Testimonial Statements, Excited Utterances and the Confrontation Clause: Formulating a Precise Rule after Crawford and Davis

Gary M. Bishop
Staff Attorney, Boston Municipal Court

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TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS, EXCITED UTTERANCES AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: FORMULATING A PRECISE RULE AFTER CRAWFORD AND DAVIS

GARY M. BISHOP

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I. INTRODUCTION

   In Crawford v. Washington, 1 the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause 2 prohibits the admission of testimonial

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statements by a witness who is absent from trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine the statements. Thus, the Court imposed an absolute bar on the admission of testimonial statements in the absence of a prior opportunity by the defendant to cross-examine those statements. Justice Scalia authored the opinion in which the Court reasoned that “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”

In establishing cross-examination as the prerequisite for the admission of testimonial evidence, the Court in Crawford did not conclusively define the term “testimonial.” Rather, it set forth various descriptions and examples of testimonial statements without explicitly adopting a definition. Therefore, a determination of whether a defendant is entitled to cross-examine a statement now requires a determination of whether that statement is testimonial.

This Article will analyze whether the post-Crawford decisions have been consistent in their treatment of statements that qualify as excited utterances in light of the Confrontation Clause principles and various definitions of testimonial in Crawford. Part II of this Article will provide a discussion of the Crawford decision itself and an analysis of Crawford’s treatment of earlier cases in this area. Part III of this Article will provide a discussion and analysis of court decisions that have applied Crawford in the context of excited utterances. It will do this by examining the factors that these courts have considered and emphasized in their analysis of whether an excited utterance qualifies as a testimonial statement, which would implicate the Confrontation Clause protections set forth in Crawford. Part IV of this Article will discuss Crawford’s impact on the admission of excited utterances by analyzing the various factors from the cases under the different formulations of “testimonial” set forth in Crawford. Part IV will then propose a composite definition of “testimonial” that will take into account the three definitions from Crawford and the application of those definitions in the cases. Part V of this Article

2U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . , to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).

3Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.

4Id. at 61.

5Id. at 50.

6Id. at 51-52.

7Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an “excited utterance” is “not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). The Rule defines an excited utterance as a “statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant [is] under the stress or excitement caused by the event or condition.” Id. The underlying rationale for the admission of excited utterances under Rule 803(2) is that a person who is still under the stress of an exciting event or experience is unlikely to possess the reflective capacity that is needed to manufacture a lie. See, e.g., United States v. Taveras, 380 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 2004).

8See infra notes 13-77 and accompanying text.

9See infra notes 78-340 and accompanying text.

10See infra notes 341-81 and accompanying text.
concludes that the intended positive impact of the *Crawford* decision will be realized only if courts refrain from applying its protections to situations that the Supreme Court neither intended nor contemplated.\(^{11}\)

II. **RATIONALE OF **CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON AND TREATMENT OF PRECEDENT

A. **“Testimonial” Statements under Crawford.**

Under *Crawford*, the threshold issue on a particular statement’s admissibility against a defendant is whether the statement is testimonial. The Court in *Crawford* declined to adopt a comprehensive definition of “testimonial,”\(^{12}\) but stated that the term clearly “applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”\(^{13}\) Quoting from the Petitioner’s brief, the Court stated that the core class of testimonial statements comes in various forms: “‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross examine [such as a deposition], or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.’”\(^{14}\)

Another description of testimonial statements set forth by the Court in *Crawford* are those “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.’”\(^{15}\) In general, the definition of testimonial would include “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”\(^{16}\) A statement need not be sworn in order to be classified as testimonial.\(^{17}\)

\(^{11}\) See infra notes 384-85 and accompanying text.

\(^{12}\) See generally Ariana J. Torchin, Note, *A Multidimensional Framework for the Analysis of Testimonial Hearsay Under Crawford v. Washington*, 94 Geo. L.J. 581 (2006) (proposing a framework for deciding whether a statement is testimonial by considering the degree of formality of the statement, the intent of the declarant and the law enforcement officer to whom the statement was made, and the extent of government involvement in the production of the statement).

\(^{13}\) *Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). The Court in *Crawford* left no uncertainty in the area of police interrogations when declaring that “[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.” *Id.* at 52. The Court further clarified the meaning of testimonial statements in the context of police interrogations in *Davis v. Washington*, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006) (holding that a statement is nontestimonial when purpose of interrogation is to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency and testimonial when purpose of interrogation is to establish prior events that may be relevant to a subsequent criminal prosecution). See infra notes 225-340 and accompanying text for an analysis and discussion of both kinds of statements.

\(^{14}\) *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting Brief of Petitioner at 23, *Crawford*, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940).

\(^{15}\) *Id.* at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).

\(^{16}\) *Id.* at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, *Crawford*, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL
In its discussion of testimonial statements, the Court in *Crawford* was particularly concerned about any statements given to officers or government agents because “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”\(^\text{18}\) The involvement of government representatives is an important factor in the determination of whether evidence qualifies as “testimonial” under *Crawford*:

> Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with any eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and again throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar. This consideration does not evaporate when testimony happens to fall within some broad, modern hearsay exception, even if that exception might be justifiable in other circumstances.\(^\text{19}\)

The Court in *Crawford* limited its decision to testimonial hearsay, stating that “[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law.”\(^\text{20}\) With respect to testimonial evidence, however, the Sixth Amendment requires both unavailability of the declarant and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.\(^\text{21}\)

The Court’s decision in *Crawford* overruled its prior decision in *Ohio v. Roberts*.\(^\text{22}\) In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause does not bar admission of the statement of an unavailable witness against a criminal defendant if the statement bears “adequate indicia of reliability.”\(^\text{23}\) This test requires the evidence either to fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,” or to bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”\(^\text{24}\)

Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion in *Crawford v. Washington*, which was joined by Justice O’Connor. The Chief Justice did not agree with the majority’s decision to overrule *Ohio v. Roberts*,\(^\text{25}\) or with the distinction made by the majority between testimonial and nontestimonial statements.\(^\text{26}\)

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\(^{17}\)Id.


\(^{19}\)Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.

\(^{20}\)Id. at 68.

\(^{21}\)Id.

\(^{22}\)Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).

\(^{23}\)Id. at 66.

\(^{24}\)Id.; see also Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search For Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1017-22 (1998) (arguing that the *Roberts* framework failed to reflect some of the enduring principles of the Confrontation Clause).

\(^{25}\)Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

\(^{26}\)Id. at 69-73.
Rehnquist also took issue with the broad definition of testimonial statements adopted by the majority:

\[
\text{\{A\}ny classification of statements as testimonial beyond that of sworn affidavits and depositions will be somewhat arbitrary, merely a proxy for what the Framers might have intended had such evidence been liberally admitted as substantive evidence like it is today.}^{27}
\]

Rehnquist would have reached the same result as the majority without overruling \textit{Ohio v. Roberts}. He reasoned that the statement at issue in \textit{Crawford} was not admissible based on \textit{Idaho v. Wright},\textsuperscript{28} which held that corroboration of an out-of-court statement’s truthfulness by other evidence at trial was an insufficient basis to admit the statement.\textsuperscript{29}

Prior to \textit{Crawford}, the United States Supreme Court had never distinguished between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.\textsuperscript{30} Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concern in his concurring opinion that the majority’s failure to clarify exactly what kind of evidence qualifies as “testimonial” would result in confusion in the lower courts.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{B. Facts and Procedural History of Crawford}

The defendant in \textit{Crawford} stabbed a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife, Sylvia.\textsuperscript{32} At the defendant’s trial for assault and attempted murder, the prosecution played for the jury Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement to the police describing the confrontation between the defendant and the victim.\textsuperscript{33} The defendant claimed self-defense.\textsuperscript{34} Because of the state marital privilege barring a spouse from testifying without the other spouse’s consent, Sylvia did not testify at the trial.\textsuperscript{35} Therefore, the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine Sylvia’s statement.\textsuperscript{36}

Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement was admitted under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest based on her admission that she had led the

\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Id.} at 71.


\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Crawford}, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also Amber Allred Furbee, \textit{Note, Legal Crossroads: The Hearsay Rule Meets the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington}, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 999, 1050-59 (2005) (stating that application of standards enunciated in \textit{Roberts} and \textit{Wright} would have produced the same result reached by the majority in \textit{Crawford}).

\textsuperscript{30}\textit{See Crawford}, 541 U.S. at 72 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191, 202 n.13 (2004) (stating that the \textit{Crawford} Court’s distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay is a novel one under the Confrontation Clause).

\textsuperscript{31}\textit{Crawford}, 541 U.S. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Id.} at 38 (majority opinion).

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Id.} at 40.

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Id.} at 38.
defendant to the victim’s apartment and thus had facilitated the assault. The prosecution sought to use Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement as evidence that the stabbing was not in self-defense. The defendant claimed that admission of Sylvia’s statement violated his federal constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment. The trial court admitted the statement based on Ohio v. Roberts, ruling that the statement was trustworthy under the Roberts standard, and offered several reasons to support that determination.

The jury convicted the defendant of assault, and the Washington Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals held that Sylvia’s statement did not bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness and offered several reasons in support of its conclusion. The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the defendant’s conviction, concluding that the statement bore guarantees of trustworthiness. Specifically, the Washington Supreme Court relied on the similarities between the defendant’s confession and Sylvia’s statement in reaching the conclusion that the statement was trustworthy.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the prosecution’s use of Sylvia’s statement violated the Confrontation Clause, and the Court reversed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court.

C. Crawford’s Treatment of Sixth Amendment Precedent

The Court in Crawford used the case as an opportunity to reconsider the standard articulated in Ohio v. Roberts for the admissibility of an unavailable witness’s out

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37Id. at 40.
38Id.
39Id.
41Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text and infra notes 47-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Roberts.
43Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41.
44See id.; State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656 (Wash. 2002).
45See Crawford, 54 P.3d at 663-64; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41-42. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that Sylvia’s statement did not have to bear guarantees of trustworthiness because the defendant waived his confrontation rights by invoking the marital privilege. Crawford, 54 P.3d at 660. The court declined to force the defendant to choose between the marital privilege and confronting his spouse. Id. The prosecution did not challenge that holding in the United States Supreme Court. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42 n.1.
46Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42, 68-69.
of court statement.\footnote{Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.} The Court stated that the test in \textit{Ohio v. Roberts} fails to protect criminal defendants against typical Confrontation Clause violations.\footnote{Id. at 60.}

In \textit{Roberts}, the defendant was charged with forgery of checks and possession of stolen credit cards.\footnote{Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.} At the preliminary hearing on the matter, the defendant’s lawyer called a witness who testified that she knew the defendant and that she had allowed the defendant to use her apartment for several days while she was away.\footnote{Id. The witness was the daughter of the couple from whom the defendant had allegedly stolen the credit cards and the checks. \textit{Id.}} The defendant’s attorney tried to obtain an admission from the witness that she had given the checks and credit cards to the defendant without telling him that he did not have permission to use them.\footnote{Id.} The witness denied that she had done so.\footnote{Id.}

When the witness became unavailable for the trial, the prosecution sought to admit the transcript of her testimony at the preliminary hearing.\footnote{Id. at 59.} The trial court admitted the transcript into evidence, and the defendant was convicted.\footnote{Id. at 60.} The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that the prosecution had failed to make a good faith effort to secure the witness’s attendance.\footnote{Id. at 61.} The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed on other grounds, holding that the witness was unavailable and that the transcript was inadmissible at the defendant’s trial.\footnote{Id. at 68-70.} The rationale was that even though the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing, this was not the equivalent of constitutional confrontation at trial.\footnote{Id. at 70.}

In its analysis of whether the prior testimony of the witness at the preliminary hearing bore “adequate indicia of reliability,” the United States Supreme Court in \textit{Roberts} declined to specify the level of questioning that would be sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause’s requirement of cross-examination.\footnote{Id. at 70.} The Court held, however, that the defendant’s attorney had tested the witness’s testimony “with the equivalent of significant cross-examination.”\footnote{Id. at 71.} Therefore, the Supreme Court relied on the defendant’s prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness in its analysis of
whether the transcript was sufficiently reliable.\textsuperscript{61} The Court in \textit{Crawford} disagreed with the rationale of \textit{Roberts} but not the result.\textsuperscript{62}

The \textit{Crawford} opinion contains an extensive history of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the development of a criminal defendant’s right to confront his or her accusers.\textsuperscript{63} The Court concluded that when dealing with testimonial statements, the framers of the Constitution did not mean to “leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’”\textsuperscript{64} The Confrontation Clause is concerned with more than reliability of evidence.\textsuperscript{65} It is concerned with the manner in which the reliability of evidence is tested, and the required test is cross-examination.\textsuperscript{66}

The Court in \textit{Crawford} cited to one of its earlier decisions, \textit{Dutton v. Evans},\textsuperscript{67} to illustrate the limitations on the definition of testimonial statements.\textsuperscript{68} In \textit{Dutton}, a statement made to someone other than a law enforcement officer or agent of the government was admissible against a defendant at his murder trial by the person to whom the statement was made.\textsuperscript{69} Shaw’s testimony about what Williams had told

\textsuperscript{61}\textit{Id.} at 73; \textit{see also} California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 151, 158-59 (1970) (Confrontation Clause not violated by admission at trial of witness’s prior testimony from a preliminary hearing—testimony that was given under oath and subject to cross examination—when witness was testifying at trial and subject to full and effective cross-examination); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-44 (1895) (Confrontation Clause not violated by admission at trial of a transcribed copy of testimony of two witnesses from a previous trial, when witnesses had died in the interim and were fully examined and cross-examined when they testified in former trial); Thomas Lininger, \textit{Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford}, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 753, 784-87 (2005) (arguing that one of the ways to facilitate domestic violence prosecutions after \textit{Crawford} is to create more opportunities for cross-examination of victims in preliminary hearings, depositions, and other pretrial proceedings).

\textsuperscript{62}\textit{Crawford}, 541 U.S. at 58 (stating that \textit{Roberts} “hew[ed] closely to the traditional line” in its outcome because of its emphasis on the defendant’s earlier opportunity to cross-examine the witness).


\textsuperscript{64}\textit{Crawford}, 541 U.S. at 61.

\textsuperscript{65}\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{66}\textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{68}\textit{Crawford}, 541 U.S. at 57.

\textsuperscript{69}\textit{Dutton}, 400 U.S. at 77, 87-88. In \textit{Dutton}, a prosecution witness named Shaw testified that he and Williams, who was an accomplice of the defendant Evans in the alleged murder, had been fellow prisoners during the time that Williams was arraigned on the murder charge. \textit{Id.} at 77. Shaw testified that when Williams returned to the penitentiary after the arraignment, Shaw asked him how he had made out. \textit{Id.} Shaw testified that Williams had responded, “‘If it hadn’t been for [the defendant] Alex Evans, we wouldn’t be in this now.’” \textit{Id.} The statement
him was admitted on the basis of a Georgia statutory hearsay exception. The statute provided that if a conspiracy had been proved, any statement made by a conspirator “during the pendency of the criminal project” was admissible against any other conspirator. The hearsay exception applied by Georgia allowed the introduction of out-of-court statements made both during the course of the conspiracy and the concealment of the conspiracy. The absence of a prior opportunity to cross-examine the statement in Dutton was not a bar to its admission because the statement was not testimonial.

The focus on government officers and agents in the determination of whether statements qualify as testimonial casts some doubt on the holding in White v. Illinois. The Court in Crawford acknowledged that its holding was not entirely consistent with the holding of White. In White, statements of a child victim to an investigating police officer were admitted as spontaneous declarations. The Crawford Court acknowledged that its analysis was “in tension” with the holding in White, but it declined to state specifically whether White survived the decision in Crawford.

was admitted over the objection of defense counsel, and Shaw was cross-examined at length. Id. at 77-78.

70 Dutton, 400 U.S. at 78.
71 Id. at 81.
72 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57. But see In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that grandmother’s testimony about child’s statements to her regarding sexual abuse implicated the Confrontation Clause even though the statements were not made to a government official), petition for appeal allowed, 833 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 2005). See infra note 328 for a discussion of In re E.H.
74 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.
75 White, 502 U.S. at 349-51.
76 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.
77 The Court later characterized the holding in White as the “one arguable exception” to the Confrontation Clause’s requirements of unavailability of the witness and prior cross-examination in cases involving testimonial hearsay. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2275 (2006). In a concurring opinion in White, Justice Thomas noted that the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence to that point had implicitly assumed that all hearsay declarants were “witnesses against” a defendant within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. White, 502 U.S. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas argued that neither the history nor the text of the Confrontation Clause supported this assumption, id. at 358, and suggested the following interpretation of the Confrontation Clause: “The federal constitutional right of confrontation extends to any witness who actually testifies at trial, but the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.” Id. at 365. Justice Thomas reiterated this position in subsequent decisions. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280-83 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 143-44 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 Geo. L.J. 1045, 1045 (1998) (arguing that the
III. IMPACT ON EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION

Federal and state courts have reached different conclusions on the admissibility of excited utterances under Crawford based on their consideration of various factors and the importance placed upon each one.78 A number of courts have concluded that excited utterances, even when made to a police officer in response to some degree of questioning, are not testimonial.79 Other courts have taken the opposite viewpoint, reasoning that an excited utterance may be testimonial if the questioning by law enforcement officers is for investigatory and fact-gathering purposes in anticipation of a future prosecution.80 Structured and detailed questioning is more likely to result in responses that implicate Crawford, even if the responses qualify as excited utterances under state evidentiary rules.81

Confrontation Clause “encompasses only those ‘witnesses’ who testify either by taking the stand in person or via government-prepared affidavits, depositions, videotapes, and the like”).

78 One view is that “[o]n paper, Crawford is a thorough originalist resolution of a constitutional question. In application, however, the Court’s analysis raises substantial questions and leaves them unanswered. Equally as significant as the Court’s holding, then, is what it failed to resolve—and indeed explicitly declined to address.” See The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Leading Cases, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 316, 321 (2004); see also Lininger, supra note 61, at 777-81. Professor Lininger explains that the Crawford decision has caused lower courts to be inconsistent in their application of various factors in cases involving domestic violence prosecutions, and also suggests several reforms that would enable prosecutors to convict batters within the parameters set out in Crawford. Id.

The purpose of this Article is to provide an in-depth discussion of the various factors that the courts have utilized and the context in which the factors arise in order to determine more accurately whether an excited utterance is admissible against a defendant under Crawford.

79 See, e.g., United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703, 707-08 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding victim’s statements to police officer not testimonial where police interaction with victim was unstructured and questioning not suggestive).

80 See, e.g., Drayton v. United States, 877 A.2d 145, 150-51 (D.C. 2005) (finding that when police questioned the victim, they were aware of the nature of the crime and the participants’ identities).

81 See, e.g., Siler v. Ohio, 543 U.S. 1019 (2004) (vacating State v. Siler, No. 02COA028, 2003 WL 22429053 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2003)). Even though approximately eight hours had passed between the estimated time of the victim’s death and the statement of the victim’s child to the officers, the child’s statement was admitted as an excited utterance because a child may be under the stress and excitement of events related to a crime for a longer period than an adult. Siler, 2003 WL 22429053, at *6. In addition, the child gave his statement to the officers in the course of two interviews. Id. The first interview lasted between thirty and forty-five minutes, and the second interview lasted for one hour. Id.

On remand, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the police had obtained the child’s statements through “a structured police interrogation” and that the statements were, therefore, testimonial. State v. Siler, 843 N.E.2d 863, 866 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), appeal allowed, 847 N.E.2d 5 (Ohio 2006).

In light of Crawford, the Supreme Court has remanded for further consideration, three cases in which statements made to the police were admitted against defendants at trial based on hearsay exceptions other than the excited utterance. See Goff v. Ohio, 541 U.S. 1083 (2004) (admitting the statement of defendant’s wife made to police at trial as a statement against penal interest when the wife was unavailable for trial). On remand, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that statements made by Mr. Goff’s wife to the police while they were
Courts that agree on the result in these cases still differ on their rationales. Some court decisions that have held excited utterances to be nontestimonial focus on the fact that the declarant initiated the contact with police and gave the statement without first being approached. Others emphasize that even if the declarant provided the statement in response to questioning, the questioning must be sufficiently structured and controlled to bring the statement within the *Crawford* rule. Still others examine the declarant’s motivation in providing the statement and conclude that it is nontestimonial if given to obtain aid or to reduce the level of danger and not to aid law enforcement in a future prosecution.\(^{82}\)

The Supreme Court has confirmed that courts must distinguish between statements that are made to address an ongoing emergency (nontestimonial) and statements that are made to provide information that can be used in a later prosecution (testimonial).\(^{83}\) Although the Court’s decision in *Davis* somewhat clarified *Crawford*’s reach, the line between these two kinds of statements can be difficult to draw.\(^{84}\) A combination of these factors in any one case only exacerbates the difficulty.\(^{85}\)

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\(^{82}\)See State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 812-13 (Minn. 2005) (listing eight factors or considerations to guide courts when determining whether a particular statement is testimonial), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006) (judgment vacated and case remanded to the Supreme Court of Minnesota for further consideration in light of *Davis*).

\(^{83}\)See generally John F. Yetter, *Wrestling With Crawford v. Washington and the New Constitutional Law of Confrontation*, 78 Fla. B.A. J. 26, 29 (2004) (“One can imagine, for instance, excited utterances subdivided into ‘really excited utterances’ that are nontestimonial statements, standard ‘excited utterances’ that could go either way, and ‘mildly excited utterances’ that would be admissible under the hearsay exception but excluded because they contain ‘testimonial’ statements.”).
A. Contact Initiated by Declarant

A number of court decisions issued after Crawford have held excited utterances to be nontestimonial when the declarant makes the statement after initiating contact with law enforcement authorities. Because the declarant initiates the interaction in these cases, the statement is not taken “in the course of [a police] interrogation,”86 and, therefore, is not testimonial. Even though the statement might still qualify as “a formal statement to government officers,”87 the absence of interrogation or formal questioning is regarded as more significant.88

An example of this scenario is Leavitt v. Arave.89 In Leavitt, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court properly admitted an excited utterance made by the victim to the police, reasoning that the statement was not “testimonial” under Crawford.90 In Leavitt, the victim had been frightened on the night before her death by a prowler at her home.91 She called the police and told them that she thought the prowler was the defendant because he had tried to talk himself into her home earlier that day.92 The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that admission of the hearsay testimony violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.93 The court acknowledged that the question was close but “[d]id not believe that [the victim’s] statements [were] of the kind with which Crawford was concerned, namely, testimonial statements.”94 The court went on to explain the distinction between the victim’s statements and the statements in Crawford:

87Id. at 51. It is worth noting that subsequent to its decision in Crawford, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that statements made in the absence of interrogation could also qualify as testimonial. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1. The Supreme Court dealt only with statements produced as the result of interrogations because those were the only statements involved in Davis and its companion case, Hammon v. Indiana. See Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
88See Dickinson, supra note 63, at 806-09. Mr. Dickinson describes the difference between these kinds of statements as follows:

The difference is subtle, yet defensible. The key is to look at the circumstances surrounding the giving of the out-of-court statement to the government. For instance, if a witness walks up to a police officer and announces, “I saw Jim shoot Lisa,” that type of situation in no way resembles the sorts of abuses concerning the framers. This wholly unsolicited statement does not resemble the prosecutorial abuses common in the trial by affidavit scenario because the statement was not elicited by the government for purposes of trial.

Id. at 807 n.364.
89Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1105 (2005).
90Id. at 683.
91Id.
92Id.
93Id.
94Id. at 683 n.22.
We do not think that [the victim’s] statements to the police she called to her home fall within the compass of [the examples of the types of statements that qualify as testimonial in the Crawford decision. The victim], not the police, initiated their interaction. She was in no way being interrogated by them but instead sought their help in ending a frightening intrusion into her home. Thus, we do not believe that the admission of her hearsay statements against [the defendant] implicate “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed[:] . . . the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”

During the defendant’s murder trial in State v. Barnes, the court used similar reasoning in admitting statements made by the defendant’s mother to a police officer, following a prior assault. The officer testified that in March 1998 the defendant’s mother drove herself to the police station, entered the station crying and sobbing and stated that her son had assaulted her and threatened to kill her. The court admitted the testimony as an excited utterance.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine concluded that the victim’s statements to the police were not testimonial under Crawford. The court based its conclusion on the fact that the victim had gone to the police station on her own, not because the police had sought her out or requested her presence. In addition, the victim was still under the stress of the event when she made the statements, and any questions posed by the police were for the purpose of determining why she was distressed. There was an absence of structured police questioning, and the police had no reason to believe that any wrongdoing had occurred until the victim made her statements.

In State v. Anderson, a group of juveniles flagged down a police officer who was attempting to locate the source of an activated burglar alarm. The officer stopped and asked the group what was going on, and the juveniles told him that a “large black man with a bald head just kicked in the door of a business across the

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95 Id. at 684 n.22 (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004)).
96 State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208 (Me. 2004).
97 Id. at 209.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 211.
101 Id. infra.
102 Id.
103 Id. The court’s reasoning in Barnes touches upon some of the other factors that are discussed infra.
105 Id. at *4.
street” and that he was “still inside.” The officer drove to the business, discovered
the door open and found the defendant inside.

The court in Anderson held that the statements were admissible as excited
utterances and did not fit into any of the core testimonial categories as set forth in
Crawford. The court went on to explain that “the essential characteristics that
cause the juveniles’ statements to fall within the ambit of the excited utterance
exception conflict with the characteristics that would make them testimonial.”

A shortcoming in the Anderson court’s analysis is that it links the evidentiary
issue too closely with the Confrontation Clause issue. A rationale that would be
more consistent with Crawford would hold that the juveniles’ excited utterances
were not testimonial because of their actions in initiating contact with the police.

In affirming the admission of the statements on appeal, the Tennessee Supreme
Court emphasized that the police were in a “preliminary investigational mode” when
they spoke to the witnesses. They were trying to determine exactly what was
happening and were not gathering evidence for a future prosecution.

These cases illustrate one factor to be used by lower courts in their application of
Crawford. When the declarant initiates the contact with governmental authorities
and makes a statement, the statement falls outside of the definition of “testimonial”
in Crawford. In such cases, the law of evidence determines admissibility of the

\[106\] Id.
\[107\] Id.
\[108\] Id. at *3-4.
\[109\] Id. at *4.

\[109\] See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (“Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.”).

\[110\] See, e.g., People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the victim’s statements to the 911 operator were not testimonial because the victim initiated the 911 call to request assistance); People v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870, 871-74 (2004) (holding that the statements of the domestic assault victim, who approached a police officer seated in the passenger seat of a van that was stopped in traffic at a red light, were not testimonial because the victim initiated contact with the police officer immediately after the incident in order to seek immediate protection); People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (holding that the restaurant employee’s statement to police that the defendant “just robbed me. He just robbed us in Burger King.” immediately following a robbery of the restaurant was not testimonial because the employee, who was injured in the robbery, initiated the exchange and did not make the statement in response to any police questioning); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 24-27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that statements of the victim were not testimonial because the victim, not the police, initiated the statements immediately after the rescue from the criminal incident without the police asking any questions), aff’d 611 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006) (judgment vacated and case remanded to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for further consideration in light of Davis), dismissed as moot, 636 S.E.2d 565 (N.C. 2006) (dismissing in light of defendant’s death).

\[112\] State v. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d 335, 353 (Tenn. 2006).
\[113\] Id.
statement. The focus in these cases is on the declarant’s timing in the making of the excited utterance, and it is irrelevant that the statement is made to a law enforcement officer or government official.

B. Location of Interaction Between the Declarant and the Law Enforcement Agents and Extent of Structure and Formality of Questioning

Another factor that courts have considered in their application of Crawford is whether questioning of the declarant by law enforcement agents is structured and formal. In most cases dealing with this factor, the location of the questioning is a consideration in the court’s analysis. If the questions are informal and unstructured, the courts are more inclined to characterize any statements procured from such questions as nontestimonial. This situation arises if the questioning takes place at the scene of the incident itself or at a location other than the police station, such as a hospital.

Other courts have placed more emphasis on whether the questioning is structured and formal and less emphasis on the location. In these cases, the courts seem concerned with the fact that a governmental authority is procuring information through direct questions, even if the questions are few in number and asked at the scene of the incident. The courts have held that statements generated under such circumstances, even if admissible as excited utterances, may implicate the Confrontation Clause under Crawford.

In People v. Cage, the California Court of Appeals had to evaluate three different hearsay statements from the victim, who had sustained a cut on his neck during a fight with the defendant (his mother). The victim stated that his mother had slashed him with a piece of glass. He made this statement to a police officer at the

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114 This factor is derived from the language in the Crawford decision where the Court discussed testimonial statements coming in the form of “custodial examinations” and a declarant “mak[ing] a formal statement to government officers.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.

115 See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.

116 See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Mass. 2005) (“[S]tatements made in response to questioning by law enforcement agents are per se testimonial, except when the questioning is meant to secure a volatile scene or to establish the need for or provide medical care.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006); Watson, 2004 WL 2567124, at *15 (whether questioning constitutes interrogation is not determined by the number of questions asked by a police officer or law enforcement agent); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 836 N.E.2d 335, 338-39 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (applying the “per se” rule announced in Gonsalves).

117 See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing view that the excited nature of the utterance is secondary to the declarant’s objectively reasonable expectations of whether the statement would be used prosecutorally), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006); Dickinson, supra note 63, at 811 (arguing against the “unwarranted and unduly restrictive” distinction “between statements made in formalized testimonial settings versus informal investigative settings”).

hospital, to a doctor at the hospital, and to the same police officer at the police station. The trial court admitted the statements under the California Evidence Code as both spontaneous statements and a victim’s report of a physical injury.

The court in *Cage* held that the statement to the doctor at the hospital was clearly nontestimonial and that the statement to the police officer at the police station was clearly testimonial. On the statement to the police officer at the hospital, the court held that the statement was not testimonial “because the interview was not sufficiently analogous to a pretrial examination by a justice of the peace; among other things, the police had not yet focused on a crime or a suspect, there was no structured questioning, and the interview was informal and unrecorded.”

The lack of formality and structure in the manner of questioning, in addition to the fact that it took place at a hospital and not in a courtroom or station house, persuaded the court in *Cage* that the interview was not an interrogation. Therefore, the statement was admissible as a spontaneous or excited utterance and was not testimonial under *Crawford*.

In contrast to the holding in *Cage*, the court in *Wall v. State* held that a police interview of a witness at a hospital was structured questioning. In *Wall*, one of the victims of an assault provided a statement to the police detailing how the defendant had made several racial epithets and then attacked his victims with a wooden board. When the victim was unavailable to testify at trial, a deputy testified as to what the victim had told him in response to the deputy’s questioning at the hospital. The trial court admitted the victim’s statements as excited utterances, and the defendant challenged the admission of the statements as a violation of his right to confront the witnesses against him.

The issue on appeal was “whether a non-testifying witness’s statement made to a police officer during investigation of a crime and incriminating the defendant, is

119 *Cage*, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 848.
120 Id. at 850.
121 Id. at 848. The victim’s statement to the police officer at the police station was a recorded station-house interview identical to the one at issue in *Crawford*, and the statement to the doctor was not made to the police or an agent of the police. Id. at 854-55.
122 Id. at 848; see also Cassidy v. State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 714-16 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that victim’s statement to police officer at hospital was admissible as an excited utterance and victim’s interview by police officer was not an interrogation as defined in *Crawford*), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 925 (2005).
123 *Cage*, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 856-57.
124 Id. at 857.
126 Id. at 851.
127 Id. at 848.
128 Id.
129 Id.
In reliance on the standard for interrogation from Crawford as a statement “knowingly given in response to structured police questioning,” the court in Wall held that an interview of a witness at a hospital is “structured police questioning” and, therefore, an interrogation under Crawford. The victim’s statement was held to be “testimonial” under the standard in Crawford.

It is difficult to distinguish Cage and Wall from each other on their facts. Perhaps one difference is that in Cage, the law enforcement agent was still trying to determine whether a crime had been committed at the time he conducted the interview. The court in Cage stated that the deputy engaged in no structured questioning but simply extended “an open-ended invitation for [the victim] to tell his story.” In Wall, however, the deputy’s questioning of the victim was more specifically related to the investigation of a crime. The cases clearly illustrate the difficulty that courts have encountered in the application of Crawford in this context.

That application, however, may become somewhat less difficult in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Washington. In Davis, the Court distinguished between interrogations that occur during an ongoing emergency and interrogations that occur when the emergency has ceased. Thus, even if the interview in Cage was informal and unrecorded, the fact that the police were asking questions some time after the incident in an effort to establish past events would seem to make the victim’s statement to the police testimonial under Davis. The

130Id. at 849.
131Id. at 851.
132Id. Applying the standard of an “objectively reasonable declarant standing in the shoes of the actual declarant[,]” the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a reasonable person would have realized that the officers were investigating a criminal occurrence and were gathering evidence for a prosecution. Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The Court of Criminal Appeals, therefore, agreed with the Court of Appeals that admission of the statement violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 745. The Court of Criminal Appeals also agreed with the Court of Appeals that the erroneous admission of the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 745-46. The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the confrontation violation was harmful during the punishment stage of the proceeding. Id. at 746-47.

The holding of the Texas Court of Appeals in Wall is also in stark contrast to its holding in Cassidy. See Cassidy v. State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 714-16 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that victim’s statement to police officer at hospital was admissible as an excited utterance and that victim’s interview by police officer was not an interrogation as defined in Crawford), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 925 (2005); see also Tyler v. State, 167 S.W.3d 550, 553-54 (Tex. App. 2005) (pointing out apparent conflict between Wall and Cassidy).

134Id. at 856-57.
135Wall, 143 S.W.3d at 848, 851.
137Id. at 2273-74.
Supreme Court of California will reconsider the result in *Cage* in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in *Davis*.138

A statement would seem to qualify as testimonial under *Davis* if it is made in response to any police questioning that occurs after the threatening incident is no longer in progress,139 even if the questioning takes place at the scene of the incident itself and elicits a statement that qualifies as an excited utterance under state evidentiary law. The Supreme Court deemphasized the requirement that the questioning be formal and structured in its decision in *Davis*,140 which was a point of emphasis for several courts in the immediate aftermath of *Crawford*.

For example, in *United States v. Webb*,141 the police officer conducted the questioning right at the scene. In *Webb*, the court held that statements made in response to investigatory questioning at the scene of a criminal event soon after the occurrence of the criminal event were not made in response to police interrogation as contemplated by *Crawford*.142 In *Webb*, a police officer arrived on the scene of an assault and asked the victim, “What happened?”143 The victim responded, “[the defendant] punched me with a closed fist two times in the face.”144 When the police officer asked her why, the victim responded that she had refused to give the defendant money for drugs and that the two had gotten into an argument as a result.145

The court in *Webb* reasoned that the police officer’s main concern in asking the questions was to investigate the situation and to ascertain what had happened.146 In addition, “[t]he situation did not resemble a formal police investigation at a police station.”147 Therefore, the victim’s statements were admitted as excited utterances.148

139See *Davis*, 126 S. Ct. at 2278-79.
140The Court in *Davis* did not entirely reject the notion that the degree of formality of the statement is an important consideration in the determination of whether the statement is testimonial. *Id.* at 2278 n.5. The Court did, however, characterize the distinction between “formal” and “informal” statements as “vague.” *Id.*
142*Id.* at *3.
143*Id.* at *1.
144*Id.*
145*Id.*
146*Id.* at *3.
147*Id.* at *4.
148*Id.* at *4-5; see also *Anderson v. State*, 111 P.3d 350, 351, 353-54 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (holding that injured man’s response to police officer’s question, “What happened?”, was not testimonial under *Crawford* because it was not given in response to interrogation), *cert. granted*, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (vacating judgment and remanding case to the Court of Appeals of Alaska for further consideration in light of *Davis*).
In two cases decided by the Indiana Court of Appeals, statements by a domestic violence victim to a police officer were held to be nontestimonial because of the informal nature of the questioning. In Fowler v. State, the court held that a domestic assault victim’s statement to a police officer, who asked the victim what had happened ten minutes after arriving at the residence in response to a 911 call, was not a testimonial statement and was therefore admissible under Crawford. The victim responded that her husband, the defendant, “had punched her several times in the face.” Despite the lapse of time between the police officer’s arrival and the victim’s statement, the court in Fowler concluded that the victim’s statement was an excited utterance.

On the issue of admissibility of the statement under Crawford, the court in Fowler held “that when police arrive at the scene of an incident in response to a request for assistance and begin informally questioning those nearby immediately thereafter in order to determine what has happened, statements given in response thereto are not ‘testimonial.’” The court emphasized that the investigation was still in a preliminary stage and that the police were asking questions at the scene of the incident shortly after it occurred.

In a concurring opinion in Fowler, Judge Crone took the position that Crawford did not apply to the facts of the case. Judge Crone stated that although the domestic assault victim in the case had been uncooperative, she testified at trial and was therefore subject to cross-examination regarding the statements that she made to the police at the scene. Judge Crone concluded his concurring opinion with the following statement: “The fallout from Justice Scalia’s ‘clarification’ of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford will reverberate through the evidentiary landscape for some time to come and will create countless dilemmas for trial and appellate courts . . . .”


150Id. at 961, 964.

151Id. at 961.

152Id. at 962.

153Id. at 964.

154Id. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court “assume[d] without deciding that [the victim’s] account [of the assault to the police] was testimonial.” Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 464 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2862 (2006). Nevertheless, the court concluded that the statement was properly admitted and affirmed the defendant’s conviction on the ground that the victim had appeared at trial and was subject to cross-examination. Id. at 464-66. Under the standard announced in Davis, the Indiana Supreme Court was correct that the victim’s account was testimonial because the “primary purpose” of the police questioning was to establish the prior criminal incident, which was no longer ongoing at that point. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).

155Fowler, 809 N.E.2d at 965 (Crone, J., concurring).

156Id. at 966. The Indiana Supreme Court agreed with Justice Crone’s position that the victim’s appearance at trial satisfied the Confrontation Clause. See Fowler, 829 N.E.2d at 464-65.

157Fowler, 809 N.E.2d at 966 (Crone, J., concurring).
Similarly, in *Hammon v. State*,\(^{158}\) which the Supreme Court reversed as the companion case to *Davis v. Washington*,\(^{159}\) the court held that statements made by a domestic violence victim to an investigating officer were not testimonial under *Crawford*.\(^{160}\) The victim’s statements were admissible as excited utterances because the victim made the statements to the police after a startling event that had recently taken place.\(^{161}\) Even though the victim gave her statement in direct response to police questioning, it was not an interrogation as defined in *Crawford*.\(^{162}\) Using some of the language from *Fowler*, the court in *Hammon* reasoned as follows:

> We thus hold that when police arrive at the scene of an incident in response to a request for assistance and begin informally questioning those nearby immediately thereafter in order to determine what has happened, statements given in response thereto are not “testimonial.” Whatever else police “interrogation” might be, we do not believe that word applies to preliminary investigatory questions asked at the scene of a crime shortly after it has occurred. Such interaction with witnesses on the scene does not fit within a lay conception of police “interrogation,” bolstered by television, as encompassing an “interview” in a room at the stationhouse. It also does not bear the hallmarks of an improper “inquisitorial practice.”\(^{163}\)

The courts in *Webb*, *Fowler* and *Hammon* separated the police activity into two distinct stages: the initial determination of what actually occurred, and if the occurrence constituted a crime, the investigation of the crime itself. These courts reasoned that any answers to police questioning during the former stage were nontestimonial statements because the Court in *Crawford* emphasized the importance of “formal statement[s] to government officers”\(^{164}\) and described the “striking resemblance [between police interrogations and] examinations by justices of the

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\(^{159}\) *Davis*, 126 S. Ct. at 2278-80.

\(^{160}\) *Hammon*, 809 N.E.2d at 952.

\(^{161}\) Id. at 948-49.

\(^{162}\) Id. at 952.

\(^{163}\) Id.; see also *People v. Corella*, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that preliminary questions asked at the crime scene shortly after the crime occurred constituted an “unstructured interaction” between the officer and the witness and not an interrogation); *State v. Hembertt*, 696 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Neb. 2005) (holding that police who ask preliminary questions to ascertain the level of danger when responding to emergency calls are not gathering information to make a case against a suspect), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006). The Indiana Supreme Court in *Hammon* agreed with the Court of Appeals that responses to initial inquiries at a crime scene typically would not qualify as testimonial statements. *Hammon v. State*, 829 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. *Davis v. Washington*, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). The Indiana Supreme Court declined to adopt the view, however, that excited utterances are per se nontestimonial. *Id.*

peace in England[,]” in the 16th and 17th centuries. If the police ask questions during the former stage, any answers to those questions constitute statements that are not testimonial. When the police possess little or no information about a particular occurrence, it follows that they will not be able to ask questions that are formal and structured as contemplated by Crawford. Responses to the more detailed questions asked during the investigatory stage, however, produce testimonial statements that are subject to the rule of Crawford.

Under Davis v. Washington, police questioning at either stage will produce testimonial statements so long as the criminal incident is not ongoing and the “primary purpose” of the questioning is to establish the prior incident in a way that could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. The degree of formality is still a consideration in the determination of whether a statement is testimonial, but the Court in Davis seemed to break from the rationale of Crawford when it stated that “[i]t imports sufficient formality, in our view, that lies to [police] officers are criminal offenses.”

An illustration of this two-stage procedure that appears to be consistent with the distinction made in Davis (between statements to meet an emergency—which are nontestimonial—and statements to establish a past event—which are testimonial) is evidenced in Stancil v. United States. In Stancil, the evidence against the defendant consisted solely of the testimony of a police officer who appeared at the home of the defendant and his wife in response to a 911 call. The police officer testified to certain statements that the defendant’s wife had made to him shortly after the police arrived on the scene. The trial judge allowed the statements to be admitted as excited utterances. On appeal, the defendant argued that the statements were testimonial under Crawford and should have been excluded because he had not cross-examined them.

165Id. at 52.

166See also People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 1882661 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004) (finding that victim’s excited utterance was not testimonial because victim was seriously injured when police found him and that the question of “What happened?” did not constitute an interrogation when victim responded that a person named Rick had shot him), remanded, 722 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 2006) (remanding to court of appeals for reconsideration in light of Davis in lieu of granting leave to appeal).


168Id. at 2278 n.5.

169Id. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent, the possibility of criminal proceedings being brought against a person who makes a false oral statement to a police officer “may render honesty in casual conversations with police officers important. It does not, however, render those conversations solemn or formal in the ordinary meanings of those terms.” Id. at 2283 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).


171Id. at 801.

172Id. at 801-02.

173Id. at 802.
The court in *Stancil* remanded the case for additional findings on whether the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated.\(^{174}\) The court reasoned that the activities of the police at the apartment during the investigation of the 911 call were divided into two distinct stages.\(^{175}\) Statements by the defendant’s wife to the police during the first stage, before the police had restored order and began asking questions, were not testimonial and could be admitted as evidence under the excited utterance exception.\(^{176}\) Statements made by the defendant’s wife to the police after the police had secured the scene, statements that were in response to questions that the police asked her, took on a “testimonial character” and would ordinarily be inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.\(^{177}\) The court in *Stancil* stated that the types of statements cited by the Court in *Crawford* as testimonial “all involve a declarant’s knowing responses to structured questioning in an investigative environment.”\(^{178}\) The “investigative environment, however, could be a home or a hotel room under the right circumstances.”\(^{179}\)

In *People v. Watson*,\(^{180}\) the court had to determine whether a series of statements were testimonial under *Crawford* when made by an employee of a Burger King Restaurant immediately following a robbery of the restaurant.\(^{181}\) Immediately after the police captured the suspects, the employee, who was bleeding profusely from an injury suffered during the robbery, stated to the police that the defendant “just robbed me. He just robbed us in Burger King.”\(^{182}\) The police officer then asked the employee whether any other perpetrators were involved in the robbery, and the employee responded that the defendant had acted alone.\(^{183}\) Finally, when the police officer asked the employee to describe what happened, the employee described the defendant’s actions in entering the Burger King Restaurant, revealing a gun and demanding money from the safe.\(^{184}\)

The employee made his second statement in response to a police question about whether any other perpetrators were involved in the robbery, but it was not a structured question that was asked in anticipation of trial.\(^{185}\) Rather, the police wanted to secure the area where the robbery had occurred and determine whether they should search for other robbers in the vicinity.\(^{186}\) Therefore, this statement was

\(^{174}\) *Id.* at 815.

\(^{175}\) *Id.* at 814.

\(^{176}\) *Id.* at 815.

\(^{177}\) *Id.* at 813, 815.

\(^{178}\) *Id.* at 812.

\(^{179}\) *Id.* at 812 n.25.


\(^{181}\) *Id.* at *1-2, *13-15.

\(^{182}\) *Id.* at *2.

\(^{183}\) *Id.*

\(^{184}\) *Id.*

\(^{185}\) *Id.* at *14.

\(^{186}\) *Id.*
not testimonial and could be introduced at the defendant’s trial without violating *Crawford*.

The employee’s final statement, however, was made in response to structured questioning by the police. When the police asked the employee what had happened, they had already placed the defendant in custody and were trying to obtain information to further their investigation and eventual prosecution of the defendant. Given the circumstances that existed at the time of the questioning, the employee should have been aware that the information would be used at future judicial proceedings. Therefore, the court in *Watson* concluded that the employee’s third statement was testimonial in nature and could not be introduced against the defendant at trial because it was not subject to cross-examination. The court rejected the argument that no interrogation had taken place because the police had asked only two questions:

> Interrogation, even as that term is used in the colloquial sense, is not determined by the number of questions asked. When a police officer or any other law enforcement agent questions a potential witness for the purpose of gathering information to aid in a suspect’s prosecution, and the witness is aware of the purpose of the officer’s questions, structured questioning amounting to an interrogation has occurred. That the officer obtained all of the pertinent information from a single question is of no moment.

The court in *Watson* permitted the police to determine what actually occurred without excluding the statements made by the employee in the course of that process. Once the police determined what had happened at the restaurant, however, the court characterized as “interrogation” any questions that followed. Law enforcement agents, therefore, are capable of producing both testimonial and nontestimonial statements within a short period of time from the same witness. Moreover, it is not always possible to draw a precise line of demarcation between the police officers’ act of responding to an emergency and the act of gathering evidence for the subsequent prosecution.

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187 *Id.*

188 *Id.* at *15.*

189 *Id.*

189 *Id.* at *15.*

191 *Id.*

192 *Id.* This analysis illustrates how the above-stated factors work together in adjudicating the issue of whether a particular statement is testimonial. The *Watson* court’s conclusion that the police were engaging in structured questioning, an interrogation, followed directly from its conclusion that the police were gathering evidence for a future prosecution. *See infra* notes 292-340 and accompanying text for a discussion of statements to be used as evidence in a future prosecution.

In *People v. Victors*, the defendant was charged with domestic battery. A couple in an adjoining room, the Doerrs, heard “slapping-type” and “thumping” noises coming from the room in which the defendant and the victim were staying. The Doerrs also heard the defendant speak in a loud, angry voice and call the victim an offensive name. When the Doerrs heard the victim tell the defendant to stop, Mr. Doerr called the police and spoke to them upon their arrival.

One of the officers on the scene spoke to the victim. The victim informed the officer that she and the defendant had an argument, and the argument escalated into the defendant pushing her, pulling her hair, punching her and choking her. At trial, the State sought to have the officer testify about what the victim had told him because the victim did not testify. The trial court admitted the victim’s statements as excited utterances.

The court in *Victors* rejected the claim that the victim’s statements to the police officers constituted excited utterances and held that the admission of the police officer’s testimony regarding the victim’s statements to him violated the rule announced in *Crawford*. The court reasoned that the victim made the statements to the police in response to their questions while they were investigating a possible crime. Because the police officer’s testimony was offered to establish an element of the crime with which the defendant had been charged, it constituted testimonial evidence under *Crawford*. The *Victors* case is another example of the distinction between the initial determination by the police of what actually occurred and police investigation of the crime itself. By distinguishing between the initial police response to the incident and the subsequent police investigation of the incident, the court in *Victors* correctly anticipated the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Davis*.

In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Malley disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the victim’s statements were not excited utterances. On whether

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195 *Id.* at 314.

196 *Id.*

197 *Id.*

198 *Id.*

199 *Id.* at 314.

200 *Id.*

201 *Id.* at 315.

202 *Id.* at 320. In ruling that the statements were not excited utterances, the court in *Victors* did not specify the evidentiary rule that would provide for the admission of the statements. *See infra* note 205.

203 *Victors*, 819 N.E.2d at 320.

204 *Id.* at 320-21.

205 *Id.* at 321 (O’Malley, J., concurring). Justice O’Malley also took issue with the majority’s decision to reach the federal Confrontation Clause issue under *Crawford* when it had already decided that the statement was excluded on evidentiary grounds under Illinois state law. *Id.* at 323.
the victim’s statements were testimonial under *Crawford*, Justice O’Malley stated the following:

With the ink hardly dry on *Crawford*’s Copernican shift in federal constitutional law, a panel of the Illinois Appellate Court plummets undaunted, but for no good reason, into the murky waters left in *Crawford*’s wake. In its zeal, the majority stretches the definition of “testimonial” to unprecedented girth in Illinois.206

Because the victim gave her statement to the police in an informal setting without any structured questioning and only minutes after the incident had occurred, reasoned Justice O’Malley, the victim’s statement was not testimonial under *Crawford*.207 It is another example of the uncertainty involved in trying to identify the precise point in time when the police have ceased to respond to the incident and have begun to gather evidence.

In *Samarron v. State*,208 the declarant was standing among a group of men who were approached by a second group of men. A man in the second group stabbed Mr. Villatoro, who was in the declarant’s group, and another man from the second group hit Mr. Villatoro over the head with a hammer.209 Mr. Villatoro died from his injuries, and the declarant gave a statement to the police one hour after the incident.210 Based on the declarant’s statement, the police were able to identify the defendant as the man who had stabbed Mr. Villatoro.211 The declarant did not testify at trial, and his statement was admitted as an excited utterance.212

The court in *Samarron* held that the admission of the declarant’s statement violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the statement was testimonial.213 The declarant had not spontaneously provided his statement to

206 Id. at 323.
207 Id. at 324. In Justice O’Malley’s view, the police were still trying to determine exactly what had happened when they spoke to the victim. Id. When asked how he conducted the questioning of the victim, the police officer testified, “I asked her basically . . . what was happening.” Id.; see also State v. Alvarez, 107 P.3d 350, 355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that victim’s excited utterance to police, which was obtained in response to questioning, was not testimonial because police did not know that a crime had been committed when they spoke to victim and were still trying to ascertain what had happened), petition for review granted in part, No. CR-05-0104-PR, 2005 Ariz. LEXIS 127 (Ariz. 2005), and remanded by No. CR-05-0104-PR, 2006 Ariz. LEXIS 96 (Ariz. 2006), vacated in part and aff’d, 143 P.3d 668 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). On remand from the Arizona Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of *Davis*, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the victim gave his statement to the police during an ongoing emergency in order to obtain medical assistance for his serious injuries, and that the officer’s purpose in asking the victim “what happened?” was to assist the victim and to meet the emergency. *Alvarez*, 143 P.3d at 674.
209 Id. at 702.
210 Id. at 703.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 706.
the police.\footnote{Id. at 707.} It was a formal, signed, written statement given in response to questions from the police.\footnote{Id.} The admission of the statement violated the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him because he had no opportunity to cross examine it.\footnote{Id.} Because the statement was in writing, it was the “functional equivalent” of “ex parte in-court testimony” discussed in \textit{Crawford}.\footnote{Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).}

Under \textit{Crawford}, informal questioning and gathering of information from witnesses and victims at the scene of a crime produced nontestimonial statements that could be used against a defendant at a subsequent prosecution without violating the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights. Under \textit{Davis}, the emphasis is more on the timing of the questioning than on the formality of it. Therefore, police questioning of witnesses and victims at the scene of an incident that takes place after the police have neutralized any danger at the scene will produce testimonial statements.\footnote{Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).} Informal, unstructured questioning designed to ascertain what happened or to address an ongoing incident does not constitute an interrogation as defined in \textit{Crawford},\footnote{See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 562-63 (Mass. 2005) (Sosman, J., concurring in part) (“‘[P]olice interrogation’ does not encompass the basic, immediate, on-scene questioning of persons present in an attempt to get the gist of what is happening or has just happened, i.e., to ascertain why police were called to the scene and what steps need to be taken in response.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006).} and this analysis is still valid after \textit{Davis}. When the questioning becomes more structured and organized, with the information gathered from it to be used in a future prosecution, such use violates the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights unless he or she has the opportunity to cross-examine the statements. The questioning is likely to become more structured and organized when the police determine that a crime has been committed and are seeking to learn the identity of the perpetrator or the manner of its commission.

Although some cases place significance on the location of the questioning, with a hospital deemed to be a less formal atmosphere than a police station,\footnote{See Cassidy v. State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 925 (2005); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), petition for review granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).} the court in \textit{Stancil v. United States}\footnote{Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 812 n.25 (D.C. 2005), reh’g en banc granted, 878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 2005).} stated that a home or hotel room could constitute an “investigative environment” under the right circumstances. In addition, the court in \textit{People v. Watson}\footnote{People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004).} concluded that even two questions can constitute structured questioning if law enforcement personnel have placed the suspect in custody prior to
asking the questions. When the witness’s statement is written or recorded, it is likely that such a statement will meet the standard for testimonial material under Crawford because the statement is very similar to in-court testimony.

C. Purpose of the Statement

In the analysis of whether the rule announced in Crawford applies to a particular statement, courts have also examined the declarant’s purpose for making the statement. In some cases, the declarant’s primary motivation is to obtain protection from danger or to be rescued from a dangerous situation. In such cases, courts have usually held the statement to be nontestimonial. If, on the other hand, the declarant makes the statement to provide information for a possible future legal proceeding, the courts have held such statements to be testimonial. It can be a difficult task for courts to distinguish between these different kinds of statements. As is the case with all of the factors, the outcome of these cases is often determined by which factor is most prevalent in a given situation.

Emergency 911 calls have been placed in both categories. A nontestimonial plea for help and protection may become a testimonial report of a crime that can be used at a future judicial proceeding if the caller makes a specific accusation. The caller may make such an accusation voluntarily or in response to questions from the 911 operator.

The Supreme Court subsequently confirmed the validity of the distinction between statements that are made to obtain protection and statements that are made to provide incriminating evidence for Confrontation Clause analysis. The Court in


224 A recorded statement may not qualify as an excited utterance in most circumstances because it is likely that such a statement would be obtained at a point when the declarant is no longer under the stress of the exciting event. If the statement was admissible as an excited utterance, however, the degree of formality and structure involved in procuring the statement would qualify it as testimonial under Crawford.

225 The declarants in these cases are usually the victims of the crimes.

226 See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily, statements made to police while the declarant or others are still in personal danger cannot be said to have been made with consideration of their legal ramifications . . . [T]herefore, . . . such statements will not normally be deemed testimonial.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006).

227 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (explaining that “‘pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorally’ are part of the core class of testimonial statements (quoting Brief of Petitioner, supra note 14, at 23)).

228 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Attempts to draw a line between statements made in contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties.”).

229 See infra notes 237-65 and accompanying text.

230 See infra notes 307-15 and accompanying text.

231 See infra notes 329-38 and accompanying text.

Davis stated that if the purpose of the police interrogation is to respond to an emergency, statements made in the course of the interrogation are nontestimonial.\textsuperscript{233} Conversely, if the purpose of the police interrogation is to establish the occurrence of an event in anticipation of a future prosecution, statements made in the course of the interrogation are testimonial.\textsuperscript{234} The Court in Davis described the distinction in terms of the interrogation and not the statements themselves because interrogation had produced the statements in the cases before them.\textsuperscript{235} The Court made clear that “even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”\textsuperscript{236}

Thus, courts that made the distinction between these two kinds of statements in the immediate aftermath of Crawford correctly anticipated the Court’s clarification of Crawford in Davis. An examination of these cases illustrates that even with the Davis decision as a guide, the distinction is not always a clear one.

1. Statements to Obtain Aid or to Reduce the Level of Danger

In People v. Moscat,\textsuperscript{237} the prosecution sought to introduce as evidence at trial a recording of a 911 call.\textsuperscript{238} The court allowed the recording to be admitted as evidence because it was not “testimonial” as that term is explained in Crawford.\textsuperscript{239} The Moscat court pointed out that 911 calls are among the most common form of evidence in domestic violence cases.\textsuperscript{240} The court explained that, prior to Crawford, it was fairly clear that the admission of 911 calls as excited utterances was not a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.\textsuperscript{241} The Moscat court then concluded that “[a] 911 call for help is essentially different in nature than the ‘testimonial’ materials that Crawford tells us the Confrontation Clause was designed to exclude.”\textsuperscript{242} The victim usually generates these calls out of desire to be rescued and protected from danger.\textsuperscript{243} In addition, the 911 call is not the equivalent of a formal pretrial examination but rather the “electronically augmented equivalent of a

\textsuperscript{233}Id. at 2273.
\textsuperscript{234}Id. at 2273-74.
\textsuperscript{235}Id. at 2274 n.1.
\textsuperscript{236}Id.
\textsuperscript{237}People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004).
\textsuperscript{238}Id. at 875.
\textsuperscript{239}Id. at 876.
\textsuperscript{240}Id. at 878.
\textsuperscript{241}Id.
\textsuperscript{242}Id. at 879.
\textsuperscript{243}Id.
loud cry for help.” Lastly, the 911 call is part of the criminal incident itself and not part of the prosecution that follows.245

In People v. Conyers,246 the prosecution sought to introduce two 911 calls made within minutes of each other by a third party who had witnessed the defendant’s alleged assault of the victim.247 In the first call, the witness screamed for police assistance to stop a fight between her son and son-in-law.248 In the second call, the witness screamed for an ambulance.249 The prosecution sought to introduce both calls as excited utterances.250

The Conyers court concluded that neither call was testimonial.251 The court reasoned that the witness made the calls as she was reacting to the serious situation that was happening right in front of her.252 Her intention in making the call was to stop the assault that was in progress and not to consider the legal consequences of being a witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution.253 Because the statements were not testimonial, their introduction at the defendant’s trial did not violate his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights under Crawford.254

244Id. at 880.

245Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Galicia, 857 N.E.2d 463 (Mass. 2006) (applying Davis and holding that domestic assault victim’s statements to 911 dispatcher were admissible because the purpose of the statements was to enable the police to respond to an ongoing emergency). But see Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1193-1200 (2002) (arguing that participants in the violence that results in 911 calls are aware that statements made in such calls are likely to result in arrest and prosecution and to be used as evidence against the defendant at trial). See generally David Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscat: Confronting Judicial Bias in Domestic Violence Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 995 (2005) (discussing discrepancies between the actual circumstances of the 911 call in Moscat and the facts recited in the decision); Linger, supra note 61, at 774, n.136 (pointing out that the Moscat court incorrectly recited several of the facts in the case and that the prosecution eventually declined to pursue the case because of problems with the evidence).


247Id. at 275.

248Id.

249Id.

250Id.

251Id. at 277.

252Id. at 276-77.

253Id. at 277.

254Id. On appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court agreed that the 911 calls were not testimonial in light of Davis because “the objective circumstances indicate[d] that the primary purpose of the police questioning during the call was to enable assistance during an ongoing emergency, rather than to establish some past fact.” People v. Conyers, 824 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (citing Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276-77 (2006)); see also People v. Coleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113-14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (determining that a brief description of an attack in progress in a 911 call was not
Similarly, the issue before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in *United States v. Brito*\(^{255}\) was whether and under what circumstances an excited utterance in a 911 call should be considered testimonial.\(^{256}\) In *Brito*, an anonymous 911 caller engaged in a dialogue with the 911 operator, stating that she had heard a gunshot, describing the suspect’s appearance and location and telling the operator that the suspect had a handgun.\(^{257}\) During the trial, the prosecution sought to introduce the tape of the 911 call as evidence.\(^{258}\) Except for the caller’s description of the pistol, the court admitted the 911 tape as an excited utterance.\(^{259}\)

On appeal, the defendant asserted that admission of the redacted version of the 911 tape violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the speaker.\(^{260}\) The defendant’s first argument was that an objectively reasonable caller would have understood that the statements given during the call would be available for use at a subsequent prosecution.\(^{261}\) Second, the defendant contended that the statements given after the questions posed by the 911 operator were the product of police interrogation.\(^{262}\)

After reviewing the three formulations of testimonial statements in *Crawford* and the court decisions interpreting those formulations, the *Brito* court held that the 911 caller’s primary motivation was to neutralize the imminent danger that she faced from the suspect and to obtain a prompt response from law enforcement.\(^{263}\) For that reason, the caller lacked the “capacity to appreciate the potential long-range use of her words,” making the call nontestimonial and admissible as an excited utterance.\(^{264}\) The questions from the 911 operator served to clarify and focus the caller’s statement and were not interrogation.\(^{265}\)

Victims also make statements with the primary purpose of escaping danger and directing law enforcement agents to the scene of the incident. In *State v. Maclin*,\(^{266}\) two police officers arrived at the victim’s home as a result of a 911 hangup call.\(^{267}\)


\(^{256}\)Id. at 55-56.

\(^{257}\)Id. at 56.

\(^{258}\)Id. at 57.

\(^{259}\)Id. at 57-58.

\(^{260}\)Id. at 58.

\(^{261}\)Id. at 59.

\(^{262}\)Id.

\(^{263}\)Id. at 59-62.

\(^{264}\)Id. at 63.

\(^{265}\)Id.


\(^{267}\)Id. at *2.
Upon entering the house, the officers saw the defendant and the victim, who had swelling and bruises on her face. The victim told one of the officers that she and the defendant had gotten into an argument on the way home from work and that the defendant had pulled out a gun, pointed it at her head and threatened to kill her if she did not shut up. The defendant also threatened to kill the victim’s children. The victim explained to the officer that the defendant had hit her in the face with his hands.

The Maclin court concluded that the victim’s statements to the police officer were nontestimonial under Crawford. The victim, who feared for her safety, summoned the police to her home and spoke to the police when they arrived there. Therefore, the police officer’s testimony about those statements did not violate the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment.

On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed and held that the victim’s statements to the police were testimonial. The Maclin court anticipated the United States Supreme Court’s rationale in Davis v. Washington, reasoning that the arrival of the police neutralized any immediate danger faced by the victim. In addition, because the victim gave such an extraordinarily detailed statement to the police, she should have reasonably expected that the statement would be used prosecutorially.

Even though the Tennessee Supreme Court agreed with the Tennessee Court of

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268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. at *16-17.
273 Id. at *17. In this way, the victim also initiated the contact or interaction with the police. See supra notes 86-111 and accompanying text.
274 Maclin, 2005 WL 313977, at *17.
275 Id.; see also United States v. Griggs, No. 04 CR. 425(RWS), 2004 WL 2676474 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2004) (permitting police officer to testify at trial that, upon arriving on the scene, he heard the statement, “Gun! Gun! He’s got a gun!,” and then saw the declarant gesture at the defendant because the statement was not testimonial under Crawford).
276 State v. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d 335, 352 (Tenn. 2006).
277 The United States Supreme Court decided Davis five months after the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Maclin.
278 Maclin, 183 S.W.3d at 352.
279 Id. The Court reached this conclusion by applying the third definition of testimonial from Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). It is interesting to note that the police in Maclin were dispatched to the residence of the victim and the defendant based on a 911 hang-up call. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d at 339. Assuming that the victim made the call, if she had stayed on the line and described the defendant’s attack on her as it was happening, her statement would have been nontestimonial and, therefore, admissible under the standard established in Davis five months later. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74, 2276-77 (2006).
Criminal Appeals that the officers’ general questioning at the scene did not constitute police interrogation, the Tennessee Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion on whether the victim’s statement was testimonial. The different results reached by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court in *Maclin* clearly illustrate the difficulty that courts face in trying to characterize police conduct as either responding to an emergency or gathering evidence for a future prosecution.

In *Key v. State*, a police officer who answered a disturbance call found the defendant and the victim outside on the ground in an argument. The victim told the officer that the defendant had restrained her since seven o’clock that morning, that she had just run from the house and that the defendant had grabbed her and pulled her to the ground.

The *Key* court concluded that, by responding to the disturbance, the police officer was not producing evidence for a potential criminal prosecution (which is one of the situations discussed in *Crawford*). Rather, the officer was securing the scene and assessing the situation. The court held that the underlying rationale of the excited utterance exception supported the conclusion that the victim’s statements were not testimonial.

The cases reveal a willingness on the part of the courts to analyze these quickly developing situations at each stage in order to determine whether any statements implicate the *Crawford* doctrine. In *Moscat*, *Conyers* and *Brito*, the courts agreed that the admission of statements made during 911 calls did not violate the

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280 *Maclin*, 183 S.W.3d at 352.

281 See *Davis*, 126 S. Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that most police responses to reports of crimes “are both to respond to the emergency and to gather evidence”) (emphasis in original).


283 Id. at 73.

284 Id.

285 Id. at 76.

286 *Id.*; see also *Stancil v. United States*, 866 A.2d 799, 814-15 (D.C. 2005) (holding that statements made by the victim to the police when the police first arrived at the scene of a domestic disturbance were not testimonial because order had not yet been restored), *reh’g en banc granted*, 878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 2005). *But see Commonwealth v. Young*, No. 0313 CR 5855 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Lynn May 7, 2004) (holding that victim’s statement to police officer upon his arrival at the scene that her husband had hit her in the face and chest, which qualified as an excited utterance, was inadmissible at trial because of the defendant’s inability to cross-examine the statement).

287 *Key*, 173 S.W.3d at 76-77.


defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. The courts are reluctant, if not completely unwilling, to exclude a statement made for the purpose of obtaining aid or neutralizing a dangerous situation. Courts that admit such statements now do so with assurance that they are correctly applying the rule laid out in *Crawford*, and clarified in *Davis*. When the statements are made at the scene to law enforcement authorities, the analysis necessarily turns to the level of questioning by the authorities.

2. Statement as Evidence for Possible Future Prosecution or Other Legal Proceeding

If a declarant makes a statement to law enforcement agents in order to provide evidence against an accused for a possible future prosecution, the statement is testimonial. It is difficult to distinguish many of these statements from those that are made for the purpose of obtaining aid. As previously illustrated, many statements share characteristics that are common to both situations, and the distinguishing factor is often the manner of questioning by law enforcement agents. The court’s characterization of the statement will often depend upon which factor is most conspicuous in the particular fact pattern.

An example of the difficulty in this area is *Davis v. State*, a case in which the defendant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. When a neighbor heard screams coming from the house where the victim and the defendant lived together, she called 911 for police assistance. When the police arrived at the house, the victim ran across the street to the neighbor’s yard. At trial, the neighbor testified that the victim told her, “[h]e tried to kill me.”

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291 The rationale in these decisions conflicts with the thesis of Professor Friedman and Professor McCormack regarding the awareness level of 911 callers. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 245; see also People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 415 (2004) (stating that purpose of a 911 call is to supply information for potential use at a subsequent prosecution); State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1265-66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that purpose of victim’s 911 call was to report defendant’s violation of a protective order, which provided evidence for his prosecution). *Cortes* is discussed infra at notes 329-38 and accompanying text, and *Powers* is discussed infra at notes 307-15 and accompanying text.

292 This factor is derived primarily from the third definition of “testimonial” in *Crawford*: “‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’” *Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 16, at 3).

293 United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 902-03 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that excited utterances were testimonial statements where victim could reasonably expect that her statements would be used to prosecute the defendant), vacated on other grounds, 434 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc granted, No. 04-5384, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 4995 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2006).


295 Id. at 663.

296 Id.

297 Id.
One of the officers who responded to the 911 call testified that he followed the victim to the front porch of the neighbor’s house. The victim was crying, trembling and frightened, and she bore signs of injury on her body. The police officer testified as to what the victim had told him on the neighbor’s porch, which included the details of the defendant’s assault on her.

The defendant argued that the admission of the police officer’s testimony about what the victim had told him violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. In its analysis of whether the victim’s statement to the police officer was testimonial under Crawford, the Davis court stated that “[a] statement is more likely to be testimonial if the person who heard, recorded, and produced the out-of-court statement at trial is a government officer.”

The court noted that simply because a statement qualifies as an excited utterance does not necessarily mean that “it is ipso facto nontestimonial hearsay outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause and admissible into evidence. Each case must be examined on its facts to determine if the evidence is testimonial and controlled by Crawford.”

The victim’s statements to the police simultaneously served two objectives. The first was to obtain assistance, and the second was to provide information for a possible future prosecution.

The Davis court conceded the difficulty in drawing the line between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay under Crawford. Ultimately, the court did not make the determination and concluded that even if the victim’s statements were testimonial, the admission of the testimony constituted error that did not contribute to the conviction. The scenario in Davis precluded the court from characterizing the statement as either primarily a call for assistance—which would be a nontestimonial statement—or primarily the provision of information for a possible future prosecution—which would be a testimonial statement.

298Id. at 664.
299Id.
300Id.
301Id. at 665.
302Id. at 667.
303Id. at 671.
304Id. at 672.
305Id.
306Id. at 672-73. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction in Davis. Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The Court first held that the victim’s statements to the police were testimonial because they were “made in circumstances objectively indicating that the emergency was over and that the investigation had begun.” Id. at 849 (citing Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006)). The statements were, therefore, erroneously admitted under Crawford. The Court also held, however, that any error caused by the admission of the statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of the volume of evidence at trial demonstrating that the defendant had attempted to strangle the victim. Id. at 849-56.
In State v. Powers, the victim made a 911 call to the police to report that the defendant had been in her home, which was a violation of the no-contact order against the defendant. In his appeal of the jury’s guilty verdict, the defendant argued that the trial court’s admission of the 911 tape of the victim’s call violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

The defendant argued that the victim’s call was testimonial as defined by the Court in Crawford because it constituted a pretrial statement that the victim would reasonably expect to be used in the subsequent prosecution. The defendant characterized the 911 operator as an “immediate conduit to the police” and argued that the victim was aware of this connection when she made the call. Also, because the victim was aware of the no-contact order, as she was named in it and spoke of it on the telephone, she would have been aware that her 911 call would result in the defendant’s arrest.

Based on its examination of the transcript of the 911 call, the Powers court concluded that the victim’s call was for the purpose of reporting a crime and not to get help or protection. Because the victim called 911 to report the defendant’s violation of the protective order and provided a description of him so that the authorities could apprehend and prosecute him, she did not call for protection and, therefore, her statements were testimonial under Crawford. The court rejected the State’s argument and refused to adopt a bright line rule that would admit all 911 recordings into evidence. Thus, the victim’s awareness of the protective order allowed the court to conclude that the statement was primarily to provide evidence for a prosecution.

308 Id. at 1263.
309 Id. at 1264.
310 Id. at 1264; see also Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 n.2 (2006) (explaining that 911 operators act as agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 911 callers).
311 Powers, 99 P.3d at 1264.
312 Id. at 1265.
313 Id. at 1266; see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 245.
314 Powers, 99 P.3d at 1266.
315 See also People v. Ruiz, No. B169642, 2004 WL 2383676 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the victim’s statement to the police about the defendant threatening to kill her with a handgun was testimonial). The victim’s statement in Ruiz was not an excited utterance, but the case illustrates the difficulty of dealing with dual-purpose statements. Id. at *9. Even though the victim was seeking aid and protection from the police, the court concluded that the victim was aware that her complaint to the police would result in the defendant’s arrest and prosecution because the conduct of which she complained was obviously illegal and highly dangerous. Id. at *9.

Similarly, a victim’s statements to police that were made contemporaneously with the defendant’s arrival on the scene were held to be both excited utterances and testimonial statements because the victim was the only witness to the incident and could reasonably expect that her statements would be used to prosecute the defendant. United States v. Arnold,
In *Lopez v. State*, the court utilized a different rationale but reached the same conclusion as the court in *Powers*. In *Lopez*, the police were investigating a reported kidnapping and assault when they encountered the alleged victim standing in the parking lot of an apartment complex. The victim told the police that a man had abducted him in his own car at gunpoint, and he pointed to the defendant, who was standing a short distance away in the parking lot. The victim also told the police that the gun used in the abduction was in his car. The officers searched the car and found a loaded gun under the front passenger seat. When the officers questioned the defendant, he admitted that the gun belonged to him and that he had hidden it in the victim’s car when he saw the police officers.

The defendant’s position on appeal was that the trial court’s admission of the victim’s statements about the gun violated his right under the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against him. The *Lopez* court agreed with the trial judge that the victim’s statement qualified as an excited utterance, but the court also stated that this determination did not necessarily mean that the statement was properly admitted into evidence. The court then analyzed whether the statement made by the victim to the police was testimonial under *Crawford*. The court concluded that the statement was not made as a result of an interrogation, nor was it made in any formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits or depositions. The court held that the statement was testimonial under *Crawford* because the victim made the statement with the reasonable expectation that it would be used as evidence in a subsequent court proceeding.

It was significant that the victim made his statement in direct response to a police officer’s question and that he accused the defendant of a crime in the statement. In its analysis, the *Lopez* court placed importance on the declarant’s purpose in making the statement: “[A] startled person who identifies a suspect in a statement made to a police officer at the scene of a crime surely knows that the statement is a form of accusation that will be used against the suspect.”

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317 Id. at 695.
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id. at 695-96.
322 Id. at 697.
323 Id. at 698.
324 Id.
325 Id. at 698-700.
326 Id. at 699.
327 See id.; see also *People v. Watson*, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (stating that no categorical rule excludes excited utterances from the *Crawford*...
statement to a spontaneous declaration made to friend or family member and reasoned that such a statement would unlikely be regarded as testimonial.328

328Lopez, 888 So. 2d at 699. The Lopez court’s analysis on this point is consistent with the statement in Crawford that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); see also State v. Aguilar, 107 P.3d 377, 379 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“The only manner by which Crawford might be implicated is if the excited utterance is made in response to a police officer’s query.”); People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533, 538 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding domestic violence victim’s statements to a friend about the defendant’s conduct not testimonial because they were not made to a law enforcement or judicial officer). aff’d, 121 P.3d 876 (Colo. 2005); Demons v. State, 595 S.E.2d 76, 80-81 (Ga. 2005) (finding murder victim’s excited utterance to a friend two weeks before the murder not testimonial under Crawford); State v. Staten, 610 S.E.2d 823, 827, 836 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding statement of murder victim made during a private conversation with his roommate that defendant had “pulled a . . . gun” on him not testimonial under Crawford), cert. granted, 2006 S.C. LEXIS 93 (S.C. Mar. 9, 2006); State v. Orndorff, 95 P.3d 406, 408 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (finding statement of Ms. Coble to Mr. Nordby, who was not a law enforcement agent, that Ms. Coble had seen a man with a pistol, tried to call 911, and was panic-stricken, not testimonial under Crawford), review denied, 113 P.3d 482 (Wash. 2005); Dickinson, supra note 63, at 809 (finding no Confrontation Clause concerns with an out-of-court statement if the government did not assist in the production of such statement); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 511, 518 (2005) (stating that one of the unresolved issues in Crawford is “whether statements must be elicited by questions from a government agent to be testimonial or whether questioning by private individuals or interrogators working for private groups can also qualify”).

The status of the statement’s recipient as a government agent or private individual is also an important factor in cases dealing with hearsay exceptions other than excited utterances. See People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 755-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding statement of child sex abuse victim to a trained interviewer at a videotaped interview at which the deputy district attorney and an investigator from the district attorney’s office were present to be made under circumstances that would lead an objective observer to believe that the statement would be accessible at a subsequent prosecution and, therefore, testimonial under Crawford); People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding statement of child sex abuse victim to examining doctor, who was a member of child protection team and who spoke with the police before performing the examination, to be made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be used prosecutorially and, therefore, testimonial under Crawford), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006); In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1031-32, 1034-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding statement of child sex abuse victim to grandmother testimonial under Crawford because the nature of the testimony, and not the official or unofficial nature of the person testifying, determines Crawford’s applicability), petition for appeal allowed, 833 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 2005).

In dissent, Justice Quinn stated that because the statements were not made to a governmental actor, the statements could not be considered testimonial under Crawford. Id. at 1041 (Quinn, J., dissenting). In Justice Quinn’s view, even though Crawford did not
In *People v. Cortes*, the defendant was charged with various crimes in connection with the shooting of the victim. At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce two separate 911 calls made by two different individuals who reported seeing the shooting. The trial court excluded one of the tapes because the statement on it was obtained through interrogation and was, therefore, testimonial. The court admitted a redacted version of the other tape because the declarant was present at trial and subject to cross-examination.

On the excluded tape, the record revealed that the 911 operator had asked the caller a series of questions about the shooter’s location, description and direction of movement. The court reasoned that the circumstances of some 911 calls, specifically those calls that report a crime, come within the definition of interrogation. Because the procedures for 911 calls were established and had rules and recognized patterns for the collection of information, they constituted formal statements as that term is used in *Crawford*.

The *Cortes* court read *Crawford* as requiring a “reexamination of the basis for treating spontaneous declarations as admissible hearsay, including statements in a 911 call reporting a crime.” In concluding that 911 calls to report a crime are testimonial, the court reasoned as follows:

> When a 911 call is made to report a crime and supply information about the circumstances and the people involved, the purpose of the information is for investigation, prosecution, and potential use at a judicial proceeding; it makes no difference what the caller believes.

. . . .

The 911 call reporting a crime preserved on tape is the modern equivalent, made possible by technology, to the [pretial] depositions taken by magistrates or [justices of the peace] under the Marian committal [act of 1555, which required preliminary examinations of prosecution witnesses to determine if the evidence was sufficient to hold the accused for trial]. Like the victims and witnesses before the King’s courts an objective reasonable person knows that when he or she reports a crime the completely define “testimonial,” the *Crawford* Court’s formulation of the core class of testimonial statements would exclude the child’s statement to her grandmother. *Id.*

330 *Id.* at 402.
331 *Id.* at 402-03.
332 *Id.*
333 *Id.* at 404.
334 *Id.* at 404-05.
335 *Id.* at 406.
336 *Id.* at 415.

http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss4/5
statement will be used in an investigation and at proceedings relating to a prosecution.  

The Cortes court put forth a “testimonial per se” rule with respect to 911 calls. The court stated that such calls are testimonial regardless of the caller’s beliefs. There is debate as to whose perspective must be considered, the caller or the listener, in the determination of whether any statement, including a 911 call, is testimonial. A bright line rule is somewhat easier for courts to apply because it allows them to avoid making distinctions that are, at times, difficult to decipher. Ease of application, however, is no justification for excluding statements made by a victim in a 911 call who sought rescue or protection.  

The Watson case illustrates that law enforcement agents can procure both testimonial and nontestimonial statements within a short period of time. The analysis becomes more complicated when the court determines that a single statement serves more than one purpose. In Davis, the court excluded a dual-purpose statement.

Whether law enforcement agents obtained the statement at issue is significant but not always determinative. In Lopez, the court placed great importance on the fact that the victim made the statement to the police. In Powers, the court relied on the victim’s awareness of the protective order to conclude that the victim’s statement was primarily to provide evidence for a prosecution. It is unclear whether the result would have been the same in the absence of such awareness.

IV. TOWARDS A MORE PRECISE STANDARD

In order to assess the Crawford decision’s impact on the admissibility of excited utterances, the various factors discussed in Part III must be analyzed according to the three definitions of “testimonial” set forth in the opinion. The goal will be to produce a clear delineation of those excited utterances that are admissible even after Crawford and those that would result in a Confrontation Clause violation if admitted. This Article will then propose a composite definition that will take into account the three definitions from Crawford and the application of those definitions in the cases. Lastly, the Article will offer a slightly revised version of the composite definition that will take into account the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Washington.

337 Id. at 415; see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 245, at 1193-1200.

338 Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 415.

339 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that the flaw in the definition of “testimonial” put forth by the United States in its amicus curiae brief, a definition that included the notion of statements “made in contemplation of legal proceedings,” was that it was unclear “whether the declarant or the listener (or both) must be contemplating legal proceedings”); Mosteller, supra note 328, at 572 (discussing issues related to whose perspective matters in determining whether a statement is testimonial).

340 See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2005) (cautioning “against the use of an ‘all or nothing’ approach to the admission or exclusion of 911 calls”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006); People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82, 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (declining to adopt a bright line rule on whether 911 calls are testimonial or nontestimonial); People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (admitting 911 call where caller’s intention in placing the call was to stop an assault), aff’d, 824 N.Y.S.2d 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
The differences between the two definitions indicate that the *Crawford* decision did indeed cause a degree of "interim uncertainty."  

A. First Definition: In-Court Testimony or its Functional Equivalent

The Court in *Crawford* described the “core class of ‘testimonial’ statements” as “‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross examine [such as a deposition], or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.’” 342 The first part of this definition would not apply to excited utterances at all because statements in affidavits, depositions or custodial examinations would not typically qualify as excited utterances. Declarants who provide statements in these formats usually provide them at some interval after any startling event or condition.

The last portion of the *Crawford* definition, however, includes statements that a declarant would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially. This might include an extremely broad class of statements, but the qualifier—“similar pretrial statements”—requires the statements to be similar to the statements set forth in affidavits, depositions or custodial examinations. These statements, in turn, are defined as the “functional equivalent” of ex parte in-court testimony. Therefore, in order to qualify as a “testimonial statement” under the first definition in *Crawford*, it is insufficient for the declarant to reasonably expect the statement to be used prosecutorially. Even if the declarant possesses this expectation, the statement must still be “similar” to a statement that is the “functional equivalent” of in-court testimony. Stated another way, the statement must be only two steps removed from in-court testimony.

Therefore, statements made to law enforcement agents where the declarant initiates the contact 343 are not “testimonial statements” under this definition, and the cases that have addressed this scenario have reached the same conclusion. To conclude that the statement is not testimonial simply because it is an excited utterance, as some of the cases do, does not take the analysis sufficiently far. 344 The

342Id. at 51 (quoting Brief of Petitioner, *supra* note 14, at 23).
343See *supra* notes 86-111 and accompanying text.
more accurate formulation is that the statement is not testimonial because an excited utterance made by the declarant through the initiation of contact with law enforcement agents does not bear any similarity to pretrial statements such as affidavits, custodial examinations or testimony.

Similarly, if the declarant’s purpose in making the statement is to obtain aid or to be protected from a dangerous situation, the statement is not testimonial under this definition.345 The courts have declined to characterize a statement as testimonial when the sole purpose of the statement is to obtain protection or to be rescued. Even if the declarant is partially motivated by the desire to provide evidence for a future prosecution, such statements still fail to satisfy this definition of testimonial because the statements are neither the functional equivalent of in-court testimony nor are they similar to statements that qualify as the functional equivalent of in-court testimony.

In addition, excluding these statements from the class of statements that qualify as “testimonial” allows the police to perform one of their essential functions: aiding those in danger and providing protection to them.

In many situations, statements that are produced as a result of questioning by law enforcement agents still qualify as excited utterances.346 Under Crawford, however, those statements are not admissible against a defendant at trial if they qualify as testimonial.347 The courts’ analysis in these instances is whether the questioning was structured or formal. The precise focus in these instances is whether the questioning is sufficiently analogous to a “police interrogation” such that the resulting statement is testimonial.

The cases do not use the concept of “structured questioning” with any degree of consistency, which makes it difficult to draw solid conclusions about its meaning. It is clear that the questioning does not constitute a “custodial examination” or “police interrogation” if the police are asking questions in the very early stage of the investigation in order to assess the situation and determine exactly what happened.349

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345 See supra notes 114-224 and accompanying text. This view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006) (declaring that a statement is nontestimonial when made in the context of an ongoing emergency).


347 E.g., Wall, 143 S.W.3d at 849-51.

348 Crawford was unequivocal in its assertion that statements procured by the police during an interrogation are testimonial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 68. Even though the Court in Crawford declined to adopt a comprehensive definition of testimonial, it stated that the term “applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” Id. (emphasis added).

Of course, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis, the courts must now discern the “primary purpose of the interrogation.” Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. It is not entirely clear whether this will facilitate compliance with the rule. Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the standard in Davis “yields no predictable results to police officers and prosecutors attempting to comply with the law”).

When the police investigation has progressed to the point where it has begun to focus on a suspect, and the questions seek incriminating evidence about that particular suspect, the questioning is sufficiently structured to be a custodial examination or interrogation.\textsuperscript{350}

Even if the investigation has begun to focus on a suspect about whom the police are asking questions, statements given in response to such questions hardly seem to qualify as the functional equivalent of in-court testimony. The statement at issue in \textit{Crawford} was a formal, tape-recorded statement given at the police station some time after the incident itself.\textsuperscript{351} The statement was procured through police interrogation and bore a similarity to in-court testimony in a way that a statement given at the scene of the incident, or even at the hospital following the incident, does not.

The courts that have applied \textit{Crawford} are in agreement that when a declarant makes a statement for the purpose of producing evidence against an accused for use in a possible future prosecution, the statement is testimonial.\textsuperscript{352} The difficulty lies in moving from this abstract principle to its practical application.\textsuperscript{353} Part of the difficulty is that any statement provided to law enforcement agents who are investigating a criminal incident could presumably be used in a future prosecution if the perpetrator is apprehended and brought to trial. The \textit{Crawford} definition focuses on whether the declarant reasonably expects the statement to be used in a future prosecution. The proposed composite definition will alleviate some of the uncertainty in this standard.

If the statement constitutes a formal accusation of a criminal act, the statement is testimonial because the declarant can reasonably expect that it will be used in a subsequent prosecution.\textsuperscript{354} Because such formal accusations would likely qualify as pretrial statements that bear a close similarity to in-court testimony, the statements


\textsuperscript{351}Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38-39. In addition, the defendant’s wife had received \textit{Miranda} warnings prior to giving the statement. \textit{Id.} at 38. Professor Friedman characterized the fact pattern in \textit{Crawford} as one involving “station house testimony.” Friedman, \textit{supra} note 344, at 6. Moreover, the Washington Court of Appeals noted that Sylvia Crawford made the majority of her statement in response to questions from the police. State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-II, 2001 WL 850119, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30, 2001). Because the questioning of Sylvia Crawford clearly qualified as “police interrogation,” the Court in \textit{Crawford} never had to address the less obvious forms of such police activity. Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 564 n.2 (Mass. 2005) (Sosman, J., concurring in part), \textit{cert. denied}, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006).

\textsuperscript{352}See \textit{supra} notes 292-340 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{353}See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Attempts to draw a line between statements made in contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties.”).

are testimonial according to the first definition in *Crawford*. If the declarant has some special knowledge about the criminal history of the alleged perpetrator, or accuses the alleged perpetrator of a particularly serious or violent crime, the statement is more likely to be characterized as testimonial. As the cases illustrate, the focus on the declarant’s subjective expectations in making the statement may lead to results that are not entirely consistent with the specific holding of *Crawford*.

**B. Second Definition: Extrajudicial Statements in Formalized Testimonial Materials**

The *Crawford* Court took the second definition of testimonial statement directly from Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in *White v. Illinois*. The Court defined these materials as "‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.’" This definition is strikingly similar to the first part of the initial definition set forth in *Crawford*. The emphasis is on the formalized nature of the materials. Therefore, the analysis of the factors under the first part of the initial definition would also apply here. In addition, statements in the formalized materials described in the second definition are unlikely to qualify as excited utterances.

**C. Third Definition: Reasonable Belief that Statement Will be Used at Trial**

The final, and perhaps most general, definition of testimonial from *Crawford* would include "‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’" This definition is similar to the last portion of the first definition from *Crawford*, which talks about "‘pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used’” in a future prosecution. The difference is that the first definition talks about the declarant’s expectation of the use of the statement at trial. The third definition states the standard in terms of an “objective witness.” It goes beyond the beliefs and expectations of the particular declarant and establishes an objective standard.


357 This inconsistency may explain why the Court in *Davis* articulated an objective standard for evaluating the circumstances surrounding the police interrogation and the resulting statements. See *Davis v. Washington*, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).

358 *White*, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).


361 *Id.* at 51 (quoting Brief of Petitioner, *supra* note 14, at 23). The Court in *Davis* took the objective standard one step further, stating it in terms of the circumstances involved in the police interrogation and the resulting statements and not in terms of the declarant. See *Davis*, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.

362 See United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 359-60 (3d Cir. 2005) (reiterating that the objective standard contemplates a reasonable person in the declarant’s position); Wall v. State,
Moreover, this third definition is primarily responsible for the inconsistent results in the cases. One of the important factors in the application of this definition is the status of the person to whom the statement was made. It also provides the lower courts applying Crawford with a level of discretion that perhaps the Supreme Court did not contemplate when it decided Crawford.

Statements made to law enforcement agents for the purpose of obtaining aid or protection are not testimonial under this definition. Under this objective standard, such statements would not be available for use at a later trial because their purpose is to neutralize a dangerous situation. Statements made at the police station or in a similar investigative environment, especially when made in response to structured police questioning, are testimonial. Such statements are testimonial even if they qualify as excited utterances under state evidentiary law because an objective witness would expect the statements to be available for later use at trial. Even though this standard is phrased in terms of an “objective witness,” a particular declarant’s knowledge that a statement will be used in a future prosecution is a factor to consider in the determination of whether the statement is testimonial.

D. Composite Definition

A final, composite definition of testimonial, which would be based on the formulations in the Crawford decision and refined through an examination of the cases dealing with excited utterances, would read as follows:

Testimonial evidence means

(a) Ex parte in-court testimony, including prior testimony during a court proceeding such as a preliminary hearing, grand jury proceeding, motion hearing or trial;

(b) statements set forth in sworn affidavits;

(c) statements set forth in depositions;

(d) statements that constitute formal confessions; or

184 S.W.3d 730, 742-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“[T]he legal ruling of whether a statement is testimonial under Crawford is determined by the standard of an objectively reasonable declarant standing in the shoes of the actual declarant.”).

363See Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 699-700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a statement to a friend or family member is not made for the purpose of accusing someone in the same way as a statement to a person of authority).

364See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (Howard, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“Many courts have resolved [the] uncertainty [created by Crawford] by seizing on the most general formulation [of testimonial, which is the third definition], and applying it, without sufficient attention to Crawford’s textual and historical rationale.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 855 (Cal. Ct. App.) (holding narrowly that despite three different definitions set out in Crawford, statements made in response to police interrogation are testimonial), petition for review granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).

365See People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (finding that interrogation occurs where declarant is aware that law enforcement agent’s purpose in asking questions is to gather information to aid in suspect’s prosecution).
(e) other pretrial statements that are substantially similar to those items listed in subsections (a)-(d) that:

(i) are provided in response to questions from law enforcement agents when the agents have thoroughly assessed a situation or incident and have begun to focus their investigation on a particular suspect or suspects;

(ii) are provided in response to questions from law enforcement agents when such questions are detailed, structured, formal and logically organized in a way that seeks specific, incriminating evidence about a suspect or suspects;

(iii) are provided in response to questions from someone other than a law enforcement agent when the questioning is conducted in the presence of a law enforcement agent, at the behest and direction of a law enforcement agent, or by a person directly associated with the government’s investigation, and has the characteristics of the questions in subsection (e)(ii); or

(iv) formally accuse a suspect of a specific crime when the declarant has some particular knowledge of the suspect or the nature of the crime.

Subsection (e) of this definition incorporates the concept of “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” It sets forth the general standard with a level of specificity that will make the standard more readily applicable to new fact situations involving excited utterances. As illustrated by the cases, the general standard is unpredictable and difficult to apply. The Court in Crawford abandoned the Roberts test for the same reason. Subsection (e) attempts to specify the “circumstances” that would cause a statement to qualify as testimonial, and most of the situations in subsection (e) are a variation of police interrogation.366

An analysis of whether a particular manner of questioning by law enforcement agents constitutes a custodial examination or interrogation must begin with the Crawford case itself. Sylvia Crawford’s statement to the police was not an excited utterance, but it is the appropriate starting point for a determination of the limitations on questioning by law enforcement agents. The manner in which Sylvia Crawford provided her statement to the police was completely different from a situation in which the declarant makes a statement at the scene of an incident to law enforcement agents, even if that statement is made in response to some degree of questioning.367


367See Robert William Best, To be or Not to be Testimonial? That is the Question: 2004 Developments in the Sixth Amendment, ARMY LAW., Apr. 2005, at 65, 79. (“Whatever else can be said about the Crawford opinion, the issue of Sylvia’s statement given during a police interrogation was the issue of the case; everything else the Court addressed served as background for the question before it.”).
It is more likely that an excited utterance will implicate *Crawford* under one of the situations in subsection (e) of the definition. A statement that meets the standard in subsection (e) of the definition must still be “substantially similar” to the formalized materials listed in subsections (a)-(d) in order to qualify as a testimonial statement. Establishing a direct link between the statement in subsection (e) and the specific examples of formalized materials in subsections (a)-(d) will provide courts with more guidance in their application of the *Crawford* decision.\(^{368}\)

Moreover, this connection finds support in the *Crawford* decision. After setting out the various formulations of testimonial statements, the Court stated that “[t]hese formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the [Confrontation] Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.”\(^{369}\) Perhaps the “common nucleus” was that the statement must contain a degree of formality or structure similar to those listed by the Court, and the belief in its availability for use at a later trial was simply a “level of abstraction around” this requirement. The formulation in subsection (e) of the composite definition transforms the abstract notion of “belief in availability for use at a later trial” into readily identifiable and specific examples. An excited utterance that fails to satisfy one of the formulations in subsection (e) is unlikely to qualify as a testimonial statement. Thus, its admissibility at trial would be determined according to state evidentiary law.

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in *Davis*, lower courts tested the parameters of the third definition from *Crawford*. In such cases, courts examined the level of accuracy and precision in the declarant’s accusation and the seriousness of the crime. A victim who simply points out the perpetrator to the police upon their arrival on the scene (That’s the man who hit me) cannot be said to have met the standard in subsection (e) of the definition. It is most likely that the victim is either initiating the contact, seeking protection or both. In addition, a victim or witness who provides information to the police in response to general, informal questions (What’s going on here? or What happened?) is not providing testimonial evidence in accordance with subsection (e).\(^{370}\) The focus under this definition must be on the statement’s nature and purpose and not on the declarant’s emotional state.\(^{371}\)

Similarly, a declarant who provides a statement to the police in response to formal and direct questioning is more likely to produce a statement that meets the standard in subsection (e). The circumstances surrounding such a statement would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a subsequent criminal prosecution. This is the point at which state evidentiary law and the Confrontation Clause part ways. The statement may qualify

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\(^{368}\)See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 570-71 (Mass. 2005) (Sosman, J., concurring in part) (emphasizing the importance of articulating a definition of “testimonial” that harmonizes all three formulations from *Crawford*), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006).


as an excited utterance, but as a testimonial statement, it can be admitted at trial only if the defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine the statement.\footnote{See, e.g., State v. Siler, 843 N.E.2d 863, 868 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (finding statement both an admissible excited utterance under Ohio law and an inadmissible testimonial statement under \textit{Crawford}), appeal allowed, 847 N.E.2d 5 (Ohio 2006).}

It is clear that the \textit{Crawford} decision presents new challenges in the area of domestic violence crimes because the prosecution of such cases relies heavily on statements made at the scene to law enforcement authorities and in 911 calls.\footnote{See supra note 328.} Placing the emphasis on the statement itself and not on whether the person to whom it was made is a government agent has the potential to expand the class of statements that will be inadmissible under \textit{Crawford}.\footnote{Mosteller, \textit{supra} note 328, at 518. The issue remains unresolved. \textit{See Davis}, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.2 ("[O]ur holding today makes it unnecessary to consider whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are 'testimonial.'")}

One of the unresolved issues in \textit{Crawford} is “whether statements must be elicited by questions from a government agent to be testimonial or whether questioning by private individuals or interrogators working for private groups can also qualify.”\footnote{\textit{Crawford} v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).} Under the appropriate circumstances, a statement made to a private citizen would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a subsequent criminal prosecution.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 51.} The standard in subsection (e)(iii) of the definition contemplates such circumstances and attempts to bring some clarity to this point. On the other hand, the absence of government officials from the interaction negates the potential for abuse that concerned the Court in \textit{Crawford}.\footnote{\textit{See In re E.H.}, 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1031-32, 1034-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), \textit{petition for appeal allowed}, 833 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 2005).}

It is important to be cognizant of two other aspects of the \textit{Crawford} decision in this context. The first is the statement in the majority opinion that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 2279. The cases illustrate that accusers sometimes make formal statements to acquaintances and casual remarks to government officers.} On the other hand, the cases illustrate that accusers sometimes make formal statements to acquaintances and casual remarks to government officers.\footnote{\textit{See} supra note 328.}
need guidance on whether the admission of such statements against defendants violates their rights under the Confrontation Clause. Subsection (e) of the composite definition provides this guidance.

The second aspect of the decision is the concern expressed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion that “any classification of statements as testimonial beyond that of sworn affidavits and depositions will be somewhat arbitrary.” Certainly sworn affidavits and depositions are part of the core class of testimonial statements. A classification of other statements as testimonial, including certain excited utterances, need not be arbitrary. If the basis of that classification is an objective belief in that statement’s availability for use at a later trial, the statement must be in a format that is substantially similar to a sworn affidavit or deposition and must meet one of the standards set forth in subsection (e) of the proposed composite definition. In this way, the appropriate balance will be struck between an accused’s rights under the Confrontation Clause and the government’s ability to prosecute its cases.

Application of the proposed composite definition would be consistent with Crawford. The definition must be slightly altered, however, in light of the Davis decision. The most significant difference after Davis is that the statements described in subsection (e) of the definition need not be “substantially similar” to the statements listed in subsections (a)-(d). As illustrated by Hammon v. Indiana, the companion case to Davis v. Washington, the statement can qualify as testimonial.

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380 See Friedman, supra note 344, at 9 (stating that participation by government officials is not the essence of what makes a statement testimonial).

381 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). This view is reflected in three United States Circuit Court decisions issued after Crawford involving hearsay exceptions other than excited utterances in which the courts held that statements, which did not involve police or government agents, were not testimonial. See Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444-45 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding victim’s statements to numerous witnesses prior to the victim’s murder by her husband not to fit the definition of “testimonial” under Crawford), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1067 (2005); Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2004) (declining to find as testimonial statements to a third party witness, made by person who had accompanied accused on the day of murder, that accused needed money and that victim had refused to give him drugs on credit), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 (2005); United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 837-38, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (testimony of victim’s half brother regarding victim’s statements to him implicating the defendant properly admitted because statements were “not the kind of memorialized, judicial-process-created evidence of which Crawford speaks”).

One case that admitted a testimonial statement was People v. Ko, 789 N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1051 (2006). At trial, a detective who had investigated the murder testified to statements made by the defendant’s girlfriend about bloody clothing found at the murder scene. Id. at 44. Even though the statements were testimonial, they were not barred by Crawford because the defendant opened the door to the admission of the entire statement concerning clothing found at the murder scene. Id. at 44-45. The court was concerned that “[a] contrary holding would allow a defendant to mislead the jury by selectively revealing only those details of a testimonial statement that are potentially helpful to the defense, while concealing from the jury other details that would tend to explain the portions introduced and place them in context.” Id. at 45.
even if it is made at the scene of the incident itself, as long as it is made after the incident is over. Subsections (e)(ii) and (e)(iv) of the definition remain unchanged because they more clearly qualify as testimonial statements after Davis. Subsection (e)(iii) remains unchanged and unresolved, but it seems that the Supreme Court is moving in the direction of classifying such statements as testimonial.

V. CONCLUSION

Crawford established a new standard for the admission of testimonial statements by a witness who is not present at trial. It overruled the standard in Ohio v. Roberts, which examined whether the statement bore adequate indicia of reliability, because the standard in Roberts provided inadequate protection for defendants’ rights under the Confrontation Clause.

An understanding of Crawford’s effect on the admissibility of excited utterances requires an understanding of which statements the Crawford Court meant to include in its definition of “testimonial statement.” Rather than focusing exclusively on whether the recipient of the statement is a government officer or private citizen, the analysis must focus on whether the statement meets one of the standards set forth in subsection (e) of the proposed composite definition. Even if the statement satisfies one of the standards, however, the statement must bear an appreciable similarity to formalized materials such as affidavits and depositions. This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court’s statement in Crawford that all formulations of testimonial statements “share a common nucleus.”

If the declarant initiates contact with law enforcement agents to seek aid or protection, the statement is not testimonial. If there is some degree of formal or structured questioning to procure the statement, then it is testimonial even if it qualifies as an excited utterance. If the questioning meets the standard, the questioner need not necessarily be a law enforcement agent. The questioning need only be conducted at the behest or in the presence of a law enforcement agent.

In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court clarified its decision in Crawford v. Washington. The degree of formality or structure in the questioning is no longer the primary consideration in determining whether the responses to those questions constitute testimonial statements. Rather, the focus seems to be on the timing of the questioning and whether it takes place at a point removed in time from the threatening situation that gave rise to it.

Both federal and states courts will continue to develop and interpret the Supreme Court’s rulings in Crawford and Davis. It remains to be seen whether the “primary purpose” test from Davis will produce consistent results, or results that require further clarification.

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383 Id. at 2279.
384 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
385 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.