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Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion

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RAPE BY FRAUD AND RAPE BY COERCION*

Patricia J. Falk†

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INTRODUCTION

Without proof of force, actual or constructive, evidenced by words or conduct of the defendant . . . , sexual intercourse is not rape. This is so even though the intercourse may have occurred without the actual consent and against the actual will of the alleged victim.¹

The outrage upon the woman, and the injury to society, is just as great in these cases as if actual force had been employed; and we have been unable to satisfy ourselves that the act can be said to be any less against the will of the woman when her consent is obtained by fraud, than when it is extorted by threats or force.²

For more than a century, courts,³ legislatures,⁴ and legal commentators⁵ have struggled with the controversial and highly charged question of whether accomplishing sexual intercourse by means of fraud or coercion is blameworthy and appropriately condemnable as rape.⁶ In 1986 Professor Susan Estrich's suggested that

¹ Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213, 1219-20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979). But see Janet E. Findlater, Reexamining the Law of Rape, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1356, 1360 (1988) (commenting on Goldberg: "What sense can one make of this paradox: The victim was not forced to have sexual intercourse, but she had sexual intercourse against her will and without her consent?").

² People v. Crosswell, 13 Mich. 427, 437 (1865) (involving sexual intercourse with insane woman); see also Pomeroy v. State, 94 Ind. 96, 102 (1883) (quoting this passage from Crosswell).


⁴ See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.90 (1996) (fraudulent medical treatment statute passed in 1883); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503 (1997) (update of 1870 husband impersonation provision); see also Jane E. Larson, "Even a Worm Will Turn at Last": Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 Yale J.L. & Human. 1, 20-21 (1997) [hereinafter Even a Worm] (discussing age-of-consent campaign as first rape reform and noting "[w]ith strengthened statutory rape laws, convictions could be achieved in the kinds of factual patterns that otherwise did not meet unreformed definitions of forcible rape, so long as the victim was young.").

⁵ See, e.g., J.H. Beale, Jr., Consent in the Criminal Law, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 317 (1895) (discussing rape by fraud); H.W. Humble, Seduction as a Crime, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 144 (1921) (same); Ernst Wilfred Puttkammer, Consent in Rape, 19 U. Ill. L. Rev. 410 (1925) (same).

⁶ The question is not unique to this time period or the Anglo-American legal tradition. Socrates is quoted as saying: "Then again, the very fact that he uses not force but persuasion makes him more detestable, because a lover who uses force proves himself a villain, but one who uses persuasion ruins the character of the one who consents."
rape law should “prohibit fraud to secure sex to the same extent we prohibit fraud to secure money, and prohibit extortion to secure sex to the same extent we prohibit extortion to secure money.” Such suggestion spawned the latest cycle of discussion about this age-old conundrum in the American legal academic community. As the cases proliferate and the intellectual debate in response to Estrich’s suggestion rages on, state legislatures, riding the successive waves of rape reform of the 1950s and 1970s, have been quietly enacting a comprehensive array of criminal statutes outlawing multiple forms of sexual offenses committed by fraudulent or coercive means.

The potential criminalization of rape by fraud and rape by coercion is, however, a difficult and troublesome legal development for a myriad of reasons. First, cases involving such acts pose significant definitional challenges for the crime of rape, inevitably implicating the debate over whether it is a crime of violence or a sexual offense and the concomitant issue of the proper function of rape law as either protecting citizens’ physical security or, more broadly, sexual autonomy. Second, because these cases generally

7 Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1120 (1986); see also SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES WOMEN WHO SAY NO (1987).


10 See, e.g., Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1802 (“One vexatious problem . . . involves misrepresentations that cause sexual cooperation.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 105, 135 (1990) [hereinafter Gender Question] (“Perhaps the hardest set of problems in this area concerns the question of when fraud or misrepresentation should invalidate consent.”).

11 See infra Part III.A.

12 See also infra Part III.A.; Lucy Reed Harris, Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 644 (1976) (“Although the force element has traditionally furthered the policy of physical protection, as well as serving an evidentiary function, the role of fraud in rape law demonstrates that freedom of sexual choice rather than physical protection is the primary value served by criminalization of rape.”).
involve factual scenarios in which physical force is absent and consent, in some form, is present, they strike at the doctrinal heart of rape law, raising issues like: the appropriate relationship between the elements of force and nonconsent, the necessity of physical force, and the parameters of legally effective consent. Third, discussion of these offenses often "trigger[s] common prejudices about the behavior of men and women in sexual encounters" and reinvigorates colloquy about rape victims’ culpability and trustworthiness, deflecting attention from what should be the real question—the criminality of defendants’ conduct. In short, consideration of these offenses pushes the envelope of rape law’s function in regulating the outermost limits of sexual encounters in our society.

Part I of this Article collects and analyzes the surprisingly large body of criminal cases in which courts have struggled with the difficult question of whether to criminally punish defendants’ use of

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13 Rape had four basic elements: (1) sexual intercourse, (2) with a woman not the defendant’s wife, (3) by force or threat of force, and (4) without her consent or against her will. Harris, supra note 12, at 613.

14 See infra Part III.A.

15 See infra Part III.A.

16 See infra Part III.B.


18 Author Joel Feinberg comments:

Of course, if an occasional nonneurotic but uneducated, trusting woman faithfully obeys the instructions of her deceitful gynecologist, . . . she would find few persons in these enlightened days to give her sympathy. Again the old attitudes of caveat emptor would surface. “If she is that stupid, she deserves what she gets” are words that come easily to many lips. . . . But negligent or not, stupid or not, she could have been severely harmed by her experience and subject to the pains of depression, shame, loss of self-esteem, and tortured conscience, if not pregnancy and more obvious harms. . . . After all, people do not forfeit their rights simply by being ignorant or naively trusting, and even stupid people—especially stupid people—can be taken advantage of and harmed.

Joel Feinberg, Victims’ Excuses: The Case of Fraudulently Procured Consent, 96 ETHICS 330, 337 (1986); see also James A. Durham, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 63 (1952) (“The rarity of these cases today may be partly explained by the difficulty of presenting a convincing picture of such grossly impeded comprehension to skeptical jurors; the scene depicted may resemble more an artful seduction than forcible intercourse.”); Chamallas, supra note 17, at 832 (noting victims of sexual fraud may be less sympathetic).

19 Harris, supra note 12, at 628 (“Scholarly discussion on consent in rape gelled in an era when legal thinkers were emotionally distrustful of rape complaints in general, but were fascinated by cases where consent was allegedly induced by subterfuge.”).
fraud or coercion in accomplishing sexual penetration or contact. Commonly, rape by fraud cases encompass instances of fraud in medical and other treatment contexts, false impersonation, sexual scams, and sexual theft; rape by coercion cases involve the abuse of authority and sexual extortion. Many of the courts in these cases have held that the defendants' behavior, although reprehensible, failed to satisfy either the force or nonconsent elements of rape. Frustrated by the lack of coverage of existing rape statutes, however, several of these courts have asked their respective legislatures to enact new criminal provisions to subsume this conduct.

Part II of this Article surveys current legislation and reveals a comprehensive battery of state criminal statutes prohibiting various forms of rape by fraud or rape by coercion. These statutes fall into five categories, those that: (1) punish criminal actors who abuse positions of trust or (2) positions of authority to secure sexual compliance, (3) specifically outlaw the use of fraud or deception, (4) substitute coercion and other types of nonphysical pressures for the force requirement, and (5) prohibit nonconsensual intercourse without reference to force, fraud, or coercion. The unitary concept of forcible rape has given birth to a host of offspring differing in substantive content and corresponding more closely to the varied behavior of sex offenders.

Part III of this Article explores the two doctrinal elements of traditional rape law—force and nonconsent—in the context of sexual offenses accomplished by fraud or coercion. First, this part addresses three major sets of objections to the expansion of the force requirement in rape law or its substitution by fraud or coercion and concludes that criminal law should punish both violent and nonviolent forms of rape. Second, because the nonconsent issue in rape law is a vast topic upon which countless courts and commentators have written, this Part considers the narrower question of how to distinguish effective and ineffective consent in rape cases involving fraud or coercion. This Article concludes that the critical question is no longer if rape law should prohibit sexual conduct secured by fraud or coercion, but rather when (or under what circumstances) such behavior merits criminal sanction.

A few definitional points are in order before proceeding. First, I retain the term "rape" largely for rhetorical reasons. Although its use may be inconsistent with dictionary definitions, potentially

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20 See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 59-60.
trivialize forcible rape, and inaccurately reflect current statutory enactments that employ designations such as criminal sexual penetration and sexual assault, I believe it conveys the appropriate level of blameworthiness and criminality for this conduct. "Sexual predation" might be preferable except for its conflicting usage in contemporary sexual predator laws. Second, I use the term "rape by fraud" as a shorthand expression for all criminal cases in which the defendant has accomplished sexual intercourse by any type of fraud, deception, misrepresentation, impersonation, or other stratagem. Finally, I employ "rape by coercion" as a catch-all term for any cases in which the criminal actor deployed nonphysical pressures, such as a position of authority, extortion, or other threats, to secure sexual compliance.

I. CASES OF RAPE BY FRAUD OR RAPE BY COERCION: "DR. FEELGOOD," "THE FANTASY MAN," AND "THE ABOMINABLE SNOWMAN"

The use or threat of physical violence is just one way men force women they know to have sex with them. Men also use other kinds of threats, such as to leave women stranded, to publicly humiliate them, and to fire them from their jobs. And men obtain sex by fraud; they lie to women, intentionally creating situations that frighten women into submitting to sex without a fight.

21 See infra Part III.A.
22 See infra Part II.
23 See also Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1183 (arguing that sex obtained by fraud or extortion should still be called rape because of "the injury to personal integrity involved in forced sex.").
24 See Lea Vander Velde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 n.2 (1996) ("By 'sexual predation,' I mean acts of sex which exploited women, including rape, coerced sex, sex based on deceptive representations, or sex that opportunistically took advantage of a woman's reproductive vulnerability. . ."); see also People v. Evans, 85 Misc.2d 1088, 1098, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 921 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975) (describing Defendant as predator); Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand so Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit': A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 453 (1993) [hereinafter Women Understand] ("[T]here is neither a principled nor a pragmatic basis for regulating the sexual sphere so as to permit more predatory conduct than is tolerated in the marketplace."). In the final analysis, disagreements about terminology should not take precedence over consideration of whether to punish the underlying conduct.
25 Findlater, supra note 1, at 1363-64 (footnotes omitted).
There exists a remarkably large and diverse body of criminal cases involving defendants’ use of fraud or coercion in accomplishing sexual intercourse, with many sharply disagreeing about the propriety of punishing such conduct as rape or sexual assault. The case law is a logical and appropriate starting point because courts are the first battleground upon which disputes are waged about whether to criminalize rape by fraud or coercion. The legal analysis and reasoning in the following legal opinions provide the fodder for subsequent legislative innovation and doctrinal commentary.

Although arising in multiple jurisdictions (some even in foreign countries) with different rape or sexual assault statutes, three common themes emerge from the following case law review. First, courts in rape by fraud or coercion cases have generally adopted an approach characterized by judicial conservatism and strict statutory construction. Hanging their doctrinal hats on either the force or nonconsent prongs of traditional rape law, courts have often been reluctant to move beyond the literal wording of a jurisdiction’s rape statute and explore alternative doctrinal avenues. For example, with respect to the force element, courts could have considered the applicability of the doctrine of constructive force, developed in burglary law, to subsume instances of fraudulent, nonforcible breaking to rape law. Similarly, in the consent context, courts perpetuated the problematic distinction between fraud in the factum (mistake as to the act itself) and fraud in the inducement (mistake about the reason for doing the act) in lieu of more critically examining the types of fraudulent inducements that impugn the voluntariness.

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26 For the most part, I omit civil cases. For discussions of some of these cases, see Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24; VanderVelde, supra note 24; Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Improper or Immoral Sexually-Related Conduct Towards Patient as Ground for Disciplinary Action Against Physician, Dentist, or Other Licensed Healer, 59 A.L.R. 4th 1104 (1988 & Supp. 1997); Brendan de R. O’Byrne, Annotation, Civil Liability of Doctor or Psychologist for Having Sexual Relationship with Patient, 33 A.L.R. 3d 1393 (1970 & Supp. 1997).

27 W. R. Habeeb, Annotation, Intercourse Accomplished Under Pretexst of Medical Treatment as Rape, 70 A.L.R. 2d 824, 826-27 (1960) (superseded) comments: “The cases are not in harmony on the question whether this constitutes rape, the conviction being in some cases sustained on the theory that a consent obtained by fraud was not a real consent.”

28 See infra Part II.

29 See infra Part III.

30 See infra notes 475-479 and accompanying text.

31 See infra notes 566-589 and accompanying text.
of consent. Counterbalancing their judicial conservatism, many courts exhorted their respective legislatures to alter the statutory complexion of rape law to cope with these troublesome cases.

A second theme emerging from the case law is that criminal defendants' use of fraud or coercion to secure sexual compliance is not a recent or rare phenomenon as several cases date to the 1800s. Moreover, repetitive patterns or similar stratagems emerge from these defendants' conduct; the times and places may change but many of the stratagems remain the same. For example, in both Don Moran v. People (1872) and Boro v. Superior Court (1985), the defendants told their respective victims that sexual intercourse was essential for effective medical treatment instead of a painful surgical alternative. In fact, cases involving sexual intercourse accomplished by two different stratagems—fraudulent medical treatment or husband impersonation—have become so common as to be recognized as archetypes of rape by fraud, and the current trend is toward expansion. The fraudulent medical treatment paradigm now encompasses cases of psychological counseling and religious guidance. Likewise, courts have had to consider whether the husband impersonation model applies to cases of feigned fiancés, boyfriends, or lovers. Moreover, new genres of sexual offenses continue to emerge, i.e., commercial-like fraud (i.e., sexual scams), property-like offenses (i.e., sexual theft and extortion), and coercive pressures (i.e., abuse of authority) which have supplemented the traditional categories.

The third theme emerging from the case law is the portrait of defendants as a distinct specie of sexual predator; they were often repeat offenders with multiple victims. Offenders were not simply

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32 Feinberg, supra note 18, at 335; Schulhofer, Gender Question, supra note 10, at 135-36.
33 See Feinberg, supra note 18, at 337; Durham, supra note 18, at 63.
34 See supra note 3.
37 See, e.g., Don Moran, 25 Mich. at 364-65 (1872 opinion discussing these two fact patterns).
38 See infra Part I.A.
39 See infra Part I.B.
40 See infra Part I.C.
41 See infra Parts I.D and I.F.
42 See infra Part I.E.
43 See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (referring to "another potential victim of the same scheme") and cases discussed infra.
persons who lied to others in the context of personal relationships, seducing prospective lovers with protestations of undying affection. Rather, they abused positions of trust and authority over their victims, such trust having been established through professional, business, or employment settings. Others preyed on victims outside of these contexts, often taking considerable pains to locate the most gullible and unsophisticated citizens. Many calculated their strategies, exploiting fully the power inherent in fraud or coercion but stopping short of physical violence. Some devised elaborate schemes to defraud their unwary targets, scams that would have resulted (and sometimes ingeniously did) in liability for other criminal acts, i.e., property crimes. These criminal defendants often earned the moral condemnation of the courts hearing their cases, even as these courts regretfully relieved them of criminal responsibility. In short, case law illustrates that these offenders are sexual predators, distinct from forcible rapists, but morally blameworthy in their own right.

notes 135-140, 149-153 and accompanying text.

44 This Part does not include cases involving purely social or romantic relationships between defendants and victims, which raise even more difficult issues. While I favor the expansion of rape law to include instances of deception in the context of purely personal relationships, see, e.g., Neal v. Neal, 179 B.R. 234 (D. Idaho 1995), a battery action based on husband’s failure to disclose to wife that he was having an affair, the resolution of rape law’s treatment of fraud in professional or arms-length transactions should be the first step in doing so.

45 The defendants in Boro, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 and the Mitchell case, infra notes 135-140 and accompanying text, are reputed to have called multiple potential victims in order to find those gullible enough to believe their misrepresentations.


47 See, e.g., United States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979) (defendant convicted of federal wire fraud); LINDA A. FAIRSTEIN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE: OUR WAR AGAINST RAPE 195-97 (1993) (discussing case of Steve Davidson who was convicted of theft).

48 Estrich points out that the defendants in People v. Evans, 85 Misc.2d at 1088, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 912, and Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), would have been guilty of property offenses if they had been attempting to obtain money rather than sex. Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1119; see also Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 412 (arguing law allows men to use tactics to secure sex that would not be tolerated to secure money, what she calls the “sex exception to fraud”).


50 See also SISSELLA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 43 (1978) (Bok quotes from Dante: “Of every malice that gains hatred in Heaven the end is injustice; and every such end, either by force or by fraud, afflicts another. But because fraud
The cases fall roughly into six major categories, although these are somewhat artificial because of inevitable overlap between fraudulent and coercive pressures. Cases of rape by fraud include: (1) fraudulent treatment, (2) fraud as to the defendant’s identity (i.e., impersonation), (3) sexual scams, and (4) sexual theft; the rape by coercion cases encompass (5) abuse of authority and (6) sexual extortion. Due to the large number of extant cases, the following examples were selected because they were representative, involved intriguing factual issues, or provided an impetus for legal change (e.g., California and Kansas passed legislation in response to cases falling outside the boundaries of their existing rape statutes). 51

A. Fraudulent Treatment

This section begins with the oldest set of cases, involving fraudulent medical treatment per se, and then considers three newer variations: defendants’ use of fraudulent inducements under the guise of providing psychological therapy, religious guidance, and, in one unusual case, musical education.

1. Fraudulent Medical Treatment

A considerable number of cases exist in which defendants had sexual intercourse with patients under the guise of medical treatment, some dating back to the 1800s. 52 These cases may be usefully divided into three subsidiary groups. 53 One group involves de-
ception as to the nature of the act, e.g., a woman believes that she is having a routine vaginal examination and the defendant is actually having sexual intercourse with her. A second group concerns defendants who induce women to have sexual intercourse by fraudulently maintaining that it is necessary for their medical treatment; the patients were aware of the nature of the act. A third group encompasses types of "ambiguously sexual" touching(s) that the patient believes are necessary for medical purposes, but which are only for a defendant’s sexual gratification.

a. Deception as to the Act

The first group of cases involves deception on the part of the defendant concerning the nature of his conduct. In these cases, the defendant professes to give the patient a routine vaginal examination but instead has sexual intercourse with her. Most courts have held that a rape conviction can be founded upon this fact pattern because the woman does not consent to sexual intercourse, not knowing that it is taking place. As the authors of one criminal

men, Burglars at Bat, The Happy-Hooker Schoolteacher and, Of Course, That Silly Suncoast Dome, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Jan. 3, 1993, at 7, available in LEXIS, News library, Orsent file ("Dr. Giggles" defendant arrested for practicing medicine without license, for posing as doctor and giving injections).

Second, doctors and dentists administered substances to patients rendering them unable to prevent sexual intercourse. These cases are usually brought under rape statutes prohibiting sexual intercourse with an unconscious or physically helpless person. See, e.g., State v. Oshiro, 696 P.2d 846 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985) (dentist administered nitrous oxide); Commonwealth v. Helfant, 496 N.E.2d 433 (Mass. 1986) (doctor administered drug); State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1992) (dentist administered nitrous oxide); State v. Lung, 28 P. 2d 335 (Nev. 1891) (no attempted rape because administered drug could not destroy power to resist); People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 422 N.E.2d 506, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1981) (dentist sexually abused patients under sedation); Flaherty, supra note 26, at 1104; see also People v. Royal, 53 Cal. 62 (1878) (defendant doctor practiced some sort of manipulation on victim and then had carnal connection with her). Finally, a few cases involved dentists who inappropriately touched patients without drugs. See Hublin v. Shira, 563 P.2d 1079 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Styskal, 493 N.W.2d 313 (Neb. 1992).
law treatise assert: "It is well settled that if unlawful sexual intercourse was had with such a girl who thought she was being treated with medical or surgical instruments and had consented to nothing else, the man is guilty of rape." Moreover, courts generally have held that the force requirement is satisfied by the mere use of the force required for the physical act of intercourse.

A recent case illustrating this type of fraudulent medical treatment is McNair v. State in which the defendant was convicted of six counts of sexual assault on his patients. McNair appealed claiming insufficient evidence of nonconsent; the Nevada appellate court disagreed, noting: "When a physician succeeds in the penile penetration of a patient under the guise of performing a medical examination, a sexual assault is committed by fraud and deceit and without the victim's consent." The court further declined McNair's invitation to consider his behavior as simply a matter of medical ethics, emphasizing the importance of treating such behavior as a crime. The court, in fact, adopted a term coined by one author to describe similar types of cases—"confidence style assaults." Lack of force was not an obstacle to the defendant's conviction because Nevada's sexual assault statute did not require force but only that the sexual penetration occur against the person's will.


56 In Borak, the court employed the concept of statutory force and stated: "Force is thus implied when the rape or deviate sexual acts proscribed by statute are accomplished under the pretext of medical treatment when the victim is surprised, and unaware of the intention involved." 301 N.E.2d at 5; see also Pomeroy v. State, 94 Ind. 96, 100 (1883) (force element satisfied when no consent exists).


58 Id. at 574.

59 McNair, 825 P.2d at 576.

60 Id. at 576; see also Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 1018-20 (1993) (discussing blitz and confidence rapes).
RAPE BY FRAUD AND RAPE BY COERCION

b. Sexual Intercourse as Necessary Medical Treatment

In contrast to opinions involving deception as to the sexual act, courts considering cases in which defendants lied about the purported benefits of sexual intercourse as a therapeutic treatment generally have found that no rape occurred. Courts have adopted two different approaches in rejecting a rape charge: the force requirement was not satisfied or consent deprived the conduct of its criminality. One of the oldest examples of this genre is the 1872 opinion in Don Moran v. People, in which a doctor induced a fifteen-year-old girl to have sexual intercourse with him. The defendant persuaded the young woman to acquiesce using a panoply of deceptive statements: the girl’s father had authorized the sexual connection, the doctor used the same technique on all women whom he treated, and the alternative was a painful medical procedure that would probably kill her. The Michigan Supreme Court overturned the conviction because the trial court erred in instructing the jury by omitting the requirement of force. Although the supreme court held that fraud cannot substitute for force in rape, the court

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Another similar case is a civil action against Dr. Julio Soto reported in the media: "A 21-year-old Syracuse, N.Y., woman has settled for an undisclosed amount of money her lawsuit against a former doctor, who she claimed tricked her into having sex by saying it was the best way to administer a secret vaccine." James Steinberg, Noted Briefly, SAN DIEGO UNION, Apr. 11, 1991, at D-2; see also Paul Leavitt, Also Wednesday ..., USA TODAY, Apr. 11, 1991, at 3A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Usatoday File; Vaccine-By-Sex Suit Settled, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 11, 1991, at 35. The judge ruled that Soto had committed medical malpractice; his license was also revoked but no criminal charges were filed.

62 Compare Boro, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (consent deprived act of criminality) with Don Moran, 25 Mich. at 356 (force element not satisfied).


64 Id. at 357.

65 See also State v. Lung, 28 P. 235, 236 (Nev. 1891) (citing Don Moran and stating fraud does not supply the place of force: "Anything which merely excites the woman’s passions, leaving her at the same time in the full possession of her mental and physical powers, capable of comprehending the nature of the act, and of exercising her
also noted that obtaining sexual intercourse by fraud may be as criminal as forcible rape but the legislature must outlaw it.\textsuperscript{66} It further noted that the defendant could be convicted on retrial if the jury found that the requirement of force was satisfied by his threat to subject the patient to a life-endangering operation.\textsuperscript{67}

A more recent case, Commonwealth v. Goldenberg,\textsuperscript{68} reached the same result. In Goldenberg, a young woman sought out a physiotherapist for an abortion. During the course of treatment, Goldenberg told the patient that he would have to have sexual intercourse with her and that this might help the procedure.\textsuperscript{69} The Massachusetts Supreme Court, directly confronting the question of whether rape can be committed when the woman's consent is procured by fraud, held that it could not: "The essence of the crime is not the fact of intercourse but the injury and outrage to the feelings of the woman by the forceful penetration of her person. . . . Fraud cannot be allowed to supply the place of the force which the statute makes mandatory."\textsuperscript{70} A concurring judge in a later case, Commonwealth v. Keevan,\textsuperscript{71} questioned the continued vitality of Goldenberg in light of recent scholarship.\textsuperscript{72}

In an even more recent case, Boro v. Superior Court,\textsuperscript{73} the is-
sue was not one of force, but of lack of consent. Boro, whom the press nicknamed “Dr. Feelgood,” posed as a doctor and tricked women into sexual intercourse by telling them that such act was necessary to cure their fatal blood disease. The defendant explained that the choice was either to undergo a painful and expensive surgery or have sexual intercourse with a donor (Boro) who had been injected with a special serum. The state prosecuted Boro for rape after he persuaded at least four women to engage in sexual intercourse, claiming that his actions fell under a statute prohibiting sexual intercourse with a victim who is unconscious of the nature of the act. Boro appealed arguing that the rape statute did not cover his case; the appellate court agreed and prohibited his prosecution. Drawing a distinction between fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement, the court held that only the former vitiates consent. In discussing a previous case raising a similar issue, it wrote:

It is not difficult to conceive of reasons why the Legislature may have consciously wished to leave the matter where it lies. Thus, as a matter of degree, where consent to intercourse is obtained by promises of travel, fame, celebrity and the like—ought the liar and seducer to be chargeable as a rapist? Where is the line to be drawn?

The dissent pointed to a separate portion of California’s statute defining consent, arguing that while not expressly repealing the factum-inducement distinction, it restricted consent to “cases of true, good faith consent, obtained without substantial fraud or deceit.” The California legislature, in response to Boro, passed a new statute specifically criminalizing this conduct. Boro was apprehended again in 1987 for the same scam and prosecuted under the new statute specially designed for him.

AT File. Boro faced similar charges in other jurisdictions.

74 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1997).
75 Boro, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 122; see also People v. Ogunmola, 238 Cal. Rptr. 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (physician obtaining sexual intercourse under pretext of medical exam constitutes fraud in the factum); People v. Harris, 155 Cal. Rptr. 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (fraud in the inducement does not vitiate consent); infra Part III.B.
76 Boro, 210 Cal Rptr. at 1230 n.5.
77 id. at 1232 (Holmdahl, J., dissenting).
c. Intermediate Cases

Three recent cases involve a factual pattern that lies between the two traditional categories of fraudulent medical treatment cases. Here, the patients agreed to various forms of intimate touching, falling short of sexual intercourse, in the mistaken belief that such touching constituted medical treatment. These cases differ from the first category—deception as to the act—because the patients were aware of the nature of the contact and not caught by surprise. They diverge from the second group—sexual intercourse as necessary medical treatment—because none of the patients consented to engage in sexual conduct; the ambiguous nature of the sexual contact reinforces this uncertainty. These cases also illustrate alternative answers to the question of whether the defendant's behavior constitutes rape or sexual assault.

In State v. Quinlan, the defendant, working as a respiratory therapist, convinced a twenty-six-year-old patient to allow him to digitally penetrate her under the guise of performing a cardio-neurological-respiratory exam. The patient believed that Quinlan's con-

79 Linda Fairstein's book Sexual Violence: Our War Against Rape provides another example of a doctor using his position to induce women to allow him to examine them. See supra note 47, at 193. Hugh Richards described himself as a therapist who specialized in holistic healing. Under the guise of therapy, Richards made breast and vaginal examinations of his patients. Each of the women said that the sole reason that they had allowed "the intimate touching was because Richards had maintained that it was an essential part of the therapy or 'medical' treatment." Id.

Two assault cases raise a similar issue. In Commonwealth v. Gregory, 1 A.2d 501 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1938), the defendant, pretending to be a doctor, persuaded a woman to allow him to examine her artificial leg and stub. He convinced her to take off her dress and to pull down her underwear. He was convicted of indecent assault and assault and battery. The court opined:

[A]ny consent claimed to have been given was obtained by the perpetuation of a fraud, was vitiated by such fraud and is not a defense . . . . The deceit practiced was a fraud on the will of Mrs. Harkins equivalent to force. The legal reasoning involved is the same as that followed in the consideration of larceny by trick.

Id. at 505 (citations omitted). In Boyett v. State, 159 So. 2d 628 (Ala. Ct. App. 1964), the defendant impersonated a doctor and took indecent liberties with a patient; he was convicted of assault and battery. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 55 cmt. a, illus. 4 (1965 & appendix 1977); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892B cmt. e, illus. 7 (1977) ("A, believing B to be a physician, removes her clothing and permits B to lay hands on her person for the purpose of a medical examination. B is not a physician and knows that A believes him to be one. B is subject to liability to A for battery.").


duct was a legitimate medical procedure for diagnosing her respiratory problems.82 Quinlan appealed arguing that his conduct did not constitute criminal sexual assault because the victim consented.83 The appellate court affirmed Quinlan’s conviction noting that Illinois’s statute criminalized sexual penetration when the accused knew the victim was unable to understand the nature of the act or was unable to give knowing consent.84 The court reasoned that the patient had consented to a medical procedure, not to sexual penetration and that her consent was vitiated because it was obtained by deceit.85 The court also noted that Illinois’s statute exempted legitimate medical treatment and, therefore, illegitimate medical examinations fell within the statute’s reach.86

In a similar case reaching the opposite result, David J. Broderson, a phlebotomist, induced three women to allow him to intimately examine them with his fingers and cotton swabs.87 When prosecutors charged Broderson with rape, a reviewing court dismissed the case asserting that Kansas’s rape law required force or fear. The district attorney did argue, however, that the legislature should enact a new statute covering similar situations because “Technically, it’s just as much rape as someone attacking a stranger on a jogging trail,… It’s just as serious, it’s only accomplished in a different manner.”88 Two years later, Kansas amended its rape statute to include instances in which the victim’s consent was obtained through a knowing misrepresentation that intercourse was a medically or therapeutically necessary procedure or a legally required procedure within the scope of offender’s authority.89

Similarly, State v. Tizard90 involved a seventeen-year-old male who visited a doctor to inquire about taking steroids. During some

82 596 N.E.2d at 30.
83 Id. at 30.
84 Id. at 31.
85 Quinlan, 596 N.E.2d at 31. Later, the court stated: “It was only after defendant used deceit to convince [plaintiff] D.S. that the test would get to the root of her medical problems that she consented.” Id.
86 Id.
87 Tony Rizzo, Case Shows Need for Rape Law Change, Prosecutors Say; Judge Drops Felony Charges in Incident that Didn’t Involve Force, KANSAS CITY STAR, July 29, 1995, at C2.
88 Id.
of these visits, the doctor rubbed the patient's genitals and, on one occasion, masturbated him to climax.\textsuperscript{91} The state prosecuted Tizard under its sexual battery statute that includes an explicit fraud provi-
sion. The defendant citing \textit{Boro} argued that the statute reached only fraud in the factum, not fraud in the inducement, but the court rejected the distinction as being irrelevant to Tennessee law.\textsuperscript{92} The court further noted that the legislature had explicitly included fraud as an alternative to force in the context of its rape and sexual bat-
tery laws.\textsuperscript{93} The court convicted Tizard, concluding that he had accomplished the touching by fraud since he did it under the guise of providing medical treatment.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Id.} at 737.
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Id.} at 741.
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Id.} at 742.
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Id.} at 742-43. An appellate court later overturned the conviction based on the admission of improper evidence. \textit{Id.} at 735.
2. Psychiatric and Psychological Treatment

Several cases implicate defendants’ use of fraud in the context of psychological treatment. In one example, State v. Leiding, a male psychologist persuaded his male patient to have sexual relations with him. The state prosecuted Leiding under a relatively new, gender-neutral statute that punished various forms of criminal sexual penetration accomplished through the use of force or coercion. The state theorized that Leiding had used force or coercion under the definition that “the perpetrator knows or has reason to know that the victim ... suffers from a mental condition which renders the victim incapable of understanding the nature or consequences of the act.” It argued that the patient had a condition

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It is almost impossible to imagine similar frauds occurring today, except—and here is the late twentieth-century analogue—in the offices of psychiatrists. Few persons are so ignorant these days as to believe, even on the immense authority of a doctor, that sexual intercourse (with him) will cure or prevent cancer, but even the sophisticated (especially when desperately neurotic) will accept a similar opinion on the authority of their psychoanalyst. And the desperately neurotic are especially vulnerable to pain and injury.

Feinberg, supra note 18, at 336-37.

96 See also Ferguson v. People, 824 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1992) (sexual penetration by psychotherapist); Shapiro v. State, 696 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (sexual misconduct by psychotherapist); State v. Nierras, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 10118 (5th App. Dist. 1980) (attempted sexual intercourse with psychiatrist’s client); Regina v. Fiqia, 87 C.C.C. 3d 377 (1993); Diana Coulter, Duped into Sex, Woman Testifies; Fiqia’s Therapy Issue in Trial, EDMONTON J., Feb. 21, 1992; Diana Coulter, Self-Styled Therapist Guilty of Sex Assault on Teen, EDMONTON J., Mar. 5, 1992 (One victim of sexual abuse by a therapist said “We have to change the laws regarding consent in power-based relationships . . . .”); Sicko Therapist Denied New Trial, TORONTO SUN, June 3, 1994, at 45, available in LEXIS, News Library, Torsun File (Defendant told fifteen-year-old client that she had fictitious disease that would drive her insane or kill her and that to cure her he must administer aversion therapy that included sexual intercourse).


99 Leiding, 812 P.2d at 798 (citation omitted).
known as transference that prohibited him from fully consenting to the sexual relationship. The court, however, concluded that transference did not render the patient incapable of consenting to the sexual act. Noting that Minnesota had enacted a criminal statute addressing sexual relations between a psychotherapist and patient, the opinion stated: "[I]f the legislature desires to make psychologist/patient sex a crime, it can certainly do so, subject only to constitutional limitations. But doing so requires legislative therapy, not judicial surgery." In 1993, New Mexico amended its statutes by expanding force or coercion to include penetration or contact "by a psychotherapist on his patient, with or without the patient's consent, during the course of psychotherapy or within a period of one year following the termination of psychotherapy; ..."

3. Religious Guidance

A number of defendants have used a clerical office or spiritual authority to persuade persons to consent to sexual relations. In State v. Dutton, the defendant, a church pastor, began counselling a woman, eventually enticing her into a sexual relationship by suggesting that it would be good for her. Dutton was convicted of four counts of criminal sexual conduct under a Minnesota statute that, while not directly addressing clergy members, criminalized psychotherapist-patient contact. Dutton was presumably aware of Minnesota's law as he asserted that while sexual intercourse between a counselor and counselee was a felony, his behavior did not qualify. The court, however, found sufficient evidence of both emotional dependency on the victim's part and therapeutic deception by Dutton to satisfy the statutory requirements of the offense. It wrote: "These statutes are meant to protect vulnerable

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101 Id. at 798.
103 Leiding, 812 P.2d at 800.
106 Id. at 191-92.
108 450 N.W.2d at 191-92.
109 Id. at 192-93.
persons and allow them to reposit trust in those who can help them. The legislature has recognized the emotional devastation that can result when a psychotherapist takes advantage of a patient.\textsuperscript{110} Following \textit{Dutton} and a similar case,\textsuperscript{111} the Minnesota legislature amended its sexual conduct statutes to include specific provisions regarding the clergy.\textsuperscript{112}

Similarly, in \textit{People v. Cardenas},\textsuperscript{113} the defendant held himself out as a faith healer in the Curanderismo religion. Cardenas used a combination of abuse of trust, religious authority, psychological coercion, physical deprivation, and a small amount of actual physical force to coerce two women, one a minor, into multiple sexual acts.\textsuperscript{114} After his conviction of seventy counts of sexual misconduct, Cardenas appealed arguing that he did not satisfy the statutory element of "force, violence, duress, menace, of fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury" and that the women had consented to his conduct as part of a cure.\textsuperscript{115} The court rejected Cardenas's arguments and upheld his conviction, noting that the women had only consented to treatment, which did not necessarily translate into consent for defendant's sexual acts. Moreover, the court found that Cardenas's behavior amounted to duress, which it defined broadly to include threats of force as well as hardship or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary sus-

\textsuperscript{110} Id. at 194.


\textsuperscript{112} MINN. STAT. §§ 609.344(l), 609.345(l) (1996).


\textsuperscript{114} Id. at 932-36.

\textsuperscript{115} Id. at 930.
ceptibilities. The court was unpersuaded by defendant’s final argument that the women’s compliance was unreasonable because “Even unreasonable fear of immediate bodily injury may suffice if the accused knowingly takes advantage of that fear in order to accomplish a sexual offense.”

Other cases implicating similar fact patterns include a Florida minister who abused his position of authority by having sex with three parishioners under the guise of confirming their virginity. Another instance occurred in Israel, where a man posing as a rabbi was convicted of nine counts of sexual assault and fraud. The defendant sexually assaulted a sixteen-year-old woman telling her that it was necessary to take a sample of her vaginal secretion. The defendant had multiple victims and was dismissed from the army after involvement in a sexual assault.

4. Musical Education

Finally, to complete the list of instances in which defendants persuaded persons that sexual acts were necessary for their medical, psychiatric, or spiritual treatment, one case involved a choirmaster who duped two young women into sexual acts by telling them it was necessary to improve their singing. In Rex v. Williams, the defendant told one sixteen-year-old girl that her breathing was not right, inducing her into a position to engage in sexual intercourse. When she asked what he was doing, he responded:

“It is quite right; do not worry. . . . This is my method of training. Your breathing is not quite right and I have to make an air passage to make it

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116 Id. at 939.
117 Id. at 940 (citation omitted).
118 Nicole Sterghos & Sarah Lundy, Portrait of a Pastor: 2 Claim Sex, Betrayal; Minister Says He’s Victim of Church Politics, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, FL), Sept. 18, 1997, at 1A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sunsen File.
120 Id.
121 Id.; see also DeStefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (husband brought civil case against priest and diocese for enticing wife into sex during marital counseling).
123 Id.
right. Your parents know all about it, it has all been arranged; before God, Vera, it is quite right. I will not do you any harm."¹²⁴

Williams was convicted of rape for this conduct and of indecent assault for digitally penetrating another female student.¹²⁵

5. Conclusion

Fraudulent medical treatment decisions, perhaps due to their greater longevity or sheer number, offer an encapsulated view of the fundamental problems inherent in rape by fraud cases. First, courts confronting factually similar behavior seem to arrive at different conclusions regarding the importance of the force and nonconsent elements of traditional rape law. The absence of force was critical for some, while consent deprived the act of criminality for others. Courts' characterization of the pivotal issue as one of force or nonconsent subsequently affected the jurisdiction's statutory enactments. Michigan, where Don Moran arose, altered its statute by enlarging the force requirement, while California, the site of Boro, passed new legislation altering the consent requirement.¹²⁶ Second, the fraudulent medical treatment cases, perhaps more than any other category, illustrate the dialectic relationship between courts and legislatures in criminalizing rape by fraud. Boro and Broderson prompted statutory innovation in medical contexts, Leiding preceded its state's psychotherapist legislation, and Dutton antedated specific clergy provisions. Thus, at least in some states, judicial invitations were answered by the legislature.

B. Fraud as to the Defendant's Identity

The second major case law category involves defendants who impersonate others in order to accomplish sexual intercourse. The archetypical fact pattern for such category is a defendant impersonating a woman's husband by getting into bed with her and engaging in sexual intercourse before the woman becomes aware of his real identity. Husband impersonation cases have reached differing outcomes, largely as a result of disagreement about whether such con-

¹²⁴ MACDONALD, supra note 122, at 236.
¹²⁶ See infra notes 280, 339-340 and accompanying text.
duct constitutes fraud in the factum or fraud in the inducement." Newer cases provide even more twists by introducing interesting variations on the husband impersonation theme, i.e., men who pretend to be women's fiancées, boyfriends, or lovers. In one case, the defendant impersonated a famous person to maneuver women into vulnerable positions.

1. Husband Impersonation

The classic husband impersonation case with a twist is Lewis v. State. Lewis, a slave, climbed into bed and had sexual intercourse with a white woman who believed Lewis was her husband. The court reluctantly held that force, actual or constructive, is a necessary ingredient of rape. If the woman consents, the court reasoned, no rape occurred even though consent was obtained by fraudulent impersonation. It added:

We depart from our usual course, for the purpose of inviting the attention of the legislature to this subject. Under our penal laws, one who obtains the goods of another under false and fraudulent pretenses, is held guilty in the same degree as if he has feloniously stolen them. He who contaminates female purity under like fraudulent pretenses, goes unwhipped of justice.

Other courts have upheld rape charges in husband impersonation cases finding fraud in the factum vitiating consent. One court, for example, reasoned that husband impersonation cases really involve fraud in the factum because the woman has consented to

127 See generally B.K. Carpenter, Annotation, Rape by Fraud or Impersonation, 91 A.L.R. 2d 591 (1963).
129 Lewis, 30 Ala. at 54-55.
130 Id. at 56.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 57.
133 See supra note 127.
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marital intercourse not adultery and, therefore, the impersonator's fraud vitiates her consent.\(^{134}\)

2. Fiancé/Boyfriend/Lover Impersonation

One of the most notorious recorded sexual scams is the case of Raymond Mitchell, dubbed the "Fantasy Man" by the press.\(^{135}\) Mitchell telephoned women, pretended to be their fiancés or boyfriends, explained that he had had a fantasy about having sex with a blindfolded woman, and persuaded them to leave their doors unlocked and to wait in bed blindfolded.\(^{136}\) He also instructed his victims not to touch him during sex.\(^{137}\) Mitchell was convicted under a Tennessee statute specifically criminalizing rape by fraud—the only one of its kind in the United States.\(^{138}\) Although arguing that the women consented to the sexual intercourse, the court held that consent is ineffective if obtained by deception.\(^{139}\) Presently, Mitchell is arguing on appeal that the statute is too vague as it does not specifically set forth the types of fraud which would lead to conviction.\(^{140}\)

\(^{134}\) Regina v. Dee, 15 Cox 579 (1884); see also Jocelynne A. Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation and Consent in Rape, 9 U. QUEENS. L.J. 59, 63-65 (1975) [hereinafter Fraudulent Impersonation] (discussing this case).


\(^{136}\) See Ager, supra note 135, at 2.

\(^{137}\) See Ager, supra note 135, at 2.

\(^{138}\) The statute provides that rape occurs if, inter alia, "The sexual penetration is accomplished by fraud." TENV. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503 (1997). News accounts suggest that the statute was an update of an 1870 criminal provision on husband impersonation. Women Who Waited, supra note 120, at 5A; Ippolito, supra note 135, at 1A.

\(^{139}\) Loggins, supra note 135, at 1A.

Similarly, in *People v. Hough*,\(^{141}\) the defendant impersonated his twin brother in order to have sexual intercourse with the brother's girlfriend. The court phrased the question in the case as “whether a female actually consents to sexual intercourse with a male who procures the female’s consent by impersonating the female’s boyfriend.”\(^{142}\) The court found New York’s nonconsent statute required either forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent and did not include fraud:

In general, in the absence of a statute, where a woman is capable of consenting and does consent to sexual intercourse, a man is not guilty of rape even though he obtained the consent through fraud or surprise. . . . The reason is that in the traditional definition of the crime of rape, the sexual intercourse must have been achieved “by force”, or “forcibly”.\(^{143}\)

The court also pointed out that New York’s statute, unlike other jurisdictions’, did not contain a husband impersonation provision. It concluded that the legislature had intentionally excluded cases of fraud or impersonation and dismissed the information.\(^{144}\)

The case of *United States v. Booker*\(^{145}\) provides a third variation on the impersonation theme. Booker had sexual intercourse with a sleeping or unconscious woman shortly after she had consensual intercourse with another man, arguably impersonating the woman’s voluntary lover. He was tried for rape under military law.\(^{146}\) The court struggled with whether his action constituted rape by fraud and whether such fraud was in the factum or in the inducement.\(^{147}\) The court ultimately held that fraud as to the identity of a sexual partner constitutes fraud in the factum which vitiates consent because: “The better view is that the ‘factum’ involves both

\(^{141}\) 124 Misc.2d 997, 607 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1994); see also Mathews v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (boyfriend impersonation case in which attempted rape charges were dismissed); Maureen Fan, *Twin Cleared for Now*, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Jan. 14, 1994, at 40 (A member of the district attorney’s office said “It creates a glaring hole in the protection afforded to victims of sexual offenses.”). The concurring judge in Mathews pointed out the different treatment of married and unmarried persons because California criminally punished husband impersonation. 173 Cal. Rptr. at 822.

\(^{142}\) Hough, 159 Misc.2d at 999, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 885.

\(^{143}\) Id. at 1000, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 886.

\(^{144}\) Id. at 1001-02, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 887.

\(^{145}\) 25 M.J. 114 (CMA 1987); see also Two Men Charged in Rape Case, IDAHO FALLS POST REG., Feb. 28, 1993, at C1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Idfall File (two friends tricked woman into having sex with both of them).

\(^{146}\) Booker, 25 M.J. at 114.

\(^{147}\) Id. at 116.
the nature of the act and some knowledge of the identity of the participant." Thus, Booker was convicted of rape.

3. Impersonating a Famous Person

Oscar E. Kendall impersonated fashion photographer Richard Avedon in a pervasive ruse to persuade women to sleep with him and give him money. Although news coverage of this unpublished case is scant, Kendall apparently used fraud to induce women into vulnerable locations, such as their hotel rooms, and then forcibly assaulted them. His conduct was calculated and deliberate: "Kendall told a police detective in California that he knew 'it is difficult to prosecute a rapist who, by fraud, gains the confidence and companionship (sic) of a woman . . . ." Once apprehended, Kendall admitted guilt to four crimes in four cities in exchange for the police dropping seventeen other charges. He had been convicted of the same charge in Florida in 1968.

4. Conclusion

The traditional husband impersonation cases provide a telling illustration of the problematic elasticity of the factum-inducement

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148 Id.; see also Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation, supra note 134, at 63-65 (making similar argument).
150 Kieman, Avedon Imposter Admits, supra note 149, at C1; see also Commonwealth v. King, 434 A.2d 1294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (defendant lured women with an advertisement about having their pictures taken, then physically attacked them); Donna Wares, Man With 30 Allases to Go on Trial for Rape; Investigators Say Jailhouse Lawyer Used his Camera to Lure Young Girls, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 28, 1988, at B01 (defendant pretended to be a photographer).
151 Kieman, Avedon Imposter Draws, supra note 149, at C2.
152 Kendall had dealt with 33 women in 25 cities. He pleaded guilty to assault with intent to commit rape. Kieman, Avedon Imposter Admits, supra note 149, at C1.
153 Kieman, Avedon Impostor Admits, supra note 149, at C1.
distinction in the context of assessing a victim's consent. One court's recharacterization of the consented-to act, as one of marital intercourse not adultery, allowed it to subsume the defendant's conduct under rape law. However, such legal sleight of hand is inadequate to address the newer variations involving sexual partners other than spouses. In addition, Kendall's case poses a more difficult challenge because it involves a different type of impersonation. Instead of relying on the factum-inducement dichotomy, a superior approach may be simply to outlaw fraud as to identity in securing sexual compliance—the standard used in England.

C. Sexual Scams: Talent Agents, Psychologists, and Psychics

Recently, courts have been confronted with a third major category, a new genre of cases involving a different kind of fraud—con men who prey on women by perpetrating some form of sexual scam, many predictably involving the entertainment industry. These cases are difficult because they lack the historical development and, more importantly, the intuitive appeal of the traditional fraudulent treatment and impersonation cases. They typically involve business settings, not professional-treatment contexts, in which the defendants deceive the victims into sexual intimacy by false promises of benefit. Because these fact patterns more closely resemble fraudulent commercial transactions and trigger discussion of sexual bargains, they demand careful consideration as to the potential limits of rape by fraud. To date, attempts to prosecute these defendants for sexual crimes, based on exploitation of victims under the guise of the casting couch or similar stratagems, have been largely unsuccessful. Most of these sexual con men have escaped criminal sanction or, more rarely, have been convicted of fraud or property crimes rather than the underlying sexual offense.

154 In Regina v. Elbekkay, [1995] Crim LR 163 (C.A. 1994), available in LEXIS, UK Library, ALLCAS File, a British court eschewed the distinction between married and unmarried persons: "How could we conscientiously hold that it is rape to impersonate a husband in the act of sexual intercourse, but not if the person impersonated is merely, say the long-term, live-in lover, or in the even more modern idiom, the 'partner' of the woman concerned?"; see also Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation, supra note 134, at 64 (arguing marriage irrelevant).


156 See Berger, supra note 8, at 76; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213 commentary (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (discussing distinction between coercion and bargain).
1. Talent Agents, Acting Coaches, and Movie Producers\textsuperscript{157}

In United States v. Condolon,\textsuperscript{158} the defendant engaged in an elaborate scheme designed "solely... to gratify his sexual desires."\textsuperscript{159} He rented an apartment, obtained a business license, and placed newspaper ads offering to find women acting and modeling jobs.\textsuperscript{160} Condolon propositioned many of the women who contacted him and a number submitted to his advances. In reality, Condolon had neither the means nor the intention of assisting his clients in obtaining work.\textsuperscript{161} He was convicted of wire fraud: "The federal statute was not used to punish Condolon for his sexual activities. Condolon was prosecuted for establishing a bogus commercial enterprise and then using the telephone to accomplish his fraudulent intentions."\textsuperscript{162} Without resort to the wire fraud statute, Condolon would likely have gone unpunished.

In Goldberg v. State, the defendant held himself out to be a free-lance agent, telling his victim that she would make a good model.\textsuperscript{163} He brought her to a condo and smooth-talked her into removing her clothing (the victim stated that she was frightened of the defendant at this point) and eventually engaged in sexual intercourse. Goldberg appealed his conviction of second-degree rape. The appellate court reversed, finding insufficient evidence of force and holding that in the absence of force, the victim’s lack of consent is irrelevant.\textsuperscript{164} The court also considered whether the victim resisted or had been prevented from resisting because of fear; however, it concluded "unreasonable subjective fear of resisting cannot convert the conduct of the defendant from that which is non-crimi-

\textsuperscript{157} See Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2185 (analyzing casting couch ploy).
\textsuperscript{158} 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979).
\textsuperscript{159} Id. at 8.
\textsuperscript{160} Id.; see also United States v. Altman, 901 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1990) (defendant convicted of sexual exploitation of minor, interstate transportation of minor with intent to engage in illegal sexual activity, and wire fraud). "Altman posed as an owner of a modeling agency and induced women to pay him money to become his models. He then plied the women with the amphetamine Didrex diet pills, had intercourse with them, and took sexually explicit photographs of them." Id. at 1162.
\textsuperscript{161} Condolon, 600 F.2d at 8.
\textsuperscript{162} Id. at 9. Florida is the only state to have a statute, a civil one, regulating sexual misconduct in the operation of a talent agency. Fla. Stat. ch. 468.415 (1996).
\textsuperscript{164} See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
nal to that which is criminal." Because the jury had been instructed not to return a verdict on any lesser-included offense, Goldberg escaped all criminal liability.

Similarly, in the civil case of Micari v. Mann, an elderly acting teacher persuaded his young female students to have sexual intercourse with him and each other by saying that it would improve their acting. After the jury was instructed that "consent... would be a complete defense unless i) the defendant falsely represented to the plaintiffs that their performance of such acts was related to their training as actresses, and ii) plaintiffs relied upon such misrepresentation," it found Mann liable and awarded the plaintiffs compensatory damages. The reviewing court determined punitive damages were appropriate, ordering a new trial on that issue:

Here the testimony indicated that defendant, playing upon the emotional needs of his insecure students, actively sought to be ensconced as their trusted father figure—indeed, one of the plaintiffs described defendant's behavior after a sexual experience as "fatherly". It is this studied effort at domination under the guise of acting in loco parentis, coupled with both his actual and apparent ability to affect plaintiffs' dearest aspirations, that renders defendant's actions so heinous. This gross violation was not merely of their bodies but of their trust as well, an invasion so reprehensible as to cry out for the imposition of a sanction expressing the moral outrage of society. Under these circumstances one would be hard pressed to find a situation where punitive damages were more warranted.

Author Linda A. Fairstein devotes an entire chapter of her book SEXUAL VIOLENCE to sexual scams. One case she describes pertains to acting coach Paul Hannon who singled out women from his large classes for special acting lessons, during which he persuaded several of them to perform fellatio on him. The pattern is almost

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165 Goldberg, 395 A.2d at 1220.
166 John MacDonald's book RAPE: OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS, supra note 122, provides the example of a Denver personnel manager who claimed to be searching for models for his store. The manager told one young woman that she would make a great model and induced her to allow him to measure her for a diaphragm, which he claimed was needed because so many models were becoming pregnant. The perpetrator digitally penetrated the young woman and proposed inserting himself, but she declined. The man succeeded in persuading a second, more gullible, woman to have intercourse with him to enlarge her to a size sufficient for the job. He told a third woman that she had a vaginal disease and that he had some pills.
168 Id. at 423, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
169 Id. at 429, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
170 FAIRSTEIN, supra note 47, at 185-197.
171 FAIRSTEIN, supra note 47, at 185-191.
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identical to Micari: "Each conceded that she had not been 'forced' to submit to him with a weapon or verbal threats, but that his presence was itself overpowering. He was in a position of responsibility and authority, and obviously aware that he was, at least psychologically, coercing his students into this behavior."  

The women's testimony was presented to a grand jury, but it declined to indict.  

A sensational case from Hong Kong completes this Article's overview of entertainment industry sex scam cases. In one of the most notorious cases of sexual con men, defendant Chin Chi-Ming, pretended to be influential in the film industry, using promises of movie stardom, apartments, and cars to lure at least five women, some well-known starlets, into bed. Afterwards, Chin blackmailed them with pictures taken at the sexual encounters. He was convicted of three counts of blackmail, one of procurement, one of

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172 FAIRSTEIN, supra note 47, at 190.

173 Steve Davidson is a third example of a man who used an acting ploy to secure sexual relations with women. Davidson, who was actually an agent for the Internal Revenue Service, pretended to audition women for a movie role and got them to spank him purely for his sexual gratification. The state cleverly prosecuted Davidson for a scheme to defraud, a property crime, rather than a sexual offense. The property was the women's videotaped performances. Davidson pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years of probation; he was also fired. FAIRSTEIN, supra note 47, at 195-97. Similarly, news accounts describe the case of Dale Normand who tricked young women, some minors, into having sex with him by telling them that he would give them parts in a movie he was producing. He also pleaded guilty to two counts of securities violations in Ohio. H.G. Reza, Sex Offender Pleads Guilty to Stock Swindle, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1990, at B8, available in LEXIS, News Library, LAT File.  


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attempted procurement, and four counts of theft; he served almost four years in prison. Recently, Chin was arrested on new rape charges.

2. "The Abominable Snowman"

The entertainment industry is not the only environment fostering sexual scams. The defendant in People v. Evans met his victim, Peterson, at the local airport where he struck up a conversation with her by claiming to be a psychologist writing a magazine article involving sociological experimentation. Defendant Evans and another woman took Peterson to a singles bar to allegedly conduct such an sociological experiment. Evans then enticed Peterson to accompany him to an apartment, saying it was one of his offices, where he continued his psychological-interviewing ploy. After several hours, Evans grabbed Peterson and tried to disrobe her. When she resisted, defendant's tactics changed, he told that she had failed the test and he was disappointed. Evans then told Peterson to consider her situation, saying among other things: "I could kill you. I could rape you. I could hurt you physically." The defendant ultimately had sexual intercourse with Peterson several times. Later, Evans claimed that the acts were consensual and told the police that "the whole psychology bit was a 'game that he played with girls' heads." The court overturned Evans' conviction, finding an absence of forcible compulsion or threat.

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172 Chin Loses Appeal on Sex Trial Delay, supra note 175, at 8.
174 Connolly, supra note 174.
178 I include Evans in the sexual scam section because defendant Evans's behavior more closely resembles the other defendants in this section than those in the fraudulent treatment cases.
179 85 Misc.2d at 1092, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 1093, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 1094, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
184 The court stressed the defendant had not resorted to physical force; it drew a line between seduction and rape:

As we have become more civilized, we have come to condemn the more overt, aggressive and outrageous behavior of some men towards women and we have labeled it "rape". We have attempted to control or deter it by providing for extremely heavy sentences, . . . .

At the same time we have recognized that there are some patterns of aggression or aggressive male sexual behavior toward females which do not
prevailing view, according to the court, was that no rape occurs when sexual intercourse is achieved by fraud, trick, or stratagem: "Provided there is actual consent, the nature of the act being understood, it is not rape, absent a statute, no matter how despicable the fraud, . . . ." Although the court reasoned that larceny by trick did not apply because a woman’s right to her body was not a thing of value within the meaning of theft law, the court did voice its strong disapproval of Evans’s conduct in the final portion of its opinion, calling him "The Abominable Snowman." 

3. A Psychic

In an English case involving a bizarre sex scam, James Finningham posed as a wealthy psychic and pretended to be inhabited by a dead American Indian chief. He persuaded a gullible victim to sleep with him by telling her during a seance that she should physically give herself to him. Following both sexual

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deserve such extreme penalties, in which the male objective may be achieved through charm or guile or protestations of love, promises or deceit.

Where force is not employed to overcome reluctance, and where consent, however reluctant initially, can be spelled out, this we label "seduction," which society may condone, even as it disapproves.

85 Misc.2d at 1090, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 914.

185 Id. at 1095, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 919.

186 The Evans court wrote:

The testimony in the case reveals that the defendant was a predator, and that naive and gullible girls . . . were his natural prey. He posed. He lied. He pretended and he deceived. He used confidences which were innocently bestowed as leverage to effect his will. He used psychological techniques to achieve vulnerability and sympathy, and the erosion of resistance. A young and inexperienced girl like Beth Peterson was then unable to withstand the practiced onslaught of the defendant. The defendant apparently got his kicks through the exercise of these techniques. He apparently spurned the readily available women, the acquiescent women, like Bridget, who was living in the same apartment. To him, the game was worth more than the prize. He boasted to the police that this was a game he played with girls' heads. The Court finds his conduct, if not criminal, to be reprehensible. It was conquest by con job. Truly, therefore, this defendant may be called "The Abominable Snowman."

Id. at 1099, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22.


188 Clarke, supra note 187.
and financial exploitation of the woman, Finningham was convicted of fraud and false imprisonment, "but cleared of obtaining property by deception and causing her actual bodily harm."

4. Conclusion

The sexual-scam cases push the frontiers of rape by fraud by exceeding the boundaries set by traditional fraudulent treatment and husband impersonation cases. Their judicial reception has been mixed. Most defendants in these cases escape criminal sanction because courts, hampered by the poverty of statutory enactments, are reluctant to extend the coverage of sexual offenses to them. However, because many of these con men also stole money or property from their victims, a few courts have managed to punish such defendants for fraud or property offenses, leaving the sexual aspects of their crimes untouched. While notable, this result is troubling because it fails to protect citizens' rights to be free of fraudulent pressures in the sexual context, exalting the protection of property rights over sexual integrity. Further, such result fails to vindicate the unique and qualitatively more serious harm of sexual offenses.

D. Sexual Theft: Prostitutes

A fourth category of potential rape by fraud cases, closely related to sexual scams, involves perhaps the most controversial of victims, persons who sell their sexual services. In some senses, these cases are easier than those involving sexual scams because the terms of exchange between defendants and victims are less ambiguous. However, given that prostitution remains illegal in most states, the victims of sexual theft may appear unworthy of sympathy because they engage in societally opprobrious behavior and may lack

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189 Clarke, supra note 162.
190 Larson calls this the sex exception to fraud. Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 412.
191 Estrich points out that if Goldberg and Evans had been stealing property, they would have been punished. ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 70.
192 Estrich emphasizes that the loss of bodily integrity is greater than the loss of money. Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1121.
193 I use the term "theft" narrowly here to include only cases in which the victim offered to sell sexual services.
legally enforceable rights to complain about the perpetration of fraud in their profession.\textsuperscript{194}

In a recent case from England, Regina v. Linekar,\textsuperscript{195} the defendant approached a part-time prostitute and negotiated a price of twenty-five pounds for sexual intercourse. Afterwards, the defendant refused to pay and the woman alleged rape.\textsuperscript{196} According to one author, the court conceptualized the question as: "whether the complainant's consent to sexual intercourse was vitiated by the defendant's decision not to pay her, namely by fraud."\textsuperscript{197} The trial court instructed the jury that consent obtained by fraud is invalid, and it returned a guilty verdict. The appellate court quashed the conviction because the prostitute had consented to the intercourse and the fraud went to a collateral matter: "The reality of that consent is not destroyed by being induced by the appellant's false pretence that his intention was to pay the agreed price of £25 for her services."\textsuperscript{198} The court held that the only forms of fraud negating consent are those that go to the nature of the act itself or the identity of the person.\textsuperscript{199} The court also emphasized that it is the absence of consent, not the presence of fraud, that turns sexual intercourse into rape.\textsuperscript{200} The court opined that Linekar should have been prosecuted under a different English statute, making it a crime to procure a woman by false pretenses or representations to have sexual intercourse.\textsuperscript{201}

In a similar case from Canada, Regina v. Petrozzi,\textsuperscript{202} the defendant solicited a prostitute and told her that he would pay her $100 for sexual services, although he had no intention of doing so.

\textsuperscript{194} See Panel Discussion, Men, Women, and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 125 [hereinafter Men, Women, and Rape] (1994) (remarks by Dripps) (Professor Dripps argues that sexual fraud will not be criminally punished until civil law enforces contracts for sexual services). He writes: "What seems to be at the heart of the problem of sexual fraud is that a pristine contract for prostitution is itself a crime under the criminal law, and unenforceable under the law of contracts because contrary to public policy." Id. at 144-45.
\textsuperscript{196} [1995] Crim LR at 320.
\textsuperscript{197} Alan Reed, Contra Bonos Mores: Fraud Affecting Consent in Rape, 145 NEW L.J. 174, 174 (1995).
\textsuperscript{198} Linekar, [1995] Crim LR 320.
\textsuperscript{199} Id.
\textsuperscript{200} Id.
\textsuperscript{201} Id.; see also Reed, supra note 197, at 176 (agreeing with Court's suggestion).
After Petrozzi had isolated the woman, he physically attacked her.²⁰³ The trial judge instructed the jury that if it found there was a causal connection between the fraud and the victim's submission, then no consent existed, and the defendant was guilty of rape.²⁰⁴ The jury convicted Petrozzi, but the case was overturned on appeal. The reviewing court held that the only types of fraud vitiating consent were those that went to the nature or quality of the act or the identity of the person,²⁰⁵ the same standard as Linekar. In a familiar refrain, the court said that if the legislature wanted to expand the range of fraud vitiating consent, it must do so explicitly.²⁰⁶ It also worried about the outer limits of a broader rule, asking whether it would be sexual assault if one adult simply lied to another.²⁰⁷

The Second Restatement of Torts adopts a similar example to illustrate the difference between fraud as to an essential matter and fraud affecting only a collateral issue in the context of the tort of battery:

1. A, to induce B to submit to intimate familiarities, offers her a paper which A represents to be a twenty dollar bill but which he knows to be counterfeit. B, believing the paper to be a genuine bill, submits. A is not liable to B for battery.
2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that the paper is offered if B will submit to a blood transfusion. A is subject to liability to B for the harm done by the operation to which A has fraudulently induced him to submit.²⁰⁸

²⁰³ Id.
²⁰⁴ Id.
²⁰⁵ Id.
²⁰⁶ The Legislature had already changed the language of the statute when Canada replaced rape with sexual assault, but the court did not find this change sufficient. Id.
²⁰⁷ See also Regina v. Clarence, (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23, a case involving a man infected with a venereal disease who had sexual intercourse with his wife without disclosing his condition. In dicta, the majority wrote:

That consent obtained by fraud is no consent at all is not true as a general proposition either in fact or in law. If a man meets a woman in the street and knowingly gives her bad money in order to procure her consent to intercourse with him, he obtains her consent by fraud, but it would be childish to say that she did not consent.

Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. at 23, quoted in Beale, supra note 5, at 319. The court also provided an example of a man who passed himself off as a person of good family and standing when in fact he was a jailbird. Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. at 23, quoted in Reed, supra note 197, at 175; see also Regina v. Cuerrier, 111 C.C.C. 3d 261 (1996) (involving man with HIV who lied about his status to two women to have sexual intercourse).

²⁰⁸ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 57 cmt. a, illus. 1 & 2 (1965); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B cmt. g, illus. 9 (1977) (describing virtually same fact pattern); Puttkammer, supra note 5, at 422 (using example of paying prostitute with
A cursory review of the above illustrates that the difference between the two examples is not entirely clear. Therein lies the problem. Commentators have suggested the real reason that the law does not recognize rape (or battery) under these circumstances is that society often views the prostitute's behavior as immoral and illegal. 209

E. The Abuse of Authority

Turning to rape by coercion, a fifth category of cases embraces situations in which a defendant uses an authoritative position or manipulates a power relationship to achieve sexual compliance. In these cases, defendants coerce victims to consent by threats or pressure falling short of physical force, rather than deploying deceptive measures. Cases falling into this category cover a broad spectrum of contexts. In three cases, the defendant held a position of trust or authority over a minor. Two cases involved real or feigned police officers. In a final case, the defendant was the victim's employer.

1. Teachers, Principals, and Guardians of Minors

The issue of coerced sex is successfully raised in Scadden v. State. 210 Scadden, a high school teacher and girls' volleyball coach, "encouraged the victims to become dependent on him in an atmosphere of trust, and . . . then used this influence to impose his sexual will on those students." 211 Wyoming's statute criminalized sexual conduct when a defendant used his position of authority to cause a victim to submit; 212 submit was defined to mean that the counterfeit money).

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209 See, e.g., 1 STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 133 (arguing Restatement's two illustrations, the gigolo and blood seller, unhelpful: "The distinction between these two situations—if it exists at all—is surely too elusive to provide useful guidance to the courts or the public. The drafters of the Restatement's illustration may have assumed, without making their premises clear, that selling sexual services is more objectionable than selling blood."). Reed, supra note 197, at 176; Men, Women, and Rape, supra note 194, at 144-45 (remarks by Dripps).

210 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987).

211 Id. at 1039.

212 The statute punishes second-degree sexual assault if "The actor is in a position of authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to cause the victim to submit." WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(vi) (Michie 1997).
person "does not give free, full and reasoned consent." On appeal, Scadden challenged the statute as being void for vagueness, arguing that the position-of-authority definition could include examples such as inducing someone to have sex by using emotional involvement. The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, stating it would use common sense in applying the statute and affirmed.

In a comparable case from a different jurisdiction without a similar statute, State v. Thompson, the defendant was a high-school principal who threatened to prevent the graduation of a female student unless she complied with his sexual demands. Before trial, the defendant sought to have the charges dismissed as failing to allege a criminal offense under Montana law. The district court agreed and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed noting that the element of force was lacking. It opined that force could not be stretched "to include intimidation, fear, or apprehension," but rather must be given its ordinary meaning. In the final paragraph of its opinion, the court opined:

This case is one of considerable difficulty for us, as indeed it must have been for the District Court judge. The alleged facts, if true, show disgusting acts of taking advantage of a young person by an adult who occupied a position of authority over the young person. If we could rewrite the statutes to define the alleged acts here as sexual intercourse without consent, we would willingly do so. The business of courts, however, is to interpret statutes, not to rewrite them, nor to insert words not put there by the legislature. With a good deal of reluctance, and with strong condemnation of the alleged acts, we affirm the District Court.

This opinion is remarkably similar to Don Moran and other cases discussing the limitations imposed on the courts by the language of their jurisdiction's rape statutes.

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213 Scadden, 732 P.2d at 1040.
214 Id. at 1042-43; see also State v. Carter, 663 A.2d 101 (N.H. 1995) (defendant eighth-grade teacher convicted of sexual assault for using his position of authority to coerce student to submit).
216 Id. at 1105.
217 Id. at 1106.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 1107.
Finally, in *Commonwealth v. Mlinarich,* the defendant guardian threatened a fourteen-year-old girl in his care with return to a juvenile detention facility if she did not accede to his sexual demands. The question that the court had to address was whether such threat constituted "forcible compulsion" or the "threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution" within the meaning of Pennsylvania's rape law. The court answered the question in the negative. It noted that forcible compulsion includes both physical force and psychological duress, but the latter must be of sufficient intensity to overpower the will to resist and here it did not. The court stated: "Notwithstanding, she was left with a choice and therefore the submission was a result of a deliberate choice and was not an involuntary act." One dissenter characterized this fact pattern as clearly involving psychological coercion. Another dissenting judge wrote: "The question is not whether she could make a choice to yield or be confined, but whether the law should allow such a choice at all." In a subsequent Pennsylvania case involving sexual acts by a male therapist with his adolescent male patient, the court found the forcible element of rape was satisfied by the therapist's position of authority.
2. Real and Feigned Police Officers

In Commonwealth v. Caracciola, the defendant pretended to be a police officer and threatened to imprison a woman unless she submitted to his sexual advances. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the force requirement of rape had not been satisfied. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant’s conduct fell within the purview of its rape statute. It sought, however, to distinguish the case from one involving fraud, although the defendant in this case was impersonating a police officer. The court analogized to the state’s robbery statute, stating that the force requirement for rape could be satisfied by constructive force because: “The defendant’s argument that physical force is a required element in rape cases asks us to assume that the Legislature intended to give greater protection to property than to bodily integrity. We decline to make such an unwarranted assump-

229 See generally Diane C. Sheiring, Annotation, Sexual Misconduct or Irregularity as Amounting to “Conduct Unbecoming an Officer,” Justifying Officer’s Demotion or Removal or Suspension from Duty, 9 A.L.R. 4TH 614 (1981); Hightower v. State, 443 So. 2d 1270 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982), rev’d, 443 So. 2d 1272 (Ala. 1983) (officer prosecuted for sexual misconduct for threatening woman with jail if she did not submit to sexual intercourse); Douglas v. Daniels, 382 N.E.2d 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (police officer coerced woman into sexual relationship in exchange for not enforcing his duty); State v. Beugli, 868 P.2d 766 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (officer charged with sexual abuse, official misconduct, and harassment for inappropriately touching four women suspects); Julie Irwin, Man Charged with Posing as Police/Lincoln Heights Firefighter Arrested, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 25, 1995, at C6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cinnqr File; Melissa Martinez, Cop Accused of Fondling Women/Tucson Police Officer Charles Thomas Robb is Suspended after Being Indicted on Six Counts of Abuse While He was on Duty, TUCSON CITIZEN, May 25, 1996, at 1C; Cheryl Martinis, Case Against State Trooper’s Searches Goes to Jury, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, July 2, 1996, at B3; Cheryl Martinis, Trial Under Way for State Trooper, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 21, 1996, at C3; Steve Rytle, 2 Women Accuse Officer of Harassment; Police: Suit Alleges Lewd Conduct by Glendale Patrolman During a Traffic Stop/Department Declines to Comment, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at B4; Around the Tristate News Tips, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 22, 1995, at C2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cinnqr File; State Trooper Charged with Sex Abuse, UPI, Feb. 14, 1991; Trooper Acquitted of Touchy Searches, BULL. (Bend, Or.), July 3, 1996, at B4; Trooper Sidelined as Prosecutors, OSP Spar, BULL. (Bend, Or.), Jan. 16, 1997, at B3; see also People v. Cavanaugh, 158 P. 1053 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1916) (involving both physical threats and coercive impersonation of an officer). The court reversed the conviction because the woman may have acceded to the defendant’s sexual demands not because of physical force but rather from his impersonation of a police officer, which would not be sufficient for rape. Id. at 1055-56.


231 Id. at 777.
tion." The dissent argued that rape requires either physical force or a threat of bodily injury, citing Goldenberg (a fraudulent medical treatment case).

Likewise, in State v. Felton, the defendant, a Louisiana police officer, was convicted of extortion, not a sex crime, for forcing a woman to have sexual intercourse with him by threatening to arrest her. The defendant appealed, arguing that the state statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The appellate court rejected both arguments.

3. Employers

In State v. Caprio, the defendant manager of a time-share condominium company called an employee into his office, maneuvered her between his legs, and fondled her. The young woman repeatedly told the defendant to stop, but he continued his advances. A jury convicted Caprio of five counts of third-degree sexual assault based on strong compulsion, the physical force he used in

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232 Id.

233 Id. at 783 (citing Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 155 N.E.2d 187 (1959)); see also State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 736 (R.I. 1987) (interpreting Rhode Island's sexual assault statute as encompassing case of police officer using his position of authority to intimidate victim into sex: "[T]he defendant's position of authority, in and of itself, carried with it an implied threat, and this appearance of authority, combined with the fact that defendant was armed, and the peculiar vulnerability of the victim, are sufficient to support a jury verdict that defendant coerced submission by impliedly threatening the victim within the meaning of § 11-37-1(c).").

234 339 So. 2d 797 (La. 1976); see also State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569 (Or. 1982) (embodying a similar fact pattern although the case turns on the constitutionality of the statute). The court wrote: "[D]efendants are accused of coercing the victim into sexual conduct by threatening to 'expose a secret and publicize an asserted fact [not further described in the indictment] which would tend to subject [her] to hatred, contempt, and ridicule.'" Id. at 589 (brackets in original).

235 Id. at 799.

236 Id. at 799-800.


239 Id. at 936.
securing the woman between his legs. Caprio challenged his conviction, claiming that the trial judge should have instructed the jury on the lesser offense of fourth-degree sexual assault, which only requires compulsion—"a threat . . . that places a person in fear of public humiliation, property damage, or financial loss." The appellate court agreed with such assertion because the evidence supported the inference that Caprio had also threatened financial loss.

4. Conclusion

The abuse-of-authority cases, like the fraudulent treatment decisions, illustrate that the availability of specific statutory enactments is frequently outcome-determinative. In the trio of opinions involving minors, defendant Scadden’s behavior was no more blameworthy or outrageous than defendants’ Thompson's or Mlinarich's. However, Scadden lived in a jurisdiction with an abuse-of-authority provision while his cohorts did not. The one exception to this trend was Caracciola where the court upheld the defendant's conviction by invoking the constructive force doctrine and analogizing to the state's robbery statute. Collectively, however, these cases clearly highlight the problem of selective coverage as a result of the diversity of extant statutory law.

F. Sexual Extortion

Closely related to the abuse-of-power cases, several opinions implicate the use of fraudulent or nonfraudulent extortion to obtain sexual intercourse, thereby blurring the line between rape by fraud and rape by coercion. These cases differ from abuse-of-power situations because they generally do not involve defendants in formalized positions of authority but rather individuals who exploit power derived from circumstantial contact with the victim.

In a 1948 case from California, People v. Cassandras, the defendant accosted a married woman outside an employment office,

240 Id. at 938.
242 Caprio, 937 P.2d at 938-39. This case is of interest because Hawaii's sexual assault statutes are rather unique in that they include nonphysical threats.
243 188 P.2d 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948); see also Harris, supra note 12, at 644 (discussing case).
told her about a possible job, and persuaded her to get into a car with him. Cassandras then drove the woman to a hotel room where he used various threats—including advising the police that she was a prostitute so they would take her children away—to cause her to submit to sexual intercourse.\(^2\) Appealing his conviction, Cassandras alleged that he did not fall under California’s rape statute which required either force or threat.\(^2\) The court rejected such assertion, finding that the defendant had used sufficient threats to secure the woman’s compliance.\(^2\)

In a more recent case, State v. Lovely,\(^2\) the defendant befriended the male victim, hired him as an employee, and paid his rent and restitution for a past theft committed by the victim. Lovely then coerced the male victim into various sexual acts by threatening to fire, evict, sue, and turn him over to the police.\(^2\) The jury convicted Lovely of twelve counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and seven counts of sexual assault.\(^2\) He appealed arguing that threats of financial retribution are not covered by the state’s sexual assault statutes, which are limited to threats of violence.\(^2\) The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the convictions relying on complex statutory interpretation. First, it noted that the sexual assault statutes prohibited coercion based on retaliation. Second, it found that retaliation was defined to include extortion.\(^2\) Because extortion was not defined in the sexual assault context, the court looked to the state’s theft by extortion statute, which defined extortion to include causing official action or harming someone in their financial condition.\(^2\) The court concluded, therefore, that “[t]hreats of mental punishment, extortion (as defined . . . to include threats of economic reprisal) or public humiliation or disgrace clearly extend beyond threats of physical violence to reach acts that undermine consent through the use of non-violent coercion.”\(^2\)

\(^2\) Cassandras, 188 P.2d at 548.
\(^2\) Id. at 549.
\(^2\) Id. at 549-50. A second issue in the case was the admissibility of evidence of a similar act committed with another woman; the court upheld its admission. Id. at 550-52.
\(^2\) 480 A.2d 847 (N.H. 1984).
\(^2\) Id. at 849-50.
\(^2\) Id. at 848.
\(^2\) Id. at 849.
\(^2\) Id. at 850.
\(^2\) Lovely, 480 A.2d at 850.
\(^2\) Id. at 850.
Following denial of his motion for reconsideration, Lovely filed an unsuccessful petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the state supreme court's interpretation was unconstitutional; the First Circuit upheld the dismissal.254

A third illustration of sexual extortion involves newspaper accounts which describe a scheme by which a man fraudulently blackmailed two women into sexual intercourse.255 The man telephoned the women and offered not to testify against their husbands in traffic-accident cases if they would bring money to a hotel room. He told one wife to wear a low-cut blouse and a slit skirt. When the women arrived, the blackmailer took the money and also coerced the women into sex. Unfortunately, no additional information is available regarding this case.

Finally, several civil cases involve sexual extortion by attorneys who have used their professional relationship to pressure women into sexual acts.256 In In re Piatt, an attorney disciplinary case, a lawyer told one client that if she did not sexually cooperate, he could not represent her without more money. He informed a second client, who had declined his sexual advances, that she would have to accept an undesirable settlement agreement or it would cost her more money.257 Piatt was found guilty and "sentenced" to public censure. Similarly, In re Rinella involved a domestic relations case.
attorney who coerced three clients into sexual relationships and lied about it later. The attorney was suspended for three years.258

The Board found that this conduct by respondent constituted overreaching because he used his position of influence over the clients to pressure them to engage in sexual relations. The Board noted that all of the women testified that they did not want to engage in sexual relations with respondent but felt that they had to in order to ensure that they were effectively represented and because they could not afford to hire another lawyer.259

Although these cases do not involve criminal charges, the conduct involved closely resembles that of others who extorted sexual intercourse.260

In summary, defendants in sexual extortion cases used coercive, sometimes fraudulent, threats to compel sexual submission. These cases emphasize the coercive nature of threats involving, for example, the police or legal system, even when the defendant does not hold an authoritative position such as a law enforcement officer. Moreover, by exploiting their clients' financial vulnerability to accomplish sexual conduct, the attorney disciplinary cases raise the specter of economic threats for the first time in this case review.261

G. Conclusion

The foregoing review of cases involving criminal actors who used fraud or coercion to accomplish sexual penetration or contact documents some important trends. First, these cases collectively paint a disturbing picture of sexual exploitation in a variety of contexts through a panoply of means. Defendants (all male) misrepresented to their prey (mostly female) that sexual intercourse was essential to their victims' medical treatment, psychological well-

259 Id. at 913.
260 William D. Langford, Jr., Note, Criminalizing Attorney-Client Sexual Relations: Toward Substantive Enforcement, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1223 (1995); Lawyer LIABLE for Coerced Sex: Jury Awards Ex-Client $225,000 for Malpractice Despite Competent Representation, A.B.A. J. Feb. 1993 at 24; see also Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 433 n.11 (quoting the Board of Governors of the Oregon State Bar: "The attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary relationship, one of trust. The nature of that fiduciary relationship tends to make the client intellectually and, in many cases, emotionally dependent upon the attorney. If the client becomes involved in a love affair with the attorney, that dependency would only be increased.").
being, or spiritual salvation or beneficial to their professional careers; they lied about their identities and intentions of paying for sexual services; and some wielded naked power derived from authoritative positions, while others used extortionate threats. Rape by fraud and rape by coercion are not unitary phenomena but comprehend a broad spectrum of conduct. Thus, the criminalization of this behavior will not be susceptible of simple solution; the legal response will need to be as innovative as these actors’ conduct.

Second, a portrait emerges of the criminal defendants in these cases as a distinct class of nonviolent sexual predator not simply individuals in poor romantic or sexual relationships. Many of these perpetrators were repeat offenders. Boro (“Dr. Feelgood”), Mitchell (“The Fantasy Man”), and Kendall (the Avedon impersonator) had large numbers of victims. Even the Florida minister, the New York acting coach, and the bogus-traffic-accident blackmailer had more than one. More importantly, a significant number of offenders employed fraudulent or coercive stratagems that would have resulted in criminal liability if their goal had been to obtain property instead of accomplish sexual intercourse—prompting frequent judicial references to, if not adoption of, analogies to theft offenses. The fact that many of these criminal actors also stole money or property from their victims only serves to underscore this similarity.

Third, in terms of legal analysis, these cases turned on courts’ interpretation of the force or nonconsent elements of the jurisdiction’s rape or sexual assault statutes—the two traditional requirements of rape law. Courts’ most common approach to this genre of cases was to hold that the force requirement was not satisfied by defendants’ use of fraudulent or coercive pressures, declining to extrapolate beyond the literal wording of the statutory language or acknowledge the similar effects these mechanisms may have on consent. Alternatively, courts held that the nonconsent element was not satisfied because victims had ostensibly consented to the sexual act. In confronting the subsidiary question of whether fraud or coercion vitiates that consent, courts relied on the traditional factum-inducement distinction to hold that defendants’ fraud went to a collateral matter and, therefore, victim consent was valid. Courts conspicuously failed to explore the parameters of legally effective consent in these sexual offenses beyond this paradigmatic

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262 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 70.
263 See infra Part III.A.
approach and as interpreted in other legal contexts. In the final analysis, courts frequently side-stepped the difficult issues embedded in these cases by asking their respective legislatures to consider expanding statutory coverage. Several state legislatures have responded to such judicial invitations by altering their criminal codes to bring some of this conduct within the purview of rape or sexual assault statutes. Part II reviews the results of these legislative efforts.

II. CRIMINAL STATUTES PROHIBITING RAPE BY FRAUD OR RAPE BY COERCION

[L]egislatures should replace the independent crime of rape with a variety of statutory offenses that would more clearly and more justly define criminal liability for culpable conduct aimed at causing other individuals to engage in sexual acts.264

This Part provides a descriptive review of legislative state of the art with respect to what may be denominated rape by fraud or rape by coercion. The review reveals a surprisingly comprehensive array of state criminal statutes prohibiting various forms of nonforcible or nonconsensual sexual conduct, some more specifically focusing on fraud or coercion. Every state has at least one relevant criminal provision, and many have civil statutes and disciplinary rules covering similar behavior, although these are beyond the scope of the present analysis.265

264 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1780.
This panoply of statutes is the logical successor to the rape-reform movements of the 1950s and 1970s which changed the face of rape law in significant ways.266 Specifically, these earlier movements altered two of the traditional elements of rape: sexual intercourse (generally limited to vaginal penetration) and a female victim not married to the defendant. Currently, statutes subsume multiple forms of sexual penetration and contact, not only vaginal intercourse,267 and employ gender-neutral language to cover perpetrators and victims of both sexes;268 a growing trend also exists, moving toward the elimination of the marital exemption.269 In addition, these reform movements were instrumental in dismantling substantive obstacles to rape prosecutions that were statutorily engrafted onto rape laws,270—such as resistance and corroboration requirements.271 They changed rape's evidentiary landscape by spawning the enactment of rape shield laws272 and the reformation of suspicion-engendering jury instructions modeled after Hale's cynical maxim.273 Finally, these reforms precipitated changes in the terms used to describe sexual crimes. Many modern statutes have replaced "rape" with offense categories such as criminal sexual

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266 Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2171 ("There have been two important waves of statutory reforms, the Model Penal Code revision in the 1950s and revisions inspired by feminist reformers in the 1970s.") (footnote omitted); see also Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 36-40 (discussing rape reforms).

267 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 83.

268 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 81.

269 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 81.

270 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 81 n.101; Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1783.

271 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 799.

272 Id.

273 Id. at n.101. Hale wrote: "It is true, rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remembered that it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved; and harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent." 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 633, 635 (1680); cf. Schafran, supra note 60, at 1013 ("Contrary to Lord Hale's allegation, rape is extremely difficult crime to charge and the easiest of all to defend."); see, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-408 (1997) (outlawing Hale's maxim and requiring jury be instructed not to allow gender bias to affect its decision).
conduct, criminal sexual penetration, aggravated felonious sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual misconduct.\(^{274}\)

Despite these many important reforms, what had not changed much, until fairly recently, was the hegemony of force and nonconsent, in conjunction, as the essential requirements of rape law.\(^{275}\) The newest wave of legislation, however, begins to accomplish what its predecessors did not and what would have been essentially unthinkable without these earlier reform movements—changing the importance and meaning of these two elements. Many of the reviewed statutes explicitly alter either the force or the nonconsent requirements in innovative ways to embrace the behavior of sexual predators who use fraud or coercion to secure sexual compliance. In short, these new statutes finally tackle a problem that has been troubling courts, legislatures, and commentators for more than a century—the criminalization of fraudulent or coercive sexual practices.

These new statutory enactments cluster around five organizational themes, provisions that outlaw sexual penetration or contact accomplished by: (1) abuse of trust, (2) abuse of authority, (3) fraud, (4) coercion, and (5) nonconsent. The first category carves out for special treatment defined groups of potential offenders who abuse positions of trust and have access to vulnerable victims, e.g., medical personnel. The second prohibits sexual conduct when the criminal actor abuses a position of authority over a victim, e.g., a prison guard. The third group specifically outlaws the use of fraud or deception in securing sexual compliance. The fourth substitutes coercion or other types of nonphysical pressure for the traditional requirement of physical force. Finally, the fifth class simply punishes nonconsensual intercourse without reference to force, fraud, or coercion.

\(^{274}\) Schulhofer, *Sexual Autonomy*, supra note 9, at 39.

\(^{275}\) See, e.g., Estrich, *supra* note 7, at 84 (noting reforms less expansive on force and nonconsent issues); Dripps, *Beyond Rape*, supra note 8, at 1784 ("the gravamen of rape remains the conjunction of force and nonconsent."); Schulhofer, *Sexual Autonomy*, supra note 9, at 39-40 ("In one form or another, however, nearly all states still preserved as essential requirements both force and nonconsent." But, he adds: "Beneath the seemingly universal and long-standing consensus that rape means forcible nonconsensual intercourse, there remains profound disagreement about what rape is."); Schulhofer, *Feminist Challenge*, supra note 8, at 2171 (same).
A. The Abuse of Positions of Trust: Doctors, Psychotherapists, and the Clergy

In modern statutory enactments, state legislatures have sought to protect victims from sexual exploitation by defining classes of individuals who occupy positions of trust. The most common classes encompassed by these statutes—doctors, psychotherapists, and clergy members—roughly correspond to the categories of offenders discussed in Part I.A. In a broader sense, these categories demonstrate internal logical coherence because they represent potential offenders who have access to victims under circumstances where the victims might be either physically or mentally vulnerable. Many of these statutes articulate the basis of victim vulnerability and explicitly negate consent as a defense. Idaho's statute is instructive; it defines medical care provider as a "person who gains the trust and confidence of a patient or client for the examination and/or treatment of a medical or psychological condition, and thereby gains the ability to treat, examine and physically touch the patient or client." Although analyzed separately below, these potential offender categories overlap. Delaware, for instance, covers all three groups in one statute.

276 Colorado articulates the basis of civil liability for psychotherapists, medical professionals, and member of the clergy in its evidence code: "In any civil action for damages by an alleged victim which alleges damages resulting from a sexual assault on a client by any person who enters into a professional-client relationship that permits professional physical access to the client's person or the opportunity to affect or influence the thought processes or emotions of such client, . . . ." COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-131(1) (1997); see also Ferguson v. People, 824 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1992) (articulating notion of victim vulnerability); Shapiro v. State, 696 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (covering particularly vulnerable members of society); State v. Carter, 663 A.2d 101, 103 (N.H. 1995) (noting victim vulnerability in teacher case).

277 IDAHO CODE § 18-919(a)(2) (1997); see also D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4415, 4116 (1997) ("in a professional relationship of trust with the actor"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(l) (West Supp. 1997) ("[M]ental health therapy" means psychotherapy or other treatment modalities intended to change behavior, emotions or attitudes, which therapy is based upon an intimate relationship involving trust and dependency with a substantial potential for vulnerability and abuse; . . . .").

1. Medical and Health Care Professionals

Perhaps due to the fact that sexual relations accomplished under the auspices of medical care is one of the most common instances of sexual exploitation, sixteen jurisdictions contain criminal provisions regarding sexual intercourse obtained through supposed medical treatment. While varying somewhat, these stat-


Cases have interpreted Illinois' sexual assault statute as covering instances of illegitimate medical treatment. In People v. Quinlan, 596 N.E.2d 28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), the court noted that Illinois has a medical treatment exception to its sexual assault statutes. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-18(b) (West Supp. 1998) provides: "Any medical examination or procedure which is conducted by a physician, nurse, medical or hospital personnel, parent, or caretaker for purposes and in a manner consistent with reasonable medical standards is not an offense under [sexual assault statutes] . . . ." The Quinlan court opined: "This section evidences a legislative intent that illegitimate medical examination are covered by the criminal sexual assault statutes." 596 N.E.2d at 31; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3125 (Supp. 1998) ("a person who engages in penetration . . . for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures commits aggravated indecent assault . . . .").

Although not outlawing sexual relations between doctors and patients, two states proscribe situations involving the administration of drugs which may include medical personnel. Ohio's gross sexual imposition law prohibits sexual contact if:

The offender knows that the judgment or control of the other person or of one of the other persons is substantially impaired as a result of the influence
utes fall into four general categories, i.e., those that: (1) expand the force requirement, (2) amplify the nonconsent requirement, (3) create a separate offense addressing sexual exploitation by medical personnel, or (4) include the conduct as one alternative in broader rape or sexual assault statutes.

Michigan, with the oldest statute, adopts the first approach. Michigan’s statute includes sexual penetration accomplished by medical practitioners under the definition of force or coercion for purposes of sexual offenses. Criminal sexual conduct occurs if the actor uses force or coercion, which includes “When the actor engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim in a manner or for purposes which are medically recognized as unethical or unacceptable.”

Delaware’s statutory law exemplifies the second approach by incorporating its provision on health-care professionals within the definition of lack of consent. According to its statute, “without consent” includes: “under the guise of providing professional diagnosis, counseling or treatment and where at the times of such acts the victim reasonably believed the acts were for medically or profes-

of any drug or intoxicant administered to the other person with his consent for the purpose of any kind of medical or dental examination, treatment, or surgery.

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.05(A)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1997). Maine's gross sexual assault statute covers instances in which the actor administered drugs to the victim, but provides for a defense based on voluntary consumption except "it is no defense when the other person is a patient of the actor and has a reasonable belief that the actor is administering the substance for medical or dental examination or treatment.") Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 253(3) (West Supp. 1997).


Michigan also has an older statute on its books, passed in 1883: Any person who shall undertake to medically treat any female person, and while so treating her, shall represent to such female that it is, or will be, necessary or beneficial to her health that she have sexual intercourse with a man, and shall thereby induce her to have carnal sexual intercourse with any man, and any man, not being the husband of such female, who shall have sexual intercourse with her by reason of such representation, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than ten years.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.90 (1996); see also People v. Williams, 175 N.W. 187 (Mich. 1919) (involving this statutory provision). Query whether Michigan passed this statute in response to Don Moran?
sionally appropriate diagnosis, counseling or treatment, such that resistance by the victim could not reasonably have been manifested.\textsuperscript{281} Texas and Utah also specify that certain forms of sex are without consent when they are accomplished by a health-care professional.\textsuperscript{282} Although no other state alters the consent requirement for sexual offenses in the same fashion as Delaware, Texas, and Utah, several explicitly negate consent as a defense to medical exploitation.\textsuperscript{283}

California, the District of Columbia, and Idaho adopt the third approach by creating separate crimes of sexual exploitation by a medical-care provider.\textsuperscript{284} Other states simply add language to existing sexual assault or rape statutes covering instances in which the offender is a health-care provider.\textsuperscript{285} Several of these statutes specifically mention some form of fraud or deceit,\textsuperscript{286} others emphasize
size the unprofessional or unethical nature of the conduct.\(^2\) Washington and Alaska specify that the sexual conduct must occur in the course of professional treatment; Alaska also requires that the victim be unaware that it is occurring.\(^3\)

2. Psychotherapists and Mental Health Professionals

Twenty-two jurisdictions have criminal statutes prohibiting various forms of sexual conduct by psychotherapists or mental health professionals with their patients.\(^4\) Minnesota’s statute, one of the most expansive, punishes criminal sexual assault if

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\(^2\) COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-403(1)(h), 18-3-404(1)(g) (1997) ("The actor engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than bona fide medical purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical practices."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(g) (1996) ("When the actor provides therapy, medical treatment or examination of the victim in a manner or for purposes which are not professionally recognized as ethical or acceptable."); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-2(4), 11-37-4(3) (1996) ("The accused engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or stimulation."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(vii) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998) ("The actor inflicts sexual intrusion in treatment or examination of a victim for purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical practices.").

\(^3\) ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(4)(A)-(B), 11.41.420(a)(4)(A)-(B) (Michie 1996) (victim is unaware of sexual act and sexual penetration/contact by health-care worker in course of professional treatment); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.050(1)(d), 9A.44.100(1)(d) (Supp. 1998) ("When the perpetrator is a health care provider, the victim is a client or patient, and the sexual contact occurs during a treatment session, consultation, interview, or examination.").

(h) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient of the psychotherapist and the sexual penetration occurred during the psychotherapy session. Consent by the complainant is not a defense.

(i) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient or former patient of the psychotherapist and the patient or former patient is emotionally dependent upon the psychotherapist; or

(j) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient or former patient and the sexual penetration occurred by means of therapeutic deception. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;\textsuperscript{290}

Two of Minnesota's three provisions explicitly negate consent as a defense. The third invalidates consent by referring to the patient as emotionally dependent which occurs when he or she is "unable to withhold consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration by the psychotherapist."\textsuperscript{291} Minnesota's statute also emphasizes therapeutic deception, the therapist's representation that sexual contact is "consistent with or part of the patient's treatment."\textsuperscript{292}

The other twenty-one states appear to follow the same pattern as the medical-treatment enactments. New Mexico's statute alters the force or coercion requirement.\textsuperscript{293} Delaware, Texas, and Utah include mental health professionals within their definitions of lack of consent for purposes of sexual offenses.\textsuperscript{294} Although not rewrit-
ing the consent requirement itself, many other state statutes rule out consent as a defense.\textsuperscript{295} Seven states have statutes specifically addressing sexual exploitation by psychotherapists;\textsuperscript{296} another three include therapists within specialized statutes dealing with the broader category of medical-care providers.\textsuperscript{297} The remaining states include psychotherapist-patient sexual contact within general sexual


assault or rape statutes. A number of these statutes overlap with those criminalizing sexual intercourse obtained under the guise of medical treatment. Finally, one unique characteristic of the psychotherapist-patient statutes is that several states place a time limit on liability for sexual conduct by mental health professionals.

3. The Clergy

Twelve states explicitly outlaw sexual exploitation by clergy members in their statutory provisions, one additional state has

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300 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1418(c) (1996) (does not apply after patient has completed course of treatment); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 729(a) (1990 & Supp. 1998) ("with former patient or client when the relationship was terminated primarily for the purpose of engaging in those acts, unless" patient referred); Fla. STAT. ch. 491.0112 (1996) (former client when relationship terminated primarily for purpose of engaging in sexual contact); IOWA CODE § 709.15 (1996) (former client presumed to be emotionally dependent for one year following therapy); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(5) (Michie 1994) (within one year following termination of therapy).

done so through judicial interpretation. Minnesota’s statute, which has the most extensive coverage provides:

(I) the actor is or purports to be a member of the clergy, the complainant is not married to the actor, and:
   (i) the sexual penetration occurred during the course of a meeting in which the complainant sought or received religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort from the actor in private; or
   (ii) the sexual penetration occurred during a period of time in which the complainant was meeting on an ongoing basis with the actor to seek or receive religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort in private.

Consent by the complainant is not a defense.

Seven states define health care provider, psychotherapist, or therapist as encompassing clergy members for the purposes of their sexual assault statutes; other states incorporate clerics in laws prohibiting abuse of positions of authority over minors. Finally, Delaware, Texas, and Utah define lack of consent for sexual offenses to include exploitation by clergy members.

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302 Florida’s statute does not mention the clergy, but a court recently ruled that they are covered under the statute dealing with abuse of a position of “familial or custodial authority” over a minor. Fla. Stat. ch. 794.011(8) (1996); Sterghos & Lundy, supra note 118, at 1A.


306 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 761(g)(4) (1995) (without consent includes health professional or “minister, priest, rabbi or other member of a religious organization engaged in pastoral counseling”); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(b)(10) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (defines without consent to include if “the actor is a clergyman who causes the other person to submit or participate by exploiting the other person’s emotional dependency on the clergyman in the clergyman’s professional character as spiritual adviser.”); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406(12)(b) (Supp. 1998) (defines “religious counselor” as “minis-
4. Conclusion

These abuse-of-trust provisions are laudatory because they explicitly outlaw a type of criminal conduct, fraudulent medical treatment, that has been troubling the courts since the last century—Don Moran’s 1872 call to legislative arms has been answered. The psychotherapist provisions beneficially expand statutory coverage to instances that may be even more common in the modern era; the clergy enactments signal an expansion based more on substantive similarity than health-care credentials. Collectively, these enactments embody legislative judgments that fraud and coercion are totally inappropriate in certain alliances between holders of positions of trust and their patients. Larson, in discussing a tort of sexual fraud notes:

> It is perhaps understandable that courts [and legislatures] are more concerned about sexual fraud in confidential relationships. The behavior involved is often outrageous, and it is perpetrated by a person sanctioned by society as a trustworthy individual. Abuse of a confidential relationship thus not only offend[s] the victim but also undermines the credibility of other professionals by transgressing fundamental social and ethical norms. Against this background of formalized obligations, the professional defendant is much less sympathetic and the victim more credible.\(^\text{308}\)

Because legislatures enacted these statutes to subsume an identifiable class of offenders, however, their major shortcoming lie in their very specificity. Covering only fraudulent or coercive practices occurring in medical, psychiatric, and religious alliances, these laws leave potential victims unprotected from similar conduct occurring outside them.

B. The Abuse of Positions of Authority

The second major approach to criminalizing nontraditional sexual offenses is one that punishes offenders who abuse their positions of authority over the victim. These provisions avoid the major
drawback of the abuse-of-trust approach by covering a broader range of possible offenders. Forty jurisdictions have at least one criminal provision outlawing the abuse of a position of power to obtain sexual intercourse.  

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evident in the wording of provisions that rely on language such as "position of authority" or "supervisory or disciplinary authority," while others describe custodial settings in which abuse of authority is implicit. In addition, some of these statutes specifically require that the actor use their position of authority to cause the victim to submit, thus emphasizing the coercive, if not forcible, nature of these offenses. With respect to nonconsent, one of the traditional requirements for rape, many of these enactments explicitly negate consent as a defense or alter the definition of consent.


California and Texas have provisions that simply outlaw the use of power by a public servant or official. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(7) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (threaten to use authority of public official to incarcerate, arrest, or deport); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(8) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (public servant coerces); see also MACDONALD, supra note 122, at 230 (in Yugoslavia "whoever through misuse of his position procures a female person subordinated or dependent upon him to have carnal knowledge shall be punished by detention for no more than three years.").


In Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Wyo. 1987), the court instructed the jury: "Submit" as used in this case means that the person subjected to sexual intrusion by an actor, who is in a position of authority over that person, does not give free, full and reasoned consent." New Mexico's jury instructions provide: "The defendant was a person who by reason of his relationship to [name of victim] was able to exercise undue influence over [name of victim] and used his position of authority to coerce her to submit . . . ." to sexual penetration or contact. N.M. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL 14-945, 14-926 (1997).

to exclude certain protected classes. While a rich diversity of statutory language and coverage exists in this context, the statutes may be organized into three major categories, those involving: (1) custodial settings, (2) minors or mentally handicapped persons, and (3) criminal sexual harassment.

1. Custodial Settings: Prisons, Hospitals, and Other Institutions

A number of state statutes protect those in custodial settings such as hospitals or prisons. A typical provision, this one from Maine, reads:

2. A person is guilty of gross sexual assault if that person engages in a sexual act with another person and:


314 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.2 (West 1997) (consent not a defense because "[a] person is deemed incapable of consent . . . when he or she is a probationer, parolee, releasee, or inmate in custody of a penal system."; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3)(e)-f(1) (Consol. 1997) (persons incapable of consent include those in correctional facilities and hospitals); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(8) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (without consent includes when actor is public servant and coerces other person to submit); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(10) (1953 & Supp. 1997) (sexual act is without consent if actor was parent, guardian, or occupied position of special trust in relation to minor).

315 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-403(1)(g), 18-3-404(1)(f) (1997) ("The victim in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and uses this position of authority . . . to coerce the victim to submit"); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-71(a)(5); 53a-73a(a)(1)(E) (1997) (supervisory or disciplinary authority); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4113, 22-4114 (1996) (supervisory or disciplinary authority); FLA. STAT. ch. 944.35 (1996) (prohibiting sexual misconduct with prisoners, consent no defense); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c) (1996) (supervisory or disciplinary authority—consent no defense); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(3) (West 1996) (supervisory or disciplinary authority); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7 (1993) (parent or person with custody in private, charitable, or governmental institution, consent no defense); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-06 (1997), 12.1-20-07(1)(d) (1997) (supervisory or disciplinary authority); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(6) (Anderson 1997) (supervisory or disciplinary authority); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-1150 (Law Co-op. 1997) (mental health facility or correctional facility).
E. The other person, not the actor's spouse, is in official custody as a probationer or a parolee, or is detained in a hospital, prison or other institution, and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the other person; . . . .\textsuperscript{316}

Many of these statutes specifically employ abuse-of-authority language, but some merely describe custodial situations in which sex is prohibited. Illinois, for instance, recently passed new legislation punishing sexual contact in custodial settings: "A person commits the offense of custodial sexual misconduct when he or she is an employee of a penal system and engages in sexual contact or penetration with a person who is in the custody of that penal system."\textsuperscript{317} Several additional states have recently enacted legislation covering prisoners.\textsuperscript{318} Moreover, Hawaii has gone even further. It recently amended its sexual assault statute on prisons and other custodial settings to include police and law enforcement officers.\textsuperscript{319}


\textsuperscript{317} 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.2(a) (West 1997).

\textsuperscript{318} ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1419 (1996) (unlawful sexual conduct); FLA. STAT. ch. 944.353(3)(b) (1996) (sexual misconduct with inmate or offender); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-731, 707-732 (1993 & Supp. 1997) (sexual assault while person employed by state correctional facility or police or law enforcement officer); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.2 (West 1997) (custodial sexual misconduct); IDAHO CODE § 18-6110 (1997) (sexual contact with inmate); IND. CODE § 35-44-1-5 (1997) (sexual relations between service provider and detainee); IOWA CODE § 709.16 (1996) (sexual misconduct with offenders); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3520 (1995) (corrections or parole officer); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520e(1)(d)-(f) (1996) (actor is employee of and victim is under corrections department, prisoner or probationer, or juvenile detainee); NEV. REV. STAT. § 212.187 (1997) (recently amended to include penalties); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2(n), 632-A:3(n) (1996 & Supp. 1997) (recently amended to include prisoners, juvenile detainees, parolees, and probationers); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(D)(2) (Michie 1994) (inmate confined in correctional facility or jail); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.053(3)(e)-(f) (Consol. 1997) (persons incapable of consent include those in correctional facilities and hospitals); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-25-24 (1997) (correctional employees); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-1150 (Law Co-op. 1997) (amended to include inmates of state or local correctional facility); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-1-26.1 (Michie 1997) (person employed in state prison or detention facility); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-241 (1997) (law enforcement and correctional officers). Many of these provisions do not appear in the sexual offense portions of codes but in sections dealing with inmates.

2. Minors and Mentally Handicapped Persons

A large number of the abuse-of-authority provisions are designed to protect minors in various settings, including foster care, detention facilities, schools, or hospitals. A few states also have abuse-of-authority or in-custody provisions for mentally handicapped persons. These statutes further underline the theme of victim vulnerability.


321 ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(3), 11.41.420(a)(2) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997) (mentally incapable in offender's care by authority of law or in facility or program licensed by state); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-103(a)(2), 5-4-108(a)(3) (Michie 1997) (rape and sexual abuse statutes amended to include residents of hospitals etc. who are incapable of consent because they are mentally incapacitated); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A §§ 253(2)(I), 255(1)(I) (West 1983 & Supp. 1997) (mentally retarded in state facility); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 34-B §§ 3008, 5004 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997) (sexual activity with recipient of mental health or mental retardation services prohibited); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520b(1)(h), 750.520c(1)(h) (1996) (mentally incapacitated); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(6) (Anderson 1997) (in custody or patient in hospital or other institution); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.050(1)(c), 9A.44.100(1)(c) (1996) (developmentally disabled), §§ 9A.44.050(1)(e), 9A.44.100(1)(e) (1996) (resident of facility for mentally disordered or chemically dependent); WIS. STAT. § 940.225(2)(g) (1995-96) (patient or resident of adult family home, community-based residential facility, inpatient health care facility, or state treatment facility). Many other rape or sexual assault statutes cover cases in which a victim is a mentally incapacitated person.
3. Criminal Sexual Harassment

Three states criminally punish sexual harassment. Delaware criminalizes a broad range of such behavior by defining sexual harassment as "threaten[ing] to engage in conduct likely to result in the commission of a sexual offense against any person; ..." North Carolina limits its offense to property lessors and defines sexual harassment as "unsolicited overt requests or demands for sexual acts when (i) submission to such conduct is made a term of the execution or continuation of the lease agreement, or (ii) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used to determine whether rights under the lease are accorded. " Texas limits the reach of its statute to public servants, defining sexual harassment as: "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition of a person's exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either explicitly or implicitly." Georgia rejected a recent bill making it a felony to solicit sex from a worker or job applicant as a condition of employment.

4. Conclusion

The abuse-of-authority enactments, more than their abuse-of-trust counterparts, emphasize the legislative judgment that it is the misuse of naked power in securing sexual compliance that is blameworthy, rather than the abuse of a professional trust or a confidential, fiduciary relationship. In some senses, these enactments are similar to statutory rape provisions that protect victims thought to be too young and vulnerable to make informed choices about sexual conduct from overreaching by those in superior positions. More...
ever, because these provisions disaggregate power from physical force, they delegitimatize conduct that has previously escaped criminal punishment, like that of the defendants in Thompson (the high-school principal) and Mlinarich (the guardian). In addition, the focus in many of these provisions on particularly vulnerable persons such as minors or prisoners underscores the power differential between defendants and victims—roughly corresponding with the abuse-of-authority cases discussed in Part I.E. Finally, the widespread adoption of these statutes, the broadest of any category, renders less meaningful the selective-coverage problem discussed in connection with those cases.

C. Sexual Penetration or Contact by Fraud or Deception

In addition to the plethora of state statutes that criminally punish individuals who abuse a position of trust or authority, some states have enacted specific statutes dealing with sexual contact obtained by fraud or deceit. First, two states punish defendants' use of unspecified forms of fraud to obtain sexual intercourse: Tennessee for the felonies of rape and sexual battery and Alabama for the misdemeanor of sexual misconduct. Second, in response to egregious acts by putative rapists and the lack of available statutory remedies, California and Kansas recently enacted provisions carving out certain circumstances in which a specific type of fraud will render a defendant criminally responsible for rape. Additionally, several states retain older criminal provisions relating to specific forms of fraud in obtaining sexual relations such as husband impersonation, fraud as to the nature of the act, or fraudulent administration of drugs. Third, ten states have global consent provisions men-

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328 Some foreign countries also have statutes punishing species of rape by fraud. In England, Parliament passed the Sexual Offenses Act of 1956 making it a misdemeanor to procure a woman by false pretenses or false representation in order to have sexual intercourse. K. L. Koh, Consent and Responsibility in Sexual Offenses, 1968 CRIM. L. REV. (ENG.) 81. New Guinea's Criminal Code provides: "Any person who has carnal knowledge of a woman, or girl, not his wife, without her consent, or with her consent, if the consent is obtained by . . . means of false or fraudulent representations as to the nature of the act, or in the case of a married woman, by impersonating her husband, is guilty of a crime which is called rape." Quoted in Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation, supra note 134, at 64.

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tioning deception that may arguably affect their jurisdiction's sexual offense statutes, although they are not explicitly part of these codes. This Part also considers remnants of the past, statutes punishing various forms of fraud in the context of separate crimes such as seduction and pandering. The common thread uniting all these statutes is their reference to fraud, artifice, or deceit; many of these enactments also explicitly alter the nonconsent requirement.\footnote{The one exception is the U.S. Military's treatment of fraud. 10 U.S.C. § 920 (1997). The Manual for Courts-Martial provides in pertinent part: "If there is actual consent, although obtained by fraud, the act is not rape, but if to the accused's knowledge the victim is of unsound mind or unconscious to an extent rendering him or her incapable of giving consent, the act is rape." MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES § 45(c)(1)(e), at iv-55 1995. However, in United States v. Booker, 25 M.J. 114 (CMA 1987), the United States Court of Military Appeals interpreted this language as pertaining to fraud in the inducement but not fraud in the factum.}

1. General Types of Fraud

Two states provide for global treatment of fraud in relation to rape or other sexual offenses—Tennessee and Alabama. The distinguishing characteristic of both states' statutes is that they do not specifically set forth the exact types of fraud at issue. In contrast to the statutes in the next part which explicitly articulate the precise types of fraud needed to commit the offense, the following statutes can encompass a variety of deceptive behavior on the part of perpetrators.

a. Tennessee: Rape and Sexual Battery by Fraud

defendant achieves sexual contact, rather than penetration, and also includes a provision on fraud. Such fraud is defined as “used in normal parlance and includes, but is not limited to, deceit, trickery, misrepresentation and subterfuge, and shall be broadly construed to accomplish the purposes of this title; . . . .” Finally, Tennessee provides that consent is not effective when it is induced by deception.

b. Alabama: Sexual Misconduct

Unlike Tennessee’s incorporation of fraud into its rape and sexual battery provisions, Alabama criminally punishes certain lesser forms of sexual misconduct as misdemeanors. One section of Alabama’s statute punishes sexual misconduct if: “Being a male, he engages in sexual intercourse with a female . . . with her consent where consent was obtained by the use of any fraud or artifice; . . . .” The commentary to this statute provides:

Section 13A-6-65 is not concerned with aggravated cases of rape, . . . rather it is directed toward the more unusual situations where a person has acquiesced to sexual intercourse . . . as a result of some fraud, artifice or stratagem.

Section 13A-6-65(a) offers an offense in instances where the line between criminal and noncriminal sexual conduct has been transgressed to an extent which requires punishment of the actor and vindication of the victim. It comprehends specific instances presently criminal (see below), but it is broad enough to include other situations where the naivete of the victim or guile of the actor is sufficient to allow the actor to gain sexual access to the person of another through some artifice or fraud, e.g., “necessary medical treatment.” . . . Section 13A-6-65(a)(1) also includes the offense of seduction . . . .

Alabama’s sexual misconduct statute operates when the victim has consented, thus the defendant cannot claim consent as a defense.

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337 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 Commentary (1994).
2. Specific Types of Fraud

a. Recent Enactments

i. California: Inducing Consent by Fear Based on Fraud

The California legislature in response to Boro v. Superior Court, discussed in Part I.A., amended its rape laws by including a new category of offense called "Inducing consent to sexual act by fraud or fear" which provides:

Every person who induces any other person to engage in sexual intercourse ... when his or her consent is procured by false or fraudulent representation or pretense that is made with the intent to create fear, and which does induce fear, and that would cause a reasonable person in like circumstances to act contrary to the person's free will, and does cause the victim to so act, is punishable by imprisonment ... .

The statutory title is slightly inaccurate because fraud must induce fear and is insufficient alone. However, in this section, California has explicitly described one set of circumstances in which consent will be ineffective.

ii. Kansas: Consent Obtained Through Knowing Misrepresentation

Kansas recently amended its rape statute to include two distinct categories of rape by fraud:

(3) sexual intercourse with a victim when the victim's consent was obtained through a knowing misrepresentation made by the offender that the sexual intercourse was a medically or therapeutically necessary procedure; or

(4) sexual intercourse with a victim when the victim's consent was obtained through a knowing misrepresentation made by the offender that the sexual intercourse was a legally required procedure within the scope of the offender's authority.

Like the California statute, Kansas's enactment renders consent based on certain types of fraud ineffective in the context of rape. Kansas's provisions closely resemble the abuse-of-trust and abuse-of-

authority statutes in Parts II.A. and II.B., but employ the unique standard of "knowing misrepresentation." Kansas, like California, enacted the above-referenced legislation to close a loophole that allowed a defendant who allegedly raped three women, under the guise of performing a medical examination, to escape punishment because his behavior fell outside the extant statute.342

b. Traditional Provisions

i. Husband Impersonation

One traditional category of rape by fraud is provisions in rape and sexual assault statutes covering cases of husband impersonation. Eleven jurisdictions have statutes explicitly punishing this form of fraud in order to obtain sexual intercourse.343

342 Rizzo, supra note 87, at C2.

343 ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1401(5)(d) (Supp. 1997) (without consent includes if "victim is intentionally deceived to erroneously believe that the person is the victim's spouse"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(5) (West Supp. 1998) (victim submits under belief actor is victim's spouse, and "this belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to induce the belief"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-403(1)(d) (1997) (actor knows victim submits "erroneously, believing the actor to be the victim's spouse"); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(6) (1997) (victim submits under belief that actor is her husband, and "the belief is induced by artifice, pretense or concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to induce such belief"); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(6) (1997) (victim submits under belief that actor is her husband, and "the belief is induced by artifice, pretense or concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to induce such belief."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(A)(3) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998) (female victim submits under belief intentionally induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by offender); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(iv) (1995) (without consent includes "consent, if any was actually given, was the result of the actor's deception as to the identity of the actor . . . ."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(4) (Anderson Supp. 1997) ("offender knows that the other person submits because the other person mistakenly identifies the offender as the other person's spouse."); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(6) (Supp. 1998) (belief induced by artifice, pretense or concealment practiced by accused or by accused in collusion with spouse with intent to induce such belief); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4061(e) (1992) (belief induced by artifice, pretense or concealment practiced by accused); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-406(7) (1996) (without consent includes actor knowing victim submits or participates because victim erroneously believes actor is victim's spouse); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(iv) (Michie 1997) (actor knows or should reasonably know that victim submits erroneously believing actor is spouse); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1) (1994) (commentary asserts that sexual misconduct also includes husband impersonation).

Texas had a statute that punished as rape sexual intercourse obtained by means of force, threats, or fraud. Fraud was defined as using some stratagem to induce the woman to believe that the defendant was her husband. Carpenter, supra note 127, at 606.
ii. Fraud as to the Nature of the Sexual Act

A number of rape and sexual assault statutes have miscellaneous provisions referring to fraud or deceit. Three states prohibit fraud or deception as to the nature of the act. Arizona defines "without consent" for purposes of its sexual offenses to include instances in which: "The victim is intentionally deceived as to the nature of the act."\(^3\)\(^4\) Similarly, Nebraska defines "without consent" for purposes of its sexual assault statute to include deception as to the identity of the actor, a variation of a husband impersonation provision, as well as deception as to the "nature or purpose of act on the part of the actor."\(^3\)\(^4\) California’s rape statute prohibits sexual intercourse when the victim is "unconscious of the nature of the act," which it defines to include "[w]as not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator's fraud in fact."\(^3\)\(^4\)

iii. Fraud in Administering Drugs

Ohio’s rape statute outlaws sexual intercourse if "[i]n order to prevent compliance, the offender substantially impairs the other person’s judgment or control by administering any drug or intoxicant to the other person, surreptitiously or by force, threat of force, or deception."\(^3\)\(^4\) Ohio’s provision is unique in that states with similar drug provisions in their rape or sexual assault statutes do not incorporate the notion of fraud.\(^3\)\(^4\)

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36 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1998); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West Supp. 1998) (consent defined as “positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved.”); Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (a discussion of the two sections in a rape case).
3. Global Consent Provisions: Consent is Ineffective if Induced by Force, Duress, or Deception

Some states have generic consent provisions applying to all types of criminal offenses not just sexual crimes. These provisions track Model Penal Code ("MPC") § 2.11 which describes when consent is ineffective in relieving a criminal actor of liability for conduct.\(^1\) One enumerated circumstance, for example, is when consent is induced by force, duress, or deception. Ten states' provisions incorporate the MPC language with respect to deception.\(^2\) These generic consent statutes commonly take two slightly different forms. One form specifies that assent does not constitute consent if: "It is induced by force, duress or deception."\(^3\) Two states further qual-


\(^1\) It provides: "Ineffective Consent. Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if: . . . it is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense." MODEL PENAL CODE \S 2.11(3)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The commentary to this section states: "Many thefts are the result of transactions to which there is assent by the victim; the fraudulent method of inducing the assent, however, deprives it of controlling force." MODEL PENAL CODE \S 2.11 commentary at 399 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

\(^2\) ALA. CODE \S 13A-2-7(c)(4) (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. \S 18-1-505(3)(d) (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, \S 453(4) (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. \S 702-235(4) (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, \S 109(3)(C) (1996); MO. REV. STAT. \S 556.061(5)(c) (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. \S 45-2-211(2)(c) (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. \S 2C:2-10(c)(3) (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE \S 12.1-17-08(2)(c) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. \S 311(C)(4) (1998). But see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. \S 626:5 (1996) (omitting the "force, duress or deception" language from its provision). See also TENN. CODE ANN. \S 39-11-106(a)(9)(A) (1997) ("Consent is not effective when: (A) Induced by deception or coercion; . . . .''); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. \S 1.07(19) (West 1994) ("Consent is not effective if: . . . induced by force, threat, or fraud.") This section appears to be limited to property offenses; Texas defines "without consent" differently in its sexual assault statutes. But see Smith v. State, 873 S.W.2d 66 (1993) (court cites both section 1.07 and sexual-assault consent provision in sexual assault case).

\(^3\) ALA. CODE \S 13A-2-7(c)(4) (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. \S 18-1-505(3)(d) (1997); MO. REV. STAT. \S 556.061(5)(c) (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE \S 12.1-17-08(2)(c) (1997). In Ferguson v. People, 824 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1992), the court cited Colorado's global con-

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ify this language by retaining the MPC language "of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense." The other form provides that consent does not constitute a defense under the same circumstances. Therefore, in rape cases where consent is procured by deception, such consent could be vitiated in states with global consent provisions fashioned after the MPC.

One question arises, however, when determining the applicability of these consent provisions—whether a conflicting definition appears in the sexual offenses section of the criminal code. Eight states do not separately define consent in their sexual offense codes; Delaware and Montana do. Delaware's definition of "without consent" is critical because it incorporates abuse-of-trust provisions for doctors, psychologists, and clergy members and appears more controlling than its generic provision. In Montana, the annotator's notes to the generic consent provision make clear that it applies to sexual crimes. However, Montana defines "without consent provision in the context of a case involving sexual imposition by a psychotherapist. It noted that in 1989, when Colorado amended its statute to negate consent as a defense, it merely clarified the application of this provision.

The MPC and seven state provisions contain language such as: "unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense . . . ." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); ALA. CODE § 13A-2-7(c) (1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-505(3) (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 453 (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-235 (1993); MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10(c) (West 1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 311(C) (1998). Maine and North Dakota simply provide "within the meaning of this section." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 109(3) (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211(2)(c) (1997).


The MPC and seven state provisions contain language such as: "unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense . . . ." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); ALA. CODE § 13A-2-7(c) (1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-505(3) (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 453 (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-235 (1993); MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10(c) (West 1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 311(C) (1998). Maine and North Dakota simply provide "within the meaning of this section." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 109(3) (West 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-08(2) (1997). Montana is silent on this issue. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211 (1997).

It provides: "It is an element of the sexual offenses of Sexual Assault and Sexual Intercourse With Consent (citations omitted) that the sexual act was committed without the consent of the victim. Thus, consent is a defense which may eliminate criminal responsibility." Annotator's Note accompanying MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211 (1997)
consent" for the purposes of the offense of "sexual intercourse without consent" more narrowly.\textsuperscript{360} Thus, the generic consent definition arguably applies to Montana’s sexual assault statute\textsuperscript{361} while the narrower consent definition applies to the offense of sexual intercourse without consent.

4. Remnants of the Past: The Other Crimes of Seduction, Abduction, Marrying Under False Personation, and Pandering

Finally, in addition to rape or sexual assault statutes, several states retain criminal seduction statutes which implicate deception. Criminal seduction statutes are one of the oldest types of statutory law prohibiting the commission of sexual intercourse based upon some form of fraud.\textsuperscript{362} Seduction required a chaste woman who was induced to have sexual intercourse under the false promise of marriage.\textsuperscript{363} Six jurisdictions presently retain seduction statutes in their criminal codes.\textsuperscript{364} Two states statutes explicitly mention some form of fraud;\textsuperscript{365} three others mention the promise of marriage.\textsuperscript{366} Moreover, several jurisdictions recognized in the past a

\textsuperscript{360} The statute defines "without consent" to include physical force and a victim incapable of consent because mentally defective, physically helpless, or less than sixteen years old. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(b)(i)-(iii) (1997).

\textsuperscript{361} MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502(1) (1997) provides: "A person who knowingly subjects another person to any sexual contact without consent commits the offense of sexual assault."

\textsuperscript{362} See generally 70 AM. JUR. 2D Seduction 97 (1987); Humble, supra note 5.

\textsuperscript{363} 70 AM. JUR. 2D at 104.


\textsuperscript{365} MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-55 (1996) (obtaining carnal knowledge by feigned or pretended marriage or false or feigned promise of marriage); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-50 (Law Co-op. 1996) (by means of deception and promise of marriage). South Carolina’s provision is quite restrictive, prohibiting conviction if the woman’s testimony is uncorroborated or she is lewd and unchaste and staying action if defendant marries woman.

\textsuperscript{366} OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1120 (1996); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4063 (1992); V.I.
tort of seduction. Since such time, most legislatures have abolished both criminal and civil seduction statutes as part of the anti-heartbalm legislation. In repealing its civil seduction statute, Illinois’s legislature stated that it would leave “punishments of wrongdoers guilty of seduction to proceedings under the criminal laws of the state . . .”

In addition to the above, five states criminalize abduction for the purposes of marriage, sexual intercourse, or prostitution; two provisions mention fraud. Seven states prohibit falsely impersonating someone for the purpose of marriage, closely resembling the husband impersonation provisions discussed earlier. California’s statute, for example, provides: “Every person who falsely personates another, and in such assumed character marries or pretends to marry, or to sustain the marriage relation towards anoth-

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367 See Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24. The commentary to New Jersey’s statutory repeal provides: “Primary aim of Heart Balm Act barring suit based upon breach of promise to marry was to do away with excessive claims, coercive by their very nature and, frequently, fraudulent in nature.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23-1 et seq. (West 1996) (Notes of Decisions) (citations omitted). Minnesota issued a similar policy declaration:

Actions based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry, have been subject to grave abuses, have caused intimidation and harassment, to innocent persons and have resulted in the perpetration of frauds. It is declared as the public policy of this state that the best interests of the people of this state will be served by the abolition of these causes of action.

**Minn. Stat. § 553.01 (1996).**


er, with or without the connivance of such other, is guilty of a felony."\(^{372}\)

Further, thirteen states have pandering statutes, a unique blend of fraud and sex,\(^{373}\) some pertaining only to the offender's spouse.\(^{374}\) Michigan's statute provides in relevant part:

[A]ny person who by promises, threats, violence, by any device or scheme, by fraud or artifice, or by duress of person or goods, or by abuse of any position of confidence or authority, or having legal charge, shall take, place, harbor, inveigle, entice, persuade, encourage or procure any female person to enter any place within this state in which prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed, for the purpose of prostitution; . . . .\(^{375}\)

The language of this enactment is striking. In warding off the evil of prostitution, Michigan crafted a comprehensive provision protecting women from a broad range of pressures including force, fraud, coercion, and other means strongly resembling more modern abuse-of-trust and abuse-of-authority provisions. Perhaps more than any other set of statutes reviewed in this Part, these laws demonstrate legislative know-how in writing all-inclusive provisions. Unfortunately, that knowledge has not been put to good use in drafting rape or sexual assault statutes.

5. Conclusion

The legislative prohibition of sexual penetration or contact accomplished by fraud that occurs outside of professional treatment contexts continues to be a difficult problem. No doubt wary of

\(^{372}\) CAL. PENAL CODE § 528 (West 1996).


\(^{375}\) MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.455 (1996).
casting their nets too wide, state legislatures have been quite conservative, tending to enact very specific provisions to cover a few factual scenarios rather than passing more global fraud statutes. The importance of the two archetypical rape by fraud cases, fraudulent medical treatment and husband impersonation, is evident in many of these modern enactments; California's and Kansas's specific fraud provisions flowed from fraudulent medical cases in those jurisdictions and Tennessee's rape by fraud law, although written broadly, is an update of an older husband impersonation statute. In addition, although some have global consent provisions, states seldom apply them in the context of sexual offenses, underlining the point that rape continues to be treated differently from other crimes. The few remaining seduction, abduction, and pandering statutes are counterexamples of a broader retrenchment in protection afforded persons from some types of sexual fraud. Finally, none of the reviewed provisions, with the exception of Tennessee's, even approaches the problem of rape by fraud in the business or commercial setting. Thus, while legislatures have made considerable progress, this area remains one of the least developed.

D. Sexual Intercourse by Coercion, Compulsion, Extortion, or Duress

A fourth major category of statutes, appearing in approximately twenty jurisdictions, deviate from rape laws by substituting non-physical forms of coercion for the traditional requirement of physical force or threat of physical force. Many of these statutes provide for a lesser degree of sexual crime than cases involving physical force. Moreover, they differ from abuse-of-trust statutes because they do not specify individuals by whom or circumstances in which victims may be assailed; they also do not rely on an imbalance of power as in abuse-of-authority provisions. Finally, these statutes address coercive, not fraudulent, pressures, distinguishing them from the previous category.

376 See infra Part III.
377 See also Schulhofer, Gender Question, supra note 10, at 136 (noting since abolition of seduction, criminal law has immunized all misrepresentations no matter how egregious).
378 See supra note 332.
1. Nonphysical Threats or Means of Causing Submission

A number of states retain criminal provisions that outlaw the use of various threats or means to coerce a victim to submit to sexual intercourse. One group punishes defendants’ use of threats to retaliate to secure sexual compliance, with some states defining “threat to retaliate” narrowly to encompass only measures involving physical force or kidnapping, but six others cover at least one nonphysical means, most commonly extortion. For example, New Hampshire’s statute, the broadest in scope, defines retaliate to include: “[p]hysical or mental torment or abuse; kidnapping, false imprisonment, or extortion; or public humiliation or disgrace.” While not employing the threat-to-retaliate formulation of these other states, Tennessee punishes rape and sexual battery accomplished by coercion, which includes extortion and the use of “parental, custodial, or official authority” on a child under fifteen. Similarly, Vermont prohibits “threatening or coercing the other person” to submit to sexual intercourse.

379 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(6) (West Supp. 1998) (against victim’s will by threat to retaliate, i.e., threat to kidnap, falsely imprison, inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(c) (1997) (causes submission by threat to retaliate, i.e., threat of kidnapping, death, serious bodily injury, or extreme pain); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(i) (Michie 1996) (same); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1(2)(D) (Supp. 1997) (defining force or coercion to include threatening to murder, inflict bodily injury, or kidnap).

380 FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(1)(f), (4)(c) (Supp. 1998) (coerces victim to submit by threatening to retaliate, i.e., threats of future physical punishment, kidnapping, false imprisonment, forcible confinement, or extortion); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(f)(iii), 750.520e(1)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1998) (coerces victim to submit by threatening to retaliate, i.e., threats of physical punishment, kidnapping, or extortion); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:1 II, 632-A:2 l(d) (1996) (coerces victim to submit by threatening to retaliate, i.e., physical or mental torment or abuse; kidnapping, false imprisonment, or extortion; or public humiliation or disgrace); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(3) (Michie 1994) (force or coercion includes threats of physical punishment, kidnapping, extortion, or retaliation); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(3) (Law. Co-op. 1996) (aggravated coercion includes threatening to retaliate by infliction of physical harm, kidnapping, or extortion); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(4) (Supp. 1998) (coerces victim to submit by threatening to retaliate, i.e., threats of physical force, kidnapping, or extortion).


383 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(1) (1997). In State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), the court interpreted coercion to include the defendant’s threat to expose the victim’s homosexuality.

Six states adopt a second approach based to some degree upon MPC § 213.1(2)(a) which prohibits sexual intercourse when the female is compelled to submit "by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution." North Dakota's sexual imposition statute tracks the MPC language most closely; it prohibits a sexual act or contact "if the actor compels the other person to submit by any threat that would render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting." Similarly, Pennsylvania prohibits indecent assault "by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution;..." The statute defines forcible compulsion broadly: "Compulsion by use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological force, either express or implied." California's rape

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385 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The commentary provides in pertinent part:

Examples might include threat to cause her to lose her job or to deprive her of a valued possession. This provision extends liability for coercion by threat far beyond anything contemplated by prior law. It rests on the judgment that using one's ability to cause harm in order to override the will of a reluctant female is wrongful and should be punished.

Stated abstractly, the rationale... seems self-evident. Yet there are obvious dangers in extending the prospect of criminal sanctions into the shadow area between coercion and bargain. To take an extreme example, the man who "threatens" to withhold an expensive present unless his girlfriend permits his advances is plainly not a fit subject for punishment under the law of rape.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentary at 314 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Coercion is overwhelming the will of the victim, while bargain is offering "an unattractive choice to avoid some unwanted alternative." ld; cf. Durham, supra note 18, at 57 ("Many threats other than direct bodily harm, such as loss of a job or suitor, may coerce a girl into submission; and though she may consider herself opposed to the act, the law does not treat these situations as rape.") (footnote omitted).

386 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-04(1) (1997). Compare this language to North Dakota's duress statute which provides: "Compulsion within the meaning of this section exists only if the force, threat, or circumstances are such as would render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-10(1) (1997). The sexual imposition statute appears to require less by way of compulsion because it does not specify force or threat of force, and may cover other types of "duress" such as exposing a secret or causing financial hardship.


statute contains a separate duress provision with duress defined as:

a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed, or acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted. The total circumstances, including the age of the victim, and his or her relationship to the defendant, are factors to consider in appraising the existence of duress.

Three states adapt the MPC language by substituting the term “means” for “threat.” Ohio and Wyoming criminalize coercing or causing another person to submit “by any means that would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution.” Colorado’s second-degree sexual assault provision outlaws if: “The actor causes submission of the victim to sexual penetration [sexual intrusion] by any means other than those set forth in section 18-3-402 [first-degree sexual assault], but of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim’s will; . . . .” Finally, Washington retains a unique provision—third-degree rape occurs: “Where there is threat of substantial unlawful harm to property rights of the victim.”

2. Compulsion, Coercion, or Extortion

Three states have criminal enactments providing for broader coverage of coercion in the rape context, although they use three different terms to address such coercion, i.e., compulsion, coercion, and extortion. Hawaii’s sexual assault statute differentiates between strong compulsion (e.g., threats, dangerous instrument, or physical force) and compulsion (“absence of consent, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of public humiliation, prop-

390 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(b) (West Supp. 1998).
392 First-degree sexual assault requires physical force, threats of force or physical retaliation, or a drugged or physically helpless victim. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1) (1997).
erty damage, or financial loss."\textsuperscript{396} Hawaii's first-degree sexual assault statute outlaws sexual penetration accomplished by strong compulsion;\textsuperscript{397} lesser degrees of sexual assault require compulsion which vary based upon the actor's mental state and whether penetration or contact occurred.\textsuperscript{398}

New Jersey's sexual assault statute prohibits penetration when the actor uses physical force or coercion, grading the offense depending upon whether the victim sustains severe personal injury.\textsuperscript{399} New Jersey defines coercion for purposes of sexual assault by reference to its criminal coercion statute.\textsuperscript{400} This latter statute covers a broad range of conduct including: inflicting bodily injury, accusing someone of a crime, exposing a secret, or "perform[ing] any other act which would not in itself substantially benefit the actor but which is calculated to substantially harm another person with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships."\textsuperscript{401} New Jersey's statute punishes coercive means falling far short of the traditional requirement of physical force or threat.\textsuperscript{402}

Delaware's sexual extortion statute, the only one in existence, is quite similar in scope to New Jersey's sexual assault statute addressing coercion. It provides in pertinent part

A person is guilty of sexual extortion when the person intentionally compels or induces another person to engage in any sexual act involving

\textsuperscript{396} \textit{Id.; see also} State v. Caprio, 937 P.2d 933 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing difference between two provisions).

\textsuperscript{397} HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730(1)(a) (1993).


\textsuperscript{399} N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:14-2(a)(6) (aggravated sexual assault), 2C:14-2(c)(1) (sexual assault) (West 1997); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-3 (West 1997) (aggravated and non-aggravated criminal sexual contact).

\textsuperscript{400} N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-5 (West 1997); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60 (Consol. 1998) (coercion in the second degree); MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1) (punishing the separate offense of criminal coercion). Courts have interpreted New York's coercion statute, which is quite similar to New Jersey's, as covering various types of sexual activity. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 508 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).

\textsuperscript{401} N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-5 (West 1997).

contact, penetration or intercourse with the person or another or others by means of instilling in the victim a fear that, if such sexual act is not performed, the defendant or another will:

inflict physical injury, cause damage to property, or expose a secret. Delaware’s final alternative in its sexual extortion statute is almost identical to New Jersey’s formulation outlawing extortionate threats with respect to business, financial condition, or personal relationships. Finally, New Hampshire retains a provision mentioning extortion but fails to utilize the “threat” or “means” language of other statutes described above.

3. Coercion or Duress Negate Consent

Four jurisdictions provide that coercion negates consent. Tennessee, for instance, provides: “Consent is not effective when: (A) Induced by deception or coercion; . . . .” In addition, ten states have global consent provisions that negate consent when “it is induced by force, duress, or deception.” However, duress is usually confined to a “threat of imminent death or serious physical injury.”

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404 Delaware’s statute continues to find guilt where one extorts a sexual act by means of instilling fear in the victim that another will: “Perform any other act which is calculated to harm another person materially with respect to the other person’s health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 776(7) (1996).
4. Conclusion

A significant number of states have statutes covering situations in which the defendant secured the victim's sexual acquiescence by threatening various types of nonphysical harm or utilizing other means not involving physical force. These coercion provisions are helpful in capturing another segment of previously unpunished criminal behavior, threats falling outside of abuse-of-authority situations. For the most part, such statutory provisions are written broadly enough to encompass the sexual extortion cases discussed in Part I.F. The statutes in Hawaii, New Jersey, and Delaware are superior to the MPC variations, however, because they more clearly embody a legislative judgment that extortionate practices are illegal in securing sex. As a result, they are also more likely to be invoked because they are more specifically tailored to the problem of coercive sex.

E. Nonconsensual Sexual Relations Without Force, Fraud, or Coercion

Finally, to complete this review of innovative rape and sexual assault statutes, eighteen states have at least one statute that dispenses with force, fraud, or coercion and punishes a specie of sexual offense that simply requires sexual penetration or contact to occur without the victim's consent. Many of these provisions, like the coercion statutes, are designed as less serious alternatives to forcible rape or sexual assault laws.

1. Eliminating Force Entirely

Nevada's sexual assault statute is the simplest; it does not require force at all, but only that the act be against the will of the victim. Nevada grades the offenses depending upon whether

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410 See also State ex. rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992) (interpreting New Jersey's sexual assault statute's requirement of "physical force" as being satisfied with force necessary for sexual act if victim did not consent).

411 While treated separately supra, several states also explicitly alter consent requirements in abuse-of-trust or abuse-of-authority statutes. See supra Part II.A-B.

the perpetrator causes substantial bodily injury or the assault is against a child under the age of sixteen.413

2. Requiring Affirmative Consent

Two states require the defendant actor to obtain affirmative consent from the victim prior to sexual contact in order to avoid criminal liability. Wisconsin punishes four degrees of sexual assault; the first two degrees require lack of consent as well as aggravating circumstances such as force, bodily harm, or multiple offenders.414 Third-degree sexual assault covers nonconsensual sexual intercourse and fourth-degree sexual assault involves nonconsensual sexual contact without aggravation.415 Wisconsin defines consent as "words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact."416 Similarly, Vermont punishes as sexual assault any act which compels another to participate in a sexual act, \textit{inter alia}, without the other's consent,417 defining consent as "words or actions by a person indicating a voluntary agreement to engage in a sexual act."418

3. Lack of Consent Expressed Through Words or Conduct

Three states provide for sexual offenses if the victim expresses nonconsent through words or conduct.419 Nebraska defines first-degree sexual assault as sexual penetration, \textit{inter alia}, without the

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416 Wis. STAT. § 940.225(4) (1995-1996); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4101 (1996) (defining consent similarly for sexual abuse provisions); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17 (West 1993) (defining consent similarly as a defense); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4) (West 1996) (inserting "present" agreement); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010 (1998) (defining consent similarly for sexual offenses); cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 1998) (consent means "positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-401(1.5) (1997) ("Consent means cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will and with knowledge of the nature of the act.").
victim’s consent\textsuperscript{420} and second- and third-degree sexual assault as sexual contact without the victim’s consent (graded based upon whether the actor causes serious personal injury).\textsuperscript{421} “Without consent” includes instances in which the victim was compelled to submit because of force or coercion or the victim expressed a lack of consent through words and conduct.\textsuperscript{422} Similarly, Utah defines “without consent” for all sexual offenses in one statute that provides multiple alternatives including force, coercion, unconsciousness, or mental disability as well as when “the victim expresses lack of consent through words or conduct; . . .”\textsuperscript{423} Specific offenses are, in turn, defined in their own individual statutes; Utah’s rape statute, for instance, provides: “A person commits rape when the actor has sexual intercourse with another person without the victim’s consent.”\textsuperscript{424} Finally, New Hampshire simply outlaws sexual assault when “the victim indicates by speech or conduct that there is not freely given consent to performance of the sexual act.”\textsuperscript{425}

4. Requiring Knowledge of Victim’s Nonconsent

Six jurisdictions require both a nonconsensual sexual act and that the defendant know that the victim is not consenting. For example, in 1995, Tennessee amended its rape and sexual battery statutes to include instances in which “The sexual penetration [contact] is accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defendant knows or has reason to know at the time of the penetration that the victim did not consent; . . .”\textsuperscript{426} Similarly, Montana’s ver-

\textsuperscript{420} NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319(1)(a) (1996). An older version of this statute provided: “Any person who subjects another to sexual penetration and (a) overcomes the victim by force, threat of force, express or implied, coercion, or deception . . . is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319(1) (1993).

\textsuperscript{421} NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-320(1)(a) (1996).

\textsuperscript{422} NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a) (1996); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(b) (1996) (“The victim need only resist, either verbally or physically, so as to make the victim’s refusal to consent genuine and real and so as to reasonably make known to the actor the victim’s refusal to consent; . . .”).

\textsuperscript{423} UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(1) (1997).

\textsuperscript{424} UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(1) (1997).


\textsuperscript{426} TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503(2), 39-13-505(2) (1997); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-404(1)(a) (1996) (prohibiting third-degree sexual assault if defendant knows victim does not consent); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13(a)(2) (West 1997) (punishing criminal sexual assault when the criminal actor engages in sexual penetration and “knew that the victim was unable to understand the nature of the act or was unable to give knowing consent”); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4106 (1997) (outlawing as misdemeanor sexual abuse
sion defines sexual assault as "A person who knowingly subjects another person to any sexual contact without consent...."427 Montana also retains a statute entitled "Sexual intercourse without consent."428 The without-consent definition for this latter statute, however, addresses only force or coercion and victims incapable of consent because they are mentally incapacitated, physically helpless, or less than sixteen years old.429 Thus, such statute is limited in its applicability.


Pennsylvania's statutory framework contains, in addition to its traditional rape and sodomy statutes, three crimes based on nonconsent: sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, and indecent assault.430 The sexual assault statute provides that except as provided in the crimes of rape and sodomy, it is an offense if a "person engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant without the complainant's consent."431 The aggravated indecent assault and indecent assault statutes prohibit penetration or indecent contact, respectively, if "the person does so without the complainant’s consent; ...."432 The language in both of these statutes is followed by traditional alternatives such as forcible compulsion, unconsciousness, or mental disability—which also appear in the rape and sodomy statutes. Thus, the assault crimes statutes recognize simple nonconsent alternatives while the rape and sodomy statutes do not.

instances in which the actor "should have knowledge or reason to know that the act was committed without that other person's permission, ...."); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.040(1) (1996) ("A person commits the crime of sexual assault if he has sexual intercourse with another person knowing that he does so without that person's consent."); see also Rizzo, supra note 87, at C2 (discussing Missouri's new statute). To cover a much broader scope of conduct, the Missouri legislature rewrote an old statute that punished sexual assault "if he has sexual intercourse with another person to whom he is not married and who is incapacitated or who is fourteen or fifteen years old." MO. REV. STAT. § 566.040(1) (1993) (superseded).

Georgia limits its nonconsensual sexual offenses to those that involve physical contact or penetration with a foreign object. Its sexual battery statute prohibits instances in which the actor "intentionally makes physical contact with the intimate parts of the body of another person without the consent of that person." Aggravated sexual battery occurs when the actor "intentionally penetrates with a foreign object the sexual organ or anus of another person without the consent of that person." Although Georgia does not define "without consent" for purposes of its sexual offense statutes, its global definition for all crimes includes: "a person whose concurrence is required has not, with knowledge of the essential facts, voluntarily yielded to the proposal of the accused or of another.

Finally, Oregon criminalizes two degrees of sexual abuse involving lack of consent on the part of the victim. Second-degree sexual abuse addresses penetration or intercourse without consent, and third-degree sexual abuse includes sexual contact without consent as well as instances in which the victim is under 18. Oregon does not explicitly define "consent" for its sexual offense statutes except for a definition of "incapacity to consent," nor does it provide a global consent provision for all its criminal statutes.

6. Blurring the Line Between Rape and Statutory Rape

Finally, the provisions in several states blur the line between nonconsensual sexual contact and statutory rape by grouping the two offenses together or using the same statute to encompass both. Mississippi and South Dakota, for example, group sexual penetration or contact without the victim's consent with instances in which the victim is mentally handicapped or a minor. Mississippi's sexual battery provision outlaws sexual penetration with another person "without his or her consent," a mentally handicapped person, or a child under fourteen. South Dakota's trilogy of statutes prohibit

433 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-22.1(b) (1996).
434 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-22.2(b) (1996).
437 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.415(1)(a) and (b) (1997).
439 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95(1)(a) (1994).
sexual contact with: (1) a person "who, although capable of consenting, has not consented . . ." 440 (2) a person incapable of consent (i.e., physical or mental incapacity), 441 and (3) a child under the age of sixteen. 442

New York 443 and Kentucky have lesser forms of sexual offenses denominated "sexual misconduct," which are defined as engaging in sexual intercourse without consent. 444 The commentary accompanying New York's statute indicates that it is intended to include the higher offenses of rape and sodomy as well as statutory rape and statutory sodomy, when the victim is below the legal age of consent, which are not included in the higher offenses. 445 By contrast, the legislative commentary to Kentucky's statute limits its applicability to statutory rape and statutory sodomy although case law has questioned this limit. 446

7. Conclusion

Nonconsensual sexual provisions address a genre of blameworthy conduct that would normally escape criminal sanction due to failure to satisfy rape law's traditional force requirement. These statutes break the hegemony of force as an indispensable element of sexual offense and, thereby, disconnect the conjunction of force

443 See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.55 (Consol. 1997) (criminalizing sexual abuse without consent).
444 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20(1) (Consol. 1997) ("A person is guilty of sexual misconduct when: 1. Being a male, he engages in sexual intercourse with a female without her consent; . . . ."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.140 (Michie 1996) ("A person is guilty of sexual misconduct when he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with another person without the latter's consent.").
445 The Commission Staff Notes to section 130.20 of the New York Penal Law, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20 (Consol. 1997), provide that it is intended to include the higher degrees of rape and sodomy, as well as statutory rape and statutory sodomy.
446 The commentary to Kentucky statute section 510.140, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §510.140 (Michie 1996), provides that its basic purpose is "to preserve the concept of statutory rape and statutory sodomy. . . . In this context the ages of the defendant and the victim are critical. Force is not an element of this offense. The victim is statutorily incapable of consent." Id. (quoted in Cooper v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Ky. 1977)). But see Yarnell v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. 1992), in which the dissenting judge argues: "The statute . . . states no age limitations. . . . The obvious difference between this offense, as stated, and Sodomy I or Rape I is that it does not require physical force or threats accompanying the acts sufficient to overcome earnest resistance, only a lack of consent." Id. at 838-39 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
and nonconsent. However, because these statutes continue to rely on the notion of nonconsent, they continue to beg the question of what constitutes legally effective consent—a question of particular importance in cases of rape by fraud or rape by coercion.

F. Conclusion

In legislative hands, the unitary concept of violent rape has given birth to a host of offspring differing in substantive make-up and degrees of severity and corresponding more closely to the varieties of sex offenders' real-world behavior. Several conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing statutory review.

First, state legislatures have not criminalized rape by fraud or rape by coercion wholesale, they have been conservative in their work. The vast majority of legislatures have begun with the most noncontroversial and unassailable factual patterns, outlawing the use of fraudulent or coercive pressures deployed against vulnerable victims in the context of professional, trust-based alliances or relationships involving authoritative positions or power imbalances. A few states have been more aggressive, making inroads into the criminalization of rape by fraud, by describing circumstances in which fraud renders the criminal actor responsible for sexual offenses. Other states have attacked the problem of rape by coercion by more expansively outlawing defendants' use of nonphysical pressures in securing sexual compliance falling outside the professional, authoritative, or institutional contexts. Finally, a minority of states prohibit a category of nonconsensual sexual crimes which fails to also require force, fraud, or coercion.

Second, this new wave of statutory enactments outlawing fraudulent, coercive, or simply nonconsensual sexual offenses has not come at the cost of eliminating protection of citizens from forcible rape. Rather, states adopting these new statutes have retained their violent rape provisions, declining to treat the criminalization of nonviolent sexual offenses as an either-or proposition. For example, while Tennessee provides an explicit fraud alternative in its rape statute, it continues to punish forcible sexual penetration as aggravated rape and forcible sexual contact as aggravated sexual battery. Similarly, Hawaii distinguishes between defendants' use of strong compulsion and compulsion, the former including violent rape and the latter covering nonviolent variations. These statutes retain the legislative judgment that sexual penetration or contact obtained by
force may be a more serious harm than the same acts accomplished by nonviolent pressures. Criminal provisions outlawing rape by fraud or coercion supplement rather than replace violent sexual crimes.

The final conclusion to be drawn from this Article's statutory review is that the diversity inherent in this grouping of new statutes is necessary to capture the broad range of defendants' conduct undertaken to accomplish sexual intercourse by fraudulent or coercive means. Because rape by fraud or rape by coercion is not an unitary phenomenon, as discussed supra in Part I, their legislative prohibition must be wide-ranging and multi-faceted. Individually, the five categories of sexual offenses reviewed above fail to cover all possible instances of using fraud or coercion to obtain sexual intimacy. Collectively, however, they provide an excellent starting point to address the criminalization of this problematic behavior. In the best traditions of statutory experimentation in a multi-state system, diversity among some states in their statutory approaches provides a fertile field of innovation inviting emulation by other states.

III. THE DOCTRINAL ELEMENTS OF FORCE AND NONCONSENT IN THE CONTEXT OF CRIMINALIZING RAPE BY FRAUD AND RAPE BY COERCION

Deceit and violence—these are the two forms of deliberate assault on human beings. Both can coerce people into acting against their will. Most harm that can befall victims through violence can come to them also through deceit. But deceit controls more subtly, for it works on belief as well as action. Even Othello, whom few would have dared to try to subdue by force, could be brought to destroy himself and Desdemona through falsehood.447

The continuing proliferation of cases involving criminal defendants who accomplish sexual intercourse by means of fraud or coercion448 and, to a lesser extent, the widespread promulgation of legislative enactments outlawing some types of this behavior,449 have fueled the heated debate over the propriety of criminalizing

447 Box, supra note 50, at 18 (footnote omitted); cf. Beale, supra note 5, at 321 ("A seeming consent extorted by force or terror differs from consent obtained by fraud. In the latter case the mind is deceived into agreement; in the former, the body is forced to act without a real agreement of the mind.").
448 See supra Part I.
449 See supra Part II.
rape by fraud and rape by coercion. In addition, Estrich's suggestion\textsuperscript{450} that rape law should prohibit sexual intercourse secured by fraud or extortion to the same extent that criminal law outlaws taking money by these means has spawned increased controversy and contributed to a substantial body of theoretical commentary.\textsuperscript{451} The breadth and depth of this debate are virtually limitless.\textsuperscript{452} Cases of rape by fraud or rape by coercion inevitably serve as lightning rods, triggering a host of fundamental disagreements about the crime of rape, many revolving around the doctrinal elements of force and nonconsent. For instance, courts, legislatures, and commentators cannot agree about: (1) rape's historical make-up, i.e., whether it always required both force and nonconsent;\textsuperscript{453} (2) the nature of its defining harm, i.e., a crime of violence or a sexual offense;\textsuperscript{454} (3) the function of rape law, i.e., to protect bodily security or sexual integrity too;\textsuperscript{455} (4) the meaning of force, i.e., physical force only or also constructive force;\textsuperscript{456} (5) the relationship between force and nonconsent, i.e., whether force merely corroborates nonconsent or has independent significance;\textsuperscript{457} and (6) the meaning of consent, i.e., tacit assent or affirmative, freely given approval indicated by words or conduct.\textsuperscript{458} Moreover, feminist and radical critiques of criminal law, in general, and rape law, in particular, overlay these multiple disagreements, adding levels of complexity to an already complex rape analysis.\textsuperscript{459}

\textsuperscript{450} ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 103.

\textsuperscript{451} Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1120. Estrich reiterates the above suggestion in a subsequent 1987 publication.

\textsuperscript{452} See, e.g., Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1796 (calling rape law "a mess"); Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 40 (noting profound disagreement about "what rape is").

\textsuperscript{453} See, e.g., Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 60 (arguing that common-law definition of rape was nonconsensual sexual intercourse).

\textsuperscript{454} See infra notes 487-534 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{455} See, e.g., Harris, supra note 12, at 644 (positing rape by fraud cases demonstrate that central question of rape law is sexual integrity not just bodily security); see also KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON, RAPE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 43 (1996) (discussing conservative (rape as trespass), liberal (rape as battery), and radical (rape as degradation) views on rape; Chamallas, supra note 17, at 780-813 (discussing the traditional, liberal, and egalitarian views of sexual conduct).

\textsuperscript{456} See infra notes 535-558 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{457} See infra Part B.

\textsuperscript{458} BURGESS-JACKSON, supra note 455, at 103, comments:

The liberal, to put it pithily, makes consent the touchstone of rape and believes that most women, most of the time, consent to sexual intercourse.
This Part explores the two separate, but interrelated require-
ments of traditional rape law—force and nonconsent.460 Cases of
rape by fraud and rape by coercion implicate both these doctrinal
mainstays of rape because physical force or threat of such force may
generally be absent and consent, in some form, is usually present.
Although related, the force and nonconsent elements present two
different challenges. First, the critical question with respect to force
is whether rape law should expand beyond physical force to sub-
sume nonforcible, alternative methods of accomplishment, such as
fraud or coercion. This Article examines three arguments against
expanding rape law in this fashion but concludes that the force
requirement does not present an insurmountable obstacle to the
criminalization of rape by fraud or coercion. The challenge posed,
however, by these fraud and coercion cases to the nonconsent
element of rape law is how to determine the parameters of legally
effective consent when that consent is induced by either fraudulent
or coercive pressures. This Article examines alternative formulations
for drawing the line between valid and invalid consent in both the
fraud and coercion contexts and concludes that considerable
scholarly and legislative progress has been made in solving these
difficult line-drawing problems. The question is no longer if rape
by fraud or rape by coercion should be punished but rather under
what circumstances.

A final caveat is necessary. Although the two doctrinal issues of
force and consent merit serious attention and certainly have re-
ceived it from various scholarly quarters, the existing statutory law
summarized in Part II already criminalizes various forms of rape by

Therefore, rape, conceived as nonconsensual intercourse, is rare. The radical
makes coercion the touchstone of rape and believes that most women, most of
the time, are coerced into having sexual intercourse. Therefore, rape is perva-
sive. ... Each theorist rejects the other's conclusion. Indeed, each finds the
other's view incomprehensible and takes the other's conclusion to be a reduc-
tio ad absurdum on the theory that generates it. The liberal finds it preposter-
ous that rape is pervasive; the radical finds it absurd that it is rare.

(footnote omitted).

460 Common law rape had four basic elements: (1) sexual intercourse, (2) with a
woman not the defendant's wife, (3) by force or threat of force, and (4) without her
consent or against her will. Harris, supra note 12, at 613. Some dispute exists regarding
whether "without her consent" and "against her will" are synonymous. Id. According to
Harris, force focuses on the defendant, while lack of consent focuses on the victim. Id.
fraud and rape by coercion, in some senses eclipsing theory. This Part, therefore, highlights this tension between scholarly debate and practical reform.

A. The Force Requirement

The first issue addressing the criminalization of rape by fraud or coercion centers around the notion that rape law has traditionally required the element of physical force or threat of such force. In considering whether to outlaw certain forms of sexual contact not involving physical force, courts and commentators have asserted three different arguments against doing so: (1) many rape statutes are explicitly written with the element of physical force and should be strictly construed; (2) rape is a crime of violence and rape law is designed to protect citizens' physical security; and (3) force provides an external, verifiable indication of nonconsent, elimination of which will cause confusion and instability in determining victim consent.

1. The Statutory Requirement of Force

At the most rudimentary level of analysis, the deceptively simple question of whether rape by fraud or coercion can be accommodated under statutes explicitly requiring force becomes more difficult upon closer inspection. The statutory-construction problem is actually two separate questions: what constitutes force for the purposes of rape law and what role do courts play in making these judgments?

a. Strict Construction of Criminal Statutes

Questions surrounding the element of force are certainly not new; courts and commentators have struggled with them since the 1800s. One excellent example discussed supra is Don Moran v. People wherein the court overturned the defendant's conviction because the trial court had failed to properly instruct the jury on the

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461 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 5; Harris, supra note 12, at 628; Puttkammer, supra note 5.

force element. The Moran court cogently summarized many of the key issues of debate regarding the statutory force requirement:

If the statute, or the definition of rape, did not contain the words "by force," or "forcibly," doubtless a consent procured by such fraud as that referred to, might be treated as no consent; but the idea of force can not thus be left out and ignored, nor can such fraud be allowed to supply its place, though it would doubtless supply, and satisfy, all the other terms of the definition; and, so far as the intimation in question is to be understood as going further and dispensing with all idea of force, it must be understood as an intimation of the court of what, in their opinion, the law ought to be, rather than what it is. And, upon abstract principles of right and wrong, a sexual connection obtained by falsely and fraudulently personating the husband of a woman, or by a physician fraudulently inducing a female patient to believe such connection essential to a course of medical treatment, must be considered nearly, if not quite, as criminal and prejudicial to society as when obtained by force or any apprehension of violence, and it might, and in my opinion would, be judicious for the legislature to make some provision for punishment in cases of this kind. But it is not for the judiciary to legislate, by straining the existing criminal law to bring such cases within it. 463

The Michigan Supreme Court’s analysis in Don Moran is appealing in its simplicity. If the statute explicitly requires force or threat, then anything falling short is not rape. Other courts have similarly concluded that fraud may not replace the force requirement of rape. 464 Despite adoption of a strict-construction approach, however, several courts have invited their respective legislatures to alter existing statutes to punish sexual offenses secured by fraud or coercion. 465

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463 Id. at 364-65.
464 See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 30 Ala. 54, 56 (1857) (constructive or actual force necessary ingredient of rape; no rape if victim consents although obtained by husband impersonation); Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 155 N.E.2d 187, 192 (Mass. 1959) ("Fraud cannot be allowed to supply the place of force which the statute makes mandatory."); State v. Lung, 28 P. 235 (Nev. 1891) (citing Don Moran and stating that fraud does not supply place of force); Walter v. People, 6 Am. L. Reg. NS 746 (N.Y. 1867) (fraud insufficient for rape); Bloodworth v. State, 65 Tenn. 614, 618-20 (1872) (no rape in sham marriage case because force absent).
465 For example, in Bloodworth, 65 Tenn. at 614, the court first quoted from a previous case, Wyatt v. State, 2 Swan 396:
“We agree with the Attorney General, that the moral turpitude of the crime is as great when perpetrated by fraud and deception, as by force,” and that the act richly deserves to be severely punished; but the question is, not what it deserves, nor what our feelings and individual opinions would dictate, but “what sayeth the law.”
The Bloodworth court thereupon added its own language to the same effect:
The question of whether nonphysical coercion satisfies the statutory force requirement seems easier to resolve than in fraud cases because of the greater similarity between physical force and coercion. Both physical force and nonphysical coercion involve the imposition of another's will on the victim without the further complication of resorting to deceptive stratagems to achieve that result. However, some courts have read force quite narrowly to exclude coercion. In State v. Thompson, discussed supra, the court dismissed the action because physical force was absent, reasoning that the force requirement could not be stretched to include coercion. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, the court found the defendant had not used forcible compulsion when he caused his step-daughter's sexual submission by threatening her return to a juvenile detention facility.

To the extent that these cases stand for the proposition that courts are not free to simply eliminate the statutory force language, they are unremarkable. The argument that neither fraud nor coercion is sufficient to satisfy statutes requiring force or threat is supported by the canon of statutory interpretation that criminal statutes must be strictly construed and implicates notions of fair notice and due process for defendant actors.

We therefore feel constrained to hold, that the element of force being entirely excluded by the proof in the case, and the fact of some degree of assent shown, and certainly no dissent, that the act could not have been both forcible and against her will, and these elements are, by our statute, made essentials in this crime.

The Legislature, with their attention called to this case, can, and no doubt will, easily enact a law that will meet the precise case. We have no power to do it, and can only administer the law as we find it.


466 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990).
467 Id. at 1107.
468 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988) (high school principal coerced pupil to sexually submit or not graduate).
469 Id.
b. What Constitutes Force in Rape Law?

i. The Elasticity of the Force Requirement

The power of the strict-construction argument is lessened, however, by the recognition that not all forms of rape involve physical force or threat: "Whatever the limits of rape by fraud, there can be no question that rape, as a legal category, has long included many forms of nonviolent misconduct."\(^{470}\) Most conspicuously, force is absent in cases of unconscious, mentally ill, or physically helpless victims; in such cases, the law presumes nonconsent and dispenses with the force requirement. For this reason, Puttkammer criticizes *Don Moran* as being decided on the wrong issue: "It would have been far simpler to go on the consent ground, and so to avoid conflict with cases holding that rape can be committed on an unconscious or terrified woman, where likewise force is not used."\(^{471}\)

Courts have further held that in husband impersonation and medical treatment cases involving fraud as to the act, the only force required is that necessary for sexual intercourse. In *Pomeroy v. State*,\(^ {472}\) for example, a case almost contemporaneous with *Don Moran*, the court quoted: "'Whenever there is a carnal connection and no consent in fact, fraudulently obtained or otherwise, there is evidently, in the wrongful act itself, all the force which the law demands as an element of the crime.'"\(^ {473}\) In fact, Roberts suggests that rape law is policy driven, stating: "'How much force should we allow this type of man to use against this type of woman?'"\(^ {474}\) Thus, while the strict-construction argument has superficial appeal and relative validity, upon closer analysis the force requirement is considerably more elastic than courts like to admit.

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\(^{470}\) Schulhofer, *Sexual Autonomy*, supra note 9, at 63.

\(^{471}\) Puttkammer, *supra* note 5, at 420.

\(^{472}\) 94 Ind. 96 (1883) (defendant represented that he was physician and had carnal connection with victim without consent).

\(^{473}\) Id. at 100. For similar reasons, not all courts have been reluctant to exclude fraud from rape. See, e.g., *Eberhart v. State*, 34 N.E. 637 (Ind. 1893) (defendant pretended to be traveling doctor).

\(^{474}\) Roberts, *supra* note 8, at 363.
ii. The Doctrine of Constructive Force

A second problem with viewing the force requirement under the narrow strict-construction approach is that courts have expanded force to include fraud in other criminal offenses in the guise of the doctrine of constructive force. For example, in burglary law, courts have enlarged the usual requirement of a physical breaking (actual force) to include instances in which the burglar obtained entry by "means of artifice or fraud or ... pretense of business or social intercourse"—defining such conduct as constructive force. Even Goldberg, quoted supra, includes constructive force as satisfying the force requirement of rape. In fact, the similarity between fraud in burglary and fraud in rape has not escaped scholarly notice:

There is no ground on which a legal distinction between such fraud in relation to the entry and fraud in relation to sexual activity can be drawn, and similarly ... there hardly seems to be support for a policy grounding which would extend greater protection in terms of crimes against property than in terms of crimes against the person.

In the development of burglary law, then, courts have looked beyond the mere exertion of force to protect habitation rights. The doctrine of constructive force has arisen in the context of rape by coercion. Several courts have interpreted the force requirement broadly, relying on constructive force to permit rape prosecutions based on coercion. For example, in Commonwealth v. Caracciola discussed supra, the court analogized to the state's robbery (not burglary) statute holding that the state's statutory force requirement could be satisfied by constructive force. The court de-

475 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 477-80 (1986)
476 Nichols v. State, 32 N.W. 543, 546 (Wis. 1887); cf. Whittaker v. State, 7 N.W. 431, 431 (Wis. 1880) ("The element of force forms a material ingredient of the offence of rape, by which the resistance of the woman violated is overcome, or her consent induced by threats of personal violence, duress, or fraud; ... ").
478 Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation, supra note 134, at 62-63; see also Sanders v. State, 1995 Del. LEXIS 161 (defendant committed burglary, kidnapping, and sexual extortion); Feinberg, supra note 18, at 339-40 (analogizing between robbery and burglary, and violent and nonviolent rape).
479 But see Beale, supra note 5, at 324 (arguing constructive breaking doctrine in burglary erroneous and therefore unhelpful in rape).
480 569 N.E.2d 774 (Mass. 1991) (defendant feigned policeman to coerce woman into sexual intercourse by threatening jail).
clined to assume legislative intent meant to provide "greater protection to property than to bodily integrity." Similarly, State v. Etheridge adopted a broad view in the parental rape context.

The phrase "by force and against the will of the other person" means the same as it did at common law when it was used to describe an element of rape. The requisite force may be established either by actual, physical force or by constructive force in the form of fear, fright, or coercion. Constructive force is demonstrated by proof of threats or other actions by the defendant which compel the victim's submission to sexual acts.

The court held: "the parent wields authority as another assailant might wield a weapon. The authority itself intimidates; the implicit threat to exercise it coerces. Coercion . . . is a form of constructive force." Thus, the constructive force doctrine offers a viable basis for expansively interpreting rape's statutory force requirement.

c. Conclusion

Although it is certainly preferable to alter the statutory definitions of offenses rather than relying on judicial interpretation of ambiguous provisions, rape law has sufficient doctrinal space to accommodate broader conceptions of force than many courts acknowledge because of the elasticity of the force requirement and the availability of the doctrine of constructive force. In addition, several state legislatures have responded to judicial invitations to change by enacting innovative legislation to deal with these difficult fraud and coercion cases. The strict-construction problem is rendered moot, at least to some extent, by enactment of these new sexual offense statutes.

481 Id. at 777. The dissent held that rape requires either physical force or threat of bodily injury. Id. at 783.
482 352 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. 1987).
483 Id. at 682.
484 Id. at 680 (citations omitted).
485 See also Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1793 n.41 ("I have serious reservations about the legitimacy of courts, as opposed to legislatures, reading the force element out of the statute books."); Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2184 ("The way to fill the gap is not to try expanding what we mean by force but to have statutes punishing, as an offense distinct from forcible rape, any sexual imposition without valid consent.").
486 See discussion supra Part II.
2. Rape as a Crime of Violence or a Sexual Offense

A second objection to criminalizing rape by fraud or coercion originates from competing conceptions of rape (i.e., the debate over whether rape is a crime of violence or a sexual offense),\(^{487}\) and of rape law (i.e., as protecting physical security or sexual autonomy).\(^{488}\) Resolution of these fundamental, definitional questions has clear implications for whether to expand rape law to include cases involving fraud or coercion. On one hand, if rape is a form of violence, it may be inadvisable to dilute rape law by including cases accomplished by nonviolent fraud or coercion. Expansion of rape law may also trivialize forcible rape by comparison and undercut progress made by the rape reform movements, which relied heavily upon the rape-as-violence argument.\(^{489}\) Moreover, expansion may cause juries to refuse to convict because rape by fraud or coercion cases may not meet jurors’ expectations of rape as a violent crime. On the other hand, if rape is a sexual offense and rape law is designed to protect victims’ sexual integrity as well as physical security, it may be preferable to expand rape law to include a broader range of methods by which sexual predation is accomplished; the sole reliance on force may actually privilege other blameworthy conduct. In addition, including fraud and coercion in rape law may be more consonant with the legal system’s treatment of other criminal offenses, such as theft, which encompass both violent and nonviolent methods.

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\(^{487}\) See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE (1975) (rape is crime of power and violence, not lust); ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 103-04 (rape is about sex and sexual violation); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 384 (1992) (rape is “substitute for consensual sexual intercourse”); Bogart, supra note 327, at 117 (rape is attack on person as sexual being); Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1183 (rape is about sex and sexual violation); Findlater, supra note 1, at 1363 (“Rape—whether seen as a crime of sex or a crime of violence—is about the abuse of power . . . .”) (discussing page 83 of Estrich’s book).

\(^{488}\) Schulhofer in Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 41, comments: [T]he main difficulty stems not from clashing conceptions of ‘force’ (though these are important) but more from unresolved tension (in both law and culture) between the conception of rape as a crime of violence requiring ‘force’ and the conception of rape as an offense against personal autonomy, centering on ‘meaningful consent.’

\(^{489}\) See Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW & PHIL 127 (1992).
a. Costs of Expanding Rape Law to Include Fraud and Coercion

i. Undercutting Rape Reform

One potential cost of expanding rape law to include fraud and coercion is the possibility of undercutting rape reform. Perhaps the most significant advantage of thinking about rape as a violent act is the impact that such conceptualization has had on rape law reform. Feminists and others, arguing that rape is not simply bad sexual intercourse but a completely different phenomenon, have drawn attention to the seriousness of rape as an individual offense and as a crime against women as a group:

"This rape-as-violence argument did succeed in disentangling rape from sex, and therefore harm from pleasure, in the minds of many. Until men and women understood that rape was not sexual passion as they understood it, it was difficult to obtain any rape law reform." The violence argument has succeeded, and significant rape reform has resulted. At this stage of legal development, therefore, it seems unlikely that expansion of rape law to include fraud or coercion will harken a return to earlier formulations. To the contrary, the success of earlier rape reform has paved the way for serious discussion of these other variations of rape. For example, one author comments: "Perhaps the most significant aspect of the new sexual liability law is that it is only in the last few years that women have been bold enough to assert that they have a legal right to expect honesty from men in sexual relationships." The newly burgeoning array of statutes punishing multiple types of rape by fraud or coercion attest to the fact that rape law is currently expanding, not constricting.

490 See Berger, supra note 8, at 69 ("By contrast, with respect to rape, a crime almost universally perpetrated by men, ordinarily against women, questions of 'whose meaning wins' are crucial in drawing the line between offensive sex and sexual offense.").
491 See, e.g., BROWN-MILLER, supra note 487.
492 Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, supra note 489, at 156. But she adds: "The rape-as-violence argument leaves unchallenged most male interpretations of heterosexual relations." Id. at 157.
493 See supra notes 266-274 and accompanying text.
494 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 813.
ii. Trivializing Violent Rape

A second potential cost of expanding rape law to encompass fraud and coercion cases is the trivialization of violent rape by comparison. Many commentators argue that an experiential or qualitative difference exists between violent and nonviolent rape, one that may be invalidated or obscured by expansion of rape law to include both forms. For instance, Berger criticizes Estrich's suggestion to criminalize sexual intercourse procured by fraud or extortionate threat because doing so would depreciate the seriousness of rape:

A fortiori, the notion that rape, one of the gravest possible infringements of human integrity, should be expanded to include situations where the woman attempts to sell her body and fails to receive the bargained-for price simply makes a mockery of women's long efforts to achieve autonomy, respect, and equality.

Other commentators agree, describing the experience of violent rape as a complete negation of existence, a form of "spiritual murder," or "[s]hort of homicide, . . . 'the ultimate violation of self.'" For some, the difference is not experiential but the degree of harm suffered by the victims: "[T]he force or threat of violence is itself an integral part of the total harm produced. Compulsion is not necessarily more destructive of voluntariness than deception is, but it is normally more harmful in itself." The rape vic-

496 See Berger, supra note 8, at 76-77.
497 Berger, supra note 8, at 76-77. Berger is especially critical of the notion of rape by fraud and finds the suggestion regarding extortionate threats more plausible. Id. at 77.
498 See Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, supra note 8, at 226 (it is rape when a women's existence does not matter). But see Bogart, supra note 327 (criticizing defining crime in terms of victim's experience).
499 Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1448 (1993); see also Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, supra note 489, at 164 (calling it "soul-murder").
501 Feinberg, supra note 18, at 339; see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 Commentary (1995) ("In the situation here discussed, since neither force nor imposition upon disability is the causa causans, there is no danger of physical injury to those unable to protect themselves."); Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1800 (arguing physical violence "expresses a more complete indifference, or a more intense hostility, to the victim's humanity."); Harris, supra note 12, at 633 (noting chance of physical harm less in fraud cases).
tim suffers not only the fundamental harm to her sexual integrity but also the effect of violence.

Some authors, however, while not disputing the severity of violent rape, point out that nonviolent sexual offenses also cause serious harm

[A] woman's decision to submit to physical force may be less agonizing than her decision to have sexual intercourse with a person who holds economic or emotional power over her and her family. Although one can argue that a man who obtains intercourse through threats of nonphysical harm should be punished less severely than a violent rapist, the growing legal appreciation of the reality of mental injury and the power of economic duress suggests that he nonetheless should be punished.502

In addition to the fundamental assault on sexual integrity embodied in rape by fraud or coercion,503 victims suffer the harms that befall persons who are lied to, betrayed, or manipulated. Schafran notes that victim trauma in acquaintance rape cases can be as great, if not greater, than in stranger cases because of self-blame and the loss of the ability to trust others.504 Larson asserts that sex induced by fraud may cause "grave physical and emotional injury",505 while Bok points out that persons who have been lied to are disappointed, resentful, and suspicious.506 Although the harm is not of the same experiential quality as violent rape, victims of nonviolent sexual assault also suffer significantly; recognition of nonviolent rape would validate these victims' experiences.

Finally, perhaps the single best response is provided by Roberts. In discussing whether grouping together all unwanted sexual intercourse and violent rape will trivialize violence against women, she comments: "I fear as much that disconnecting all seemingly nonviolent sexual coercion from sex accompanied by physical violence will obscure the common nature of both."507

502 Harris, supra note 12, at 644-45 (footnotes omitted).
503 See, e.g., Bogart, supra note 327.
504 See Schafran, supra note 60, at 1018; see also Feinberg, supra note 18, at 340 ("Fraud in the inducement is a form of manipulation in which some traits of the victim are used—turned against her—by the deceiver. It is not misleading to say that even her will is to some extent involved, as well as her general desires (with new mistaken beliefs subsumed under them) and such traits as credulity, naivete, cupidity, or trustfulness.").
505 Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 380, 453.
506 See BOK, supra note 50, at 20.
507 Roberts, supra note 8, at 381.
agrees: "The 'rape as violence' approach may strengthen the case for punishing violent sex, but it may do so at the cost of obscuring the case for punishing forced sex in the absence of conventional violence, the usual pattern in the simple rape."  

iii. The Effect on Juries

Some theorists worry that juries will not convict defendants if the evidence fails to disclose the use of force because this does not correspond to jurors' intuitive notions of rape:

But even if we by-pass the obvious vagueness problems entailed in deploying such a standard against economic inducements, emotional pressure, and the like, this approach will not necessarily work well for the women we want to protect, because there is no guarantee that prosecutors and juries will accept a feminist perspective on when such pressures are improper.  

Recent cases, however, suggest that it is not at all clear juries would not convict. In some of the most difficult cases, involving prostitutes who were deceived, juries returned guilty verdicts, although appellate courts eventually overturned them. Moreover, opinion polls indicate strong public sentiment against these types of nonviolent sex crimes.  

b. Benefits of Expanding Rape Law to Include Fraud and Coercion

i. Broader Coverage of Blameworthy Conduct

Abandoning the unitary concept of rape-as-violence has several potential benefits. First, expansion will plug a hole in rape law that has been troubling courts for more than a century: "These cases make clear that one thing missing in the law of rape is some way to

508 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 83.
509 Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2177.
510 See supra notes 193-209 and accompanying text.
511 In a student opinion poll conducted by Samuel Horowitz, while a visitor at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, students identified fraud in securing sexual intimacy as high on their list of reprehensible conduct. (Sept. 10, 1996) (on file with author); see also Dan Subotnik, "Sue Me, Sue Me, What Can You Do Me? I Love You": A Disquisition on Law, Sex, and Talk, 47 Fla. L. Rev. 311, 393-401 (1995) (discussing various public opinion polls arriving at different conclusions).
punish sexual misconduct that is not physically violent. It is as if we had a law against armed robbery but no law against theft.\textsuperscript{512} The exclusive reliance on force or violence as the indispensable element of rape has the undesirable effect of insulating a broad range of blameworthy conduct from criminal condemnation. As Roberts notes:

\begin{quote}
If rape is violence as the law defines it (weapons, bruises, blood), then what most men do when they disregard women's sexual autonomy is not rape. If rape is committed only by violent men, then very few men are rapists. By defining most male sexual conduct as nonviolent, even when it is coercive, it has been possible to exempt a multitude of attacks on women's autonomy from criminal punishment, or even critical scrutiny. The category of violence, far from punishing all sexual assaults, actually privileges most of them.\textsuperscript{513}
\end{quote}

Roberts's observation is buttressed by the fact that many defendants in rape by fraud or coercion cases are habitual offenders with multiple victims.\textsuperscript{514} They were not simply persons who lied to victims in the context of private relationships but intentionally set about satisfying their sexual desires by preying on the most vulnerable victims using methods falling just short of physical force. Including fraud and coercion under rape law means that a wider range of such defendants' blameworthy conduct will be criminalized.

\textit{ii. The Analogy to Theft Crimes}

One of the strongest arguments for expanding rape law to include fraud and coercion cases is the aptness of the analogy many courts and commentators have made between rape and theft offenses,\textsuperscript{515} although troubling problems inhere in equating sexual au-

\textsuperscript{512} Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2184.
\textsuperscript{513} Roberts, supra note 8, at 362-63 (footnotes omitted); see also Rosemary J. Coombe, Room for Manoeuver: Toward a Theory of Practice in Critical Legal Studies, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 69, 80 (1989) ("Economic dependence or cultural degradation are contexts socially defined as consistent with free sexual consent and a woman's actual agreement is constituted within this context—she is very likely to conceive of her sexual relations as consensual so long as there is no physical coercion . . . ."); Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1118 ("the force standard guarantees men freedom to intimidate women and exploit their weaknesses, as long as they don't 'fight' with them."); Men, Women, supra note 194, at 153 (remarks by Prof. West) ("the focus on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of rape law . . . tends almost inevitably to legitimate, as praiseworthy, just or morally non-problematic, the vast bulk of our non-criminal consensual heterosexual encounters.").

\textsuperscript{514} See supra Part I.G.

\textsuperscript{515} See, \eg, Lewis v. State, 30 Ala. 54, 57 (1857) (noting obtaining goods by fraudu-
tonomy with property.\textsuperscript{516} Simply put, the criminal law punishes both theft of property accomplished by force or threat as robbery and theft of property without force as larceny, false pretenses, or extortion depending on the nonviolent method. Robbery is graded as the most serious offense because it entails the use of physical force. Estrich builds on the theft analogy by arguing that the law should punish the use of fraud or extortion to secure sexual intercourse to the same extent it outlaws their use to secure money.\textsuperscript{517}
Not only does this argument have intuitive and logical appeal, it has two additional benefits. First, the theft analogy offers a viable model for reconciling the seriousness of violent rape with the criminalization of lesser forms of nonviolent rape. One would never argue that the prohibition against robbery precludes punishing larceny, false pretenses, or extortion. The theft paradigm makes clear that it is not an either-or proposition. Second, implementing the theft paradigm equalizes the law’s treatment of force, fraud, and coercion across the crime spectrum. Rape law, instead of making exceptions for fraud or coercion, should treat these pressures with the same repugnancy as they are treated in theft offenses.

The analogy between rape and theft law, however, has not been universally embraced. Ironically, Dripps and Posner, who emphasize an economic analysis of rape, would provide little support for the concepts of rape by fraud or coercion. Dripps discusses the theft analogy in the context of elaborating his commodity theory of sex, his own property analogy, in which he likens sexual cooperation to a service. He proposes dividing sexual offenses into two categories: sexually motivated assault, essentially violent rape, and sexual expropriation, covering instances in which the victim expressed refusal or was incapable of consent. Dripps believes the theft analogy works for the assault offense but does not work as well for sexual expropriation because “sex differs from other commodities in that no clear line separates the consumer from the supplier.” Thus, Dripps likens sexual intercourse with an unconscious, helpless, or incompetent woman to larceny but balks at expanding the analogy to theft by false pretenses. Moreover, he

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518 Susan Estrich in Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509, 512 (1992), argues rape should be treated more like other crimes: “What I have been fighting for, over these years, is not to give rape special treatment . . . but rather to stop treating it specially; . . . .”

519 See Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 412 (arguing law allows men to use tactics to secure sex that would not be tolerated to secure money, what she calls the sex exception to fraud).

520 See supra notes 515-531 and accompanying text (burglary analogy). But see Schulhofer, Gender Question, supra note 10, at 136 (arguing against using same standards of fraud in rape and property contexts and advocating looking at how fraud works in sexual arena).

521 See Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8. Dripps’s proposal has been heavily critiqued. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 8; West, supra note 454.

522 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1807-08.

523 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1801.

524 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1802 (“Should sex be among the things it
remains skeptical about criminalizing rape by fraud, although he suggests it might be treated as theft of services.\footnote{525}

Posner has also equated sex with a good but, like Dripps, argues that sex by fraud should not be punished because fraud should not be recognized as a form of coercion.\footnote{526} He comments:

The law usually treats force and fraud symmetrically in the sense of punishing both, though the latter more leniently. It is a crime to take money at gunpoint. It is also a crime, though normally a lesser one, to take it by false pretenses. But generally it is not a crime to use false pretenses to entice a person into a sexual relationship. Seduction, even when honey-combed with lies that would convict the man of fraud if he were merely trying to obtain money, is not rape. The thinking may be that if the woman is not averse to having sex with a particular man, the wrong if any is in the lies (and we usually do not think of lying in social settings as a crime) rather than in an invasion of her bodily integrity.\footnote{527}

Posner’s analysis, however, fails to account for non-social situations in which victims are defrauded; most of the cases in Part I involved professional or business contexts.\footnote{528}

Some feminists have also criticized the theft analogy for completely different reasons. West argues that the analogy “wildly misdescribes the experience of rape,” which is more akin to “spiritual murder than either robbery or larceny.”\footnote{529} She elaborates: “Rape is sui generis. It is not accurately captured by any analogy, no matter how clever or elaborate. . . . [R]ape itself cannot be reduced to other painful experiences. It certainly cannot be reduced to theft.”\footnote{530} Other feminists are troubled by the analogy, claiming it is reminiscent of earlier notions of women as men’s property.\footnote{531} The point, however, is not that rape is similar to theft—they prohibit

\footnote{525} Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1803. Dripps also argues that criminal penalties for sexual fraud cases are premature “until the civil law enforces contracts for sexual services, . . . .” Men, Women and Rape, supra note 171, at 145 (remarks by Dripps).
\footnote{526} See POSNER, supra note 487, at 392.
\footnote{527} POSNER, supra note 487, at 392.
\footnote{528} Posner distinguishes husband impersonation and fraudulent medical treatment cases because there the act is disgusting and humiliating. POSNER, supra note 487, at 392-93.
\footnote{529} West, supra note 499, at 1448; see also Men, Women, and Rape, supra note 194, at 157 (comments of Fairstein; agreeing with West).
\footnote{530} West, supra note 454, at 1449; see also Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, supra note 8, at 219 n.97 (1987-88) (arguing nature of rape is not like theft).
\footnote{531} Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, supra note 8, at 219 n.97. But see Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1805 n.75 (suggesting women have property rights in their own bodies).
entirely different harms—but rather that the law's umbrella treatment of theft crimes, subsuming a broad range of conduct, is useful in crafting a comparable approach to the varieties of sexual offenses.

c. Conclusion

The benefits of expanding rape law to encompass fraudulent or coercive inducements outweigh those of retaining a unitary, rape-as-violence conceptualization. Rape law, like theft law, should subsume a broad range of blameworthy conduct, not simply forcible sexual penetration or contact. More importantly, several state legislatures have already transcended many of the theoretical issues inherent in this debate by prohibiting both violent rape and nonviolent sexual offenses accomplished by fraud or coercion or without reference to force, fraud, or coercion. These legislative bodies have declined to assume that enactment of the latter forecloses retention of the former. The resulting statutes grade violent rape more harshly and punish it more severely, preserving the judgment that it is a qualitatively more serious offense and forestalling any possible hint of trivialization.

3. The Relationship of Force and Nonconsent in Rape Law

A third set of objections to the expansion of rape law to include fraud or coercion implicates the confusing and murky relationship between force and nonconsent in rape law: are these two elements coequal or does force serve a corroborative function by providing an external, verifiable indication of nonconsent? If force is an independent element of rape, then its elimination or substitution by fraud or coercion may be problematic. However, if the real inquiry of rape law is consent, and force merely corroborates nonconsent, then factors other than force can be recognized as invalidating consent. Embedded within this inquiry lie two subsidiary concerns: (1) the need for verification of nonconsent based on

See supra notes 328-409 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 410-446 and accompanying text.
The debate over whether rape law protects women from physical assault or protects their sexual integrity is also implicated in the question of whether force and nonconsent are equivalent prongs of rape law.
an assumed untrustworthiness of rape victims and (2) the effect of fraud or coercion on consent.

a. Force Corroborates Nonconsent

Competing views exist about the proper relationship between the force and nonconsent elements of rape law. Goldberg, for example, quoted at the beginning of this Article, argued that the issue of consent is simply irrelevant in the absence of force. The Goldberg court held that force and nonconsent are coequal elements of the crime; rape cannot occur in either’s absence.\(^{536}\) Dripps concurs: "The conjunction also means that no matter how nonconsensual the sex may be, there is no crime without force."\(^{537}\) By contrast, Crosswell emphasized consent as being the central inquiry of rape law, and force, threat, or fraud may negate it.\(^{538}\)

Historical support exists for the notion that the force requirement of rape is subservient to nonconsent. Specifically, Schulhofer notes that the common law definition of rape was "unlawful sexual intercourse with a female person without her consent."\(^{539}\) One court observed that the better view is

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\ldots \text{to require a showing of only such force as is necessary reasonably to demonstrate that an act of intercourse has been undertaken without the victim's consent}\].\(^{540}\)
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\ldots
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\(^{537}\) Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1794; see also Commonwealth v. Childs, quoted in Puttkammer, supra note 5, at 420 ("No amount of persuasion or solicitation however improper, no amount of deception or even fraud however villainous or outrageous, will make illicit intercourse constitute rape, where the woman, induced or persuaded consents to the act."). Dripps ultimately argues for abandoning the conjunction by eliminating consent and focusing exclusively on the defendant's actions. Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1805-06 ("By defining the assault offenses exclusively by reference to the alternatives the defendant presents the victim with, consent to sex can be taken out of the law."); see also Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Note, Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 Geo. WASH. L. REV. 399 (1988) (making similar proposal).

\(^{538}\) See People v. Crosswell, 13 Mich. 427 (1865).

\(^{539}\) Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 60. He notes that American jurisdictions added the force element. Id.

\(^{540}\) People v. Cicero, 204 Cal. Rptr. 582, 590 (1984); see also State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1270 (N.J. 1992) (quoting Perkins & Boyce, supra note 55, at 211, for a similar proposition); Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 63 (noting Perkins reads force element out of rape).
As these authorities make clear, the fundamental wrong at which the law of rape is aimed is not the application of physical force that causes physical harm. Rather, the law of rape primarily guards the integrity of a woman’s will and the privacy of her sexuality from an act of intercourse undertaken without her consent. Because the fundamental wrong is the violation of a woman’s will and sexuality, the law of rape does not require that “force” cause physical harm. Rather, in this scenario, “force” plays merely a supporting evidentiary role, as necessary only to insure an act of intercourse has been undertaken against a victim’s will.\footnote{Cicero, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 590 (ruling force element of committing lewd and lascivious acts upon child suffices to show it was against child’s will).}

This interpretation of the force element is preferable to any other interpretation because it also helps to make sense of cases involving unconscious, mentally ill, or physically helpless victims: “[W]here the complainant clearly was incapable of effective consent, . . . it is settled that the force requirement is satisfied merely by the amount of force necessary to perform the sexual act.”\footnote{Harris, supra note 12, at 619-20 (1976) (footnotes omitted) (“[I]t is evident that juries, courts and commentators consider assailant force and victim resistance primarily as indicators of nonconsent. Where the force used was extreme . . . , the trier of fact generally assumes that the victim did not consent to intercourse . . . .”); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(5) (1997) (force or threat sufficient to show nonconsent); M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1270-71 (discussing force requirement as proving act against woman’s will and significance of resistance as proxy for force illustrated by cases in which victims unable to resist); POSNER, supra note 487, at 388 (distinguishing rape from ordinary sex by nonconsent, which is difficult to prove without physical injury); WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 290 (1995) (no consent if defendant uses force or threat).}

Thus, with force correctly understood as corroborating nonconsent, it should not elide further inquiry into the question of consent.

b. Women as Untrustworthy Rape Accusers

Rape law’s insistence on an external, verifiable criterion of nonconsent embodied in the force requirement must also be viewed in a larger historical and jurisprudential context. Many commentators have pointed to the gender bias inherent in criminal law,\footnote{See, e.g., Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8.} which “is—and has been for centuries—a system of rules conceived and enforced by men, for men, and against men.”\footnote{Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2154.} Rape law is peculiarly vulnerable to discriminatory biases against women because it is one of the only crimes that pits men directly against women, wherein issues of credibility are often outcome-determinative.\footnote{Deborah W. Denno, Why Rape is Different, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 128 (1994).} Estrich adds: “Moreover, because the crime involves sex
itself, the law of rape inevitably treads on the explosive ground of sex roles, of male aggression and female passivity, of our understandings of sexuality—areas where differences between a male and female perspective may be most pronounced. Even more importantly, feminist and other writers have noted that rape jurisprudence, dating from Lord Hale’s famous maxim, reveals a basic distrust of women and fear that they will make false accusations of rape.

The fear of false rape charges is exacerbated in rape by fraud cases because “doubts as to the credibility of the complainant are magnified by the absence of such outward indicia of nonconsent as force and resistance.” Puttkammer similarly argues that fraud cases are dangerous because “the central fact of prime importance is, not the woman’s objective conduct, but her unmanifested thoughts and beliefs. To ascertain them with any degree of assurance is bound to be an excessively difficult task.”

It may be asserted, therefore, that errors in decision-making will be minimized by retaining an external criterion such as force.

("Relative to other crimes, rape reveals the dark side of the social and biological differences and potential conflicts between men and women."); see also Findlater, supra note 1, at 1357 (rape law based on sexist notions).

546 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 1091.

547 Hale wrote: “It is true, rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remembered that it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved; and harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent.” M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 633, 635 (1680); cf. Schafran, supra note 60, at 1013 (“Contrary to Lord Hale’s allegation, rape is an extremely difficult crime to charge and the easiest of all to defend.”).

548 See, e.g., State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1273 (N.J. 1992) (“During the 1970s feminists and others criticized the stereotype that rape victims were inherently more untrustworthy than other victims of criminal attack.”); Legal Bias, supra note 469.

549 Harris, supra note 12, at 631; see also Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App.3d 369, 377 (1983) (opining that it would be awful if we admitted that the legal system could not sort out false from true claims).

550 Puttkammer, supra note 5, at 421. The author discloses his bias when he articulates why rape is different from automobile theft—we should be more suspicious of rape victims. Id.

551 Harris, supra note 12, at 628; see also Chamallas, supra note 17, at 832.
Today, the widespread proliferation of rape law reform attests to a more egalitarian system, one not predominated by distrust of rape victims. Several states, for example, have eliminated Hale’s cynical maxim from their jury instructions. Furthermore, empirical support is notably absent in support of the notion that women fabricate rape claims. Harris recommends

If the law would formalize the unofficial practice of requiring force as an element of rape only where the expectation of the complainant’s untruthfulness is not rebutted by extrinsic evidence, and then discard that expectation itself as unreasoned and unreasonable, then the law would very likely conclude that the freedom of sexual choice which is to be protected by rape law can be as effectively negated by nonphysical as by physical coercion.

Banishing the basic distrust of rape victims means external indicia of nonconsent such as the use of force become less important.

c. Fraud and Coercion Also Invalidate Consent

If the real question in rape law is victim consent, then it seems logical to look at all factors that undermine consent, not simply physical force. The exclusive focus on physical force may deny the philosophical and empirical reality that other types of pressures erode or negate consent. Commentators approaching the consent question from varying perspectives conclude that persons may be compelled to do things against their wills or without true consent by means other than force, i.e., fraud, coercion, and economic pressure. Moreover, as noted earlier, criminal law takes cogni-

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552 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-408 (1997) (outlawing Hale’s maxim and requiring jury instruction against gender bias).
553 See Schafran, supra note 60, at 1012-13.
554 Harris, supra note 12, at 645.
555 See, e.g., BOK, supra note 50, at 18 (noting deceit and violence may coerce persons into acting against their wills); JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 269 (1986) ("Coercive force is by no means the only kind of factor that can reduce or vitiate the voluntariness of consent. Deficient or mistaken information is another."); Chamallas, supra note 17, at 814 (arguing consent ineffective if secured by physical force, economic pressure, or deception); Coombe, supra note 513, at 80 ("This move to contextualization, however, has no logical (that is to say non-arbitrary) limits; economic dependence, cultural degradation, and psychological pressure, for example, could be considered in this calculation of coercion and consent if an interpretive construct other than the prevailing mind/body dichotomy were utilized."); Harris, supra note 12, at 644 ("The law should recognize that forms of coercion other than threats or infliction of bodily harm preclude effective consent to intercourse."); Larson, Women Un-
rance of these other factors in numerous contexts; fraud or coercion provide a sufficient explanatory mechanism in burglary and theft law. Finally, the impact of these factors on consent is recognized in many legal contexts, particularly commercial ones outside criminal law.

\[\textit{d. Conclusion}\]

Rape law, in some senses, has come full circle. Common law rape constituted nonconsensual sexual intercourse without reference to force. American jurisdictions added the force requirement to supply external evidence of nonconsent, probably because of rampant, sexist distrust of rape victims. Exclusive reliance on force as the indicator of nonconsent has prevented more careful consideration of other types of pressures that also invalidate consent. Today, many state legislatures have solved this problem by enacting statutes making certain forms of fraud or coercion illegal in the context of accomplishing sexual intercourse. Others have disconnected the substantive link between force and nonconsent by explicitly altering one or another of these requirements. Finally, a substantial minority outlaw at least one form of nonconsensual sexual offense without force, returning to rape's common law formulation.

\[\textit{4. Conclusion}\]

In summary, the doctrinal element of force in traditional rape law does not present an insurmountable obstacle to the criminalization of rape by fraud or rape by coercion. First, rape law has sufficient doctrinal space to accommodate a conception of force broader

\[\textit{derstand}, \textit{supra} \textit{note 24}, \textit{at} 414 ("Free choice may be thwarted by compulsion of the body through physical violence, or more subtly by the creation of false belief through deception."); \textit{Schulhofer}, \textit{Sexual Autonomy}, \textit{supra} \textit{note 9}, \textit{at} 45 ("Many of the ways to defeat a person's will are not usually thought to involve force: trickery, stealth, (possibly) economic leverage.").\]

\[\textit{556 Global criminal consent provisions often include trilogy of force, duress, or deception. See \textit{supra} \textit{notes} 349-354 and accompanying text.}\]

\[\textit{557 See \textit{Larson}, \textit{Women Understand}, \textit{supra} \textit{note} 24, \textit{at} 412 (noting greater protection against fraud in commercial than sexual spheres); \textit{Schulhofer}, \textit{Sexual Autonomy}, \textit{supra} \textit{note} 9, \textit{at} 89 (observing that from "commercial transactions to medical procedures and surgery, material misrepresentations are widely acknowledged as sufficient to invalidate consent. Yet current law does not proscribe nondisclosure or even active, affirmative misrepresentations to induce sexual intimacy in most contexts.").}\]

\[\textit{558 See \textit{supra} \textit{Part II.E.}}\]
than physical harm. Moreover, state legislatures have already enacted a new genre of sexual offenses that explicitly alter, replace, or eliminate the force requirement of traditional rape law. Second, the costs of expanding rape law to include nonforcible fraud and coercion are relatively small and the benefits considerable when compared to retaining the unitary concept of violent rape. In addition, the theft analogy provides a valuable paradigm for punishing both forcible and nonforcible offenses. Third, the real focus in rape law should be consent. Force, although an important method of corroborating nonconsent, should not prevent examination of other factors that also undermine consent such as fraud and coercion.

B. The Nonconsent Requirement

The second major challenge inherent in cases of rape by fraud and rape by coercion concerns rape law’s doctrinal requirement of nonconsent. The common denominator of cases involving physical force, fraud, and coercion is the effect of these pressures on consent. Simply put, the central question is whether a victim’s fraudulently induced or nonphysically coerced consent is valid, depriving the defendant’s conduct of criminality, or whether the offender’s use of fraud or coercion vitiates the victim’s seeming consent. Another way of posing this inquiry, one suggested by Schulhofer, is: does yes always mean yes? Because modern rape law has recognized some forms of fraud or coercion as vitiating consent, the narrower problem is where to draw the line be-

559 Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 418-19, comments: “A victim’s will may be bent to the coercer’s ends by means other than physical force. Force, fear, and fraud work in much the same way: The wrongdoer arranges the victim’s world so that the act he wants her to perform appears as her best choice. . . . For the duration of the threat or the deception, the coercer has captured the victim’s will for his own ends.”

560 Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation, supra note 134, at 59, conceptualizes the question as follows: “Where ‘consent’ to the particular act has in fact been given by the woman concerned, is the charge of rape thereby ousted, or does the fraud vitiate the consent, thus validating a charge that the man has had carnal knowledge of the woman without her consent?”

561 Schulhofer, Gender Question, supra note 10, at 135, comments: “Once a ‘no’ means ‘no,’ the next generation of issues will center on when or whether ‘yes’ is sufficient to mean ‘yes.’ What happens when the ‘yes’ is produced by intimidation, indirect pressure, or manipulation?”

562 Some argue that these may be exceptions rather than the rule. See Chamallas, supra note 17, at 830 (“It might be claimed that the current legal prohibitions against deception in sexual relationships are exceptions to a more general rule that immunizes
tween effective and ineffective consent in cases of fraud and coercion. Schulhofer comments:

Despite the undoubted value of legal analysis or cultural criticism that points to commonalities between physical violence and social, economic, or psychological pressure, the job of legal scholarship is not finished until a workable boundary between permitted and regulated conduct has been identified. And in the case of rape, the boundary problem is acute.

This section explores various formulations of how to draw the line in both the fraud and coercion contexts.

1. Fraud

a. Traditional Formulations

i. Fraud in the Factum vs. Fraud in the Inducement

The traditional formula for distinguishing legally valid from invalid consent in fraud cases is the dichotomy between fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement. Perkins and Boyce
describe such concepts as follows:

The general rule is that if deception causes a misunderstanding as to the fact itself (fraud in the factum) there is no legally-recognized consent because what happened is not that for which consent was given; whereas consent induced by fraud is as effective as any other consent, so far as direct and immediate legal consequences are concerned, if the deception relates not to the thing done but merely to some collateral matter (fraud in the inducement).\textsuperscript{567}

The authors maintain that the most striking illustration of this dichotomy occurs in rape law,\textsuperscript{568} supporting their thesis with the following example. If a doctor falsely tells a woman that sexual intercourse is necessary for her treatment and she agrees, no rape occurred because the doctor's misrepresentation constitutes fraud in the inducement and the resulting consent is effective. On the other hand, if the doctor pretends to perform a routine pelvic exam and instead has sexual intercourse with the woman, then it is rape because this is fraud in the factum which vitiates her consent. The woman never consented to sexual intercourse because she was deceived about the act itself.\textsuperscript{569} In fact, the court in \textit{Boro v. Superior}\textsuperscript{570} relied on this classic distinction. As discussed \textit{supra} in Part I.A.1, \textit{Boro} involved a feigned doctor who told his victims that sexual intercourse was a necessary treatment to cure their fatal blood disorder. The \textit{Boro} court held that the defendant's lies constituted fraud in the inducement, the victims' consent was effective, and, therefore, defendant was not found guilty of rape.\textsuperscript{571}

Likewise, the \textit{Restatement of Torts} recognizes the factum-inducement dichotomy. Consent is ineffective if induced by a substan-
tial mistake as to the nature of the invasion or the extent of harm
and it is induced by another or known to him.\textsuperscript{572} However,

If the consent is induced by mistake concerning other matters, the rule
does not apply. \ldots Sometimes this is expressed by saying that the con-
sent is "voidable," but not "void" sometimes by saying that the mistake
goes merely to the "inducement" of the consent, rather than to the es-
sence of what is consented to; sometimes by saying that it goes merely to
a "collateral matter."\textsuperscript{573}

Moreover, even contract law recognizes the void-voidable dichoto-
my depending upon whether the fraud occurred in the execution or
in the inducement.\textsuperscript{574}

Despite widespread adoption, the factum-inducement distinc-
tion is objectionable on several grounds. First, some commentators
argue it is of dubious origin and question its emergence, at least in
the torts context.\textsuperscript{575} Second, and more importantly, scholars sug-
gest that the distinction makes no sense and provides little real
assistance in differentiating between legally effective and ineffective
consent: \textsuperscript{576}

Although superficially appealing, the traditional dichotomy between es-

sential and collateral matters breaks down in application and has little
predictive value. \ldots Recent scholarship has rejected the traditional fac-
tum/inducement dichotomy and has held that if the mistake materially
affects the plaintiff's decision-making process, the consent is invalid—but,
again, only if the mistake is known to the defendant.\textsuperscript{577}

In particular, the predictive utility of the distinction has been seri-
ously undermined by its elastic application in rape cases.\textsuperscript{578} Re-

\begin{itemize}
\item[^{572}] \textsc{Restatement (Second) of Torts} § 892B(2) (1977).
\item[^{573}] \textit{Id.} § 892B cmt. g (1965). The illustration accompanying this provision concerns
giving a prostitute or gigolo a counterfeit bill. \textit{Id.} at § 892B cmt. g, illus. 9 (1977).
\item[^{574}] The contract distinction seems to have spilled over into the marriage area. For
instance, section 106.030 of Oregon statutes, \textsc{Ore. Rev. Stat.} § 106.030 (1996), provides
for voidable marriages when "the consent of either party is obtained by
force or fraud, \ldots ."
\item[^{575}] The distinction appeared in the \textsc{First Restatement of Torts}; before the \textsc{Restatement},
scholars either did not discuss this issue or concluded that all forms of fraud vitiated
consent. David A. Fischer, \textit{Fraudulently Induced Consent to Intentional Torts}, 46 CINCI-

\item[^{576}] See \textit{id.} at 71 ("[T]here is no basis for the distinction. Fraud always invalidates
consent, whether the fraud relates to the tortuous nature of the act or to matters of in-
ducement."); see also Fowler V. Harper et al., \textsc{1 the law of torts} 303 (2d ed. 1986)
(citing Fischer and concluding case law on the distinction thin); Stuart M. Speiser et
al., \textsc{1 the American law of torts} § 5:7, 800 (1983) (citing Fischer).
\item[^{577}] Vincent R. Johnson, \textit{Mastering torts} 42 (1995) (emphasis added).
\item[^{578}] See also Puttkammer, supra note 5, at 423 ("But in fact there is little profit in any


call, for instance, the legal sleight of hand used by the court in *Regina v. Dee*, a husband impersonation case, to bring the defendant's conduct within the purview of rape law.\(^7\) Although impersonation cases were commonly thought to involve fraudulent inducement, the court held that the woman had consented to marital intercourse not adultery, which constituted fraud in the factum; therefore, the impersonator's fraud vitiated her consent.\(^8\) While some authors defend this example, arguing that the courts are not disagreeing about the underlying principle but only its application, Feinberg comments: "there is a danger in packing too much into the description of what was consented to, since it could undermine altogether the distinction between fraud in the *factum* and fraud in the inducement."\(^5\) Ambiguity in the description of the consented-to act similarly arises in fraudulent treatment cases\(^8\) and in the sexual theft context.\(^5\)

Third, the factum-inducement dichotomy fails to accurately distinguish degrees of voluntariness. Feinberg maintains that the real distinction should not be between fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement but "between those cases of fraud in the inducement that reduce the voluntariness of consent substantially and event in speaking of 'fundamental differences' as contrasted with 'merely collateral circumstances'; the dividing line may too easily be drawn where the speaker wishes and the arbitrary nature of his choice be covered by such terms of mere camouflage."\(^*)\) (footnote omitted).

\(^7\) *Regina v. Dee*, 15 Cox 579 (1884); see also Scutt, *Fraudulent Impersonation*, supra note 134, at 63-65 (discussing case).

\(^8\) *Dee*, 15 Cox at 579; see also Scutt, *supra* note 134, at 63-65 (discussing this case).

\(^5\) Feinberg, *supra* note 18, at 335; see also *id.* at 344-45 (discussing difference between husband impersonators and medical misrepresentation).

\(^*\) Feinberg, *supra* note 18, at 335, comments: The consent to intercourse with a physician when fraudulently induced by medical misrepresentations, for example, could be reclassified as fraud in the *factum* and therefore rape after all, since the woman could always argue that though she consented to sexual intercourse, she was not consenting to what in fact was done, but rather to an act of therapy that was not in fact administered.

Later, he adds "But there is no reason in principle why sex by fraudulent inducement in cases where it is plausibly harmful (as in our example) ought not to be a crime." *Id.* at 341; see also *State v. Quinlan*, 596 N.E.2d 28 (1992) (victim consented to medical procedure, not acts of sexual penetration; thus, consent vitiated because obtained by deceit).

\(^5\) See *JOHNSON*, *supra* note 577, at 42 ("Surely, the gigolo's mistake . . . relates to those facts which determine whether the liaison was offensive to him or whether he suffered mental aggravation.").
those that do not."\(^{584}\) Schulhofer similarly comments: "[A]t least some frauds in the inducement are sufficiently serious to invalidate consent and justify criminal punishment."\(^{585}\) Courts' adherence to the formulaic factum-inducement distinction thwarts serious inquiry into these more significant and finer-grained differences.

Finally, Perkins and Boyce assert that the distinction is only "controlling in the prosecution of offenses in which absence of consent is an element of the crime, but unimportant in the prosecution of other offenses."\(^{586}\) In battery and larceny cases, they argue, all types of fraud render consent invalid.\(^{587}\) Harris disagrees with this basic premise, asserting that other crimes, such as assault and robbery, also require nonconsent.\(^{588}\) Her argument reinforces the notion that the real difference is not doctrinal (i.e., whether the nonconsent element is explicit or implicit) but rather the differential treatment of fraud in the context of rape as compared to other crimes. Moreover, under Perkins and Boyce's analysis, the factum-inducement distinction may lose its significance in states with provisions explicitly altering the nonconsent element or with new statutory crimes such as sexual battery or sexual extortion, depending upon the elements required for conviction. Notably, courts in Hawaii, Tennessee, and Wisconsin have recently eschewed the distinction by holding that it was irrelevant under their respective sexual offense statutes.\(^{589}\)

ii. Nature and Quality of Act and Identity

A second formulation, very similar to the factum-inducement dichotomy and appearing in British and Canadian cases, is fraud as to the nature or quality of the act or the identity of the defen-

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\(^{584}\) Feinberg, supra note 18, at 335.

\(^{585}\) Schulhofer, Gender Question, supra note 10, at 135-36.

\(^{586}\) PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 475, at 1084; see also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note x, at 479 ("However, as to other offenses where consent is only sometimes a defense, such as battery, both forms of deception may be considered unlawful and thus a bar to effective consent.").

\(^{587}\) In an old larceny case, the court held "fraud supplied the place of force." PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 475, at 1083 (quoting Pear's Case, 2 East P.C. 685 (1779)).

\(^{588}\) Harris, supra note 12, at 638-40 (analogizing rape to robbery and assault as nonconsensual, forcible versions of ordinary interactions).

Commentators, however, have also criticized this formulation for its elasticity: "But once the courts admit that a consent to a touching or intercourse can be vitiated by the fraudulent concealment of the purposes of the accused, then the problem of where to draw the line becomes acute. The expression 'the nature and quality of the act' does not help the courts to solve this problem." This formulation seems no more satisfactory than others because it still begs the question of what constitutes the act to which the victim consented. Its explicit inclusion of identity fraud, however, does resolve the impersonation aspect of rape by fraud, a strategy not emulated in other formulations. Rather than debating whether deception as to identify constitutes fraud in the factum or fraud in the inducement, this formulation bypasses that classification and explicitly provides that identity fraud vitiates consent.

b. Commentators' Suggestions

Abandoning the traditional formulation of fraud in the factum versus fraud in the inducement, legal commentators have made some suggestions, varying in degrees of specificity, about how to draw the line between valid and invalid consent in cases of rape by fraud. These scholarly approaches fall into the following three overarching categories: (1) voluntariness or autonomy, (2) materiality, and (3) totality of the circumstances.

590 See also Puttkammer, supra note 5, at 424 (suggesting drawing the line between cases where victim knows she was consenting to sexual intercourse and those where she did not). Statutes in Arizona, Nebraska, and California use this language. See supra Part II.C.

591 Hooper, supra note 563, at 121.

592 Koh, supra note 328, at 92-94 (discussing medical treatment cases). In England, Parliament also passed the Sexual Offenses Act of 1956, making it a misdemeanor to procure a woman to have sexual intercourse by false pretenses or false representations. However, because the scope of this provision is unclear, Koh suggests construing it more broadly than nature of the act or identity.

It is hoped the courts would give it a liberal construction and consider the types of misrepresentation that are likely to induce a woman to have sexual intercourse, to which but for the representation, she would not so consent. For example, a misrepresentation as to a person's health such as in Clarence's case should be serious enough to merit punishment but not, it is submitted, if it involves a misrepresentation of a person's wealth or family connections. Id. at 94 (referring to Regina v. Clarence, (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23, 43-44.).
i. Voluntariness or Autonomy

In one of the most thorough treatments of fraudulently procured consent, 593 Feinberg argues that the real question is what types of fraud reduce the voluntariness of consent to a level that should not be recognized as legally effective. He classifies fraudulent inducements as follows: (1) bluffing threats (extortionate fraud), (2) bluffing warnings, (3) false promises, and (4) other false pretenses. Bluffing threats are really a form of coercion and not fraud because the real harm comes from its extortionate aspect. Bluffing warnings combine fraud and coercion "in such a way that the coercive pressure that reduces the voluntariness of the victim's consent would not exist but for her fraudulently induced false belief." 594 The worse the threatened harm, the less voluntary is the consent. 595 Feinberg would outlaw Boro-like 596 fraudulent treatment cases under this second category based on the coercive nature of the false warning. The third category, false promises, affects voluntariness because the victim does not assume the risk of default; these should be actionable as rape or gross sexual imposition if they are coercive enough (i.e., avoiding or eliminating an intolerable evil rather than offering an attractive prospect). For instance, Feinberg argues that criminal law should subsume the actions of a wealthy man who falsely promises to financially assist the mother of a sick child in return for her sexual favors but not the actions of the same rich man who merely offers a desirable, but not desperately needed, alternative to the woman. Finally, Feinberg discusses several types of fraudulent inducements in his fourth category, other false pretenses, positing the same coerciveness distinction. 597 He excludes from criminal sanction, for example, a rock-star impersonator who exploits a fan's mistake as to his identity to accomplish sexual intercourse. In summary, Feinberg finds fraud objectionable when its effect on consent is too coercive. 598 While his proposal is more

593 Feinberg, supra note 18.
594 Feinberg, supra note 18, at 343.
595 Feinberg, supra note 18, at 343, adds: "If we use objective standards of voluntariness and require also that the warning be at least minimally credible, then the voluntariness of the procured consent might also vary with degree of credibility."
597 Feinberg, supra note , at 344-45.
598 BOK, supra note 50, at 22, comments: "Deception, then, can be coercive. When it succeeds, it can give power to the deceiver—power that all who suffer the consequences of lies would not wish to abdicate."
expansive than the factum-inducement distinction, subsuming Boro for instance, it still may not be broad enough to cover many sexual scam cases because of its emphasis on coerciveness.

On the other hand, Schulhofer advocates focusing on sexual autonomy as the central precept of rape law and outlawing illegitimate pressures in causing someone to submit to sexual intercourse. In the fraud context, where he believes no clear consensus exists, he argues that the autonomy perspective helps identify some forms of deception that are "indefensible intrusions on freedom of choice." Schulhofer specifically mentions falsehoods about pecuniary interest, nondisclosure or misrepresentations involving significant health risks and adds that any deceptions "intended to create feelings of isolation, physical jeopardy, or economic insecurity should likewise be considered unprivileged and an unwarranted intrusion on autonomous choice." He remains more wary of misstatements concerning emotions or commitment to a relationship. Schulhofer's proposal, like Feinberg's, is more expansive than the traditional factum-inducement distinction because it includes falsehoods regarding pecuniary interests and health issues. Moreover, his comment regarding deceptions strongly resembles Feinberg's emphasis on coerciveness.

Finally, Bogart advocates defining rape simply as nonconsensual sexual intercourse. Judging, on standard philosophical grounds, the four possible conceptualizations of rape, i.e., as forcible, coerced, nonvoluntary, or nonconsensual, Bogart concludes that the superior definition is one based on nonconsent. He defines nonconsensual sex as existing "[w]here participation is not willing, not chosen freely, not chosen without the application or presence of external pressures, ...." Bogart posits a nonconsensual model of rape as the preferable choice because of its ability to cover a broad spectrum of scenarios, including those involving deception. He argues that fraud cases distinguish the nonconsent and nonvoluntary models: Specifically, "Because the beliefs un-

599 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 92.
600 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 93.
601 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 93.
602 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 93.
603 Bogart, supra note 327, at 118.
604 Bogart, supra note 327, at 118; see also Chamallas, supra note 17, at 814 (discussing refurbished model of consent which is not "freely given if secured through physical force, economic pressure, or deception").
605 Bogart asserts that nonvoluntary sex includes forcible and coerced sex as well as
derlying the action are false, although the action itself is voluntary, there is no effective consent. Consequently, the cases may be termed instances of rape under the nonconsent model. Under the nonvoluntary model, these are cases of simple seduction. For Bogart, then, rape law should focus on the falsity of the victim's belief, rendering the resulting consent ineffective, rather than on the coerciveness of the fraudulent inducement. This more expansive approach is shared by Larson and Bok in their discussions of sexual fraud and lying. All three scholars opine that deception prevents the victim from having information necessary for an informed choice.

The major critique of the voluntariness or autonomy approach is two-fold. First, some feminists argue that autonomy is illusory in a culture in which women occupy a subordinate role and that all forms of sexual intercourse are coerced to some degree. Second, they argue that the liberal idea of rights embedded in the autonomy perspective is more male-oriented and does not take into account women's feelings. Chamallas, for example, proposes a notion of mutuality that goes beyond consensual sex. While these critiques are valid, they fail to offer an alternative method of distinguishing valid and invalid consent. West is the most helpful by suggesting that rape law should not ask about consent but rather about the legitimacy of the pressures brought to bear on victims.

cooperation due to "compelling circumstantial pressures." If lack of cooperation results in serious inconvenience or substantial harm, the sex is nonvoluntary; examples include unemployment and being abandoned in an unfamiliar place. Bogart, supra note 327, at 18. One example of a court adopting a nonvoluntary approach is Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335, 1335 (Pa. 1988).

Bogart, supra note 327, at 120.

606 Bok, supra note 50, at 20 ("They see that they were manipulated, that the deceit made them unable to make choices for themselves according to the most adequate information available, unable to act as they would have wanted to act had they known all along."); Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 414, 422.

608 See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 17, at 783 ("[F]eminists have contended that the liberal notion of rights is inadequate to protect women against the coercive power exercised by men in society."); Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2175-76 (discussing dominance approach of MacKinnon).

609 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 796.

610 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 784.

611 West, supra note 499, at 1459.
ii. The Materiality Approach

Commentator's second approach to determining whether consent is legally effective, derived from criminal and civil fraud law, is to focus on the nature of the misrepresentation, particularly its materiality to the victim's decision-making process. Estrich, in her proposal to criminally punish actors using fraud to obtain sexual intercourse in the same manner as actors using fraud to obtain money, describes the relevant category of fraud as "deceptions of material fact." This approach would have three basic components: (1) the misrepresentation must be material, (2) the victim's reliance must be reasonable, and (3) the actor must have intended to mislead when making the misrepresentation.

Larson advocates the adoption in the civil arena of a modern tort of sexual fraud, a modified version of an action for intentional misrepresentation applied to lies told to induce sexual consent. Some of Larson's ideas supporting tort liability for achieving sexual intercourse by fraud may be adapted to criminal law, although the two systems obviously serve different functions. Larson's new tort of sexual fraud provides:

One who fraudulently makes a representation of fact, opinion, intention, or law, for the purpose of inducing another to consent to sexual relations in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for serious physical, pecuniary, and emotional loss caused to the recipient by his or her justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.

This sexual fraud tort would require an intentional misrepresentation, (i.e., knowledge of falsity and calculated to mislead), mate-

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612 Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1182.
613 See also Feinberg, supra note 18, at 343 (discussing requirement that bluffing warning be at least minimally credible).
614 With respect to the intent, one way of narrowing the class of behavior that might fall within the purview of rape by fraud is to insert a heightened intent requirement, for example, the specific intent to cause the victim to submit through the use of fraud. Kansas's rape statute prohibits two types of knowing misrepresentations. See supra notes 297-298 and accompanying text. Bok defines a lie as "an intentionally deceptive message in the form of a statement." BOK, supra note 50, at 15. She distinguishes cases in which the person intends to deceive the other person from those in which the person is self-deceiving. Id.
615 Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 453.
616 Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 453.
riality (i.e., whether a reasonable person would act on it), and justifiable reliance (i.e., was it justified under the circumstances).

Chamallas, who is skeptical about whether the law is at a stage of development where deception is generally regarded as an impermissible inducement to sex, comments: "Perhaps the principal impediment to criminalizing rape by fraud is the desire to avoid the difficult task of choosing which lies will be treated as material and which will be dismissed as insignificant." Chamallas appears to favor a tort action like Larson's, although she worries such liability might interfere with "the universal interest in ending unwanted relationships." However, she adds: "This concern could be met by limiting recovery to cases in which a plaintiff proves that the defendant consciously misrepresented a material fact with the purpose of inducing sex," thereby adopting the major components of Larson's proposed tort.

Several other scholars discuss an approach to rape by fraud cases which strongly resembles the materiality approach. Dripps, in proposing to treat cases of sex secured by fraud as theft of services, emphasizes that most sexual relationships are complex and would limit criminal liability to a narrow class of deception:

No single representation causes sexual cooperation; a host of causes are in play. A prospective lover can be talented, beautiful, and rich, but still somehow unacceptable. By contrast, the theft-of-services statutes only punish representations made in bad faith when the representation is a necessary and sufficient condition for obtaining the service.

Dripps's approach requires a higher standard for the misrepresentation than Larson's but still focuses on the causal connection between the statement and sexual relations. Feinberg also notes that

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617 One torts treatise states: "Material . . . means not . . . decisive, but . . . given [some] weight in the decision-making process." Johnson, supra note 528, at 42. The book asserts the gigolo may be able to maintain an action for battery under a materiality theory because "[s]urely, the gigolo's mistake . . . relates to those facts which determine whether the liaison was offensive to him or whether he suffered mental aggravation." Id.

618 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 833 (footnote omitted).

619 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 835.

620 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 835.

621 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1803. Dripps is also concerned with the slippery slope argument; he worries that the criminalization of rape by fraud would lead inevitably to the "sweeping criminalization of sex, including, most prominently, recriminalizing adultery." Id. He adds that sexual fraud cases are premature until the civil law enforces contracts for sexual services. Men, Women, and Rape, supra note 194, at 145 (remarks by Dripps).

622 Dripps' proposal seems only to make sense in the relatively rare cases in which
one possible way of grading fraudulently induced beliefs is according to their centrality to the victim's decision-making process. As discussed above, however, he prefers an alternate conceptual approach to ranking false beliefs.

The major critique of the materiality approach concerns its feasibility. Subotnik, for instance, questions whether a sexual fraud tort is really workable. Similarly, Posner discusses the difficulty of litigating over false statements about feelings. He believes that women should take self-protective measures against fraud by potential sexual partners rather than punishing those who perpetrate the fraud.

iii. Totality of the Circumstances

In an article written more than twenty years ago, Harris argues that the criminal law "has not yet developed a principled standard of effective nonconsent in rape." To fill this void, she suggests: "Principles that should guide the current controversy over consent in rape can be derived from an examination of policies that govern the meaning of effective consent in other situations where one person violates another's safety and freedom of choice." More specifically, Harris proposes that courts look at the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether the victim validly consented to sexual intercourse. She likens this inquiry to that conducted in search-and-seizure cases: "To best protect fourth amendment interests, courts require that effective consent be informed, specific to the scope of the search, and uncontaminated by any physical or

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the victim was a prostitute and offered her sexual services for sale, but not in other noncommercial cases in which the woman's sexual integrity is impugned. See also Reed, supra note 197 (suggesting the use of the crime of obtaining services by deception in cases involving prostitutes in England).

Feinberg, supra note 18, at 341, asks whether mistaken belief is the whole reason, a sufficient condition or critical element thereof, a necessary but insufficient reason, or a mere consideration for consenting.

See supra notes 593-597 and accompanying text.

Subotnik, supra notes 433-438.

POSNER, supra note 487, at 393.

POSNER, supra note 487, at 393.

See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(b) (West 1998) (duress for rape tested by the totality of the circumstances).

Harris, supra note 12, at 613.

Harris, supra note 12, at 637.

Harris, supra note 12, at 645.
mental coercion."\textsuperscript{632} Harris's proposal is also similar to the paradigm of informed consent used in medical treatment cases.\textsuperscript{633}

c. Legislative Enactments

State legislatures have approached the line-drawing problem in criminalizing rape by fraud cases from several different angles, providing a fertile field of alternative statutory solutions. First, some states simply outlaw fraud in the context of certain professional relationships. Several medical-treatment statutes, for instance, explicitly mention fraud or deceit, while others emphasize the unprofessional or unethical nature of the conduct, arguably including fraudulent practices.\textsuperscript{634} Similarly, a number of states rely on the notions of therapeutic deception or emotional dependence in psychotherapist-patient provisions.\textsuperscript{635} These enactments embody the legislative judgment that fraud is totally inappropriate in certain alliances between vulnerable patients and those holding positions of trust.\textsuperscript{636} Moreover, these statutes embody the corollary proposition that fraud is generally more coercive in these contexts than outside them, lending tacit support to Feinberg's and Schulhofer's emphasis on coerciveness.

Second, some states specify a limited set of conditions involving fraud under which victim consent, as traditionally understood, does not relieve the defendant of criminal sexual liability.\textsuperscript{637} In addition to older provisions outlawing husband impersonation, fraud as to the nature of the act, fraudulent administration of drugs, or seduction, three states punish a form of sexual offense when the victim concededly consented to the conduct. Alabama punishes

\textsuperscript{632} Harris, supra note 12, at 642. She does not favor looking at consent in terms of duress.

\textsuperscript{633} See also \textsc{Restatement (Second) of Torts} § 57 cmt. 9, illus. 2 (1977) (discussing providing intercourse for counterfeit money); Schulhofer, \textit{Feminist Challenge}, supra note 8, at 2181 (discussing consent in the context of medical procedure).

\textsuperscript{634} See supra notes 279-288 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{635} See supra notes 289-300 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{636} See also \textsc{Fairstein}, supra note 47, at 197 (arguing legislation particularly needed when defendant serves professionally as victim's caretaker or in similar position of trust); Larson, \textit{Women Understand}, supra note 24, at 411 (concurring in her discussion of tort liability for sexual fraud). \textit{But see} Jeffrey A. Barker, Comment, \textit{Professional-Client Sex: Is Criminal Liability an Appropriate Means of Enforcing Professional Responsibility?}, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1275 (1993) (arguing against a broad application of criminal sanctions).

\textsuperscript{637} See supra notes 339-348 and accompanying text.
sexual activity if consent is obtained by any fraud or artifice, \(^{638}\) California requires consent be induced by fear based on fraud, \(^{639}\) and Kansas requires consent be secured by the defendant’s knowing misrepresentations regarding necessity or authority. \(^{640}\)

Each of these statutes represents a unique legislative judgment about the effects of certain types of fraud on consent. The provisions in California and Kansas, based largely on fraudulent coercion, are similar to suggestions made by Feinberg and Schulhofer. Kansas’s knowing-misrepresentation standard also adopts the heightened intent requirement emphasized in the materiality approach. Alabama’s treatment of fraud in the sexual context as a misdemeanor or represents a more general judgment that fraud is a less serious inducement than force. While these statutes are useful because they describe the types of fraudulent misrepresentations that are so egregious as to render a defendant’s conduct criminal in the face of consent, they also cover only a limited range of scenarios. They represent a strategy that has characterized rape by fraud—piecemeal solutions to a more global problem.

A third legislative approach is that adopted by Tennessee which simply rewrote its rape and sexual battery statutes to include instances in which sexual penetration or contact is accomplished by fraud. \(^{641}\) The primary benefit of Tennessee’s approach is that it defines the offense broadly, not triggering the limitations inherent in the other two approaches. However, the problem is ascertaining what types of fraud make consent invalid. Although Tennessee’s courts have eschewed the factum-inducement distinction, \(^{642}\) it remains unclear how the state distinguishes effective and ineffective consent in the fraud context. Further legislative guidance seems preferable, perhaps in the guise of a nonexclusive list of the types of misrepresentations that fall inside or outside (e.g., relating solely to emotional ties or the intimacies of a romantic relationship) the statute’s purview.

Finally, some state legislatures have explicitly altered the consent standard by including global consent provisions in their crimi-

\(^{638}\) See supra notes 336-338 and accompanying text.

\(^{639}\) See supra notes 339-340 and accompanying text. But see Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 93 n.136 (suggesting California’s statute does not add much to current rape doctrine).

\(^{640}\) See supra notes 341-342 and accompanying text.

\(^{641}\) See supra notes 331-335 and accompanying text.

nal codes which state that consent is ineffective if obtained by force, duress, or deception.\textsuperscript{643} These enactments are not tied to particular status relationships or specific types of misrepresentations but provide that deception is an illegitimate inducement across the board. Moreover, because these consent provisions arguably apply to all crimes, not simply sexual ones, they equalize the treatment of deception in rape law with its treatment in other criminal contexts. However, it remains unclear whether in practice states actually apply these global consent provisions to sexual offenses. If they do not apply them, then victims of sexual exploitation receive no protection. If they do, the problem is knowing what types of deception make consent ineffective—the line-drawing problem again. Will these statutes harken back, for instance, to the inducement-factum distinction? The first step in developing these statutes may be to insert language or commentary explicitly making them applicable to sexual offenses. Second, further definition similar to Tennessee’s statute may be useful although case law may have already fleshed out the contours of deception in nonsexual contexts for application to rape cases.

d. Conclusion

Diversity of opinion continues to exist regarding the appropriate parameters of legally effective consent in cases of rape by fraud. In general, both commentators’ suggestions and legislative enactments are more expansive than the traditional factum-inducement dichotomy and, thereby, offer greater protection to potential victims. The current stream of legal thought is decidedly pointing in the direction of a more thorough examination of the basis of victim consent and the effect of defendants’ fraud on the voluntariness of that consent, rather than adherence to a formalistic distinction. What Larson terms the “sex exception to fraud” may be slowly eroding.\textsuperscript{644} This trend coincides with movements in the tort and contract realms, where the emphasis seems to be shifting toward a materiality standard. Within this larger intellectual movement lies a smaller trend focusing on the coerciveness of fraud. This smaller

\textsuperscript{643} See supra notes 349-361 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{644} Larson, \textit{Women Understand}, supra note 24, at 412 (“I use the shorthand term ‘sex exception to fraud’ when referring to the law’s failure to protect the decision to have sexual relations from coercion by fraud.”).
trend represents a logical starting point for expansion of rape law's coverage because the emphasis on coerciveness resonates with the traditional force element and cases involving coercion per se. A greater challenge inheres in cases where the effect of fraud is not strictly coercive but the denial of information critical (or material) to the victim's decision-making process. The dividing line between valid and invalid consent in rape by fraud cases merits continued attention and development from judicial, legislative, and scholarly quarters.

2. Coercion

Courts, legislatures, and commentators agree to a far greater extent about the propriety of criminally punishing rape by coercion than its fraudulent counterpart. This more robust agreement is likely due to the greater similarity which exists between physical force or threat of force, extreme forms of coercion, and the pressures encompassed by nonphysical coercion. Berger comments: "In general, the notion of submission to threat not only finds a basis in current understandings of force but also invokes the types of concern for sexual autonomy that are wholly absent when a man fraudulently induces a woman to engage in sex." Moreover, coercion cases bypass many of the highly charged problems that have plagued the treatment of fraud in sexual contexts. Thus, Dripps, Schulhofer, and Chamallas, all skeptical to some degree about punishing rape by fraud, endorse outlawing some forms of coercive sexual conduct.

645 Berger, supra note 8, at 77 (also arguing that woman who yields to sex for advancement suffers the same diminution in integrity whether or not man has lied, while a victim of rape by coercion who yields because of intimidation has the right to feel "degraded, not merely duped.").
646 See Chamallas, supra note 17, at 830 ("It is debatable whether the law is at a point where deception is generally regarded as an impermissible inducement to sex. It might be claimed that the current legal prohibitions against deception in sexual relationships are exceptions to a more general rule that immunizes sexual encounters from charges of fraud."); Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1803 ("Applying criminal fraud principles to representations made to initiate relationships more complex than one of simple prostitution invites the sweeping criminalization of sex, including, most prominently recriminalizing adultery. . . . I shall content myself with skepticism about the desirability of doing so."); Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 92 (noting that no clear social consensus exists about when misrepresentations in intimate sexual matters are improper).
This greater unanimity is further reflected in scholarly and legislative proposals for distinguishing between legal and illegal coercive pressures on consent in rape cases. The major line-drawing problem in these cases is the one identified by the MPC: "[T]here are obvious dangers in extending the prospect of criminal sanctions into the shadow area between coercion and bargain. To take an extreme example, the man who ‘threatens’ to withhold an expensive present unless his girlfriend permits his advances is plainly not a fit subject for punishment under the law of rape."\textsuperscript{647} According to the MPC, coercion is overwhelming the victim’s will, while a bargain is merely offering "an unattractive choice to avoid some unwanted alternative."\textsuperscript{648} The same distinction arises in the case law. In \textit{Commonwealth v. Mlinarich},\textsuperscript{649} for instance, the court reasoned that the defendant’s step-daughter could choose between returning to a juvenile detention facility or acceding to defendant’s sexual demands; therefore, her assent was not involuntary.\textsuperscript{650} A second source of dispute is whether coerced sexual contact should be punished as a sexual offense or as nonsexual extortion or coercion.

\subsection*{a. Commentators’ Suggestions}

\subsubsection{i. Extortionate Threats}

Estrich, one of the foremost proponents of the criminalization of rape by coercion, argues that rape law should comprehend instances in which the criminal actor secures sexual contact through extortionate threats; more specifically, she proposes punishing sex secured by extortion in the same manner as the law prohibits extortion to obtain money—at least as a starting point.\textsuperscript{651} Confronting

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\textsuperscript{647} See \textit{MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1} cmt. at 312 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see also Berger, \textit{supra} note 8, at 76 (opposing criminalizing situations in which victim does not get bargained-for exchange).

\textsuperscript{648} \textit{MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1} commentary at 314 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see also Feinberg, \textit{supra} note 18, at 344 (using similar test); Chamallas, \textit{supra} note 17, at 820 ("When the [economic] pressure is regarded as unlawful, it is labeled coercion; when it is lawful, it is likely to be called a bargain." (footnote omitted)).

\textsuperscript{649} 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988).

\textsuperscript{650} \textit{Id.} at 1341. The court added: "Certainly difficult choices have a coercive effect but the result is the product of the reason, albeit unpleasant and reluctantly made." \textit{Id.} at 1342.

\textsuperscript{651} Estrich, \textit{Rape, supra} note 7, at 1120 ("It is almost certainly impossible to expect

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the line-drawing question of whether rape law can effectively regulate sexual bargains, Estrich argues that the task is not impossible because extortion law already prohibits a broad range of threats. Estrich also believes that the inclusion of coerced sex under nonsexual criminal coercion statutes is a poor alternative to expanding rape law's coverage because such other statutes do not emphasize that the loss of bodily integrity is far more serious than monetary loss.

Dripps, as noted earlier, proposes treating sexual autonomy as a commodity and its exploitation as analogous to theft. Although Dripps suggests that "sexual autonomy means freedom from illegitimate pressures" and that "[c]onsent is only the label we attach to causes of conduct deemed legitimate," he appears to posit that the only illegitimate means worthy of criminal condemnation are force (i.e., his crime of sexually motivated assault) and disregarding an expressed refusal or exploiting a victim's incapacity to consent (i.e., his sexual expropriation offense). This conceptualization offers little by way of expanding the reach of traditional rape law.

In response to Estrich's proposal to outlaw sexual intercourse secured through extortionate threats, Dripps argues: "Extortion can be covered simply by amending the extortion statutes to include sex among the things it is criminal to obtain by unlawful threat." Thus, Dripps, unlike Estrich, believes that nonsexual crimes would adequately redress instances in which the defendant coerced the victim's sexual submission; he makes no provision for the unique harm endemic to sexual offenses.

that the law could address all of the techniques of power and coercion which men use against women in sexual relations.

Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1120.
Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1121.
Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8; see also Donald A. Dripps, More on Distinguishing Sex, Sexual Expropriation, and Sexual Assault: A Reply to Professor West, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1460 (1993). For critiques of Dripps's analysis, see West, supra note 499; Men, Women, supra note 194, at 148-56 (remarks by West).

Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1786-87; see also Coombe, supra note 513, at 80 ("Peller's point is that concepts of consent and coercion which are supposed to be the source of legal interpretation are actually effects of the structure of legal representation.").

Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1807-08 (model statutes).
See also Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2178 (reaching same conclusion about Dripps's proposal).
Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1802.
See also Feinberg, supra note 18, at 335 (discussing bluffing threats or extortionate fraud).
ii. Illegitimate Restraints on Sexual Autonomy

In contrast to Estrich's and Dripps's focus on extortionate threats, several other scholars approach the coercion problem from a more global perspective by suggesting that the appropriate dividing line is between legitimate and illegitimate inducements or restraints on sexual autonomy. For example, West comments: "We might very profitably ask not which sexual practices are consensual or not, but rather which of our sexual practices are legitimate means of obtaining sex and which are not." Even Dripps suggests: "In the rape context, we must grade the pressures to have sex according to their legitimacy—from those pressures to have sex that are perfectly moral, to those that are immoral but not criminal, to those that are criminal, to those that constitute crimes of the most serious sort." While this formulation is promising, it begs the question of what are legitimate and illegitimate restraints?

Schulhofer and Chamallas have attempted to flesh out in greater detail what constitute illegitimate restraints. Schulhofer proposes that the law should focus on women's autonomy which he defines as "the right to protection from those interferences that our culture and our legal system already consider impermissible." Schulhofer's first premise is that consent for sexual intimacy requires affirmative permission clearly signaled by words or conduct and that silence or ambivalence are insufficient to qualify as consent. Second, he seeks to identify the kinds of interferences that violate sexual autonomy in cases in which the victim agrees. Thus, he argues that an employer cannot legitimately trade a promotion for sexual favors, but a man living with a woman may condition continued financial support of her on sexual intimacy because he is validly entitled to pursue sexual fulfillment. In other words, Schulhofer would criminally punish some sexual bargains based on

60 West, supra note 499, at 1459.
61 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1788.
62 Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2180. He also asserts that the dominance approach articulated by Catharine A. MacKinnon and others does not solve the problems in determining what conduct to punish as rape.
63 Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2180-81.
64 Id. at 2182.
65 But see Roberts, supra note 8, at 381-386 (disagreeing with some of Schulhofer's conclusions and arguing that "relying on autonomy replicates the problems I noted earlier of defining rape according to male entitlements to sexual access to women." Id. at 384.).
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the pressure, rather than measuring its effect on the victim. He adds: "This approach identifies a baseline of existing rights, and it leaves room for the evolution in the standards for valid consent." 666

In another article, Schulhofer provides more detail about the "kinds of pressures and constraints that intrude on autonomous choice and render consent ineffective" 667 by identifying four possible categories of illegitimate pressures. Three involve types of coercion: extortionate behavior, institutional or professional authority, and economic power; the fourth, deception, was discussed earlier. 668 Agreeing with Estrich and Dripps, Schulhofer asserts: "[E]xtortionate behavior is already understood to be unprivileged and illegitimate." 669 He also argues that institutional and professional relationships should be protected from sexual exploitation, a position consonant with the burgeoning group of abuse-of-trust and abuse-of-authority statutes reviewed supra in Part II. With respect to institutional authority and economic pressure, Schulhofer notes that "coercion results from altering the [person's] ordinary range of options in a legally impermissible way." 670 In total, Schulhofer provides the broadest, most well-developed categorization of coercive pressures by exploring what it is that makes nonforcible conduct excessively intrusive or coercive, without resort to concepts that are hopelessly open-ended. 671

Chamallas argues that criminal law should refurbish the notion of consent in the context of sexual offenses. 672 Rape law, instead of simply relying on consent, should be based on a new, positive ideal of mutual sexual conduct—"mutuality"—which is also capable of separating moral from exploitative sex. 673 She elaborates: "Under the refurbished version of consent, consent is not considered freely given if secured through physical force, economic pressure,

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666 Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2184.
667 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 77.
668 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 77-93.
669 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 77. Schulhofer argues that if one is not permitted to obtain property by such behavior, then one should not be allowed to obtain sexual acquiescence either.
670 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 85.
671 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 77.
672 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 814.
673 Chamallas defines mutuality as "whether the target would have initiated the encounter", but notes that this standard may be problematic in the criminal context. Chamallas, supra note 17, at 836-37.
or deception"—the "trio of unacceptable inducements." Chamallas's proposal resembles Schulhofer's because of its emphasis on the unacceptability or illegitimacy of pressures causing sexual compliance. It is also expansive because it conjoins force, economic pressure (one type of coercion), and fraud (discussed above) as factors invalidating consent. Chamallas notes that physical force is always considered an illegitimate inducement to sexual intercourse, an assertion that is clearly consistent with traditional rape doctrine. She argues that the case is less clear regarding economic pressure because of the blurry line between coercion and bargain, but adds, "I discern a trend here to regard economic pressure as an unacceptable inducement to sex and to create a range of legal sanctions to discourage economically coerced encounters, even if such sex is not subject to direct criminal sanctions." Although Chamallas's discussion of unacceptable inducements is not as well-developed as Schulhofer's, she agrees with his conclusion that economic pressure is illegitimate.

b. Practical Reforms

State legislatures have adopted three general approaches to the line-drawing problem in cases of rape by coercion. First, the most common tack is to criminalize sexual intercourse between victims and persons holding positions of trust or authority, mirroring Schulhofer's suggestion to the same effect. Coercion is implicit in the abuse-of-trust statutes based on the power inherent in professional authority; it is explicit in the abuse-of-authority provisions, especially those requiring that the criminal defendant use the position of authority to cause submission. Addressing rape law's nonconsent element, several enactments explicitly alter the definition of consent (although a few change the force requirement), while others eliminate consent as a defense, e.g., psychotherapists and prison guards provisions. Finally, some states specifically pro-

674 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 814. She adds: "This trio of unacceptable inducements may not seem exceptional to anyone with a passing acquaintance with twentieth century contract law." Id. at 815.
675 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 816.
676 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 820.
677 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 830.
678 See supra notes 276-327 and accompanying text.
679 See supra notes 311-312 and accompanying text.
hibit sexual extortion in employment. These statutes express a legis-
lation conclusion that coercion, in the form of a position of trust or
authority, is an illegitimate inducement to sexual relations regardless
of consent.

A second major approach adopted by several states is to outlaw
various forms of nonphysical coercion administered to accomplish
sexual intercourse.680 A number of states prohibit threats to retaliate,
including extortion. Several jurisdictions provide for other types
of coercion, such as exposing the victim to public humiliation or
disgrace. Others, modeled after the MPC, do not specify the precise
nature of the threat, but employ a generalized standard such as ren-
dering "a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting."681
These provisions beneficially supplement the abuse enactments by
transcending professional relationships and authoritative positions.

The third major approach involves a few jurisdictions that have
crafted special provisions addressing instances of sexual extortion or
sexual coercion.682 Delaware, the only state with a sexual extor-
tion statute, covers a broad range of extortionate measures such as
exposing secrets or harming another in health, business, or repre-
tation. Hawaii's definition of compulsion includes property damage
and financial loss. New Jersey defines coercion for purposes of
sexual assault by reference to its criminal coercion statute, which
covers the same types of conduct as Delaware's statute. These three
statutory approaches, especially the third, are noteworthy not only
because they tacitly agree with Estrich's position but because they
reflect a normative judgment that sexual intercourse accomplished
by coercive pressure merits punishment as a sexual crime rather
than as nonsexual extortion or criminal coercion.

c. Conclusion

A remarkably strong isomorphic relationship exists between
scholarly suggestions and legislative enactments regarding the types
of coercive pressures that are legally problematic in securing con-
sent to sexual intercourse. This commonality of approach "rests on
the judgment that using one's ability to cause harm in order to

680 See supra notes 277-394 and accompanying text.
682 See supra notes 395-405 and accompanying text; see also State v. Lovely, 480
A.2d 847 (N.H. 1984) (interpreting state's sexual assault statute by referring to theft by
extortion statute).
override the will of a reluctant female is wrongful and should be punished. The best-developed area, especially in terms of statutory enactments, is the abuse of professional or authoritative positions. The widespread criminal condemnation of this behavior is further supported by civil statutes and disciplinary rules that prohibit sexual abuse occurring in these contexts. Extortion or extortionate threats are also well-represented in current enactments, either in statutory variations based on the MPC language or in more specific provisions like Delaware's sexual extortion law. The extortion statutes provide a viable model of thinking about a comprehensive array of nonphysical threats that would be illegal if used to obtain property or money. Finally, the least-developed area concerns economic pressures or inducements, probably because they come closest to the vexatious problem of sexual bargains or, even more broadly, prostitution; this facet of coercion and its effect on consent warrants increased attention from academic and legislative circles.

CONCLUSION

As we have become more civilized, we have come to condemn the more overt, aggressive and outrageous behavior of some men towards women and we have labelled it "rape".

Amid the flux of scholarly debate and practical reform, one thing is clear: The law of rape has not ceased and in all likelihood will not cease to evolve. Nor, arguably, should it, for the law of rape, like any body of law—perhaps more than other bodies of law—reflects changing social attitudes and conditions, normative as well as material.

After more than a century, modern rape law stands on the threshold of resolving the difficult conundrum posed by cases involving rape by fraud and rape by coercion. This legal evolution has awaited certain critical developments in judicial, legislative, and scholarly thought. First, it has taken the gradual proliferation of archetypical fraudulent treatment cases occurring in ever-broadening
professional circles and husband impersonation scenarios spilling over into assorted nonmarital contexts, as well as the steady accumulation of new genres of fraudulent and coercive sex cases more closely resembling commercial-like fraud, property-like offenses, and authoritative abuse, to recognize the patterns of sexual predation inherent in these crimes. Second, state legislatures have had to undergo two successive waves of rape reform before most were willing to respond to repeated judicial invitations for reform and to seriously confront the specter of criminalizing this conduct. Altering the force and nonconsent elements of traditional rape law in innovative ways, these legislative bodies have enacted five different statutory solutions to the problems posed by cases of rape by fraud and rape by coercion. Finally, it has required countless scholarly articles and commentary addressing the historical, doctrinal, philosophical, and political aspects of rape law and, more specifically, the function of force and the meaning of consent in sexual offenses to augur change in this area. Today, as a result of these synergistic developments, it would not be an overstatement to assert that the crucial question is no longer whether to criminalize rape by fraud and rape by coercion but rather when (or under what circumstances) to do so. If, as one author argues, rape law developed into its traditional formula because of inordinate attention to rape by fraud cases, these cases (and those involving coercion) currently provide an opportunity to recalibrate the outer boundaries of acceptable sexual conduct between members of our society. As the twenty-first century approaches, the evolution of rape law to condemn those persons who accomplish sexual intercourse by means of fraud or coercion is long overdue.

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688 Harris, supra note 12, at 628.
689 State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992) ("Today the law of sexual assault is indispensable to the system of legal rules that assures each of us the right to decide who may touch our bodies, when, and under what circumstances.").