstration in Munich discussed in Chapter 3. In that moment, German pacifists were delighted to have direct contact with the American man and by the fact that his presence drew local attention and ultimately fostered transnational awareness among Munich pacifists.⁸⁵ This transnational interaction sparked additional awareness in Germany. The absence of direct established networks, therefore, did not prevent the existence of alternative forms of transnational interaction between German political actors and their counterparts in other nations, even in the intense nationalist environments of the Weimar Republic and the Nazi Regime.

National identity takes on new meaning in all three levels of transnational interaction. The symbolic presence of multiple national identities marked a key component of transnational movements. Flags, signs, and even cultural displays of dance or costume boldly represented delegates from different nations at transnational gatherings. Historian Leila Rupp stresses that overt displays of national identity among feminist networks created “visual images of the merging of discrete national loyalties into an international identity.”⁸⁶ Historian Holger Nehring reinforces this impression in his assessment of postwar British and German antinuclear campaigns. Individual activists purposefully included symbols of national identity in their protests, realizing that “the international movement would be meaningless without the national movements.”⁸⁷ In

⁸⁵ Detlef Garz and Anja Knuth, *Constanze Hallgarten: Porträt einer Pazifistin* (Hamburg: Kovac, 2004), 38, 42. Hereafter cited as Garz and Knuth, *Porträt einer Pazifistin*. Constanze Hallgarten, *Als Pazifistin in Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Conzeil-Verlag, 1956), 50-51. Hereafter cited as Hallgarten, *Als Pazifistin*.

⁸⁶ Leila Rupp, “Constructing Internationalism: The Case of Transnational Women’s Organizations, 1888-1945” *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (Dec. 1994): 1593.

⁸⁷ Holger Nehring, “National Internationalists: British and West German Protests Against Nuclear Weapons, the Politics of Transnational Communications and the Social History of the Cold War, 1957–1964.” *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 04 (2005): 577. Hereafter cited as Nehring, “National

almost every case of transnational interaction among the case studies in Part II, activists drew attention to their national identities in order to stress the value of cooperation between and beyond nations.

Transnational networks and interaction were deeply entwined with understandings of national identity and the role of the nation within the international community. Yet as Nehring demonstrates, transnational rhetoric and awareness do not always indicate direct transnational communication between national movements.⁸⁸ Activists on the Left were frequently drawn to pacifist strategies and movements from other nations which they would then deploy in their own political efforts. Weimar-era pacifists in the DPSt discussed in Chapter 3 as well as KdA activist and Social Democrat Alma Kettig featured in Chapter 5 exhibited remarkable transnational consciousness, the first level of analysis, and promoted awareness of other national movements in their political agitation.

Transnational awareness was fostered outside of established networks. Student leaders like Weyl brought the ideas of foreign pacifists, feminists, and anarchists into the German political arena through a series of reading sessions. The series featured many transnational topics, yet the overwhelming majority of speakers were German. Similarly, Kettig drew upon Spaniard Salvador de Madariaga's pacifist literature during the 1958 KdA campaign.⁸⁹ Although Kettig did not have direct contact with Madariaga, she cleverly employed his descriptions, incorporating his transnational appeal to mothers into

Internationalists." Nehring argues that the purposeful representation of national identities in rallies like the Easter Marches indicate that marchers did not yet see themselves as part of a "global community." The idea of transnational collective identity, as Rupp describes it, remained intertwined with national identity.

⁸⁸ Nehring, "National Internationalists."

⁸⁹ Stefan Appelius and Alma Kettig, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden: Biographie einer Bundestagsabgeordneten* (Oldenburg: BIS, Bibliotheks- und Informationssystem der Universität Oldenburg, 1990), 19. Hereafter cited as Appelius, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden*. Madariaga was a member of the League of Nations Disarmament section. See the full discussion in Chapter 5.

maternalist dialogues targeting German women in the 1950s. She mobilized transnational pacifist ideas, attacking what were traditionally considered female roles within the fatherland and pitting the “feminine” transnational realm against the “masculine” nation. Kettig’s speech is fully analyzed in Chapter 5. Both the DPSt reading sessions and Kettig’s rhetoric represent examples of transnational awareness operating independently from established interpersonal networks on the German Left.

The second level of transnational interaction represents a transitional space where awareness and interpersonal contacts blended together. An intermediate stage of transnational communication, organizations and individuals at this level exhibited transnational awareness as well as encouraged intermittent individual exchanges between national organizations. In addition to the Munich No-More-War example highlighted earlier, Social Democrats and pacifists during the 1950s and 60s referenced British and Japanese peace movements as models for German activism with limited direct interpersonal communication between the national groups. Pacifist pastor Kurt Essen traveled to Tokyo in 1957, for example, and upon his return relayed vital information to SPD party chairman Erich Ollenhauer about the successful collaboration between the Japanese Socialist Party (SDPJ) and Japanese pacifists. Essen was the only German delegate to attend the transnational conference, yet he brought knowledge of other movements back to Germany, significantly augmenting transnational consciousness on the political Left through his detailed report.

Direct and deliberate contact between individuals from different nations comprises the third and most dynamic level of transnational interaction. WILPF educational courses during the Weimar Republic, support networks for political exiles

during the Nazi Regime, and German pacifist participation in post-1945 British and transnational antinuclear activities are a testament to this variety of transnational interaction. As my dissertation shows, WILPF efforts drew attention to the importance of peace and transnational cooperation, encouraging German citizens, and first-time voters in particular, to participate in the new democracy and develop a political awareness that defied national boundaries. Baer's description of WILPF international educational courses reveal a sense of community beyond the nation which flourished upon the foundation of WILPF's pre-existing transnational networks. Perhaps most importantly, Weimar political actors on the Left, whether Social Democrats or pacifists, fared better under the Nazi Regime in comparison to their colleagues when they had a strong transnational network to draw on for emotional, physical, and financial support.⁹⁰

Tight connections between German co-ed international summer school participants and their colleagues not only represent a third level for transnational analysis, they demonstrate the success of this collaboration in creating a sense of community that transcended national borders. As Leila Rupp argues, one of WILPF's greatest contributions to international understanding was the construction of a collective identity through these interpersonal networks.⁹¹ German pacifists relied on this developing collective identity during the Nazi dictatorship. Individual activists utilized pacifist networks, including WILPF, to lobby the internationally-respected Nobel Peace Prize Committee on behalf of imprisoned German pacifist Carl von Ossietzky. Advocates believed that attention from the transnational community would be enough to pressure

⁹⁰ See Chapter 2.

⁹¹ Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, 209.

Nazi authorities to release Ossietzky.⁹² By 1934, the sense of transnational collective identity was so strong that Ossietzky's supporters hoped it would provoke a reaction from national Nazi authorities.

After 1945 pacifists and Social Democrats continued to build interpersonal connections and foster transnational collective identities which would enhance their legitimacy in the German political arena. Cross-border connections between pacifists and Social Democrats expanded and in 1959 the European Congress for Nuclear Disarmament met in both Great Britain and Germany. Not only did individual activists travel across borders to participate, the conference as a unit transcended national boundaries, commencing in London and ending in Frankfurt.⁹³ The conference showcases all three potential sites for transnational analysis: Individual activists forged new connections through interpersonal contact; the conference took place in two different national venues, increasing transnational awareness in both Great Britain and Germany; and attendees voted the European Federation against Nuclear Arms, a new transnational organization, into existence.

The combination of all three levels of interaction ultimately shaped German politics on the Left throughout 1921-1966, leading to increasingly transnational grassroots space within national political culture and culminating in conflicts between the

⁹² See Chapter 2 for a full discussion. Also Irwin Abrams, "The Multinational Campaign for Carl von Ossietzky," A paper presented at the International Conference on Peace Movements in National Societies, 1919-1939, Stadtschlaining, Austria, September 25-29, 1991. Archived at his website <http://www.irwinabrams.com/articles/ossietzky.html>. Hereafter cited as Abrams, "The Multinational Campaign for Carl von Ossietzky." Ingo Müller, "Carl von Ossietzky," in *Die Friedensbewegung: Organisierte Pazifismus in Deutschland, Österreich Und in Der Schweiz*, ed. Helmut Donat and Karl Holl (Düsseldorf: ECON Taschenbuch Verlag, 1983), 294-296. Article hereafter cited as Müller, "Ossietzky." Book hereafter cited as Donat and Holl, *Die Friedensbewegung*.

⁹³ Protokoll der Sitzung des zentralen Ausschusses "Kampf dem Atomtod," February 21, 1959, Mappe 286, Folder 7, NL Helene Wessel, AdsD.

SPD leadership and pacifists. The party confronted crises of national political stability near the end of the Weimar Republic, during the upheaval of the Nazi Regime, and as they struggled to reestablish a political presence after 1945. Conflicts between the peace party and peace movements became more common as party leaders discounted increasing transnational awareness and cooperative activism among their constituents. Despite limits on political activism, the development of new political space between the party core and extra-parliamentary periphery between 1921 and 1966 helped lay the groundwork for future transnational interaction in German politics.

This new political space complicated traditional ideas grounded in constructed assumptions about party politics. Organized pacifism and peace advocacy itself had long been characterized as feminine in German political culture.⁹⁴ Since Austrian Baroness Bertha von Suttner wrote her influential pacifist novel *Lay Down Your Arms* in 1889, her ethical pacifist position has been relegated to the political margins. Positioned opposite dominant narratives of masculine militarism in nineteenth-century Germany, Suttner's ethical pacifist position led to the implicit gendering of peace as feminine by many activists and politicians. Despite Suttner's original intentions, her sex combined with her historical position as a co-founder of organized German pacifism fostered a feminine stereotype of peace that affected the relationship between pacifists and Social Democrats between 1921 and 1966. Canning argues that gender histories "follow their own temporalities," meaning that they do not fit comfortably back into "established

⁹⁴ Organized pacifism was "dominated by men, while at the same time stigmatized for dealing with a 'women's' issue." See Belinda Davis, "'Women's Strength Against Crazy Male Power' Gendered Language in the West German Peace Movement of the 1980s" in *Frieden – Gewalt – Geschlecht. Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als Geschlechterforschung*, ed. Jennifer A. Davy, Karen Hagemann, and Ute Kätzel (Essen: Klartext, 2005), 244. Hereafter cited as Davy and Hagemann, *Frieden-Gewalt-Geschlecht*.

chronologies and categories.”⁹⁵ The history of peace and pacifism as a gendered concept reinforces her claim. The stereotype of peace as feminine endured even after the SPD shifted tactics, embracing Willy Brandt’s chancellor candidacy as well as his “masculine” understandings of peace in 1961.

Historian Roger Chickering traces the origins of organized peace movements in Germany to 1892 when Suttner and Alfred Fried founded the DFG.⁹⁶ Suttner clearly understood her own position in nineteenth-century European society where “politics was an absolute taboo-theme for young ladies” as marginal to the masculine strongholds of militarism and party politics.⁹⁷ Indeed, she sought to avoid stereotypes of her pacifist work as essentially feminine and actively engaged with debates on sexual equality in her literature. Nonetheless, Chickering concludes that Suttner’s “emotional moralism” was a “liability” to the early pacifist movement and limited its appeal during the Kaiserreich.⁹⁸ His seminal study of the German peace movement is bookended by the 1892 founding of the DFG and the outbreak of World War I, however. A long *durée* analysis reveals a

⁹⁵ Canning, *Gender History*, 60-1.

⁹⁶ Roger Chickering, *Imperial Germany and a World Without War: The Peace Movement and German Society, 1892-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 4-8. Hereafter cited as Chickering, *World Without War*.

⁹⁷ Gisela Brinker-Gabler, ed., *Kämpferin für Frieden: Bertha von Suttner: Lebenserinnerungen, Reden und Schriften* (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1986), 12. Hereafter cited as Brinker-Gabler, *Kämpferin für Frieden*.

⁹⁸ Chickering, *World Without War*, 93. The second preface to a 1914 English edition of *Lay Down your Arms* addresses this concern directly. The editor urged readers not to pursue “sentimental emotions and vague protests” after reading the book and have a “business-like discussion of the means by which the resort to war may be at any rate rendered more and more infrequent,” instead. Bertha von Suttner, *Lay Down Your Arms: The Autobiography of Martha von Tilling*, trans. T. Holmes (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914), ix. Hereafter cited as Suttner, LDYA (1914). See also Karl Holl, *Pazifismus in Deutschland* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988), 73-4. Hereafter cited as Holl, *Pazifismus*.

complicated narrative of changing gender perceptions of peace and the SPD's appropriation of these concepts at various moments between 1921 and 1966.

Suttner's moral view of peace shaped the general tone of the peace society during Chickering's timeframe. DFG co-founder Fried critiqued her brand of ethical pacifism, favoring his own concept of scientific pacifism, grounded partially in Marxist theory as a more politically viable concept.⁹⁹ Fried did not directly challenge Suttner's position as a female pacifist. His reconceptualization of the pacifist position based on scientific logic and political theories confirms Chickering's claim that Fried questioned the "efficacy" of Suttner's moral ideology.¹⁰⁰ A member of the SPD, Fried believed that those who possessed the political and economic power to prevent war would not be persuaded by morals. His scientific pacifism rationalized Suttner's moral view. With this ideology, Fried hoped to influence politicians in the party political core and sought ways to exert a pacifist influence on those who held political power. Fried's concept was one of many ideologies to huddle under the umbrella term of pacifism. As the DFG reemerged after each world war the diversity of its members posed a constant challenge to its organizational unity. Though Suttner's brand of pacifism enjoyed popularity in the wake of her book, as I show it was certainly not the only choice for potential German peace activists between the 1920s and 1960s.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Fried looked to Marx, sociologist Jacob Novikow, Eugen Schlieff, and Polish banker Ivan Bloch for inspiration for his pacifism. See Chickering, *World Without War*, 94-108. Fried based his pacifist theory in two realms traditionally dominated by men: Marxist theory which informed Social Democratic strategies and logical scientific arguments. See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of scientists as pacifists.

¹⁰⁰ Chickering, *World Without War*, 94.

¹⁰¹ See *Ibid.*, Introduction.

Rather, Suttner's work is at the center of a fascinating paradox. *Lay Down Your Arms* itself is a study in gender relationships, yet its publication and subsequent use as a key text for the organized peace movements in Germany and Austria led to deep gender divisions which are still evident today. In her novel, Suttner describes the life of Martha von Tilling who was flanked on all sides by militarism as "a general's daughter, wife of a first lieutenant and...mother of a corporal."¹⁰² Through Martha, Suttner questions the necessity of war, only to have her repeatedly silenced and dismissed by her father and other strong male characters. Women did not escape Suttner's critique. Even Martha's friend Lori Griesbach, who happily accepts her position as an upper-class patriotic woman and soldier's wife, receives harsh treatment from the author as a willing participant in the militaristic system.

As a female author, Suttner constantly worried about the reception of her work in academic and political circles, going so far as to publish her previous novels anonymously to prevent any audience preconceptions. She feared her books would "remain unread by the intended audience."¹⁰³ Suttner's fears were not unfounded. She chronicles an amusing incident in her memoirs which attests to the widespread belief that women should not be active in politics. While attending a dinner party, Suttner overheard a conversation about her book *The Machine Age* which was published under the pseudonym "Someone." When Suttner remarked that she might read the novel under

¹⁰² Suttner, LDYA (1914), 15. When Martha's husband Arno makes this statement he refers jokingly to their son as a corporal because society dictates that he will grow up to be a soldier.

¹⁰³ Bertha von Suttner, *Memoiren von Bertha von Suttner* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1909), 170. Hereafter cited as Suttner, *Memoiren*.

discussion she was immediately rebuffed- “It is not a book for ladies!”¹⁰⁴ Suttner felt vindicated because this incident revealed that, contrary to widespread belief, women could indeed write serious studies of political and social issues. Nonetheless, as the story suggests most contemporaries felt that politics was not a socially acceptable occupation for women. This was a stereotype which Suttner, who imagined herself as a legitimate contributor to political debates regardless of her sex, rejected.

Suttner published her next novel, *Lay Down Your Arms* under her own name, painstakingly staging the story in an effort to ensure that her message was not easily dismissed because she was a woman. She complicates the heroine’s voice with the claim that Martha published her autobiography at the request of her second husband Friedrich von Tilling. Friedrich insisted that she continue his pacifist work after his death. Suttner’s messages, therefore, acquired certain legitimacy as the legacy of a man who had learned from his experiences at war.

Chickering depicts the tone of *Lay Down Your Arms* as one of “melodramatic sentimentality, despite the fact that much of the book consists of war scenes described in lurid detail.”¹⁰⁵ The historian privileged Suttner’s status as a woman over her position as a pacifist. To be sure, these war scenes were integral to the success of the novel. As narrator, Martha describes how painful it is to relate stories of war and battlefield anguish and her hope that it will also be a painful for the reader.¹⁰⁶ Suttner uses vivid descriptions

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 179.

¹⁰⁵ Chickering, *World Without War*, 89. See page 16 for Chickering’s definition of pacifism.

¹⁰⁶ Suttner, *LDYA* (1914), 427. “If that pain should only awake in a few hearts the energetic hatred against the source of all misery here described, I shall not have put myself to the torture in vain,” Martha stated in Suttner’s final chapter. Interestingly, Martha’s stories and opinions are quickly dismissed by her father and other characters in the novel. It is only after she visits the battlefields in Bohemia herself that her

of battles and their aftermath to create, and in some cases recreate, the experience of war for her audience. Men and women frequently became pacifists as a result of brutal experiences in armed conflicts. Henri Dunant, who was a co-recipient of the first Nobel Peace Prize and established the International Committee of the Red Cross, was shaped by his experiences as an inadvertent witness of the bloody battlefield at Solferino in 1859. Dunant shared his observations in the book *A Memory of Solferino*, in order to “awaken the abhorrence of war in his readers.”¹⁰⁷ In a similar effort, Suttner shepherds her readers through the necessary experience of war as a rite of passage on the way to becoming defenders of peace.¹⁰⁸

The war scenes in Suttner’s novel initiated or reacquainted readers with the gruesome battlefield scenes; yet this time the author accompanied the reader, filtering the experience for the audience and guiding readers to the end goal of peace activism. Suttner and other pacifists were convinced that the peace movement had to become a mass movement and she viewed her book as a rallying cry for that cause. It is no wonder that as Europe plunged into World War I over 200,000 copies of her novel had already been purchased and a new German edition was published in November 1914. Suttner offered a template with which to interpret and understand the militaristic spirit

stories received an audience. With this Suttner suggests those who experience war first hand are most equipped to speak out against it. Martha, therefore, has her rite of passage through war. See page 288.

¹⁰⁷ Brinker-Gabler, *Kämpferin für Frieden*, 213. See also Jürgen Zeichmann, “Henri Dunant,” in *Die Friedensbewegung*, ed. Donat and Holl, 94-5. Dunant was traveling for business at the time.

¹⁰⁸ Irwin Abrams argues that Suttner was drawn into the peace movement largely through writing about it. The experience of writing transformed her pacifism. Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner*, xiv and Introduction. See also 62 and Hamann’s chapter 5 for a full analysis of *Lay Down your Arms*. Suttner researched the battlefield descriptions for her novel. See Suttner, *Memoirs of an Eventful Life Authorized Translation* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1910), 295.

surrounding war and the traumatic experiences of the conflict on the front and homefront.¹⁰⁹

Historian Anne Dzamba argues that scholars cannot understand Suttner's "program for peace" without first acknowledging her interpretation of past and future gender relations. Indeed, Dzamba describes Suttner's biting critique of gender relations as the most controversial topic in the novel and one reason why Suttner's publishers were reluctant to publish it in the first place.¹¹⁰ Though contemporaries and subsequent scholars note the novel's shortcomings as a literary masterpiece, Suttner's keen observations of Viennese culture and gender conflicts provide historians with a lens into everyday aristocratic life at the end of the nineteenth century and her own pacifist position.¹¹¹ As a pacifist, Suttner believed in the goal of ending the war between the sexes as well as the struggles between nations and classes. Despite this belief, she prioritized her pacifism over feminist activism.¹¹² *Lay Down Your Arms* is a testament to this goal, combining a gendered critique of society with her platform for peace. Indeed, Suttner directly challenged the political core. First, she published a polemical political novel under her own name. Second she proposed agendas for peace and international

¹⁰⁹ Bertha von Suttner, *Die Waffen Nieder! Eine Lebensgeschichte*, ed. Sigrid and Helmut Bock (Husum: Verlag der Nation, 2006), 406. Hereafter cited as Suttner, *Die Waffen Nieder* (2006).

¹¹⁰ Anne O. Dzamba, "Bertha von Suttner, Gender, and the Representation of War" in ed. June K. Burton *Essays in European History: Selected from the Annual Meetings of the Southern Historical Association, 1986-1987* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 62, 66. Hereafter cited as Dzamba, "Bertha von Suttner."

¹¹¹ Suttner, *Die Waffen Nieder* (2006), 436. Dzamba, "Bertha von Suttner," 61.

¹¹² Though she was often invited to join women's societies or participate in their events Suttner maintained a distance from feminist and women's activism. She saw it as a possible distraction from her larger purpose of establishing peace and disarmament. Suttner showed considerable support for feminist causes, however. See Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner*, 257, 267-271.

arbitration, intervening in debates normally reserved for male participants in high politics during the nineteenth century.

Suttner threw off the guise of anonymity with *Lay Down Your Arms*, but she acknowledged the advantages of having male voice behind her most important pacifist messages. The heroine's second husband, Friedrich, issued critical prescriptions for world peace in the novel.¹¹³ "Peace is the greatest blessing, or rather the absence of the greatest curse," Friedrich asserted, taking on Martha's militaristic father when the female protagonist could not effectively do so herself.¹¹⁴ The female author and heroine commented on the state of gender relations, yet Suttner cunningly placed her strongest political messages in the mouth of a male character. "I hate war. If only every man who feels the same would dare to proclaim it aloud, what a threatening protest would be shouted out to heaven!"¹¹⁵ This statement is one of Friedrich's most explicit in the novel. His observations while serving in the army were crucial to Suttner's message and broke social taboos. Friedrich frequently wrote home about the horrors of war and he wonders why other men "bring fresh... joyful images" home.¹¹⁶ He concludes that his comrades remained silent and indifferent about the most horrible aspects of conflict and tailored their stories to heroic models which they learned in school rather than reality. In Suttner's eyes, this social "silence" about battlefield atrocities only perpetuated the myths

¹¹³ Suttner published her previous socially critical novel, *The Machine Age (Das Maschinenzeitalter)*, anonymously. She feared her name alone and status as a woman would prevent the book from being taken seriously. According to Hamann, the book's success proved that there was no specifically female way of writing. Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner*, 265-7

¹¹⁴ Suttner, LDYA (1914), 97.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 155.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 239.

that war was an honorable affair and encouraged men like Martha's first husband to do all in their power to fight in the frontlines.

Complicating the legacy of pacifism as a woman's issue, biographer Brigitte Hamann shows that Suttner was equally critical of the women who touted peace as an explicitly feminine cause. She countered arguments that women were naturally against war and violence with examples of women who enthusiastically supported war. Suttner took a radical position on equality, stating "there is no difference between the male and female sex in regard to their position on the peace issue."¹¹⁷ For Suttner, the issue of peace was universal. This did not prevent her from engaging critically with class and gender inequalities in her activism and novels. By refusing to acknowledge the traditional roles of men as fighters or defenders and women as mothers and supporters of the nationalist effort, Suttner made a powerful statement. *Lay Down Your Arms* is a key example. Here Suttner fought the militaristic traditions of Austrian and European society as well as the class and gender constructions which perpetuated glorified conceptions of war.

Lay Down Your Arms was translated into 12 different languages and reprinted over forty times in German. Sigrid and Helmut Bock edited the most recent edition in 2006. Suttner was delighted when Social Democrat Wilhelm Liebknecht invited her to publish the novel in *Vorwärts* in 1892.¹¹⁸ "What you strive for, that is peace on earth, we can accomplish—I mean Social Democracy, which is in truth a great international peace-

¹¹⁷ Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner*, 267.

¹¹⁸ Brinker-Gabler, *Kämpferin für den Frieden*, 11. Suttner, *Die Waffen Nieder* (2006), Jacket summary and 451-2.

league” he wrote in a letter to Suttner.¹¹⁹ Like many Social Democrats and pacifists after them, Suttner and Liebknecht recognized the potential for cooperation between the party and peace movement.

Cooperation between pacifists and Social Democrats was complicated by the common perception that Suttner’s pacifism was feminine and located outside the realm of party politics. Chickering demonstrates that Suttner’s moral pacifism, which he affirms had little grounding in practical politics for arbitration and disarmament, limited the peace society’s potential for political influence during the Kaiserreich. Suttner was not the only leader to blame. Chickering asserts that prominent pacifists like Ludwig Quidde and Fried were also limited by their own pacifist ideologies and “their power and influence was negligible” before World War I.¹²⁰ Chickering takes a critical tone as he describes Suttner’s writing as “raptures,” yet her moral version of pacifism drew many activists into the German Peace Society and the “limits” Chickering teases out were caused by disputes over international arbitration, not necessarily Suttner’s female sex.¹²¹

One of the first and most vehement gendered critiques of pacifism emerged 35 years after the publication of Suttner’s novel. Discussed in detail in Chapter 3, Carl von Ossietzky drew explicit connections between *Lay Down Your Arms* and pacifist impotency in Weimar political culture. Ossietzky was one of the most prominent pacifist

¹¹⁹ Brinker-Gabler, *Kämpferin für den Frieden*, 12. Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner*, 64-5, 73.

¹²⁰ Chickering, *World Without War*, 88, 92.

¹²¹ Chickering, *World Without War*, 92. Chickering had to reach beyond his timeframe into the Weimar Republic for a quote that derides Suttner’s brand of pacifism as distinctly feminine. Chickering refers to the Weimar-era journalist and anti-militarist Ossietzky who described Suttner as “a gentle perfume of absurdity.” Furthermore, Brinker-Gabler notes that the DFG was not conceived as a political organization but a non-partisan one. This structural limitation probably affected the organization’s appeal to new members as much or more than its grounding in ethical pacifist or scientific pacifist ideologies. See Brinker-Gabler, *Kämpferin für den Frieden*, 14-15.

critics of Suttner's ethical pacifist ideology. He believed that the German peace movement was founded in Suttner's "feminine sentimentality" and prevented pacifist participation in the male-dominated realm of party politics. Historian Jennifer Anne Davy shows that the "militaristic rhetoric" of pacifists like Ossietzky was grounded in their own gendered understandings of politics as masculine and of the stigma of the peace movement as feminine. At a moment of intense frustration in a society dominated by militarism, Ossietzky looked abroad to other national pacifist organizations lead by prominent male figures. He imagined that pacifist impotency in Weimar-era politics was a distinctly German occurrence linked to Suttner's legacy.¹²²

Suttner's complicated legacy as a female ethical pacifist continues to resonate on the German Left. My dissertation historicizes moments of conflict between pacifists and Social Democrats between 1921 and 1966, many of which were sparked by dissonant understandings of the political role of pacifists. As Social Democrats ventured into extra-parliamentary cooperative activism between 1921 and 1966 they not only blurred the lines between core and penumbra but also masculine and feminine conceptions of peace. After several attempts to reconcile party goals with pacifist ideologies and movements, SPD leaders ultimately settled on an understanding of peace which was decidedly paternalistic. Embodied by charismatic leader Willy Brandt, the development of this masculine sense of peace coincided with the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and

¹²² Jennifer A. Davy, "'Manly' and 'Feminine' Antimilitarism. Perceptions of Gender in the Antimilitarist Wing of the Weimar Peace Movement" in *Frieden – Gewalt – Geschlecht*, ed. Davy and Hagemann, 155. Carl von Ossietzky "Die Pazifisten" in *Carl von Ossietzky Sämtliche Schriften* Volume II, ed. Bärbel Boldt, Dirk Grathoff, and Michael Sartorius (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1994), 373-374. Book hereafter cited as Ossietzky, *Sämtliche Schriften*. Ironically, Ossietzky grounded in his Sonderweg-like criticism in a critique of Suttner's novel although her work continued to be popular among pacifists beyond German borders and most probably influenced the foreign pacifists he admired as well.

fit well with the SPD's aggressive move away from a marginal position as an opposition party to membership in a governing coalition.

Similar to the term transnational, peace represents a loose concept as the opposite of war and violence. It was constantly reinterpreted by political actors who drew on their specific historical contexts and past experiences for their own understanding of the term. SPD party chairman Brandt's 1977 foreword to the reprint of *Lay Down Your Arms* reinforces this point. After the formative experiences of Weimar democracy, two world wars, and the establishment of a German republic, Brandt leaves the question of political activism *versus* ethical pacifism open, inviting the reader to decide Suttner's meaning for their own historical moment. "Every reader must answer for him or herself whether she was a pacifist politician or — as is often said—a literary talent and likable dreamer."¹²³ Although attitudes towards Suttner and various gendered characterizations of peace shifted between 1921 and 1966, gender analysis of the relationship between pacifists and Social Democrats reveals the need to historicize these moments of intense conflict.

Core party politics remained an intrinsically masculine realm even after female suffrage was granted in 1918, forcing individuals and organizations in the political periphery to adapt and find ways to influence those who held political power. This dissertation utilizes a long *durée* perspective to highlight the ways cooperative activism practiced by individual Social Democrats and pacifists eroded long standing assumptions about peace and politics on the German Left. Individual actors constantly renegotiated and transgressed accepted boundaries between "masculine" and "feminine" political spaces including between national political culture and developing transnational arenas.

¹²³ Bertha von Suttner, *Die Waffen Nieder* (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1986), vi.

As an institution, the SPD represents structural continuity on the German Left. It remained grounded in the political core as its individual members ventured into other political spaces, including extra-parliamentary space categorized as feminine by gendered understandings of political power and pacifism. These individual activists represent critical connections between transnational networks which created alternative forms of structural continuity tied to both party politics and periphery groups. Chapter 2 fully explores the role of their biographical experiences. Developing transnational frameworks complicated political power relationships between core and penumbra, leading to conflicts between Social Democrats and pacifists as they promoted pacifism and sought politically viable understandings of peace on the German Left.

Chapter 2:
“Experience is a Subject’s History”¹²⁴
The Personal and Political in Historical Analysis

“There is no such thing as a compromise-war where people are only shot half-dead”¹²⁵
- Gerhart Seger (1896-1967), 1929

“We were always suspected of Communist infiltration, at least of being a Communist-influenced organization, especially by the party leadership [exiled] in Prague. I do not know who came up with that theory.”¹²⁶
- Rudolf Küstermeier (1903-1977) in 1970

“Do you know...the Reichsminister’s son-in-law?”¹²⁷
-Vorwärts article on Walter Menzel (1901-1963), 1960

“Experience is a subject’s history,” according to historian Joan Scott.¹²⁸ She argues that individuals possess a certain degree of agency though they are still connected through discursive contexts. As Chapter 1 demonstrates, cooperative activists maneuvered among historical structures such as political parties and transnational networks. Though these frameworks limited personal political mobility, activists

¹²⁴ Joan W. Scott, “Experience,” in *Feminists Theorize the Political*, ed. Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott, 22-40 (New York: Routledge, 1992), 34. Hereafter cited as Scott, “Experience.”

¹²⁵ SPD Vorstand, *Protokoll Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag Magdeburg 1929 vom 26. bis 31. Mai in der Stadthalle* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1974), 130. Hereafter cited as *1929 Parteitag*.

¹²⁶ Rudolf Küstermeier, *Beiträge zum Thema Widerstand: Der Rote Stoßtrupp* (Berlin: Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, 2001), 9. Hereafter cited as Küstermeier, *Der Rote Stoßtrupp*.

¹²⁷ “Kennen Sie den?: Der Schwiegersohn des Reichsministers,” Newspaper clipping from *Vorwärts*, August 4, 1960. “Walter Menzel,” Box 6767, Sammlung Personalalia, AdsD.

¹²⁸ Scott “Experience,” 34. The individual should not be separated from the linguistic context or conditions of existence that accompany his or her personal story. Moreover, as Scott argues, “these conditions enable choices, although [the choices] are not unlimited.” In my analysis, these “conditions” comprise the historical context including structural entities like the SPD and transnational networks.

consistently challenged constructed boundaries. This chapter investigates the impact of individual agency on the SPD as an institution and the ways in which the long term relationship between Social Democrats and pacifists on the German Left challenges standard historical periodizations. Biographical analysis works in tandem with the transnational and gender methods illustrated in the previous chapter. Located in the penumbra, international feminist and transnational networks represent important continuities in German political culture that defied the rupture of the Nazi period. At the same time, the historical specificity of World War II experiences for those activists who remained in Germany and those in exile created lasting fault lines, leading to tension in German politics on the Left after 1945.

Biographical analysis provides valuable insight into the choices of pacifists and Social Democrats as they negotiated the complicated realm of political culture between 1921 and 1966. Their connections to the party, organized pacifism, and transnational networks all contributed to their *habitus*, as Pierre Bourdieu conceives it, and influenced their personal and political decisions.¹²⁹ Historian Simone Lässig argues that “biographies provide insights into contexts and interconnections that are relevant to everyday history.”¹³⁰ Lässig reinforces the interrelationship between institutions and personal agency demonstrated in Part I of this dissertation with her assertion that “biography rises... above the individual; it is neither structure nor agency, but always

¹²⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*, ed. Randal Johnson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 14. For Bourdieu, *habitus* represents a structure. For Scott, it is part of the subject’s discursive context.

¹³⁰ Volker Berghahn and Simone Lässig, *Biography Between Structure and Agency: Central European Lives in International Historiography* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 20. Hereafter cited as Berghahn and Lässig, *Biography between Structure and Agency*.

both.”¹³¹ Drawing on Lassig’s insights, this chapter historicizes individual experiences, recognizing important continuities represented by lifetimes which defied constructed historical periods such as the Nazi era. It also explores the impact of personal decisions on political institutions and networks as individual activists sought and created political space for their activism.

This dissertation spans standard periodizations, utilizing biographical analysis across a long *durée* to critique accepted categories of the past. Historian Glenn Penny has grappled with the constraints of periodizations in his article on East German academic Liselotte Welskopf-Henrich. He concludes that the use of biography “compels us... to move beyond” the established history of a specific period and start writing history “through” these periods. Furthermore, biography “urges us to think through chronological and geographical borders and write German cultural history across the political ruptures that punctuate our narratives of the past.”¹³² Penny’s retooling of biographical analysis provides a critical framework for scholars to challenge the stigmas associated with totalitarian regimes. Individual life experiences bridged political regimes and created links between organizations where cooperation on an official level was restricted. These experiences shaped individuals, influencing their perceptions of, and reactions to, future events.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² H. Glenn Penny, “Red Power: Liselotte Welskopf-Henrich and Indian Activist Networks in East and West Germany” *Central European History* 41(2008): 452-3. Hereafter cited as Penny, “Red Power.”

All too often, dominant institutional histories, such as that of the SPD, obscure the agency of individual political actors and the tensions created by cooperative activism.¹³³ Pacifist Social Democrat Gerhart Seger (1896-1967) articulated the inner struggles of peace activists in the SPD well during a speech at the 1929 party meeting. In a heated debate over rearmament, Seger rejected the label “only a pacifist” (*Nurpazifist*) and positioned himself within masculine party political space.¹³⁴ Seger removed the peace question from its limbo between masculine party political and feminine extra-parliamentary spaces as seen in Chapter 1, declaring that “in politics [peace] is perhaps the single point that we can answer only with yes or no.” Driving the argument home he continued, “there is no such thing as a compromise-war where people are only shot half-dead.”¹³⁵ As a cooperative activist and party representative, Seger felt bound to his pacifist convictions yet constrained by the party he represented. “We [Social Democrats] say we are against war, but we are still ready to lead the next one,” he lamented.¹³⁶ His statement illustrates the tension between SPD peace rhetoric and party leaders’ efforts to craft viable political strategies. Bringing individual experiences to the foreground reveals fissures in the relationship created by gendered assumptions and growing transnational awareness in Germany.

¹³³ See Heinrich Potthoff and Susanne Miller, *Kleine Geschichte der SPD* (Bonn: Dietz, 2002). Potthoff and Miller, *Kleine Geschichte*. Detlef Lehnert, *Sozialdemokratie zwischen Protestbewegung und Regierungspartei 1848-1983* (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983). Hereafter cited as Lehnert, *Sozialdemokratie*. One effective counter to this trend is Karen Hagemann’s *Frauenalltag und Männerpolitik: Alltagsleben und Gesellschaftliches Handeln von Arbeiterfrauen in der Weimarer Republik* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1990). Hereafter cited as Hagemann, *Frauenalltag und Männerpolitik*.

¹³⁴ *1929 Parteitag*, 130.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 130.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 131.

The complex relationship between the SPD and the peace movements, as well as the party's survival beyond the Nazi era needs to be problematized. Weimar political institutions either adapted to the new restraints of the Nazi bureaucracy or faded from the public arena during its twelve-year rule.¹³⁷ To say that the SPD as an institution went underground or into exile, however, is not entirely correct. Penny depicts World War II as "...a moment of shifting contexts in which actions and ideas coalesced in new ways, quickly regrouping before clear social and political structures reemerged."¹³⁸ Individual Social Democrats undertook inner and traditional emigration, carrying the organizational spirit of the SPD through the turbulent war years and, as Penny describes, reinterpreting its meaning when the party could be reestablished in 1949.¹³⁹

Erich Ollenhauer (1901-1963) became one of the main torch-bearers of the party's organizational spirit in exile. Born into a SPD founding family in Magdeburg, Ollenhauer dedicated his life to the party and its goals, which later included international reconciliation and peace. His leap to prominence coincides with a cleverly-timed and compelling speech at the 1920 Socialist Youth Day (*Arbeiterjugendtag*) in Weimar. After this event "[h]e was suddenly known throughout the country," Social Democrat

¹³⁷ For an example of an institution that adapted under the Nazi Regime see Atina Grossmann's study of the birth control reform movement, Grossmann, *Reforming Sex: The German Movement for Birth Control and Abortion Reform, 1920-1950* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

¹³⁸ Penny, "Red Power," 476.

¹³⁹ Historian Wu Pi-Wen argues that the SPD as an institution endured but the basic character of the party changed over time. Pi-Wen, "Das Scheitern der Weimarer Republik und der Wiederaufbau Deutschlands aus Sicht der deutschen Sozialdemokraten im Exil 1933-1945" (PhD dissertation, Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster, 2000), 8-9, 69-71, 98-9. Hereafter cited as Pi-Wen, "Das Scheitern der Weimarer Republik." Ernst Thape notes that the SPD was the only party to retain its original name in the postwar and shows its continuity from Kaiserreich to Federal Republic. Ernst Thape, *Von Rot zu Schwarz-Rot-Gold: Lebensweg eines Sozialdemokraten* (Hannover: Dietz, 1969), 87. Hereafter cited as Thape, *Lebensweg*.

Ernst Thape recalls.¹⁴⁰ Ollenhauer came in contact with many young activists through his activity as a speaker and coordinator for the Socialist youth groups, including international No-More-War participants in the 1920s.¹⁴¹ His position as an influential youth leader was integral to his election to the SPD party executive in April 1933 and his subsequent inclusion in the World War II-era SPD leadership (SOPADE) established in Prague the following June.¹⁴²

SPD leaders nominated Ollenhauer because of his reputation as a youth leader and close familiarity with younger networks of Social Democrats. Here, Ollenhauer's past experiences proved formative for his later political career. Human rights scholar Sally Merry demonstrates that individuals both shaped and were shaped by their positions in established institutions.¹⁴³ Young Ollenhauer illustrates Merry's argument well. He observed that the *Verband der Sozialistischen Arbeiterjugend* (SAJ), a Socialist youth association, needed strong leadership and he worked diligently alongside colleague Max Westphal (1895-1942) to fill that void in the organization's structure. When Westphal resigned to join the party executive committee, Ollenhauer eagerly took his place at the head of the Socialist youth movement. He worked within the existing organizational

¹⁴⁰ Thape, *Lebensweg*, 85.

¹⁴¹ Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, *Ollenhauer: Biedermann und Patriot* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1984), 15, 23-29. Hereafter cited as Seebacher-Brandt, *Ollenhauer*.

¹⁴² Marlis Buchholz and Bernd Rother, *Der Parteivorstand der SPD im Exil: Protokolle der Sopade 1933-1940* (Bonn: Dietz, 1995), XXX. Hereafter cited as Buchholz and Rother, *Parteiivorstand im Exil*.

¹⁴³ Sally Engle Merry, *Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 186. Merry draws on Judith Butler's performative concept of gender identity to understand the place of women within legal systems. The ability of these women to craft their own identities within the limits of each legal framework is critical. The legal system allows for the position of a woman as a victim for example, but the position of that victim within the structure changes based on the discourses surrounding her and how she situates herself within the available legal framework

frameworks to reinvigorate a movement in danger of becoming politically stagnant. As one biographer notes, Ollenhauer facilitated a new beginning in the Socialist youth group akin to the broader sense of rebirth in Weimar society after World War I.¹⁴⁴ The young chairman encouraged ideological discussions about practical Socialism and urged young Social Democrats to become active citizens in the new democratic system. “First and foremost we must strengthen our awareness of the individual’s great responsibility to the collective,” Ollenhauer preached in 1922.¹⁴⁵ This advice to young Social Democrats demonstrates that the youth leader recognized the importance of individual support in the collective preservation of Weimar democratic institutions.

Ollenhauer impressed party leaders when he addressed the 1931 Leipzig party meeting. In the deteriorating political climate, his speech, “Party and Youth,” spoke directly to their desperate need to appeal to younger voters. Challenging generational differences, Ollenhauer estimated that 320,000 SPD members were under the age of 35.¹⁴⁶ The youth movement leadership took responsibility for 14- to 20-year-olds. Once this age-group joined the party, he argued, SPD leaders must take responsibility for its

¹⁴⁴ Willy Brandt, et al. *Erich Ollenhauer: Ein großer Sozialist* (Berlin: Arani Verlags-GmbH, 1964), 8. Hereafter cited as Brandt, *Ein großer Sozialist*. Westphal would become part of the Löbe-Executive, formed in opposition to the SOPADE by SPD leaders who remained in Germany, in 1933. See Heiner Lindner, “*Erkämpft Eure Freiheit! Stürzt Hitler!*” *Die “Sozialistischen Mitteilungen” 1939-1948* (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2003), 40. Hereafter cited as Lindner, *Sozialistischen Mitteilungen*.

¹⁴⁵ Brandt, *Ein großer Sozialist*, 12.

¹⁴⁶ Ollenhauer’s 1931 speech at the Leipzig Party Meeting reflects his status as a respected youth leader. His proposals for youth outreach reflect an understanding of both party politics and the state of youth groups. Ollenhauer’s tone is decidedly optimistic however; whereas Potthoff and Miller estimate that eight percent of party members were under the age of twenty-five in 1930, Ollenhauer used 35 as a cut-off age to emphasize a larger number of young members in his speech to SPD leaders. SPD Vorstand, *Protokoll Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag Leipzig 1931 vom 31. Mai bis 5. Juni im Volkshaus* (Bonn: Dietz, 1974), 197, 190-206. Hereafter cited as *1931 Parteitag*. See also Potthoff and Miller, *Kleine Geschichte*, 121.

retention themselves. Ollenhauer advocated a mass mobilization of this 20- to 35-year-old age group to recruit more young people to the party and its youth organizations. The 30-year-old eased his own transition to the party mainstream with this well-timed speech, carving out a role for himself that built on his youth movement experience. Social Democratic journalist Friedrich Stampfer (1874-1957) praised Ollenhauer in *Vorwärts*, particularly noting his efforts to support the party line and connect with older leaders. “The tone was perfect,” Stampfer reported, “Indeed what resonance!”¹⁴⁷ The decision to dedicate himself to the Socialist youth movement a decade earlier positioned Ollenhauer well for a place on the party executive committee that may not have been open to him otherwise. Ollenhauer’s dedication to the SPD as an institution played a significant role here and would influence his political activities in exile as well as after 1945.

In foreign exile, preservation of the SPD as an institution fell to members like Ollenhauer who reestablished, adapted, and remembered the traditions and structure of the Social Democratic Party. Seasoned SPD leaders Otto Wels (1873-1939) and Hans Vogel (1881-1945) banked on the ability of individual SOPADE members to preserve SPD frameworks despite National Socialism and reconstruct the institution after Hitler’s eventual defeat.¹⁴⁸ Basing their opinions on previous experiences of Socialist persecution during the Kaiserreich, the majority of party leaders were convinced that exile was the only way to preserve the party’s organizational integrity under the Nazi government. Wels and his colleagues were comforted by the fact that German Social Democracy had

¹⁴⁷ Quoted in Seebacher-Brandt, *Ollenhauer*, 54.

¹⁴⁸ See Buchholz and Rother, *Parteiivorstand im Exil*, XIX-XXI.

successfully weathered past persecution and exile under Bismarck and could potentially succeed again. This faith in exile led to heated disputes between SPD leaders.

The executive committee was made up of members from diverse party factions in an effort to dispel any suspicion that the party was too traditional or outdated. As Wels, Vogel, and Stampfer began to set up a party headquarters in Prague, however, members of the executive split between those who supported exile and those who were determined to continue the fight in Germany. In the end, a minority of executive members remained in Germany led by former Social Democratic Reichstag President Paul Löbe. These men resolutely denied the sole authority of the Prague SOPADE. Most of Löbe's minority executive hailed from either the far left or right wings of the party whereas the exiled SOPADE consisted of majority Social Democrats who stood essentially behind the party line.¹⁴⁹ Ollenhauer's youth movement colleague Westphal, for example, chose to remain in Germany with the executive minority. Social Democrats, he argued, "preferred to see their party leaders in prison, where they could not work, than in exile, where they could work but were not in any direct danger." Westphal died in 1942 after being imprisoned in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.¹⁵⁰ When the SPD was reestablished in 1945, Social Democrats from exile and within Germany came together to re-form the party based on their Weimar experiences. Each group learned different lessons over the long decade of Nazi rule: as if on a Social Democratic homefront, exiled party members preserved SPD legacies and traditions away from the fighting and supported party

¹⁴⁹ Erich Matthias, ed., *Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland: Eine Dokumentation über die sozialdemokratische Emigration* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1968), 31-32. See also Lewis Edinger, *German Exile Politics: The Social Democratic Executive Committee in the Nazi Era* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), 26. Hereafter cited as Edinger, *German Exile Politics*.

¹⁵⁰ Quoted in Seebacher-Brandt, *Ollenhauer*, 93. Buchholz and Rother, *Partei Vorstand im Exil*, xx.

members like Westphal who experienced Nazi persecution firsthand in Germany. The relationship between the exiled and homebound Social Democrats mirrors historian Karen Hagemann's illustration of the stereotypical relationship between a "masculine" battlefield, where male soldiers defended the nation, and the homefront where "women protected and preserved" the homeland.¹⁵¹ The ramifications of these different wartime experiences would shape the nature of the party after 1945.

Historians who study Social Democrats in exile, such as Wu Pi-Wen, Lewis Edinger, and Anthony Glees, agree that the survival of the party and its institutional continuity were key successes for party members after World War II. Pi-Wen separates the institution from its character, noting that the structural framework of the SPD endured although the basic nature of the party had changed over the course of the war. She situates her study in intellectual history, arguing that SPD leaders drew on the legacy of Socialist traditions during their exile, yet broke away from perceived mistakes during the Weimar Republic.¹⁵² Their collective agency created a pivot point during World War II, drawing from past and exile experiences in order to craft a new vision for Social Democracy in postwar Germany. Pi-Wen cites the defense of "party unity" as the "most pressing task in exile" for leaders Wels and Stampfer.¹⁵³ SOPADE leaders understood the meaning of party unity more clearly as a structural framework than a more abstract sense of community. In her analysis, Pi-Wen elaborates on the "trustees" concept coined by SPD scholars Marlis Buchholz and Bernd Rother. Exiled party leaders acted as

¹⁵¹ Karen Hagemann, "Home/Front" in *Home/Front: The Military, War and Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (New York: Berg, 2002), 2. Edited volume hereafter cited as Hagemann, *Home/Front*.

¹⁵² Pi-Wen, "Das Scheitern der Weimarer Republik," 8-9, 69-71, 98-9.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 3.

“trustees” of the party and as such, they were responsible for preserving party “organizational and programmatic continuity” through the Nazi period.¹⁵⁴ This deliberate separation of individual members from the party leadership demonstrates an awareness of the distinctions between individual agency and party structure during the Nazi Regime. Preservation of the party as an organization, including defending its reputation, took priority over maintaining individual ties to dissident members of the executive.

Glees places credit for SPD party survival firmly in the hands of the SOPADE leaders. A prohibited and exiled left-wing party, the SPD could have crumbled under the National Socialist dictatorship or been dissolved completely in the chaos of wartime and sprawling exile. Glees stresses that SOPADE leaders effectively rehabilitated the party by grounding themselves in its political heritage and defending all outside efforts to dilute their commitment to Social Democracy. The KPD attempted to merge with the SOPADE in 1943 but the majority of the exiled executive, including Ollenhauer, voted against the union. In this act, Social Democrats acknowledged the tense relationship between the Communist Soviet Union and its allies as well as reinforced a long-standing suspicion of Communists still held by many Social Democrats.¹⁵⁵ According to Ollenhauer biographer Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, this widespread suspicion deepened during exile, and would play a key role after 1945.¹⁵⁶ Party hostility towards Communists was one of the main ideological gaps between Social Democrats who remained in Germany and those in exile.

¹⁵⁴ Pi-Wen, “Das Scheitern der Weimarer Republik,” 4. Buchholz and Rother, *Partei vorstand im Exil*, XLI. Buchholz studied political science and history. Rother studied political science and pedagogy.

¹⁵⁵ Anthony Glees, *Exile Politics during the Second World War: The German Social Democrats in Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 7, 18-9. Hereafter cited as Glees, *Exile Politics*.

¹⁵⁶ Seebacher-Brandt, *Ollenhauer*, 125.

Individual Social Democrats and pacifists faced difficult choices during the National Socialist dictatorship. The outbreak of war created an especially thorny dilemma for pacifists and pacifist party members. Many activists suspended or discarded their ethical pacifist positions in the face of Nazi terror, deciding that the dictatorship could be fought with violent means if necessary. Pacifists and Social Democrats alike turned to transnational networks fostered during the Weimar Republic for aid in the face of Nazi abuses, such as the unfair imprisonment of their colleagues. Furthermore, as Glees illustrates, Social Democrats not only divided on the issue of exile but whether or not to collaborate with the remnants of the KPD as well.

Pacifist Constanze Hallgarten (1881-1969) was profoundly affected by her experiences of German occupation in Paris and in exile during World War II. In 1934, her son George described the struggle of both mother and son to articulate changing pacifist convictions in the face of the brutal dictatorship.¹⁵⁷ Hallgarten, a founding member of WILPF, questioned her pacifist, national, and international identities under the Nazi regime. In an autobiographical account of the German invasion of Paris where she lived as a refugee with her dying mother, Hallgarten faced difficult personal and ethical decisions in her fight to survive. Paris, where she had fled to escape Nazi persecution, was suddenly dominated by German troops in 1940. In this new environment, Hallgarten applied for a French identity card. She spoke fluent French, a main signifier of national identity, and consciously used language to complicate her otherwise straightforward German identity. Hallgarten knew that her status as German

¹⁵⁷ Detlef Garz and Anja Knuth, *Constanze Hallgarten: Porträt Einer Pazifistin* (Hamburg: Dr. Kovac, 2004), 104. Hereafter cited as Garz and Knuth, *Porträt Einer Pazifistin*.

pacifist refugee was more dangerous under Nazi occupation than that of an ordinary French civilian.¹⁵⁸

Despite this charade, Hallgarten recognized the extent of German atrocities and felt her own guilt as a German citizen. French citizens who cooperated with or ignored Nazi policies infuriated her. Hallgarten was forced to reconcile her love of Paris with her anger at French bystanders and accomplices in Nazi atrocities and occupation. During this bitter time, Hallgarten freely admitted that she hoped for an English military victory over the Germans to end the horrors of Nazi rule, defying years of pacifist commitment for this one exceptional case.¹⁵⁹ After 1940, Hallgarten recognized that the measures required to stop Hitler could not be “of a purely pacifist nature.”¹⁶⁰ George and Constanze Hallgarten, therefore joined the ranks of pacifists who were faced with the dilemma of resisting Nazi violence or complying with a cruel regime. Despite wartime doubts, Hallgarten returned to Germany in 1955, reviving WILPF networks in Munich with the help of younger pacifists Lilly Nevinny and Gertrud Baer. Hallgarten remained an ardent pacifist even in the last years of her life, as evidenced by her signature on a 1963 Easter March call (*Aufruf*).¹⁶¹ The threat of National Socialism, therefore, distanced

¹⁵⁸ Constanze Hallgarten, *Im Besetzten Paris: Aufzeichnungen vom Sommer 1940* (unpublished typescript, Library of Congress), 2-7. Hereafter cited as Hallgarten, *Im Besetzten Paris*. Hallgarten was a bourgeois pacifist, yet she often voted Socialist and was a member of the League of German Socialist Women. Her Socialist and pacifist connections are explored more fully in Chapter 3. See Garz and Knuth, *Porträt Einer Pazifistin*, 38.

¹⁵⁹ Hallgarten, *Im Besetzten Paris*, 2-7, 14, 16.

¹⁶⁰ Garz and Knuth, *Porträt Einer Pazifistin*, 104.

¹⁶¹ Garz and Knuth, *Porträt Einer Pazifistin*, 133-135. Pressedienst Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner, March 18, 1963. Box “KfA and Ostermarschbewegung,” Sammlung Ostermarsch, APO Archiv. Constanze Hallgarten is listed under “Schriftsteller.” Information on Gertrud Baer’s birth and death dates is limited. Garz and Knuth also note that little is known about Lilly Nevinny. Nevinny appears as the translator of several books in the 1920s and 1930s, the earliest of which was published in 1929. See Henri de Jouvenel, *Graf Mirabeau der Volkstribun*, trans. Lilly Nevinny (Leipzig: List Verlag, 1929). John

Hallgarten from her own pacifist convictions, yet she was able to return to her WILPF and pacifist activities after Hitler's defeat.

Rudolf Küstermeier (1903-1977), a pacifist Social Democrat, found himself at odds with the Nazis and his own party through his relationship to Communists and his resistance activities in Germany. After decades of pacifist activism and two years of resistance to the Nazis Küstermeier, like Hallgarten, accepted the fact that Hitler's regime could only be defeated with violence. During the Weimar Republic, Küstermeier was chairman of the DPSt and played a leading role in the national organization as publisher of their newsletter *Pazifistische Jugend* (Pacifist Youth). Beginning in 1932, Küstermeier led one of the earliest resistance groups against the Nazis, the Red Shock Troop (*Der Rote Stoßtrupp*), comprised mainly of young Social Democrats.¹⁶² In fact, the group contacted the SOPADE in the early years of the Nazi Regime. Willi Strinz (1908-1988) traveled to Prague in 1933 to report on the Red Shock Troop's activities and the group received funds from the exiled leaders.¹⁶³

In addition to the main organization in Berlin, organized Red Shock Troop groups existed in Düsseldorf, Duisburg, and Essen totaling over 3,000 members.¹⁶⁴ Küstermeier

J. White speculates that Lilly Neviny was a pseudonym, possibly for author Yvan Goll. John J. White, "Iwan Goll's Reception of Italian Futurism and French Orphism" in *Yvan Goll-Claire Goll: Texts and Contents*, ed. Eric Robertson and Robert Vilain (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997) 38. Yvan's wife Claire, an author herself, wrote critically about women who did not speak out against World War I. See Brinker-Gabler, ed., *Frauen gegen den Krieg* (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980), 58-63, 135-6.

¹⁶² Siegfried Mielke, *Einzigartig: Dozenten, Studierende und Repräsentanten der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik (1920-1933) im Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus* (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2008), 144. Hereafter cited as Mielke, *Einzigartig*.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 152.

¹⁶⁴ Mielke, *Einzigartig*, 144. At its height the Red Shock Troop consisted of 3,000 members, mostly from Berlin. Gert-Joachim Glaessner, Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Sühl, eds., *Studien zur Arbeiterbewegung und Arbeiterkultur in Berlin* (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1989), 329. According to Glaessner and Sühl, 240 members of the Red Schock Troop were arrested across Germany beginning in

and his colleagues based their resistance efforts in Berlin, which had been a key mobilization site for the DPSt and Socialist student groups in the 1920s. During the Weimar Republic, student pacifists had targeted university students with educational reading sessions and lectures that emphasized transnational awareness and cooperation.¹⁶⁵ Berlin also harbored a significant working class population. Küstermeier drew on these Weimar-era networks, as well as his publishing and organizational experience, to promote Red Shock Troop resistance activities.

In a 1970 speech on his underground activities, Küstermeier specifically addresses the problem of anti-Communism within the party leadership and the divergent goals of those who remained in Germany and those in exile. The SOPADE cultivated a general prejudice against the KPD and even in the face of the world war they feared that Social Democrats would succumb to Communist influence. SOPADE paranoia trumped practical solutions for resistance on the ground. “We [in the Red Shock Troop] were always suspected of Communist infiltration, even of being a Communist-influenced organization, especially by the Party leadership in Prague,” Küstermeier regretted.¹⁶⁶ Indeed, SPD apprehension of Communist influence constitutes a red thread of continuity through the Weimar, Nazi, and postwar periods.

1933. Michael Schneider notes that Socialist student groups at the Berliner Universität provided a foundation for the Red Schock Troop. Michael Schneider, *Unterm Hakenkreuz: Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung 1933 bis 1939* (Bonn: Dietz, 1999), 79.

¹⁶⁵ “Deutscher Pazifistische Studentenbund,” File 5, Box 130, DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva. This file contains numerous copies of *Pazifistische Jugend* edited by Küstermeier. See also Frank McDonough, *Opposition and Resistance in Nazi Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 3.

¹⁶⁶ Küstermeier, *Der Rote Stoßtrupp*, 9, 9-10.

Küstermeier admits that he attempted to distance Red Shock Troop members from known Communists. There remained a key difference, however, between SOPADE reservations about Communists and Küstermeier's own misgivings. The dangers of association with the KPD were not explicitly political for the Red Shock Troop. The decision to avoid Communist resisters was a matter of survival. Communist ranks were closely monitored by the Nazis and frequently arrested or attacked according to Küstermeier. Social Democrats who contacted Communists inside Germany risked being observed and arrested by the Gestapo. The resistance leader published warnings in the Red Shock Troop newsletter advising readers to avoid contact with Communists for their own individual safety.¹⁶⁷

The Red Shock Troop and Küstermeier's resistance efforts were short-lived, however. He was arrested in December 1933 and subsequently acknowledged the grim reality that grassroots resistance groups like the Red Shock Troop were not effective against the resources of the Nazi regime. Instead of continuing their covert and passive resistance, Küstermeier describes how Red Shock Troop members waited for a "weak spot" which could be exploited during Hitler's impending war: a sign that Küstermeier came to terms with the use of military force as a legitimate weapon against the Nazis although he was a pacifist.¹⁶⁸

As Küstermeier's memoirs reflect, SPD party leaders disagreed over the issue of collaborating with Communists. Stampfer, for instance, strongly advocated cooperation

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 9-10.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 19. Küstermeier claimed in 1970 that he and his 1930s comrades recognized their best chance for resistance would be during the domestic confusion accompanying the impending military conflict. His assessment must be filtered by the fact that these claims were made in 1970 with the benefit of hindsight and the possibility that Küstermeier felt he needed to explain the inactivity of the group after his arrest.

between Communists and Social Democrats from foreign exile in 1935. “The relationship between Social Democrats and Communists in Germany today is generally one of coexistence. This coexistence does not need to be a competition and indeed it is not,” he reported that year in *Vorwärts*.¹⁶⁹ Stampfer was a loyal member of the SPD leadership. Yet as historian William Smaldone demonstrates, he exercised a certain degree of individual agency within this group. The tenacious *Vorwärts* editor once resigned his journalistic post to dispute the decision of an SPD-led coalition government to bar Leon Trotsky from asylum in 1929. He was not afraid to take political risks for the preservation of democracy and its principles.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, it was Stampfer’s strong belief in a united workers’ front that led him to schedule a meeting with KPD representatives in 1933. This meeting never took place due to the Reichstag fire and the subsequent Nazi takeover. Cooperation between the two politically antagonistic groups during World War II would remain sporadic.

As the war progressed, cooperation between Social Democrats and Communists took on new meaning among those who remained in Germany. After years in the Buchenwald concentration camp, for example, prisoners from different nations and political backgrounds gathered to write a political manifesto after overthrowing their guards in April 1945. The authors focused on presenting a united opposition to the Nazis. The horrific common circumstances under the regime brought these left-wing political actors together despite various Weimar-era differences. As a result of these

¹⁶⁹ Friedrich Stampfer, “Sozialdemokraten und Kommunisten in Deutschland” from *Deutscher Kurierdienst*. 6. November 1935. Barch V 230/4/10 Blatt 41.

¹⁷⁰ William Smaldone, *Confronting Hitler: German Social Democrats in Defense of the Weimar Republic, 1929-1933* (New York: Lexington Books, 2009), 215, 218-219. Hereafter cited as Smaldone, *Confronting Hitler*. Smaldone provides an insightful analysis of Stampfer’s actions during the last years of the Weimar Republic.

experiences two prominent German Social Democrats in Buchenwald, Hermann Brill and Ernst Thape, envisioned Socialist cooperation on a grander scale than exiled SOPADE leaders. Indeed, Thape emphasizes that the Buchenwald Manifest was not intended to be the foundation for a new workers' party, consisting of both Communists and Social Democrats, but advocated "the reestablishment of the old Social Democracy."¹⁷¹ The authors did not propose an exact reincarnation of Weimar Social Democracy, however. According to the Manifesto, new Social Democrats would either foster cooperation between the two working-class groups or simply not stand in opposition to Communists.

The "Buchenwald Manifesto" authors drew directly on traditions from Weimar antiwar movements which had included many Social Democratic participants. The Manifesto boasts the familiar Weimar-era slogan, "No More War!" and the authors vowed to "...do everything to make future wars impossible." They also called for world organizations to support peace and security while expressing the desire to "create a collective European identity, which is the only thing that can bring about peace between all people."¹⁷² Cries for "No More War" were not the only links to the bygone Weimar era. The Manifesto authors had preserved the antiwar slogan, resurrecting it at a critical point in their own lives. Similarly, pacifists and Social Democrats maintained transnational contacts and networks fostered during the Weimar Republic throughout the Nazi period. Restricted by the totalitarian regime, these transnational links nonetheless created space for interventions and resistance to the National Socialist dictatorship.

¹⁷¹ Thape, *Tagebuch*, 208.

¹⁷² Butterwegge and Hofschien, *Sozialdemokratie, Krieg und Frieden*, 246-7.

In the moment of extreme national tension created by the Nazis, pacifists and Social Democrats relied on the sense of transnational collective identity fostered by pacifist networks to work towards change and combat the nationalist regime. Gerhart Seger's journey from one of the first concentration camps to eventual exile in the United States illustrates this point well. During the early years of the Weimar Republic both Social Democrats and pacifists experimented with cooperative activism and many of these individuals reconciled pacifist and political activities in their daily lives. Seger was one such figure. Nazi discrimination, however, forced him to make difficult decisions about his own political loyalties. In the face of persecution and forced exile, Seger turned to transnational networks for aid.

The Nazis imprisoned Seger in the Oranienburg concentration camp near Berlin in 1933 due to his political activism, not as a pacifist but as a Social Democrat.¹⁷³ When he succeeded in a daring escape, Seger wrote an exposé on the camp that was published in 1934.¹⁷⁴ As a pacifist Social Democrat Seger manifested a multiple threat to Nazi authority. He was a member of the SPD Reichstag faction and active secretary for the Weimar-era DFG until 1930. Seger actively took part in numerous rallies and helped Hallgarten prepare for a groundbreaking transnational peace exhibition in Munich in 1927.¹⁷⁵ This exhibit and his cooperative activism during the Weimar Republic is explored in more detail in Chapter 3. Seger's story parallels those of other Social

¹⁷³ See June Hannam and Karen Hunt for a discussion of identities determined by political affiliation or membership. Although Seger's Weimar activism reveals several overlapping political identities, the Nazis focused on one in order to persecute him. Hannam and Hunt, *Socialist Women: Britain, 1880s to 1920s* (London: Routledge, 2002), 8-11. Hereafter cited as Hannam and Hunt, *Socialist Women*.

¹⁷⁴ Gerhart Seger, *Oranienburg. Erster authentischer Bericht eines aus dem Konzentrationslager Geflüchteten* (Karlsbad, Verlagsanstalt Graphia, 1934). Hereafter cited as Seger, *Oranienburg*.

¹⁷⁵ A comprehensive analysis of Seger's Weimar activity is located in Chapter 3.

Democrats and pacifists caught up in the bureaucratic scrutiny of the Nazis agents, their neighbors, and colleagues and were subject to their categories.

The Nazi bureaucracy labeled Seger as a Social Democrat. “On March 12, 1933 I was the third Social Democratic member of the Reichstag from Leipzig to be arrested,” Seger recalled.¹⁷⁶ When he speculated on the causes for his persecution, Seger cited his political activities as a primary reason, his increasing participation in the growing resistance movement after that, and only mentioned his peace activism as a third cause for persecution. The imposition of Nazi categories on Seger’s self-characterization is evident. Included in a wave of arrests targeting Social Democrats, Seger logically assumed that he was arrested for his SPD affiliation and his republican resistance activities which antagonized a powerful local official.¹⁷⁷ At the moment of his capture the pacifist, journalist, husband, and son ceased to matter—for Nazi purposes his most dangerous identity was as a political dissident. The necessity of the Nazi bureaucracy to label him confined him to this category.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ Gerhart Seger, *Reisetagebuch Eines Deutschen Emigranten* (Zürich: Europa-Verlag, 1936), 5. Hereafter cited as Seger, *Reisetagebuch*. Seger was General Secretary of the DFG from 1923-1928 before continuing his peace activism in the Deutscher Friedensbund in 1930. See Appelius, *Pazifismus*, 37.

¹⁷⁷ Detlef Schmiechen–Ackermann and Matthias Tullner, “Stadtgeschichte und NS-Zeit in Sachsen-Anhalt und im regionalen Vergleich. Forschungsstand, Fragen und Perspektiven” in Detlef Schmiechen-Ackermann, Steffi Kaltenborn, eds., *Stadtgeschichte in der NS-Zeit: Fallstudien aus Sachsen-Anhalt und vergleichende Perspektiven* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005), 22.

¹⁷⁸ Although she does not address the plight of Social Democrats in particular, late nineteenth-century restrictions on the political activities of Social Democrats under Bismarck’s Anti-Socialist Law represent some of the “dry timber” Doris Bergen describes as a precondition to the mass persecution of victims during the Nazi Regime. Doris L. Bergen, *War & Genocide* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 1. Although the Anti-Socialist Law period represented a moment of triumph in the face of adversity for Social Democrats, it also partially prepared the general German population to accept the persecution of Social Democrats under the Nazis. Party leaders like Otto Wels drew direct comparisons between Anti-Socialist laws and early Nazi persecution. The Anti-Socialist Laws sparked party reform and a new sense of purpose in 1891. See Potthoff and Miller, *Kleine Geschichte*, 53, 146.

Although Seger was a visible pacifist leader during the Weimar Republic, he was more vulnerable as a Social Democrat in 1933 than as a pacifist. Nazi leaders focused on core political threats first, in other words organized political groups like the SPD. In the absence of detailed organizational records like membership lists and as part of the political penumbra, pacifists proved to be more elusive targets. The fragmented nature of the Weimar peace organizations by 1933 hindered Nazi identification of members and blunted the movement's ability to resist. Despite his Weimar commitment to Social Democracy and pacifism, Seger immigrated to England and then the United States with his family and remained there until his death in 1967.

As in the cases of many pacifists and Social Democrats who participated in transnational networks fostered during the Weimar Republic, Seger's traumatic experiences under the Nazis were to some extent alleviated by transnational attention to his situation. First, he hastened to foreign exile after escaping from Oranienburg in December 1933. Shortly after, Seger's wife and infant daughter were taken into custody by Nazi leaders who hoped this action would force his return. He appealed to influential British parliamentarians Lady Astor and Mrs. Mavis Tate for help. Their transnational pressure, combined with efforts led by a bishop of the Church of England and media outlets in Great Britain that publicized the story, facilitated the release of the Seger family. Mrs. Tate traveled to Germany herself to ensure the mother and daughter's release and to escort both to London where Seger eagerly waited.¹⁷⁹ The absence of this transnational intervention would have been disastrous for the Seger family. He grimly

¹⁷⁹ Seger, *Reisetagebuch*, 33-41. See also "Author to tell of Escape from German Nazi Prison," *Reading Eagle* (February 25, 1935). The *Reading Eagle* was published in Pennsylvania.

remarked, “My wife’s case is by far not the only instance of hostage-taking; there are not only many more, but far worse cases.”¹⁸⁰

Pacifists mobilized transnational networks again in 1934, coming to the aid of journalist Carl von Ossietzky who was imprisoned by the Nazis. As an investigative reporter and organizer of the antimilitarist No-More-War demonstrations, Ossietzky posed a significant threat to the Nazi Regime. Furthermore, Ossietzky edited the newspaper *Die Weltbühne* which published a series of articles denouncing secret German rearmament in 1929, a violation of the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles.¹⁸¹ In 1932 Ossietzky was arrested and sent to prison for the first time, only to be released seven months later during a “Christmas Amnesty.” Ossietzky’s freedom was short-lived however. In February 1933 he was arrested once again in the wave of persecution which followed the Reichstag fire and sent to Sonnenburg concentration camp where he was severely mistreated.¹⁸² Though a distinct threat to Nazi authority, Ossietzky was not immediately executed. This delay can be attributed in large part to the tremendous transnational publicity campaign spearheaded by his former Weimar colleagues in exile who formed the “Friends of Carl von Ossietzky” group.

¹⁸⁰ Seger, *Reisetagebuch*, 35. This case is an early example of transnational intervention into a national context. The legitimacy and mechanics of such action is debated among human rights advocates even today. See Mary Kaldor, “Transnational Civil Society,” in *Human Rights in Global Politics*, eds. Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 195-213.

¹⁸¹ Fredrik Stang, “Presentation Speech” December 10, 1936. Nobelprize.org (the official website of the Nobel Foundation), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1935/press.html. Hereafter cited as Stang, “Nobel Presentation Speech.” Ingo Müller, “Carl von Ossietzky,” in *Die Friedensbewegung: Organisierte Pazifismus in Deutschland, Österreich und in der Schweiz*, ed. Helmut Donat and Karl Holl (Düsseldorf: ECON Taschenbuch Verlag, 1983), 295.

¹⁸² Willy Brandt, “Eine Kampagne für den Friedenspreis gegen Hitler” in ed. Helmut Donat and Adolf Wild, *Carl von Ossietzky Republikaner ohne Republik* (Bremen: Donat und Tammen, 1986), 27.

Ossietzky's "friends" helped raise transnational awareness and obtained official inquiries into Ossietzky's well-being from recognized organizations like the International Red Cross.¹⁸³ They also gathered support for Ossietzky's nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize from contacts in France, the United States, Great Britain, and Norway. Even future Nobel Prizewinner Willy Brandt got involved from his Norwegian exile. Ludwig Quidde and Jane Addams were among the former Nobel Prizewinners to support Ossietzky. Addams' involvement and the support of WILPF networks turned out to be critical as members facilitated correspondence between national pacifist networks, most notably American Emily Greene Balch and German Lida Gustava Heymann.¹⁸⁴ Ironically, these established transnational feminist networks played a pivotal role in Ossietzky's nomination and subsequent receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize despite Ossietzky's position as one of the most vocal critics of what he perceived as "feminine" ethical pacifism during the 1920s.

Ossietzky won the Peace Prize in 1935 bringing the attention of the transnational pacifist and diplomatic community to bear on Nazi policies and creating an awkward intersection of transnational, international, and national politics. His successful nomination sparked discussions on the nuances of transnational and national boundaries among members of the Nobel Committee as well as national leaders. If Ossietzky, as many of his "friends" intended, was awarded the prize as a symbol of resistance against

¹⁸³ Irwin Abrams, "The Multinational Campaign for Carl von Ossietzky," Paper presented at the International Conference on Peace Movements in National Societies, 1919-1939. Stadtschlaining, Austria, September 25-29, 1991. Archived at <http://www.irwinabrams.com/articles/ossietzky.html>. Hereafter cited as Abrams, "The Multinational Campaign for Carl von Ossietzky."

¹⁸⁴ Ibid and Emily Greene Balch (EGB) to Frau Hilde Walter, March 12, 1935 and July 31, 1935. Mappe 7, Collection Freundeskreis Carl von Ossietzky, IISG. It is a bit ironic that international feminist WILPF networks played such a key role in the campaign for Ossietzky since he was one of the most vocal critics of the stereotype of pacifism as a feminine concept.

the Nazis this might imply that the Nobel committee was intervening in a sovereign state's affairs. Perceived violation of national borders, however symbolic, was unacceptable for members of the impartial committee. Peace historian Irwin Abrams argues that the Norwegian king did not to attend the award ceremony for this reason. Royal advisors feared the monarch's presence might be construed as a demonstration of the Norwegian government's disapproval of Nazi policies.¹⁸⁵ Pacifist use of transnational networks to combat persecution within German borders during World War II brought latent tensions between national and transnational realms to the forefront. Activists and politicians contended with these questions in earnest after 1945 in the postwar political arena.

The controversy raised by the collision of national and transnational interests prompted Brandt to work behind the scenes of the Norwegian media to promote Ossietzky's cause. Fredrik Stang, who delivered the 1935 Presentation Speech for Ossietzky expressed the need to defend the committee's decision at the ceremony itself. Stang noted that "many people ask, has Ossietzky really contributed so much to peace?"¹⁸⁶ The Nobel Committee Chairman quickly answered this question, asserting that Ossietzky was a symbol for peace as well as an individual man. "His candidacy was examined in the same manner as that of all others, and the decision was reached according to the same principles," Stang reassured the audience. "In awarding this year's Nobel Peace Prize to Carl von Ossietzky we are therefore recognizing his valuable contribution to the cause of peace- nothing more, and certainly nothing less," he

¹⁸⁵ Abrams, "The Multinational Campaign for Carl von Ossietzky."

¹⁸⁶ Stang, "Nobel Presentation Speech."

concluded safely short of imposing on German national sovereignty.¹⁸⁷ Despite all transnational efforts, Ossietzky died in Nazi custody on May 4, 1938. The legacy of his friends' transnational effort to rescue him, however, remains a fitting testament to the strength of pacifist networks during the Nazi Regime, even if the individual contacts which made up these networks were on the run or in foreign exile.

The wartime separation of Social Democrats in exile and those in Germany provides another case study for tensions between the national and transnational political arenas. The individual biographies of Social Democrats and pacifists reveal much about the lasting impact of these wartime conditions on German political actors. Many activists, such as Ollenhauer and Hallgarten felt directly threatened by the Nazis because of their political and pacifist activities and chose to go into exile. For Social Democrats, previous exile experience from 1878 to 1890 under the Anti-Socialist Laws was a key element of their 1930s historical consciousness.

Historian Glees supports this idea, illustrating a fierce party commitment to remain independent and continue political activities even in exile. From the outset, SOPADE leaders actively prepared for Hitler's defeat and the reestablishment of democracy in Germany.¹⁸⁸ Lewis Edinger also highlights the importance of the Anti-Socialist Law exile legacy. "...[I]t became an accepted party tradition that the victory [in the 19th century] had to a large extent been a result of the work of the 'representation

¹⁸⁷ Stang, "Nobel Presentation Speech." The German government stated that Ossietzky was free to collect his prize but then refused him a passport. See Charmian Brinson and Marian Malet, ed., *Rettet Ossietzky! Dokumente aus dem Nachlaß von Rudolf Olden* (Oldenburg: Bibliotheks- und Informationssystem der Universität Oldenburg, 1990), 53-54.

¹⁸⁸ Glees, *Exile Politics*, 11.

abroad' (*Auslandszentrum*)," according to the historian.¹⁸⁹ This legacy, Edinger asserts, spurred party leaders to send Social Democrats Friedrich Ebert and Otto Braun to Switzerland as a political precaution in 1914. In this tradition of self-preservation, Stampfer prepared for Czech exile and the continuation of *Vorwärts* issues as early as February 1933.

Others, including postwar party scion Kurt Schumacher, Löbe, Menzel, Küstermeier, and the Kettig family, chose to stay in Germany. Schumacher and his domestic colleagues faced persecution, camp imprisonment, poverty, and other hardships based on their decision to remain, especially after Germany became a warzone. Those Social Democrats who remained found themselves in a very different situation than those in exile. While both faced economic hardship and discrimination, those in Germany were confronted with a constant struggle for their own individual survival, much like in the frontlines of a battlefield. In this context, as the Red Shock Troop and Buchenwald cases illustrate, many Social Democrats developed a sense of comradeship with members of groups formerly feared and shunned by party leaders, such as Communists.¹⁹⁰

Social Democrats in exile carried the idea of the SPD as an independent political institution through World War II and into the postwar period when Ollenhauer stepped off the plane in Hannover to meet Schumacher in 1945. Both men had played critical roles in the continuity of the SPD over this 12-year timeframe, preserving organizational

¹⁸⁹ Edinger, *German Exile Politics*, 25.

¹⁹⁰ Thomas Kühne argues, "that constructs of femininity, designed by men and connected to a notion of 'comradeship' that was of mythical dimension, served to smooth over symbolic contradictions, social differences and emotional tensions which existed in a world of war dominated by men." For Social Democrats on the frontlines of the struggle against the Nazi Regime, comradeship forged by hardships led to informal cooperation and relationships with Communists that may not otherwise have developed during peacetime. See Thomas Kühne, "Comradeship: Gender Confusion and Gender Order in the German Military, 1918-1945," in Hagemann, *Home/Front*, 236.

legacies through times of political and social turmoil. Party members were both empowered to act and constrained by the SPD party program, expectations, and traditions. As Germans struggled to meet basic needs in a devastated country, these individuals found stability in an institution which spanned the turbulent periods in their lives.

Politicians responsible for re-forming the SPD after 1945 drew on their own perceptions of party history to adapt the “new” SPD for a leading role in the Federal Republic. Varying wartime experiences complicated this new conception of Social Democracy. Potential conflicts between SOPADE members and Social Democrats who remained in Germany, as well as generational differences, loomed over efforts to reconstruct the party. The aging leadership had preserved party traditions in exile yet middle-aged members like Ollenhauer, who was 44-years-old at the end of the war, were eager to rebuild the SPD in a new image.¹⁹¹ Inherent differences between Ollenhauer, a majority Social Democrat who had spent the war away from Nazi violence in exile, and Schumacher, a vocal critic of the SOPADE who had been baptized by fire within German borders, were evident in the tense moments before the two party leaders met in Hannover. SPD historian Heiner Lindner declares, however, that “those [contemporaries] who expected a controversy at the [1945] Hannover Party conference found themselves baffled.”¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ When SOPADE leader Vogel died in 1945 just before returning to Germany, former Social Democratic Minister Carl Severing lamented that it was “a great loss for the Party.” Severing saw potential in Hans Vogel to forge connections between generations of Social Democrats scattered for over a decade by dictatorship and war. Carl Severing, *Mein Lebensweg*, Vol. 2 (Cologne: Greven Verlag, 1950), 479-80.

¹⁹² Lindner, *Sozialistischen Mitteilungen*, 14.

Lindner cites the opening remarks of Schumacher and exile representative Wilhelm Sander as evidence of the gathering's success. After horrible experiences under the Nazi Regime delegates from both sides "forgot all conflicts" in their happy reunion.¹⁹³ Heiner's positive evaluation of this gathering calls for closer investigation. Two distinct elements stand out in Schumacher's and Sander's speeches. First, Sander indicated SOPADE members' fear of rejection by the Germany-based Social Democrats. They worried that those who endured all the hardships of Nazi Germany firsthand would reject the overtures of exiled leaders as insincere. In fact, Sander's behavior suggests that SOPADE leaders recognized their own role in preserving the SPD in exile as secondary to that of Social Democrats' who fought against Hitler in Germany: much like government leaders positioned workers and wives on the homefront in supporting roles to soldiers at the front.

Schumacher's speech indicates that he recognized the political high ground. He expressed his appreciation of exiled Social Democrats' work throughout the war and claimed "they fought courageously for the cause of Social Democracy in the international realm."¹⁹⁴ Schumacher divided Social Democratic wartime activities into two separate levels: national and international. With this rhetorical gesture, Schumacher avoided a messy comparison of the resistance efforts and sacrifices between the two groups. He placed exile wartime activities in a supporting role to the active resistance which took place within national borders. Following Schumacher's speech, Sanders proudly accepted this characterization of SOPADE efforts as behind-the-scenes and the

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 15.

implication that their activities supported those in the primary battlefield. Schumacher laid claim to a distinctly masculine identity tied to images of Social Democrats fighting National Socialism within Germany, positing this position against the less “manly,” because they were less physically dangerous, activities of SOPADE members in exile. The reunion of these two groups was similar to processes of postwar demobilization and the integration of front and homefront. Each process required compromises which would shape the party leadership during the postwar period.

Ollenhauer, for instance, was a famed orator and rising party leader in 1934 and he resolutely helped lead the SOPADE through the tough period of foreign exile. After 1945, Ollenhauer was elected party vice chairman to Schumacher, never achieving comparable notoriety. Contemporary Theo Pirker even observed Ollenhauer’s weakened political position claiming that the SOPADE leader brought little political clout to the meeting in Hannover.¹⁹⁵ Two potent symbols of party masculinity and charisma, his predecessor, Schumacher, and his successor, Brandt, overshadowed the once-dominant leader. Like soldiers, Schumacher fought in the frontlines of resistance against Hitler’s regime and Brandt proved himself on the frontlines of the Cold War as mayor of Berlin in 1961 when the wall was constructed. Ollenhauer, on the other hand, first chose to fight on the “homefront” against Hitler and during the 1950s he participated prominently in the pacifist antinuclear Paulskirche and KdA movements which bridged both “masculine” and “feminine” political realms. Ollenhauer’s association with political activities implicitly and explicitly gendered as feminine limited his personal viability in the

¹⁹⁵ Theo Pirker, *Die SPD nach Hitler: die Geschichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1945-1964*. Munich: Rütten & Loening, 1965, 37. Hereafter cited as Pirker, *Die SPD nach Hitler*.

masculine political core. In fact, the “crowning achievement of [Ollenhauer’s] lifework” according to Brandt, was not his service as German Chancellor, a national position which he ran for but never attained, but the moment he was voted in as the president of the Socialist International in 1963.¹⁹⁶

The immediate postwar period was difficult for both pacifists and Social Democrats. In 1949 the SPD suffered a disappointing defeat in the first Bundestag election. Shortly after, party leaders decided on the position of “constructive opposition” which would characterize SPD politics until they entered the Grand Coalition in 1966, which marks the end of this study.¹⁹⁷ In the meantime, Schumacher sternly led the party through the new landscape of postwar politics until his death in 1952 when Ollenhauer succeeded him as party chairman.¹⁹⁸ Organized pacifists remained scattered. Illustrated fully in Chapter 4, 1949 election campaign posters declared “No More War,” yet peace historians such as Alice Holmes Cooper place the reemergence of organized peace protest as late as the 1955 Paulskirche movement and 1958 KdA campaigns which were supported by SPD leaders.¹⁹⁹

Cooperative activists who participated in both party and peace activities during the 1950s and 1960s found themselves in a complicated matrix of party frameworks, past experiences, and shifting political spaces. Pacifist Social Democrats Alma Kettig, Karl Bechert, and Walter Menzel found themselves particularly restrained by party

¹⁹⁶ Brandt, *Ein großer Sozialist*, Foreword by Willy Brandt.

¹⁹⁷ Potthoff and Miller, *Kleine Geschichte*, 199-200.

¹⁹⁸ See Lewis J. Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965).

¹⁹⁹ Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace*, 25-62. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the 1949 election.

frameworks and personal history in the 1960s. Their difficult positions within the party were the result of previous pacifist activities, family ties, and changing party expectations. As cooperative activists, Kettig and Menzel were strongly influenced by their families and Social Democratic backgrounds. Every member of Kettig's family was involved with the SPD or one of the many smaller left-wing parties during the Weimar Republic. Menzel married into former Social Democratic minister Carl Severing's family, acquiring an identity as the "Reichsminister's Son-in-Law" which would follow him throughout the rest of his political career.²⁰⁰ Bechert, a scientific expert, found himself limited by his role as a pacifist within the party.

The Kettig family had deep roots on the political Left. Kettig's parents were both Social Democrats and provided their children with a diverse political and cultural education. Frau Kettig (*-1939) came in conflict with the SPD in the twilight years of the Weimar Republic however. In 1931, she, along with other disillusioned Social Democrats, gave up her membership in the SPD and joined the splinter Socialist Workers' Party (SAP) in response to covert government rearmament policies. Her actions confirmed that her commitment to pacifism and disarmament was stronger than her loyalty to current party doctrine. Frau Kettig was willing to sacrifice her SPD membership, a main marker of her identity, in favor of pacifism. Indeed, her daughter Alma (1915-1997) also rejected SPD circles at this time and joined the Socialist Youth Club, a SAP-affiliated youth group.²⁰¹ This first experience of tension between party and

²⁰⁰ "Kennen Sie den?: Der Schwiegersohn des Reichsministers," and "Politiker, von denen man spricht: Schwiegersohn Menzel," August 20, 1960, "Walter Menzel," Box 6767, Sammlung Personalia, AdSD.

²⁰¹ Gisela Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft: Sozialdemokratinnen im Parlamentarischen Rat und im Deutschen Bundestag 1948/49-1957* (Bonn: Dietz, 2003), 265. Hereafter cited as Notz, *Frauen in der*

personal loyalty made a deep impression on young Kettig. She would draw on this precedent as she navigated the still largely masculine realm of party politics in the 1950s and 60s. Kettig was not afraid to act contrary to party discipline, a trait which would bring negative attention on her as a female MdB.

June Hannam and Karen Hunt argue in their study of British Socialist women that historical identities are determined by organizational membership, even multiple memberships, and those external factors, such as “awareness of... the gendering of politics” or family background, that shaped activism within those frameworks.²⁰² They critique terms like Socialist and feminist as rigid and often imprecise categories. Instead they propose an analysis of individual actions and rhetoric to determine nuances of political identity for each historical actor. Like Seger, Kettig identified as both a pacifist and a Social Democrat. Her parents and siblings were active SPD members and Kettig joined the SAJ when she was fourteen years old. The depth of this commitment is exemplified by the fact that Kettig did not give up her party membership even when she left her parliamentary position in 1965. Her niece attributes this fierce attachment to the party directly to her rich Social Democratic family heritage.²⁰³

Position and context are key to the use of biographical analysis for understanding individual political behavior. The German political arena in 1931 drastically differed

Mannschaft. Stefan Appelius and Alma Kettig, *Pazifismus in Westdeutschland: Die Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft 1945-1968*. Aachen: G. Mainz, 1991), 101, 113. Hereafter cited as Appelius, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden*, 101, 113. Especially Edith Laudowicz and Dorlies Pollmann, *Weil Ich Das Leben Liebe: Persönliches und Politisches aus dem Leben Engagierter Frauen* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1981). Hereafter cited as Laudowicz and Pollmann, *Weil ich das Leben Liebe*, 52.

²⁰² Hannam and Hunt, *Socialist Women*, 8-9, 10-11.

²⁰³ Notz Interview with Familie Kettig. For Notz’s biography of Kettig see Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 264-282.

from that of the early 1960s yet the individuals who operated within these contexts retained their agency. Kettig's position in 1965 differed from her and her mother's in 1931 in many ways. During the Weimar Republic, Frau Kettig was a rank and file member of the SPD and Alma was a participant in Socialist youth groups and not yet a full party member. They were arguably freer to change party allegiance. By 1965, though, Alma Kettig had already served as a Social Democratic Bundestag representative for twelve years. Her service indicates a deep level of commitment to the party in the postwar and helps explain her unwillingness to abandon the party ranks.

Kettig's treatment by SPD leaders in the 1960s is specific to the historical context and party leaders' gendered perceptions of political vulnerability. As a woman and a pacifist, Kettig faced discrimination in the SPD Bundestag faction which limited her independent activism. Although peace was often the focus of SPD rhetoric and politics, pacifists were increasingly marginalized in a postwar SPD which was shifting its political focus to core space. She was also affected by her colleagues' perception of her susceptibility to malicious outside influence as a woman. SPD leaders felt that she was vulnerable because of her romantic relationship with fellow MdB Arno Behrisch which is examined thoroughly in Chapter 5. These limits were imposed on Kettig by her colleagues who observed her current position, background, sex, and personal beliefs. As an active SPD representative Kettig played a larger role in party activities than in 1931. In addition, her party membership had become an integral part of her own political identity as a politician and a pacifist. As opposed to 1931 when she was still developing her own political identity and was not yet a full party member, in 1965 Kettig's identity

was more intimately entwined with the party and she retained her membership for the rest of her life.²⁰⁴

Personal agency and organizational structures are interrelated. This comparison is incomplete without Bourdieu's critical reminder that no one lives in a vacuum.²⁰⁵ Frau Kettig disagreed with SPD actions in 1931, leaving the party instead of working within SPD channels to initiate change. From her position, membership in a splinter party was a viable option. The circumstances were considerably different for Alma Kettig in the 1960s. As I show in more detail in Chapter 5, she had created space for herself in the postwar democracy that encompassed party membership, pacifist convictions, and an active career in parliament. Alma had much more to lose, professionally and personally, by leaving her position. Splinter parties were unstable in the Federal Republic since their influence was limited by the five-percent threshold for representation and Kettig did not take this chance. She also had to consider the financial consequences: she remained unemployed and with no income for three years after choosing to leave her parliament position in 1965.²⁰⁶ Each of these circumstances contributed to her decision to retain her parliament position in the SPD despite intense pressure to leave. Kettig remained loyal to the party as a political institution, however, making her own distinctions between allegiance to the organization and disappointment in the individual members who drove her away.

²⁰⁴ Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 281.

²⁰⁵ Pierre Bourdieu "The Biographical Illusion," in *Identity: a reader*, ed. Paul du Gay, Jessica Evans, and Peter Redman, 297-303 (London: SAGE Publications, 2000). 302.

²⁰⁶ Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 278. Representatives could receive transition money if they were not re-elected but they did not receive any if they resigned in 1965.

Kettig's postwar pacifist and Social Democratic identities were profoundly shaped by her experiences under National Socialism. In an autobiographical essay, Kettig illustrates strong ties to former Socialist youth members throughout the dictatorship. Significantly, she makes almost no distinction between SPD and SAP affiliated groups in her description of wartime interaction with other students. The political differences that once split her from her SAJ colleagues paled in comparison to the oppression and destruction they faced under the Nazi regime.²⁰⁷ In fact, Kettig's is not the only case of cooperation between former opponents in this period of extreme political stress. For example, the dreadful conditions of the Buchenwald concentration camp spurred Social Democrats and Communists to band together in resistance to Hitler despite pre-war political differences.²⁰⁸

Experiences under the Nazi regime not only strengthened Kettig's identification with fellow Social Democrats. Biographer Helga Julien argues the "one-sided" Nazi image of women moved Kettig to fight for equal rights for women in the postwar SPD.²⁰⁹ She sought to empower married women especially and encouraged their participation in politics. Kettig herself emphasized her own position at the end of the war as one with tremendous potential for participation in male-dominated party politics compared to her

²⁰⁷ Kettig and her brother aided Wuppertal students who were fleeing the Nazis. Presumably they were SAJ, but she does not make any political distinction. Kettig only recognizes their need for camaraderie and aid. She also notes that many discussed joining the KPD after the war. Appelius, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden*, 106-7, 115.

²⁰⁸ Christoph Butterwegge and Heinz-Gerd Hofschien, *Sozialdemokratie, Krieg und Frieden* (Heilbronn: Distel Verlag, 1984), 246-7. Hereafter cited Butterwegge and Hofschien, *Sozialdemokratie, Krieg und Frieden*. Küstermeier, *Der Rote Stoßtrupp*, 9-10.

²⁰⁹ Appelius, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden*, 137.

female colleagues. “Not married and without children, therefore independent, I had more time and opportunities than others to become politically active,” she surmised.²¹⁰

Kettig certainly was active immediately after the war: she gave her first speech at a women’s meeting in 1946. She focused mostly on basic welfare issues such as high infant mortality rates and called for renewed female political activism. The experience of World War II not only bolstered Kettig’s Social Democratic activities, it cemented her pacifist convictions. Kettig was determined to establish “political relationships” in Germany which would prevent future conflicts and placed the need to eliminate war high on her foreign policy agenda for postwar Social Democracy.²¹¹ In 1953, despite pressure to give up her seat in favor of a male candidate Kettig got her chance to pursue these goals as a Bundestag representative.²¹² Party politics was still dominated by men in the immediate postwar period.

Social Democrat and pacifist Max Brauer once hailed the SPD as a “great peace movement,” yet the SPD faction supported the reintroduction of compulsory military service in Germany on March 26, 1956.²¹³ Kettig and 18 other SPD representatives voted against the measure. For Kettig, the vote represented a turning point. It was clear now that party space for pacifism was limited.²¹⁴ Kettig claimed the SPD had violated its

²¹⁰ Ibid., 116.

²¹¹ Ibid., 12.

²¹² Kettig and Trudel Meyer were pressured to give up their seats. Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 272. Both women were single, never married, and against rearmament.

²¹³ SPD Vorstand, *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 20. bis 24. Juli 1954 in Berlin* (Bonn: Graphische Gesellschaft, 1954), 53, 73. Hereafter cited as 1954 Parteitag. Appelius, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden*, 85.

²¹⁴ Kettig remained in the party even though Trudel Meyer did not run in the next election. Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 371.

basic postwar policies on the party, national, and international level with this decision, but she did not resign. She was reelected to the Bundestag the next year and found ways to continue her cooperative activism. Kettig would go on to participate in the SPD-sponsored KdA, appearing alongside prominent pacifists at rallies.²¹⁵

Kettig and other pacifist Social Democrats faced new challenges when the SPD adopted the reform-minded Godesberg Program in 1959. In 1961, Social Democratic leaders officially forbade SPD members from taking part in the pacifist Easter Marches and party space for pacifism became extremely limited.²¹⁶ Informal cooperation was not uncommon, however, and Kettig's family remembers that she was very proud of nieces and nephews who marched for nuclear disarmament.²¹⁷ Under pressure from party leaders, Kettig resigned her parliamentary positions in 1965. She remained a member of the SPD and active pacifist until she died in 1997. Kettig's complex biography reveals that standard structural analysis of political contexts limits scholar's understandings of postwar political culture and emphasizes the need for a long *durée* perspective.

Chairperson of the postwar SPD-sponsored KdA committee Menzel represents another case where personal agency overcame institutional and familial limitations. Menzel struggled with his personal history and the limits of Social Democratic party during the 1960s. Like Kettig, he enjoyed strong family ties to the SPD. Perhaps these ties were too strong, however. His father-in-law Carl Severing (1875-1952) was a dominant Weimar political personality. As Prussian and *Reichsminister* of the Interior,

²¹⁵ Ibid., 274.

²¹⁶ Ollenhauer to (the) Bezirke, 1.3.1961 NL Menzel FES, AdsD.

²¹⁷ Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 273.

Smaldone argues that, “there were few leaders in the late [Weimar] republic that could match his accomplishments and experience.”²¹⁸ After being forced out of his post in the Prussian government in 1932, Severing weathered the Nazi Regime in Bielefeld. Some critics claimed he made a mistake by laying low and avoiding attention during the Nazi regime. Severing avoided the frontlines, and similar to Ollenhauer, never achieved the level of national notoriety that he enjoyed during the Weimar Republic.

A 1960 *Vorwärts* article about Menzel quipped “Do you know... the *Reichsminister’s* son-in-law?”²¹⁹ To say that Menzel’s career benefited and suffered from his father-in-law’s legacy is an understatement. Prior to his marriage to Emmy Severing, which is downplayed in the articles and biographies, Menzel participated in the Weimar youth movement and became active in the SPD in 1921. He spent the Nazi period in Germany, unemployed after 1934, providing aid to victims of the dictatorship but escaping direct persecution or imprisonment. Menzel rejoined the party and became an influential member of the Bundestag in 1949, a post he held until his death.

Despite his own considerable personal success, Menzel was constantly connected to Severing in the press. These references even included negative publicity as Menzel served as chairman of the SPD-supported 1950s antinuclear KdA movement. Menzel’s steadfast commitment to antinuclear pacifism although the party shifted away from KdA activities after 1960 drew comments like “Carl Severing he was not” in several newspaper articles.²²⁰ Ties to Severing enhanced Menzel’s initial postwar position in the

²¹⁸ Smaldone, *Confronting Hitler*, 182.

²¹⁹ “Kennen Sie den?: Der Schwiegersohn des Reichsministers,” Newspaper clipping from *Vorwärts*, August 4, 1960. “Walter Menzel,” Box 6767, Sammlung Personalien, AdSD.

party, notably an important asset, but Menzel maintained agency over his actions within the party. His political freedom was perhaps enhanced by the fact that Severing died in 1952, ultimately releasing Menzel from any direct personal responsibility to his father-in-law's politics.²²¹ Menzel's pacifist convictions led him to defy party discipline even further, in 1962, pledging support for the party-prohibited Easter Marches and resigning his position as KdA committee chairman when he could no longer comply with party expectations.²²²

Karl Bechert (1901-1981) occupied liminal space between gendered perceptions of peace and activism within the SPD. As a physicist, Bechert's pacifist identity was grounded in the rational, and therefore implicitly masculine, realm of science. His scientific antinuclear pacifism built upon a wave of powerful criticism from the academic communities in Göttingen and Tübingen as well as Alfred Fried's nineteenth-century efforts to ground pacifist theory in a more masculine and political realm.²²³ Before 1961, SPD leaders pressed Bechert to stress his role as a scientific expert in the political arena, providing a masculine voice for party antinuclear efforts.²²⁴

SPD leaders employed Bechert's scientific expertise in 1950s election campaigns and in numerous KdA events. While Bechert always provided an authoritative masculine voice as a scientific expert, his gendered message varied based on his audience and party

²²⁰ "Kennen Sie den?: Der Schwiegersohn des Reichsministers," Newspaper clipping from *Vorwärts*, August 4, 1960 and "Politiker, von denen man spricht: Schwiegersohn Menzel," August 20, 1960, "Walter Menzel," Box 6767, Sammlung Personalien, AdSD.

²²¹ Menzel's involvement in Kampf dem Atomtod is investigated thoroughly in Chapter 5.

²²² Menzel to Kloppenburg, May 10, 1961. Signature 613/2, NL Kloppenburg, EZAB.

²²³ See Chapter 4 and 1, respectively, for detailed analysis.

²²⁴ Willi Eichler to Bechert, March 12, 1957, Mappe 179, NL Bechert, AdSD.

needs. At a rally organized by MdB Lucie (Kurlbaum) Beyer in 1957, for example, Bechert adopted maternalist language very similar to Kettig's, calling on mothers to unite in protest against atomic weapons.²²⁵ The nuances of Bechert's case are investigated fully in Chapter 4.

As the party shifted towards a more masculine understanding of peace under Brandt's leadership, Bechert came under fire for his pacifist convictions in 1962. Bechert's scientific pacifist position lost value as political tool for attracting pacifists into the party political realm when SPD leaders began to draw clearer lines between party pacifist positions and extra-parliamentary positions. Despite internal tension, Bechert remained in the SPD after 1962 and he did not face the same level of intense discrimination as Kettig. He was insulated by his male sex as well as his position as a scientific pacifist which blended better with the post-1961 SPD stance than ethical pacifists consistently branded as "feminine."

Individuals like Kettig, Bechert, and Menzel who identified with multiple political agendas and gendered concepts of peace, drove the relationship between Social Democrats and pacifists over the breaks of accepted periodizations. They fostered a tradition of cooperative activism which led to conflicts as the SPD negotiated the space between its reputation as a "peace party" and the shift to a governing party in postwar politics. Biographical analysis provides a deeper understanding of these events and the impact of individual choices and actions on party politics. SPD actions cannot be considered in the context of political strategy alone. Social Democrats who also

²²⁵ Poster "Gegen die Atomgefahr," July 7, 1957. Signature 613/84, NL Kloppenburg, EZAB

identified as pacifists struggled to balance their activism and, in turn, complicated the party's legacy as a "peace party" and its behavior in the national political arena.

The exiled SPD may have preserved the SPD as a political institution over the caesura of war and dictatorship but the structure was considerably strained by individual agents in its changed constituency. Constant negotiation between party and individual activists characterized peace, and especially antinuclear politics, on the Left after 1945. Individual agency, then, continued to drive the relationship between pacifists and Social Democrats on the German Left through the Nazi period and into the postwar. Case studies of transnational interaction, gender perceptions, and individual biographies, such as those presented in Part II, shed light on the interdependency of structure and agency during the Weimar Republic and post-1945 periods. They also demonstrate the advantages of biographical analysis for studying the complicated relationship of pacifists and Social Democrats on the German Left.

PART II

***“Politics is the Art of Possibilities:”*²²⁶ Case Studies in Cooperative Activism**

²²⁶ Karl Bechert to Carl von Weizsäcker, February 2, 1958. Mappe 191, NL Bechert, AdSD.

Chapter 3:
“Socialism and Pacifism Belong Together:”²²⁷
Exchanges between Pacifists and Social Democrats, 1921-1933

“Three years of work for ‘No More War’ has proven that broad sections of the population, in particular the Socialist workers, are very likely to be enlisted for the pacifist cause. Perhaps not organizationally, but at least for the sake of the idea,” Carl von Ossietzky concluded in a June 1923 article in the pacifist publication *Friedenswarte*.²²⁸ Ossietzky summed up the paradox of the relationship between pacifists and Social Democrats during the Weimar Republic with this frank assessment of the No-More-War movement, which staged protests on the anniversary of the outbreak of World War I from 1920 to 1925. Individual Social Democrats participated in pacifist activities but official institutional cooperation between the SPD and peace organizations would not be realized before the outbreak of World War II. The SPD and labor unions briefly sought stronger leadership roles on the No-More-War committee in 1925 but, as Dieter Riesenberger demonstrates, they failed to secure additional positions and subsequently withdrew from

²²⁷ Wilfried Knauer, “Die Haltung von SPD und KPD zur Friedensbewegung der Weimarer Republik” in ed. Helmut Donat and Johann P. Tammen, *Friedenszeichen Lebenszeichen. Pazifismus zwischen Verächtlichmachung und Rehabilitierung. Ein Lesebuch zur Friedenserziehung* (Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag NW Verlag für neue Wissenschaft GmbH, 1982), 229. Book hereafter cited as Donat and Tammen, *Friedenszeichen*. Article hereafter cited as Knauer, “Haltung von SPD und KPD.”

²²⁸ Carl von Ossietzky, “‘Nie Wieder Krieg!’ Der Rundlauf einer Parole” in *Sämtliche Schriften: Oldenburger Ausgabe*, ed. Bärbel Boldt, Dirk Grathoff, and Michael Sartorius (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1994), 269-270. Hereafter cited as Ossietzky, “Nie Wieder Krieg!”

the antiwar movement.²²⁹ Ossietzky and his contemporaries blamed this predicament on constant internal conflicts between the Socialist parties. The political struggle between the SPD, USPD, and KPD according to Ossietzky “occupied the best forces on the German Left” which allowed for little room for concentrated peace activism.²³⁰ A structural analysis of pacifist organizations and the Social Democratic party, therefore, is not sufficient for a complete understanding of peace politics on the Weimar Left.

The “overwhelming majority of pacifists were organized in or sympathized with the SPD” during the Weimar Republic, yet the relationship between peace and Social Democracy was far from self-understood. Although prominent Weimar pacifists argued that “Socialism and pacifism belong[ed] together” because of the SPD’s “traditional connections to the idea of international understanding” and the Second International, party leaders rejected most attempts at direct organizational cooperation.²³¹ Before World War I, Riesenberger contends Social Democratic cooperation with the then primarily bourgeois pacifists simply was not feasible. The ideological gulf widened when the SPD supported war credits during World War I, causing many pacifist party members to split into the USPD until 1922.²³² Nevertheless, as disparate Weimar peace groups banded together as the German Peace Federation (DFK) in 1921, many pacifists considered the “peace party” a potential political ally and hoped workers would prove to

²²⁹ Dieter Riesenberger, *Geschichte der Friedensbewegung in Deutschland: Von den Anfängen bis 1933* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985), 136. Hereafter cited as Riesenberger, *Friedensbewegung*.

²³⁰ Ossietzky, “Nie Wieder Krieg!” 268.

²³¹ Knauer, “Haltung von SPD und KPD,” 229. The *Nie-Wieder-Krieg* demonstrations were a notable exception. The quote “pacifism and socialism belong together” is attributed to pacifist Fritz Küster.

²³² Riesenberger, *Friedensbewegung*, 86.

be eager participants in pacifist agitation within Weimar democracy. This watershed moment, the same year that many individual Social Democrats displayed increasing participation in the No-More-War movement, provides a starting point for this analysis which extends beyond the traditional limits of the Weimar period.²³³

Historian Wilfried Knauer reflects on the SPD and KPD leaders' perception of the peace movement. He conducts his own analysis on an institutional level yet his conclusions are intended to encompass grassroots activism as well. Even though Knauer maintains that pacifists of all ranks supported the idea of the SPD as a peace party, he primarily focuses on the SPD leadership's rejection of official connections to pacifism as a point of breakdown. This approach neglects the rank and file within the party which formed critical links between pacifism and Social Democracy. Careful investigation of individual pacifists and Social Democrats within the greater context of the German political Left reveals that cooperative activism fostered sustained transnational awareness between 1921 and 1929. Their stories expose the meaningful interpersonal links between peace activism and peace politics that a top-down structural analysis obscures.

Structural changes in German political culture after World War I, such as the establishment of democracy, women's suffrage, and the shift in governing power to the SPD and USPD in 1919, made connections between the political penumbra and party core possible. The Weimar Republic is one of the most rigidly framed eras in the field of modern German history. Germany's first democracy is chronologically positioned between World War I and the Nazi Regime, two tragic events whose significance for

²³³ Additionally, influential pacifist leader Alfred Fried died in 1921. Olga Misra authored his obituary in *Die Frau im Staat* where she referenced his close association with Bertha von Suttner. Misra carefully set him apart from Suttner's "feminine" legacy though, stating that "Fried was not sentimental in his devotion to pacifist thought." Olga Misra, "Alfred Hermann Fried †" *Die Frau im Staat* (June, 1921): 1-2.

continuities and discontinuities within the overall narrative of the German past, as discussed in Chapter 1, is still hotly contested among scholars.

Furthermore, World War I was a catalyst for changes in the gender and political order in Germany, bequeathing a difficult legacy to Weimar politicians. Historian Kathleen Canning highlights the futility of Weimar lawmakers' efforts to reestablish pre-World War I gender relationships and labor balances. "[D]rastic transformations of civil society," during the war, as Canning describes them, dictated new boundaries for the Weimar political arena.²³⁴ These new boundaries were drawn in part by pacifists and Social Democrats who referred to their personal experiences to create political space for Weimar peace activism, including transnational space.

The realm of the "political" expanded after World War I, rendering the core/penumbra model particularly useful. As historian Belinda Davis demonstrates in her work *Home Fires Burning*, political culture evolved and individual activism spilled onto the streets during World War I food protests led by women. Whereas some scholars discount these moments of women's protest as purely economic matters, Davis argues that World War I officials "considered popular cries for food, tied up with demands to force an end to the war ... to be highly political."²³⁵ The protests represent a moment

²³⁴ Kathleen Canning, "Women and the Politics of Gender" in *Weimar Germany*, ed. McElligott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 154. Birthe Kundrus argues that the "daily realities of life" during the Weimar Republic also contributed to the construction and reconstruction of gender identities after World War I. Kundrus, "Gender Wars: The First World War and the Construction of Gender Relations in the Weimar Republic," in *Home/Front*, ed. Hagemann and Schüler-Springorum, 159-180 (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 172.

²³⁵ Belinda J. Davis, *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 237 and 243. For a discussion of male and female political spaces during the Weimar Republic see Karen Hagemann, *Frauenalltag und Männerpolitik: Alltagsleben und Gesellschaftliches Handeln von Arbeiterfrauen in der Weimarer Republik* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1990). Hereafter cited as Hagemann, *Frauenpolitik und Männerpolitik*.

where women intruded on the “masculine” realm of politics. Furthermore, the legacy of this expanded political culture “was rich in possibilities” that included participatory democracy. The increasing visibility of female political protest during World War I and the advent of women’s suffrage in the Weimar Republic increasingly gendered the field of politics, augmenting divisions between arenas and ideologies perceived as either masculine or feminine.

Just over a year after his positive report on the No-More-War movement, Ossietzky sharply criticized German pacifists revealing more tangled threads of gender stereotypes in Weimar political culture. Pointing abroad to British pacifist Ramsay MacDonald and French pacifist Edouard Herriot, Ossietzky drew a stark contrast between their political successes and the lack of political achievements by the German peace movement whose “origins lay in the sentimental novel of a very delicate and sheltered woman.”²³⁶ As opposed to the “political” pacifism of the two foreign male statesmen, Ossietzky accused the German peace movement of being “illusionary” and “distrustful” of politics as well as of any pacifist leaders who tried to embrace political strategies. German pacifists, according to the journalist, ignored the realm of politics, which he characterized as masculine, at their own peril.

Ossietzky’s frustration must be seen tandem with the wider context of German history. Shown in more detail later in this chapter, the No-More-War movement rapidly lost momentum in Germany in 1924 when political activities, peace-related or otherwise, were restricted by bans on public assembly. Despite these obvious contemporary limitations on pacifist organizations, Ossietzky targeted Bertha von Suttner as the source

²³⁶ Ossietzky, “Die Pazifisten,” 373-374.

of pacifist weaknesses. According to Ossietzky's tirade, Suttner was primarily responsible for pacifists' willful collective ignorance of politics. Her philosophy, even though it was an ethical pacifist philosophy, was not the problem. According to Ossietzky, "Peace Bertha," was a woman who purposefully expressed her doctrine through "whining self-pity" (*Wehleidigkeit*), and was the creator of the "perfume of absurdity" that had clung to the peace movement through World War I and into the Weimar Republic.²³⁷

Though Ossietzky possessed a certain transnational awareness and clearly looked beyond German borders himself, he neglected to acknowledge the fact that Suttner's novel circulated outside German and even European borders. The English translation, among others, was already into its second edition by 1914. Interestingly, the translator's preface to this edition reveals a certain effort to guide readers away from types of peace activism characterized by "sentimental emotions and vague protest." The translator further encouraged readers to engage in "business-like discussion" on how to "render [war] more and more infrequent."²³⁸ The wide, transnational, and continued circulation of *Lay Down Your Arms* challenges Ossietzky's 1924 claims of a German pacifist *Sonderweg* linked to Suttner's role as co-founder of the DFG and advocate of a sentimental pacifism. In fact, as the analysis of Suttner's work in Chapter 1 demonstrates, she manipulated the influence of gender stereotypes in her own fictional environment, most noticeably by placing her critical ideological messages in the mouth of the heroine's second husband Friedrich Tilling. In this manner, Suttner created

²³⁷ Ibid.," 374.

²³⁸ Suttner, *Lay Down Your Arms: The Autobiography of Martha von Tilling*, trans. T. Holmes (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914), ix. Hereafter cited as Suttner, LDYA (1914).

legitimacy for the pacifist cause by filtering the novel's main message through a war-tested, masculine voice.

Though he was one of the most prominent critics of Suttner's ethical pacifism, Ossietzky was in the company of other Weimar pacifists frustrated by the peace movement's lack of political traction. Many activists sympathized with the SPD paramilitary group the *Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold* and frequently supported the organization in its mission to defend the first German republic with violence if necessary.²³⁹ Sponsored by the party, the *Reichsbanner* members positioned themselves near the masculine political core on the Weimar Left.²⁴⁰ Davy links male pacifists' increasing emphasis on militaristic and masculine politics to the "widespread trend in the Weimar Republic to emphasize 'manly' strength through militaristic symbols."²⁴¹ She cites two reasons for this trend: the threatening image of the New Woman in Weimar society and the collapse of the pre-World War I gender order when men went to the front and women held down the homefront. Male pacifists who embraced militaristic language drew on common, predominantly right-wing, rhetoric from Weimar political culture to distance themselves from a pacifist position branded as unpolitical and feminine. Seen through the core/penumbra lens, divisions deepened between a political core dominated

²³⁹ Riesenberger, *Friedensbewegung*, 232.

²⁴⁰ See Karl Rohe, *Das Reichsbanner Schwarz Rot Gold: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Struktur der Politischen Kampfverbände zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1966).

²⁴¹ Jennifer A. Davy, "'Manly' and 'Feminine' Antimilitarism: Perceptions of Gender in the Antimilitarist Wing of the Weimar Peace Movement," in *Frieden, Gewalt, Geschlecht: Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als Geschlechterforschung*, ed. Jennifer A. Davy, Ute Kätzel, and Karen Hagemann, 144-65 (Essen: Klartext, 2005), 156, 156-7. Hereafter cited as "'Manly' and 'Feminine' Antimilitarism."

by male politicians and party-sponsored paramilitary organizations and the “feminine” penumbra groups.

WILPF represented a contemporary foil to Ossietzky’s brand of masculine belligerent pacifism (*kriegerischer Pazifismus*) during the Weimar period. Instead of efforts to gender pacifism as more masculine, and therefore more political, radical pacifists and founding editors of the WILPF publication *Die Frau im Staat*, Heymann and Anita Augspurg, advocated a feminist pacifism. No less political than Ossietzky’s efforts to masculinize pacifism, these women challenged gender norms and called for equal standing between men and women. Heymann cited the “masculine, destructive principle” of violence as the opposite of the feminine principles of “mutual aid, goodness, understanding, and cooperation.” She even went so far as to declare that the “feminine instinct is identical to pacifism.”²⁴² German WILPF leaders viewed an increase in female participation in politics and governing coalitions as a potential solution to the problem of war.

Augspurg and Heymann grounded their feminist pacifism in the belief that the increased presence of women in the masculine realm of politics through universal suffrage would bring peace. Drawing positively on Suttner’s legacy, they called for mild, peaceful men and women to participate in high politics and mediate impulses to solve international conflicts with violence.²⁴³ In contrast, as biographer Brigitte Hamann

²⁴² Lida Gustava Heymann, “Weiblicher Pazifismus” in *Frauen gegen den Krieg*, ed. Gisela Brinker-Gabler, 65-70 (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980), 65, 66.

²⁴³ See Davy, “‘Manly’ and ‘Feminine Antimilitarism,’” 158-164 for an extended discussion of WILPF feminist pacifism. Regina Braker, “Bertha von Suttner’s Spiritual Daughters: The Feminist Pacifism of Anita Augspurg, Lida Gustava Heymann, and Helene Stöcker at the International Congress of Women at the Hague, 1915” *Women’s Studies International Forum* 18, no. 2 (1995): 106. Suttner was willing to speak at women’s suffrage functions and correspond with leaders but did not see suffrage as her primary task. Brigitte Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner: A Life for Peace*, trans. Ann Dubsky (Syracuse:

shows, Suttner “resolutely resisted all temptation to present the peace movement as a typically feminine movement against the masculine principle of war.”²⁴⁴ Here, Heymann and Augspurg took Suttner’s work to a feminist extreme, deliberately drawing on a common language of motherhood and femininity to unite female activists.²⁴⁵

Beyond the printed word of *Die Frau im Staat*, international feminists promoted feminist pacifism and international understanding through the WILPF’s interpersonal transnational networks. These networks formed the foundation of what many scholars consider typical transnational interaction: direct and deliberate contact between individuals from different nations.²⁴⁶ WILPF vacation and summer courses during the Weimar Republic are a testament to this intense variety of transnational interaction. The organization’s efforts drew attention to the importance of peace and transnational cooperation, encouraging German citizens, and first-time voters in particular, to participate in the new democracy and develop a political awareness that defied national boundaries. Unlike No-More-War activists who forged their own transnational networks after World War I, WILPF members relied on long-standing international feminist networks to promote transnational awareness, enabling the organization to mobilize a diverse group of pacifists for their vacation schools.

Syracuse University Press, 1996), 267-274. See especially 270. Hereafter cited as Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner*.

²⁴⁴ Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner*, 267.

²⁴⁵ See Ann Taylor Allen, *Feminism and Motherhood in Germany, 1800-1914* (New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 1991), 3-12 for a detailed discussion of this phenomenon among feminists in Germany. Hereafter cited as Allen, *Feminism and Motherhood in Germany*.

²⁴⁶ See Holger Nehring, “National Internationalists: British and West German Protests Against Nuclear Weapons, the Politics of Transnational Communications and the Social History of the Cold War, 1957–1964,” *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 04 (2005): 559-582. See Chapter 1 for a full explanation of the three types of transnational interaction.

WILPF groups across Europe hosted international summer and vacation courses in an effort to promote domestic political participation, develop transnational networks, and instill a sense of urgency for international reconciliation among young people. Drawing on its rich tradition of international cooperation among women, WILPF provided a critical framework for pacifist and feminist activism, strengthening connections between German chapters and transnational networks by bringing activists together across national borders.²⁴⁷ Historian Jo Vellacott cites interpersonal contacts established in nineteenth-century women's social and suffrage networks as playing a "real and significant role in international understanding."²⁴⁸ These early links, Vellacott argues, laid critical foundations for transnational WILPF networks at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. WILPF leaders built on this tradition of personal networks, organizing vacation courses which served as incubators for renewed transnational contact during the 1920s.

In 1923, Walter Fabian and his future wife Dora Heinemann participated in WILPF vacation courses at the University of Geneva in Switzerland.²⁴⁹ Fabian

²⁴⁷ See Leila Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997) for more information.

²⁴⁸ Jo Vellacott, "Putting a Network to Use: Formation and Early Years of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom," in *Politische Netzwerkerinnen. Internationale Zusammenarbeit von Frauen 1830-1960*, ed. Eva Schöck-Quinteros, Anja Schüler, Annika Wilmers, and Kerstin Wolff, 131-54 (Berlin: Trafo Verlag, 2007), 135. Hereafter cited as Vellacott, "Putting a Network to Use." Both Vellacott and Rupp describe WILPF networks as transnational but Rupp leaves the term largely unproblematic.

²⁴⁹ Charmian Brinson, *The Strange Case of Dora Fabian and Mathilde Wurm* (Berne: Peter Lang, 1997), 107. Hereafter cited as Brinson, *The Strange Case of Dora Fabian and Mathilde Wurm*. Heinemann and Fabian were members of DPSt until early 1923. Walter Medding (DPSt) to Katharina Kupsch (DFK), January 23, 1923, File 5, Box 130, Deutsches Friedenskartell (hereafter DFK), League of Nations and Peace Movement Collection (hereafter LNPMC), UN Library at Geneva. Dora (Heinemann) Fabian was a member of the USPD, SPD, SAP during the Weimar period. At the time of the summer school, she would have been a member of the SPD.

remembers this cross-border collaboration warmly, praising both the women's organization and the DFG for "cultivating international connections" during the Weimar Republic. Colleague Detlef Oppermann's observation that Fabian's World War II exile experiences were relatively smoother than others attests to the enduring strength of these connections. Oppermann attributes Fabian's comparable good fortune in exile to his contacts in the former Czechoslovakia, France, and Switzerland which he nurtured through his Weimar "political position."²⁵⁰ WILPF courses provided participants like Fabian with direct personal networking opportunities and fostered a spirit of transnational cooperation. British organizers described these activities best in 1921, dubbing their pedagogical "experiment" in Salzburg "Education for Internationalism."²⁵¹

The Salzburg summer school boasted over 300 participants from eight countries and territories, including Germany. Teachers conducted sessions in English, French, and German. Though no direct translations were available to students, linguistic diversity among the participants provided an opportunity to escape the boundaries of one of the most prominent symbols of individual national identity: native language.²⁵² German participant Gertrud Baer enthusiastically described the international group of summer school participants "who got to know one another through their common task," revealing the strength of her identification with the transnational connections fostered in

²⁵⁰ Donat and Tammen, *Friedenszeichen*, 171. Detlef Oppermann, "Walter Fabian (1902-1992). Journalist-Pädagoge-Gewerkschafter," *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte* 54, no. 7 (2003): 415. Hereafter cited as Oppermann, "Fabian." Fabian's participation in transnational pacifist networks no doubt helped establish some of these connections. Similarly, Seger and Ossietzky also benefitted from networks established during the Weimar Republic during the Nazi Regime.

²⁵¹ *Bulletin of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* (February, 1922): 4. File 1, Box 131, DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva. Hereafter cited as *Bulletin of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom*.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

Salzburg.²⁵³ Baer's enthusiastic report attests to the success of the 1921 session and WILPF expanded offerings in 1922 to include Easter courses in England and two more summer schools, one of which was organized and hosted by the German WILPF branch at the Bavarian castle Lauenstein.²⁵⁴ These courses were a welcome outlet for German students frustrated by the largely conservative and nationalist university environment of the Weimar period.

Fabian and Heinemann were especially familiar with this environment. As university students in Berlin, Freiburg, and Giessen between 1920 and 1924, they navigated the permeable space between party and popular politics. Over the course of the Weimar period, Fabian in particular participated in No-More-War demonstrations, taught WILPF vacation courses, and was a member of the DPSt. He also became a member of the DFG when it was reestablished in 1919. While completing his thesis on the pacifist philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, Fabian recognized a link between pacifism and Socialism which he applied in his own activism.²⁵⁵ He emphasized a "new beginning" for the Weimar peace movement which was augmented by a new purpose for pacifists. According to Fabian, the primary tasks for post-World War I activists were to combat the common pre-war notion that military conflicts were inevitable and remind German

²⁵³ Gertrud Baer, "Die Internationale Sommerschule in Salzburg," *Die Frau im Staat* (October, 1921): 6, 8.

²⁵⁴ *Bulletin of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom*, 5.

²⁵⁵ Oppermann, "Fabian," 410-413. Fabian joined the SPD in 1924 and lived in Dresden after 1928. See Brinson, *The Strange Case of Dora Fabian and Mathilde Wurm*, 107 for more on Dora's biography. The couple married in 1924.

citizens of the dangers of modern warfare. Both tasks were embraced by participants in the No-More-War rallies.²⁵⁶

A site of visible political interaction between Social Democrats and pacifists in the penumbra, the “No More War” demonstrations serve as a key example of a combination of transnational awareness and the foundation of new transnational antiwar networks during the Weimar period. Activists staged No-More-War demonstrations on the anniversary of the outbreak of World War I in cities across Germany and in international venues. The first public demonstration occurred in Berlin on August 1, 1920 and participants from diverse pacifist organizations, not necessarily political parties, planned the event. Although the Socialist parties did not officially endorse the 1920 rally, many SPD and USPD members supported No-More-War events by 1921. In fact, Riesenberger attributes the success of these subsequent rallies to support from the SPD and USPD which were grounded in the masculine party political realm.²⁵⁷

The annual protests, therefore, represent one prominent site where significant numbers of party members and pacifists interacted and core political support would prove crucial for success. Between 100,000 and 200,000 individuals participated in the 1921 Berlin rally and approximately 500,000 demonstrated in solidarity across Germany. Fabian estimates 100,000 people packed around him in the Berlin Pleasure Garden (*Lustgarten*) for a demonstration that had “international character and led to a highpoint

²⁵⁶ Anne-Marie Fabian, Walter Fabian, Arno Behrisch, et al., *Arbeiterbewegung, Erwachsenenbildung, Presse: Festschrift für Walter Fabian zum 75. Geburtstag* (Cologne: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1977), 228-231. Donat and Tammen, *Friedenszeichen*, 169.

²⁵⁷ Riesenberger, *Friedensbewegung*, 134. The SPD and USPD often found themselves working towards similar political goals although they remained separate parties until 1922.

of the international peace movement.²⁵⁸ Photos of the Pleasure Garden support the accuracy of Fabian's description. They depict both men and women packed shoulder-to-shoulder in the approximately five acres between buildings, overflowing into the colonnade of the Old Museum and even standing on nearby statues.²⁵⁹

Fabian does not explicitly connect the SPD or labor unions with the dynamic No-More-War protests in his memoirs, although there is significant evidence of a Social Democratic presence.²⁶⁰ Prominent signs declaring "No More War!" mix with others in the photos announcing SPD groups among the participants, offering visual confirmation of Social Democratic support in 1921. Party members mingled with periphery political actors like pacifists and the rallies served their purpose as a reminder of the atrocities of World War I. The No-More-War protests demonstrated both the expansion and strengthening of transnational pacifist networks and informal interaction between pacifists and Social Democrats in the penumbra of German national political culture.²⁶¹

Pacifism and Social Democracy blended more explicitly outside Germany in a 1921 Paris memorial service for slain French antimilitarist and Social Democrat Jean

²⁵⁸ Reinhold Lütgemeier-Davin, "Basismobilisierung gegen den Krieg: Die Nie-Wieder-Krieg-Bewegung in der Weimarer Republik" in *Pazifismus in der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Karl Holl and Wolfram Wette (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1981), 53-54, 57-60. Article hereafter cited as Lütgemeier-Davin, "Basismobilisierung," Book hereafter cited as Holl and Wette, *Pazifismus in der Weimarer Republik*. Lütgemeier-Davin ">>Nie-Wieder-Krieg<< Bewegung" in *Die Friedensbewegung*, ed. Donat and Holl, 286. Donat and Tammen, *Friedenszeichen*, 172.

²⁵⁹ Holl and Wette, *Pazifismus in der Weimarer Republik*, cover photo "Pazifistische Massenkundgebung im Berliner Lustgarten anlässlich des Jahrestages des Ausbruchs des Ersten Weltkrieges, 31. Juli 1921." These impressive attendance estimates can be compared to the 400,000 West Germans who rallied on June 10, 1982 against nuclear weapons in one of the largest Cold War peace demonstrations in Bonn. See Steve Breyman, *Why Movements Matter: The West German Peace Movement and U.S. Arms Control Policy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 106.

²⁶⁰ Donat and Tammen, *Friedenszeichen*, 229.

²⁶¹ Lütgemeier-Davin, "Basismobilisierung," 47.

Jaurés conducted under the No-More-War banner. Arthur Crispian, a leading Independent Social Democrat who would join the SPD a year later, spoke at the ceremony. His appearance was a powerful symbol of the cooperation between pacifists and Socialists in Germany and France, two former World War I enemies that Jaurés had attempted to keep from military conflict before he was assassinated in 1914. From Dortmund to Leipzig, Germans read about Crispian's appearance, an important transnational event, and the growing popularity of No-More-War activities in their mainstream newspapers.²⁶²

Indeed, newspapers represented a critical publicity instrument for these popular demonstrations, fostering rich exchanges between core and penumbra and increasing transnational awareness among readers. Just as in Brockliss and Jones' Habermasian interpretation of the French medical world, media played a key role in Weimar political culture. In Berlin, the main Social Democratic newspaper *Vorwärts* advertised regularly for the No-More-War demonstration in the weeks prior to the 1921 rally, announcing on July 20 that Social Democrats from greater-Berlin "officially" decided on "active participation in the.... peace demonstration 'No-More-War!'" The author invited not only all comrades but "all friends of the idea of international understanding" to get involved.²⁶³ This endorsement encouraged support for the fledgling peace demonstrations which were already located on the margins of Weimar political culture.

²⁶² Harvey Goldberg, *The Life of Jean Jaurés* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), 458-472. Lütgemeier-Davin, "Basismobilisierung," 56, 64. News of Crispian's speech reached Germans through major newspapers such as the *General-Anzeiger für Dortmund und die Provinz Westfalen* and the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*. Social Democrats Rudolf Breitscheid and Toni Sender spoke at subsequent Jaurés events.

²⁶³ "Nie Wieder Krieg!," *Vorwärts* (July, 20, 1921).

As the demonstration date loomed closer, *Vorwärts* printed various notices for participants including lists of demonstrations in other German cities and planned SPD speakers for the Berlin rally. A front-page article from July 24, 1921 describing preparations for both German and foreign rallies is particularly telling.²⁶⁴ The publicity committee's combination of German and English, such as "Friedensmeeting," and repeated use of English words textually reflects a transnational awareness between the founders of the British "No More War" movement, among others, and the German "*Nie-Wieder-Krieg*" demonstrations.

The British monthly publication *No More War* contains further evidence of cooperation between German No-More-War activists and demonstrators around the world. The February 1922 edition featured an article with the title "'No More War: British, French and German Resisters on One Platform.'" The article highlighted Martha Steinitz, Berlin secretary of the German Union of War Resisters, who traveled to London to promote German and international No-More-War activities. Steinitz's speech "in almost perfect English" caught the attention of British antimilitarists and her vivid description of the "remarkable" series of No-More-War rallies in Germany prompted British activists to plan their own demonstrations. German pacifists were also influenced by descriptions of British activism in *No More War*. One German mother wrote that she received a copy of the monthly from "from an old English friend... [and] was deeply impressed by the contents."²⁶⁵ In addition, *No More War* frequently mentioned cross-

²⁶⁴ Aktionausschuss Nie Wieder Krieg, "Nie Wieder Krieg!," *Vorwärts* (July 24, 1921); "Nie Wieder Krieg!," *Vorwärts* (July 25, 1921); "Wer von der SPD spricht am Sonntag, den 31. Juli, auf der Kundgebung, Nie Wieder Krieg?," *Vorwärts* (July 28, 1921); Aktionausschuss Nie Wieder Krieg, "Nie Wieder Krieg!," *Vorwärts* (July 30, 1921).

²⁶⁵ Lütgemeier-Davin highlights the organization of rallies in France, Germany, and England in "Basismobilisierung," 56. "'No More War: British, French and German Resisters on One Platform,'" *No*

border interaction between activists including an exchange program which encouraged contact between English and German families “holding similar views” in 1921 and 1922. Both German *Vorwärts* and British *No More War* reports attest to increasing transnational awareness and the establishment of new pacifist networks on the Weimar Left.

The relationship between the SPD and the numerous Weimar-era pacifist organizations nonetheless was capricious. Party leaders frequently focused attention on national political interests at the expense of pacifist goals. Peace historian Reinhold Lütgemeier-Davin observes that despite early Social Democratic enthusiasm for the demonstrations, antimilitarist war veterans’ groups gradually took responsibility for organization of the annual No-More-War rallies. Riesenberger attributes the SPD leaders’ distance to internal tension over peace mobilization in the newly reunited party and thwarted Social Democratic efforts to expand their role in the No-More-War leadership.²⁶⁶ SPD historian Heinrich Potthoff chronicles programmatic shifts in party consciousness which occurred after the USPD joined the SPD in 1922. The 1925 Heidelberg party program reflected this merger with a renewed focus on class struggle and an increasingly “Marxist tone.” Potthoff suggests that after 1925 the SPD limited its political focus to the “formal functions of democratic institutions” and the “defense” of Weimar democracy in order to make the transition for former USPD members

More War: The Monthly Organ of the No More War International Movement (February 10, 1922). “Visit of English War Resisters to Germany,” *No More War* (March 10, 1922). “A German Woman’s Moving Appeal,” *No More War* (December 1922).

²⁶⁶ Lütgemeier-Davin, “Basismobilisierung,” 63. Riesenberger, *Friedensbewegung*, 136. According to Riesenberger SPD leaders sought to expand their role in the No-More-War committee. Failing to do so, they distanced the party from the movement.

smoother.²⁶⁷ Ultimately, leading Social Democrats turned their attention inward to the national political core and away from controversial extra-parliamentary pacifist activities in their efforts to preserve the democratic system which was increasingly under threat.

The Heidelberg program represented party leaders' efforts to unite a broadened spectrum of rank and file Social Democrats under one universal agenda. Internal divisions remained and many Social Democrats continued to support the No-More-War protests. Although there was significantly less publicity for the 1922 rallies than in the previous year, *Vorwärts* printed a notice from the eve of the event that declared the SPD "convincingly in agreement" with the No-More-War organizers. Reports also expressed enthusiasm for rallies in France and England.²⁶⁸ This party endorsement linked the rallies to core political culture lending further credibility to the cause. No-More-War maintained its momentum with demonstrations in over 200 German cities in 1922.²⁶⁹ In 1923, however, crisis struck both Germany and the No-More-War protests. French and Belgian troops occupied the critical Ruhr industrial region and were met by steady passive resistance from local workers. The war-devastated countries intended to force reparations from an already financially distressed German population. Passive resistance to this military intrusion had a heavy price. The continued stagnation of these main industrial, coal-producing regions crippled the economy, leading to inflation and extreme hardship for many Germans.

²⁶⁷ Heinrich Potthoff and Susanne Miller, *Kleine Geschichte der SPD* (Bonn: Dietz, 2002), 120-122. Hereafter cited as Potthoff and Miller, *Kleine Geschichte*. The party struggled to redefine itself after it merged with the USPD, culminating in the 1925 party program.

²⁶⁸ "Nie Wieder Krieg," *Vorwärts* (July 30, 1922).

²⁶⁹ Riesenberger, *Friedensbewegung*, 134.

In this unstable climate, Social Democratic Interior Minister Carl Severing prohibited all public demonstrations and thereby severely limited No-More-War activities. The preservation of the republic trumped party support of any public demonstrations. A notice for the annual No-More-War rallies appeared on the second page of the July 26, 1923 edition of *Vorwärts* however. As a result of the prohibition, organizers reduced the mass No-More-War Berlin demonstrations of previous years to five small gatherings in closed venues and cancelled outdoor marches. The rallies were relegated to private political spaces which Hagemann argues were characterized as feminine during the Weimar Republic.²⁷⁰ Interested participants needed to pick up tickets distributed in three-hour windows the preceding Friday and Saturday at each location.²⁷¹ Although the tickets were free, this new system placed greater responsibility on individual demonstrators. They were now required to plan ahead, choose a venue and make an additional trip for tickets. Reports in the British publication *No More War* noted the smaller German meetings were a stark contrast to the highly visible, and considerably more accessible, open-air demonstrations held in previous years.

Vorwärts announcements for the demonstrations in 1924 suggest a similar compartmentalized arrangement on both the traditional Sunday afternoon and the following Monday. This controlled environment did not, however, keep German No-More-War organizers from calling for “rallies for world peace in all parts of the country.” British reporters also drew attention to the participation of French, German, and English speakers in Berlin rallies. When the police superintendent prohibited Frenchman Paul

²⁷⁰ Hagemann, *Frauenalltag und Männerpolitik*, Introduction.

²⁷¹ “Die Friedensfeiern am nächsten Sonntag,” *Vorwärts* (July 26, 1923).

Langevin from taking the stage at an indoor rally, demonstrators read his prepared speech aloud.²⁷² The physical meeting space for transnational pacifist activists was restricted, but their antiwar efforts continued to intrude into the wider realm of Weimar political culture.

The No-More-War legacy is both lasting and complex despite some historians' negative assessments. Lütgemeier-Davin considers the No-More-War rallies a failed experiment. He argues that, "...the peace question as an integration-moment for pacifists, republicans, socialists, and labor organizations" was not successful.²⁷³ Historian Richard Bessel also grounds his conclusions about the disappointing impact of pacifism on Weimar culture partially in Lütgemeier-Davin's evaluation of the No-More-War initiative. By 1925, No-More-War events had indeed lost momentum and Lütgemeier-Davin correctly argues that the mobilization effort as a formula for lasting *official* SPD and peace movement cooperation was a disappointment. Pacifists, however, carried on the No-More-War spirit, Fabian's "high point" of the international peace movement in Weimar Germany, and integrated its battle-cry into other contexts. No-More-War reappeared during the May 1st labor rallies, for instance. Pacifist student leader and Social Democrat Gerda Weyl authored a front-page article in the DPSt's newsletter "Young Pacifists" (*Pazifistische Jugend*) in 1925 that firmly linked the May 1st "Anti-War Day" with the familiar "No-More-War" call.²⁷⁴

²⁷² "The Demonstrations Abroad," *No More War* (September 1923). WILPF and general SPD activities were also limited during this period. "Nie wieder Krieg," *Vorwärts* (July 31, 1924), "Nie wieder Krieg," *Vorwärts* (July 23, 1924). Lütgemeier-Davin, "Basismobilisierung," 67. Lütgemeier-Davin notes the general fear that opposition from right-wing groups would lead to violence during the demonstrations.

²⁷³ Lütgemeier-Davin, "Basismobilisierung," 63.

²⁷⁴ Lütgemeier-Davin, "Basismobilisierung," 68-76. Gerda Weyl, "Zum Anti-Kriegstag 1. Mai 1925," *Pazifistische Jugend* (May, 1925): 1. The DFG carried the institution still further, publishing an

These broad uses of the slogan received mixed reviews during the Weimar Republic. Quidde and mainstream pacifists balked at the broad anti-militarist pacifist message promoted by the No-More-War rallies. However even Quidde admitted the general appeal of “No More War” lent a certain freshness to the greater pacifist cause, attracting younger participants like Fabian and Weyl.²⁷⁵ The perceived failure of the extra-parliamentary No-More-War movement also fueled Ossietzky’s critique of the peace movement as weak and unpolitical. Although the No-More-War effort exercised little direct influence over Weimar party politics, the legacy of this dramatic collective political action remained alive until the final years of the Republic and even after World War II. Participants fondly remembered it as a moment of idyllic international cooperation and drew on the experience to inform their subsequent peace activism.²⁷⁶

Although SPD support for organized peace activism like the No-More-War demonstrations drastically diminished over the first half of the 1920s, individual Social Democrats continued to participate in transnational pacifist initiatives. The No-More-War movement provided pacifists with a visible outlet for their convictions. As the demonstrations lost support, organizations like WILPF and DPSSt filled the void with alternative educational programs which drew attention to the importance of peace and transnational cooperation. Some of the most effective strategies were vacation courses,

annual special issue with the title *Nie-Wieder-Krieg* until 1932. Riesenberger notes that when Social Democrats were stymied in their effort to take control of the No-More-War demonstrations they moved on to alternative commemorations, such as traditionally Socialist May 1st rallies. Riesenberger, *Friedensbewegung*, 136. A 1931 article in *Die Frau im Staat* linked the phrase to an antiwar appeal from Malaysian, Chinese, and Dutch students addressed to students in “the whole world.” “Nie Wieder Krieg!” *Die Frau im Staat* (April, 1931): 5-6.

²⁷⁵ Riesenberger, *Friedensbewegung*, 145.

²⁷⁶ Donat and Holl, *Die Friedensbewegung*, 288.

educational exhibits, and reading sessions which encouraged German citizens to develop a political awareness that defied national boundaries.

Fabian describes the efforts of organizations like the DPSt to sway non-political or conservative university students to the pacifist cause. Pacifist Student Union activities represent the most basic level of transnational interaction: awareness. These social actors were aware of parallel transnational movements and brought their ideas into the German political arena, but they did not maintain direct contacts with foreign groups. Through a series of reading sessions (*Leseabende*), the Pacifist Student Union introduced its audiences to a diverse set of topics ranging from international arbitration and peace to contemporary social issues. Although the series featured many transnational topics, the overwhelming majority of speakers were German. This effort in transnational education, therefore, was grounded primarily in the organizers' determination to look beyond national borders for examples of pacifist and social activism.

As Berlin DPSt leader, Weyl led the effort to incorporate transnational pacifist ideas into a successful series of *Leseabende* held from 1925 until 1927. A woman of many interests, Weyl's personal biography provides insight into the behavior of a female pacifist Social Democrat in the Weimar Republic. Entangled in various networks of pacifists and Socialists in a university environment that was rather unfriendly to both, Weyl worked diligently in pacifist organizations like the DPSt and the *Bund freier sozialistischer Jugend* (League of Free Socialist Youth). As a leading student pacifist, she often represented both groups at DFK meetings in the 1920s.²⁷⁷ In 1926 DPSt

²⁷⁷ See Reinhold Lütgemeier-Davin, *Pazifismus zwischen Kooperation und Konfrontation. Das Deutsche Friedenskartell in der Weimarer Republik* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1982), 58-61, 91-2. Hereafter cited as Lütgemeier-Davin, *Pazifismus*. The German Peace Cartel was an umbrella pacifist group founded in 1921. She represented the DPSt and Bund freier sozialistischer Jugend. Weyl appeared in DPSt

national press officer Rudolf Küstermeier recognized Weyl's deep commitment to the organization and her exceptional work in a report on the 1925/1926 winter semester. "The best group is apparently Berlin," Küstermeier claimed, "where Gerda Weyl achieved promising improvements as deputy chairman, especially with her pacifist reading sessions."²⁷⁸

The DPSt needed a rallying point in the turbulent scene of Weimar pacifism. In October 1924, Weyl participated in the DPSt Berlin Conference where the pacifist group formulated a tactical new program which embraced all students "who fight against war as a crime and advocate international cooperation."²⁷⁹ Roughly a year later, Weyl launched the first reading sessions, encouraging exchanges of information and ideas through a broad range of themed meetings. The series occurred at a critical moment in Weimar history and the history of the DPSt as an organization. 1926 marked Germany's acceptance into the League of Nations after years of negotiation and brought a surge in domestic media attention to its activities.²⁸⁰ In the midst of these international political dialogues, the Berlin DPSt group initiated reading sessions which addressed diverse

leadership ranks in 1923 after she joined the SPD. Gerda Weyl (DPSt) to Albert Einstein, May 18, 1923, Document Number [44-647], Albert Einstein Archive. A police report in Düsseldorf estimates a total of nine DPSt university groups and approximately 500 members in February 1922. "Auszug aus dem Lagebericht vom 16. Februar 1922." Blatt 9 Regierung Düsseldorf 15590, Hauptstadtarchiv Düsseldorf, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen.

²⁷⁸ Rudolf Küstermeier, "Tätigkeitsbericht des Deutschen Pazifistischen Studentenbundes für das Winter-Semester 1925-26," Special Edition of *Die Friedenswarte* 26. File 5 Box 130, DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva.

²⁷⁹ Lütgemeier-Davin, *Pazifismus*, 59.

²⁸⁰ Christoph Kimmich, *Germany and the League of Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 100.

issues ranging from international arbitration and peace to contemporary social tensions. The meetings were well-publicized and open to all, not just students.²⁸¹

Weyl's initiative was not the first instance of ideological grassroots education in the political arena. She drew heavily on the example of Social Democratic women. Jean Quataert's work on early Social Democratic women's programs reveals that reading sessions organized by female Social Democrats in Berlin in the early 1900s were part of a "long-standing commitment to continuous education for [the] rank and file." This "education of all by all" included guided discussions of works like the *Communist Manifesto* and various programmatic documents of the SPD.²⁸²

The Social Democratic tradition of "women's meetings" continued even after women gained the right to vote in 1919. These meetings took the form of organized lectures, reading sessions, and other alternative activities to general party meetings which were characteristically not well-attended by female members.²⁸³ Despite female suffrage there remained gaps between traditionally masculine political arenas and those established for female political activities. Nonetheless, Weyl would have been familiar with the reading session tradition as a young Social Democrat and through her mother who participated in numerous Berlin Social Democratic women's clubs and social advocacy committees from the turn-of-the-century through the Weimar Republic. Weyl's placement of the DPSt flyer collection with her mother's papers at the Archive of

²⁸¹ "Deutscher Pazifistischer Studentenbund Gruppe Berlin Veranstaltungen im Wintersemester 1926-27," Box 130, File 5, DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva. The DPSt frequently sent publicity to the DFK. It is included in File 5 referenced above.

²⁸² Jean Quataert, *Reluctant Feminists in German Social Democracy, 1885-1917* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 193,195. Hereafter cited as Quataert, *Reluctant Feminists*.

²⁸³ Hagemann, *Frauenalltag und Männerpolitik*, 593-595.

Social Democracy suggests that she linked her own reading sessions with this common Social Democratic practice more explicitly than the documents alone reveal.²⁸⁴

The use of the reading sessions reflects the impact of Social Democratic women's culture on Weyl's activities as a young adult in the 1920s. It was part of her political experience and this experience affected her daily actions. Although Weyl's sessions targeted a broader and more co-educational audience than traditional women's reading sessions, the focus was nevertheless the same: to convey the groups' message by encouraging an interactive educational experience apart from mainstream political and social rhetoric. These activities took advantage of emerging space in political culture and by integrating ideas from the feminine edge of core party politics and transnational pacifist networks Weyl inscribed political meaning to these otherwise periphery student pacifist activities.

Gertrud Eysoldt, a prominent actress, teacher, and radio announcer, kicked off the theme "Comrades in Humanity" in October 1926 with her lecture "America and China." Between 1905 and 1934 Eysoldt taught over 2000 students at the German Theater Acting School and was extremely popular with young Berliners. In addition, her biographer, Carsten Niemann, notes that Eysoldt was enamored with new radio technology and served as a regular broadcaster in the 1920s. Listeners could tune in to her programs in Germany as well as abroad. Niemann also describes Eysoldt's deep commitment to pacifism and her use of many different venues to promote peace in German society.²⁸⁵

²⁸⁴ Ibid, 74 and Sydney Strong, "Berlin's Fight with Disease and Poverty," February 1, 1923, Document 78 NL Weyl, AdsD. The DPSt flyers make up the majority of Gerda Weyl's papers in the AdsD. A significant portion of Weyl's personal papers are housed in the Stadtarchiv Celle implying that she intentionally placed the DPSt flyers at the Ebert Stiftung.

²⁸⁵ Carsten Niemann, "*Das Herz meiner Künstlerschaft ist Mut*" *Die Max-Reinhardt-Schauspielerin Gertrud Eysoldt* (Hannover: Theatermuseum und -archiv der Niedersächsischen

Although Eysoldt was a German actress, she drew many ideas from outside German national borders to promote peace and transnational awareness in her Berlin broadcasts. Her background and deep commitment to peace connected her with DPSt goals, while her international reputation drew attention to the Berlin organization's efforts to promote peace by looking beyond national boundaries.

In preparation for Eysoldt's talk, the DPSt produced flyers in handy half-sheets to publicize the "Comrades in Humanity" event, purposefully highlighting Eysoldt's name in bold, red letters. (Figure 1) The DPSt counted on the actress' popularity to draw a large crowd and her enthusiasm for pacifism and the topic to keep up the momentum for the remainder of the series.²⁸⁶ Weyl rode Eysoldt's coattails, scheduling her "Comrades in Humanity: North and South" session exactly two weeks after "America and China." Two weeks later, Rolf Gärtner delivered the third "Comrades in Humanity" installment entitled "The New Russia Takes Flight," building on the energy of the previous two events.²⁸⁷ Such clever marketing strategies no doubt contributed to the impact of DPSt reading sessions as they sought to expand transnational awareness in Berlin.

Staatstheater, 1995), 19, 80, 83. Interestingly, Eysoldt had contact with prominent Social Democrat August Bebel as a child.

²⁸⁶ "Kameraden der Menschheit I. Amerika und China," October 23, 1926. File 5, Box 130, DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva. On Eysoldt's work with youth see "Gertrud Eysoldt," *Die Frau im Staat* (May, 1925): 11.

²⁸⁷ Document 51: "Kameraden der Menschheit," November 6, 1926. NL Weyl, AdsD.




Figure 1: DPSt Flyer. Courtesy of League of Nations and Peace Movements Collection, Deutsches Friedenskartell, United Nations Library at Geneva.

Weyl's "North and South" discussion attests to her blending of pacifist, feminist, and transnational ideas in the reading sessions. The title itself suggests a broad non-geographical perspective and the flyer announced that Weyl read from Danish feminist author Karin Michaëlis' work as well as from the correspondence of iconic Italian actress, Eleonora Duse.²⁸⁸ In this evening session, Weyl encouraged the audience to look beyond German borders to women who challenged the status quo. In her famous literary work *The Dangerous Age* Michaëlis chronicles the life of a divorced woman at the turn of the century, challenging the social stigmas applied to single and divorced women. Biographer Helen Sheehy declares the Italian actress "expanded the very idea of Woman" throughout her acting career. Furthermore, Duse's work "revealed the immense gap between accepted ideas of woman and what a woman really was."²⁸⁹ These iconic

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Karin Michaëlis, *The Dangerous Age: Letters and Fragments from a Woman's Diary* (New York: J. Lane Co., 1912). Helen Sheehy, *Eleonora Duse: A Biography* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 5.

women represented a long tradition of feminist thinking on women's issues often considered private. Weyl drew on their legacies to establish dialogues across national borders based on shared values and to encourage German activists to look outside their own nation for inspiration. In fact, Weyl's focus on feminist icons across national borders placed her in a bold position during the Weimar period. As a feminist and a pacifist Weyl threatened what Davy describes as the "normative gender order" by holding open discussions about the nature of the family, feminism, politics, and pacifism.²⁹⁰ Her innovative use of Social Democratic tradition contributed to the success of the Berlin DPSt and reveals the growing potential of peripheral political initiatives in Weimar democracy that defied the structural boundaries dictated by high politics and accepted gender norms.

Weyl's use of the reading sessions was a distinct effort to promote the goals of the 1926 DPSt program which called for open international cooperation between students and academics of all countries. The DPSt explicitly acknowledged its support of Weimar individual and group networks advocating "a basic reorganization of the relationships of individual person to individual person, group to group and country to country." The fourth program point declared support for the League of Nations and efforts to make it a "true supranational working-group."²⁹¹ This point highlights DPSt members' desire to see the League become a more transnational rather than strictly international organization, a goal shared by many Social Democrats who envisioned the League as one

²⁹⁰ Jennifer A. Davy, "Pacifist Thought and Gender Ideology in the Political Biographies of Women Peace Activists in German, 1899-1970" *Journal of Women's History* 13, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), 5.

²⁹¹ "Der Deutsche Pazifistische Studentenbund," File 5, Box 130, DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva.

of peoples rather than nations.²⁹² DPSt members and fellow pacifists, though limited to the periphery of political culture, structured their transnational ambitions carefully in an effort to bring cross-border collaboration and awareness into the larger national political arena. The 1927 Munich peace exhibit further demonstrates the success of transnational pacifist initiatives in the Weimar Republic to break away from the limits of national and political frameworks.

The 1927 peace exhibition entitled “Peace Movements and Peace Activism in all Countries” is perhaps the best indicator of expanding transnational influences in German political culture. Indeed, here the established networks of individual pacifists and organizations, like Ludwig Quidde, paired with activists’ intense desire to bring transnational awareness inside German borders. The Munich exhibit brought together material from all over the world and traveled to various cities throughout Germany. Hallgarten describes the perseverance of pacifist Marie Zehetmaier, who was appalled by the presence of “chauvinistic and warmongering exhibits,” as the main catalyst for the project. Her peace exhibit would challenge these masculine and militaristic presentations in their own public spaces. Failing to gain support for her initiative from the Munich DFK, Zehetmaier appealed to Quidde as a prominent pacifist leader.²⁹³

²⁹² For more information on Social Democratic views of the League of Nations see Vincent Sheridan, “The German Social Democratic Party and the League of Nations during the Weimar Republic, 1918-1933” (PhD diss., Arizona State University, 1975). Hereafter cited as Sheridan, “The German Social Democratic Party and the League of Nations.” Social Democrats advocated a more democratic organization of the League of Nations which would be truly a league of peoples rather than nation-states and their representatives.

²⁹³ Constanze Hallgarten, *Als Pazifistin in Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Conseil-Verlag, 1956), 70-1. Quidde was out of town when Zehetmaier’s original proposal was rejected by the DFK. See also “Friedensausstellung in München” *Die Frau im Staat* (May/June, 1927), 10.

Zehetmaier's personal agency brought this transnational vision to fruition. Working with Quidde's personal networks, Zehetmaier gathered so much material from various international groups in her home that Hallgarten marveled at how she could live "in such a tangled mass of paper."²⁹⁴ The overwhelming enthusiasm and the speed with which Zehetmaier was able to collect project materials (less than one year) demonstrates the tight links between pacifist networks in Germany and abroad. Hallgarten voted against Zehetmaier's 1926 proposal as a member of the DFK, yet she could not deny the mounting enthusiasm for the innovative exhibit from both German and international pacifist organizations.

As noted in Chapter 2, Hallgarten herself represents an intriguing figure in Weimar political culture. A middle-class feminist as well as a pacifist, she insists in her autobiography that she never belonged to a political party. Her inclination towards Socialism is documented however, especially at the beginning of the Weimar period when she was a member of the League of Socialist Women (*Bund Sozialistischer Frauen*). In addition, her biographers note that she voted Socialist in the 1919 elections even though her husband voted democratic. Hallgarten's participation in the 1919 WILPF Zürich Conference directly after the war, despite extreme financial hardship and difficult traveling conditions, also demonstrates her dedication as a transnational activist. In addition, she represented the DFK at the first Munich No-More-War demonstration in 1922, enthusiastically noting the participation of American pacifists in her memoirs.²⁹⁵

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 71.

²⁹⁵ Detlef Garz and Anja Knuth, *Constanze Hallgarten: Porträt Einer Pazifistin* (Hamburg: Dr. Kovac, 2004), 38, 42. Hallgarten, *Als Pazifistin*, 50-51.

Hallgarten's activities reveal the extent to which transnational and national political culture intersected in the Weimar era.

The idea for a peace exhibit may have been initiated through the individual efforts of pacifists like Zehetmaier, Hallgarten, and Quidde, but the trio's combined connections to larger pacifist networks helped make the exhibition a success. Hallgarten reached out to Munich leaders for support and was surprised to find that of the two main religious groups, Catholic officials were more likely to support the initiative than Lutheran. In fact, Hallgarten, a member of the Lutheran church, was deeply disappointed by the intense negative reaction of the clergymen, one of whom mocked not only the idea of peace to her face, but the League of Nations as well.²⁹⁶ Interestingly, Hallgarten attributed this difference to a Catholic predisposition to be internationally-minded based on the church's supranational structure as opposed to the national structure of the Lutheran church. She surmised that Catholic officials transcribed positive experiences from wider church frameworks to the proposed transnational German peace exhibit and supported the effort. Here, Hallgarten shows a keen awareness of differences between transnational and national perspectives in her own political activities.

Although the Munich DFK officially declined the project, many of its member organizations participated. The three largest exhibit rooms reflected complementary involvement of the DFG, WILPF, and Zehetmaier's religious pacifist organization as main Munich sponsors.²⁹⁷ Contributions for the displays came from all over the world.

²⁹⁶ Hallgarten, *Als Pazifistin*, 72. For more on Lutheran nationalism see Roger Chickering, *Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 126-9.

²⁹⁷ Gerhart Seger, "Die erste deutsche Friedensaustellung," *Die Friedensbewegung* (May, 1927), 19. File 4.2, Box 138, DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva.

After an entrance exhibit illustrating the costs and horrors of World War I through photographs, artwork, and graphic statistical charts, the organizers dedicated a room solely to the League of Nations. The League's Information Section provided extensive materials highlighting its international organization as well as past, present, and future diplomatic work. DFG organizers hoped the League's prominent place in the exhibit would be thought-provoking for visitors and simultaneously pressure League officials to develop the body into "a true instrument of peace," something which many Weimar pacifists, including the DPSt as noted above, advocated.²⁹⁸ The first room reflected Weimar pacifists' efforts to remind Germans of the horrific war between nations and the second advocated a transnational solution.

The peace exhibit prominently displayed and celebrated critical moments where pacifists reached across national borders and accepted so-called enemies without prejudice. One way participants in supranational networks demonstrated their international consciousness, according to the historian Leila Rupp, was to "reach out to those [who were] supposed to be ... enemies."²⁹⁹ WILPF members' efforts to bridge national animosity with personal acts of symbolic "sisterhood" are well-documented in Rupp's *Worlds of Women*.³⁰⁰ An entire exhibit room was devoted to WILPF and a poster captioned "Women from 'Enemy' Countries Meet in Zurich in May 1919" reinforces Rupp's point. (Figure 2) It displayed a collage of photographs taken at the 1919 WILPF

²⁹⁸ Ibid. See also Käthe Kupsch, "Die Friedensaustellung in Harburg," *Harburger Volksblatt* (January 21, 1928) File 4.5, Box 138, DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva.

²⁹⁹ Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, 118.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 117-121.

meeting and emphasized the lasting impact of conscious acts of transnational cooperation.³⁰¹



Figure 2: “Women from ‘Enemy’ Countries Meet in Zurich in May 1919.” Courtesy of League of Nations and Peace Movement Collection, Deutsches Friedenskartell, United Nations Library at Geneva.

At the time, women from across the globe had gathered in Zurich to protest the harsh peace treaty terms simultaneously under discussion in Versailles. Vellacott emphasizes the contrast between the female Hague delegates in 1919 brought together by “a shared and terrible experience of war” and the statesmen at Versailles. Instead of focusing on preventing war, these men “thought in terms of retribution, of gains, of enforcement, of maintaining the upper hand,” Vellacott argues. “[I]ndividually, each worked for the perceived advantage of his own country.”³⁰² These women met outside of

³⁰¹ Oversize Photo: “Frauen der ‘feindlichen’ Länder treffen sich in Zürich im Mai 1919,” DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva.

³⁰² Vellacott, “Putting a Network to Use,” 148-9.

party politics and the international realm of high diplomacy which represented the national and masculine interests of individual countries.

WILPF delegates to the 1919 meeting built upon foundations laid by the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace at The Hague and their feminist networks remained grounded in the same spirit of conscious transnational cooperative action throughout the Weimar period.³⁰³ The poster's designers captured this moment of purposeful female solidarity, presenting photographs of women from various countries, including prominent German personalities Augspurg, Heymann, and Hallgarten. The photos vividly display transnational interpersonal contact by including women of several nationalities as subjects. (Figure 3) The emphasis was the product of conference participants' efforts to demonstrate international female solidarity in 1919 as well as the pride of Hallgarten and exhibit organizers to illustrate this moment of true transnational cooperation. After all, Vellacott reiterates, "war requires an enemy, and it is hard to consider as enemies those you know well."³⁰⁴ The poster format was a conscious demonstration of transnationalism in both moments, one example of many throughout the exhibit.

³⁰³ Olga Knischewsky, "Der Internationale Frauenkongress in Zürich," *Die Frau im Staat* (May/June, 1919): 3. Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, 26-30. These women's networks were very much part of post-World War II women's organizations and instrumental to integrating women into the new United Nations agenda on human rights.

³⁰⁴ Vellacott, "Putting a Network to Use," 153.



Figure 3: Close up from “Women from ‘Enemy’ Countries Meet in Zurich in May 1919.” From left to right: Anita Augspurg (Germany), Charlotte Despard (Great Britain), Lida Gustava Heymann (Germany), Rosa Genoni (Italy), Leopoldine Kulka (Austria), Andrée Jouve (France). Courtesy of League of Nations and Peace Movement Collection, Deutsches Friedenskartell, United Nations Library at Geneva.

The focal point of the peace exhibit, a large sarcophagus, represented another symbol of purposeful transnational solidarity among the displays. In Munich, the casket “ruled” the stage of the exhibit hall where Quidde, a transnationally recognized figure, had laid a golden laurel wreath on it. A nearby sign displayed the words “To all those who died for their country 1914-1918.”³⁰⁵ This gesture demonstrated a tremendous effort towards international reconciliation and recognized suffering on both sides of the battlefield. The sarcophagus display revisited the earlier tentative effort to equate the experiences of all victims of aggression, which international feminists and pacifists had

³⁰⁵ Seger, “Die erste deutsche Friedensaustellung,” 19 and Ludwig Quidde, “Eine Pazifistische Ausstellung,” April 22, 1927. File 4.2, Box 138, DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva. The sign read “Allen, die für ihr Vaterland gestorben 1914-1918.”

grappled with in transnational discussions of the 1922 No-More-War demonstrations.³⁰⁶ By 1927, however, Quidde boldly used this symbol to invoke a sense of common experience and brotherhood with foreign soldiers and their families. The sarcophagus featured in several DFG announcements for the exhibit, with authors often stressing the transnational solidarity represented by the display. Quidde's efforts were meant to have visual shock value as well as educational merit, causing Germans to think about similarities between themselves and victims of war in every nation.

Despite DFK misgivings, the peace exhibit was successful, launching from its Munich base and traveling in 1927 and 1928 to the German cities of Würzburg, Erfurt, Harburg, and Dresden. The exhibit drew many school classes and visitors came "again and again" to view the displays.³⁰⁷ What started as a local pacifist's vision of bringing transnational awareness to Munich transformed into a national exhibit which itself attracted notice within and beyond German borders.³⁰⁸ This exhibit was indeed a site of transnational exchange in German political culture. It represents a rich moment of cooperation between pacifists, Social Democrats, and feminists as they worked together to bring transnational awareness to their own regions.

³⁰⁶ "Nie Wieder Krieg," *Die Frau im Staat* (July/August, 1922): 21. "The Demonstrations Abroad," *No More War* (September 1923).

³⁰⁷ Hallgarten, *Als Pazifistin*, 74.

³⁰⁸ Files 4 and 5, Box 138, DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva. Few international requests for the exhibit were filled due to financial constraints. In fact, the exhibit accrued a large debt. Hallgarten, *Als Pazifistin*, 75. The intense cooperation between feminists, pacifists, and Social Democrats in the Munich exhibit makes it of particular interest for this transnational study. Ernst Friedrich organized similar antiwar exhibits during the Weimar Republic and also accrued large debts. A donation from a Swedish pacifist made his creation of a permanent exhibit at the Antiwar Museum in Berlin possible. See Wilfried Knauer, "Ernst Friedrich" in *Die Friedensbewegung: Organisierter Pazifismus in Deutschland, Österreich und in der Schweiz*, ed. Helmut Donat and Karl Holl (Düsseldorf: ECON Taschenbuch Verlag, 1983), 152-4. See also Ernst Friedrich, *Krieg dem Kriege* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004).

Gerhart Seger, the General Secretary of the DFG and later SPD representative to the Reichstag, traveled from Berlin to help prepare the exhibit and generate publicity. Seger spoke on the destructive potential of future wars in the evening lecture series held in tandem with the Munich exhibition and personally guided the audience through the exhibit on opening night.³⁰⁹ Although publicity for the lecture series did not explicitly associate Seger with the SPD, his presence and participation suggest that party officials did not actively block him from publically supporting a pacifist agenda. In fact, Seger was not unique. Reports in the WILPF publication *Völkerversöhnende Frauenarbeit* from December 1928 claimed that Dresden WILPF members, many of whom were Social Democrats, brought the peace exhibition to their city. In the same report, the WILPF group in Darmstadt boasted of great support for their publicity campaigns from Social Democratic publicists.³¹⁰ Even though the SPD withdrew official support from peace organizations in the mid-1920s, individual party members like Seger participated in the feminine penumbra of Weimar politics in order to promote peace.

Despite wide-ranging cooperation and intersections between the pacifist milieu and Social Democracy, this tacit relationship was tested in 1928. After an intense election campaign that had promised “food for children” instead of funding for new *Panzerkreuzer* (battleships), Social Democratic cabinet members turned their backs on the campaign promise and their own party colleagues. The ministers supported the ship

³⁰⁹ Hallgarten, *Als Pazifistin*, 73-4. “Ausstellung Friedenbewegung und Friedensarbeit in Allen Ländern Abendvorträge,” April 22- May 8, 1927, File 4.2, Box 138, DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva. See also “Friedensaustellung in München” in *Die Frau im Staat*. See Chapter 2 for Seger’s experiences under the Nazi Regime.

³¹⁰ Internationalen Frauenliga für Frieden und Freiheit Deutscher Zweig, *Völkerversöhnende Frauenarbeit, Januar 1926-Dezember 1928* (Munich, c.1928): 15. Folder 13-14, Box 41, Associations Pacifistes Federalisme (DB), League of Nations Brochure and Pamphlet Collection, UN Library at Geneva.

construction project, believing they had made a logical compromise by allowing the battleships to be built and preserving political harmony in a fragile coalition government.³¹¹ SPD historian Donna Harsch observes, however, that the “decision unleashed a storm of protest in the SPD more intense than any since the [1918/1919] revolution.”³¹²

A key part of Social Democrats’ disappointment in their ministers derived from the recent 1928 election campaign against rearmament. SPD candidates from all levels jumped on the controversial issue, fueling the fire with slogans critiquing battleship supporters’ efforts to prioritize funds for weapons over the basic needs of its population. The campaign was in large part successful, gaining the SPD more than twenty new Reichstag seats. There was a strong pacifist presence in the party by 1928, in part thanks to the merger with the USPD, and peace historian Karl Holl notes that the majority of organized pacifists rejected the proposed battleships.³¹³ Harsch evaluates the general appeal of the slogan, stating that it added “spice” to SPD propaganda and tapped into the “antimilitarism [that] was a potent ingredient in the Social Democratic worldview.”³¹⁴ SPD leaders had brought pacifist and antimilitarist rhetoric, traditionally located in the political periphery, into the masculine party political core. Furthermore, campaign rhetoric drew attention to party antimilitarism and social welfare concerns during the

³¹¹ “Kampf um den Panzerkreuzer: Im Reichskabinett-Eine ungenügende Erklärung- Unruhe in der Partei,” *Rheinische Zeitung* (August 14, 1928). Article 41, Mappe 147, NL Carl Severing, AdsD.

³¹² Donna Harsch, *German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 46.

³¹³ Karl Holl, *Ludwig Quidde (1858-1941). Eine Biografie* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 2007), 412.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 40-1, 46. During the previous government, leading Social Democrat Otto Braun worked diligently to block the construction proposal and it lay stagnant in the political realm until after the election.

election, intensifying the contrast between campaign promises and the ministers' actions once in office.

Outcry from all ranks of the SPD and peace organizations flooded newspapers and dominated meeting minutes within days of the battleship vote. Pacifist convictions as well as a strong belief in party discipline and upholding electoral promises drove many party members and supporters to denounce the decision and demand greater accountability for the SPD ministers' actions. Social Democrats and pacifists who had collaborated successfully on Weimar educational and protest activities were outraged by this controversy. Fabian called for the SPD to leave the governing coalition and mobilize popular political opposition against the battleship construction akin to the No-More-War protests.³¹⁵ In a DFG press release outlining the group's objections, secretary Seger declared the decision not only represented "the beginning of rearmament" but was "a slap in the face of the voting masses." WILPF leader Augspurg concurred, prophesying the act as "the first nail in the coffin" of the new government.³¹⁶

The SPD ministers' decision was severely disillusioning from the perspective of many party sympathizers and members. Pacifist Social Democrat Heinrich Ströbel fumed that the incident revealed "all the [Social Democratic] disarmament and No-More-War talk" as "blue smoke and world peace as a soap bubble."³¹⁷ In addition, the grassroots education efforts meant to empower new voters were all for naught if elected

³¹⁵ Ibid., 47.

³¹⁶ Seger, "Gegen den Panzerkreuzer!" August 13, 1928. File 3, Box 129, DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva. Anita Augspurg, "Der Panzerkreuzer," *Die Frau im Staat* (September 1928): 2. Hereafter cited as Augspurg, "Der Panzerkreuzer."

³¹⁷ Lothar Wieland, "*Wieder wie 1914!*" *Heinrich Ströbel (1869-1944). Biografie eines vergessenen Sozialdemokraten*, (Bremen: Donat Verlag, 2009), 242.

leaders ignored those newfound voices. True to Fabian's call for popular protest, pacifist groups organized public events in the weeks after the crisis began. The German League for Human Rights and WILPF, both DFK organizations, were among the groups to schedule public protests.³¹⁸ These dissident voices, fostered by the sustained promotion of transnational awareness and opposition to SPD support of militarism culminated in demands for a people's referendum to take matters into their own hands.

Intense reactions to the battleship scandal were not limited to the political penumbra. Party members across the ranks were equally outraged by the actions of their ministers. The 1929 Magdeburg party meeting was fraught with arguments that party discipline had broken down and the ministers were out of line. Cabinet member Hermann Müller claimed he never personally uttered the much-criticized campaign promise. Other speakers passed the blame around from the ministers to party opposition, and even to the voters who did not muster enough support to create a cabinet with a Social Democratic majority.³¹⁹ Despite these disagreements, representatives at the meeting produced the "Guidelines for Military Policies" (*Richtlinien zur Wehrpolitik*). The guidelines emphasized the SPD's position against war as an instrument of diplomacy and sought the democratization of the League of Nations. Social Democrats envisioned the diplomatic organization as a league of peoples rather than a league of states so that it could become an "effective instrument of peace." Defensively, the guidelines reaffirmed SPD foundations in transnational ideas of international Socialism stating, "Socialism is

³¹⁸ "Panzerkreuzer, Volkswille und Reichsregierung," August 24, 1928, Item 153, Folder 12, Poster Collection, DFK, LNPMC, UN Library at Geneva. Augspurg, "Der Panzerkreuzer," 1-2.

³¹⁹ *Protokoll Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag Magdeburg 1929 vom 26. Bis 31. Mai in der Stadthalle.* (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Dietz, 1974), 79-81.

the power that will bring the world lasting peace,” echoing Wilhelm Liebknecht words to Suttner over thirty years earlier.³²⁰

Many historians cite the battleship scandal as a massive breakdown in SPD party organization and, especially for Harsch, one moment that could be considered the beginning of the end for Social Democrats in the Weimar Republic. The scandal represents much more than inner-party strife and the breakdown of party and pacifist cooperation, however. The outcry against the ministers’ decision from all corners of the German Left is particularly telling. As Potthoff notes, SPD leaders began to look inward to the masculine political for solutions to broader problems of Weimar democracy after 1925. They failed to consider that pacifism and transnational awareness had become a commonplace among many participants in core and penumbra political culture as well as national and transnational networks.

The issue even attracted attention outside German borders. Dutch Social Democrat and war resister Dr. Johan Willem Albarda wrote to Müller about the reaction to the scandal in the Netherlands: “[w]hen we held a number of demonstrations for disarmament on September 16 the streets were covered with huge signs with *Panzerkreuzer!*”³²¹ The scandal, therefore, can be seen as a litmus test for subtle changes in political consciousness on the German non -Communist Left. It reveals expanding transnational awareness in the national arena and the issue of peace as a site of tension

³²⁰ Ibid., 289. For more on the League debate see Sheridan, “The German Social Democratic Party and the League of Nations,” 149.

³²¹ Dr. J. W. Albarda to H. Müller, September 27, 1928, Document 2, Signatur 1/HMAG00034, IV, NL Müller, AdsD.

between SPD leaders and individual activists. Furthermore, the scandal illustrates the impact of national events beyond delineated borders.

Interaction between pacifists and Social Democrats reveals sustained efforts to bring transnational awareness and ideas into the German political arena as well as the formative effects of gendered characterizations of both core and penumbra political spaces.³²² The lines between the core and the periphery, as well as leadership and grassroots, were blurred and subject to reinterpretation during the Weimar period and beyond. Structurally, the relationship between Social Democrats and pacifists provides a unique lens for different levels of transnational interaction in the space between formal Weimar party politics and periphery political culture. Groups like the DPSt demonstrate that transnational analysis does not have to be limited to direct mutual communication across borders. Transnational awareness cultivated through educational initiatives like the *Leseabende* should not be discounted because these activities do not conform to expectations of direct, reciprocal contact as an integral part of transnational interaction. Activities that flourished in the space between party and periphery political groups highlight the contribution of each type of transnational interaction to developing transnational awareness in Weimar political culture. Nonetheless, pre-existing networks fostered by WILPF and prominent German pacifists like Quidde remained the most effective foundations for direct transnational contact during this timeframe.

The combination of all three types of interaction ultimately shaped Weimar politics on the Left leading to increasingly transnational grassroots space within national political culture and culminating in conflicts between the SPD leadership and pacifists.

³²² As outlined in the Chapter 1, this analysis is based on a broad view of political culture that encompasses party politics as well as extra-parliamentary activities, expanding the foundations of previous studies of Weimar politics that are limited to party politics.

Party leaders confronted crises of national political stability in the late Weimar Republic, discounting increasing transnational awareness among their constituents despite the involvement of many Social Democrats in penumbra peace activities. The disconnection between party leaders and the rank and file led to internal conflicts in an already fragile political environment. Despite increasing limits on political activism, the development of this new political space between core and periphery helped lay the groundwork for future transnational interaction in German politics.

Equally similar to the party truce over war credits, political tensions in 1928 triggered a limited, and in the eyes of pacifists, empty response from SPD leaders who turned inward for the sake of party political power and stability rather than recognizing increasingly effective grassroots efforts to shape Weimar political culture. Frustrated pacifists like Ossietzky saw the peace movement's lack of political influence as a consequence of Suttner's feminine legacy. Radical WILPF leaders like Heymann pushed these feminine stereotypes further advocating their feminist pacifism and positioning their pacifist attacks on the masculine political realm. As Chapter 2 illustrates, these transnational and gendered networks would not fade away during the Nazi dictatorship. Individual activists maintained contact with networks formed during the Weimar Republic and worked quickly after 1945 to reestablish them in the postwar arena.

Despite the feminine characterization of pacifists and their movements, initiatives like the No-More-War protests, WILPF vacation courses, DPSt reading sessions, and the 1927 peace exhibition promoted transnational networks and cooperation in an environment infamous for supporting rising nationalism and militarism. These activities reveal a visible layer of pacifist activity in the Weimar Republic obscured by scholarly

attention to the rise of National Socialism and the collapse of the Republic. Despite increasing limits on political activism, the development of new political spaces fostered by individual cooperation on the Left during the Weimar Republic helped lay the groundwork for transnational interaction and challenges to gendered peace politics in the postwar German political arena.

Chapter 4:
“Crusade of Conscience:”³²³
Peace and Political Power on the Postwar Left, 1946-1960

As she listened to Herbert Wehner’s now famous Bundestag speech on June 30, 1960 Social Democrat and pacifist Alma Kettig grimly remarked to her colleague, “this heralds a totally new politics.”³²⁴ Wehner affirmed SPD support of NATO, defying the image of a party which many pacifists believed to be their oldest and most practical ally in German party politics. Essentially Kettig’s observation was correct, the SPD embarked on a new programmatic path grounded in its revised 1959 party program and capped by Wehner’s pivotal 1960 speech. Starting the same year, the SPD issued warnings against member participation in the pacifist Easter March movement. Party historians focus on the 1959 and 1960 as a period when SPD leaders necessarily dispensed with the ideological “ballast” traditionally associated with German Social Democracy, such as greeting fellow members with “comrade.” Social Democrats believed this shift would allow the SPD to become a people’s party (*Volkspartei*) and earn it a coveted place in a governing coalition.³²⁵

³²³ Arbeitsausschuß “Kampf dem Atomtod,” “Das Nein zum Nuklearen Selbstmord: Der Kreuzzug des Gewissens” (Bonn, n.d).

³²⁴ Erasmus Schöfer, “Alma Kettig” in *Die Kinder des roten Großvaters erzählen* (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1976), 234. Hereafter cited as Schöfer, “Alma Kettig.” Stefan Appellus and Alma Kettig, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden: Biographie einer Bundestagsabgeordneten* (Oldenburg: BIS, Bibliotheks- und Informationssystem der Universität Oldenburg, 1990), 132. Hereafter cited as Appellus, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden*.

³²⁵ Heinrich Potthoff and Susanne Miller, *Kleine Geschichte der SPD* (Bonn: Dietz, 2002), 208. Hereafter cited as Potthoff and Miller, *Kleine Geschichte*. Carlo Schmid is credited with this “ballast”

These institutional reforms obscure important shifts in gendered understandings of peace and the continued promotion of the SPD as a “peace party” during this timeframe. Wehner’s speech and the Godesberg Program did not initiate a clean break with pacifist politics for the SPD. Careful examination of SPD peace politics and forays into the extra-parliamentary realm between 1946 and 1966 reveals an institution balanced between the political core and the penumbra. Moments of intense interaction in the relationship between the SPD and antinuclear movements like the Paulskirche movement, KdA, and Easter Marches reveal blurring lines between “masculine” party politics and “feminine” penumbra peace activities.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Social Democrats revived the cry for “No More War!”³²⁶ They attempted to use familiar strategies in an unfamiliar political landscape. By the 1950s, the SPD began to forge connections between the realm of “masculine” party politics and “feminine” periphery, drawing on transnational examples for inspiration. After 1960, pacifist Social Democrats found themselves in a party determined to achieve governing power. Although the SPD made repeated compromises over issues of rearmament and peace, many activists held their ground hoping for continued informal cooperation between party and penumbra groups that would support pacifist goals in German political culture. By 1966 however, the party was firmly entrenched in the political core, determined to measure political success with votes.

Nevertheless, Social Democrats and cooperative activists had sustained growing extra-

phrase which meant toning down party symbols like the red flag, directing election strategies to a broader audience than the working class, and dropping informal greetings like “comrade” and “Du” among party members.

³²⁶ See “Nie Wieder Krieg! –Nie Wieder KZ!” (1946), Signatur 6/PLKA000185; “Nie Wieder Krieg!” (1946), Signatur 6/PLKA000255; “Wählt SPD. Nie wieder Krieg! Nie Wieder Diktatur!” (1946), Signatur 6/PLKA000301; Plakatsammlung, AdsD for examples of these slogans.

parliamentary space for peace politics in the 1950s that would support the later development of German APOs.

In 1955, political leaders like Erich Ollenhauer and Gustav Heinemann (then GVP) collaborated with extra-parliamentary activists, journalists, clergymen, and academics to protest political decisions they deemed destructive to German reunification. Their visible support of the nonpartisan Paulskirche antinuclear movement blurred the lines between party efforts and peripheral politics. The SPD sought to capitalize on growing support for antinuclear protest, organizing the KdA Committee in 1958. With this new effort, the SPD straddled party politics and extra-parliamentary activism, ultimately positioning itself between core and penumbra in the political arena and blurring gendered notions of peace. Social Democratic leaders answered the question of whether the SPD was a peace party or governing party in 1960 with the prohibition of member participation in the extra-parliamentary Easter Marches. Yet again, they did not shun all peace activities; they continued to support KdA on paper until 1968, as long as the organization remained grounded in party discipline and was perceived as an appropriate alternative outlet for member peace activism.

The reasons for stalled cooperation between peace movement and peace party by 1966 lie in both national and transnational postwar contexts as well as party leaders' implicit gendering of peace. On a transnational level, Germans were literally caught in the middle: threatened by the potential of a nuclear or traditional conflict between the dueling "superpowers." The Socialist International (SI), the SPD's traditional link to a transnational network of like-minded Socialist parties, reevaluated its traditional position against capitalism and focused on the threats of Communism and the urgent need for

international collective security. Inside Germany, the SPD grappled with politically debilitating suspicions of Communist activity in their own ranks and the desperate defense of their Social Democratic party identity and belief in reunification. In this unsteady climate, SPD leaders considered peace movements and potential peace parties as particularly weak and vulnerable to Communist infiltration by the SPD. This party perspective was augmented by decades of politicians and pacifists labeling ethical pacifism as feminine.

The SI, reestablished in 1951, was subject to some of the same pressures in the transnational arena as the SPD faced within German borders. Strained by the Cold War dichotomy of capitalist *versus* communist, the 1951 SI Program preamble situates the International as a “protest movement against the evils stemming from the capitalist social system.” Capitalism as the primary adversary faded into the background after 1945 as the SI attacked “international Communism as the instrument of a new imperialism.”³²⁷ The SI couched its calls for world peace as the most pressing task of its time in the recognition of a collective security system as the first step to disarmament.³²⁸ This was the price of a nuclear age. The transnational institution recognized the power of “masculine” politics associated with nation-states. This fundamental compromise in the International Socialist position provided the SPD with the transnational, and therefore higher, authority to pursue reunification as a primary goal in national politics. In the years leading up to the 1959 program, party leaders justified party support of peace and

³²⁷ Dieter Dowe, *Programmatische Dokumente der deutschen Sozialdemokratie* (Bonn: Dietz, 1973), 286-7.

³²⁸ Christoph Butterwegge and Heinz-Gerd Hofschien, *Sozialdemokratie, Krieg, und Frieden* (Heilbronn: Distel Verlag, 1984), 265. Hereafter cited as Butterwegge and Hofschien, *Sozialdemokratie, Krieg, und Frieden*. The affinity between peace and SPD in the Weimar era was grounded in the concept of international Socialism as explained in Chapter 3.

antinuclear activism as a means to reunification. After the shift from labor party to peoples' party, however, reunification took center stage and the pursuit of "peace" took on different meanings in SPD rhetoric.

On a national level, divided Germany called for drastically different political strategies than Weimar and Nazi Germany. In the two former political landscapes, the nation itself was a relatively defined concept and threats to democracy manifested themselves visibly in the street and through the printed word. After 1945, SPD leaders feared both physical destruction and subtle infiltration by Communist forces. They sought in vain to redefine a German nation which for them included the Soviet-occupied zone and required careful consideration of the disputed territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line.³²⁹ Many Social Democratic politicians considered periphery organizations like antinuclear movements, perceived as "feminine," to be particularly vulnerable to covert attack. Nevertheless, as Chapter 1 demonstrates Social Democrats enjoyed a long tradition of cooperation with pacifist endeavors, especially at the grassroots level, and this interdependence is critical to understanding the development of the German Left between 1946 and 1966.

Historical analysis of the ways in which party leaders negotiated changing political space between 1946 and 1960, including transnational and changing gendered spaces, will shed light on the SPD's transition from opposition party to governing party in the 1966 Grand Coalition. In 1919, the SPD held high expectations for voter returns on its previous service record. Weimar SPD leaders hoped to receive many female votes

³²⁹ See Pertti Ahonen, *After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945-1990* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Chapter 3 for an excellent discussion of expellee politics and the SPD.

after women were granted suffrage, a cause consistently supported by the party and implemented by an SPD government. SPD leaders who had fought to maintain the party's institutional integrity during the Nazi Regime held similar expectations after World War II.

Posters and publicity from the zone elections in 1946 resurrected the familiar pre-war slogan "No-More-War!" Indeed, the SPD leaders of all ranks were eager to show the peace party's resilience through the trauma of World War II. Many hoped that the SPD's reputation as a peace party was potentially the best way to appeal to voters, especially female voters, disillusioned by war and hardship. Similarly to 1919, the SPD groups across Germany appealed directly to women and mothers and against war. They paired the Weimar-era slogan with visual and textual references to the recent defeat of National Socialism and impending reconstruction efforts. A 1946 Kassel poster emphasized, "SPD Women! You want: No More War, happy children, and equal pay for equal work! You must: Think independently about politics! Vote Social Democrat!"³³⁰ This plea to women, headed by the familiar No-More-War call, recurred across regional election zones. Such posters reflect politicians' suspicions that the failure of republican parties like the SPD to garner significant numbers of female votes during the Weimar Republic had contributed to popular support for the Nazi Party. A poster from Ulm reinforces this point. It read, "SPD-the Construction Party. Women and Mothers! No More Militarism and War!"³³¹ The writers inscribed women with the innate responsibility to preserve

³³⁰ "SPD Frauen! Ihr wollt: Nie Wieder Krieg, glückliche Kinder, gleichen Lohn für gleiche Leistung! Ihr müßt: Selbständig politisch denken! Wählt Sozialdemokraten!" Signature: 6/PLKA000117, Plakatsammlung, AdsD.

³³¹ "SPD-die Partei des Aufbaus." Signature: 6/PLKA001494, Plakatsammlung, AdsD.

peace and the SPD as the party best-suited to this task. In 1958 these calls for women and mothers would be renewed as a key component in the SPD-supported KdA campaign.

The SPD was disappointed by a lack of voter support in the first zone elections in 1947 however. By 1949 party leaders had decided for a position of “constructive” opposition. The only party to publically oppose Hitler’s 1933 Enabling Acts in the Reichstag would now sit in opposition to CDU-led governments until 1966.³³² While Kurt Schumacher’s fiery stage-presence and charismatic personality reinvigorated the war-weary Social Democratic party, his criticism of the Catholic Church and Allied powers alienated many average Germans and potential coalition partners.³³³ Schumacher also agreed with aspects of rearmament in Germany, a position opposed by many of his constituents.³³⁴ The SPD would spend the next two decades attempting to reconcile its proud heritage with a constituency eager for stability and fearful of Communism.

The reforms implemented in the Godesberg Program were not written overnight, nor did these programmatic changes permeate every aspect of Social Democratic policies. Party leaders were confronted with the need to revise the outdated 1925 Heidelberg Program already in 1946. Concerned about reforming the party in a country that was still

³³² Potthoff and Miller, *Kleine Geschichte der SPD*, 190.

³³³ Manfred Görtemaker, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999), 80. Hereafter cited as Görtemaker, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*.

³³⁴ Gisela Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft: Sozialdemokratinnen im Parlamentarischen Rat und im Deutschen Bundestag 1948/49-1957* (Bonn: Dietz, 2003), 38. Hereafter cited as Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*.

in the process of reconstruction, Schumacher did not want to rush the process.³³⁵

Keeping an unwavering eye on the goal of reunification, SPD leaders took the first formal steps towards a reformed program with the 1952 *Dortmunder Aktionsprogramm* (Dortmund action program) and its 1954 revision, retaining International Socialist understandings of peace as a primary party goal. According to the 1954 party meeting minutes, the action program stated that “[t]rue to the unifying idea of Socialism the German Social Democratic Party advocates the political, economic, and cultural cooperation of peoples and states in order to secure a shared peace.”³³⁶ By the time the SPD published the new postwar program in 1959 only sixteen Social Democrats voted against it.³³⁷

The Godesberg Program was the product of many internal party compromises, including some dealing with pacifist concerns. Bremen delegate Arnold Müller, for example, pointed out a contradiction in SPD support of national defense (*Landesverteidigung*) and its rejection of nuclear arms during 1959 discussions of the new program. An SPD in favor of national defense endorsed the Bundeswehr, or German army, Müller argued. If the SPD was in favor of a modern Bundeswehr then “[t]hat means we [Social Democrats] are, whether we want to be or not, indirectly in favor of

³³⁵ Willy Albrecht, *Die SPD unter Kurt Schumacher und Erich Ollenhauer 1946 bis 1963. Sitzungsprotokoll der Spitzengremium Vol. 1 1946-1948*. (Bonn: Dietz, 2000), XLVIII. Hereafter cited as Albrecht, *SPD unter Schumacher und Ollenhauer*.

³³⁶ Vorstand der SPD, Bonn, *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 20. bis 24. Juli 1954 in Berlin* (Berlin-Grunewald: Graphische Gesellschaft Grunewald, 1954), 346. Hereafter cited as 1954 *Parteitag*.

³³⁷ Vorstand der SPD, Bonn, ed., *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Außerordentlichen Parteitages der SPD vom 13. -15. November 1959 in Bad Godesberg* (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1972), 325. Hereafter cited as 1959 *Parteitag*.

nuclear weapons in Germany” the delegate asserted.³³⁸ The phrasing of the Godesberg Program reflected this tension with a provisional compromise that approved national defense, but not nuclear weapons, and acknowledged every citizen’s right to conscientious objection. Despite these compromises, the program itself did not distance all Social Democratic pacifists from the party. The independent magazine *Das Gewissen* (The Conscience) even tagged its 1959 article on the Godesberg Program with the headline “SPD Against Atomic Weapons.”³³⁹ Many pacifists remained involved in party politics and continued to pursue cooperative agendas for peace.

Throughout the turbulent opposition period between 1949 and 1966, individual Social Democrats served as mediators between the gendered spheres of Left penumbra and party politics. The Frankfurt Paulskirche movement, KdA, and Easter Marches serve as excellent lenses into this interaction. Activists drew on both national and transnational precedents to mobilize support against West German rearmament and facilitated a reorganization of West German political culture which profoundly shaped German politics into the twenty-first century. In 1955, Social Democrats worked with Heinemann to protest the ratification of the Paris Treaties in the Bundestag. The treaties, which ended official Allied occupation of Germany and conferred sovereignty on the Federal Republic, had been under discussion for several years. Most importantly for pacifists and antinuclear campaigners, the treaty signified the acceptance of German membership in

³³⁸ 1959 *Parteitag*, 137-9, 15-16. Interestingly, the conscientious objection section separates traditional military service from service with “weapons of mass destruction” even though program authors rejected atomic weapons earlier in the draft. They also called for common and controlled international disarmament. Müller’s concerns echoed 1951 protests against West German rearmament spearheaded by pacifist Klara Marie Fassbinder and the WFFB. See Gisela Notz, “Klara Marie Fassbinder (1890-1974) and Women’s Peace Activities in the 1950s and 1960s” *Journal of Women’s History* 13, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 103. Hereafter cited as Notz, “Fassbinder.”

³³⁹ “SPD gegen Atomwaffen” *Das Gewissen* 4, no. 12 (December 1959), 86.

NATO and the potential to be armed with nuclear weapons. When the Bundestag was ready to vote on the Paris Treaties in early 1955, many Social Democrats feared the establishment of West Germany as a sovereign state would hamper any further attempts at reunification. Together with antinuclear supporters, SPD leaders including party chairman Erich Ollenhauer mobilized what became known as the Paulskirche movement.

Postwar antinuclear pacifism, grounded in global efforts opposing the development and use of nuclear arms, joined the ranks of the various categories of peace activists outlined by Roger Chickering in *A World Without War*. A reaction to the detonation of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki Japan in 1945, peace historian Lawrence Wittner describes the early phases of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement as a moment when “thousands of people rallied behind a loose, popular crusade to save humanity from nuclear destruction.”³⁴⁰ Wittner argues that pacifists who survived the trauma of World War II formed the core of this “new” movement, objecting to nuclear arsenals as the new status quo of an armed peace. Antinuclear pacifism drew on the legacy of Bertha von Suttner’s ethical pacifism, supporting disarmament and embracing the lofty utopian goal of preserving all of humanity from the threat of nuclear war. In the tense years following the war, pacifists and politicians alike grounded their actions in an understanding of peace that opposed all war and the new range of destructive weapons available to the nations who might wage them. Many also based their convictions in the traumatic experiences of atomic bomb

³⁴⁰ Lawrence S. Wittner, *One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953, Volume 1* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 39. Hereafter cited as Wittner, *One World*.

victims, visually portrayed by widely distributed photos.³⁴¹ This antinuclear understanding of pacifism was an ideological descendent of the ethical pacifism labeled as emotional and feminine by critics.

Grounded in this basic pacifist ideology and SPD efforts towards a reunited Germany, the January 29, 1955 Paulskirche rally blurred the lines between party politics and extra-parliamentary political space in postwar West Germany. Its conception as a nonpartisan movement highlighted SPD intrusion into the extra-parliamentary sphere to collaborate with pacifists in a visible way. SPD leaders appropriated periphery antinuclear supporters to influence the masculine party realm dominated by the CDU. As an opposition party, the SPD occupied a secondary, and therefore peripheral, position within the sphere of party politics itself.³⁴² Starting from this weaker position within party politics, SPD leaders reached outside the political core to increase support among like-minded activists located in the penumbra.

Pacifists, politicians, and unionists spoke out together against rearmament and in favor of reunification, all the while emphasizing their participation as independent of any personal affiliations.³⁴³ Peace historian Eckart Dietzfelbinger cites the Paulskirche

³⁴¹ Wittner, *One World*, 48-9. See Wittner's discussion of the *hibakusha*, atomic bomb-affected persons. An early antinuclear activist himself, it is interesting that Wittner dedicates his work on the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement to the *hibakusha*. See the discussion of the documentary *March to Aldermaston* beginning on page 173 of this chapter.

³⁴² See Pierre Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production* ed. Randal Johnson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 41-47 for his discussion of power relationships within fields of cultural production that informs my understanding of power relationships between governing and opposition parties in postwar German party politics. Bourdieu also emphasizes that in his model the boundaries between fields are not static, similar to the permeability between core and penumbra politics described in detail in Chapter 1.

³⁴³ Görtemaker, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 328. "Rettet Einheit, Freiheit, Frieden! Gegen Kommunismus und Nationalismus!" Paulskirche Demonstration on January 29, 1955. (Frankfurt a.M.: Union Druckerei, 1955) Hereafter cited as "Rettet Einheit, Freiheit, Frieden! Gegen Kommunismus und Nationalismus!" (Pamphlet).

movement as the first time that the SPD, GVP, and penumbra organizations worked together in a nonpartisan protest movement.³⁴⁴ Attended by 1000 participants, the rally enjoyed great support from Social Democrats. Many signees of the resulting “*Deutsches Manifest*” ranged from rank-and-file members to prominent Social Democrats like Wehner, Max Brauer, and Fritz Heine.³⁴⁵ Their participation, and that of party leader Ollenhauer, reinforced the party’s emphasis on peaceful German reunification at Paulskirche. (Figure 4)

Sociologist Alfred Weber opened the rally declaring “[w]e are gathered here in the Paulskirche, where it is well-known that the first much-criticized [*vielverlaesterte*] German Parliament met to take Germany’s political unification to task.”³⁴⁶ With this bold sentence, Weber drew a clear parallel between the ill-fated 1848 parliament, which the speaker claimed laid the foundations for German unification in 1871, and the Paulskirche rally. Weber imagined a reunified Germany in which citizens would look back on Paulskirche as a similarly meaningful foundation for unification. Journalist Georg Reuter took the podium directly after Weber, drawing yet another connection

³⁴⁴ Eckart Dietzfelbinger cites Gustav Heinemann as a driving force behind this movement in Dietzfelbinger, *Die Westdeutsche Friedensbewegung 1948 Bis 1955: Die Protestaktionen Gegen Die Remilitarisierung Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1984), 186. Hereafter cited as Dietzfelbinger, *Westdeutsche Friedensbewegung*.

³⁴⁵ See “Rettet Einheit, Freiheit, Frieden! Gegen Kommunismus und Nationalismus!” (Pamphlet). The Paulskirche crowd was not the only audience for this new political cooperation; the speeches were broadcast on the radio and printed in pamphlets containing the full text as well as copies of the “*Deutsches Manifest*.” Hans Karl Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer der Kampf Gegen die Atombewaffnung in den Fünfziger Jahren: Eine Studie zur Innenpolitischen Entwicklung der BRD* (Cologne Pahl-Rugenstein, 1984), 50. Hereafter cited as Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*.

³⁴⁶ “Rettet Einheit, Freiheit, Frieden! Gegen Kommunismus und Nationalismus!” (Pamphlet), 2.

between the gathering of “free and independent public figures” and the “memorable location” of the rally.³⁴⁷



Figure 4: "Rettet Einheit, Freiheit, Frieden!" Courtesy of the Archiv der sozialen demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Erich Ollenauer’s picture is featured prominently on the left side of this flyer and the caption highlights his position as Chairman of the SPD. The photo on the top right visually links the event to the familiar image of the Paulskirche building itself.

The physical space of the Paulskirche reflected the organizers’ efforts at egalitarian representation within the movement. Paulskirche was the first building reconstructed after World War II in devastated Frankfurt am Main. The brochure accompanying the permanent Paulskirche exhibition, “The Paulskirche: Symbol of Democratic Freedom and National Unity,” recognizes Social Democratic mayor and *Deutsches Manifest* signee Walter Kolb as the driving force behind reconstruction efforts

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 4.

which culminated on the hundredth anniversary of the first German parliament held in 1848. Kolb hailed the church as a “House for all Germans” (*Haus aller Deutschen*).³⁴⁸ The church sanctuary is round and speakers standing at the front podium stood practically in the midst of their close to 1000-strong audience. The resulting division between speaker and spectator was minimal and promoted a deeper sense of community. The church building’s association since 1948 “in and outside of Germany ...as a ‘symbol of the past democratic will of the German people” combined with this spatial intimacy, providing politicians in the Paulskirche movement with the symbolic tools to transcend party political boundaries.³⁴⁹ Later SPD experiments in the extra-parliamentary realm lacked this type of intimacy and sense of equality. The many settings for the 1958 KdA rallies, for example, reinforced the dichotomies between speaker and audience and, by extension, between the party and protesters.

The program order demonstrates a symbolic flow as well, linking democratic tradition to nonpartisan cooperation and finally the party political sphere. The first two speakers steeped the protest in German national democratic tradition. Weber and Reuter discussed the significance of the Paulskirche itself and were followed by speeches from the rally’s three theologians: Helmut Gollwitzer and Ernst Lange, both Lutheran, and Johannes Hessen, a Catholic. The theologians asserted that the Paulskirche rally spanned political and religious boundaries. DFG member Helmut Gollwitzer emphasized the organizers’ intention to appeal to a broad audience. Similar to later KdA and Easter

³⁴⁸ Evelyn Hils-Brockhoff and Sabine Hock, *Die Paulskirche: Symbol Demokratischer Freiheit und nationaler Einheit* (Frankfurt a.M.: Institut für Stadtgeschichte, 2004), 71. Hereafter cited as Hils-Brockhoff and Hock, *Die Paulskirche*.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 78.

March initiatives, Paulskirche participants claimed that they were not speaking as party members or for any affiliated groups. Gollwitzer noted that neither “votes for the SPD” nor union or religious interests mattered in the moment of the Paulskirche demonstration or for the manifesto it produced. They focused on demands for peace and reunification as uniting factors between the participants, rather than politics. Hessen focused his remarks on the concept of Christian pacifism and a universal responsibility to prevent war. As the final theologian to speak and twenty-years younger than his Lutheran colleague Gollwitzer, Lange brought the discussion back to the theme of nonpartisanship among Paulskirche supporters. Lange emphasized the inability of a younger generation on “either side of the Iron Curtain” to be heard in politics. In his conclusion he pleaded “I don’t know how many we are, but we are many (*Zahlreich*). We come from all walks of life and we ask the leaders of our country: ‘Listen to us! Listen to us before it is too late, we have no time to lose.’”³⁵⁰

Two politicians rounded out the program. Heinemann, himself the embodiment of faith combined with politics, spoke of government responsibility. Heinemann’s speech smoothly transitioned from echoes of the scholars’ calls for reunification and the theologians’ emphasis on universality to political responsibility. He reminded the audience that opposition to the government was not merely the task of the SPD and labor unions. “The citizen who remains inactive, must endure what has been dictated for him,” the politician cautioned.³⁵¹

³⁵⁰ “Rettet Einheit, Freiheit, Frieden! Gegen Kommunismus und Nationalismus!” (Pamphlet), 8-10.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 10.

Neatly bringing the rally full circle from the scholars' emphasis on a German democratic legacy, the theologians' calls for cooperation and Heinemann's linkages between citizenship and political responsibility, SPD chairman Ollenhauer connected the issues of reunification and peace to the "masculine" party political realm. Ollenhauer dubbed the Paulskirche rally "a special kind of demonstration" which brought together participants from all backgrounds over the issue of reunification. His speech, "Unification is only Conceivable through Peace," succinctly outlined strategies emphasizing peace as a means to the ultimate goal of a reunited Germany, locating peace in a dual political role: as a means for reunification and the desired result of that process. He highlighted peace as a precondition for reunification and promised future stability as the end result of a successful reunification strategy. Indeed, Ollenhauer argued, unification was "the central problem of [securing] a peaceful future for our people."³⁵² At the time, the SPD chairman did not directly affiliate himself with his party through his speech. Instead Ollenhauer consistently placed himself among the community of Paulskirche protesters with phrases like "We are witnesses and participants," and "We want the reestablishment of German unity in freedom." In effect, Ollenhauer and his fellow speakers attempted to create a new solidarity in German politics which transcended party, confessional, and generational boundaries.

The Frankfurt rally and subsequent "Paulskirche" demonstrations and petition-signing events were well-attended, but the movement fell short in its primary objective to sway German public opinion and have the Bundestag reject the treaties as damaging to

³⁵² Ibid., 12.

the prospect of reunification.³⁵³ Nonetheless Ollenhauer's emphasis on a positive relationship between peace and reunification as well as his prominent participation in the demonstration distorted the boundaries between core and penumbra politics.³⁵⁴ The ratification of the Paris Treaties in the Bundestag on February 27, 1955 brought the short-lived Paulskirche movement to an end, yet Social Democratic and pacifist criticism of West German rearmament, especially nuclear weapons, continued. Social Democrats experimented with antinuclear rhetoric in subsequent elections and eventually created their own antinuclear action committee, KdA.

Paulskirche set the stage for an additional shift in party political culture on the Left: the changing place of women in SPD party and extra-parliamentary strategy. Increased female presence in the political realm often signaled heightened gender tension however. One striking aspect of the 1955 rally was the absence of women from the line-up of speakers. As opposed to the later KdA movement and even the Easter Marches, this early extra-parliamentary effort was dominated by men. 206 people signed the Manifest, only seventeen (8%) of whom were women. Most of these seventeen women were Social Democrats and the statistics correspond with the growing, but limited, direct participation of women in West German politics during the 1950s.³⁵⁵ Perhaps SPD

³⁵³ Dietzfelbinger, *Westdeutsche Friedensbewegung*, 191, 193. There were seven more events after the main Paulskirche demonstration. According to Dietzfelbinger, the final one in Munich on February 15, 1955 was attended by around 20,000 people.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 187-9. Sociologist Prof. Dr. Alfred Weber spoke first followed by unionist Georg Reuter, Lutheran pastor Helmut Gollwitzer, Catholic clergyman Johannes Hessen, Lutheran pastor Ernst Lange, and then GVP representative (later SPD) Gustav Heinemann. The rally closed with Erich Ollenhauer, deftly bringing the extra-parliamentary event into a party political fold with the final two speakers.

³⁵⁵ "Rettet Einheit, Freiheit, Frieden! Gegen Kommunismus und Nationalismus!" (Pamphlet), 13-16. 8% of Paulskirche signees were female compared with 7% female MdB's in 1949 and a 1950s high of 9.6% for female Social Democratic representatives within their own party. Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 36, 50. Barbara Thiede also notes the general lack of female participation in politics during

leaders felt that an appeal to the masculine political core should be fronted by an all male cast. Women took on the antinuclear mantle in preparation for International Women's Day in 1957, spurring later involvement of female activists in extra-parliamentary peace initiatives. Historian Gisela Notz articulates a close relationship between Social Democratic International Women's Day preparations, antinuclear strategies, and the KdA campaign. These connections were fostered by the individual female organizers who facilitated links between party initiatives and the extra-parliamentary activity which culminated in the KdA movement.³⁵⁶

Social Democratic MdB Lucie (Kurlbaum-) Beyer co-organized a July 7, 1957 women's conference supported by the *Kampfbund gegen Atomschäden* (Combat Group against Nuclear Destruction), the first extra-parliamentary organization to fight the threat of nuclear weapons as its primary goal.³⁵⁷ Beyer and her colleagues drew on images of politically-engaged scientists like Nobel-Prize winner and outspoken pacifist Albert Schweizer to draw attention to the antinuclear cause and staged their rally at the Frankfurt Paulskirche. SPD candidate Karl Bechert served as the keynote speaker. Taking cues

the 1950s in her examination of the KdA movement. Thiede, "Anti-Nuclear Liberals and the Bomb: A Comparative History of Kampf dem Atomtod and the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 1957-1963" (PhD diss., University of Missouri-Columbia, 1992), 152-4. Hereafter cited as Thiede, "Anti-Nuclear Liberals."

³⁵⁶ Notz, *Mehr als Bunte Tupfen im Bönner Männerclub: Sozialdemokratinnen im Deutschen Bundestag 1957-1969* (Bonn: Dietz, 2007), 31. Hereafter cited as Notz, *Mehr als Bunte Tupfen*. Notz also notes that these International Women's Day rallies should not be considered part of the March 8 Women's Day activities which these Social Democrats and their contemporaries saw as primarily Communist at the time.

³⁵⁷ A contribution to the congress by prominent pacifist Klara Marie Fassbinder was excluded by organizers as too sympathetic to the "East." This is just one example of how Fassbinder and other pacifists who were not explicitly connected to the political core were often excluded from protest activities due to anti-Communist suspicions, even by other like-minded women like Social Democratic organizers Lucie (Kurlbaum-) Beyer and Hedi Knoll. Notz, "Fassbinder," 115.

from International Women's Day efforts to highlight the dangers of atomic weapons as a major concern for postwar women, Bechert, colleague Bodo Manstein, "as well as various women" staged a "nonpartisan and non-denominational conference" addressing the theme "What are tasks for women and mothers in the atomic age?"³⁵⁸ As a testament to the solidarity among "women and mothers" against atomic weapons, participants in the women's conference issued a statement outlining their position and calling especially for the West German government to support a nuclear-free zone in central Europe. Similar to this initiative, SPD antinuclear propaganda throughout the 1950s and 1960s often targeted women and mothers in particular.

Two days after Beyer's Frankfurt rally, Bechert accepted a nomination to the DFG board of trustees. Bechert's open involvement in the DFG and *Kampfbund Gegen Atomschäden* during election time indicates he foresaw few conflicts between his antinuclear position and SPD politics in 1957. The presence of several Social Democrats on the DFG board further attests to a common acceptance of peace and Social Democracy as compatible agendas among individual activists.³⁵⁹ Beyer and Bechert's participation in the Frankfurt demonstration was one of many tandem efforts of Social Democrats and pacifists during the 1957 election campaigns and later the KdA.

³⁵⁸ Poster "Gegen die Atomgefahr," July 7, 1957. Signature 613/84, NL Kloppenburg, EZAB. See Karl A. Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO: Geschichte der Ausserparlamentarische Opposition in der Bundesrepublik 1960-1970* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag, 1977), 56 and Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 70 for background on the Kampfbund Gegen Atomschäden, which Bechert co-founded in 1956. Otto hereafter cited as Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*. For more on the women's conference see Peter Brollik and Klaus Mannhardt, *Blaubuch 1958: Kampf dem Atomtod und Aufrufe* (Essen: Klartext, 1988). 213. Hereafter cited as Brollik and Mannhardt, *Blaubuch*.

³⁵⁹ DFG to Karl Bechert, June 18, 1957 and Bechert to the DFG, July 9, 1957. Mappe 203, NL Bechert, AdsD.

Bechert's authority as a scientist and politician was bolstered by the declaration of eighteen scientists from Göttingen three months earlier on April 12, 1957. Historian Hans Karl Rupp described the declaration as a "godsend" for the SPD even though it is clear that the party was not directly involved in its conception.³⁶⁰ The three initiators of the declaration, Otto Hahn, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, and Werner Heisenberg, originally corresponded with Minister of Defense Josef Strauß in their efforts to be heard in the political arena. Ultimately, the physicists resorted to a public denunciation of atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr and scientific clarification of the consequences of atomic weapons in Germany. "We do not feel we have the expertise to make concrete political recommendations for great power politics," the scientists qualified in their statement. Yet they felt obligated to act. Based on their scientific opinions, they argued, "We believe even today that a small country like the Bundesrepublik will be best protected and world peace best facilitated if [West Germany] explicitly and voluntarily renounces atomic weapons of all kinds." Weizsäcker and his colleagues trespassed into the political arena because they sought to avoid a "catastrophe similar to 1933" and felt this grave task to be the responsibility of "everyman," not just politicians.³⁶¹

SPD leaders reacted positively to this essentially pacifist, and most importantly "male," interjection of peace into the political realm. All eighteen signees of the Göttingen Declaration were men and the idea of a universal scientific authority is largely

³⁶⁰ Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 104.

³⁶¹ Elisabeth Kraus, *Von der Uranspaltung zur Göttinger Erklärung. Otto Hahn, Werner Heisenberg, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker und die Verantwortung des Wissenschaftlers* (Würzburg: Verlag Königshausen & Neumann, 2001), 202-203, 190.

grounded in a male-dominated academic realm.³⁶² After the Declaration, the SPD attempted to blend “masculine” and “feminine” peace strategies, drawing on the realm of scientific authority as well as extra-parliamentary support and maternalist language targeting women. This dual rhetorical strategy paralleled the efforts of a party ready to straddle the core and penumbra realms in upcoming campaigns.

Capitalizing on this momentum, SPD candidates and representatives called further attention to the issue of nuclear weapons throughout the course of the 1957 election campaign. Future KdA members and SPD candidates Bechert, Carlo Schmid, and Max Brauer participated in a large election rally in Hamburg in May 1957 according to *Vorwärts*. Despite heavy rain, an audience of “thousands” listened to Schmid and Brauer extol the virtues of nuclear disarmament and praise scientific critics of nuclear weapons like Schweizer and the recent declaration of the Göttingen Eighteen.³⁶³ Bechert, in his role as physicist and SPD candidate, emphasized the devastating effects of radiation in Hiroshima and the inevitability of that kind of destruction on German soil in the event of nuclear war. The scientist-politician also brought existing nuclear pollution issues to the forefront, closing his speech with a reminder of concrete atomic hazards with peaceful usage as well as the more hazy future risk of nuclear war. Here Bechert differed from the Göttingen Eighteen who spoke out against atomic weapons but vowed to continue research into the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The rally’s focus on scientific expertise,

³⁶² See Gabriele Metzler, *Internationale Wissenschaft und Nationale Kultur: Deutsche Physiker in Der Internationalen Community 1900-1960* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000) for a useful overview of scientific culture during this period.

³⁶³ “Großkundgebung der SPD in Hamburg-Altona,” *Vorwärts* (May 31, 1957). The SPD showed the Göttingen 18 great support and even published the text of the declaration in *Vorwärts* on April 19, 1957.

especially Bechert's, was a recurring theme for the SPD in the 1957 election and would be a key component in the KdA campaign.

The use of scientists as a voice of reason in politics was not limited to Bechert and the Göttingen Eighteen. An article in the December 19, 1957 SPD *Pressedienst* (press service) celebrated the resonance of the Göttingen message “three-quarters of a year” later.³⁶⁴ The unnamed author describes a struggle over proposed nuclear missile bases in the West German town of Miltenberg. Spurred to action by Social Democratic MdLs, Hessen Prime Minister Georg August Zinn vehemently spoke out against the base and against Bonn politicians. In addition, 84 professors and instructors at Heidelberg University sent a telegram to Chancellor Adenauer “reminding him” of the Göttingen Declaration. These educators drew on the powerful legacy and sense of scientific authority associated with the Declaration. In fact, the article concludes with the grim warning that it was in the interest of everyone “who did not want to see Germany reduced to a gigantic cemetery” to keep the message of the Göttingen Eighteen alive.³⁶⁵

Teachers in Tübingen headed this warning well, joining a rally organized by local SPD and SDS members two months later. Around one thousand demonstrators gathered in the Tübingen marketplace on February 15, 1958. Presented as a precursor to KdA in later accounts of the movement, the Tübingen groups staged a demonstration and parade with three main goals: to protest atomic weapons for the *Bundeswehr*, the stationing of missile bases in West Germany and the production of atomic weapons on German soil.³⁶⁶

³⁶⁴ “Unruhe in der Bevölkerung,” *SPD Pressedienst*, P/XII/290 (December 19, 1957): 7-8.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁶ “Das Nein zum Nuklearen Selbstmord,” 17-18. Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 126.

Preceding the official series of KdA demonstrations, this local movement encouraged SPD leaders to continue their efforts to unite party strategy with explicitly extra-parliamentary tactics. Four days later, following in the tradition of the Göttingen Eighteen, 125 faculty members from the university signed a declaration in support of the demonstration's goals. On February 22, SPD leaders helped establish the KdA committee. The activities in Heidelberg and Tübingen reinforced SPD interest in capitalizing on popular antinuclear sentiment, placing it at the forefront of party campaign strategies in 1957 and 1958.

Vocal opposition to nuclear weapons was not limited to the realm of science and academia. In 1957 SPD candidates responded enthusiastically to a survey sponsored by the German branch of War Resisters' International. Distributed before the 1957 election, the survey questioned whether candidates supported the abolition of mandatory military service and opposed nuclear arms for the German army. There are twenty-two completed surveys in the file: all from SPD candidates. A few notable names stand out. Walter Menzel, chair of the KdA committee, answered all the questions with "ja" and emphasized (by underlining the instructions) that his answers to the survey applied for both West and East Germany.³⁶⁷ Kettig also answered the questionnaire affirmatively. Otto Striebeck, a Social Democrat from Mülheim-Ruhr, stressed his own involvement in both the DFG and IdK before and after 1933 in his response. The ambitious candidate explained in an included letter that he did not want to answer the questionnaire with "a

³⁶⁷ "Fragenbogen," Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner Deutscher Zweig der War Resisters' International, Bundesvorstand. August 17, 1957. Blatt 2-23, RW 259, Nr. 334, Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft – Vereingte Kriegsdienstgegner (hereafter DFG-VK), Landesarchiv NRW, Düsseldorf. It is not clear whether only SPD candidates responded or if the IdK only kept those replies. Also interesting, Alma Kettig is the only female responder among the 22 surveys.

simple yes” and even inquired of his pacifist comrades if they would divulge the answers of his competition from the CDU.³⁶⁸ For Striebeck, pacifism played a dual role. Striebeck’s steadfast pacifist position was a matter of pride, reinforced by his past experiences and loyalty, as well as a tool against the majority CDU government. Ultimately, the questionnaire responses highlight a cross-section of support for pacifist convictions among Social Democratic participants in the party political realm, such as the rejection of expanding the German army and continued calls for peaceful reunification in 1957.

Social Democrats drew from transnational examples as well as their experiences with grassroots antinuclear organizations, of which *Kampfbund Gegen Atomschäden* and local DFG groups were among the many. KdA participants turned to peace movements in Great Britain and Japan for transnational models of activism. Pastor Kurt Essen looked to the Japanese example to advocate cooperative activism in the Federal Republic. Essen, who was actively involved in the German struggle against rearmament, attended the third “World Conference against A- and H-Bombs and for Disarmament” in Tokyo in August 1957. Wittner claims the conferences, coinciding with the anniversary of the US atomic bombings in Japan, had little impact beyond Japanese borders. This interpretation needs modification: Essen came away from his transnational experience with valuable lessons, including the idea of a united political front against atomic bombs.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁸ Otto Striebeck to the Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner Wuppertal-Elberfeld, August 24, 1957. Blatt 6-7, RW 259, Nr. 334, DFG-VK, Landesarchiv NRW, Düsseldorf.

³⁶⁹ Wittner, *The Struggle Against the Bomb, Volume 2. Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 42. Hereafter cited as Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*. See the *Gensuikyo* website for further information on its current activities, including the annual conference (last held in 2007). The Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, <http://www10.plala.or.jp/antiatom/en/index.html> (accessed July 24, 2009).

This case provides compelling evidence of both transnational awareness and intermittent contact with foreign activists on the German Left. In August 1957 Essen, the only German delegate, hailed the united front in Japan as a “model” for German activism. In a letter to Ollenhauer, Essen extended greetings from the Japan Socialist Party (SDPJ) and reported that he told the Japanese he believed that the SPD was one of the only chances for antinuclear representation in West German government. Although Essen lamented the absence of government support for the movement, he specifically brought the cooperation between the SDPJ and Japanese peace movements to Ollenhauer’s attention. “They all stand together, whether part of the peace movements, the SDPJ, unions, students, workers [,]...farmers, or churches,” according to Essen. The pastor expressed his wish for such unity in Germany and concluded with the suggestion that Germans take the Japanese structure “as a model.”³⁷⁰

Essen’s experiences must be historicized. His 1957 visit to Tokyo captures a specific moment in the SDPJ and pacifist relationship. Essen’s telescoped observations need to be analyzed in the broader context of the relationship between the Japanese antinuclear movement and the SDPJ. In fact, the Japanese Left faced instances of instability in the 1950s and Essen’s glowing report of cooperation should be couched in this knowledge. During Essen’s 1957 visit to Tokyo, the SDPJ was enjoying a period of political stability: two opposing factions had reunited in 1955 to form the SDPJ. By 1959 and 1960, however, the Japanese party splintered once again.³⁷¹ This political context no

³⁷⁰ Kurt Essen to Erich Ollenhauer, August 29, 1957 and Ollenhauer to Essen, September 12, 1957, Mapped 214, NL Ollenhauer, AdsD.

³⁷¹ See J.A.A. Stockwin, “The Japanese Socialist Party under new Leadership,” *Asian Survey* 6, no. 4 (April 1966): 187-188.

doubt contributed to Essen's glowing report of cooperation on the Japanese Left.

Nonetheless, Ollenhauer responded positively to Essen's description, received just weeks before the 1957 Bundestag election. Beginning in February 1958, Ollenhauer headed the effort to form national and local KdA groups in cooperation with unionists, pacifists, clergymen, and students.

Essen's letter was not the only indication that SPD leaders looked beyond German borders for examples of successful antinuclear strategies, displaying clear transnational awareness. The KdA campaign was prompted by the Bundestag foreign policy debate on January 23 and launched officially during the parliamentary debate from March 23-25, 1958. Three years after the Paulskirche rally, Heinemann, now an SPD representative, also pointed to transnational models for peace and antinuclear activism during the January debate. Rejecting Christian Democratic accusations that antinuclear activists and politicians were "panic-makers," Heinemann named Japanese and English antinuclear movements as legitimate responses to the atomic threat.³⁷² The SPD *Pressedienst* included several articles on the Japanese antinuclear movement in 1958 and 1959 as an example of both successful and flawed antinuclear strategies.

Heinemann also referenced the fledgling British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) which had close ties to the British Labour Party and served as a model for KdA activities. CND staged its first public demonstration on February 17, 1958 within five days of the KdA organizational meeting on February 22.³⁷³ Drawing

³⁷² Otto Dann, *Ein Sternstunde des Bundestages. Gustav Heinemanns Rede 23. Januar 1958* (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2008), 59. Heinemann joined the SPD in 1957.

³⁷³ Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 124-5. For the British CND see Richard Taylor, "The Labour Party and the CND: 1957-1984," in *Campaigns for Peace: British Peace Movements in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Richard Taylor and Nigel Young, 100-130 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 106-7.

attention from across the channel, the SPD *Pressedienst* featured an article on CND at the end of March. “The [CND] in Great Britain is able to achieve such breadth because it combines different currents.” Among these, the service noted, were pacifists, Labour Party members, and clergymen. The article highlighted the critical role of academics in the British antinuclear campaigns which “prove[d] that nuclear testing and weapons were much more dangerous for humanity than politicians were willing to admit.”³⁷⁴ CND organizers had come to rely on scientific authority as a way to legitimize their efforts just as Social Democrats and KdA organizers used the image of the Göttingen Eighteen and politician-scientists like Bechert in their campaigns. The masculine realm of science tempered feminine stereotypes associated with peace activism. Finally, the *Pressedienst* outlined CND plans for an antinuclear protest march to the nuclear weapons research facility in Aldermaston, England. The Aldermaston marches were held annually on Easter weekend from 1959 to 1963 and would serve as a model of cooperation between pacifist groups for KdA members, such as Stefan Andres, and Easter March organizer Hans-Konrad Tempel.

A year later, KdA members participated in the transnational European Congress for Nuclear Disarmament on January 17 and 18, 1959. The Congress serves as an outstanding example of transnational interaction between pacifists and Social Democrats. KdA reporter and career journalist Andres provided his assessment of this moment of transnational interaction. “The organization in London was excellent and exemplary in every way,” he recounted. Andres was particularly impressed by the fact that speeches were translated immediately into various languages so that non-English speakers could

³⁷⁴ “Die Bewegung gegen den Atomtod in Großbritannien,” *SPD Pressedienst* P/XIII/66 (March 20, 1958): 2.

follow the proceedings. Furthermore, Andres and his fellow KdA members were deeply moved by a visit to a London CND exhibit where they viewed the documentary *March to Aldermaston* which featured the British group's 1958 inaugural antinuclear march.³⁷⁵

March to Aldermaston "above all things made a deep impression on foreign participants" according to the KdA report.³⁷⁶ Individual responsibility to act was among the key themes addressed by marchers who candidly explained their convictions before the camera. One anonymous clergyman drew on his experiences with popular protest in Africa, calling on British citizens as well as "people in other countries including the Soviet Union" to join the antinuclear cause. Other marchers cited their children as the main reason protesting atomic weapons which might endanger their future. A female interviewee spoke of the duty of women to come out and "pull their weight" during the march, making it clear that female voices mattered too. The emphasis on individual political responsibility drove these journalistically-styled interviews.

The documentary drew clear links between British marchers and the universal consequences of atomic war. Near the conclusion of the film the sound of marching feet provided a solemn background to a first-hand description of the destruction at Hiroshima. These audio impressions were reinforced by gruesome photos of the victims of the bomb blast and radiation poisoning flashing up on the screen. This clever editing brought the scale of destruction and danger posed by nuclear weapons close to home for visitors of the CND exhibition.

³⁷⁵ Protokoll der Sitzung des zentralen Ausschusses "Kampf dem Atomtod," February 21, 1959, Mappe 286, Folder 7, NL Helene Wessel, AdsD. Social Democrats Walter Menzel and Karl Bechert were invited to the Congress but do not appear to have attended. See also "Von Monat zu Monat" *Das Gewissen* 4, no. 1 (January 1959), 5. EZA 686/7910 NL Helmut Gollwitzer, EZAB

³⁷⁶ Protokoll der Sitzung des zentralen Ausschusses "Kampf dem Atomtod," February 21, 1959, Mappe 286, Folder 7, NL Helene Wessel, AdsD.

Music added yet another dimension to the film and the march, enhancing feelings of community among marchers in the film and those viewers who might follow in their footsteps. Among the many background songs played by marchers, only one is clearly edited into the footage and meant to attract the viewer's full attention. The singer first blames politicians for a hypothetical atomic bomb blast. The lyrics continue, however and "a voice from the rubble"- representing victims of the blast - chides, "we'll tell you who's really guilty." Then the victims shouted the singer's name. The lyrics go on with the victims' accusations that ordinary people like him, "gave politicians their power" and "could have made them agree." This message echoes the overall tone of the film, calling on ordinary people to take a political stand. In the final minutes the narrator issues a challenge. "When politicians fail people must give the lead-not people of one class, or age, or country- for this is everybody's call. The challenge of our day confronts us. Have we the courage to meet it? We must give our answer now."³⁷⁷ The powerful images of solidarity and stark messages of individual responsibility deeply impressed German participants at the conference, especially from the perspective of the party political and pacifist periphery. They would later put these ideas to use in their own KdA and extra-parliamentary Easter March demonstrations.

The European congress itself was transnational in both attendance and location. Over 300 delegates traveled from London to Frankfurt on the last day for a moving

³⁷⁷ *March to Aldermaston* (1959) in Disc 3. *Free Cinema: The Films that Launched the British New Wave*, dir. Lindsay Anderson, Alain Tanner, Michael Grigsby, John Irvin, Karel Reisz, British Film Institute (Chicago: Facets Multi-Media, Inc., 2007) The *Aldermaston* filmmakers were certain to include a speech at Trafalgar square by an African-American man as well as footage of marchers wearing turbans and other visible symbols of non-western cultures. There are also several interviews with women and teenagers during the march. Efforts to engage the average voter by connecting politics to everyday life are still used today and reflect the endurance of perceived gaps between the penumbra political arena and party political core. See Joe Painter and Alex Jeffrey, *Political Geography: An Introduction to Space and Power* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Ltd., 2009), 19-20.

concluding rally at the Paulskirche hosted by the local Social Democratic government.³⁷⁸ Social Democrat Waldemar von Knoeringen was among the “13 to 14 speakers;” one of whom dubbed the whole January congress, “an historical event second to none.”³⁷⁹ Networks forged by these transnational interpersonal contacts created a lasting impression on emerging German pacifist movements. Attendees voted the European Federation against Nuclear Arms into existence at this meeting, a transnational organization which would prove an important transnational anchor for the West German Easter March movement.³⁸⁰ Furthermore, both the British CND and Japanese antinuclear movements provided templates for the tandem party and extra-parliamentary cooperative activism that would come to characterize KdA.

British and Japanese movements provided models for the structure of KdA, but the tremendous outpouring of support from party members and general constituents alike fueled its perception as a viable political strategy. Indeed, Ollenhauer and his colleagues received so many supportive letters after the spring Bundestag debates against atomic arms for the Bundeswehr and the inaugural KdA demonstration on March 23, 1958 that it was nearly impossible to answer each one specifically. A tally of 300 sample letters as of April 16 revealed that 92 percent of the correspondents agreed with the Social Democrats’ position on atomic weapons.³⁸¹ Furthermore, the report confirms that “for the most part” the letters were not from party-affiliates but independent or even Christian

³⁷⁸ Thiede, “Anti-Nuclear Liberals,” 228.

³⁷⁹ Protokoll der Sitzung des zentralen Ausschusses “Kampf dem Atomtod,” February 21, 1959, Mappe 286, Folder 7, NL Helene Wessel, AdsD.

³⁸⁰ Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 300.

³⁸¹ Report from Bonn (no title or author given), April 16, 1958. EZA 613/84, NL Kloppenburg, EZAB.

Democratic voters. For SPD leaders, this was a clear sign that after years of opposition, the issue of nuclear arms might be strong enough to put the party into a governing coalition, converting penumbra potential into party political power.

Support for the SPD antinuclear position was not clear cut. In fact, Ollenhauer often expressed his surprise at the sudden surge of support for an SPD stance against nuclear arms in Germany which had dated back to the first federal elections and the Paulskirche movement in 1955. To Helmut Rosenbusch, who was not a Social Democrat, Ollenhauer marveled at the “unexpected, exceedingly large resonance” of the party’s “fight against atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr in all parts of the population.”³⁸² This surge in support can be partly attributed to the increased incorporation of scientific antinuclear arguments and experts into party activities. These largely “male” voices contributed an authority and political legitimacy to the SPD’s antinuclear stance that an ethical pacifist position grounded in sentimental, “feminine” morality lacked. Encouraged by this grassroots support, Ollenhauer expressed the new-found confidence of party leaders to stay the course towards disarmament. They pursued an active schedule of tandem KdA demonstrations which began during the March 1958 debate and continued through the summer of 1958.

Hundreds of letters flooded the offices of Social Democratic MdBs Fritz Erler, Carlo Schmid, Bechert, Wessel, and Ollenhauer after the January and March 1958 Bundestag debates. The correspondence reflected widespread grassroots support for SPD antinuclear policies that extended beyond party and, especially in Wessel’s case, state,

³⁸² Ollenhauer to Otto Lamprecht from Hamburg.Rahlstedt, May 29, 1958, Mappe 225; Ollenhauer to Helmut Rosenbusch, May 29, 1958, Mappe 226, NL Ollenhauer, AdsD.

lines.³⁸³ A letter from Manfred Dornbusch in Berlin provides an excellent example. In March 1958 he wrote to Erler in support of KdA. “I want to emphasize that I am 28 years old and have never belonged to a party. If the SPD calls us workers to the streets to end this nonsense, however, I solemnly promise to fight with you.”³⁸⁴ Dornbusch and others stressed their independence from party politics in order to spotlight the conscious decision to support the SPD and its efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. Such confirmation of grassroots support did not go unheeded by party leaders. The SPD’s antinuclear message targeted voters like Dornbusch as part of the capricious independent constituency which the SPD needed to gain power. SPD leaders grounded their antinuclear strategy in the belief that these letters represented a substantial silent constituency eager for change in Bonn.

Party hopes for voter support were not unfounded. Even devoted CDU members wrote to the Social Democrats expressing their support for antinuclear politics. Bechert in particular received many letters from non-SPD constituents. His appeal to voters as a scientist brought a sense of professional expertise and rationality to parliamentary politics which proved to be an appealing strategy. For example, impressed by the physicist’s performance in the Bundestag debate, Christian Democrat Walter Gerhard wrote on May 5, 1958. “I listened to the debate as a CDU-supporter, but at the end of the debate there was only one vote for me: rejection of nuclear arms.”³⁸⁵ The staunch Christian Democrat found himself convinced not only by Bechert’s performance, but his credentials as a

³⁸³ The MdBs regularly received letters from the GDR. See NL Helene Wessel, AdsD in particular.

³⁸⁴ Manfred Dornbusch to Erler, March 23, 1958, Mappe 148, NL Erler, AdsD.

³⁸⁵ Walter Gerhard to Bechert, May 5, 1958, Mappe 148, NL Bechert, AdsD.

scientist. Gerhard shifted from a party political position to an issue-oriented position because this particular topic concerned “all humanity” and did not depend on party allegiances. When Willi Eichler advised Bechert to speak as a scientist rather than an “*SPD-Mann*” during political campaigns in 1957, he had constituents like Gerhard in mind.³⁸⁶ SPD leaders took their cues from academics like the Göttingen Eighteen as the party continued to struggle with its own class-based identity and the long shadow of Schumacher’s larger-than-life legacy. Scientific expertise provided a politically-neutral, “masculine” pacifist authority which legitimized SPD antinuclear strategies beyond party lines.

Other writers insisted that antinuclear sentiment was commonplace among German voters. Alwine Currel, a “businesswoman, homemaker, and mother” assured Erler, “do not think that the [KdA] is all for nothing, from what I hear, the voters are waking up.”³⁸⁷ A group of six women from Düsseldorf conveyed similar feelings to Schmid, declaring that “many people’s hopes hinged on his statement that ‘For Social Democrats, the fight would not end with the [Bundestag] debate.’”³⁸⁸ These women were not the only ones looking forward to further party action, whether within or outside the party political core. Hilda Giespert, a self-described housewife, urged Schmid and the SPD to continue their efforts in her March 23, 1958 letter. Giespert called on the party to stage rallies like the Frankfurt demonstration, which accompanied the five-day March

³⁸⁶ Willi Eichler to Bechert, March 12, 1957, Mappe 179, NL Bechert, AdsD.

³⁸⁷ Alwine Currel to Erler, March 28, 1958, Mappe 148, NL Erler, AdsD.

³⁸⁸ Elisabeth Käufer, et al. to Schmid, March 26, 1958, Mappe 1274, NL Schmid, AdsD.

Bundestag debate, in every major German city.³⁸⁹ The SPD certainly answered this call, staging rallies throughout 1958. The largest rally occurred in Hamburg with an estimated 120,000 participants.³⁹⁰

Ollenhauer played a critical role in KdA, gathering support within the SPD for the extra-parliamentary movement. The party chairman walked a fine line between official party policy and the expectations of pacifist and antinuclear constituents. He received numerous letters from Social Democrats and other voters, especially in the election year 1957. Like Essen, many writers advised Ollenhauer on potential political tactics and campaign strategies. On April 30, 1957, Dr. G. Bothfeld wrote to Ollenhauer after hearing warnings issued by the Göttingen Eighteen. The SPD should have jumped at the chance to build on their momentum, Bothfeld argued. Bothfeld felt the scientific position was strong enough to support a party platform. There was still time, however, according to the writer, and the SPD could plan demonstrations to show their support. Ollenhauer responded with the assertion “in terms of the nuclear question we have absolutely not been inactive.”³⁹¹ The party chairman was also quick to assure Otto Engelke from Berlin that “[t]he main objective of our politics is the preservation and safeguarding of peace in Europe and the world” in November of the same year.³⁹² Even after the lost election, Ollenhauer received letters that criticized and encouraged him at

³⁸⁹ Hilda Giespert to Schmid, March 23, 1958, Mappe 1275, NL Schmid, AdsD. There are many similar letters in this file in response to both the January and March 1958 debates. Many also appear in Helene Wessel’s papers.

³⁹⁰ Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 290.

³⁹¹ Dr. G. Bothfeld to Ollenhauer, April 30, 1957 and Ollenhauer to Bothfeld, May 29, 1957, Mappe 213, NL Ollenhauer, AdsD.

³⁹² Ollenhauer to Otto Engelke, November 18, 1957, Mappe 214, NL Ollenhauer, AdsD.

the same time. Manfred Feldman questioned whether the party had learned anything from the lost 1953 election. He then ended positively however, noting that the SPD ultimately would learn from its experiences in 1957 when it faced the next election.³⁹³

The numerous letters and countless lines of advice were all duly addressed by Ollenhauer or his assistant. In Dr. Bothfeld's case, for example, he even sent supplemental materials about SPD activities with his response.

SPD leaders grew confident that their antinuclear efforts were viable in the political arena even though they were grounded intrinsically in pacifist strategies normally characterized as part of the political, often feminized, penumbra. SPD MdB Annemarie Renger describes antinuclear sentiment and party leaders' faith in its success as an election strategy in her memoirs. "With the rejection of atomic weapons we Social Democrats felt in tune with the most important social currents and above all with the Intelligentsia and youth."³⁹⁴ Renger notes that Schmid supported her impression and the SPD's faith in grassroots support for the antinuclear strategy. "The people listened when we spoke," Schmid declared following with statistical proof, "surveys show that far more than 80 percent of the German people want nothing to do with atomic bombs."³⁹⁵

The KdA committee staged its first demonstration in Frankfurt on March 23, 1958 during a fierce Bundestag debate against atomic arms for the Bundeswehr. The carefully orchestrated Frankfurt rally occurred on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the National Socialist Enabling Acts, boldly connecting the moment when Social Democrats took up

³⁹³ Manfred Feldmann to Ollenhauer October 14, 1957, Mappe 215, NL Ollenhauer, AdsD.

³⁹⁴ Annemarie Renger, *Ein Politisches Leben* (Stuttgart: Deutsches Verlags-Anstalt, 1993), 197.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.* Renger quotes Schmid here.

their political responsibility to oppose Hitler with the party's current responsibility to fight nuclear weapons. The voting public did not miss the gravity of the occasion as participants flocked to the Frankfurt Congress Hall, overflowing into neighboring rooms in their excitement to join the KdA rally.

The Congress Hall was a fresh venue for the antinuclear event.³⁹⁶ Switching from the Paulskirche and its spatial emphasis on equality and community, the layout of the Congress Hall created a spectacle. The space articulated a new relationship between the speakers and audience, delineating clear leaders and followers in this campaign. Whereas the 1955 planners carefully chose the Paulskirche program and venue in order to emphasize symbolism, democratic tradition, and nonpartisanship within the extra-parliamentary movement, the KdA organizers left little room for individual interpretation. The Congress Hall's arrangement, a large hall with a high, imposing dais at the front, clearly divided the speakers from the audience. Indeed, photos of the rally depict speakers standing at the center of the stage, surrounded by members of the Frankfurt Youth Orchestra and dwarfed by an enormous background poster with the words, "Atomic Weapons? No!"³⁹⁷ The venue set the tone for an extra-parliamentary movement with clear leadership from the political core. KdA organizers took heed of the successful Frankfurt rally and encouraged additional demonstrations in conjunction with pacifist groups like the DFG throughout the summer. The SPD's "crusade of conscience," a

³⁹⁶ Barbara Thiede argues that SPD leaders used the new venue to distance themselves from the "failed" Paulskirche campaign. Thiede, "Anti-Nuclear Liberals," 136.

³⁹⁷ Friedhelm Boll, *Die SPD im Deutschen Bundestag. Der Bildband zur Geschichte der sozialdemokratischen Bundestagsfraktion 1949-2009* (Bonn: Dietz, 2009), 47. Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 126, 149, 153, 289-296. Although some sources suggest the rally took place at Paulskirche, Rupp's investigation firmly places the rally at the larger Kongresshalle which would have realistically accommodated the over 2000 estimated participants and "overflow" rooms.

transnational phrase borrowed from the 1957 Tokyo World Conference Against Hydrogen Bombs, had begun. Rupp tallies twenty-nine separate KdA demonstrations in April 1958 alone.³⁹⁸

The physical space of the Congress Hall was not the only framework imposed on the KdA demonstration. The KdA committee called the “entire German people” to action without consideration of “class, confession, or party.” Its 1958 brochure “No to Nuclear Suicide” cleverly and deliberately linked each speaker to a target constituency. Every orator played a specific role, bringing their transnational, religious, gender, scientific, and party political experiences to this nonpartisan effort. Nearly every presenter addressed the connections between KdA extra-parliamentary protest and party politics. Journalist Robert Jungk asked the audience not to think of the rally as a party demonstration because the dangers of atomic arms was an issue that “transcended the party-political realm.”³⁹⁹ As an illustration, Jungk emphasized that “representatives from every party” in Japan rejected nuclear weapons. Pacifist Andres further differentiated between the participants’ political loyalties. Rally speakers, who were not connected to a political party, Andres qualified, would have supported the antinuclear demonstration even if it had been organized by the CDU. He emphasized the universality of the atomic threat and criticized CDU scare-tactics which labeled antinuclear politicians and activists as influenced by Communists.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁸ Arbeitsausschuß “Kampf dem Atomtod,” “Das Nein zum Nuklearen Selbstmord. Der Kreuzzug des Gewissens” (Bonn, n.d). See page 12 for the context of “crusade of conscience.” Rupp, *Außerparlamentarischen Opposition*, 289-96.

³⁹⁹ Robert Jungk, “Rede in der Frankfurter Kongresshalle” March 23, 1958. BArch DZ 9/1076.

⁴⁰⁰ Stefan Andres, “Rede in der Frankfurter Kongresshalle” March 23, 1958. BArch DZ 9/1076.

In contrast to the nonpartisan spirit of the Paulskirche movement, SPD representatives opened and closed the rally. These bookend speeches represent the increased overlap between extra-parliamentary efforts and party politics. The KdA campaign explicitly politicized the nuclear issue, calling for supporters to reject armed politics and “promote a politics of peaceful development.”⁴⁰¹ Bringing scientific authority to KdA, theoretical physicist Walter Weizel from Bonn painted a stark picture of the effects of modern nuclear weapons. He immediately called upon memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to reinforce his points. “Atomic weapons do not only affect the aggressors,” Weizel argued, “[t]hey are aimed against noncombatants, against women, against children, even –which was not possible before- against unborn children [and] against children not yet conceived.”⁴⁰² Weizel made it clear to the Frankfurt audience that atomic weapons were a universal concern, at the same time combining his “masculine” scientific authority with a distinct emotional appeal very much like Bertha von Suttner’s mediated descriptions of war in *Lay Down Your Arms*.

Pouncing on Weizel’s grim predictions, and emphasizing female roles in the fight for peace Social Democratic MdB Wessel reminded women of their “responsibility” to summon the courage for daily struggles against nuclear threats and to support the KdA. Wessel spoke as a “woman and politician,” as she called for women to “publically raise their voices” and provocatively claimed they were on the “frontlines” in the fight against atomic weapons. The MdB passionately pointed to statistics from the SPD-sponsored survey on atomic weapons. “We women, 86 percent of whom are against nuclear

⁴⁰¹ Arbeitsausschuß “Kampf dem Atomtod,” “Das Nein zum Nuklearen Selbstmord,” 20.

⁴⁰² Arbeitsausschuß KdA, “Das Nein zum Nuklearen Selbstmord,” 21. Weizel was a member of the SPD Ausschuss für Fragen der Atomenergie in 1955. See SPD Jahrbuch 1954-55, 190.

weapons and bases according to the February 1958 EMNID-Institute survey, must now publically speak out.” Wessel repeatedly emphasized that women were not powerless. Alluding to past female inaction, she asserted that women “did not want to be complicit in the inhumanity of a nuclear war.”⁴⁰³

There is an inherent tension between Wessel’s ardent calls for action and her maternal emphasis on women’s duties as “the guardians and conveyers of life” in the same speech.⁴⁰⁴ Part of this tension might be attributed to the fact that Wessel had been called to this KdA event with a specific purpose. The organizers originally intended for FDP representative Marie-Elisabeth Lüders to represent women at the Frankfurt rally. Wessel was recruited when Lüders sent her regrets, a choice which turned out well for the SPD after Wessel’s successful Bundestag speech two days earlier.⁴⁰⁵ Wessel held nothing back in the Bundestag, opening her speech with a bold critique of CDU and Deutsche Partei (DP) members. “I have the impression that your belief in the power of atomic bombs for the Federal Republic is greater than your belief in God as the determinant of world history,” she challenged her Catholic colleagues.⁴⁰⁶ Wessel frequently employed such a confrontational political style: it was an essential element of her self-inscribed identity as “the only man in the SPD.”⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰³ Helene Wessel, “Rede in der Frankfurter Kongresshalle” March 23, 1958. BArch DZ 9/1076.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Rupp notes that FDP representative Marie-Elisabeth Lüders was the first choice for a female speaker at the rally but she declined and sent a letter of support instead. Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 153-154.

⁴⁰⁶ Bundestag, *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages 3. Wahlperiode. Stenographische Berichte von der 17. Sitzung am 13. März bis zur 29. Sitzung am 9. Mai 1958*. Vol. 40 (Andernach/Bonn, 1958), 964.

⁴⁰⁷ “Bericht” July 4, 1959. BArch DY 31/994, Blatt 32.

Nonetheless, Wessel attempted to establish connections between herself and her female audience. Notz points out that Wessel referenced women as “guardians of life” frequently in her KdA advocacy. This language was also closely tied to the West German Women’s Peace Movement (*Westdeutsche Frauenfriedensbewegung-WFFB*), which in turn drew on feminist and ethical pacifism.⁴⁰⁸ Although not a mother herself, Wessel drew on a strong legacy of feminist and pacifist activism with language that historian Ann Taylor Allen demonstrates was used by both mothers and childless women to create a sense of community.⁴⁰⁹ The inherent tensions in her speech between masculine and maternalist language may simply be an extension of the general strain of the KdA movement, whose leaders attempted to pair “masculine” scientific authority and party politics with appeals to more traditional ethical pacifist convictions in the penumbra. Additionally, Wessel herself faced scrutiny as a female politician participating in the male-dominated realm of party politics.

Weizel brought scientific authority to the rally and Wessel spoke specifically to women, yet both referenced the atomic bombings of Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Jungk then brought this transnational example into focus with moving descriptions of the atomic bomb victims. Jungk called a moment of silence to honor “the bombing victims of the last war,” forcing the thousands-strong audience to reflect on the devastation caused by both traditional and nuclear bombs. “Let us think of Warsaw, Rotterdam, Coventry, Cologne, Hamburg, Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki,” Jungk

⁴⁰⁸ Notz, *Mehr als bunte Tupfen*, 303.

⁴⁰⁹ Ann Taylor Allen, *Feminism and Motherhood in Germany, 1800-1914* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1991), 3-12. Similarly, Kettig employed maternalist imagery in her speech for a May 1958 KdA rally in Essen. Appellius, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden*, 18-20. Kettig did not marry or have children.

instructed, not unlike Quidde's efforts to link victims across national borders during the 1927 Munich peace exhibit. Jungk also described his experiences in Hiroshima hospitals, bearing witness to the human cost of nuclear weapons.⁴¹⁰ This presentation and re-presentation of wartime atrocities reveal that although Suttner had been criticized for her sentimentality, the strategy remained one of the most effective elements of pacifist and antinuclear campaigns.

As in the 1955 Paulskirche meeting, SPD pressure for reunification featured in many of the KdA speeches. In addition, Wessel addressed reunification as the primary topic in her impressive speech for the Bundestag before the KdA rally. Unionist Willi Richter called for reunification based on the union program. Advocating national and transnational solidarity, Richter appealed to his audience emotionally. "This rally ... in Germany, that is all of Germany, because we do not forget our brothers and sisters in the Soviet-occupied zone, should launch a movement of the German people, together with similar efforts in other countries of the world," against atomic weapons.⁴¹¹ In one powerful sentence Richter linked German reunification with transnational concerns about atomic destruction.

The SPD and extra-parliamentary activities were more explicitly linked in the KdA demonstration. Ollenhauer closed the rally, this time announced as chairman of the SPD.⁴¹² He and Wessel stressed the need for extra-parliamentary cooperation and drew explicit attention to the ongoing Bundestag debate and their party-political positions. As

⁴¹⁰ Jungk, "Rede in der Frankfurter Kongresshalle" March 23, 1958. BArch DZ 9/1076. See Chapter 3 for the description of the Munich peace exhibit.

⁴¹¹ Willi Richter, "Rede in der Frankfurter Kongresshalle" March 23, 1958. BArch DZ 9/1076.

⁴¹² Arbeitsausschuss KdA, "Das Nein zum Nuklearen Selbstmord," 20.

opposed to understating his party connection as he did in the earlier Paulskirche movement, Ollenhauer proclaimed “I speak to you as a politician” and drew the nuclear issue solidly into the party realm. “The Bundestag intends, in principal, to approve atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr. We must raise our voices [in protest],” Ollenhauer asserted. Citing the 1958 SPD-commissioned EMNID survey which found 83% of the population to be against atomic weapons, Ollenhauer was confident that extra-parliamentary voices would influence party politics.⁴¹³

The SPD-commissioned EMNID survey was completed in February 1958 and the KdA committee met for the first time the same year.⁴¹⁴ The survey represented rational and scientific evidence that antinuclear pacifism enjoyed large amounts of support among voters. This tangible proof provided the boost needed for SPD leaders to fold the antinuclear cause into party political strategies. Social Democrat Walter Menzel led the group in this new political strategy, working primarily as an organizer behind the scenes. In the Paulskirche spirit, Menzel asserted that every individual associated with the group represented only themselves and not their affiliated organizations. As a “real idealist,” Menzel dedicated himself to KdA in both party and movement form.⁴¹⁵ His long career in the SPD as a Bundestag representative, regional minister, and a critical participant in drafting the postwar constitution enabled him to create important links between the party

⁴¹³ Erich Ollenhauer, “Rede in der Frankfurter Kongresshalle” March 23, 1958. BArch DZ 9/1076 and Signature 613/84, NL Kloppenburg, EZAB. This, paired with numerous letters of support was enough for Ollenhauer.

⁴¹⁴ Institut für Meinungsforschung der EMNID K. G., *Raketenbasen in Westdeutschland? Einstellung der Öffentlichkeit zur Errichtung von Raketenbasen in der Bundesrepublik* (Bielefeld: EMNID K. G., 1958).

⁴¹⁵ “Walter Menzel,” *Westfälische Rundschau* September 25, 1963. “Die SPD Fraktion Teilte mit: Betr. Trauerfeier für Walter Menzel,” October 2, 1963, “Walter Menzel,” Box 6767, Sammlung Personalien, AdSD. Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 131-2.

and extra-parliamentary activities. Menzel still believed in KdA goals as he resigned his post in November 1961.⁴¹⁶ He was not the only “idealist” Social Democrat, however. Many party members became disillusioned with the KdA as the SPD limited its extra-parliamentary activities and often supported the Easter Marches as a result.⁴¹⁷

The Frankfurt rally inspired a series of further demonstrations. Menzel wrote to Ollenhauer, Richter, and FDP chairman Reinhold Maier on April 2, 1958 to give his glowing report of the rally and suggest their encouragement of the establishment of regional KdA groups and additional rallies.⁴¹⁸ KdA found much success on the regional level. These regional groups organized at least twenty-nine antinuclear demonstrations in 1958.⁴¹⁹ In a May 1958 letter to Menzel, local KdA organizers reported that a pastor, an SPD member, and a doctor established their own group in Calw-Wimberg and “without any difficulties formed a working group of unionist, liberal, and Christian citizens.”⁴²⁰

Individuals who were affiliated with the SPD and various pacifist organizations are testament to this diverse cooperation and formed the key connections between the party and its efforts to embrace extra-parliamentary peace activism. Social Democrats Bechert and Wessel participated in both KdA demonstrations and were members of the DFG. Kettig and Arno Behrisch were both Social Democratic representatives and

⁴¹⁶ “Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Vorstandes des Arbeitsausschusses ‘Kampf dem Atomtod’ e.V.” November 29, 1961. Mappe 28, NL Menzel, AdsD. Menzel emphasized his decision was based entirely on health reasons rather than political ones. See Chapter 5.

⁴¹⁷ Beilmann to Wessel, March 25, 1963. Mappe 8, NL Beilmann, AdsD.

⁴¹⁸ Menzel to Willi Richter, Ollenhauer, and Reinhold Maier, April 2, 1958. “Walter Menzel,” Box 6767, Sammlung Personalien, AdsD.

⁴¹⁹ Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 289-296.

⁴²⁰ B. Pfeleiderer and Hans Bay to Menzel, May 19, 1958. Forwarded to Heinz Kloppenburg. EZA 613/84, NL Kloppenburg, EZAB.

involved with pacifist groups at various times. Kettig actively supported the DFG after she left the SPD in 1966 and Behrisch was a member of the IdK and later the DFU. Heinz Kloppenburg, a Lutheran clergyman, was deeply engaged in the KdA and the Easter Marches. Although never an SPD member Kloppenburg cited his deep commitment to the SPD as a uniting force. Each activist represents a link between pacifism and Social Democracy, core and penumbra, and “masculine” and “feminine” politics.

Despite many overlaps between the SPD and DFG, only a few of the KdA demonstrations were officially organized or co-organized by DFG members in 1958. Member Pastor Martin Niemöller participated in nine separate rallies for KdA in the summer of that year, including one alongside Kettig and Behrisch.⁴²¹ Niemöller persisted even after SPD support for KdA faded, speaking at regional KdA rallies where local groups continued to promote antinuclear activism. Social Democrat and DFG representative Helmut Hertling wrote in April 1959 that a primary concern with plans for an extra-parliamentary anti-atom exhibit was “strengthening” the KdA.⁴²² Cooperative activism between Social Democrats and DFG members sustained the relationship between party and pacifists even after KdA lost momentum. DFG members like Johannes Meyer, who expressed his interest in the SPD program in a 1957 letter to Ollenhauer sharing that “many of his friends from the *Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft*

⁴²¹ Stefan Appelius, *Pazifismus in Westdeutschland: Die Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft 1945-1968* (Aachen: G. Mainz, 1991), 717. Hereafter cited as Appelius, *Pazifismus*. Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 289-296.

⁴²² “Informationsblatt,” May 16, 1959, Box “Stierwaldt C-H,” NL Stierwaldt, Sammlung Appelius, AdsD. Hertling to Vittinghoff and Gärtner, April 8, 1959. [unmarked Box “1”] NL Hertling, Sammlung Appelius, AdsD.

spoke highly of [his] party,” continued grassroots cooperation between the two organizations, especially at the rank-and-file level.⁴²³

The KdA movement burned out quickly. The majority of the rallies occurred between February and July 1958. Catching many activists by surprise, KdA activities declined for four primary reasons. First, the party withdrew much of its support after devastating regional election defeats, especially in Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) on July 6, 1958. Second, party calls for a public referendum on atomic weapons were deemed unconstitutional by the constitutional court, eliminating one of the KdA committee’s main plans to influence party politics. Third, the SPD underwent major programmatic changes in 1959, already described above, which culminated in the approval of German membership in NATO in 1960. These changing dynamics made pacifist and antinuclear activism within the party difficult, leading to an idle KdA. Fourth and interrelated to the third factor, the SPD embraced antinuclear strategies grounded in the “masculine” political realm, relying on either scientific authority or supporting armed peace as opposed to the emotional, ethical pacifism of those activists located outside the party political realm. Some penumbra activists remained part of the KdA but many would later join the completely extra-parliamentary Easter Marches discussed in Chapter 5.

The first problem lay in the fact that many SPD leaders considered KdA principally as an election tool and when Social Democrats failed to gain a majority in the July 6 Nordrhein-Westfalen elections they abandoned the tactic. In his study of SPD peace politics, Michael Longerich correctly disputes political gain as the only factor for SPD support of KdA. The continued involvement of pacifists in the party, and Social

⁴²³ Johannes Meyer to Ollenhauer, September 10, 1957. Mappe 218, NL Ollenhauer, AdsD.

Democrats in peace activism, further supports his argument.⁴²⁴ The SPD did not completely abandon the topic of peace, simply extra-parliamentary advocacy of the issue. There remains strong evidence that SPD members thought the voting strategy argument was legitimate. Some contemporary SPD delegates assumed this was the case as they struggled to gather votes in their constituencies. When Kettig wondered at the abrupt drop in SPD KdA activity in 1958, Renger responded, “we lost the elections, what else should be done?”⁴²⁵ The CDU won by an overwhelming majority on July 6, 1958, governing without coalition partners. It was a devastating defeat for the SPD and its tandem extra-parliamentary strategy.

The rejection of the SPD-led calls for a referendum on the stationing of nuclear missiles in the Federal Republic as unconstitutional was another factor in the downfall of KdA according to historians like Christoph Butterwegge. One of the group’s main initiatives was a referendum in the different states asking whether Germans wanted nuclear bases in Germany. The results of the referendum completed in Bremen and Hamburg were promisingly in favor of SPD opposition to the bases.⁴²⁶ However, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the referendum was unconstitutional and

⁴²⁴ Michael Longerich, *Die SPD als “Friedenspartei”- mehr als nur Wahlpolitik?* (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Peter Lang 1990), 450-1. Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 217. Helmut Hertling even participated on the preparation committee for the Easter Marches as an SPD member beginning with the first Hamburg March in 1960. Appelius, *Pazifismus in Westdeutschland*, 710.

⁴²⁵ Appelius, *Pazifismus*, 424. Future president and local Wuppertal KdA leader Johannes Rau wrote to the central KdA committee in dismay on December 19, 1960. He wanted to know if anyone had heard about the “continued work” of the KdA. Rau to Arbeitsausschuss “Kampf dem Atomtod” e.V., December 19, 1960. Signature: 613/89, NL Kloppenburg, EZAB.

⁴²⁶ Christoph Butterwegge, *30 Jahre Ostermarsch: Ein Beitrag Zur Politischen Kultur Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Und Ein Stück Bremer Stadtgeschichte* (Bremen: Steintor, 1990), 8. Hereafter cited as Butterwegge, *30 Jahre Ostermarsch*.

undermined the democratically-elected government as well as the election process.⁴²⁷

The court's rejection was a major blow to the KdA campaign. This defeat, paired with the dismal showing in the Nordrhein-Westfalen elections and the wheels of reform already turning in the party led to steadily decreasing SPD support for KdA activities.

Decreasing support for KdA activities did not mean a complete party abandonment of the campaign. The group remained alive, though stagnant, and served the SPD as a rhetorical and political tool more than as an extra-parliamentary experiment. Chairman Menzel stated despite these defeats, "we Social Democrats will not rest until the threat... to our nation and humanity is averted."⁴²⁸ While Menzel and other KdA Social Democrats kept the committee afloat, peace activists like DFG member Max Stierwaldt faced confusing obstacles in their previously productive cooperation with KdA groups. In an August 1959 letter Stierwaldt described going to participate in a rally only to find that the SPD and unionists had withdrawn their support and claimed they had never supported the event. Stierwaldt recognized the need for more cooperative activism, in this case mainly among extra-parliamentary groups, yet he closed his letter with resignation. Political parties were no longer potential partners for activism, he wrote, "even [with] the *Kampf dem Atomtod* which is purely an SPD affair (Unfortunately)."⁴²⁹

Still others, APO-scholar Karl Otto among them, blame the failure of KdA on changing SPD party politics. The party moved closer to the CDU politically, according

⁴²⁷ Uli Jäger and Michael Schmid-Vöhringer, "Wir Werden Nicht in Ruhe gehen..." *Die Friedensbewegung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945-1982: Geschichte, Dokumente, Perspektiven* (Tübingen: Verein für Friedenspädagogik, 1982), 17, 20.

⁴²⁸ Walter Menzel, speech, n.d., Mappe 29, NL Menzel, AdsD. Probably from late 1958.

⁴²⁹ Stierwaldt to Justizrat Dr. Peter Boie, August 11, 1959. Box "Stierwaldt A-B," NL Stierwaldt, Sammlung Appelius, AdsD.

to Otto, which “sharpened extra-parliamentary confrontations and internal political repression.”⁴³⁰ Despite programmatic changes and the SPD’s acceptance of German membership in NATO in 1960, the KdA committee remained functional, although stagnant. Even after Wehner made SPD intentions to change its opposition position clear in his Bundestag speech, individual Social Democrats remained involved in cooperative activism and maintained the links between peace organizations, activism, and the party. They were the ones who felt the tension between participating in the SPD and their own individual activism the most.

MdBs like Bechert continued their cooperative activism within the party even as the KdA grew inactive. Bechert in particular advocated scientific vigilance and repeated his antinuclear messages as a MdB.⁴³¹ He represented a masculine pacifist stance compatible with SPD leaders’ efforts to assert power in the party political realm and did not come into conflict with party leadership until 1962 when he rejected SPD-supported plans for protecting civilians from atomic fallout. Bechert’s authority no longer held intrinsic value for the party on nuclear issues even though fellow academic Karl Kayser claimed his position was the same as “thousands of scientists, including several Nobel prizewinners, worldwide.”⁴³² Bechert and the SPD parted ideological ways over the air-raid protection issue. In 1962 Bechert explained frankly, that the SPD executive “had distanced itself from him over the air-raid protection issue. That naturally does not mean

⁴³⁰ Otto, *Ostermarsch zur APO*, 64. See also Alice Holmes Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements since 1945* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

⁴³¹ Article from “HP ‘der SPD nahestehend”” according to Bechert’s notes. August 11, 1966. Mappe 178, NL Bechert, AdsD. This article describes a speech Bechert delivered to a local KdA committee on the 21st anniversary of the bombing of Nagasaki.

⁴³² Karl H. Kayser to Präsidium der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands Bonn, April 1, 1962. Mappe 180, NL Bechert, AdsD.

that I have changed my opinion.”⁴³³ Although SPD leaders continued to promote the image of peace party, understandings of a “masculine” peace were underscored by the changing Cold War context in 1961. The party moved away from ethical understandings of peace to embrace a more paternalistic view fostered by Willy Brandt’s Chancellor candidacy. SPD leaders no longer relied on the political legitimacy offered by Bechert’s scientific pacifism.

Nevertheless, the SPD continued to cleverly employ peace rhetoric, perpetuating its reputation as peace party and providing pacifist Social Democrats with a limited party outlet for their activism. Ironically the SPD was instrumental in the creation of the very extra-parliamentary realm it later struggled against. The party’s tandem KdA strategy opened up new legitimate political space for activism which extra-parliamentary groups on the Left did not enjoy during the Weimar Republic or Nazi Era when pacifists were generally characterized negatively as feminine. As party leaders distanced the organization from “feminine” pacifist penumbra activities such as the close collaboration between KdA and DFG members, they separated it from strategies perceived as politically ineffective and positioned outside of the “masculine” party core. The extra-parliamentary realm therefore was branded as vulnerable to outside influence because it remained outside of the realm of party politics.

Cooperative activism established irreversible links between the two realms, culminating in the strong APO movement of the late 1960s and 1970s and the eventual creation of the Green party, which had origins in the penumbra and would enjoy later success in the core political sphere. Many earlier groups attempted to promote peace

⁴³³ Bechert to Kurt Denke, April 11, 1962. Mappe 180, NL Bechert, AdsD.

issues in party politics, including the DFU, but a successful transition to the political core was not possible without the connections between “masculine” core and “feminine” penumbra politics forged by Social Democrats in the 1950s and 1960s. Social Democrats who had previously engaged in cooperative activism found themselves forced to choose between their political party and their political convictions as the SPD distanced itself from the Easter Marches, and by extension extra-parliamentary politics, in 1960. These personal and political decisions are a focus of the next chapter, which highlights the effects of broader political changes on the individuals who identified with both party politics and the pacifist penumbra on the Left.

Chapter 5:
“The Edge of Political Possibilities:”⁴³⁴
Peace Party and Peace Activism at Odds, 1960-1966

“I have decided to observe politics, in the most general sense, from the sidelines,” Walter Menzel informed his close KdA colleague Alexander Maaß in 1962. “It is a new generation--one that must take on responsibility and certainly shall. We must accept that,” he concluded.⁴³⁵ Menzel, Social Democrat, son-in-law of Severing, craftsman of the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law), and KdA chairman, did not specify if he was referring to a new generation of pacifists or Social Democrats in these comments, but he made it clear that it was not simply a matter of “age difference” (*Jahresdifferenz*). As the SPD leadership withdrew support from the KdA committee the 61-year-old Social Democrat found himself in a penumbral area of Left political culture: that is in the space between the SPD and extra-parliamentary movements. Although SPD leaders like Erich Ollenhauer forged links to the extra-parliamentary realm during the 1950s, Menzel found himself attempting to negotiate a widening gulf between the two groups after 1959. According to one obituary, Menzel followed his convictions to “the edge of political possibilities” pushing the limits of accepted political boundaries like many other pacifists and Social Democrats.⁴³⁶

⁴³⁴ “Walter Menzel †” *Atomzeitalter* Nr. 10 (October 1963), 253. Hereafter cited as “Walter Menzel †.”

⁴³⁵ Menzel to Alexander Maaß, September 26, 1962. Mappe 28, NL Menzel, AdsD.

⁴³⁶ “Walter Menzel †,” 253.

Menzel and Maaß struggled with the implications of growing contradictions between their political position and deep-rooted identities in both “masculine” and “feminine” political spaces. SPD leaders began to limit the party’s peace advocacy to the party political realm and renewed their efforts to form a governing coalition. The first three years of the 1960s proved to be a pivotal moment for the non-Communist West German Left. A moment in which the “peace party” turned away from its extra-parliamentary efforts and disillusioned activists took advantage of political space no longer dominated by the lame-duck KdA and official SPD cooperation. Here in this vacated space, pacifists like Easter March founders Hans-Konrad and Helga Tempel laid the first foundations of what would become *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, or APO, in extra-parliamentary German politics.

The SPD maintained its reputation as a peace party in the 1961 federal elections and this chapter traces its transition from opposition to governing party. It also illustrates party leaders’ reactions to the changing Cold War context with the construction of the Berlin Wall.⁴³⁷ SPD rhetoric around peace shifted from an at times awkward combination of scientific peace advocacy and “feminine” ethical pacifism towards a distinctly masculine and paternalistic understanding of peace. Frustrated Social Democratic and independent pacifists, who drove KdA efforts for almost five years, faced the choice between re-casted SPD politics and emerging APO groups like the Easter Marches which maintained their footing in ethical pacifist ideals in the penumbra. As Menzel recognized, the time had come for new direction and reorganization on the German Left. Many activists, like Menzel, were simply too weary to continue the

⁴³⁷ Breaking down the core/penumbra model further, the SPD as an opposition party is less “masculine” than those parties in power with the governing coalition. See Chapter 4, note 341.

charade of cooperation between the party-bound KdA and pacifist efforts. Others, like young Social Democrat Christel Beilmann, fought to keep the KdA spirit alive within the party while building up peace movement legitimacy in the extra-parliamentary sphere. If this were possible, Social Democratic pacifists could keep the antinuclear cause anchored in party politics and therefore maintain political legitimacy. In the end, however, Easter Marchers had to look outside national politics for credibility.

As the party drew closer to election victory in 1961 with Willy Brandt as chancellor candidate, the KdA suffered from neglect.⁴³⁸ The Social Democratic concept of peace became more often associated with basic needs like shelter, food, and security than with non-violence or an antinuclear pacifist ideology. The potential for legitimate pacifist activity in the political sphere was not lost, however. The SPD had legitimized periphery political space on the Left through its 1950s experiments in the extra-parliamentary penumbra. SPD leaders invited non-politicians into the political core through the Paulskirche and KdA campaigns, giving these extra-parliamentary activists enhanced authority when they moved on to subsequent organizations. The strength of this newfound authority was confirmed by SPD leaders' vehement struggle against the Easter Marches in the 1960s. As party leaders promoted peace in the party political core, they perceived strengthening penumbra peace activities as a direct threat to their own position. In order to avoid any association with the ethical pacifist Easter Marches, the party leaders prohibited SPD members from cooperative activism. They feared that continued blurring of the lines between party and penumbra politics would dilute potential SPD power in the "masculine" political core.

⁴³⁸ Heinrich Potthoff and Susanne Miller, *Kleine Geschichte der SPD* (Bonn: Dietz, 2002), 217. Hereafter cited as Potthoff and Miller, *Kleine Geschichte*.

Karl Otto confirms the significance of this reorganizational moment and the political dilemmas it created for activists and politicians in his seminal study *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*. When Wehner set the SPD on its new political course in 1960, Otto argues, “anti-militaristic opposition in the Federal Republic lost its parliamentary presence.”⁴³⁹ Otto infers that the “skepticism” surrounding the Easter March movement refers to its image as an ethical pacifist movement: one that did not belong, therefore, in the realm of *Realpolitik* (party politics). The question remains, however, why pacifist activists were not considered participants in *Realpolitik* when they frequently addressed issues within that realm, such as national security and diplomacy. In order to fully understand this accepted division between party and penumbra politics in the 1960s, historians must refer to the lasting effects of gendered notions of pacifism that can be traced back to Bertha von Suttner’s *Lay Down Your Arms*.⁴⁴⁰

The realm of party politics on the Left continued to be dominated by men after World War II and was often implicitly gendered as masculine. As seen earlier, the majority of active female politicians concerned themselves with *Frauenpolitik*: issues that directly affected women. Social welfare, abortion rights, and children’s needs were common pursuits of female politicians beginning in 1919, when German women were granted suffrage, to the 1960s and beyond. This trend is not surprising considering the discrimination suffered by women who deviated from “acceptable” women’s issues throughout this timeframe, such as Weimar representative Toni Sender and postwar MdB

⁴³⁹ Karl A. Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO: Geschichte der Ausserparlamentarische Opposition in der Bundesrepublik 1960-1970* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag, 1977), 98-99. Hereafter cited as Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*.

⁴⁴⁰ See Chapter 1 for an in-depth discussion of Bertha von Suttner and gendered pacifism.

Alma Kettig.⁴⁴¹ In the 1960s, however, a few exceptional women broke from this trend, becoming successful politicians while focusing on a broad array of topics, including women's issues. Annemarie Renger, who became the first female Bundestag president in 1972, is one excellent example. Considering herself part of a new generation of female Social Democrats after World War II, Renger consciously, and sometimes unconsciously, crafted her political positions according to gendered perceptions of politics.

Renger “never understood herself as a women's politician (*Frauenpolitikerin*)” but she frequently supported policies that would benefit women, such as abortion reform.⁴⁴² Indeed, Renger dedicated herself to diverse causes within the party, including support for KdA. The future Bundestag president specifically commented on the sense of hope for a successful antinuclear campaign in her memoir even though her political record as an advocate of anti-militarist measures in the Bundestag was spotty. In contrast to die-hard supporters like Menzel and Kettig, Renger describes a sudden demise of KdA after SPD election defeats instead of acknowledging its slow decline in her 1981 reflection on the movement.⁴⁴³ Renger was more personally invested in the party than in

⁴⁴¹ Julia Sneeringer, *Winning Women's Votes: Propaganda and Politics in Weimar Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 11. Toni Sender was often depicted harshly in Weimar media as an Amazon woman or other gendered stereotype. Sender writes in her memoir that a Catholic parliamentarian wrote about her first parliamentary appearance in “a very friendly tone.” Toni Sender, *The Autobiography of a German Rebel* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1939), 166. For another example see E.R. Müller, ed., “Das Rote Hochwasser. Respektlosigkeiten zum Magdeburger Parteitag,” (Magdeburg: Verlag Parteitags Komitee, 1929). Mappe 8-0005, NL Franz Künstler, AdsD. See also Belinda Davis, “The Personal is Political: Gender, Politics, and Political Activism in Modern German History,” in *Gendering Modern German History: Rewriting Historiography*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Jean H. Quataert, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 108. Hereafter cited as Davis, “Personal is Political.”

⁴⁴² Gisela Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft: Sozialdemokratinnen im Parlamentarischen Rat und im Deutschen Bundestag 1948/49-1957* (Bonn: Dietz, 2003), 406. Hereafter cited as Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*.

⁴⁴³ See Annemarie Renger, “‘Kampf dem Atomtod,’ ‘Friedensbewegung,’ SPD- Ein Lehrstück” *Neue Gesellschaft* 28, no. 8 (1981): 704-709.

peace activism, a position reinforced by her personal experiences and political role models.

In 1956 the SPD Bundestag faction supported the introduction of compulsory military service in Germany and represented a political turning point for Renger. Many pacifist Social Democrats specifically voted against this measure or deliberately avoided the vote although the faction as a whole decided to approve it.⁴⁴⁴ At the time, MdBs cast their votes by walking out a particular door. Nineteen pacifist Social Democrats including Kettig, Trudel Meyer, Fritz Wenzel, and Arno Behrisch voted against the measure and against their faction. Most interesting, however, several observers recalled seeing Renger pass through the “No” door and she became associated with the nineteen naysayers. Emotions ran high on all sides. Renger was outraged when she was named as one of the undisciplined Social Democrats, and representatives like Kettig were disappointed in Renger’s vehement denial of her alleged “No” vote.⁴⁴⁵ How Renger truly voted is irrelevant. The reaction to her actions and subsequent denial forced her to publically situate herself more firmly within the spheres of SPD politics in 1956. Her subsequent antinuclear sympathies must be read through this position. Although she sympathized with the KdA movement, Renger remained tied to her Social Democratic identity when the extra-parliamentary experiment faltered.

⁴⁴⁴ Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 274.

⁴⁴⁵ Stefan Appelius, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden: Biographie einer Bundestagsabgeordneten* (Oldenburg: BIS, Bibliotheks- und Informationssystem der Universität Oldenburg, 1990), 125. Hereafter cited as Appelius, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden*. Renger denied the alleged “no” vote until she died in 2008. Incidentally, Kettig related to Appelius how furious Ollenhauer was at the 19 naysayers. Ollenhauer’s fury lay not with the issue itself, but with party discipline. As fraction leader he suggested that those who could not vote with the party should stay away from the session altogether. Ollenhauer empathized with pacifist Social Democrats.

Individual politicians remain one of the best lenses into the subtle gendered meanings of the German political Left. Renger's behavior should be examined in tandem with her biography and position in the party. As Notz describes, Renger did not limit herself to women's issues during her political career. Perhaps this is one reason she distanced herself from a pacifist position, implicitly gendered feminine, most notably in 1956. Whereas several of her female colleagues in the 1956 Bundestag faction referred to their mothers as strong early political influences, Renger favored her father as a role model. Renger remembered that he was always available to discuss politics with her and as the "pet of the family" he began bringing her to public political events at an early age.⁴⁴⁶ Furthermore, Renger describes the fight to preserve the republic as her most "formative memory" during the Weimar period. She fondly recalls marching next to the prominent male Social Democrat, Paul Löbe, in support of this goal in 1931.⁴⁴⁷ After World War II, Renger discovered another strong male mentor in Kurt Schumacher. The party scion exerted great influence on Renger, shaping her political identity even before she became an MdB herself in 1953.⁴⁴⁸

Schumacher, who by 1948 had lost both an arm and a leg as a result of his World War I service and Nazi concentration camp ordeals, served as the charismatic leader of the SPD until his death in 1952. Iconic photographs after 1948 depict Renger literally supporting him at various political functions. Indeed, Renger described herself as

⁴⁴⁶ Such events would have been within the masculine political realm according Karen Hagemann's understanding in *Frauenalltag und Männerpolitik: Alltagsleben und Gesellschaftliches Handeln von Arbeiterfrauen in der Weimarer Republik* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1990). Hereafter cited as Hagemann, *Frauenalltag und Männerpolitik*.

⁴⁴⁷ Renate Lepsius, *Frauenpolitik als Beruf: Gespräche mit SPD-Parlamentarinnen* (Hamburg: Hoffmann and Campe, 1987), 52-53. Hereafter cited as Lepsius, *Frauenpolitik als Beruf*.

⁴⁴⁸ Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 395-401.

becoming his “second half” in her memoir.⁴⁴⁹ Acting in place of Schumacher’s amputated arm and leg, Renger symbolically made the disabled man whole. Renger accompanied Schumacher at all times and not only became an accepted extension of the man in her own eyes, but also in those of other party members. Her presence at the party chairman’s side was never questioned by contemporaries and Schumacher biographer Edinger notes that many Social Democrats felt that Renger wielded a strong political influence over him.

Edinger assesses Renger’s important influence on Schumacher, yet he classifies her in a different way than Schumacher’s other associates. Renger even plays a different role than Arno Scholz, who Edinger also sets apart from the rest of the party leaders’ closest confidants in his text. She is not among those whom the biographer identifies as Schumacher’s important “political associates,” however.⁴⁵⁰ The historian accepts Renger’s presence in Schumacher’s life as a given, but separates her from Schumacher’s male political associates. Edinger’s dismissal of Renger’s influence reveals the relative neglect of women’s roles in postwar SPD historiography that has only recently been addressed by scholars like Gisela Notz.

⁴⁴⁹ Renger, *Ein Politisches Leben*, 141. Sabine Kienitz notes in her work on the psychological effects of war-disabilities on conceptions of masculinity that losing the security of “body certainness” meant losing abilities “construed as male” such as “the habitus and practice of intellectual productivity, mobility and independence in their everyday lives.. [and] also the entitlement of those forms of authority enacted directly via the body.” Schumacher was deeply psychologically affected by his leg amputation. Renger describes his stubborn resistance to the surgery until Ollenhauer argued “We don’t need your leg, we need your head.” See Sabine Kienitz, “Body Damage: War Disability and Constructions of Masculinity in Weimar Germany,” in *Home/Front: The Military, War, and Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 187. See also Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 402 for an excellent photo of Renger supporting Schumacher.

⁴⁵⁰ Lewis Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 116. See also Appendix A “Schumacher’s Political Associates, 1947-1952.” Willy Albrecht’s study *Kurt Schumacher. Ein Leben für den demokratischen Sozialismus* (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1985) also barely mentions Renger’s role in Schumacher’s life.

After Schumacher's death, Renger campaigned for a position in the Bundestag, thus beginning her independent political career in 1953. Renger was influenced by masculine role models and she envisioned herself participating in the same political spheres as her mentors. In a fitting parallel, Renger's mother moved to Bonn and took care of her grandson as well as Renger's domestic affairs for the next nine years. Her mother's presence freed Renger from the stress of running a single-mother household and allowed her to pursue her political career more freely than many of her female colleagues, such as her predecessor Anni Krahnstöver who gave up her Bundestag seat when she got married.⁴⁵¹ Indeed, Renger's political position and personal choices reflect a strong affinity for the "masculine" political core and a desire to conform to a political identity often in conflict with the "feminine" periphery, including antinuclear politics.

As part of a new generation of female SPD representatives, Renger was not the only Social Democrat who formed connections between the party and its efforts to embrace extra-parliamentary activism. MdB Kettig was involved in both party politics and antinuclear activism throughout the 1950s. Although Kettig clung to the hope that the SPD would remain a parliamentary supporter of pacifist agendas into the 1960s, she relinquished her seat in the Bundestag in 1965 after years of intense pressure from party leaders. Unlike Renger, whose political activities illustrate the subtle gendering of political spheres on the Left, Kettig's case starkly reveals the consequences of gendered politics and stereotyping within the SPD. Kettig came into direct conflict with party leaders when their gendered perceptions of her personal life invaded and endangered her political position as an MdB. When her colleague and former lover Arno Behrisch left

⁴⁵¹ Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 404. Notz clarifies that party leaders frowned upon married couples serving in the Bundestag at the same time.

the SPD to join the DFU in 1961, Kettig came under fire not for her own allegiances, but for her extra-marital relationship with Behrisch that made her a political liability in the eyes of SPD leaders.⁴⁵²

Elected to the Bundestag the same year as Renger, Kettig was also among the Social Democratic MdBs who voted against compulsory military service in Germany in March 1956. An ardent pacifist and free-thinker, Kettig, along with eighteen colleagues, based her rejection of the military service requirement not only on pacifist convictions but a careful pacifist interpretation of the 1954 SPD party action plan. The political backlash that occurred when Kettig deviated from party line in 1956 made it painfully clear that the SPD leadership had begun to limit internal party space for pacifism.

Despite signs of shrinking party space for pacifism, Kettig attended the Frankfurt Paulskirche rally one year prior to the controversial vote and she eagerly participated in subsequent KdA demonstrations. Billed beside Behrisch, clergyman Martin Niemöller, and unionist Fritz Strothmann, Kettig spoke at the May 24, 1958 rally “End the Atomic Nonsense!” The Essen rally assumed the nonpartisan mantle of earlier KdA efforts and reflected the deep-seated pacifist values of the individuals who participated in and drove this movement, as well as the significant grassroots response. 2000 people participated in the Essen event.⁴⁵³ Kettig, the only woman on the program, followed Wessel’s cues from the March 23 rally in Frankfurt, focusing on the traditional roles of women as mothers and protectors.

⁴⁵² See also the extended discussion of Kettig’s Weimar and Nazi period experiences in Chapter 2.

⁴⁵³ Hans Karl Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer der Kampf Gegen die Atombewaffnung in den Fünfziger Jahren: Eine Studie zur Innenpolitischen Entwicklung der BRD* (Cologne Pahl-Rugenstein, 1984), 293. Hereafter cited as Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*.

Kettig targeted women, parents, and transnational pacifists in this moment of cooperative activism. Indeed, much of Kettig's work as an MdB centered on women's issues. Biographer Helga Julien argues that Kettig's experiences under the Nazi regime and the "one-sided" Nazi image of women as promoters of the "Aryan race" moved her to fight for equal rights in the postwar SPD.⁴⁵⁴ Kettig sought to empower married women and encouraged their participation in politics. As a single woman, Kettig accepted the political responsibility to fight for her female constituents. True to her word, Kettig once rode her bicycle for miles appealing to local officials in search of an apartment for a single mother in her constituency.⁴⁵⁵ Deeds like this and her enthusiastic presence at the 1958 KdA rally reflect how sincerely Kettig pursued her political tasks at both the grassroots and party political levels.

In her Essen speech, Kettig drew on a long tradition of pacifist rhetoric which focused on women as mothers and called on them to prevent future wars and nuclear proliferation. Kettig utilized powerful literary imagery to convey the antinuclear message to women. The politician quoted Spanish writer Salvador de Madariaga's vivid description of a child's life from conception to young adulthood, depicting the hardships and rewards of motherhood. Madariaga's passage ends with "he has claimed twenty years of anxiety, effort, sacrifice, and consideration...A bullet could kill him in one second."⁴⁵⁶ Kettig directly appealed to mothers with Madariaga's stark depiction of the realities of war.

⁴⁵⁴ Appellius, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden*, 116, 137.

⁴⁵⁵ See Erasmus Schöfer, *Die Kinder des Roten Grossvaters Erzählen* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1975), 243-245 for this excellent example of Kettig's devotion to women's needs as an MdB. Hereafter cited as Schöfer, *Kinder des Roten Grossvaters Erzählen*.

⁴⁵⁶ Stefan Appellius, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden*, 19.

Kettig, who once called housewives to activism from behind their stoves, mobilized this powerful pacifist motherhood imagery as a source of moral authority. She drew on the strong legacy of feminist language which Ann Taylor Allen indicates was used by both mothers and childless women to create a sense of community through the experience of motherhood.⁴⁵⁷ Historian Irene Stoehr further notes that patriotic images of the self-sacrificing mother who sent her sons off to war were commonplace in postwar Germany. After 1945, Stoehr argues, this imagery “contributed to women’s attempts to work through their experience of war.”⁴⁵⁸ In 1958, as the only female speaker at the rally, Kettig mobilized the familiar maternalist legacy to convince women that sometimes the most effective way to recognize the value of peace was to relate it to the trauma of war experiences.⁴⁵⁹ These experiences were still fresh for many German women.

The use of Spaniard Madariaga’s quote was more than a simple pacifist appeal to mothers however. Kettig combined her efforts to pursue women’s politics with a keen awareness of the transnational importance of pacifism. Madariaga was a member of the League of Nations secretariat and became the head of the Disarmament section in 1922. Although Kettig consciously employed his words to spur women to action against nuclear arms, her use of Madariaga illustrates an awareness of his transnational significance. Indeed, Madariaga’s passage is itself testament to an enduring association of pacifism with women and mothers that crossed national borders. Kettig paired her call for mothers

⁴⁵⁷ Ann Taylor Allen, *Feminism and Motherhood in Germany, 1800-1914* (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1991), 3-12. Hereafter cited as Allen, *Feminism and Motherhood in Germany*.

⁴⁵⁸ Irene Stoehr, “Cold War Communities: Women’s Peace Politics in Postwar West Germany, 1945-1952,” in *Home/Front*, Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schueler-Springorum, ed. (New York: Berg, 2002), 317.

⁴⁵⁹ Kettig’s efforts mirror Suttner’s in *Lay Down Your Arms* though perhaps not intentionally.

and fathers “all over the world” to unite against nuclear arms deftly with the words of man who led the pursuit of disarmament before World War II and advocated international cooperation among governments.⁴⁶⁰ She linked SPD politics, pacifism, motherhood, and transnational cooperation in her brief, yet meaningful speech.

The SPD’s programmatic change of course in 1959 and 1960 shook Kettig’s political convictions yet again, but was not the primary reason for her resignation from the Bundestag in 1965. Kettig was increasingly marginalized within the party due to her pacifist views and enjoyed the company of only eleven other colleagues in her last major Bundestag vote against the Emergency Laws.⁴⁶¹ When asked about the reasons for Kettig’s departure in an interview, Renger recalled that she “went to the other side” and was involved in a love affair.⁴⁶² According to Renger, Kettig’s pacifist convictions were so far out of sync with SPD party intentions that she became part of a political dichotomy representing “the other side” although she remained a party member. Renger’s “other side” alluded to Kettig’s devotion to pacifism and an implicitly understood separation between the “masculine” political core and “feminine,” therefore vulnerable, penumbra that grew consistently stronger after 1960. Additionally, Renger and many other colleagues perceived Kettig’s rather well-known affair with Behrisch as political folly.

Not only did Kettig break a serious postwar taboo regarding marriage and romantic relationships between Social Democratic MdB’s, she got involved with a man who later joined the DFU, an organization strongly suspected to be influenced by East

⁴⁶⁰ Madariaga was head of the League of Nations Disarmament Section from 1922-1927. Paul Preston, *Salvador de Madariaga and the Quest for Liberty in Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 6.

⁴⁶¹ “Zwolf Sozialdemokraten stimmten dagegen,” *Die Andere Zeitung* (July 22, 1965). “Alma Kettig,” Box 5121, Sammlung Personalialia, AdsD, and Appellius, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden*, 90-2.

⁴⁶² Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 278.

German Communists. Behrisch became the object of extreme suspicion within the SPD and Kettig's association with him brought party fears of Communist infiltration within the political core to the forefront. Despite this discrimination, Kettig remained an active MdB until 1965 and proudly maintained her party membership until her death in 1997.

Anti-Communist sentiment was abundant in the post-1945 SPD, even among respected leaders like Ollenhauer, causing deeper divisions between core party politics and periphery pacifist organizations like the Easter Marches.⁴⁶³ Party leaders questioned the degree to which pacifists cooperated with East German agents bent on weakening West German political strongholds. While long-standing suspicions of Communists stemmed from the Weimar Republic, Social Democrats particularly feared Communist infiltration of a pacifist periphery seen as a vulnerable feminine opposite of a masculine core during the postwar. Indeed, Julia Sneeringer concludes that by the end of the Weimar Republic almost every political party came to view women as a type of "vessel," which is "by nature passive."⁴⁶⁴ By extension, postwar party leaders assumed agents in the "feminine" penumbra, including participants in peace movements like the KdA, were passive and vulnerable to political suggestions. Leading Social Democrats conflated anti-Communist and gendered political concerns after World War II, and allowed these prejudices to shape internal and external party politics during the early 1960s.

Kettig's case exposes the consequences of these Social Democratic biases. In this political context of suspicion and party upheaval, Kettig faced discrimination based on

⁴⁶³ Ollenhauer carried his suspicion of Communists from his days in the Social Democratic Youth movement and through Nazi exile. Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, *Ollenhauer: Biedermann und Patriot* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1984), 33.

⁴⁶⁴ Sneeringer, *Winning Women's Votes*, 282.

Social Democratic perceptions of both gender and pacifism. Party leaders questioned her ability to remain politically independent from Behrisch although they did not base this distrust on Kettig's own service record. As Notz emphasizes, the couple agreed early on to remain politically independent; a decision which disappointed Behrisch when Kettig remained in the SPD after his exclusion in 1961. Nevertheless, it is clear that party officials perceived Kettig as vulnerable because of her sex. Behrisch's expulsion from the SPD made her a further liability when he immediately joined the newly-formed pacifist party, the DFU.⁴⁶⁵ Not only did leading Social Democrats see the DFU as a potential site for Communist infiltration, Behrisch and Kettig's relationship threatened the political security of the SPD. Kettig's status as a woman and influences from the pacifist DFU, implicitly gendered as feminine, posed a double threat to stability of a political Left which remained centered on "masculine" party politics.

At a time when married couples were not allowed to serve during the same Bundestag term, Kettig and Behrisch broke two social and political taboos.⁴⁶⁶ Their unconventional personal relationship defied traditional understandings of the family and challenged party officials to address the otherwise unmentionable conflict of interest created by her alleged romance with Behrisch. SPD leaders like Karl Mommer, who served as President of the SPD Bundestag faction, did not openly address Kettig and Behrisch's relationship but their apprehension was clear. Mommer and others suspected Kettig was more vulnerable because of her romantic relationship. They even claimed that

⁴⁶⁵ Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 279.

⁴⁶⁶ In 1965 Lucie Kurlbaum-Beyer and her husband Georg became the first married couple to serve together in the SPD Bundestag faction. See Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft*, 336.

she passed confidential party information to Behrisch and tapped her phones in their efforts to force her out of the party.⁴⁶⁷

In 1961 SPD leaders were preoccupied by concerns that Behrisch's new party was heavily influenced by Communists, only augmenting their worries about Kettig. Few of Behrisch's Social Democratic male colleagues ran into the same problems; Kettig was seen as vulnerable to his influence because of her gender. Behrisch's wife left her city council position under similar pressures in 1961, reinforcing the point. Outside of the party leadership, however, loyalties between Social Democrats and pacifists remained blurred. Kettig recalled, for example, that the majority of Social Democrats stayed in their seats when Mommer tried to initiate an SPD walkout during one of Behrisch's 1961 Bundestag speeches.⁴⁶⁸

Behrisch and his colleagues attempted to integrate ethical pacifism fully into the "masculine" party political core through the DFU. For many pacifist Social Democrats, Herbert Wehner's decisive June 1960 speech was the last straw.⁴⁶⁹ Frustrated activists founded the DFU and the new party prepared to face many obstacles in the 1961 elections. The first and most significant drawback was the five-percent threshold every West German party had to exceed in order to obtain Bundestag representation. Similar to SPD strategies in 1958, DFU leaders tried to capitalize on widespread antinuclear

⁴⁶⁷ "Interview Stefan Appelius mit Alma Kettig," August 5, 1989. Sammlung Appelius, AdsD. Accessed June 2007. Hereafter cited as "Interview Stefan Appelius mit Alma Kettig," August 5, 1989. When asked why she thought she was being followed and having her phones tapped in 1963 Kettig responded the only reason could be her difficulties with the SPD faction.

⁴⁶⁸ "Interview Stefan Appelius mit Alma Kettig," August 5, 1989. See also Marie Behrisch to the Vorstand des Ortsvereins Hof der SPD, March 25, 1961, "Arno Behrisch," Box 856, Sammlung Personalialia, AdsD. Behrisch finished his term in the Bundestag as an independent representative after he left the SPD.

⁴⁶⁹ Arno Behrisch to Stefan Appelius, December 16, 1986. Box "Arno Behrisch," Sammlung Appelius, AdsD.

feelings as well as pick up the torch left smoldering by pacifist GVP supporters who joined the SPD in 1957. “The five-percent-clause is no problem if all concerned democrats vote for the DFU this time” a poster announced during the DFU’s second and last Bundestag campaign.⁴⁷⁰

It is clear that even mainstream pacifists questioned the DFU’s viability in parliament. DFG Chairman of Trustees Max Stierwaldt expressed his feelings directly in a 1961 letter. “If one could be 100% sure that the DFU will exceed the 5-percent clause (I hope so) and that it will not stall once in Bonn, then I would prefer to see all our leading officials...clearly stand on the [DFU] side.”⁴⁷¹ Even top pacifists like Stierwaldt harbored doubts about a party explicitly marketed as a peace party. Lacking the confidence of many voters in its target audience, like DFG members, the DFU never realized its parliamentary ambitions. It fell short of the benchmark in 1961 and 1965 by more than three percent. Behrisch would remain the DFU’s only voice in the Bundestag as he completed his elected tenure as an independent MdB.

The DFU program was grounded in ethical pacifism and anti-militarism. “Whoever wants peace must vote for peace” exclaimed one 1961 election flyer. Another poster boasted “Choose Peace-DFU-...Neutral and Nuclear Weapon-Free.”⁴⁷²

Furthermore the new party inspired debates among mainstream pacifists, the DFG in

⁴⁷⁰ “Verlorene Stimmen” in *Wahrheiten-Wahlzeitung der Deutschen Friedens-Union*, n.d., ca. 1965 and Rosel Lohse-Link, “Bürger und Bürgerinnen!” poster, n.d., ca. 1965. Box 1, Sammlung Appelius, AdsD.

⁴⁷¹ Max Stierwaldt to Ludwig Blümke, August 26, 1961. Box “Stierwaldt A-B,” NL Max Stierwaldt, Sammlung Appelius, AdsD.

⁴⁷² “Aufrüstung führt zwangsläufig zum Krieg,” n.d. ca. 1961. Box “Organisation, DFU,” Sammlung Appelius, AdsD. “Frieden wählen - DFU - Deutsche Friedens-Union - neutral – atomwaffenfrei.” Signature: 6/PLKA020520, Plakatsammlung, AdsD.

particular, as to whether pacifists who remained hitherto unconnected to a political party should join the DFU. Hamburg DFG member Ludwig Blümke argued that the organization had “rightly” remained nonpartisan up to 1961, but with the lack of SPD support in parliament the DFG should now come out in support of the DFU. Blümke admitted that although he voted for the SPD in 1957, he now supported the DFU. Hans Woltering also petitioned the DFG trustees for support in 1961.⁴⁷³ DFG leaders answered both men with the organization’s strict policy to remain nonpartisan. They reiterated, however, that individual members were free to engage in party political activities on their own accord.

The DFG leaders’ precautions were understandable when considered with the DFU’s risky attempt to represent ethical pacifist politics in the party core as well as its real vulnerability to outside influence. Representing ethical pacifism, a peace ideology seen as particularly feminine, the DFU found hostile territory in party politics. As a penumbra organization, the DFG could not afford the risk of direct association with the DFU cause. Even DFU founder and former Social Democrat Renate Riemeck recognized the DFG’s need for political independence. Riemeck was convinced that any efforts to link the peace society directly with a political party would have led to its demise. Even though many DFG members participated in the DFU, the suspicions surrounding the party would have potentially weakened the already fragile peace society.⁴⁷⁴ The SPD

⁴⁷³ Oberregierungsrat a.D. Blümke to the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft Bezirksgruppe Hamburg, August 1961 and August 19, 1961. Box Stierwaldt A-B, NL Max Stierwaldt and Hans Wolter to Stierwaldt, March 3 and 22, 1961, Box Stierwaldt C-H, Sammlung Appelius. See also Stefan Appelius, *Pazifismus in Westdeutschland: Die Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft 1945-1968* (Aachen: G. Mainz, 1991), 481-94 for further discussion of the DFG-DFU relationship in 1961. Hereafter cited as Appelius, *Pazifismus*.

⁴⁷⁴ The DFG eventually merged with the War Resisters International. See Appelius, *Pazifismus*, 639-667.

was the main supporter of these doubts, condemning DFU organizational activities in 1960. Leading Social Democrats consistently claimed the DFU was supported by Communists. This defensive position was driven partly by SPD leaders' convictions that ethical pacifism belonged to a more vulnerable periphery political realm and partly because the SPD's position as a peace party was threatened by the DFU's pacifist platform. Stefan Appelius' interviews with former DFU members suggest that the union emerged as a legitimate opposition party and viable alternative for former members of the banned West German KPD, yet insiders later admitted that within a few years the party was compromised by Communist agents.⁴⁷⁵

While the DFU pursued peace politics in the party political core, the Easter March movement founded by Hans-Konrad Tempel filled the political space vacated by the KdA. Tempel organized the first West German march in Hamburg a year after participating in the 1959 British antinuclear march to Aldermaston. The Social Democrat and Quaker carefully differentiated between the KdA and Easter Marches, however, declaring that the KdA was a "precursor" to the Easter Marches and that it could not be called a peace movement. For Tempel, party affiliation set the KdA apart from the Easter Marches which were conceptualized foremost as a gathering of individuals against nuclear weapons outside of party politics. 120 "politically motivated marchers, pacifists and Christians" marched from Hamburg to Bergen-Hohne over a four-day Easter weekend in 1960. Tempel and his wife Helga gathered supporters together under the transnationally-conscious slogan "Against atomic weapons of any kind or in any nation in

⁴⁷⁵ Appelius, *Pazifismus*, 468, 475, and 481.

the East or West.”⁴⁷⁶ “We are going to the streets because those who should represent us do not represent us anymore,” Tempel explained in a *Die Andere Zeitung* article.⁴⁷⁷ The marches resonated among activists, especially KdA participants, eager for an effective outlet for antinuclear protest. By 1961 9,000 people marched and 23,000 gathered at the closing rallies of Easter Marches around Germany.

The Easter March founders’ insistence on the differences between the KdA and its own strategies has led prominent historians and political scientists such as Otto, Nehring, and Cooper to position the initiative as a new type of protest movement which itself expanded political space.⁴⁷⁸ In reality however, the SPD and KdA had created new political space between core party politics and extra-parliamentary activism, laying the foundations that enabled Easter March organizers to mobilize popular protest as a practical strategy in the early 1960s. In fact, *Die Andere Zeitung* declared in 1963 that the Easter Marches were the “legitimate heirs” of the KdA.

Tempel himself took part in an Easter March rally at the Frankfurt Paulskirche on the fifth anniversary of the original 1958 KdA demonstration in the same city. Anne Kolb, the widow of Frankfurt’s former Social Democratic mayor and supporter of the

⁴⁷⁶ Johannes Bastian, “Ein Blick in die Geschichte der Friedensbewegung” *Westermanns Pädagogische Beiträge* 34 (1982): 122. Hereafter cited as Bastian, “Ein Blick in die Geschichte der Friedensbewegung.”

⁴⁷⁷ “Wo einst Erich Ollenhauer stand...” *Die Andere Zeitung* (April 4, 1963). Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 102.

⁴⁷⁸ In particular see Nehring, “Demonstrating for ‘Peace’ in the Cold War: the British and West German Easter Marches, 1958-1964” in Matthias Reiss, ed., *The Street as Stage: Protest Marches and Public Rallies since the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 278. Nehring and other Easter March historians tend to see the demise of KdA and the rise of the Easter Marches as separate events although Otto notes the Easter Marches as one of three successor movements to the crumbling KdA. Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 65. Cooper notes that “the political opportunity structure improved significantly for protest in general” when the Easter Marches were founded but downplays their significance. Alice Holmes Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements Since 1945*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 80, 84. Hereafter cited as Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace*.

Paulskirche movement, told the press that she fully supported the Easter Marches. Otto attributes this transitional moment to Easter March leaders' confidence in the ability of the new movement to take over "abandoned KdA-potential."⁴⁷⁹ Despite Tempel's insistence on separation, the Easter Marchers truly inherited the political space opened up by the SPD-sponsored KdA and Paulskirche campaigns. The Easter March rally in Frankfurt symbolically conveyed important ideological continuities between the new extra-parliamentary movement and previous antinuclear movements that bridged the distance between party politics and extra-parliamentary activism. After Frankfurt, the Easter March movement stood on the foundations of cooperative behavior set by previous antinuclear movements like the KdA.

Building on the legacy of the Paulskirche and KdA initiatives, Easter March organizers took the idea of party independence to an extreme, prohibiting any organization from participation in the events.⁴⁸⁰ Otto argues that this allowed the original Easter Marches to unify protestors against nuclear weapons as opposed to a specific political agenda. Cooper takes this argument further, asserting the Easter March ideology was "thus ethical-pacifist, rather than political."⁴⁸¹ The Easter March organizers always aimed to influence West German politicians, though, so their actions, however nonpartisan, should be classified as political.

The primary reason for the emphasis on nonpartisanship was to avoid potential accusations of Communist influence that were rampant in postwar West German society.

⁴⁷⁹ "ostermarsch der atomwaffengegner kampagne für abrüstung pressedienst," (c. 1963), Mapped 8, NL Beilmann, AdsD. Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 106.

⁴⁸⁰ Bastian, "Ein Blick in die Geschichte der Friedensbewegung," 120-3.

⁴⁸¹ Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 73. Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace*, 99.

“SPD leaders, who formerly called for the *Kampf dem Atomtod*, are now suspicious of the Easter March Movement and the DFU” because both groups attempted to resurrect former party slogans, a reporter from *Die Andere Zeitung* complained.⁴⁸² The SPD leadership’s suspicions were well-known and the party cited Communist influence as a main cause for its rejection of the Easter Marches in 1960.⁴⁸³ Indeed, both Hans-Konrad and Helga Tempel expressed their fears of being labeled as a Communist “camouflage” organization after seeing the DFU suffer politically under the same brand.⁴⁸⁴

Historians Christoph Butterwegge and Heinz-Gerd Hofschien blame increased fears of Communism in the 1950s and 1960s on the outbreak of the Korean War.⁴⁸⁵ Social Democratic anxiety over Communist influence went deeper than that however. Party leaders in Ollenhauer’s generation remembered the destructive effects of Communism on the unity of the political Left during the Weimar Republic. Fears of Communist influence and anti-Communist propaganda were both familiar strains in the SPD between 1921 and 1966, especially after 1960 when competition for voter allegiance on the Left, even covert competition, threatened SPD aspirations for a governing coalition. A 1960 political cartoon from *Die Andere Zeitung* illustrates this legacy well. (Figure 5)

⁴⁸² “Führende Politiker der SPD...,” *Die Andere Zeitung* (April 11, 1963).

⁴⁸³ Vorstand der SPD, *Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1960/1961* (Hannover-Bonn: Neuer Vorwärts Verlag, 1961), 464. Hereafter cited as *SPD Jahrbuch 1960/61*.

⁴⁸⁴ Bastian, “Ein Blick in die Geschichte der Friedensbewegung,” 122.

⁴⁸⁵ Christoph Butterwegge and Heinz-Gerd Hofschien, *Sozialdemokratie, Krieg und Frieden* (Heilbronn: Distel Verlag, 1984), 232.




Figure 5: “March to the SPD Party Meeting” *Die Andere Zeitung*, November 1960.

The cartoon depicts leading party reformers Brandt and Herbert Wehner marching confidently towards the 1960 party meeting in Hannover wielding a worn sledgehammer labeled “anti-Communist slogans (proven effective since 1918).” Brandt represents the smiling fresh face of the party while Wehner follows as the determined reformer working behind the scenes. The hammer is tagged with the instruction “for handling uncomfortable proposals.” Ollenhauer trails the two significantly larger SPD leaders, holding up the corner of the hammer while reluctantly gazing out toward the reader. The cartoon’s message points to the SPD’s tradition of anti-Communist rhetoric and its continued use after 1959 in the face of Easter March opponents in the extra-parliamentary realm.

Although Ollenhauer used anti-Communist rhetoric to defend the party from collaboration with KPD exiles during the Nazi Regime, he is depicted in the cartoon as a

reluctant postwar participant. Cartoon Ollenhauer looks to the reader as if to say that he is going along with the reforms for the sake of party discipline but he has not forgotten his constituency and most important, the antinuclear currents in the SPD which led Ollenhauer to participate in the Paulskirche and KdA movements. Indeed, Ollenhauer appeared on KdA stationary and renewed his commitment to KdA as late as 1960.⁴⁸⁶ After the SPD prohibition, however, the party chairman defended the party decision to withdraw from extra-parliamentary activities and cooperative antinuclear activism, coming into conflict with former colleagues like Max Born.

As Figure 5 suggests, Ollenhauer's position as party chairman and KdA member became increasingly complicated as the SPD distanced itself from extra-parliamentary activities and marched confidently towards party reform. Instead of heading the charge, the aging party chairman became a conduit for official party policy and a critical link to the party for pacifist Social Democrats frustrated with the new political direction. Strikingly, Ollenhauer is out of step with Brandt and Wehner in the cartoon, further indication of his position apart from Brandt and Wehner as a former member of the SOPADE, Paulskirche Movement, and KdA. Each of these three affiliations could be characterized as "feminine" and limited Ollenhauer's potential for power in the "masculine" political core. When KdA rallies dropped off in 1959, Ollenhauer addressed a complaint from Alfred Teuchert insisting, as he did many times over in his correspondence to unhappy constituents, that the SPD "now as before intensively

⁴⁸⁶ Menzel to die Teilnehmer des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, November 12, 1959. Mappe 1/WMAC000028, NL Menzel, AdsD.

support[ed] KdA activities.”⁴⁸⁷ The nature of these activities had changed however. Ollenhauer directed Teuchert’s attention from the obvious lack of the traditional public demonstrations to new KdA campaigns within the party political realm. The party chairman proudly described a KdA campaign for government support of the Red Cross Action for the prohibition of A-B-C weapons.⁴⁸⁸ This effort portrayed SPD efforts to bring the KdA into the party political realm and engage with *Realpolitik*, as Otto characterized it, rather than extra-parliamentary activities.

Ollenhauer came under direct fire again in 1961, this time from renowned physicist Max Born, cosigner of the original KdA appeal. Born stated that when he signed the appeal with Ollenhauer in 1958, the party “was completely behind the movement.” “Now that is not longer the case,” he concluded matter-of-factly.⁴⁸⁹ Continuing, Born criticized SPD treatment of the Easter Marches and asked “I would be grateful, Herr Ollenhauer, if you could explain to me how the SPD could change its opinion over a fundamental question in such a way.” Ollenhauer personally replied with repeated assurances that the SPD still pursued every “defense” against the nuclear arms

⁴⁸⁷ Ollenhauer (Heinz Castrup) to Alfred Teuchert, December 7, 1959. Mappe 237, NL Ollenhauer, AdsD.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid and Ollenhauer (Heinz Castrup) to Günter Obermeyer, November 6, 1959. Mappe 236, NL Ollenhauer, AdsD. Menzel to Teilnehmer des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, November 12, 1959. Mappe 1/WMAC 000028, NL Menzel, AdsD. Ollenhauer cited the “Konvention des Roten Kreuzes zur Ächtung der Massenvernichtungsmittel.” The draft of this convention was brought to the 1957 Conference in New Delhi but deferred to the national level when the Western powers rejected the guidelines as too strict and the Socialist countries criticized the measure’s “lack of clarity.” See François Bugnion, “The International Committee of the Red Cross and Nuclear Weapons: From Hiroshima to the Dawn of the 21st Century,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 87, no. 859 (September 2005), 518. See Barbara Thiede, “Anti-Nuclear Liberals and the Bomb: A Comparative History of Kampf Dem Atomtod and the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 1957-1963,” (PhD diss., University of Missouri -Columbia, 1992) 232-9 for her discussion of the KdA leaders’ support of what became known as the Red Cross Action and their efforts to promote an international ban of nuclear weapons in the national and transnational arena. Hereafter cited as Thiede, “Anti-Nuclear Liberals.”

⁴⁸⁹ Max Born to Ollenhauer, March 28, 1961, Mappe 241, NL Ollenhauer, AdsD.

race.⁴⁹⁰ Born remained convinced that the party was treating the Easter March activists unfairly. Perhaps constituents like Born were the intended recipients of Ollenhauer's rueful gaze in Figure 5.

In addition to the strong party tradition of anti-Communism and fears of a vulnerable "feminine" political penumbra, there is a transnational aspect to SPD anti-Communist sentiment. Communist influences threatened West German politics from outside what were considered by many contemporaries to be national boundaries. Known Communist influence within the DFU as well as the Guillaume affair in 1974, when an East German spy was discovered in Brandt's inner circle, prove that East German and Communist infiltration of West German politics was, in fact, possible. Ollenhauer drew attention to the transnational threat, declaring in his opening speech at the 1960 party meeting, "there is no neutral neighborhood (*Lebensbezirk*) and no geographic island that the worldwide struggle with Communists does not reach!"⁴⁹¹ Social Democrats and Germans in general struggled to define their national identity and were keenly aware of the "dangers" represented by any force that might disrupt their new-found political balance.

After twelve years of uncertainty, the fear of Communist influence in West Germany during the Cold War was grounded in past experiences of political breakdown. This was especially true among SPD leaders like Ollenhauer, who was willing to sacrifice

⁴⁹⁰ Ollenhauer to Born, April 18, 1961 and Born to Ollenhauer, April 28, 1961. Mappe 241, NL Ollenhauer, AdsD. Born cites the SPD's reliance on scientists and use of scientific expert opinions in their KdA campaigns as a key point. The dangers still exist, but the SPD does not acknowledge them anymore according to Born.

⁴⁹¹ Vorstand der SPD, Bonn, *Protokoll der Verhandlungen und Anträge vom Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands in Hannover 21. bis 25. November 1960* (Bonn: Neuer Vorwärts Verlag, 1960), 76. Hereafter cited as 1960 *Parteitag*.

his antinuclear convictions for measures he believed would lead to party stability.⁴⁹² Ultimately, the assumption that the political penumbra was particularly susceptible to Communist influence drove the SPD even further from feminine extra-parliamentary activities in the 1960s although it maintained official sponsorship of the KdA into the late 1960s.

As the Easter Marches gained momentum, the KdA limped along within the SPD. The committee steadily declined in membership and influence until it dissolved officially in 1968.⁴⁹³ Scholars have discounted the fact that the KdA, though significantly handicapped by the lack of party support, remained a part of SPD strategy long after it supposedly “failed” in 1959. The KdA committee served an important strategic role in the SPD even though it was politically stagnant. After 1959 KdA became a buffer against outright SPD rejection of the antinuclear or pacifist organizations. KdA member Max Brauer noted the significance of this position in a 1961 letter to Ollenhauer. “I can fully understand that we cannot give up our own organization [KdA] and that we need to develop the outward appearance of activity,” Brauer conceded.⁴⁹⁴ As Menzel’s successor to the KdA chair, Brauer cooperated with party expectations for the committee where Menzel could not. The KdA would function as a symbolic place marker for SPD pacifist activity between 1960 and 1966. Social Democrats may have embraced the policy changes initiated by the Godesberg Program and Wehner’s 1960 speech, but they did not

⁴⁹² See the discussion of Ollenhauer’s Weimar and exile experiences in Chapter 2.

⁴⁹³ Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 237. See footnote 1264.

⁴⁹⁴ Brauer to Ollenhauer, October 20, 1961. Mappe 245, NL Ollenhauer, AdsD.

forget the still substantial constituency which rejected nuclear arms and had encouraged party sponsorship of the KdA campaign in the first place.

The 1960/1961 SPD Yearbook provides a most telling example of SPD use of KdA as a party counterpoint to the extra-parliamentary Easter Marches. According to the yearbook, “party members of the *Kampf dem Atomtod* Committee,” not party leaders, “[were] requested to ensure that Social Democrats [did] not participate in the planned Easter Marches.”⁴⁹⁵ This passive statement against the Easter Marches placed responsibility for the prohibition specifically in the hands of KdA members and not party leaders. Similar to Tempel’s attempts to create distance between KdA and the Easter Marches, this statement gives agency to the Social Democratic antinuclear activists. With this strategy, the SPD created a dichotomy between legitimate, party-bound peace activism and rogue, possibly Communist-influenced developing APOs. This way, they hoped to avoid a direct confrontation between party and peace organizations. SPD leaders used the once extra-parliamentary KdA committee as a buffer between the party and the potentially negative consequences of interaction with an extra-parliamentary movement seen as “feminine” and vulnerable to Communist influence and slander.

The continued existence of KdA and the party’s increasingly mainstream politics caused considerable strain on the relationship between the party and pacifists between 1960 and 1966. Convinced pacifists and antinuclear advocates within the SPD and KdA committee took the brunt of this uneasy coexistence. Menzel found himself particularly caught between his convictions and general party reform. In a July 1960 press release Menzel reiterated the SPD’s cooperation and support of KdA “in the same capacity as in

⁴⁹⁵ *SPD Jahrbuch 1960/1961*, 464.

1958.” The release included a final note advising “subscribers and friends that Dr. Walter Menzel is a member of the SPD party executive committee.”⁴⁹⁶ The party specifically utilized Menzel’s dual position as a party executive and antinuclear activist to ground the KdA and its future activities firmly within the party political core. Furthermore, the declaration of support indicated the proper outlet for Social Democratic antinuclear activism in 1961. SPD members were encouraged to follow Menzel’s example by remaining active members of the party while satisfying the need for individual cooperative activism in the KdA. Menzel, however, was unable to accept the growing political contradictions, resigning his position as committee chair less than six months later.⁴⁹⁷

Despite SPD efforts to maintain the KdA façade, historian Hans-Karl Rupp cites the increased participation of KdA members Andres, Kloppenburg, and Bodo Manstein in the 1961 Easter Marches as an indication that committee was falling apart.⁴⁹⁸ Rupp discounts the fact that these men did not specifically withdraw from the KdA however. Andres, Kloppenburg, and Manstein all ignored the party’s warnings against participation in the marches and continued their personal cooperative activism. Indeed, Kloppenburg and young activist Christel Beilmann fought hard to reconcile the KdA and the Easter Marches, focusing their efforts on promoting personal and transnational contacts between the two antinuclear efforts.

⁴⁹⁶ “Atomzeitalter – aktuell (Nr. 2),” July 5, 1960. Mappe 191, NL Bechert, AdsD. *Atomzeitalter* was a KdA publication.

⁴⁹⁷ “Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Vorstandes des Arbeitsausschusses “Kampf dem Atomtod” e. V. November 29, 1961. Menzel to Alexander Maaß, September 26, 1962. Mappe 28, NL Menzel, AdsD.

⁴⁹⁸ Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 236-7.

Kloppenburg in particular represents a fascinating case. In 1961, the clergyman became a member of the Easter March board of trustees, yet he remained active in the KdA. Menzel and Kloppenburg enjoyed a mutually supportive collaboration. The activist corresponded with Menzel, receiving the confidential messages of KdA approval of the Easter Marches. Kloppenburg notably wrote to Menzel on September 25, 1961 with the suggestion that the KdA not seek direct affiliation with the European Federation against Nuclear Arms. The KdA, according to Kloppenburg, should remain associated with the SPD and labor unions because links to the European Federation would imply that the committee had lost its party political support. Kloppenburg recognized that KdA legitimacy was grounded in the group's intimate ties to core party politics, however empty the party's support might be.⁴⁹⁹

Kloppenburg, like Born, was deeply disappointed by the SPD's position on the Easter Marches. When the majority of KdA members rejected a 1961 proposal to oppose NATO as a nuclear force, Kloppenburg became gravely concerned about the organization. He appealed to Ollenhauer directly, seeing him as a former KdA colleague, not just the party chairman. Indeed, although few other politicians were ready to reaffirm their commitment to KdA in 1960, Ollenhauer was one of the two prominent Social Democrats still involved in the committee.⁵⁰⁰ Ollenhauer's persistent personal support of the initiative, attests to his commitment to the cause beyond just political strategy. Like Menzel, Ollenhauer was forced to confront the tension between his own individual

⁴⁹⁹ Kloppenburg to Menzel, September 25, 1961. Signature 613/37, NL Kloppenburg, EZAB. Kloppenburg would later appeal to the European Federation on behalf of the Easter Marches in an effort to gain legitimacy outside of party politics... he was very clever in terms of legitimatizing political space.

⁵⁰⁰ Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 234. The other was Gustav Heinemann.

political activism and his relationship to reform-minded colleagues like Brandt and Wehner.

On February 20, 1961 Ollenhauer called a meeting with Wehner, Ernst Schoettle, Menzel, and Kloppenburg in order to clarify and discuss the party's position on the Easter Marches. Ollenhauer reiterated that SPD leaders were most concerned with Communist influences in what they saw to be loosely organized activism in the vulnerable periphery. Party leaders refused to cooperate or even tacitly approve of Social Democratic participation in the movement even when Kloppenburg, as acting KdA chair for the ill Menzel, suggested stricter screening for march participants. Ollenhauer and his colleagues continued to act in what they believed to be the best interests of the SPD. Although he remained linked to both the SPD and KdA, Ollenhauer feared the potential of Communist influence in extra-parliamentary antinuclear activism and the danger this posed to a unified SPD. Party stability was worth the sacrifice Ollenhauer endured when he turned away from the antinuclear agenda he had supported for almost fifteen years.

Ollenhauer's reluctance to abandon the antinuclear campaign in favor of party loyalty shows through when he again attempted to clarify the SPD's position on the Easter Marches and disarmament in a follow-up letter to Kloppenburg. The SPD "distanced itself from the Easter Marches not because it supports a nuclear arms race or has given up on disarmament, but because the Easter Marches do not seem to be an appropriate means to bring us closer to disarmament," according to the chair. To some extent, Ollenhauer was correct. Even today the Easter Marches and other antinuclear movements have not achieved the goal of universal nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, peace historian Wittner argues the "public pressure" the antinuclear movements applied

to world leaders played a role in limiting the scope of the nuclear arms race even though neither a party nor movement has been able to achieve full disarmament.⁵⁰¹

In March 1961 SPD leaders published a revised declaration of opposition to the Easter Marches, finally taking full responsibility for the ban. It explicitly states, “[t]he Social Democratic Party cannot and will not support these events.” In a separate notice, Ollenhauer specified that party leaders expected KdA committee members and local groups to comply with this policy as well. As an alternative, they suggested supporting the causes of Social Democracy, which they left open to interpretation in an effort to bring pacifist Social Democrats back into the party fold. The last point reiterated that the SPD sought to end the arms race and pursue controlled, international disarmament.⁵⁰² Party leaders continued to employ the KdA as a rhetorical tool in order to sustain its reputation as a peace party.

The image of the SPD as a peace party remained strong despite party opposition to the Easter Marches. Brandt replaced Ollenhauer as Chancellor candidate and became the fresh face of the party in the 1961 election campaign. Publicity for the election made two things clear. First, many pacifist Social Democrats remained in the party and actively supported Brandt’s 1961 candidacy. Second, the party continued to use its reputation as a peace party in its campaigns even as it distanced itself from the Easter Marches and its own KdA.

⁵⁰¹ Ollenhauer to Kloppenburg, March 9, 1961 and Kloppenburg to the members of the Easter March Trustees and Friends of the Easter Marches, n.d. EZA 613/90, NL Kloppenburg, EZAB. See Lawrence Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement 1954-1970*, x. Wittner’s bold claim that grassroots movements like the Easter Marches prevented all-out nuclear war requires further investigation but there is no doubt that the visibility of the issue through public demonstrations consistently reminded politicians of the strong public opinions on the topic.

⁵⁰² Ollenhauer to *Die Bezirke*, March 1, 1961. Mappe 395, NL Ollenhauer, AdsD.

The SPD return to peace, but not necessarily antinuclear, slogans in the 1961 election can be attributed to the DFU's direct challenge of the SPD's identity as the parliamentary peace party, as well as an increasingly "masculine" Social Democratic understanding of peace embodied by Brandt and developed after the construction of the Berlin Wall. It had become even more urgent for the party to move from the crowded space for parliamentary opposition to coalition political power. Heinemann addressed the peace conundrum in SPD politics directly in his 1961 article "New Strengths-New Paths." "Underlying pacifist ideas can, as Willy Brandt among others have publically confirmed, be represented in and outside the party," he clarified.⁵⁰³ Brandt did, in fact, personify the SPD's journey as a peace party after 1958. As a member of the Berlin KdA organization "which believed that every last citizen of Berlin should be educated about the [nuclear] danger," Brandt was involved in the SPD's 1958 extra-parliamentary effort in the city.⁵⁰⁴ In April 1961 he listed the preservation of peace as one of his campaign goals "including peace on earth."⁵⁰⁵ Brandt achieved even greater fame as Mayor of Berlin when the Berlin Wall was constructed during the 1961 election season.

The construction of the Berlin Wall changed the tone of the Cold War for Germans. Proof of the international conflict now stood literally in the streets of Berlin as opposed to the corridors of American and Soviet institutions. While Kennedy and

⁵⁰³ Gustav Heinemann, "Neue Kräfte- neue Wege," *Politische Verantwortung* 5, no. 1/2 (February 1961).

⁵⁰⁴ Berliner Ausschuss "Gegen den Atomtod" to Dr. Wolf, June 25, 1958. BArch DZ 9/ 2338. See also Brandt's speech, Kundgebung des Berliner Arbeitsausschusse "Gegen den Atomtod" Berliner Kongresshalle, April 24, 1958. Signatur 1/WBA-Pub10099, Willy-Brandt-Archiv, AdsD.

⁵⁰⁵ Willy Brandt, *Berliner Ausgabe Vol. 4: Auf dem Weg nach vorn Willy Brandt und die SPD 1947-1972*, Daniela Munkel, ed., (Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz, 2000), 250-251. Brandt also called for controlled disarmament.

Khrushchev breathed tentative sighs of relief, many East Germans died as they attempted to escape what had become a German Cold War-zone. The wall as a physical symbol of Germany's division and Cold War animosity sparked SPD leaders to discuss "the defense of peace" in the 1960/1961 party yearbook, altering their understandings of the concept with the shift in Cold War tensions.⁵⁰⁶ For post-1961 Social Democrats, peace was less about non-violence and the threat of nuclear destruction and more about the need for protection from outside enemies. This protection was something that the SPD as a paternal parliamentary power was eager to provide. An announcement that the party sent delegates to the NATO parliamentarians' conference for the first time also appeared, cementing the party's new focus on a masculine conception of peace tied to security.⁵⁰⁷

Pacifist Social Democrats embraced Brandt's candidacy and the renewed party focus on peace. In a September 1961 election poster, for example, Hamburg Social Democrat and eventual KdA chair Brauer went beyond the traditional peace party image declaring "Make Willy Brandt the Peace Chancellor (*Friedenskanzler*)! Vote for the Party of Peace."⁵⁰⁸ Brauer was not the only one excited by Brandt's candidacy. Kettig issued her own campaign poster which proclaimed "Willy Brandt will rescue peace!" (Figure 6) The text focused on Brandt as well as promises of peace, freedom, and unity in Germany. Kettig directly referenced the Berlin Wall in her flyer titled "Think of Berlin!" Highlighting Brandt's opposition to the grim barrier, Kettig insisted "no propaganda can obscure what one can see with his/her own eyes." Brandt and Berlin are the focus of

⁵⁰⁶ *SPD Jahrbuch 1960/1961*, 22.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 22-26.

⁵⁰⁸ "Max Brauer ruft die Hamburger..." Signature: 6/PLKA036893, Plakatsammlung, AdsD.

Kettig's text, but the placement of the photos emphasizes that she paired herself quite explicitly with the Chancellor candidate, aligning equal-sized pictures of herself and Brandt at the bottom of the poster. The photos flank the words, "District 94: [vote] with Alma Kettig for Willy Brandt!"⁵⁰⁹ Although the meaning of "peace party" transformed in 1961, both posters illustrate that peace rhetoric was alive and well as an SPD election strategy among cooperative activists.



Figure 6: "Think of Berlin" Alma Kettig Election Poster, Courtesy: Stefan Appelius.

Peace, freedom, and reunification were a trinity of terms for the SPD campaign in 1961. Ollenhauer and Brandt campaigned together under the banner "Peace and Freedom, today and tomorrow" and another poster emotionally proclaimed, "Choose the party

⁵⁰⁹ Appelius, *Verpflichtung zum Frieden*, 97. The text for their names is also the same size. In Brauer's poster his name appears at the top in a similar sized font but there is a black band in the middle of the poster where "Macht Willy Brandt zum Friedenskanzler" is written in white letters. This effect draws the observer's eye immediately to the text on Brandt on first glance.

which in its truest heart will strive for the reunification of the German people in peace and freedom.”⁵¹⁰ By 1965 the party took its pairing of peace and security (in a broad sense) even further. “Secure is Secure” a household mailing argued, highlighting Cold War tensions and the Berlin Wall before discussing healthcare politics.⁵¹¹ Most 1965 posters also featured a smiling portrait of Brandt with a keyword- either security, unity, or Germany- written below it in white letters on a red background.⁵¹² Posters hawking votes for the “Peace Chancellor” like Kettig and Brauer’s 1961 examples were conspicuously absent in the 1965 campaign. Party literature instead focused on the idea of “security” for the preservation of peace rather than the “feminine” ethical pacifist or even antinuclear perceptions of peace held by pacifist Social Democrats during the height of the Paulskirche movement and the KdA.⁵¹³

Despite the SPD’s fluctuating interest in peace politics, the party’s previous leadership in the KdA campaign had raised activists’ expectations for action. This past initiative emphasized permeability between party and extra-parliamentary activities and fostered the expectation of SPD support for extra-parliamentary agitation. Kloppenburg, for instance, continued to lobby the SPD to renew its former support for KdA. Even in

⁵¹⁰ “Frieden und Freiheit heute und morgen” Signature: 6/PLKA010903 and “Wählen Sie die Partei...” Signature: 6/PLKA025228, Plakatsammlung, AdsD.

⁵¹¹ “Vorn. Sicher ist Sicher” (1965) RW 477-790, DFG-VK Beständ, Landesarchiv NRW, Hauptstaatsarchiv Düsseldorf.

⁵¹² See for example “Sicherheit-SPD,” Signature: 6/PLKA009448; “Einigkeit-SPD,” Signature: 6/PLKA001471; and “Deutschland-SPD,” Signature: 6/PLKA009446, Plakatsammlung, AdsD.

⁵¹³ 1965 represents a lull in ethical pacifist party peace rhetoric but references to the peace party and No-More-War as well as other pacifist slogans resurface in association with the SPD and Social Democrats even today. For example see: Richard Bernstein, “Germany and America: Soul Searching over the *Realpolitik* of the Iraqi War” *New York Times*, March 12, 2006. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/international/europe/12germany.html?ex=1143003600&en=03d787a0db9f3e00&ei=5070&emc=eta1> (accessed March 20, 2006).

March 1961, the clergyman expressed his faith that party leaders would eventually change their attitudes toward the antinuclear movement. Kloppenburg stated in a letter to Menzel that he believed the situation could still be repaired. After SPD leaders repeated their refusal of support for the extra-parliamentary movement, Kloppenburg still asserted that potential Social Democratic defeats in the election would be a “catastrophe” and sought ways to reconcile disillusioned voters with the party.⁵¹⁴ Three years later, Easter March member Manfred Liebel noted Kloppenburg brought up the relationship between the SPD and the movement again at a 1964 organizational meeting. Kloppenburg suggested the Easter March Central Committee “rescue” KdA initiatives like the periodical *Atomzeitalter*.⁵¹⁵ As KdA abandonment by the SPD became more apparent, Kloppenburg turned to the Easter March Central Committee for support from outside the party realm.

Nevertheless, the 1960s KdA increasingly became an SPD façade leading many individual participants, including Social Democrats, to transition to the Easter March movement. Menzel confidentially declared plans for the KdA committee to endorse and financially support the 1962 Easter Marches to Kloppenburg despite party objections.⁵¹⁶ Indeed, in later 1961 KdA minutes, newly-elected chairman Brauer spoke of the committee as “nonpartisan” and encouraged fundamental changes to its organizational structure. Brauer insisted that the committee remained duty-bound to “secure peace,

⁵¹⁴ Kloppenburg to Menzel, March 22, 1961, EZA 613/90, NL Kloppenburg, EZAB.

⁵¹⁵ Manfred Liebel-handwritten notes on a meeting of the Easter March Central Committee, ca. 1964. Box BV mit Friedenszeichen, Sammlung SDS, APO Archiv.

⁵¹⁶ Menzel to Kloppenburg, May 10, 1961. Signature 613/2, NL Kloppenburg, EZAB.

achieve disarmament, and push collective action.”⁵¹⁷ Ironically echoing the SPD leaders’ language of security, Brauer desperately sought a means to mobilize activists without direct support from the party. The new KdA chair reminisced about one of the biggest 1958 KdA rallies in Hamburg where over 150,000 people, more than Brauer had ever seen before, took to the streets. Brauer emphasized the need for future KdA mobilization in masculine public space, as Hagemann characterizes it, in order to “count as a political force” once again.⁵¹⁸ The Tempels also participated in the 1958 Hamburg demonstration and pointed to the moment as a formative experience for their leadership in the Easter March movement.

In 1963 Social Democratic members’ participation in the Easter Marches continued to increase. *Die Andere Zeitung* reported an influx of Social Democratic and union participants in the 1963 demonstrations, noting that the numbers increased from the previous year despite repeated SPD bans. Another participant pointedly observed to Beilmann that many Social Democrats helped prepare and participate in the Easter Marches although the SPD banned them from doing so. On a local level, the SPD youth group in Offenbach and other local Social Democratic youth organizations publically pledged support for the marches. “The campaign ‘Easter March of Opponents of Nuclear Weapons’ has received its authority through the inactivity of the ‘*Kampf dem Atomtod*’ movement that once was called to the same objectives as our party,” the Offenbach group

⁵¹⁷ “Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Vorstandes des Arbeitsausschusses “Kampf dem Atomtod” e. V. November 29, 1961. Mappe 28, NL Menzel, AdsD.

⁵¹⁸ “Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Vorstandes des Arbeitsausschusses “Kampf dem Atomtod” e. V. November 29, 1961. Menzel to Alexander Maaß, September 26, 1962. Mappe 28, NL Menzel, AdsD. Whether Menzel was referring to Social Democrats or pacifists like the Easter Marchers is unclear. It seems like he implied both, recognizing the growing antagonism. Hagemann, *Frauenalltag und Männerpolitik*.

declared.⁵¹⁹ To them, the Easter Marches had become the logical extension of previous party KdA activism and many pacifist Social Democrats perceived the Easter Marches as a successor to the incapacitated KdA. Others, like Beilmann, reluctantly accepted the transition, attempting to forge solid connections between past KdA participation and future Easter March action.

In a revealing 1963 letter to Helene Wessel, Beilmann frankly addressed the tensions between KdA, the SPD, and the Easter Marches. Beilmann sought Wessel's signature for the 1963 Easter March appeal. Although the KdA technically still existed, Beilmann spoke of Wessel's involvement in the past tense. Beilmann reminded the MdB of the high point of her KdA activism in 1958 and 1959. Now, Beilmann coaxed, KdA had "outrageously fizzled out."⁵²⁰ "The Easter March is in some part a sequel to [KdA] action," Beilmann argued, implying the Marches were a logical successor to KdA activism and therefore a reasonable next step for Wessel. As she attempted to convince Wessel further, Beilmann noted "it is interesting how many 'prominent people' ... signed this year's appeal for the 1963 Easter Marches." Wessel herself would have indeed been one of those "prominent" people and an asset to the Easter March's extra-parliamentary cause as a popular politician and KdA figurehead. In addition, Wessel's support would undermine SPD prohibitions against the extra-parliamentary action, once again forging a connection between a pacifist movement and party politics.

Beilmann appealed to Wessel's transnational consciousness as well as her past experiences in KdA. She referenced a trip to Russia that she and Wessel took part in

⁵¹⁹ "Vierter Deutscher Ostermarsch," *Die Andere Zeitung* (March 7, 1963) and "Bilanz Ostermarsch 1963," *Die Andere Zeitung* (April 25, 1963). H. Günneberg to Christel Beilmann, n.d. (approx. 1963), Box 8, NL Beilmann, AdsD. Ostermarsch Pressedienst, 1963. Box 8, NL Beilmann, AdsD.

⁵²⁰ Beilmann to Wessel, March 25, 1963, Box 8, NL Beilmann, AdsD.

already in the first line of her letter. As Beilmann solicited Wessel for support she argued “the Easter Marches have the advantage of not being an exclusively German occurrence.”⁵²¹ As an extra-parliamentary and transnational effort, the Easter Marches had the potential to succeed where the party-bound and largely nation-bound KdA failed. Beilmann acknowledges that the effort kept discussions of nuclear weapons alive in society, despite the fact that the antinuclear position was not necessarily represented in parliament in 1963. Indeed, Wessel would have represented a tangible connection to the parliamentary sphere. Beilmann assured the Social Democratic MdB that she knew Wessel must make her decision carefully and in the best interests of her current political work. This understanding did not prevent Beilmann from encouraging Wessel, and she concluded conspiratorially, “it would be very valuable if you sign [the appeal]- I do not need to lay out why.”⁵²² Despite Beilmann’s persuasive request, Wessel did not sign in support of the Easter Marches.

Like Kloppenburg, Beilmann sought to tie the legacy of KdA to the Easter March movement, connecting “masculine” party politics and “feminine” extra-parliamentary forces once again. Although she served primarily in Easter March ranks as a publicist, Beilmann maintained ties to the SPD and KdA. Both the KdA and Easter Marches were restructured the year Beilmann wrote Wessel. Beilmann participated in discussions about reactivating the KdA in 1963 and an extensive assessment of the group outlines KdA limitations. The group leaders ultimately decided to act in a purely advisory capacity as a

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Ibid. Wessel’s name does not appear on any of the extensive 1963 lists or other publicity available in the APO Archiv. Since her support would have been a coup for the group and widely publicized, it is probable that she never signed.

“study group” which would collect and distribute information on disarmament. In contrast, 1963 was a pivotal year for the Easter March movement. Organizers changed its name to “Campaign for Disarmament,” taking a step closer to becoming a mass opposition movement by expanding protest activities beyond the annual Easter Marches and even national borders.⁵²³

The West German Easter Marches were an essentially transnational endeavor from the moment the Tempels put the idea into action in 1960. Inspired by his participation in the British CND marches, Tempel remembers taking a postcard map of possible locations in hand and searching for atomic missile bases in northern Germany in order to stage his own antinuclear pilgrimage. Tempel’s initial expedition failed, but a mainstream newspaper, *Hamburger Morgenpost*, conveniently published information about a Bundeswehr nuclear exercise grounds at Bergen-Hohne in 1959. The site, coincidentally located near former concentration camp Bergen-Belsen, became the endpoint of the first West German Easter March.⁵²⁴

Organizers expanded their Easter March ambitions in 1961. Building on the popularity of the first Hamburg March, West German protestors planned several simultaneous marches from missile bases in West Germany to closing rallies in cities like Cologne, Essen, Hamburg, Hannover, and Frankfurt. Tempel and his fellow organizers continued to look to CND marches as an example of antinuclear protest. The original CND marches, including the one Tempel participated in, started in London and ended at

⁵²³ “Kampf dem Atomtod 63: Bemerkungen zu einer Reaktivierung des Arbeitsausschusses Kampf dem Atomtod” Box 41, NL Beilmann, AdSD. Otto, *APO. Außerparlamentarische Opposition in Quellen und Dokumenten (1960-1970)* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1989), 49. Hereafter cited as Otto, *APO Quellen*.

⁵²⁴ Bastian, “Ein Blick in die Geschichte der Friedensbewegung,” 121.

the nuclear missile base in Aldermaston. By 1960, CND organizers reversed the direction of the march, encouraging larger, more visible closing rallies in London as opposed to the English countryside. The West German movement quickly caught on and expanded on this idea, starting the 1961 marches at various missile bases and marching out like a star to nearby German cities for their closing rallies.

The British marches were not the only influence on the West German organization. *Die Andere Zeitung* also reported that Easter Marchers looked to Japan as the ideal example of mass opposition to nuclear weapons. In a population of 90 million people 40 percent remained against nuclear weapons and the movement encompassed every political party according to the enthusiastic newspaper report.⁵²⁵ This open admiration of Japanese and British movements represents continuity between the 1958 KdA activists and is not surprising considering the amount of overlap between those members and Easter March supporters.

As popularity for the Easter Marches grew, their participants and networks became increasingly transnational.⁵²⁶ *Die Andere Zeitung* described how Danish marchers joined the 1963 northern marches, despite travel prohibitions, and at least 55 British marchers were detained at the Düsseldorf airport in their efforts to reach the Ruhr Easter March. Sympathetic German demonstrators flocked to the airport in protest against the extreme measures and even as the plane headed back to the United Kingdom British protestors dramatically attempted to leave the aircraft as it taxied the runway. Referring to the this incident and the tremendous media attention it attracted, British

⁵²⁵ “Ostermarsch 1961 wird vorbereitet,” *Die Andere Zeitung* (February 1961).

⁵²⁶ See Holger Nehring, “National Internationalists: British and West German Protests Against Nuclear Weapons, the Politics of Transnational Communications and the Social History of the Cold War, 1957–1964” *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 04 (2005): 559-582.

Labour Party representative Carmichael declared at the Hamburg march, “now the whole world knows that there was an Easter March in Düsseldorf.”⁵²⁷

Press coverage certainly emphasized the transnational scope of the Easter March phenomenon. One 1963 article, “Powerful Warning to Atomic Warriors,” highlighted the movements in “Western Europe” as a whole, citing over 150,000 participants in Great Britain, West Germany, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland. The report continued with descriptions of many more supporters who lined the march routes and attended closing demonstrations in support of the protestors.⁵²⁸ Easter March leader Andreas Buro also announced the group’s strategic affiliation with the European Federation Against Nuclear Arms in a 1962 newsletter. March organizers reached beyond the nation to the still-developing transnational arena for political legitimacy and publicity, intent on remaining independent from party politics to differentiate themselves from previous antinuclear efforts like the KdA.⁵²⁹

Interestingly, the Easter March movement, though grounded in the extra-parliamentary realm, was dominated by male leaders. Tempel founded the marches and although his wife Helga assisted him and was an activist herself, she rarely appears as a key leader. Taking the Tempels as an example, it seems women may have been socially limited in their participation in extra-parliamentary activities. Helga and Hans-Konrad both worked as school teachers and when asked in a shared interview about bringing their pacifist convictions into the classroom, she was more reserved than her husband stating

⁵²⁷ “Bilanz Ostermarsch 1963,” *Die Andere Zeitung* (April 25, 1963). “Das Flugzeug wurde zum Gefängnis,” *Stuttgarter Nachrichten* (April 16, 1963). Blatt 46, RW 115- 68, DFG-VK Beständ, Landesarchiv NRW, Hauptstaatsarchiv Düsseldorf.

⁵²⁸ “Machtvolle Warnung an Atomkrieger” *Die Wahrheit* (April 18, 1963).

⁵²⁹ Andreas Buro, “Rundbrief,” November 4, 1962. Signature 613/33, NL Kloppenburg, EZAB.

that she kept her personal activism and professional life carefully separate. Hans-Konrad, on the other hand, claimed that his professional life and his activism were often intertwined and that he purposefully brought these political issues into his classes.⁵³⁰ Many women participated in the grassroots marches, however, and as in party politics, a few exceptional women like Beilmann enjoyed prominent positions in the Easter March movement.

Political space on the West German Left transformed between 1955 and 1966 yet it continued to revolve around the SPD as a party political anchor. Chapter 4 revealed the various ways the SPD mixed its own party politics with extra-parliamentary strategies in the 1950s. As the party shifted its focus from ethical pacifist, antinuclear activism grounded in the feminine penumbra to mainstream defense issues and support of NATO, SPD leaders recognized the political paradox they had created through their extra-parliamentary experiments. Dramatic changes occurred within the party between 1960 and 1966, however, including the party leaders' withdrawal to the "masculine" political core and prohibition of the extra-parliamentary, and vulnerable to Communist influence, Easter March movement. Pacifists like Kettig, Kloppenburg, Menzel, and Ollenhauer who had practiced cooperative activism in the 1950s Paulskirche and KdA movements found their loyalty to the party and their own pacifist positions tested. Each individual had to make tough choices between party and periphery in this changing political terrain: choices which depended on their past experiences and positions within the postwar political context.

The KdA, though dormant, remained a part of the SPD. The committee served as a shell organization where pacifist Social Democrats continued to feel useful as

⁵³⁰ Bastian, "Ein Blick in die Geschichte der Friedensbewegung," 123.

antinuclear activists and the SPD maintained its peace party façade. Instead of completely distancing themselves from the extra-parliamentary sphere however, SPD leaders lashed out at the Easter Marches. The Easter March movement filled the peripheral political space vacated by the KdA and in doing so, threatened the realm of SPD party politics. Ironically, the party's venomous rejection of the antinuclear Easter Marches only reinforced the political value of the penumbra movement. Social Democratic leaders traditionally saw peace movements located entirely in the political periphery as particularly vulnerable to Communist threats, but through past KdA efforts in the extra-parliamentary realm they had supplied the Easter Marches with a more legitimate political space. In fact, this new space provided the Easter Marches, future APOs, and eventually the Green party with a platform to party politics.

Individual Social Democrats and pacifists serve as excellent lenses into these political transformations. Cases like Renger, Kettig, and Behrisch's all help illustrate the subtle categorizations, including gendered characterizations, of political space on the Left. Feminized perceptions of pacifism inscribed on the extra-parliamentary sphere complicated the acceptance of pacifist and antinuclear strategies in the masculine realm of party politics. Furthermore, these perceptions shaped the reactions and behavior of SPD leaders and activists to the Easter Marches and the threat of Communist influence in West German politics. The 1974 Guillaume scandal, which forced Brandt to resign as Chancellor, indicates that there was indeed a very real threat of Communist infiltration in West German politics. The Guillaume affair also proves however, that party and penumbra organizations were equally vulnerable to Communist meddling during the Cold War. Nonetheless, leaders increasingly neglected the peace party image as the SPD

approached election success in 1965, focusing instead on the young and popular chancellor candidate Brandt and the “masculine” concept of peace which he embodied. The SPD as a peace party evolved in response to the changing Cold War context in which it struggled to thrive.

Conclusion:
“Learn from History?”⁵³¹
Rethinking the German Left

In 1981, the SPD executive distributed posters announcing a book on SPD peace politics extending back to 1863 declaring, “learn from history.” (Figure 7) “Inform yourself!” party leaders demanded, invoking the familiar slogan, “No More War!”⁵³² The poster offers a visual summary of the SPD’s legacy as a peace party. An atomic mushroom cloud dominates the background next to a small corner photo of Kurt Schumacher taken in 1946. The Weimar phrase “No-More-War” calls to mind the rich legacy of cooperative activism between Social Democrats and pacifists which fostered transnational networks and increasing pacifist activism in the penumbra during the Weimar Republic. These networks, and many of the individuals who constructed them, provided important continuities from Weimar Democracy, through Nazi dictatorship, and into postwar politics. The text on the right side of the mushroom cloud in the poster draws explicit connections between the 1920s, 1945, and the 1980s. As this dissertation shows, Social Democrats resurrected the “No-More-War” cry in the Buchenwald concentration camp, in the 1946 SPD election posters, and again in the 1980s SPD peace propaganda linking peace and party narratives between 1921 and 1966. Furthermore, this dissertation illustrates the critical role cooperative activists played in the political arena.

⁵³¹ “Aus der Geschichte Lernen: Sozialdemokratische Friedenspolitik von 1863 bis heute. Informieren Sie sich: Nie wieder Krieg!” Signature: 6/PLKA007892, Plakatsammlung, AdsD.

⁵³² Ibid.

Their presence in both party and extra-parliamentary politics led to conflicts between the party and pacifist movements at various moments throughout this timeframe, drawing specific attention to 1928, 1956, and the period between 1960 and 1966.



Figure 7: "Aus der Geschichte Lernen," Design: ARE. Courtesy of the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Transnational and gender analysis provides important new perspectives on Social Democrats and the legacy of the SPD as a “peace party” even today. A January 2010 article in *Der Spiegel* entitled “The SPD Searches for Peace with Itself” provides an excellent contemporary example of the continued prominence of the SPD’s legacy as a “peace party” and of its masculine figureheads such as Schumacher and Willy Brandt. Schumacher continues to be a strong symbol in the postwar party as the inclusion of his photo in the 1981 poster suggests. He represents the party’s triumph over Nazi adversity

as well as the successful reconstruction of the SPD after 1945. Brandt enjoys similar status as a symbol in the post-1945 SPD tradition. Reporter Veit Medick of *Der Spiegel* asserts, “the peace party wants to go back to its roots. It wants to go back to Willy Brandt.”⁵³³ Brandt’s paternalist conception of peace and charismatic leadership provides a convenient marker in contemporary discussions of party peace politics. This dissertation demonstrates that the significance of his moment cannot be understood without closer examination of the party’s legacy as a peace party between 1921 and 1966, however. Brandt’s leadership fostered a sense of party political stability and his “masculine” understanding of peace harmonized well with the male-dominated realm of party politics, providing a strong anchor for continuing peace party narratives after 1961.

This dissertation problematizes critical moments of cooperation and conflict on the German non-Communist Left through gender, transnational, and biographical analysis. It reveals that the party’s reputation as a “peace party” extends further back than Brandt’s tenure as party chairman, his chancellor candidacy, and his 1971 Nobel Peace Prize. Indeed, the relationship between the SPD and the peace movements provides an alternative historical perspective, highlighting structural and personal continuities between 1921 and 1966 as well as challenging traditional master narratives. As Tony Judt, Michael Geyer, and Konrad Jarausch stress, master narratives focusing on modernization or Marxist theories of progress were discredited or “shattered” after 1945. Instead of turning back to the familiar rhythms of these metanarratives, this dissertation follows the examples of historians like Glenn Penny, Pierre-Yves Saunier, and Belinda Davis who have applied new analytical and thematic perspectives to the study of political

⁵³³ Veit Medick, “SPD sucht den Frieden mit sich selbst,” *Der Spiegel* (January 22, 2010).

and cultural history. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, transnational and gender analysis of the relationship between Social Democrats and pacifists between 1921 and 1966 reveals hitherto under-examined networks and stereotypes that endured the test of two world wars and were rooted in nineteenth century cooperation between these activists.

Part I of this dissertation presents gender, transnational, and biographical studies of the relationship between pacifists and Social Democrats from 1921 to 1966 over a long *durée*. These analytical perspectives shed important light on the lasting reputation of the SPD as a peace party. Davis suggests that the term “left” might be best utilized as a postwar descriptor for “informal political groupings and their actions.”⁵³⁴ This dissertation reveals, however, that although the German Left between 1921 and 1966 was a fluid space, it was dominated by deep-seated, though permeable, boundaries between core and penumbra spheres. Furthermore, it illustrates the constructed divisions between “masculine” and “feminine,” as well as transnational and national, spaces on the non-Communist Left. Individual pacifists and Social Democrats mediated these political spaces, at times transcending their limits and reaching out to foreign counterparts during the No-More-War demonstrations and Easter Marches, while at other times falling victim to the rigid structural frameworks of institutions like the SPD, as in the case of Alma Kettig. This process frequently resulted in a two-step forward, one-step backward dynamic. Nevertheless, cooperative activists provided the motor for political developments through their constant negotiation of political space and ideas. The case studies examined in Part II illustrate this unique dynamic between peace party and peace movement.

⁵³⁴ Belinda Davis, “What’s Left? Popular Political Participation in Postwar Europe” *The American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 384-5.

Gender analysis of the non-Communist Left featured in Chapter 1 reveals the importance of enduring stereotypes of masculine and feminine political spaces over this timeframe. The core/penumbra model provides a conceptual framework for understanding masculine party politics and periphery political activities frequently considered feminine. Chapter 1 demonstrates the foundations of masculine characterizations of party politics in the nineteenth-century realm of electoral politics. This realm was reserved nearly exclusively for men in Germany until formal political equality in 1919. Henceforth, female participation in male party rituals and spaces created both new opportunities for female activism and increased moments of gender tension on the Left. As this dissertation shows, the relationship between pacifists and Social Democrats is a valuable lens through which to examine gendered ties and tensions.

Ethical pacifism, promoted most famously by Bertha von Suttner, struggled under the stereotype that the ideology was “feminine” and therefore unsuited to the “masculine” political realm. Cooperative activists who straddled the gap between party loyalties and pacifist convictions challenged these labels in diverse ways at different times. For example, Kettig determinedly pursued peace politics within the SPD after 1959 while party leaders refocused their goals on parliamentary political power. WILPF members participated in international summer schools during the Weimar Republic and worked together with local Social Democratic officials to promote transnational awareness of peace activism within their own communities in 1927. Scientists like Karl Bechert and the Göttingen Eighteen attempted to establish peace, in the form of antinuclear protest, as a viable cause in the party political realm. They hoped their positions within the

academic community would reinforce their masculine pacifist voices and influence party politics.

Part II of this dissertation contributes to the developing field of transnational historiography. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 provide empirical analysis of transnational interaction on the non-Communist Left. As Part II reveals, my three main types of transnational interaction developed in Chapter 1 - awareness, intermittent contact, and direct reciprocal contact- influenced the behavior of political actors and political space between 1921 and 1966. The Panzerkreuzer incident provides an excellent case in point. At the time, individual actors constructed and also participated in transnational networks and formed political positions based upon understandings of peace and the party's position on rearmament between 1921 and 1928. In contrast, SPD ministers supported a militaristic agenda in the interest of maintaining party political power in 1928. Here, as this dissertation shows clearly, party and peace agendas temporarily derailed. The ministers' retraction of support for the ships in response to significant grassroots and penumbra protest brought the relationship between Social Democrats and pacifists partially back on track.

Chapter 2 uses biographical analysis to demonstrate the integral roles individual activists played in networks and institutions like the SPD. The lived experiences of these activists transcended constructed historical boundaries of 1919, 1933, and 1945 helping shape structural frameworks such as transnational networks and political organizations through their own personal agency. This dissertation particularly explores the resonance of Weimar and Nazi-era experiences among postwar political actors. Social Democrats in exile preserved the SPD as an institution but their personal experiences, as well as the

experiences of those who remained in Germany like Schumacher, exerted a profound influence over the character of the postwar party. Gendered assumptions about individual wartime experiences, in exile and in Germany, marked the careers of many SPD leaders, maintaining divisions which affected postwar politics as explored in Chapters 2, 4, and 5.

As this dissertation has stressed as well, gender, biographical, and transnational analysis provide unique insights into the narrative of the relationship between Social Democrats and pacifists on the non-Communist Left. For many SPD scholars, 1959 and 1960 represent a decisive turning point in party history and a break with many explicitly pacifist agendas. Indeed, the Godesberg Party Program provided a distinct institutional change in SPD history. Herbert Wehner augmented the reforms which had “cast off its Marxist ballast” with his own carefully timed speech announcing the party’s intention to support NATO.⁵³⁵ The alternative narrative revealed through the lens of the relationship between Social Democrats and pacifists, however, illustrates that many pacifists and pacifist Social Democrats continued to support party activities despite programmatic changes. Individual cases where pacifist Social Democrats were alienated from the party remained historically specific. Biographical analysis shows that personal decisions to participate in either the SPD or peace organizations, or to practice forms of cooperative activism, were dependent on individual habitus. That is, they were dependent on individual positions with the party or movement, previous experiences, and the landscape of political space in that specific moment. When the political landscape shifted, as in 1961, spaces for individual activism shifted as well.

⁵³⁵ Alice Holmes Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements Since 1945* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 27-28.

Acknowledging the fluidity of political space on the non-Communist Left, this dissertation historicizes moments of cooperative activism between 1921 and 1966. Individual activists formed links between the party and peace movements based on their own experiences. Walter Fabian, for example, became an active member of the DFG and participated in the No-More-War movement and WILPF networks after World War I. He was only able to connect his pacifist beliefs with a Social Democratic political position, however, after he recognized links between pacifism and Socialism in his scholarly work.⁵³⁶ World War II experiences of Social Democratic prisoners in Buchenwald, highlighted in Chapter 2, provide another key example of shifting political positions. These men were able to suspend widespread Social Democratic suspicions of Communists when they composed the Buchenwald Manifesto in a nonpartisan spirit. The post-1945 Left provides further compelling examples of permeability between constructed political boundaries fostered by individual pacifists and Social Democrats like Heinz Kloppenburg, Christel Beilmann, and Hans-Konrad Tempel.

Postwar pacifists and pacifist Social Democrats were caught up in some of the most heated conflicts sparked by cooperative activism between 1921 and 1966. Annemarie Renger was forced to decide between “masculine” party politics and a pacifist position during the 1956 Bundeswehr vote, ultimately choosing a path within the accepted boundaries of SPD party politics. Walter Menzel, Kettig, and Bechert, all pacifist Social Democrats, participated in both party and pacifist arenas during the heyday of SPD extra-parliamentary experiments with the Paulskirche and KdA movements. Once the party withdrew from the putative feminine extra-parliamentary

⁵³⁶ Detlef Oppermann, “Walter Fabian (1902-1992). Journalist-Pädagoge-Gewerkschafter,” *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte* 54, no. 7 (2003): 410-413. See Chapter 3.

realm and pursued peace issues solely from the arena of party politics however, each activist faced hard choices between their pacifist convictions and party policies. In Kettig's case, she faced additional discrimination based on her sex and perceived relationships to pacifist initiatives like the DFU.

Writing about the period before 1968, the historian Geoff Eley states "Socialism was always the core of the Left; and the Left was always larger than Socialism."⁵³⁷ This study demonstrates that German Social Democracy remained the linchpin on the non-Communist Left. Grounded in the "masculine" realm of party politics, the SPD leadership experimented with different paths to political power. Whether individual cooperative activists worked within party channels to provoke change or party officials reached across gender, national, or political boundaries to cooperate on a higher level, the SPD as a political party remained a critical institution, providing continuity on the Left. And yet, the party's relationship to peace facilitated communication between formal and informal political actors, maintaining a dialogue which though strained at times, continues to the present day.

Individual activists and party leaders continue to negotiate core and penumbra political spaces. This dissertation argues for hybrid approaches to standard political narratives. To this end, it historicizes structural continuities, such as transnational networks and party political institutions, as well as moments of tension sparked by gendered and transnational assumptions about political space. Chapter 5 exposes the weaknesses of the peace-movement-inspired DFU as a political party grounded in a pacifist program. When DFU members engaged in party political rituals such as debates,

⁵³⁷ Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 8. See the introduction of this dissertation for further discussion of this point.

elections, and campaigns, the SPD persecuted them as Communists, taking advantage of a hostile Cold War environment. DFU efforts were ultimately unsuccessful in two sequences of national elections. The DFU and the contemporary Green party provide a fascinating comparison and compelling evidence for the need to historicize the relationships between pacifists and party politics on the Left in the period under consideration and beyond. Twenty years later, the Green party successfully entered party politics, garnering voter support from its social movement base which included a large number of pacifists. In 1985, the Greens succeeded where the DFU had failed.

Margit Mayer and John Ely argue that for the Greens the “transition from ‘movement’ to ‘political party’ was not accompanied by a clear distinction between movement politics and party politics. Rather, the concept of ‘new politics’ blurred the boundaries between the two.”⁵³⁸ The Green party capitalized on the blurred boundaries between party and penumbra politics created by the SPD links to the extra-parliamentary realm in the 1950s and 1960s. Unlike the DFU, the Green party was not immediately oppressed by anti-Communist sentiment. Individual activists in the 1980s continued to provide critical connections between peace activism and party politics. Although successful in the parliamentary arena, Mayer and Ely note that the Green Party, like the 1960s SPD, was at times stymied by tensions between party political rituals and the need for support from social movements based in the political periphery.⁵³⁹ Divisions between core and penumbra, though diluted, remained a critical stumbling block for cooperation between party and movement politics even after 1966.

⁵³⁸ Margit Mayer and John Ely, eds., *The German Greens: Paradox between Movement and Party* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), 7.

⁵³⁹ *Ibid*, 8.

This dissertation problematizes the relationship between peace and Social Democracy from 1921 to 1966 utilizing transnational, gender, and biographical methodologies to shed light on an affiliation largely taken for granted by both contemporaries and scholars. It reveals critical continuities that transcend accepted periodizations of German history and reevaluates turning points in party history such as the long-heralded 1959 party reforms. In contrast, it stresses continuities over structural divides in both German and party history, highlighting the advantages of transnational and gender analysis as alternative perspectives to standard political narratives. As shown for the period between 1921 and 1966, political space on the non-Communist German Left was characterized by gendered assumptions about individual political roles and appropriate, masculine, behavior in the party political realm. However, this analysis demonstrates the need for further study of gendered political spaces and the effects of transnational awareness in national politics for the subsequent periods of rising APO activity in the late 1960s and 1970s. It also provides important analytical background for future studies of the 1980s peace movement as well as political parties like the DFU and Green party that have attempted to utilize extra-parliamentary political support as a springboard into the party political realm.

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