Fighting the Germans. Fighting the Germs: Cleveland's Response to the 1918-1919 Spanish Flu Epidemic

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FIGHTING THE GERMANS. FIGHTING THE GERMS.
CLEVELAND’S RESPONSE TO THE
1918-19 SPANISH FLU EPIDEMIC

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Epidemics and disease are often overlooked in historical inquiries. This is unfortunate for a number of reasons. First of all, people's beliefs about what causes disease, as well as their ideas about how to respond to disease, are intrinsically linked to culture, philosophical convictions, and identity. Secondly, the ways a society respond to disease and epidemics largely reflect existing ideologies, values, social structures, and various needs and interests. In short, medical history is a tremendously helpful lens for studying political, economic, social, and ideological aspects of cultures and societies.

This thesis looks at Cleveland's response to the 1918-19 Spanish Influenza epidemic. Relying heavily on newspaper accounts and various annual reports, the study views the epidemic crisis from a public health perspective, and explores the multiple factors that influenced the city's response. Acutely aware of the roles played by historical precedents, the thesis delves deeply into Cleveland's history of health care and finds a rich tradition of public health responses in the city. Many of these were utilized during the Spanish Flu crisis. Most importantly, the city relied greatly on Progressive traditions of education and cooperation. It also benefitted from a highly educated and well organized health department. Equally aware of the importance of historical context, the
thesis looks at life in Cleveland in 1918. An extraordinary event in its own right, the deadly flu epidemic arrived in the U.S. and Cleveland during even more extraordinary times. Most crucially, in 1917, the United States became embroiled in what is now known as the First World War. This changed life in the U.S. and Cleveland almost beyond comprehension. The war effort took on such an important role that practically all elements and facets of society were affected by it. Public health was not an exception. This thesis explores many of the numerous ways that the Great War affected Cleveland's response to the Spanish Flu. Crucially, the war not only helped spread the disease, but also provided health professionals in Cleveland with a number of weapons and tools to fight the epidemic with.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Avoid crowds, coughs and cowards,  
but fear neither germs nor Germans!1

- Advertisement in Cleveland Plain Dealer.

It is said that when one person dies it is a tragedy, but when thousands die it is statistics. The history of the 1918-19 influenza pandemic encapsulates both these elements. Hidden within the horrifying numbers and statistics of one of the deadliest events in history are thousands upon thousands of personal and social tragedies as both young and old succumbed to the disease. For some, the contrast between happiness and despair was particularly strong. Young Mary Carroll, for instance, travelled from her home in Indiana to Bucyrus, Ohio, to marry her sweetheart Edwards Searls. Whatever the couple's hopes and dreams about the future were, it all came tumbling down in an instant. Before the two even made it to the altar, any chance of marital bliss was suddenly and brutally extinguished as nineteen year old Edward fell ill with influenza. He died shortly thereafter. Neither youthful strength nor the prayers of his fiancée could

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save him. Left behind, Mary fell ill with the same disease. The records do not say whether she lived or died. Even if she lived, her life was forever changed by the death of her original fiancé.\(^2\) Mary and Edward were not the only ones to experience intense pain and the utter destruction of marital- and family life. Mr. and Mrs. Abraham Rodgers from Washington, Pennsylvania, were found "[c]lasped in each other's arms, with the agony of their death struggle plainly pictured in their faces."\(^3\) A man in Lowellville, near Youngstown, Ohio, was struck harder than most, losing twelve close relatives to the epidemic. To add to his misery, the man was prevented from attending any of their funerals because of quarantine regulations.\(^4\)

Other kinds of tragedies were also reported. For instance, many people blamed influenza for causing all sorts of violent insanity. Newspapers reported that a woman from Wallington, Connecticut, had committed brutal acts of insanity because of the emotional distress caused by losing her spouse: "Crazed by the death of her husband with influenza, Mrs. Mary Bustai,... murdered two of her small children, slashed the throat of a third and probably fatally wounded herself."\(^5\) Samuel T. Zick from Detroit died from the terrible internal injuries he sustained as he, "delirious from influenza and pneumonia", jumped from the third floor of the hospital he was in.\(^6\) Even more terribly, Mrs. Masnagetti of Uhrichsville, Ohio, drowned herself and her infant son in a hideous pool of water at the American Sewer Pipe works close to her home. Her husband found the two of them, his dead son clasped tightly against the mother's chest. The article ends

\(^2\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 6, 1918.  
\(^3\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 26, 1918.  
\(^4\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 24, 1918.  
\(^5\) Cleveland News, Oct. 26, 1918  
\(^6\) Cleveland Press, Oct. 28, 1918.
with the simple statement that "[i]llness with influenza is believed to have affected her reason."³ Others, perhaps not insane but certainly believed to be affected by the epidemic, chose to take their own lives rather than succumbing to the disease. Thomas L. Fox of Cleveland, for instance, shot himself while hospitalized with the flu.⁸ A Cincinnati business man ended his life in much the same way but with much more drama. After a night out with his wife, and still in evening attire, 32 year old Lee B. Ault killed himself by placing a gun in his mouth and pulling the trigger. The best suggestion that his friends could come up with to explain Mr. Ault's actions was that "he was depressed because he feared he would become a victim of influenza."⁹ Whether the Spanish Influenza caused insanity, depression or suicides or not, people certainly found it a likely culprit to blame.

The Spanish Influenza was indisputably to blame for some of the most heart wrenching tragedies of 1918-19. The unspeakable sadness of deathly ill children and children orphaned by the flu is aptly described in numerous newspaper articles. Many of these types of stories also took place in Cleveland. The following account about two young sisters typifies the dreadful experiences faced by untold children and their families: "There are 30 little white beds in the Louise Day Nursery.... Eighteen were occupied Tuesday by babies and children ill with flu. The remaining beds will be filled by Tuesday night with other victims. Julia Haina, 3, and her baby sister, Irene, occupy adjoining cots. Neither is expected to live. Other patients are seriously ill."¹⁰ The two

³ Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec 14, 1918.
⁸ Cleveland Press, Oct. 25, 1918.
⁹ Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 24, 1918.
sisters were taken to the day nursery after the undertaker who came to pick up their dead mother recognized that the little girls were suffering from the same disease that had just killed their parent.\(^\text{11}\) Many flu-orphans survived the disease itself, but still faced tremendous sadness, uncertainty and challenges. When George and Anna Koprionack died of the flu within a three day time span, the care of their children John, Michael and Mary fell to one of the children's uncles. When the uncle also fell ill to the disease, the children - all under the age of 8 - joined the list of the many orphans who needed a new home.\(^\text{12}\) By early 1919, the number of orphans in Cleveland had risen by about 4,000 as compared to the previous year. Most of these had been orphaned by the flu.\(^\text{13}\) When contemplating the number of children who lost just one parent, or the number of families who lost their main bread winners, the social impact in Cleveland alone must have been widespread and with long-lasting effects.

It is clear that even for many of those who did not succumb to the disease, the flu epidemic stood out as an extraordinary and very dramatic experience. Mr. John W. Hencke of Cleveland lived through a close brush with death as Spanish Flu struck him with tremendous force. After several days of being bed-ridden and with high fever, Mr. Hencke started to feel better. Then, as he later recalled to the Cleveland Press, his heart suddenly seemed to stop beating, prompting him to stoically tell his wife: "I guess I'm going,... Good-by." Describing the unusual experience, Mr. Hencke told the paper that "[t]here was a feeling that my soul was leaving my body. It seemed to float away from me in a sort of zigzag fashion." His life was allegedly saved by the quick actions of his

\(^\text{11}\) Cleveland Press, Oct. 22, 1918.  
\(^\text{12}\) Cleveland News, Nov. 19, 1918.  
\(^\text{13}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 2, 1919.
wife who responded to the crisis by forcing a strong heart stimulant down her husband's throat. Mr. Hencke completed his tale by simply stating: "So now I'm back on the job." It is safe to say that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Hencke forgot about the Spanish Flu very easily. The epidemic must have been equally unforgettable for others who fell desperately ill, and for the number of friends and relatives who had to help dig graves for their dearly departed when Cleveland's cemetery personnel became overloaded by the number of dead who were piling up and awaiting burial.

People were also affected by the many measures taken by the City of Cleveland in order to combat the dreaded disease. Whether it was dealing with flu masks, the open windows on the street cars, the closed schools and churches, the closing of theaters and other forms of entertainment, or the ban on a number of football games, the people of Cleveland individually and collectively experienced what it was like to combat a wildly communicable disease that had no known cure. Cleveland was not a passive victim of Spanish Influenza. In fact, the city's leaders and its populace engaged in a wide variety of actions when fighting the flu. This study examines the nature of their response. I have chosen to approach the topic by focusing on two distinct elements. One part of the study looks at the many different responses that the City of Cleveland, particularly its health commissioner and Department of Health, undertook during the epidemic. The second part explores some of the main factors that influenced the city's responses. I posit that three factors uniquely shaped Cleveland's fight against Spanish Flu. Firstly, the city's

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14 Cleveland Press, Oct. 29, 1918.
16 Cleveland News, Oct. 12, 1918; Oct. 15, 1918; Oct. 16, 1918; Oct. 21, 1918; Oct. 25, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 11, 1918; Oct. 20, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918; Oct. 11, 1918; Oct. 15, 1918; Oct. 21, 1918;
history and traditions greatly affected the response. In this category I include the city's progressive ideals and traditions, the development of highly organized and engaged private charitable organizations, the professionalization of the health department, the American cultural values of civic duty and obligations, and previous experiences with epidemic disease. I argue that by the time Spanish Flu arrived, the City of Cleveland had already established a long tradition of broad, societal cooperation in matters of public health, and had also developed a system of norms, values and ideals that promoted civic duty, voluntarism, and cooperation. Secondly, Cleveland response to the 1918-19 flu epidemic was largely affected by the development of the epidemic itself. Measures were implemented, changed, and abandoned depending on the spread and severity of the disease. Finally, Cleveland's fight against the epidemic was tremendously influenced by the historical context, specifically by the Great War. The war effort was by far the most important part of life in both the United States and Cleveland in 1918. In fact, the Great War was such a defining and essential aspect of 1918 life that Cleveland's fight against Spanish Flu cannot in any way be studied, interpreted or understood separate from the world war context. The war on Germans quite simply overshadowed the war on germs. In the process, the Great War, influenced, and even dictated parts of the battle against influenza. When discussing the impact of the world war on the flu fight, I focus specifically on wartime obsession with patriotism, loyalty, sacrifice, cooperation, propaganda, persuasion, and coercion. I also look at the ways in which war time organization and mobilization helped Cleveland deal with the epidemic. The Red Cross is a particularly great example of such activity, as the organization had been greatly expanded during the war, and also infused with a tremendous degree of patriotic fervor
and voluntary cooperation. I also look at how the war effort re-defined what parts of
society and life were essential and which ones were not. The latter point greatly
influenced what public health measures were acceptable and not.

While exploring these factors and describing the various measures that Cleveland
undertook during the epidemic, I also discuss a number of various themes and concepts.
Greatly inspired by World War I historians Christopher Capozzola and David M.
Kennedy, I ponder the nature of American voluntarism, civic duty, and cooperation.17 I
also base my study on the concept that all public health measures must be understood as
extremely complex matters that are influenced by several various elements. For
example, public health decisions must be seen in the light of conflicting interests.
Although it is fundamentally a matter of medicine and public health, a public health
measure is just as essentially a political decision. And, as we know, political decisions
are always influenced by various factors, including other political needs, desires or
aspirations, or by economic, cultural, social, religious, ideological, philosophical, and
technological ones. A good, responsible leader must consider the various conflicts of
interest that exist in a society, and make a educated, balanced, and well considered
decision. Such a leader, or leaders, should consider the multiple consequences of their
actions, weigh the different needs and interests of the populace with the needs and
necessities of the situation, and make decisions accordingly. In short, decision-making is
a balancing act in which some needs or desires are placed before others. This study

shows that when responding to the Spanish Influenza epidemic, the city's leaders clearly considered various needs and necessities when making decisions.

I have opted to leave a number of factors that influenced Cleveland's response to the Spanish Flu out of the main part of this study. This does not mean that these elements were not important. It is instead a reflection of my belief that albeit important, they were not as instrumental or fundamental as the other factors that I have explored. The most poignant example of this is Cleveland's status as an immigrant city. The immigrant nature of Cleveland surely influenced the city's life and response. However, primarily because of the Great War and the ways U.S. leaders and people used the war to force universal patriotism, Americanism and notions of loyalty, sacrifice and civic duty throughout society, it appears that the immigrant nature of the city mattered less than it otherwise would have. Again, the war did not remove the immigrant factor entirely, but it made it matter less in regards to the Spanish Flu fight. Still, because first and second generation immigrants made up a significant part of Cleveland's population, I have decided to cover the topic briefly in order to help with the overall context. Or, as the Protestant organization called the Federated Churches of Cleveland stated in 1917, "[t]o understand Cleveland we must understand its people."18

Between 1900 and 1915, about fifteen million immigrants entered the United States, inevitably affecting the cultural, social, religious, political, and economic structure of

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18 David E. Green, *The City and Its People; a Brief Statement of the Character and Distribution of the Population of Cleveland* (Cleveland, OH: Federated Churches of Cleveland, 1917), Oberlin College, Storage, Call Number 312.771 C5999G.
society. Cleveland welcomed a great portion of the newcomers. At the turn of the century, the city had already been experiencing tremendous growth for a good forty years, greatly helped by the expansion of industry during and following the U.S. Civil War. The city was also already the home of numerous first- and second generation immigrants. In fact, as early as in 1900, more than seventy-five percent of Cleveland's residents were either foreign-born or had at least one foreign-born parent. The explosive population growth did not end with the turn of the century, nor did the immigrant nature of the residents. Between 1900 and 1920, the city's population more than doubled, going from about 380,000 to just under 800,000. And although the ratio of the foreign element dropped slightly to encompass about sixty-nine percent of the total population in 1920, the number of residents with immigrant background or parent(s) had increased from just under 290,000 in 1900 to around 550,000. Many of these immigrants hailed from Eastern and Southern Europe, adding new elements to the city's already wide range of ethnic backgrounds. In 1920, the size and rich variety of the immigrant population was so great that it allowed for the local publication of twenty-one foreign-language newspapers in twelve different languages. Not surprisingly, the vast and varied immigrant presence in the city presented a number of challenges for the city and its officials. From a political point of view, immigrants often became voters. This fact made it necessary for elected officials to try to attract the support of immigrant groups.

21 Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 8 (Cleveland, OH: Cleveland Hospital Council, 1920), 672, Oberlin College, Storage, Call Number 614C5992C pt. 8.
Sometimes this involved dealing with and gaining the support of strong ethnic or religious community leaders. Cultural challenges were probably even more dire and noticeable. For instance, a sizeable number of people were transforming from a rural background in the Old World to an urban, industrial life in Cleveland. These newcomers had to learn not only how to live in a foreign country, deal with a foreign language, and learn new types of jobs. They also had to simply learn how to live in an urban setting. Although the immigrants certainly faced the greatest trials, their presence must have also been a tremendous challenge for city officials and community leaders, especially when attempting to govern and organize a city with multiple languages, cultural traditions, values and customs. In short, immigrants had to learn how to live and function in America and in Cleveland, and native-born Clevelanders had to learn to live and function with them.

Some scholars argue that many immigrants adapted to their new surroundings brilliantly. According to this view, the newcomers were not only "Americanized" when coming to the U.S., they also changed America by bringing their own unique ideas, mores, values, beliefs, traditions and resourcefulness. Although this idea seems quite clear and maybe even inevitable today, it was not the main belief, and certainly not the established ideal in the early twentieth century U.S. For many Americans, the governing ideal in regards to immigrants was Americanization. Newcomers should adjust and

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adapt to their new life in America as quickly and as thoroughly as possible. Viewing immigrants through a lens of cultural superiority, proponents of Americanization believed that immigrants had to learn the civic duties of Americans, as well as the language, customs, values and expected behavior. One way to do this was to declare certain forms of voluntarism and cooperation as good, and others as unacceptable. In Cleveland, this was for instance done by encouraging immigrants to join religious and philanthropic organizations such as the Red Cross while discouraging them from associating with labor union activities.\textsuperscript{25} However, the main force for Americanization was undoubtedly the public schools, where immigrant children were taught both to speak English and what it meant to be American.

Educating the immigrants was also a big part of the city's public health tactics. Cleveland reformers and health officials held up the foreign-born population's woeful lack of education, its general inability to speak English, and its primitive ideas about medicine and health care as tremendous challenges for Cleveland when confronting issues of public health.\textsuperscript{26} Cleveland health officials saw the immigrants' propensity for relying on "quack doctors" and miraculous concoctions as big problems.\textsuperscript{27} The issue was highlighted by the enormous number of advertisements for such physicians and drugs in newspapers, particularly in the foreign press.\textsuperscript{28} These ads escaped the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 by exploiting a legislative loophole. The law stated that medicines

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{26} Cleveland Hospital Council, \textit{Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 8}, 672.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 672, 675.
\end{itemize}
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could not have fraudulent information on their labels. Advertisements, on the other hand, were fair game for any type of phenomenal claim. The same went for doctors. In a world of creative self-promotion, one physicians even had the chutzpah to claim that he was "[f]ormerly doctor to the Czar." The situation was quite extraordinary, and the city's health officials saw it as a legitimate danger to the health and health care of society. A group referring to themselves as "Firms Interested In The Welfare Of the Working People" went as far as holding quack doctors and miracle drugs largely responsible for the spread of venereal disease, and consequently a detriment to both society. Immigrants and their gullible and primitive ways were therefore seen as a challenge as well as a potential danger to public health. It did not help that many immigrants hailed from cultures and traditions where hospitals were seen as "places where you go to die." Today it is well known that this tradition generally can be traced back to Medieval customs, practices and beliefs that became engrained in society and passed down through the generations. However, to many Old Stock Clevelanders in the early twentieth century, the immigrants' reluctance to visit hospitals was seen simply as proof of ignorance. Some of the Old Stock took a more generous view and, rather than simply criticizing the immigrants, sought to remedy the situation. The 1920 Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey thoroughly explored the issue and suggested that

29 Ibid., 675.
30 Ibid., 674.
31 Cleveland Citizen, Dec. 14, 1918.
32 Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 10 (Cleveland, OH: Cleveland Hospital Council, 1920), 850, Oberlin College, Storage, Call Number 614C5992C pt. 10.
34 Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 10, 850.
hospitals should make special efforts to help immigrants who spoke little or no English, and to help them understand better what was going on. Too many people experienced finding themselves in a hospital without even knowing their official diagnosis, prognosis, or what to expect of treatment. One solution to this problem was to hire professional interpreters for the hospitals, especially in cases where there were no English-speaking friends or relatives to help communicate important or reassuring information.  

The Western Reserve University provided a different kind of solution for dealing with immigrants and for educating them in matters of health. As was common in many U.S. cities at the time, Cleveland had a number of nurses who visited homes in order to both help treat and educate the sick and their families. In order to better equip these nurses to deal with an ethnically diverse population, the University invited Professor Henry G. Bourne to come and teach about "the Traditions and Ideals of the Foreign population of Cleveland." Representatives from different ethnic- and religious groups were also invited to help teach the nurses how to best communicate with the immigrants and their communities.  

The challenges were there, and the city tried to address them. Another tried and true tactic was to organize various community centers to help promote civic education of the city's immigrants.

Issues of health care and education were not the only challenges Cleveland faced when dealing with the immigrant part of the population. The ethnic, cultural and religious conflicts inherent in an immigrant city can easily be imagined. Old World

animosities continuing in the U.S., intra-group conflicts, labor conflicts, conflicts between immigrants and the Old Stock, and religious disagreements inevitably existed in Cleveland during the early twentieth century. However, immigrants were not the only newcomers to Cleveland who forced both the residents and leaders of the city to adapt to new demographic, economic, social and cultural realities. For many white residents of Cleveland - immigrant and Old Stock alike - the Great Migration of African Americans presented a reality that many would much rather have been without. Anti-immigrant sentiment certainly existed throughout parts of the city's population. Racist sentiments towards blacks were more or less universal. With almost 30,000 African Americans arriving in Cleveland between 1900 and 1920 - especially from 1916 and onwards - the "Negro" population of the city grew by an incredible 475 percent. Although blacks still made up only around four percent of Cleveland's residents, their arrival inevitably increased racial tensions. In addition to all these challenges, on the eve of the Spanish Influenza outbreak Cleveland and Clevelanders were also contending with women's suffrage issues, matters regarding Prohibition and myriad other challenges associated with rapid urbanization and an incredibly culturally and ethnically diverse population.

Even so, the main factor of 1918 - by an almost incomprehensible amount - was the Great War.

38 One of the most prevalent conflicts to affect numerous immigrant groups in Cleveland revolved around matters of faith and religion. The Catholic Church in particular faced multiple issues, often rising from the fact that different ethnic groups had unique traditions of worship. In Cleveland, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church was dominated by the Irish, giving the diocese a distinct Irish Catholic character. Many of the other immigrant groups resented the Irish dominance and sought permission to worship in their own fashion, in their own language, and with priests who they found acceptable. Many groups also sought to construct a new type of church in the new world, with a much freer and equal religious hierarchy. For more on ethnic conflicts over religion, and numerous other examples of both conflicts and cooperation involving Cleveland's immigrant population, see David C. Hammack, Diane L. Grabowski, and John. J. Grabowski, Identity, Conflict, & Cooperation: Central Europeans in Cleveland, 1850-1930 (Cleveland, OH: The Western Reserve Historical Society, 2002).

39 City of Cleveland, Ohio, Statistical Records, 1916-24, 8.
Cleveland's response to the Spanish Flu was clearly influenced by numerous factors. This study looks at a number of specific measures, and explores the origins and explanations for these responses. Chapter II looks at the history of the city, including previous experiences with epidemic disease, the professionalization of the health department, and how progressive ideals of education, voluntarism, civic duty and cooperation came to be a big part of the city's public health system. Chapter III explores the arrival and progression of Spanish Flu in Cleveland and discusses many of the various forms of reactions and measures the city responded with. The concepts of education and cooperation are central in this discussion. Chapter IV deals with the Great War and how this extraordinary historical context affected Cleveland's fight against deadly influenza. This chapter raises further questions about the nature of war time and crisis voluntarism. Conclusively, I argue that Cleveland's fight against Spanish Flu was largely characterized by a tremendous degree of both voluntary and coerced cooperation. This cooperation had its roots not only in historical precedents and Cleveland traditions, but also in the patriotic whirlwind of world war era America.
CHAPTER II

A HISTORY OF FIGHTING

[E]fforts to meet the epidemic must also be understood in light of other factors which generally describe the relationship of disease and society. Local politics, cultural and medical understanding of epidemic in general and legislation all influenced the nature of the medical and public response.40

Rome was not built in a day. Neither was Cleveland. Many of the various factors and elements that shaped and affected the city's battle with Spanish Flu developed through years of experience and the inevitable progression of time and society. Any moment of history, such as the Spanish Influenza epidemic, is simply that; a moment in history. As such, it is not distinct or separate from the rest of history nor from the multiple environmental, cultural, economic, social, religious, ideological, political, and other human factors that make up history, the present, and the past. Studying the years leading up to the outbreak of Spanish Flu in the United States and Cleveland therefore allows us to better understand why people reacted the way they did, whether it was the city's health commissioner, religious figures, private organizations, companies, or regular residents. The history and people of Cleveland changed and developed continuously for

years, as any group of human beings invariably does. The moment in time that was the Spanish Influenza epidemic is simply a particular point on that long line of human life and experience in the city. To better understand this historical moment, we look even further into the past.

When the Spanish Influenza arrived on the United States' East Coast, it quickly caused widespread illness and death. Starting in military bases and port cities, the disease spread swiftly throughout the nation, affecting both the military and the civilian population heavily. By the time its fury was finally spent, the Spanish flu had made more than twenty-five percent of the U.S. population sick and killed at least 550,000 American men, women and children.\(^{41}\) Infinitely more sinister than a seasonal inconvenience, the 1918-19 flu epidemic became the single greatest killer of American men and women since the U.S. Civil War. And, horrifically, whereas the Civil War needed five grueling years to exert its deadly toll, the Spanish Flu did most of its damage in less than a year.\(^{42}\) In fact, according to historian Alfred W. Crosby, "[n]othing else - no infection, no war, no famine - has ever killed so many in as short a period."\(^{43}\)


\(^{43}\) Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic, 311.
The Spanish Flu was truly a deadly moment in U.S. history. Granting this fact, some writers have gone too far in their attempts at establishing the lethal nature and thus importance of the epidemic. With a strong penchant for the dramatic, John. M. Barry conjures up the image of history's ultimate pathological demon, stating that "[Spanish influenza] killed more people [globally] in a year than the Black Death of the Middle Ages killed in a century." This comparison is problematic. The Spanish Flu was no doubt a terrible affair, but no matter how many people it killed and how terrifying the Spanish Influenza epidemic must have been for an untold number of people, it cannot very well be compared to the tremendous horrors and profound social impact of the Black Death. In an otherwise very intriguing, thoroughly researched and well written book, Barry simply goes too far trying to make Spanish Flu sound like a greater scourge than it in fact was. First of all, when it comes to comparing the epidemic to the Black Death, it is quite impossible to make specific and certain claims about Medieval mortality numbers. We simply cannot know how many people the legendary pestilence killed. Secondly, a long period of incredible population growth was clearly a big reason for the large number of deaths during the 1918-19 epidemic. For instance, the 1918 U.S. population of some 103 million residents clearly dwarfed the 1860 population of around 31 million, making even the comparison with the Civil War seem somehow unfair. The number of people who died from Spanish Flu may have been numerically similar to the numbers attributed to the Civil War. However, in terms of lethality and social

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44 Barry, The Great Influenza, 5.
impact, numbers are not as important as ratios. And it is clear that the number of people who died because of the Civil War was a much larger part of the total U.S. population than those who died from Spanish Flu. The example of the Black Death highlights this point even further. Whereas the Medieval scourge is generally considered to have wiped out anywhere from a quarter to half of the population in large areas of Europe - not to mention a great number of people in Asia and the Middle East - the Spanish Flu is estimated to have killed only about two and a half percent of infected Americans.\(^{46}\) Considering that these two and a half percent came from the estimated twenty-five percent who fell ill, the overall impact of Spanish Flu on the U.S. population in terms of percentages was actually remarkably small.\(^{47}\) Therefore, to state that the Spanish Flu was somehow more deadly or affected societies more than a number of other diseases is simply not true. Smallpox, for instance, left a much more devastating imprint on the American continent than Spanish Flu ever did.\(^{48}\) Illnesses like yellow fever, cholera, measles and tuberculosis also decimated European and American populations for years and years. The claim that Spanish Influenza was deadlier than any of these scourges becomes particularly unsupportable when compared to the impact of European diseases on the Native American population following Columbus's arrival.\(^{49}\)


\(^{47}\) Certainly less than one percent of the population.


All this is not to say that Spanish Flu was not a deadly and devastating epidemic. After all, it killed so many Americans that 1918 became the only year in the twentieth century when the U.S. population shrank. At no other time in the entire century did the annual growth rate drop below 730,000. In every year between 1901 and 1930, the population grew by at least 1.3 million, except in 1918. That year, the overall number of Americans shrank by some 60,000. Furthermore, estimates suggest that even with its low death ratios, the epidemic still took more American lives in one year than died in battle in World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War combined.

Some historians have also argued, at times very convincingly, that the political, economic, social, and psychological impact of the epidemic was significant. The discussion about lethality and impact of epidemics is therefore not for the sake of discounting Spanish Influenza. Instead, it is simply a reminder that although the flu epidemic was deadly and impactful, it was simply not as lethal or influential as many other scourges. If anything, the horrors of the Spanish Flu remind us how truly horrific the other epidemics must have been.


51 Kolata, ix-x, 6-7.

52 See for example Crosby, America's Forgotten Pandemic, 171-207; Dorothy A. Pettit and Janice Baille, A Cruel Wind. Pandemic Flu in America, 1918-1920 (Murfreesboro, TN: Timberlane Books, 2008), 119-150, 177-228.
"Grippe" - It's Not So Bad

It is important to remember that although Spanish Influenza was not as deadly as a number of other diseases, it was far more deadly than regular flu. Less bloodthirsty and destructive than Black Death and smallpox, the Spanish Flu was still a monster. Regular flu, on the other hand, was not. With Spanish Flu still a thing of the future, it is not surprising that early twentieth-century Americans and Clevelanders did not think of influenza as a horrific scourge. They certainly did not think of the illness in the same terms as smallpox, plague, cholera, typhoid fever, or tuberculosis. Experience and history had made it so. First and foremost, people in both Europe and the U.S. had known and experienced flu - or "grippe" - for generations. The exact origin of the disease is not known, but some scholars argue that descriptions of flu-like epidemics go as far back as to the ancient Greeks.  

53 The term 'influenza' is not quite as old. Even so, by 1918 it had already been used in Europe and the U.S. for centuries. Derived from Italian, the word itself simply means "influence", apparently referring to early beliefs that people who suffered from the disease were influenced by celestial bodies or unseen forces. The French word "grippe" was another centuries-old word used to describe the same type, or types, of disease. With its easy-to-understand and rather fetching meaning, "grippe" became a highly popular nickname for influenza in late nineteenth- and early twentieth century Cleveland. Not at all surprisingly, the German "shafhosten" and "shafkrankheit" (translated as "sheep cough" and "sheep disease") did not enjoy the same success.  

54 The terms that Americans used to describe the disease originated in

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53 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 30, 1889; Dec. 15, 1918.
54 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 15, 1918.
Europe. However, intimate knowledge of influenza, or "grippe", was certainly not limited to the Old World. The U.S. experienced several rounds of the disease prior to the Spanish Flu, as did Cleveland. The most virulent bout arrived in the city around Christmas, 1889 and lasted into January of 1890. Sometimes referred to as the Russian Influenza, this short-lived epidemic affected about 20,000, or 7.5 percent, of Cleveland's inhabitants. The epidemic strongly limited the productivity of factories, offices and schools while it lasted. Even so, relatively few people - less than 100 - actually died as a result of it. In addition to this, doctors believed that most of the people who died had succumbed to secondary illnesses and complications caused by influenza rather than by flu itself.\(^5\) With its relatively light impact, the disease was something to respect mainly because of its role in slowing down society. In this same manner, it was really only to be feared for its role in causing worse diseases.\(^6\) In 1889-90, the fear and concern was apparently not very large in Cleveland. Far from scared, some residents even considered the flu to be more like a barrel of fun than a cause for worry, especially when compared to pneumonia and cholera. An article in a local newspaper declared influenza to be "An Annoying and Amusing Disease" that caused hilarious scenes of people "sneezing their noses off."\(^7\) Even among the less humorously inclined residents, influenza was hardly a disease that inspired trepidation or concern.

Despite its limited impact in terms of fatalities and immediate social impact, Cleveland's experience with the Russian Influenza is still important for a number of reasons. Most notably, the epidemic set a number of precedents for Cleveland's

\(^{55}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 14, 1890; Oct. 16, 1918.  
\(^{56}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 23, 1889.  
\(^{57}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 20, 1889.
subsequent responses to flu. For starters, it was around this time that Clevelanders began using the term "grippe" for the illness. They even shortened it to the simpler and more American 'grip'. Why they chose to adopt the French term is not clear, but it may have been thanks to the knee-jerk instinct of newspapers to create catchy plays on words, such as "The Influenza Still Holds Europe in Its Grip" and "Influenza Continue[s] to Strengthen Its Grip Throughout the Country".\(^{58}\) Whatever the reason, "grippe" and "grip" provided people with a less official and more whimsical way to describe a disease that was often seen as maybe more annoying than dangerous. Beyond simple terms, the 1889-90 epidemic also set a precedent in tying more virulent flu epidemics to a location in Europe, and in recognizing certain versions of flu as more serious than others.\(^{59}\) Perhaps more importantly, the epidemic set the precedent of viewing influenza as dangerous mainly for its role in weakening the body and causing more serious infections. It also reminded the medical field that even in the midst of tremendous technological and medical developments and breakthroughs there were still no known ways to either prevent or cure the malady. This fact inspired a series of both scientific and less scientific but tremendously creative ideas for treatment.\(^{60}\) Among the less scientific ideas, the therapeutic anti-flu powers of strong laxatives or cinnamon-infused toothpicks rank high.\(^{61}\) Among the more scientific approaches, a notable change in belief occurred as medical experts began to embrace more and more the germ theory of disease and applied this to influenza. The 1889 belief that "grippe" was impossible to prevent

\(^{58}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec 20, 1889; Dec. 25, 1889; Dec 28, 1889; Dec. 30, 1889; Jan. 7, 1890; Jan. 8, 1890; Jan. 14, 1890; Oct 16, 1918.

\(^{59}\) See for instance Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 4, 1890.

\(^{60}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 2, 1890.

\(^{61}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 16; Oct 27, 1918.
because it spread through atmospheric changes and clearly "independent of personal communication" made way for a more optimistic approach that saw prevention as possible in parts because of the fact that flu spread through personal communication.\(^\text{62}\)

A cure was still unknown, but doctors and scientists were hopeful. Optimism grew exponentially following the 1892 discovery of the "influenza bacillus" by German doctor Richard Pfeiffer. Riding on a wave of successful vaccine discoveries, many doctors believed that it would only be a matter of time before an effective vaccine for influenza would also be developed.\(^\text{63}\) Despite these high hopes, by 1918, a working vaccine had still not been found. Even so, vaccination remained a topic of discussion throughout the epidemic and the quest for a functioning vaccine remained a top priority among a number of leading physicians.\(^\text{64}\) Also, vaccination was not the only medical advice that grew out of the 1889-90 epidemic. A number of other ideas and actions regarding influenza prevention and treatment were also passed on. For instance, from the Russian Influenza and all the way through the Spanish Flu, health professionals in Cleveland believed that cold weather somehow alleviated the scourge.\(^\text{65}\) The flu mask was also introduced.\(^\text{66}\) These beliefs and practices, along with other ideas about the nature and treatment of "grippe," heavily influenced the types of advice and actions that the city's health commissioner used during the crisis of 1918.

\(^{62}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 20, 1889; Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.


\(^{64}\) The quest for a working flu vaccination is thoroughly described throughout Barry, The Great Influenza.

\(^{65}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 31, 1889; March 15, 1891; Jan. 27, 1905; Dec. 28, 1915; Nov. 3, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 28, 1918; Nov. 2, 1918.

\(^{66}\) William Ganson Rose, Cleveland: The Making of a City (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1950), 497.
Influenza visited Cleveland on several more occasions between 1889 and 1918 but never caused tremendous devastation. The far deadlier 1918 version of the flu was simply not your typical "grippe", as the U.S. and Cleveland would soon discover.

Disguised as annoying but hardly dangerous flu, the Spanish version quickly proved monstrous. The city of Philadelphia experienced one of the most horrifying bouts of the disease, with probably more than half a million residents falling ill. At the height of the epidemic, more than 4,500 of the city's 2 million residents died from flu-related illness in a single week. Over a four week period, more than 11,500 perished, causing the city to even run out of caskets. The much higher than usual number of dead also taxed the city's ability to bury the bodies. Before all was said and done, Philadelphia had had to resort to burying a number of people without caskets, and had even been forced to dig mass graves to dispose of the bodies of flu victims.

Although Philadelphia saw some of the worst devastation, it was not alone in experiencing the tremendous power of the Spanish Flu. In fact, numerous rich and vivid accounts describe the horrendous impact of the disease on both individuals and society in general.

A doctor at Fort Devens, thirty miles west of Boston, witnessed the quick and awful death of hundreds of young men to "the most vicious type of [p]neumonia that has ever been seen." The doctor lamented the terrible conditions in the military base in a letter, stating that "[i]t is horrible. One can stand to see one, two, or twenty men die, but to see these poor devils dropping like flies gets on your nerves. We have been averaging about 100 deaths a day,

See for instance Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 17, 1892; Feb. 24, 1895; Dec. 24, 1898; Nov. 15, 1900; Jan. 24, 1904; Feb. 27, 1910; May 16, 1910; Dec. 28, 1915; Rose, Cleveland: The Making of a City, 497, 512.

See for instance the introduction chapter of this thesis, as well as numerous stories in Barry, The Great Influenza; Crosby, America's Forgotten Pandemic; Kolata, Flu; Pettit and Bailie, A Cruel Wind.
and still keeping it up. 70 Former president of the American Medical Association, Colonel Dr. Victor C. Vaughan, also described his experience at Fort Devens, reporting that "the dead bodies are stacked about the morgue like cord wood." Horribly impressed by the gruesome realities at Fort Devens, Vaughan wrote that his memories from his time there were "ghastly ones which I would tear down and destroy were I able to do so, but this is beyond my power." 71 In Kentucky, some poor souls even starved to death, not because there was a shortage of food, but because the healthy were too afraid to help them. 72 People were dying by the thousands throughout the United States. Amazingly, they were succumbing to a disease that history and experience had taught them should not be as fierce and as deadly as it was proving to be. Apparently, the 1918-19 version of influenza failed to abide by tradition and the results were massive. Amongst the 77.8 percent of the population that provided mortality reports to the federal government in 1918, almost half a million deaths were attributed to influenza and pneumonia alone. The two diseases were counted together that year because imperfect reporting practices made it hard to ascertain which of the two was the true culprit in individual cases, especially during the confusing and overwhelming conditions caused by the Spanish Flu epidemic. Furthermore, influenza often led to pneumonia, making it even harder to accurately determine the exact killer in any given case. In the end, the two conditions were therefore combined for the sake of accuracy. It made for a deadly duo, combining for almost one third of all U.S. deaths that year. Of these deaths, nearly eighty percent occurred during the epidemic-months of September through New Year's. This made the

71 Quoted in Ibid, 16.
72 Ibid, 116.
Spanish Flu epidemic responsible for about twenty-five percent of all reported deaths in
the nation that year. U.S. life expectancy statistics also testify to the impact of the flu
epidemic on American life in 1918 as the average life expectancy for the year was
twelve years lower than that of 1917. This was a significant yet momentary setback in
the overall steady increase in life expectancy in the country.

In a World of Death and Disease, What is Flu?

For people living in 1918, one of the most disconcerting descriptions of the disease
was summed up by health officials and sanitarians in the eastern parts of the U.S.. When
asked by visiting health officers from the Mid-West about how to best deal with the
Spanish flu epidemic, the health professionals who had already faced the onslaught of
the disease solemnly told their visitors that "[w]hen you get back home, hunt up your
wood-workers and cabinet-makers and set them to making coffins. Then take your
street laborers and set them to digging graves. If you do this you will not have
your dead accumulating faster than you can dispose of them."

After first painting these Medieval-esque scenes of horror, the Easterners went on to list a number of other
specific types of advice for prevention, such as using face-masks and educating the
public in personal hygiene. Even so, they held on to the opinion that wherever the

73 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Mortality Statistics 1918, Nineteenth Annual
74 Jeffrey K. Taubenberger, "Genetic Characterization of the 1918 Spanish Influenza Virus," in The
Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19: New Perspectives, eds. Howard Phillips and David Killingray
Congress. Life Expectancy in the United States," accessed May 2, 2012,
disease hit, it would hit with tremendous force and kill more people than any community was used to handling. In their opinion, Spanish Flu was "utterly unlike any plague which has yet visited this country." Stories from Eastern cities such as Philadelphia and Boston provided horrific images to go along with the warning.

The extent and virulence of the disease was well known in Cleveland as well, as news and details travelled as fast as the existing means of communication allowed. Even so, a number of the city's residents appear to have believed that the epidemic would not to be much more dangerous, nor cause more reason for concern than previous bouts of the flu. This was in many ways a very reasonable response. For starters, recent history did not suggest that any particular fear or special precautions or measures should be necessary when dealing with the disease. After all, wasn't Spanish Influenza simply a fancy name for "grippe"? This slightly debonair attitude does not mean that the disease was considered entirely harmless. For instance, unlike during the Russian Influenza epidemic, there is no evidence that anyone considered the Spanish Flu laughable. Personal experiences may have contributed to this more serious yet far from panicky attitude. Less than three years earlier, during the winter of 1915-16, Cleveland had experienced a round of epidemic influenza that had left thousands of residents sick and maybe as many as a hundred dead from "the grip". Harmful is not the same as calamitous though, and neither Cleveland's citizens nor health officials appear to have viewed the episode as particularly threatening, nor as a legitimate ground for implementing serious public health measures. In fact, the 1915-16 bout of influenza does

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77 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 14, 1918.
not appear to have caused any type of major reaction in the city at all. The only official statements that appeared in the newspapers during this time came from the chief of the Bureau of Communicable Diseases Dr. Martin Friedrich, who calmly stated that the epidemic was likely to run its course soon, hopefully aided by an expected wave of cold weather. In short, the city officials and general population appear to have adopted the attitude of simply waiting out the epidemic. This was a tried and true traditional response to influenza in Cleveland, stretching at least as far back as to the Russian Flu of 1889-90. The message from Cleveland's health officials was clear: Influenza may be a nuisance, but it is not a cause for fear. When faced with the disease, it is best to simply keep calm and carry on.

Along with the relative mild lethality of regular influenza, it seems likely that concerns with the disease simply paled among a wide array of other maladies, many of which killed far more people every year than the flu had ever done. After all, even in the flu-year of 1916, more than five times as many people died in Cleveland from "diarrhea" than from influenza. The following year, more deaths were even caused by diabetes or by homicides than were attributed to "the grippe". In a more typical year when influenza was not epidemic, the disease was an even smaller concern, as more people died from burns, falling down, or being crushed to death than died from flu.

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78 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec 28, 1915, Jan. 6, 1916.
79 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct, 16, 1918. This approach was not taken during the worst stages of Spanish Flu for a number of reasons that will be explored later. Among these, one obvious reason was that the 1918-19 version of influenza quickly proved way too aggressive and deadly to allow the city to take the passive approach of waiting things out.
81 City of Cleveland, Annual Report of the Departments of the Government of the City of Cleveland For the Year Ending December 31st, 1902(Cleveland, OH, 1903), Cleveland State University, Michael Schwartz Library, Division of Special Collections; City of Cleveland, Annual Report of The Departments
an industrial city like Cleveland, it should come as no surprise that work-related
accidents and deaths were more common, and a greater cause of concern, than influenza.
Being a baby was even more dangerous than being an industrial worker. As late as
1917, mortality rates among children under one year of age were still around ten percent,
and about 3.5 percent of all births were still births. In May 1918, the chief of
Cleveland's Bureau of Child Welfare Dr. R. A. Bolt was happy to inform Clevelanders
that the city was experiencing the lowest infant mortality rates in its history. During the
first four months of the year, the mortality rates had been "only" seven percent.
Clearly, not all deaths were due to industrial work or being a baby. Even suicide
consistently remained a greater destroyer of life in the city than flu was. However, the
main cause of death in Cleveland was disease, and the most prolific killers throughout
the era remained tuberculosis, heart diseases and pneumonia. By 1916-17, the three were
each responsible for about 1/9 of all deaths in the city, for a total of around one third of
all deaths. It made much more sense for people to fear these diseases, along with all
the "traditional", horrific illnesses such as typhoid fever, measles, whooping cough,
cholera, poliomyelitis and diphtheria. These were monsters and killers. Compared to
them, influenza was a nuisance. Instead of a pain it was an itch. Instead of a monster, it
was an annoying flee. Furthermore, in a world before antibiotics, any type of infection

of the Government of the City of Cleveland For the Year Ending December 31, 1912 (Cleveland, OH, 1913), Cleveland State University, Michael Schwartz Library, Division of Special Collections.
82 Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 19, 1918.
84 Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 15, 1918.
85 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902; City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1912.
86 City of Cleveland, Statistical Records, 1916-1924, 19-23, 54-5; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 6, 1916.
could spell tremendous danger. What was flu compared to that? In such a vast sea of
diseases, infections, infant mortality and industrial accidents, "the grip" did not seem
like all that much to worry about. What they failed to realize is that even fleas can turn
into terrible instruments of death.

Cleveland - A Public Health City.

Prior to the Spanish Flu, Cleveland's health officials helped create an attitude of
unafraid awareness towards influenza. As mentioned, although medical theory and
practice had taken giant leaps following the discovery of the germ theory of disease, the
early twentieth century world was still a world full of dangerous illnesses, and medical
mysteries and misconceptions. Despite these medical blind spots, the City of Cleveland
and the U.S. in general were experiencing steady improvements in public health and
healthcare.\textsuperscript{88} The city had even risen to hold the reputation as one of the healthiest large
cities in the nation.\textsuperscript{89} This prominence lasted up to the Spanish Flu epidemic and
beyond.\textsuperscript{90} In the last week of recorded death rates prior to the epidemic, Cleveland led

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\textsuperscript{88} Cleveland Hospital Council, \textit{Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 1} (Cleveland, OH: Cleveland
Hospital Council, 1920), 25-8, Oberlin College, Storage, Call Number 614C5992C pt. 1; Engs, \textit{The
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\textsuperscript{89} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 7, 1911; Jan. 3, 1912; Jan. 1, 1914; U.S. Department of Commerce and
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\textsuperscript{90} City of Cleveland, Health Division, Annual Report, 1922 (Cleveland, OH, 1923), Cleveland Public
Cleveland, Health Division, Annual Report, 1923 (Cleveland, OH, 1924), Cleveland Public Library,
Cleveland Public Library Microfilm Center, Cleveland Documents Microfilm Collection, Cleve. Pub.
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all the large cities in Ohio with a weekly death rate reported at 11.8 per 1,000 inhabitants, compared to Columbus' 14.7 and Toledo's 18.3. As early as 1878, Cleveland's health officer identified a death rate of 17 per 1,000 to be the measurement of a healthy city, or "the standard that can generally be attained by careful sanitary supervision[,]" and reveled in Cleveland's success at obtaining the "excellent [rate]" of 16.72 that year. The requirements for what constituted "a healthy city" became more stringent or narrowly defined over the next forty years, especially considering all the developments within health care and medical knowledge. Even so, Cleveland appears to have kept up with greater health expectations, pushing death rates in the city lower and lower over time. A clear victory of modern medicine in matters of public health came about as vaccinations helped reduce and finally eliminate smallpox from the city. In the process, the city also experimented widely with methods of sanitation and disinfections, producing both controversy and valuable knowledge and experience, including the need to earn the trust and cooperation of the public. On another front, improved sewage and water treatment and safer water intake helped conquer typhoid

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91 Cleveland News, Oct 3, 1918.
92 Annual Reports of the Departments of the Government of the City of Cleveland For the Year Ending December 31, 1878 (Cleveland, OH, 1879), Cleveland State University, Michael Schwartz Library, Divisions of Special Collections, 375.
fever and reduce the number of all sorts of water-borne illnesses and conditions.  
Supplying the city with "the Purest Milk in the World" and implementing stricter food controls also helped reduce mortality rates. Perhaps even more importantly, 
Cleveland's effort against tuberculosis was ranked among the best in the nation, with the privately organized Anti-Tuberculosis League, the Red Cross, and the city's health board cooperating closely in the fight against "the white plague".

Expansion and professionalization of the public health system was another major improvement. The first Board of Health was established in 1832 while Cleveland was still a village. Formed to combat a specific cholera epidemic, the health board received the power to inspect both ships and people and to isolate and treat those who were sick. The board disbanded once the crisis was over. This type of need-based formation and dissolution of health boards continued until 1850, when the State of Ohio authorized Cleveland to form a health board with the authority to reduce public disorder and to prevent the spread of communicable diseases. Importantly, this created a close connection between the city's police powers and the city's public health powers. The union of the two became particularly clear in 1875 when the Board of Health was placed under the Bureau of Police and renamed the Health Department.

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96 City of Cleveland, Reports of the Departments of the Government of the City of Cleveland For the Year Ending December 31, 1882 (Cleveland, OH, 1883), 462, Cleveland State University, Michael Schwartz Library, Division of Special Collections, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 8, 1895; Jan 10, 1897; April 3, 1906; Jan 1, 1914; Feb. 3, 1918; Kenneth Finegold, Experts and Politicians, 85.
97 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1912; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 17, 1905;
99 "Cleveland Board of Health", in Encyclopedia of Cleveland History, 11-14, 205-6.
bore the title of sanitary policeman. The sanitary policemen had a variety of responsibilities, including examining houses and places for filthiness, securing law and order wherever they went, and educating people on the benefits of separating the healthy from the sick and on how to use disinfectants. In short, the sanitary policemen were medical investigators, educators, and policemen keeping the order. They were the hands and feet of a system that married police powers to matters of public health and vice versa, allowing the authority of one factor to extend into the other. The practice of using sanitary policemen remained in place even after 1882, when an independent Health Board, free from the Bureau of Police, was re-established. Furthermore, the sanitary policeman positions were becoming more permanent, making the workers more experienced in public health work and in keeping the order in less intrusive ways. This, according to the chief health officer, "led to fewer complaints from citizens, and an increased respect for the [health] officers and [Health] Department." Respect was obviously tremendously important, as respect, trust, and cooperation are often closely connected.

The Health Board was thus learning to function more effectively within the city. It was also growing. By 1902, the number of sanitary policemen had grown from less than

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100 There were sanitary policemen in Cleveland at least as early as 1870, and possibly even before then. See Plain Dealer, May 14, 1870.
101 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1878; City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1882.
102 The cooperation between the city's health officials and the police department survived even after public health got its own health department. This cooperation was alive and well during the city's response to the Spanish Flu.
103 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1882; "Cleveland Board of Health", in Encyclopedia of Cleveland History, 205-6.
104 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1882. The Health Department was once again placed under the Police Department between 1892 and 1902, before re-emerging as an independent department in 1903. This shows the strong connection between the police and the health board in the city. See also "Cleveland Board of Health", in Encyclopedia of Cleveland History, 205-6.
ten in 1882 to twenty. More importantly, the board was growing in powers and responsibilities. The Health Board was charged with sanitary inspections of milk, food, industries, businesses, and schools. It also oversaw birth- and death certificates, issued burial permissions, and inspected water, plumbing and sewers. Crucially, the health board had the power to forcefully isolate people who were sick with infectious diseases, and also to forcefully vaccinate people against communicable illnesses such as smallpox. As early as 1893 it even received absolute powers to implement quarantines in times of crisis. The expansion of powers, duties, and numbers of long term workers allowed the Health Board to become more professionalized. By 1902, there was a food inspector, and a plumbing and sewers inspector who had four assistants. Even more importantly, the city now had a bacteriological laboratory and twelve district physicians, one for each of the city's health districts.

Another important part of the city's development and success in public health during the early twentieth century was the long and faithful service of a number of professional health officers. In 1901, Progressive mayor Tom Johnson selected a highly educated and well respected doctor to become the head of Cleveland's public health office. The appointment of Doctor Martin Friedrich marked a change in attitudes regarding the skills necessary to be the city's health commissioner. In a conflict that stretched over almost two years, Dr. Friedrich was attacked by some central members of the health board for what appears to have been administrative failings. The doctor found support with other

105 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1882; City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902.
106 “Cleveland Board of Health”, in Encyclopedia of Cleveland History, 205-6.
107 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902.
108 Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 22, 1901.
109 Finegold, Experts and Politicians, 82-4, 86, 103.
members of the board, as well as the mayor and several politicians. In the end, the health commissioner retained his position by virtue of his knowledge and skills as a physician, rather than his skills as a bureaucrat.\textsuperscript{110} Administration and organization was clearly important, but so was medical skills. Collectively, the expansion of the public health corps, as well as the political support of Dr. Friedrich based on his skills and knowledge as a medical doctor shows a marked professionalization of the city's public health force.\textsuperscript{111}

The trend of increasing expertise, professionalism, organization, modernization and governmental involvement in public health continued over the following decade. The process was aided greatly by mayoral involvement, especially by the progressive mayors Johnson and Baker. As seen in the case of Dr. Friedrich, both mayors focused on appointing experts and professionals to governmental positions.\textsuperscript{112} Johnson and Baker, along with Democrat mayor John H. Farley and Republican mayor Herman C. Baehr, also provided the health department with a notable amount of funding.\textsuperscript{113} Johnson described the wisdom of this tactic in a 1905 campaign pamphlet, stating that "under the ancient theory and practice of city government, money was saved on the Health Department so that there would be funds to fight epidemics. The modern method is to spend enough money on the Health Department so that there will be no epidemics to fight."\textsuperscript{114} Increased funding and a focus on professionalism undoubtedly helped improve and expand Cleveland's public health services. For instance, by 1912, the Department of

\textsuperscript{110} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Apr. 7, 1904; June 22, 1904; July 2, 1904; July 12, 1904; Sept. 3, 1904; Sept. 17, 1904; Dec. 9, 1905.
\textsuperscript{111} City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902.
\textsuperscript{112} Finegold, \textit{Experts and Politicians}, 82, 86, 103.
\textsuperscript{113} City of Cleveland, Ohio, Statistical Records, 1916-24, 12.
\textsuperscript{114} Quoted in Finegold, \textit{Experts and Politicians}, 95.
Public Health consisted of eight specialized bureaus. Reflecting the most important issues of the day, the bureaus dealt with communicable disease, tuberculosis, child hygiene, sanitation, food and dairy inspection, vital statistics, occupational disease, and bacteriological examinations and laboratory work. The city also employed a bacteriologist, a chemist, and several nurses dealing specifically with contagious disease. Slowly but surely, the Health Department became part of almost every part of life in Cleveland. Amazingly, Doctor Martin Friedrich remained one of the men in charge of the city's health response during this decade of tremendous expansion and growth, despite the serious attempts by some to have him ousted. This shows the dedication of the progressive mayors Johnson and Baker to retain experts in important positions of government. It also shows the progressive preoccupation with improvements in health care and with expanding governmental involvement in public health matters. However, public health was clearly not just a Progressive political concept, it was a Cleveland ideal. The fact that the Health Department and the professionals who worked there largely made it through the two-year rule of Republican mayor Herman Baehr suggests that public health matters in Cleveland during the early twentieth century were to a notable degree left free from politics and political favors.

115 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1912.
116 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902; City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1912, Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 22, 1901; April 9, 1903; April 7, 1904; Jan. 27, 1905; July 6, 1907; Jan. 1, 1910; June 17, 1910; Jan. 25, 1911.
117 See for instance Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 2 (Cleveland, OH: Cleveland Hospital Council, 1920), 103-6; Oberlin College, Storage, Call Number 614C5992C pt. 2
118 See Plain Dealer, Jan 1, 1910; Jan. 7, 1910; June 17, 1910; Dec. 20, 1913. This was quite unlike the situation of health boards and health departments in a number of other U.S. cities, including Philadelphia and Atlanta. See Barry, The Great Influenza and VanHartesveldt, The 1918-1919 Pandemic of Influenza. Some cities enjoyed similar relationships between city governments and public health boards. This was for instance the case in New York City between 1900 and 1917. See Augustus Cerillo Jr., "The Impact of
The city's great success in reducing death rates and improving public health, and the expansion and professionalization of the health department, caused a tremendous degree of optimism in the face of disease. This optimism was alive and well despite the multiple challenges that explosive population growth, urbanization, and extensive industrialization and commerce brought. Reflecting the positive mentality perfectly, Dr. Friedrich stated that

Cleveland has grown to such a large size and its commerce has assumed such immense proportions, that travelers from all parts of the continent come and go daily, and we must expect that any disease which appears in any place of the Union will sooner or later come to us. But the Health Department as now constructed is able to take care of anything that may come.\footnote{City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1912.}

If the health commissioner felt optimistic in the face of plague, yellow fever, typhoid fever, cholera, smallpox, and even tuberculosis, he would not be likely to feel particularly threatened by the arrival of influenza. Hindsight clearly makes this attitude appear not only hubristic but positively foolish. However, what we may consider scientific or medical hubris today was part of a genuine belief among many Americans at the time that the medical field would ultimately be capable of conquering all sorts of disease.\footnote{This was especially a true belief among Progressive reformers who believed that mankind had the ability to better itself and create what amounts to a perfect society. For examples on this way of thinking, see Cleveland Hospital Council, \textit{Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part I}, 25-8; Arthur Ekirch, \textit{Progressivism in America. A Study of the Era From Theodore Roosevelt to Woodrow Wilson} (New York, NY: New Viewpoints, 1974); Ruth C. Engs, \textit{The Progressive Era's Health Reform Movement}; Frederic C. Howe, \textit{The Confessions of a Reformer} (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, [1925] 1988).}

Furthermore, medical knowledge, technology and practices were increasingly...
seen as ways to obtain longer life. This is wonderfully exemplified by numerous newspaper articles that called on a long line of medical doctors to give their expert advice on health care and longevity. The *Plain Dealer* even ran an article series titled "The Art of Living A Hundred Years" in which doctors gave advice about all sorts of medical concerns, including how to use medicine properly and the importance of not worrying.\(^{121}\) In the same way, "To Secure Long Life" was obviously an "[e]xceedingly [i]nteresting" matter. The person that was called on to discuss this essential topic was not surprisingly a doctor.\(^{122}\)

The early twentieth century was a time when the potential and possibilities of modern medicine seemed boundless to many Americans.\(^{123}\) The almost wild faith that some had in medicine's tremendous powers is seen in a number of extraordinary claims that even made it into larger newspapers. For example, in 1906, the *Plain Dealer* ran a sensational article about the connection between sour milk and long life. Not unlike more traditional forms of folk medicine, the article drew a distinct connection between food and health. It stated that according to Louis Pasteur's successor - a man named Metchnikoff - people who drank sour milk could live to the ripe old age of 180.\(^{124}\) The main connection between the claim and modern medicine was the reference to the medical pioneer and superstar Pasteur. The claim of sour milk's miraculous powers may have been of a more old-fashioned kind. The connection to a champion of modern medicine made it much

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\(^{121}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Apr. 11, 1901; May 2, 1901.

\(^{122}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 21, 1902.

\(^{123}\) This view was not universally held. Many immigrant groups, for instance, trusted more in traditional ways of health care and healing than in modern, American medicine. See Cleveland Hospital Council, *Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 10* (Cleveland, OH: Cleveland Hospital Council, 1920), 850-4, Oberlin College, Storage, Call Number 614C5992C pt. 10; Kraut, *Silent Travelers*.

\(^{124}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 4, 1906.
more believable, at least for some. Just like hindsight makes optimism in the face of deadly diseases appear prideful and misguided, dreams of living past a hundred years appear unrealistic. Even so, these dreams and beliefs show the optimism that many people had in matters of health and medicine. Furthermore, considering the many accomplishments that modern medicine had steadily made, including ways to effectively combat ancient foes such as smallpox, cholera, and typhoid fever, the optimism does not appear entirely unfounded. After all, a pattern of success often creates an expectation of further success. It may be hubristic, but it is certainly understandable.

Grip: Chief Ally of the Grim Reaper.

And,... when influenza kills, it usually kills through pneumonia.

Cleveland had experienced many medical improvements and successes firsthand. Along with the relatively limited historical impact and virulence of “the grip” in the city, it therefore makes sense that health officials and citizens alike thought of influenza in less than horrifying terms. The disease had one disconcerting characteristic though, and that was its connection with other diseases, especially with pneumonia. Starting in late

125 In some ways, it is not unlike the early part of the twenty-first century, when medicine - including genetics, stem cell research and nanotechnology - are viewed by many as fields of tremendous opportunity. Also, especially in the Western world, professional health care systems are armed with tremendous knowledge, technology, and not least antibiotics. Many of us who live here are raised to believe that modern medicine had an almost divine ability to safeguard us from disease and death. At the very least, we certainly do not expect to die from illnesses such as influenza, tuberculosis or plague. In many ways, our twenty-first hubris in the face of disease and health care may be just as high, if not higher, than that of our early 1900s ancestors.
127 See earlier discussions about smallpox, typhoid fever, etc.
March of 1916, the city's newly appointed health commissioner Dr. R. H. Bishop began alluding to pneumonia when discussing the recent "grip" epidemic of 1915-16. In one of his daily newspaper columns named "The First Wealth is Health", Dr. Bishop focused not on the number of deaths caused by influenza directly, but highlighted instead how a bout of the disease could lead to pneumonia. Influenza, Dr. Bishop stated, can often leave the body in a weakened state, making it easier for pneumonia to grab a hold of a person. Influenza, much like alcohol consumption, overweight, overworking, and a lack of physical exercise, was therefore seen as a predisposing factor for infections of the lungs.\textsuperscript{128} Doctor Bishop was not the only nor the first person in Cleveland to hold this view about the disease. As already seen, doctors in the city had highlighted the connection between "grippe" and other diseases at least as early as during the Russian Influenza epidemic in 1889-90.\textsuperscript{129} In 1905, then health commissioner Dr. Friedrich also warned that a pneumonia epidemic could easily follow on the heels of an influenza epidemic. "The grip itself is not so bad," Friedrich said, "it is the results that grow out of it that are to be feared."\textsuperscript{130} Two years later, Dr. Friedrich reiterated the power of "grip", stating that it could both cause secondary infections and turn pre-existing conditions into terminal cases. In a newspaper article titled "Grip Chief Ally of Grim Reaper", Friedrich attributed the rise in deaths during the first half of 1907 "entirely to the effect of grip which swept the city last winter." The doctor stated that although "only" sixty deaths were reported as caused by "grip", untold people with heart problems, tuberculosis, or other diseases had died from those diseases after being infected with the flu. In short,

\textsuperscript{128} Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 31, 1916; Nov 2, 1916.
\textsuperscript{129} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 23, 1889; Dec. 28, 1889; Jan. 8, 1890; Jan. 14, 1890.
\textsuperscript{130} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 27, 1905.
influenza could not only cause pneumonia and other maladies, but also made other illnesses more lethal.\textsuperscript{131} In 1910, Dr. Friedrich once again blamed "grip" for causing numerous cases of tuberculosis and pneumonia, and thus contributing to a substantial number of deaths in the city, at least far beyond the two deaths that were directly attributed to flu.\textsuperscript{132}

Doctor Bishop's 1916 statement about influenza was therefore part of a much longer tradition of viewing the disease first and foremost as a cause or intensifier of other diseases. Even so, it was still a communicable disease that could seriously affect the city, and therefore something the city's health officials believed that the public should be well informed about. In January 1917, Dr. Bishop replaced his daily "The First Wealth is Health" newspaper column with a new series of educational articles that were published in the Sunday edition of the Cleveland Plain Dealer. The series was called "Beating the Weather Man" and was a continuation of the health commissioner's campaign of educating the people of Cleveland on how to avoid preventable and communicable diseases.\textsuperscript{133} In February the same year, he posted a thorough guide on the nature of "Grippe", discussing how to avoid catching and spreading it.\textsuperscript{134} The column was not associated with any particular outbreak of influenza and did not suggest that people had to be overly concerned nor that official responses or regulations were necessary during an outbreak. It focused instead on popular awareness and voluntary preventive actions. The topic for the following week had a much more sinister focus as it dealt with

\textsuperscript{131} Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 6, 1907.
\textsuperscript{132} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 27, 1910.
\textsuperscript{133} Dr Bishop's work on educating the public and encouraging their cooperation in matters of public health was later mentioned amongst the greatest parts of his legacy as health commissioner in Cleveland. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 11, 1918.
\textsuperscript{134} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 18, 1917.
pneumonia, a disease that Bishop held to be the cause of ten percent of all deaths in the U.S. annually. In this article, Bishop once again reminded the public of how "grippe" predisposes people to catch the far more deadly pneumonia. In the end, flu itself was not that dangerous, but it could become a reason for great concern whenever it caused or intensified other illnesses. The main thing to do to avoid the disease was to take proper preventative precautions.

When news about the Spanish Influenza began appearing in the newspapers, there were no real historical or recent reasons why Clevelanders should feel more concerned than during other rounds of the disease, or why the health department should resort to extreme actions. There were certainly no historical or medically known reasons for implementing comprehensive bans, isolations or quarantines. The only real cause for concern or alarm was found within the increasingly shocking and disturbing reports arriving from Europe, from the American East Coast, and from representatives of the U.S. Public Health Service. The name of the disease was flu. But its nature appeared to be much more sinister than what its name suggested.

A Tradition of Education and Cooperation.

First and foremost by a long interval among the weapons of attack, comes education, not alone the training of the intelligence, the distribution of the facts, but the development of the feelings, the emotions, the instinctive reactions which guide us chiefly in the emergencies and great decisions in life.

135 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb 25, 1917.
136 Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 1, 26-7.
Stories about the Spanish Flu first began appearing in Cleveland newspapers on June 17, 1918, with the number of articles increasing steadily throughout July. The first mentions of this new round of influenza focused on how it was spreading in Europe and how this affected the war effort.\textsuperscript{137} The Spanish Influenza moniker made it into Cleveland newspapers as early as July 3rd, as it was then known that the disease was widespread on the Iberian Peninsula.\textsuperscript{138} With Spanish Influenza ravaging Europe but apparently leaving the U.S. alone, Clevelanders could allow themselves to be fascinated by the disease's actions in Europe without fearing any immediate personal impact. A particularly exotic story reported that the Sultan of Turkey, and therefore an enemy in the war, had succumbed to the scourge.\textsuperscript{139} Making use of the tantalizing nature of the story of the Sultan's death, Health Commissioner Bishop posted a reminder of the seriousness of the disease in the city's newspapers, highlighting the importance of taking proper personal precautions.\textsuperscript{140}

Four days later, the health commissioner was chosen by the American Red Cross to go to Italy to join the fight against tuberculosis there. The doctor was promptly granted a six month leave of absence by Cleveland's welfare director Beman, who planned to appoint the chief of the city's Bureau of Child Hygiene, Dr. R. Bolt, as acting health commissioner in Dr. Bishop's stead.\textsuperscript{141} Dr. Bolt had other plans though, as he and the chief of the Bureau of Public Health Education, Mr. J. D. Halliday, decided to go with Dr. Bishop to Italy to fight tuberculosis together. Therefore, when reports began

\textsuperscript{137} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jun 29, 1918; July 8, July 9, July 12, July 13, July 22, 1918.
\textsuperscript{138} Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 3, 1918.
\textsuperscript{139} Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 5, 1918.
\textsuperscript{140} Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 6, 1918.
\textsuperscript{141} Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 10, July 11, 1918.
confirming the presence of Spanish Influenza in the U.S., Cleveland found itself without its highly respected health commissioner as well as two other key members of the city health department.\textsuperscript{142} During the epidemic, the city also lost the services of former health commissioner and then chief of the Bureau of Communicable Diseases Dr. Friedrich, as he fell ill with influenza and remained bedridden for three solid weeks before returning to his office.\textsuperscript{143} The task of leading the city's response against the Spanish Flu thus fell to Dr. H. L. Rockwood who was the chief of the Bureau of Tuberculosis. As history would go on to show, the appointment was both wise and fortuitous. The wisdom of the decision was proven as Dr. Rockwood went on to perform marvelously well as both medical director of the tuberculosis sanatorium and city health commissioner for the next decade, with him and his co-workers in the health department receiving much of the credit for Cleveland's continued success in ranking among the healthiest large cities in the United States.\textsuperscript{144} His reputation eventually rose to the point where the doctor was offered the position of Director of Health for Ohio, an offer he turned down in order to continue his work in Cleveland.\textsuperscript{145} As things turned out, the doctor had the skills and talent needed to lead the city through the epidemic, proving able to not only provide medical expertise, but also showing a keen ability to organize, coordinate, communicate, and secure large scale cooperation. The combination of these

\textsuperscript{142} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 5, 1919. Dr. Bolt was Welfare Director Beman's original first choice for serving as health commissioner while Dr. Bishop was in Italy. With Dr. Bolt also going overseas, the choice fell on Dr. Rockwood. See for instance Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 10, 1918. Dr. Bishop was a nationally recognized expert on tuberculosis. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 12, 1909 and April 26, 1913.

\textsuperscript{143} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 18, 1918. Dr. Friedrich was healthy and undoubtedly helpful during the worst part of the epidemic. By the time he fell ill in late November, the epidemic had already subsided markedly and was not considered a 'crisis' anymore.

\textsuperscript{144} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 21, 1930.

\textsuperscript{145} City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1922; City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1923; City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1928
factors was immensely helpful during the influenza crisis and beyond. However, all these attributes would have been practically worthless if Dr. Rockwood had shared the same fate as Dr. Friedrich. Thankfully, the decision to appoint Dr. Rockwood was also a fortuitous one, in that he avoided catching Spanish Flu throughout the epidemic. If he had become sick, the city would have been left scrambling to find yet another health commissioner to lead the fight against the flu. As it happened, Dr. Rockwood took charge of the health commissioner's office and kept it throughout the crisis and for years to follow.

Neither of these facts were obviously known in September, 1918. Even so, probably due to the city's tradition of having well qualified doctors serve as health commissioners, Dr. Bishop's replacement appears not to have been chosen for political reasons. When the original candidate for the position followed Dr. Bishop to Italy, the city did not turn to Dr. Rockwood as a political favor or in desperation. Instead, Dr. Beman recognized Rockwood as an expert doctor, as a valued member of the city's health department, and as intimately familiar with diseases of the respiratory system. Rockwood was consequently a natural candidate to lead Cleveland in its response to epidemic influenza. The doctor was also a great candidate because of his experience within the health department. Almost five years earlier, in January, 1914, Dr. Rockwood had been

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146 Welfare Director Beman was a longtime active political supporter of Republican Henry L. Davis and was appointed to his position by then Mayor Elect Davis in December, 1915. Beman was therefore involved in placing Dr. Bishop in charge of the health department while moving Dr. Friedrich - who had served as head of the department throughout the rule of Cleveland's Progressive mayors Johnson and Baker - to head the Bureau of Communicable Disease. It seems possible that political considerations kept Friedrich from being re-appointed to a position he was already well acquainted with, making Rockwood an all the more acceptable candidate. The point remains that a highly qualified physician was placed in charge of Cleveland's health department at the eve of an epidemic crisis. Considering Friedrich's subsequent bout with the disease, the decision, whether politically motivated or not, turned out to be a good one. For more on Welfare Director Beman, see Cleveland Plain Dealer Oct. 17, 1911; Dec. 2, 1915; Jan. 6, 1916.
appointed to the position of resident physician at the tuberculosis sanatorium at Warrensville. The appointment was given by none other than Dr. Bishop, who was arguably the main man in charge of Cleveland's fight against tuberculosis at the time.\textsuperscript{147} Dr. Rockwood apparently took well to his new job and responsibilities, quickly rising to the position of superintendent at the Warrensville sanatorium. As further proof of Rockwood's abilities and success, in 1917, then health commissioner Bishop appointed Dr. Rockwood to succeed him in the positions of Chief of the Bureau of Tuberculosis and medical director at the Warrensville Sanatorium.\textsuperscript{148} Therefore, when Spanish Flu arrived in the U.S., Cleveland's new acting health commissioner was not only experienced within the city's health department, but, having worked closely with Dr. Bishop for years, was also familiar with Dr. Bishop's ideas and methods of public health leadership.\textsuperscript{149} His experience with both these elements strongly influenced Dr. Rockwood's leadership and actions during the Spanish Influenza epidemic in Cleveland.

The greatest inheritances of Dr. Bishop's regime was a focus on educating Cleveland's residents and winning their voluntary cooperation.\textsuperscript{150} The focus on education was a central tenet in the Progressive worldview that sought to create good civil society and a "perfected humanity".\textsuperscript{151} The ideal of education and voluntary public participation became the core strategy of many public health matters in Cleveland during the early twentieth century. The Anti-Tuberculosis League is a prime example of this.

\textsuperscript{147} Dr. Bishop's role in the tuberculosis fight in Cleveland is discussed later in this chapter.
\textsuperscript{148} Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 2, 1917. Dr. Bishop was appointed health commissioner in early 1916. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 7, 1916; Feb. 15, 1916.
\textsuperscript{149} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan 4, 1914; Jan 5, 1919.
\textsuperscript{150} Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 11, 1918.
Throughout its fight against "the great white plague", the League relied on educating the public and largely depended on people's willful participation in working to eradicate the scourge.\textsuperscript{152} Dr. Bishop was intimately involved in this process, serving as the League's secretary for years, also while simultaneously serving as chief of the city's Bureau of Tuberculosis.\textsuperscript{153} The focus on education and dissemination of information, and a desire for voluntary cooperation, became trademarks of Dr. Rockwood's response to the Spanish Flu epidemic too.

This was not the only public health tradition that Rockwood came to rely on. Previous bouts with epidemic disease had allowed the City of Cleveland and its health department to develop numerous traditions and responses to communicable disease, and also create a number of measures and laws that gave the city power to enforce certain public health measures during times of epidemics. Earlier smallpox epidemics, for instance, had exposed the need to create legislation that allowed for both forced vaccinations and forced quarantines.\textsuperscript{154} Many of these measures were developed and implemented during times when the population proved unwilling to voluntarily and dutifully follow the health board's advice.\textsuperscript{155} The long and steady battle against tuberculosis also played a role in providing the city with legal power in matters of public health, making Cleveland "admirably equipped with legislation for the prevention of the

\textsuperscript{152} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb 13, 1905; Oct. 7, 1906; Sept 17, 1906; Jan 24, 1907.
\textsuperscript{153} Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 12, 1909; April 26, 1913.
\textsuperscript{154} City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1878; "Cleveland Health Board", \textit{Encyclopedia of Cleveland History}, 205-6.
\textsuperscript{155} City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1878, 382-3; City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902, 937-40; Willrich, \textit{Pox}, 238-40.
spread of the Great White Plague." Furthermore, previous bouts of diphtheria and scarlet fever had led the city to develop a system of placarding houses to indicate the presence of communicable disease. 

Most crucially, earlier experiences with contagious diseases had taught elements of the city to cooperate. At least as early as in the 1870s, the city's health officials and the public school officials cooperated in combating an outbreak of diphtheria. In the 1880s, health officials and the schools cooperated once again, as the Board of Education set out to improve the air quality in school buildings and to supervise the health of the pupils. The smallpox epidemic of 1902 proved an even stronger unifier of Cleveland institutions and residents as important parts of the city cooperated in combating a terrible disease. Faced with an outbreak not of the "mild, slightly contagious disease of the previous years which left no marks and seldom proved fatal", the city experienced a visit from an ancient foe. It was "the smallpox 'we read about,' that terrible scourge that struck so much terror into the former generations." The tremendously fatal nature of the disease, more so than the number of sick and dead, caused health officer Dr. Friedrich to seek the help of a wide array of people and groups including Mayor Tom Johnson, the City School Council, and the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce - a tremendously influential, powerful, and intensely engaged organization throughout most

156 Cleveland Hospital Council, A Popular Summary of the Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, (Cleveland, OH: The Cleveland Hospital Council, 1920), 13, Oberlin College, Storage, Call Number 614C5992CS.
157 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1882.
158 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1878.
159 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1882.
160 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902.
of the city's history. Help was needed mainly because of the experiences of the previous year, when a much milder form of smallpox had hit the city. The city had then responded to the threat by the tried and true tactic of recommending and executing widespread vaccinations. The only problem was that the vaccine was not safe and clean, with the result that numerous people throughout the city experienced episodes of tremendous, debilitating pain. At least four people even died excruciating deaths from tetanus because of the tainted vaccine. Besides the obvious discomfort of getting ill and the terror of watching people die of tetanus, the vaccination tragedy also heavily affected households who depended on the income of someone who was suddenly unable to work because of adverse effects from the smallpox vaccine.

The following year, Dr. Friedrich mentioned the recent experience as the main obstacle to voluntary vaccination during the much more dangerous smallpox outbreak of 1902. In his words, "the people still remembered the vaccination horror of 1901 and were afraid of the vaccinators sent out by the city." The number of Clevelanders who volunteered to be vaccinated was so small that Dr. Friedrich even reported that he "did

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161 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902. The epidemic saw a horrifying 17.95 per cent death rate among those who caught the disease. There were also thirty instances of the terrible "black smallpox", which had a 100 per cent death rate. Plain Dealer, Oct. 26, 1902. The influence and importance of the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce during the history of Cleveland is hard to overstate. An indicator of their importance, and of their often times civic and philanthropic manner, is hinted at in the Encyclopedia of Cleveland History and in the numerous annual reports and minutes found in the archives of the Western Reserve Historical Society. As seen in these sources and in numerous newspaper articles from the time, in 1918, the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce and its members were involved in one way or another in practically every major aspect of both charity work, city government and much more. The overall goal of the organization was to "provide a forum for businessmen to discuss their ideas and problems; to stimulate investments in the local economy; and to make Cleveland a better place to live and work." See for example The Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, Annual 1919 (Cleveland, OH: The Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, 1919), Greater Cleveland Growth Association, Records, 1881 - 1971, Container 73, Annual Reports, 1917 - 1920, Bound Volume 176. Annual Reports, 1919. The Western Reserve Historical Society; "The Greater Cleveland Growth Association," in Encyclopedia of Cleveland History, eds. David D. Van Tassel and John J. Grabowski (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 469.

162 Willrich, Pox, 239.
not feel justified to continue this kind of work." Simply put, negative experiences with public health measures had caused a close to total evaporation of public voluntarism and cooperation. The problem was that the city was being attacked by smallpox, and vaccination was the only real, effective weapon against it, a fact that Dr. Friedrich was certainly aware of. Smallpox made vaccination essential. Public cooperation was therefore also essential, voluntary or not. However, it was a well-known fact that the use of outright force could cause tremendous resistance and conflict. In Boston, for instance, health officials who tried to forcefully vaccinate nineteen citizens were met by fierce resistance as the men "kicked and clawed and also fought with teeth and heads against what some of them declared was an assault upon their rights as otherwise free and independent American citizens." When faced with the prospect of having to forcefully vaccinate Jackson County, Kentucky, the health inspector in charge reported to his superiors that forced vaccination would require "four battalions of four hundred soldiers each, well armed." In fact, the only way to truly be successful in forcefully vaccinate a group of people was by marginalizing that group as a minority, gain the support of the majority, and use police powers or military force to enforce the vaccinations. Dr. Friedrich himself stated that in his experience, "compulsory

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163 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902.
164 Dr. Friedrich was accused of some for being against vaccinations. This was not true. The misunderstanding had arisen due to the doctor's refusal to continue the use of the impure vaccine. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 22, 1901; "The Smallpox Situation in Cleveland", in Pennsylvania Medical Journal, Volume 6, Pittsburg, Murdoch-Kerr Press, 1903, 23-4; Willrich, Pox, 239.
165 There is an incredible amount of examples of people violently resisting forced vaccinations. Many of these stories are easily accessible through secondary works of history. Numerous examples can for instance be found in Fenn Pox Americana; Krau, Silent Travelers; Nuwer Plague Among the Magnolias; Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides. Epidemic and Race in San Francisco's Chinatown (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2001); Willrich, Pox.
166 Quoted in Willrich, Pox, 238.
167 Quoted in Willrich, Pox, 151.
168 This is for instance shown in myriad examples in Willrich, Pox, especially in chapters 3-6.
vaccination has won only enemies." It would certainly not be an easy, or maybe even plausible affair in Cleveland. Rather than attempting a hugely unpopular, and possibly destabilizing police-style enforcement measure, the health commissioner obtained instead the voluntary cooperation of other holders of influence and power in the city. Aided by these groups' methods and powers of persuasion, coercion and encouragement, Friedrich found a way to secure public compliance by making vaccination the path of least resistance. Vaccination was not technically forced. Instead, failure to cooperate was made as undesirable or unsustainable as possible. For many Clevelanders, vaccination probably even became the path of absolute necessity, especially when proof of vaccination was made a criteria for working.

The road to wholesale vaccination of the city followed three main routes. First, the school council made vaccination a "conditio sine qua non for attending school", making proof of vaccination a requirement for pupils throughout the city. In a further sign of their cooperation with the health department, the school officials even put Dr. Friedrich in charge of everything, allowing him to make sure that the vaccination of school children was being carried out. The Chamber of Commerce provided the second strong impetus for encouraging public cooperation by getting employers throughout the city to require that both workers and workers' families be vaccinated. The third string of attack was carried out "through an extraordinary public effort" that included a number of religious leaders and civic groups. These groups and individuals helped to both educate the public and pressure reluctant residents to get vaccinated. By obtaining

169 Quoted in Willrich, Pox, 239.
170 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902.
171 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Mach 29, 1903.
the cooperation of various forms of city leaders and working hard to restore the people's trust in the health department through conversation, communication and education, Dr. Friedrich thus managed to enforce wholesale vaccination while avoiding the use of blatant force and coercion.\(^{172}\) Vaccination remained a voluntary choice, but it became a choice that most people, for either financial or social reasons, could not afford to reject. Dr. Friedrich later highlighted the importance of all the groups and people that had helped him, stating that "[o]nly one who has been through the trying ordeal of fighting a smallpox epidemic can fully appreciate the help that the Chamber of Commerce gave us in time of need."\(^{173}\) Through the 1901 and 1902 smallpox debacle, health commissioner had learned first-hand the incredible value of using city leaders to encourage, persuade and enforce public compliance when voluntary cooperation was problematic.

The practice of cooperating with city leaders and organizations to encourage or coerce public cooperation did not end with the smallpox epidemic. Instead, it remained a main tactic in dealing with any outbreak of communicable disease in Cleveland. The Chamber of Commerce, for one, helped Dr. Friedrich the following year when the city was beset by an outbreak of typhoid fever. In this instance, the Chamber joined the health commissioner in exhorting the public to boil their water, and also urged employers to provide their workers with boiled water and to make sure that posters from the health board would be published in highly visible areas throughout the workplace.\(^{174}\) Even with the persuasive and coercive powers of the Chamber of Commerce at his back, Dr. Friedrich remained true to the ideal of voluntarism and called for the voluntary

\(^{172}\) Willrich, *Pox*, 239-40.
\(^{173}\) City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902.
\(^{174}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 29, 1903; April 9, 1903.
cooperation of the public, declaring that the recommendation of boiling drinking water
could not be carried out by ordinance nor enforced by sanitary policemen. Instead, he
stated, "it depends largely upon the citizens to put an end to the epidemic by taking the
[necessary] precaution of boiling all drinking water."\textsuperscript{175} The tradition of obtaining
cooperation from city leaders and groups, and the ideal of seeking the voluntary
compliance of the public became trademarks of Cleveland's Health Department. It is
therefore not surprising that Dr. Rockwood adopted the same tactics during the Spanish
Influenza crisis.

Education and Voluntarism. The Progressive Ideal.

A new Cleveland is springing into existence: a city in which it is good to live; a
city whose residents believe that "he profits most who serves best"; Cleveland,
the city that co-operates; Cleveland, the city that seeks perfected humanity;
Cleveland, the city with sublime faith in its future; Cleveland, the city of ideas
and high ideals; Cleveland, the city that really has a soul!\textsuperscript{176}

Although force was sometimes needed, far from all public cooperation was coerced
or obtained through persuasion. In fact, the ideal of voluntary participation was far from
a perpetually unobtainable mirage. The city's fight against tuberculosis provides one of
the best examples of a much more ideal and voluntary form of cooperation. In their
struggles against the great white plague, Cleveland's residents joined efforts in a
tremendously comprehensive and inclusive way. The main efforts were coordinated and

\textsuperscript{175} Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 9, 1903.
\textsuperscript{176} The Cleveland Association of Building Owners and Managers, "Cleveland, The City That Co-
operates", in NARD Journal, Vol. 24, Issue 23, 1917, National Association of Retail Druggists U.S.,
1024-8
carried out through profound cooperation between the city health department, the Anti-
Tuberculosis League, The Red Cross, and a wide variety of private organizations and
individuals. It involved the young and the old; public officials and private individuals;
men and women; Protestants, Catholics, and Jews; Americans and immigrants; labor
unions, industrialists, businessmen, educators, and medical professionals, to name but a few.\footnote{177}

Not surprisingly, the city's campaign against tuberculosis relied first and foremost on
educating the public and appealing to people's sense of civic duty.\footnote{178} The Anti-
Tuberculosis League of Cleveland played a huge role in this process. Founded in 1904
for the express purpose of combating tuberculosis, the League was formally organized in
the city during the spring of 1905.\footnote{179} It originally consisted of members of twenty-two of
the city's "public spirited organizations", including the Cleveland Chamber of
Commerce, the Academy of Medicine, Cleveland's public library, the city's Board of
Education, the YMCA, the Board of Health, a number of settlement houses, the
Associated Charities, the Slavic Alliance, the Visiting Nurse Association, and the United
Trades and Labor Council. The League sought to coordinate and organize the anti-
tuberculosis work already done in the city, and to secure the help of all the appropriate
"mutual aid societies and other associations and bodies" that could help stamp out the
disease.\footnote{180} Crucially, the League sought to work closely with the city's health officials.

\footnote{177} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 13, 1905; Feb. 19, 1905; March 3, 1905; July 4, 1906; Sept. 167, 1906;
March 14, 1909; March 26, 1909; Jul 13, 1910; Sept. 27, 1910; Oct. 13, 1911.
\footnote{178} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 13, 1905; March 4, 1905; July 31, 1905; Sept. 17, 1906; March 14, 1909;
Sept. 27, 1910.
\footnote{179} Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 4, 1905; "The Northern Ohio Lung Association", in \textit{The Encyclopedia
of Cleveland History}, 726.
\footnote{180} Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 4, 1905.
In a clear connection between the health department and the League, members of both the city's health board and health office were also members of the League's board of directors. Furthermore, the health commissioner and communicable disease expert Dr. Friedrich was appointed to be in charge of the League's disinfection activities. This personal connection between the two institutions would later be carried on in Dr. Bishop, who served as both secretary for the Anti-Tuberculosis League, chief of the city's tuberculosis bureau, and city health commissioner. City health officials and the Anti-Tuberculosis League cooperated, complemented, coordinated, and organized much of the city's efforts against tuberculosis for years to come.

In 1905, the newly elected president of the Anti-Tuberculosis League, Dr. J.H. Lowman, made a series of statements expressing the tactics that the new organization would use in its war on consumption. First of all, he stated that tuberculosis could only be defeated "when we know who the enemy is, what is its power for evil, how to avoid it and how to arm against it." In short, medical knowledge and etiology would largely dictate specific measures. More practically, the Anti-Tuberculosis League would aid the city in the fight against the disease in a number of crucially important ways. First of all, it would "aid the health authorities by influencing public opinion." This would be done by using "schools, libraries and publications... to inform and educate the people", and by giving lectures and hosting educational exhibits. Education was therefore not just

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181 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 4, 1905.
182 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 4, 1905.
183 Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 12, 1909; Aug. 17, 1911; April 26, 1913; Dec. 20, 1913.
184 See for instance Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 17, 1906; March 14, 1909; June 2, 1910; July 13, 1910; Nov. 30, 1910; April 10, 1911.
185 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 4, 1905.
186 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 4, 1905; Sept. 17, 1906; Jan. 24, 1907.
about creating an informed populace, but also about creating an engaged and cooperative one. This process expanded way beyond traditional means and arenas of education. Through its different committees, the League also interacted with people on a very personal level, educating patients and their families about how to deal with the illness, and even providing aid for consumption stricken families. The League even helped convalescing adults find light work.\textsuperscript{187} Along with its role in education and in winning the hearts and minds of the public, the League's most important role was to secure the cooperation of mutual benefit societies. More than anyone else, these societies best represented the part of the population that suffered from tuberculosis, not least because many of their members were industrial workers and their families and people who lived in crowded conditions. Crucially, the mutual benefit societies also represented the myriad different ethnic groups that lived in the city. Essentially, the mutual benefit societies therefore not only had thousands of members, but also "reach[ed] homes of all kinds and classes."\textsuperscript{188}

Based on these tactics of education and voluntary public participation, the Anti-Tuberculosis League of Cleveland went on to perform marvelously well in both educating the public, win their support and cooperation, instill a sense of civic duty regarding a matter of public health, and work closely together with the city's health department. The cooperation did not stop there though. Working closely with educational and philanthropic groups, the League managed to spread information and

\textsuperscript{187} Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 4, 1905.  
\textsuperscript{188} Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 4, 1905.
instill anti-tuberculosis attitudes far and wide in Cleveland. In 1906 for instance, the League helped a number of charitable, religious and sociological associations to organize a tuberculosis exhibit. All Clevelanders were invited to come and learn about the scourge and how to best avoid it. The visitors also got to listen to experts talking about what was being done to combat the disease. Creatively, the exhibit even held a contest for school children in which seventh- and eighth graders competed in writing the best "tuberculosis essays." Eunice Ekers of 9801 Elizabeth Avenue won first prize and received a handsome ten dollar reward. Other children won smaller prizes of five, three and two dollars each. The League also organized a lecture series "to be delivered in the public schools and branch libraries and before the members of various labor unions and social settlements", effectively educating various parts of Cleveland's residents in anti-tuberculosis behavior. Throughout this period, the Anti-Tuberculosis League remained closely allied with the city's schools and board of education, consistently urging the need to teach school children about the disease and how to avoid it.

One of the most important aspects of the League's work was to recruit the engagement and cooperation of the entire populace. They were remarkably successful at this. A key element of their success was that the League not only communicated and cooperated with various groups in society, but also offered memberships for organizations and individuals alike. Anyone who could contribute a dollar or more could

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189 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 13, 1905; Sept. 17, 1906; Sept. 10, 1910.
190 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 17, 1906.
191 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 7, 1906.
192 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 24, 1917.
193 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 4, 1905; Jan. 24, 1907; Sept. 27, 1910; Oct. 13, 1911;
become a member. "In this way", League officials stated, "physicians, clergymen, lawyers, businessmen and all those interested in the health of the city can become members." By 1909, clergymen were certainly involved in the movement as churches organized anti-tuberculosis Sundays, invited experts to come and speak on the topic, encouraged anti-tuberculosis discussions, and even held fundraisers to combat the disease. As already seen, the League also focused on reaching not just the elite, but "all kinds and classes". This inclusive and universal attitude was central to the League from day one and may explain why Cleveland's labor unions were among the League's strongest and most active supporters. The labor unions' involvement and cooperation even preceded the formal organization of the League, and was in fact one of the principal forces that pushed for its formation. The unions remained actively engaged in the tuberculosis fight for years. All the various groups that were involved in the anti-tuberculosis movement show how effective the League and the overall movement was in creating a wide, unified front against the disease.

Evidence of the anti-tuberculosis movement's success in arousing public participation in Cleveland can also be seen in the city's overall cooperation with the Red Cross, most noticeably during the Red Cross Christmas campaigns against tuberculosis. In 1907, the Red Cross chapter in Delaware issued special Red Cross stamps which proceeds would go towards fighting tuberculosis. It was an astounding success. In only three weeks more than 400,000 stamps were sold in the small state, providing some $3,000 towards the

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194 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 13, 1905.
195 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 26, 1909; March 29, 1909.
196 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 4, 1905.
197 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 19, 1905.
198 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 3, 1908.
anti-tuberculosis work there. Encouraged by the success, the Red Cross decided to issue the stamp in all the states of the union in 1908, and also declared itself as intimately engaged with the fight against tuberculosis on a national level.\(^{199}\) Cleveland proved to be an enthusiastic ally in the fight. By November 28, 1908, Cleveland newspapers were commenting on the tremendous success of the stamp campaign. The *Plain Dealer* reported that "Christmas Stamp Is Season's Fad", and that the "Little Sticker Issued by Red Cross Society Arouses Wide Interest."\(^{200}\) The campaign was not just a success in Cleveland though. In fact, something akin to a Christmas stamp craze swept through the nation. The state of Pennsylvania led the charge with about 2,500,000 stamps ordered by November 30th. New York had ordered just around 2,000,000, whereas officials in Indiana feared that the demand for stamps would overtake and dwarf the supply. Even among such enthusiasm, Cleveland soon rose to national prominence. By the end of November, the City of Cleveland alone had gone through its original quota of 200,000 stamps and had ordered 300,000 more, hoping to receive them within a day or two.\(^{201}\) It did not stop there. By December 4, the extent of Cleveland's participation and civic interest in anti-tuberculosis work became remarkably clear as the Red Cross decided to discontinue distribution of Christmas stamps to the whole rest of the state in order to keep up with the city's demand.\(^{202}\) About three weeks later, on December 26, 1908, Cleveland was closing in on Philadelphia in "the civic contest" of what city was the greatest purchaser of Christmas stamps in the nation, despite the fact that Philadelphia's population of roughly 1.5 million was about three times larger than Cleveland's

\(^{199}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 22, 1908.  
\(^{200}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov 28, 1908.  
\(^{201}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 30, 1908.  
\(^{202}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 4, 1908.
population of just under 500,000.\textsuperscript{203} At this point, Cleveland had sold about 900,000 Red Cross stamps and was hoping to make it through the entire lot of 1,250,000 by the end of the year. The goal of selling all the stamps was held up as a matter of "civic pride."\textsuperscript{204} It is unclear whether the city managed to live up to their goal in 1908. But, carrying on a tradition of civic pride and participation in matters of public health, Cleveland undoubtedly rose to first place in the nation in 1911, selling more of what was then called Red Cross Christmas seals than any other municipality and city in the nation.\textsuperscript{205} This was no small feat, considering that Cleveland with its estimated 580,000 residents was only the sixth largest city in the U.S. at the time.\textsuperscript{206} It is especially impressive when compared to New York City. With an estimated 4.9 million residents in 1911, New York City had more than eight times the population of Cleveland.\textsuperscript{207} Even so, Cleveland managed to sell more than fifteen percent more seals than the Big Apple. This tradition of tremendous popular participation in Red Cross campaigns and other civic assignments continued through to the war era. In 1917, Cleveland prided itself on being first in the nation in Red Cross donations per capita, and also first in the nation in "civic attainment".\textsuperscript{208} A stated ideal for the present and the future was that Cleveland's

\textsuperscript{204} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 26, 1908.
\textsuperscript{205} Cleveland Plain Dealer April 3, 1912.
\textsuperscript{208} The Cleveland Association of Building Owners and Managers, "Cleveland, The City That Co-operates ", in NARD Journal, 1024.
residents "believe[d] that 'he profits most who serves best'". Cooperation was seen as an essential element in all these claims. The city was therefore presented to the world as "The City That Co-operates". It is doubtful that cooperation and voluntary service and sacrifice were universally held positions and practices in the city. Even so, both factors were evidently common enough for the city to brag about them. And in the case of anti-tuberculosis work, the reality of things certainly seems to have been remarkably close to the ideal.

Cleveland participation in the Red Cross anti-tuberculosis sales is therefore a great example of how involved and engaged the city was in matters of public health. It also shows how much importance and value the city placed on the concept of civic duty and civic pride. Just as importantly, the Red Cross Christmas campaigns show the wide public participation in Cleveland. Civic duty and cooperation in public health was not just an elite or middle class matter. Everybody should be involved. President Lowman of the Anti-Tuberculosis League praised the stamp campaign for helping achieve this goal, stating that it was "the best possible means of interesting the greatest number of people in our work[.]" His enthusiasm did not end there. "One of the best features of the Christmas stamp crusade", he said, "is the fact than everyone can enlist in it." In early twentieth century Cleveland, public health was a matter that ideally involved all parts of the public.

The anti-tuberculosis movement in Cleveland is a tremendous example of a city that both cooperated, educated, and fostered widespread public participation in matters of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{209}}\text{ Ibid., 1028.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{210}}\text{ Ibid., 1024, 1028.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{211}}\text{ Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec, 18, 1908.}\]
public health. It also reflects the core Cleveland ideology of voluntarism and participation as a civic duty. Progressive mayor Newton D. Baker referred to the ideal form of civic involvement and duty in Cleveland as "civitism". Civitism was in many ways like a local version of patriotism. It held that the more people loved Cleveland as their home, the more they would participate in making the city a better place.\textsuperscript{212} It can also be induced from this that the more they loved the city, the more they would be willing to sacrifice for its sake. Love of the city and local pride were therefore elements that influenced whether people would voluntarily cooperate or had to be persuaded, forced, or coerced. It is likely that the ideals of civic duty and responsibility were also used as a way to pressure people to cooperate. After all, whenever actions or ideals become social norms or collective values, it can be terribly difficult for individuals to go against them. It such cases, it is not so much a matter of governmental coercion as it is group coercion. If cooperation and participation became a societal norm, many may have chosen to toe the line simply as a path of least resistance. In addition, social norms have a way of reproducing themselves in both groups and individuals. It clearly does not always happen, but it is certainly possible for people to adopt norms and ideals simply because other people have them. It is even more common that people adopt values and beliefs because somebody else convinces them of the virtues of said norms and ideals. This is where education, whether in schools, newspapers, libraries, or on a one-on-one basis, becomes tremendously important.

The anti-tuberculosis fight in Cleveland is important for two other reasons as well. First of all, the city learned to cooperate with other cities. For example, in 1910 the city's superintendent of health, Dr. C. E. Ford, went on a tour of the large Eastern cities and learned "valuable information regarding the construction and operations of hospitals for victims of the white plague."\(^{213}\) Secondly, the anti-tuberculosis fight brought the city of Cleveland and its residents into a close relationship with the Red Cross. Also organized in 1905, the Cleveland chapter of the Red Cross started off in many ways as an organization for the civic minded part of the city's middle class and elite. The first meeting was led by the chapter's first president, famous industrialist and philanthropist Samuel Mather. It was attended by a number of other businessmen, industrialists and professionals who, according to a Red Cross historian, "by their life experience, training, and inheritance, viewed humanitarian service as their duty and obligation to the city where they had made their home and carried on their business or profession." The organization's stated goal was first and foremost to provide voluntary aid to the military, but also to help in civilian emergencies and disasters. Its focus and dedication to medicine and health care was reflected in its appointment of the famous physician, surgeon, and later co-founder of the Cleveland Clinic, Dr. George W. Crile as chapter president in 1909.\(^{214}\) Its political influence was likewise reflected in the appointment of the next president in 1911, Mr. Myron T. Herrick. Herrick was a lawyer, politician, businessman and diplomat who had served on the City Council for five years in the late nineteenth century, served as governor of Ohio between 1904 and 1906, and served as

\(^{213}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 2, 1910.
ambassador to France under President Taft between 1912 and 1914. The Red Cross also had clear connections to the city's Protestant groups, shown for instance in the next president, Charles E. Adams, who served from 1912 until 1913 and was also involved in the leadership of The Federated Churches of Greater Cleveland - an organization consisting of most of the city's Protestant churches. By 1912, the Red Cross was also working closely with the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, the Associated Charities, and the city's larger newspapers, with each institution being placed in charge of committees according to their unique expertise and specialties. The Red Cross committee of publication, for instance, was made up of the city editors of Cleveland's daily newspapers. Four of these - the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the Cleveland Leader, the Cleveland News, and the Cleveland Press - were in English. The fifth and last - the Waechter und Anzeiger - was in German. Over time, and greatly helped by the anti-tuberculosis movement and later the world war, the Red Cross came to be largely synonymous with civic participation and cooperation in Cleveland. By 1917, the city's prominence in Red Cross contributions and voluntary enlistments was even held up as a key factor in earning the city the title of "First City of American Spirit." That same year, more than 100,000 women volunteers and 125,000 school children were engaged in Red Cross work and activities in the city. Ideals of civic duty, cooperation between city government, private organizations and private individuals, cooperation across class and ethnic lines, and public health education was all combined in the Red Cross. This

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217 Duffy, Kissel, and Birkhold, History of the Greater Cleveland Chapter, 8.
218 The Cleveland Association of Building Owners and Managers, "Cleveland, The City That Co-operates", in NARD Journal, 1024.
219 Duffy, Kissel, and Birkhold, History of the Greater Cleveland Chapter, 16.
became extremely important during the Spanish Flu epidemic, as the Red Cross played a
tremendously important role in Cleveland's fight against the scourge.

In dealing with the Spanish flu, Cleveland and its health commissioner relied to a
large degree on the multiple public health connections and traditions that already existed
throughout the city. When the epidemic struck, the city already had a long history of
public health cooperation, coordination, and education. It had also developed a strong
connection between public health issues and civic duty, and created numerous modes of
operation to use when dealing with public health matters and crises. The cooperation
between the Health Department, the Anti-Tuberculosis League, the Red Cross, and all
the other organizations, institutions and individuals who participated in the anti-
tuberculosis fight is one of several tremendously important public health precedents
leading up to the Spanish Flu crisis.
CHAPTER III

CLEVELAND FIGHTS THE SPANISH FLU

During the epidemic, the health department has received the backing of a great majority of the citizens to a degree that was not unexpected in a city which for a long period has prominently stood among American communities in the matter of its high standard of public health. The removal of the greater part of the restrictions Sunday at midnight is simply a transfer to each citizen of the civic responsibility for the control of influenza which still exists.\(^{220}\)

- Dr. Rockwood, Nov. 10, 1918

Public health is a lens. When used to look at a human society, it can reflect and reveal values, beliefs, priorities, customs, traditions, ideas, social organization, power structures, conflicts, conflict solving techniques, and more. This is especially true during crisis situations such as epidemics. After all, a crisis situation demands action, especially seeing how a good and effective response can mean the difference between life and death for numerous people. However, in reality, public health is about much more than saving lives. Crucially, public health efforts inevitably affect economics, making it just as inevitably a political matter. Furthermore, the way a society chooses to respond to an epidemic reveals medical beliefs, ideals, social cohesiveness or conflicts, and ideas.

\(^{220}\) Quoted in Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 10, 1918.
about what are essential aspects of life. Public health is a lens into a society's beliefs, structures, and functions. It is therefore very telling, for instance, if a society does not respond much during an epidemic. Does this mean that certain powerful interests wish to minimize negative effects on commerce? Or does it mean that members of the community are strong believers in hands-off government, to the point where even a governmentally organized public health effort is anathema? If so, what can we deduce about a locale that depends primarily on private initiatives and responses? Conversely, what can we deduce about a place that has a highly developed public health system, and has a long tradition of broad, societal cooperation in public health matters? More broadly, what do specific public health responses and actions tell us about any given society? The answer is a whole lot. In the case of Cleveland, the city's public health fight against the Spanish Influenza epidemic reveals certain fundamental aspects of the city. Essentially, Cleveland's fight against flu shows us some of its most prized ideals. Specifically, the Spanish Flu epidemic reveals that many Clevelanders viewed voluntarism and cooperation as central parts of civic pride, loyalty, and duty. The highly organized and widely cooperative nature of the city's response also shows that Cleveland had a well established tradition of viewing public health as important, and of approaching public health crises through cooperation. The emphasis on education further cements the ideal of voluntary cooperation. The city's various responses to Spanish Influenza show that public health matters are anything but random events. Instead, a public health crisis is a great reflector of a society's most pressing ideas, ideals, traditions, and beliefs.
As chapter II shows, although certain types of legislation and traditions of coerced cooperation were available, Cleveland health officials clearly favored education and voluntary public participation to governmental enforcement and coercion. Coercion was used only when voluntary cooperation failed, and only when the situation was deemed a significant threat to the health and safety of the city. For example, during the 1902 smallpox epidemic, some people were in fact forcefully taken to hospital quarantine, but only when quarantine was deemed necessary and the persons in question refused to go voluntarily.\textsuperscript{221} Cooperation was the ideal. Coercion was a last resort. The City of Cleveland and its health commissioners embraced these ideals and used them both before, during, and after the Spanish Influenza crisis. Dr. Rockwood was no exception. In fact, the combination of seeking to educate the public, a preference for broad social cooperation and voluntarism, and the use of legislation as an emergency resort largely reflects Dr. Rockwood's approach to the Spanish Flu epidemic. The doctor's actions and tactics during the crisis were therefore not random or uniquely peculiar to him. Instead, his leadership followed along a well established Cleveland tradition of public health ideals and measures. Reflecting a prevalent aspect of the city, Cleveland's response to the epidemic was thus greatly influenced by typical American and Progressive ideals that had been uniquely shaped and developed in the city for years. However, although very important, ideology and ideals do not account for all the reasons behind decision-making. Crucially, the city's American and Progressive traditions and ideals existed within a much larger and tremendously complex historical and societal context. All the decisions that Dr. Rockwood made during the epidemic were affected in one way or

\textsuperscript{221} City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902.
another by this context and must be understood and interpreted accordingly. The ideals may have guided the health commissioner's actions, but he also had to consider a number of other factors and necessities.

One of the most fundamental factors that affected Rockwood's tactics and decisions was the need to balance society's interests and needs. Every society has, at any given time, a tremendous amount of various and often conflicting ideas, desires, considerations and needs. These can be for example economic, political, social, religious, ideological, scientific, technological, and cultural ones. Throughout history, all these factors have strongly influenced people's and societies' responses to epidemics and communicable diseases. With this in mind, it is imperative to consider the different demands and needs that the City of Cleveland and its health commissioner had to deal with when responding to the Spanish Influenza. When the epidemic struck the U.S., Cleveland's leaders not only had to make preparations and organize responses according to tenets of medicine and public health. They also had to consider myriad other factors and develop a response that was as balanced and responsible as possible. The actions and decisions of Dr. Rockwood and the other leaders in Cleveland thus become a lens not only into matters of etiology and medical practice, but also into the overall ideologies, politics, economics, social elements, and power structures in the city. For instance, who or what decided which tactics, measures or regulations were appropriate or not? And who

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222 Examples of these different factors are legion. For instance, the importance of politics and economic interests when dealing with epidemics was very evident during the outbreak of cholera in Hamburg in 1892, as well as during uncountable outbreaks of plague. The importance of politics, ideology and social issues are likewise obvious in the case of in San Francisco's treatment of Chinese immigrants during the late nineteenth century. See for example Richard J. Evans, *Death in Hamburg*; Rosemary Horrox, *The Black Death* (New York, NY: Manchester University Press, 1994); Alan M. Kraut, *Silent Travelers*; Nayan Shah, *Contagious Divides. Epidemics and Race in San Francisco's Chinatown* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2001).
decided when the situation became so dire that coercion and the use of force became a legitimate way to secure cooperation or compliance? One of the ways to study this balancing act is by looking at the implementation of flu regulations such as the closing of schools, churches and businesses, and also recognize the parts of society that were not placed under flu bans or regulations. For instance, it is worth noting that some businesses were shut down during the crisis while others were allowed to stay open. Furthermore, it is also worth considering the reasons given for these decisions, and the language used when explaining the regulations and bans. Finally, it is necessary to keep in mind that many of the flu measures were unpopular ones. Arguments for and against the restrictions, incidents of resistance and enforcement, and the implementation and the lifting of flu regulations all show how Cleveland's city government worked to counteract the epidemic while simultaneously balancing the needs and demands of the war effort, the economy, and the city's inhabitants.

The Spanish Flu Invasion.

The first report that the Spanish Flu had arrived in the U.S. appeared in Cleveland newspapers on September 12, 1918. The article informed readers that there was no known way of effectively combating the scourge other than total quarantine, which seen in the context of the war was clearly impossible. Branding Spanish Flu as a "new [disease] to American physicians", the writer stressed the importance of preventive measures and the need for the government to issue and disseminate warnings and
instructions on how to avoid the malady. On September 22, 1918, in an early attempt to educate the public and engage their cooperation, Dr. Rockwood issued his first set of warnings and instructions to the people of Cleveland, asking everybody to take preventive measures against influenza. This was based on similar warnings sent throughout the nation by the U.S. Surgeon General, stressing the need to limit the spread of the disease. The epidemic did not reach Ohio until about a week later and was not properly identified as Spanish Influenza until the end of the month. Despite the lack of a confirmed influenza presence in the city and state, Rockwood nonetheless responded by issuing a call for voluntary, preventative action. Isolation of the sick was a central part of the recommended precautions. Any person who suffered from sneezing, headaches, bone aches, or cold-like symptoms, Rockwood stated, "should refrain from visiting public places like movies, theaters, churches, or other places where people congregate in numbers." The main advice for the healthy was simply to avoid getting cold.

Dr. Rockwood's recommendations, although certainly a nuisance to some, can hardly be called stringent, extreme, or even comprehensive. Furthermore, the doctor's list of advice and call for preventative measures does not suggest any form of real, desperate concern. Instead, just as the number of Spanish Flu cases was about to explode in Cleveland, the health commissioner suggested that the city would probably be spared the full force of the epidemic. It is unclear whether this was a genuine hope,
overconfident hubris, or an excuse for postponing the implementation of emergency flu regulations. Most likely it was the latter. For one thing, based on information from newspapers and from local, state and federal health officials, Dr. Rockwood was certainly aware of the fact that Spanish Influenza did not seem to spare any community. On the other hand, reluctance to implement flu regulations early on can easily be seen as a matter of balancing the city's various interests. After all, the political, economic and social needs and desires of any city or society often make it extremely difficult to enforce public health regulations unless there is a generally recognized crisis. Simply put, it is very difficult to get people or organizations to willfully and voluntarily sacrifice freedoms, conveniences or money unless they recognize the need and wisdom of such actions. Essentially, public health exists within a large, dynamic, and very complex context where extreme actions are typically only seen as legitimate if circumstances are equally extreme. Metaphorically speaking, most people will only step up to man the pumps if the ship is taking on water. In the same way, most will only consider getting in the lifeboats if the ship is actually sinking. Similarly, the threat of disaster may inspire some passengers to put life jackets on, but a good number will resist any intrusion on their life for as long as possible. In the same way, the need and use of public health measures must always be seen in the light of how it relates to both changing circumstances and to the many needs and wishes of society. The actions taken must likewise be seen as a reflection of the ways people continually determine and re-determine what are the most important needs of a community at any given time.

The mere threat of epidemic disease does not necessarily carry the power to convince people that other needs or desires must be subordinated to public health needs. The
actual presence of disease and death is much more powerful, as anybody faced with an actual matter of life and death is likely to recognize survival as more important than many other things. Survival depends on several factors. Crucially, survival is a constant companion of human existence and not just something that appears during a crisis. For instance, a steady supply of oxygen, water, food, and sleep is essential to the preservation of human life, regardless of circumstances. Disease, accidents, violence, and other kinds of trauma or lethal threats are more sudden and often unexpected than our constant struggles for survival. We therefore experience these crises as far more intrusive, dramatic, and scary. Even so, we cannot wisely sacrifice our essential needs for oxygen and water for the sake of surviving a number of other threats. At least not for long. However, we may be able to sacrifice food and sleep for slightly longer, and deny ourselves numerous social and material needs or desires such as church attendance, choir practice, sports games, travelling, or new clothing, for even longer than that. When it gets down to it, some things in life are more essential than others. The same is true about society as a whole. There is one big difference between an individual and a society. Crucially, whereas it is fairly easy to agree on a number of factors that are essential to preserve human life, it is far more difficult to determine exactly what factors are needed in order to prevent a society from collapsing. Things get even more complicated when trying to not only differentiate between what is essential or nonessential, but also determine on a continuous scale which factors are more or less important than others. To create such a "hierarchy of importance", where some things are seen as more essential than others, can be tremendously difficult. It is also a very political, economic, cultural, ideological and social endeavor, as all these aspects of
society will present various arguments for or against the importance of themselves and others. This is one of the reasons why, especially in a crisis situation, the question of what are essential needs of a society becomes exceptionally important. The question of what are nonessential needs also takes on tremendous importance, as the essential/nonessential question can dictate whose needs and desires are sacrificed for the greater good and which ones are allowed to continue on even through a crisis.

It is unlikely that Dr. Rockwood's failure to launch a more comprehensive or forceful campaign of preventive measures early on was based on genuine hope or overconfident hubris. As mentioned, the health commissioner certainly knew that uncountable other places throughout the U.S. East Coast and Midwest were in the midst of vicious outbreaks of influenza at the time. It must have seemed extremely unlikely that any community, great or small, would be lucky enough to somehow escape the scourge. Cleveland, as big and central to commerce and industrial production as it was, could not possibly have hoped to make it through the epidemic unscathed. In fact, the eventual need of a more comprehensive flu response in the city was a virtual certainty. This was also made clear from the numerous reports from places where Spanish Flu had arrived. Simply put, any community that was struck by the scourge was forced to take a series of measures in order to deal with the crisis. Washington DC, for instance, attempted to reduce the spread of the malady by regulating and reducing crowding. This was done by closing all their schools and implementing a type of shift-work program in which

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228 Dr. Friedrich's 1902 statement that Cleveland was bound to experience any epidemic present in the nation only became truer as the city's population, commerce and industry continued to expand in the following years. The interconnection between the city and the rest of the nation became even more inevitable as the U.S. entered the world war. Dr. Rockwood's Oct. 4 statement that it was improbable that Spanish Flu would spread in Cleveland can simply not have been an honest and true claim.
different government offices were open at different times. The latter limited crowding both on streetcars and in office buildings.\textsuperscript{229} In Chicago, people began wearing flu-masks in the hope that the masks would offer protection against the influenza bacillus. In another effort, health officials in the Windy City told the city's theaters to ban anyone showing signs of the "grippe".\textsuperscript{230} New York City also saw a tremendous number of people falling ill with Spanish Flu. As a result, the city proposed closing certain types of businesses and stores, saying they would even consider closing churches, schools and other public gathering places if the situation deteriorated further.\textsuperscript{231} In New England, the federal government took the crucial step of cooperating with both municipal and state authorities to combat the malady.\textsuperscript{232} Such broad governmental cooperation became imperative as Spanish Flu began spreading from military camps and to the civilian population throughout the nation, starting in the east.\textsuperscript{233} With at least 50,000 cases of flu in Massachusetts alone by September 27, communities throughout the state began implementing more extreme measures. Boston, for one, chose to close all its dance halls, theaters, and "other unnecessary places of public assembly".\textsuperscript{234} In a definite sign of how seriously the federal government viewed the threat of influenza, and in recognition of the horrific conditions in military camps, Provost Marshall General Chowder even cancelled the draft of 142,000 American men.\textsuperscript{235} This was done despite the demand for manpower caused by the war effort. In Ohio, Camp Sherman near Chillicothe was

\textsuperscript{229} Cleveland Press, Oct. 2, 1918; Oct 3, 1918. Note that street cars and governmental offices were still kept running, a clear indicator that these were clearly, and not surprisingly, seen as more important than the schools.
\textsuperscript{230} Cleveland Press, Oct. 2, 1918.
\textsuperscript{231} Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.
\textsuperscript{232} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 27, 1918.
\textsuperscript{233} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 25, 1918.
\textsuperscript{234} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept 27, 1918.
\textsuperscript{235} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 27, 1918.
placed under quarantine on September 30. Quarantine did not arrest Spanish influenza. Shortly after arriving in Camp Sherman, the "grippe" began spreading to civilian locales throughout the state, forcing cities and towns alike to implement a variety of flu regulations. Miami University closed on Oct. 4, as did all churches, schools, lodges and theaters in Cambridge. A day later, Cincinnati followed suit and ordered the closing of all the city's churches, schools, theaters, and "other places of congregation." During this same time, the Spanish Influenza was quietly making its way into Cleveland, infecting more and more of the city's men, women, and children. Still, as there was not a serious, recognized influenza presence in the city, the health commissioner decided to rely primarily on education and voluntary public preventive measures.

The Weapons of Public Health

First and foremost by a long interval among the weapons of attack, come education.

Whatever caused Dr. Rockwood to delay more stringent flu measures, these reasons soon became less important as Spanish Influenza began producing the kind of serious situation that required far more extensive and determined actions. Friday, October 4, 1918, brought a series of disconcerting news to the city. First, the flu situation was quickly going from bad to worse on the East Coast, developing into a genuine epidemic

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236 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 30, 1918.
237 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 4, 1918; Cleveland News, Oct. 4, 1918.
238 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct 6, 1918.
239 Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 1, 26.
disaster. The tremendous impact of the epidemic caused U.S. Surgeon General Rupert Blue of the Public Health Department to send out a message throughout the U.S, "urging the closing of all churches, schools, theaters and public institutions in every community where the disease has developed." Second, the Ohio State Department of Health reported from Columbus that the illness had arrived and was spreading furiously throughout the state with 4,000 reported cases at Camp Sherman alone. Of these, over a hundred had already died. On this same day, Cleveland also saw its first official cases of Spanish Influenza. Of the twelve reported cases, one person died. Seventy-two year old Murdoch Ross thus became the first person in Cleveland known to succumb to the epidemic.

Health Commissioner Rockwood's response to all of this highlights a couple of key issues. Presented with evidence of an increasingly rampant and rapidly encroaching epidemic, Rockwood exuded a degree of confidence that would later prove remarkably unfounded. "Blue's order [will] not be carried out in Cleveland at present", Rockwood stated, "because of the few cases reported and the improbability of the disease spreading." As discussed, his response was less a genuine case of hope than it was an

240 Cleveland News, Oct. 4, 1918.
241 Cleveland News, Oct. 4, 1918. It is clear that there had been cases of Spanish Influenza in Cleveland prior to Oct. 4. For instance, a number of nurses at St. Luke's hospital had fallen ill from the disease after marching in the Liberty Loan parade on Sunday Sept. 30. These nurses had been ill for days before the first "official" case was reported and posted in the city's newspapers. Furthermore, if people caught the disease during the Liberty Loan parade, a number of people present must already have suffered from the illness and spread the contagion to other people present. Dr. Rockwood also held this assumption, stating that although there were twenty-three reported cases, there were probably as many as 300 unreported cases as early as Oct 5. For the remainder of the epidemic stage in Cleveland, newspapers posted both the official and unofficial number of sick in the city. See Cleveland News, Oct 5, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 24, 1918; Josephine Robertson, Saint Luke's Hospital, 1894-1980 (Cleveland, OH: Saint Luke's Hospital, 1981), 107-8.
242 Cleveland News, Oct 4, 1918.
243 Cleveland News, Oct. 4, 1918.
indicator of the city's reluctance to implement bans on schools, churches, businesses and public gatherings. Furthermore, Rockwood's handling of the Surgeon General's message does not mean that Cleveland public health leaders neglected to respond to the situation or increase their precautionary measures against the epidemic. In fact, city officials, hospitals, private organizations and institutions, and private individuals, responded to the increasingly threatening situation in a variety of ways.

Deeming isolation of patients one of the best means of fighting flu, Dr. Rockwood ordered that parts of City Hospital be prepared and equipped to care for influenza patients if the situation in the city deteriorated to epidemic proportions. Although this move was important, the most crucial part of the fight was education. Welfare Director Beman quickly joined in the education effort by ordering thousands of informative placards to be posted throughout the city, telling people to avoid crowds and get "plenty of fresh air." Dr. Rockwood's education campaign went much further than that. On the very next day, Rockwood presented Cleveland with the city's own alternative to Blue's closing orders. Rather than implementing flu bans and closings, Rockwood called on all Clevelanders to "Help to Keep 'Flu' Out of Cleveland". The call was posted in large letters on the front page of the Cleveland Press. The article that followed is a tremendous example of what Dr. Rockwood and the city's health department viewed as the ideal way of responding to Spanish Flu. Essentially, it is a great example of the kind of education effort that not only informs, but also seeks to win the hearts, minds, and cooperation of the public. Reflecting the city's ideals, the health commissioner resisted

244 Cleveland Press, Oct. 4, 1918.
245 Cleveland Press, Oct 5, 1918.
flu bans and appealed instead to people's voluntary participation. Like his predecessor Dr. Friedrich, Dr. Rockwood was not above placing a large degree of responsibility in citizens' hands, expressing the belief that the disease could only be defeated if people cooperated and fought together against the scourge. "The situation is not now alarming," he stated, "but it will become alarming unless proper preventive measures are taken by every man, woman and child in Cleveland."246

Drawing on examples from other cities, Rockwood highlighted the importance of not allowing the disease to reach epidemic proportions in Cleveland, as this would force the city to start closing down schools, theaters, and even churches. This was bad enough in itself, but the gravest danger - apart from the obvious danger to human life - was the epidemic's ability to hamper the war effort by shutting down factories and suspending public gatherings, including Liberty Loan events. "We don't want that to happen here", Rockwood declared. The health commissioner thus appealed to civic responsibility and patriotism to ensure people's loyal obedience. In short, Dr. Rockwood told Clevelanders that love, loyalty and duty to both city and country demanded everyone's cooperation in responding to the Spanish Flu. Cooperation was not forced, per se, but it was certainly strongly encouraged. Dr. Rockwood did not limit his call for cooperation to feelings of duty and responsibility. Also appealing to the innate human desire to avoid dangerous diseases, the health commissioner emphasized the need for Clevelanders to cooperate with the health board in order to minimize the threat to human life. Thus highlighting and explaining the importance of defeating Spanish Influenza, the doctor once again presented his idea of the ideal response to the epidemic, stating that "[e]very person

246 Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.
must become an unofficial health officer charged with the responsibility of seeing to it that the disease will not gain ground in Cleveland." He then gave them a list of proper actions and precautions to follow.\(^{247}\) If successful, this effort of educating the public would produce a well-informed and highly motivated, cooperative city. This was clearly more important than forcing flu restrictions on people. The health commissioner hoped that if his education campaign succeeded, the harsher methods would not have to be implemented. The situation was clearly getting serious enough to prompt a strong exhortation from the city's health commissioner. Even so, it was not yet considered serious enough to implement restrictive regulations or challenge the long established Cleveland ideal of voluntarism and willful cooperation.

The entire October 5 front page article was clearly part of the health commissioner's education campaign, created to maximize Cleveland's preparedness and resistance power. As stated, Dr. Rockwood saw education as one of the most crucial elements of the city's response to public health issues and crises. His education campaign should therefore not be interpreted as a lame, second-rate alternative to strict regulations and forced prohibitions of public gatherings. Instead, we need to view the role, power, and nature of education and voluntarism as Dr. Rockwood and his contemporary health professional viewed it. Education, as understood by Cleveland health officials in the 1918-19 period, was much more than simply "the training of the intelligence [and] the distribution of the facts[.]" Crucially, education was also "the development of the feelings, the emotions, [and] the instinctive reactions which guide us chiefly in the

\(^{247}\) Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.
In other words, education included winning the hearts and minds of the populace, and through this also win their voluntary, willful, engaged and effective cooperation. The health commissioner not only wanted to present Cleveland's residents with a list of weapons to use against Spanish Flu. He also wanted everybody to become actively involved in the fight. An educated populace was therefore seen as a populace that not only knew what to do, but, recognizing the wisdom and need for action, also did what had to be done. Therefore, his education campaign included both a profound call for public participation and a thorough explanation of what people should do to fight Spanish Influenza.

Dr. Rockwood posted his long list of practical advice in a clear and straight-forward way, giving people specific instructions about what to do in order to avoid getting the flu, and what to do if suffering from the disease. The list is exceptionally helpful when it comes to understanding subsequent measures and responses taken by city officials, private organizations, and a private individuals. This is because the list provides a great view into the prevailing official ideas on etiology, medical beliefs and practices at the time. And, considering that people tend to have reasons for acting or responding in certain ways, ideas or beliefs about the nature of influenza and how to best fight it help us understand why people did the things they did during the epidemic. For instance, there would have been no reason for closing churches and schools unless people believed that flu spread through human interaction. Or, people would not have worn face masks to ward off the disease unless they believed that the masks could

248 Cleveland Hospital Council, *Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 1*, 26-7.
249 Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.
actually help. Whether hindsight would prove their beliefs to be true or not is beside the point. What matters is that people acted one way or another because of their etiological beliefs. This was obviously the case with Dr. Rockwood as well, which makes the front page article important for yet another reason. Specifically, the article shows that Dr. Rockwood viewed modern medicine and science as the best way to combat the scourge. Although this is not surprising, it is very important. Throughout the epidemic, the doctor was remarkably consistent in providing reasons for his different actions, making sure to provide expert medical opinion as the intellectual authority behind his decisions. This is seen particularly well whenever he chose to use coercion or force to implement and enforce flu regulations. Essentially, by referring to modern medicine and educating the public about expert opinions and scientific views, Dr. Rockwood found a way to legitimize and implement unpopular regulations by declaring them a necessary part of a collective fight against influenza. It was in many ways like convincing people of the virtues of smallpox vaccination. And, as with the matter of smallpox vaccination, some people questioned the wisdom of the health commissioner's recommendations, while others resisted or even rejected the doctor's scientific argument altogether.\(^\text{250}\) One writer to the *Plain Dealer* wondered for instance why,"[seeing how t]he influenza germ is so small that it cannot be seen with a microscope... people have been trying to shut it out by the coarse meshes of a 'flu mask."\(^\text{251}\) Cleveland's Christian Scientists' opinions about Rockwood's later closing orders were of a much fiercer character. How can the churches be closed, they asked, when the church is needed more than ever? Viewing Rockwood's

\(^{250}\) For tremendous discussions on the controversies over smallpox inoculation and vaccination in U.S. history, see Fenn, *Pox Americana*, 38-42, 83-4, 112 and Willrich, *Pox.*

\(^{251}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 18, 1918.
scientific approach as something akin to blasphemy they lamented that "it is proposed that these churches shall be shut, and that the admission shall be made that it is dangerous for men and women to congregate to worship God, for fear the Lord's arm is so shortened that He cannot contend with microbes." Mixing theological arguments with the world war context, they went on to ask: "[i]s it to be supposed that the prayers for the success of Truth in the war will be more successful than the prayers in the churches for freedom from influenza?" In a special petition to Dr. Rockwood for the sake of being allowed to keep their churches open, the Christian Scientists argued that "[s]urely the God to whom Christians pray will protect them and deliver them from any danger while they are praying to Him[.]" Dr. Rockwood, preferring the tenets of modern medicine to the tenets of religion, and holding that there could be no exception to the order, did not comply with their wishes.

On October 5th, well prior to the debacle with the Christian Scientists, Dr. Rockwood did not yet see the need to introduce flu bans and regulations. Instead, he hoped that people would diligently follow his list of advice and that this would be sufficient to halt the Spanish Flu. The main pieces of advice that he offered for avoiding catching the illness included staying away from crowds, staying warm, keeping the hands and mouth clean, covering the mouth and nose with a handkerchief when sneezing or coughing, not visiting the sick, keeping feet warm and dry, and to not worry. The advice given to the ill was to go to bed and stay there until at least three days after any type of fever had disappeared. While in bed, the patient should preferably be in a warm

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252 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 28, 1918.
253 Cleveland News, Oct. 12, 1918.
yet well-ventilated room. In addition, everybody who fell ill should contact a physician, avoid kissing, and avoid sharing bowls, plates, and cutlery with others. Finally, the sick were reminded that the "[a]fter effects of influenza are worse than the disease" and that the real danger came from pneumonia. This was the reason given for telling people to stay in bed even after they felt better.254

Several issues become instantly clear when considering the health commissioner's list of advice. Most notable is the great challenge or even utter impossibility for many people to adhere to the different points on the list, for cultural, social, political, and economic reasons. Not visiting the sick, for instance, was quite contrary to some of the cultural traditions that were present in the city's remarkably varied ethnic population.255 For instance, evidence suggests that some groups interpreted quarantine placards on houses to be invitations to visit the sick rather than to stay away, much to the health officials' chagrin. Some even "insist[ed] on seeing those sick".256 Economic necessity and need must also have affected a number of people's obedience to the list. To stay in bed, even when struck by fever, could present severe economic hardships on workers who would certainly not receive any money from their employers while on sick-leave. The fact that Dr. Rockwood asked employers to send home anyone who showed signs of illness certainly suggests that a number of workers were reluctant to forego work and the wages that came with it even if they were sick.257 Their reluctance is understandable.

254 Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.
256 The Jewish Independent, Dec. 13, 1918.
257 Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.
The tremendous financial impact that sickness and inability to work could have on a Cleveland family in 1918 can easily be imagined. It is also made painfully clear when reading the numerous, detailed calls for aid posted by the city's charitable organizations.\(^{258}\)

Avoiding crowds could also be next to impossible for a number of people, not least the poorer individuals and families who, as was common throughout the nation's cities at the time, often lived in rather crowded houses, rooms and apartments. And what about the thousands of people who were packed into the city's streetcars every day? Crowding was simply a fact of life for many Clevelanders at the time. How could they possibly hope to avoid it? Furthermore, even if people somehow managed to avoid crowds, they still faced the daunting task of somehow finding a way to stay in a room that was not only warm but also well ventilated. As with most other matters, this must have been especially difficult for the poorer residents of the city. Even if poor insulation or open windows provided better ventilation, neither can be said to provide much heat during the winter months.\(^{259}\) Even so, the city's health department stated that the indoor temperature in homes and schools alike should not drop below an already chilly sixty degrees Fahrenheit during the epidemic.\(^{260}\) During the winter of 1918 and well into 1919 this meant artificial heating, most often by burning coal. Heating was obviously not free of charge, and it became even more expensive as coal prices increased along with the

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\(^{258}\) See for instance Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 11, 1918 and Jan. 10, 1919.

\(^{259}\) A rumor exists in Cleveland that following the Spanish Flu epidemic, many of the new houses in the area were built with extremely large and efficient furnaces. These are said to have been installed for the sake of being able to keep the houses warm even if the windows were kept open during wintertime. I have not been able to confirm or disprove the rumor.

\(^{260}\) Cleveland Press, Oct 11, 1918.
ballooning demand for fuel caused by the nation's war effort.\textsuperscript{261} For others, the problem of heating had a more human character, specifically in cases of "profiteering apartment house owners." In more than a hundred instances, tenants reported landlords who neglected to keep apartment buildings heated.\textsuperscript{262} Claiming that they had been told by the county Fuel Administration to not light their furnaces until November 1, the landlords sought to save a good deal of money by withholding heat from their renters. Whether this scheme would have been successful in other circumstances is unknown. Under Spanish Influenza circumstances, it backfired tremendously. Denying the existence of any government orders prohibiting the heating of apartment buildings, Dr. Rockwood stated that "[t]he government wants public health protected[,]" and that "[the health department] will prosecute all unpatriotic landlords who are hiding behind the government at this critical time." The health commissioner also made sure to show that he was supported by both the National and County Fuel Administration in making these claims.\textsuperscript{263} Although the health commissioner came to the aid of a few people, it is clear that a large number of Clevelanders simply could not live up to all of Dr. Rockwood's recommended dos and don'ts.

\textsuperscript{261} The coal issues and shortages are a recurring themes in newspapers throughout the war years. In 1918, Cleveland even implemented coal holidays where a number of street cars, offices, and even some factories were closed for a day to ration the coal reserves. The city held at least two of these "heatless Mondays". See for example Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 9, 1917; Oct. 7, 1917; Oct. 13, 1917; Nov. 1, 1917; Jan. 21, 1918; Jan. 22, 1918; Jan. 26, 1918; Feb. 2, 1918.
\textsuperscript{262} Cleveland Press, Oct. 9, 1918; Nov. 2, 1918.
\textsuperscript{263} Cleveland Press, Oct 9; Oct 11, 1918.
Volunteer, Or Else.

Dr. Rockwood's reaction to profiteering landlords highlights the health commissioner's need to balance voluntary cooperation with coercion. The October 5 front page article in the Cleveland Press gives another clear example of this. In addition to posting a list of advice and calling for the voluntary participation and obedience of every individual in the city, the health commissioner also made five very telling statements. The language used in each statement not only gives us an indicator of what the doctor saw as more imperative and essential, but also highlights the various limits and limitations of his authority and power. First, Rockwood "ordered" that people sick with the Spanish Flu should be quarantined. Second, he "requested" that manufacturers would send their sick workers home and not allow them back until they had received a proper diagnosis. Third, school officials were "urged" to report any cases where they suspected that a child had the flu. Fourth, the health commissioner "required" that doctors notified the city's Health Department of all cases of Spanish Influenza. Finally, he "got [streetcar] officials to agree" to keep windows open in their cars to improve ventilation. The article thus makes it clear that the health commissioner had the legal power to order quarantines when necessary, and to make certain requirements of the city's physicians. The fact that he chose to make use of this power from the very beginning of the epidemic tells us that he viewed these factors as imperative in order to combat the disease.

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264 Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.
265 There is little to no evidence suggesting that residents were forced into quarantines during the Spanish Flu epidemic. Many had quarantine placards posted on their houses, but enforcement appears to have been left up to each individual, family, or community. There is also little to no evidence suggesting that people
The other three points in which he requested, urged and convinced parts of society to carry out his wishes also highlight elements that Rockwood must have seen as very important. Intriguingly, they also show us that the health commissioner may not have had the legislative power to order or demand these actions, but relied instead on the tradition of cooperating with central parts of Cleveland's leadership and society in order to implement them. Much of these requests appear to follow along the same lines as the city's response to the smallpox epidemic almost two decades earlier, in which the city's mayor, schools, private organizations, and the Chamber of Commerce played instrumental roles in overcoming the scourge. Much like what was done in 1902, Rockwood responded to the threat of Spanish Influenza by asking for the help and cooperation of employers and school officials and relying on their powers and influence to further the health commissioner's wishes. As was also the case during previous epidemics, much of the cooperation that doctor Rockwood sought from officials, businesses and organizations was for the sake of encouraging and enforcing broader societal and individual cooperation. For example, employers were asked to send sick workers home, again clearly suggesting that ailing men would not necessarily volunteer to leave work. Pressure was thus applied from above to make sure that the needs and health of the public was placed ahead of individual persons or families. In short, through the voluntary cooperation of upper layers of society, Dr. Rockwood found the power and means to both encourage and coerce cooperation or compliance in others.

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266 Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918. The Cleveland Chamber of Commerce was certainly involved in this.
The health commissioner found a huge part of this form of voluntary cooperation in various sections of the city government as well. For example, the often crowded streetcars that took many Clevelanders to and from work became an early concern. As seen, Dr. Rockwood sought and obtained the promise of cooperation from both ConCon officials and leaders of the Cleveland Railway Company.\textsuperscript{267} Apparently not trusting whole-heartedly in the voluntary cooperation of the streetcar companies, Dr. Rockwood also acquired the cooperation of the city's traction commissioner who blatantly ordered that all streetcars had to have at least two windows open during rush hour.\textsuperscript{268} The voluntary cooperation of the traction commissioner thus made the cooperation of the streetcar companies more or less compulsory. The cooperation - voluntary or not - of the streetcar companies and their employees, made widespread public cooperation also compulsory, as people were told that the windows had to stay open. The order was not popular among streetcar patrons who "shivered on their way down town", courtesy of cold weather. Many passengers tried to close the windows but were stopped by the car conductors, causing numerous heated arguments.\textsuperscript{269} By securing the help of the traction commissioner and the street car companies, the health commissioner managed to use the cooperation of another branch of the city government and of private companies to force uncooperative individuals to abide by flu regulations.

Similar tactics were used when dealing with a couple of other major concerns: dust and spitting. The exposure of soil had long been believed to be a cause of disease in both

\textsuperscript{267} Cleveland Press, Oct 5, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct 6, 1918. These were the two leading street car companies in the city.
\textsuperscript{268} Cleveland News, Oct 7; Oct 8, 1918.
\textsuperscript{269} Cleveland News, Oct. 8, 1918.
Cleveland and elsewhere. The connection between soil and disease even survived the arrival and development of the germ theory of disease. The only thing that separated 1918 views about the dangers of soil and multiple earlier views on the same matter was evolving medical theories and language. Soil went from being a contagion because of unfavorable humors, to being dangerous because of the presence of fomites, to being a cause of disease because "[a]ll kinds of germs" were trapped in the soil, only waiting to be released into the air. As late as 1903, Dr. Friedrich stated that "[t]he continual digging up of streets and the tearing up of pavements.... is not conducive to health. All kinds of germs which have been washed into the roadbed and buried there are brought again to the surface." Dr. Rockwood believed much the same in 1918, stating that "the dust swept from sidewalks floats through the air for hours and carries with it hundreds of influenza germs." During the epidemic the city therefore decided to periodically open fire hydrants to moisten city streets and sidewalks. This was believed to prevent infectious dust clouds from arising. Crucially, the health commissioner also secured the cooperation of the police chief who ordered his officers to arrest anyone who created dust clouds by sweeping. Anybody who wished to sweep their sidewalks had to make sure to wet the ground first.

270 City of Cleveland, Reports of the Departments of the Government of the City of Cleveland For the year Ending December 31, 1882 (Cleveland, OH, 1883), 462. Cleveland State University, Michael Schwartz Library, Division of Special Collections. The connection between soil and disease is not as farfetched as we may think. For example, multiple fungal illnesses easily connect dust and soil to disease. Coccidioidomycosis, better known as Valley Fever, is one example of this. For more information see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Coccidioidomycosis (Valley Fever)", accessed March 15, 2013, http://www.cdc.gov/fungal/coccidioidomycosis/
271 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902, 941.
272 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902, 941.
275 Cleveland News, Oct. 31, 1918.
Dust was dangerous, and stopping dust clouds was therefore important. Spitting was also a menace. Although spitting was originally connected to the spread of tuberculosis, Dr. Rockwood and other physicians also saw public spitting as an effective way of spreading flu germs. The health commissioner therefore declared "[w]ar to the hilt" against the practice. To fight this war against spitting, Rockwood not only relied on the voluntary response of the people. In a move quite in line with Cleveland's tradition of combining public health authority with police authority, he also obtained the help of the city's police to help put an end to the unsanitary, germ-spreading custom. Emphasizing the seriousness of the situation and supporting the validity of banning a very common practice, Police Chief Frank Smith stated that "[i]n the view of the present situation, every member of the police department must understand that it is just as important to arrest and prosecute people who spit on streets, sidewalks and street cars, as it is to apprehend burglars and thieves." People who broke the spitting ban were to be immediately arrested and prosecuted without lenience and with no "golden rule" exemptions. Streetcar officials quickly seconded this move, ordering their motormen and conductors to "cause the arrest at once of all persons.... see[n] spitting on cars", and asking residents to report offenders. The police leaders, acting on behalf of Rockwood, also instructed streetcar conductors to turn over anyone seen spitting. Although the new campaign against spitting quickly led to a few arrests, it soon became evident that enforcement of the regulation would never live up to the police chief's

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276 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 22, 1897; Oct 6. 1918.
277 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 6, 1918.
278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
280 Cleveland News, Oct, 5, 1918.
extraordinary statement.\textsuperscript{281} Instead, it appears to have quickly fallen out of use altogether, as evidenced by the sudden disappearance of reported arrests in the newspapers and the 1920 Hospital and Health Survey which state that only seven people were convicted for breaking the anti-spitting ordinance in 1918.\textsuperscript{282} It is very likely that the war on spitting lost momentum as the influenza epidemic developed to the point where a tremendous amount of pressure was placed on both the police and the public in general. There are multiple examples of policemen working long hours to aid in transporting the sick, enforcing flu closings, placing quarantine placards on houses, making sure that sick people got in touch with doctors, and so on.\textsuperscript{283} Already overtaxed by the many demands caused by the epidemic, the police force became further limited in its ability to enforce spitting bans as several policemen fell ill with influenza and pneumonia. In fact, more policemen were incapacitated by the Spanish Flu than by anything else in the city's history, making it imperative for the police leaders to prioritize matters of greater importance.\textsuperscript{284} Despite the quickly diminishing importance placed on the spitting regulations, it still stands out as an example where the health commissioner sought cooperation from other parts of the city government to enforce public cooperation. The enormous expansion of police responsibilities during the epidemic also testify about the extent that Dr. Rockwood relied on the cooperation and help of other parts of the city government to deal with the Spanish Flu.

\textsuperscript{281} Cleveland News, Oct. 7, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 8, 1918; Oct. 11, 1918.
\textsuperscript{282} Cleveland Hospital Council, \textit{Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 4} (Cleveland, OH: Cleveland Hospital Council, 1920), 354, Oberlin College, Storage, Call Number 614C5992C pt. 4.
\textsuperscript{283} See for example Cleveland News, Oct. 5, 1918; Oct. 15, 1918; Oct 19, 1918; Oct 26, 1918, Oct. 31, 1918; Nov. 1, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 6, 1918; Oct. 11, 1918; Oct. 14, 1918; Oct. 21, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 15, 1918; Oct. 19, 1918; Oct. 25, 1918; Oct 28, 1918.
\textsuperscript{284} Cleveland News, Oct. 15, 1918; Oct. 22, 1918; Oct. 26, 1918; Oct. 28, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 16, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 21, 1918; Oct 29, 1918; Oct 31, 1918.
Teaching the People. Tracking the Foe.

The schools also played an important role in the city's response to the epidemic. Crucially, the schools took center stage in the health commissioner's plans "for a campaign of education, coupled with a system of tracing cases of influenza[.]"\(^{285}\) Cooperating with the Board of Education, the chief medical inspector of the schools, and the city's Director of Hygiene, Cleveland's health department managed to provide every teacher in the city with a list of practices and precautions to teach to the school children.\(^{286}\) For example, in the belief that fresh air combats influenza, teachers instructed pupils in breathing exercises in front of open windows.\(^{287}\) Even greater plans were fashioned though, as Dr. Rockwood singled out the schools as a primary way "to bring knowledge of the disease and of means of prevention into every home in Cleveland."\(^{288}\) This was to be achieved by printing up informative pamphlets and hand them out to all the school children. The schools were particularly important in the dissemination of information because of the many various ethnic groups and languages in the city. Referring to the immigrant nature of Cleveland's populace Rockwood stated that "[i]f this plan is adopted these leaflets probably will be printed not only in English but as well in the chief foreign languages spoken in the city[.]"\(^{289}\) City schools could thus

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\(^{285}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 6, 1918.

\(^{286}\) Cleveland News, Oct. 7 1918; Oct. 8, 1918.

\(^{287}\) Cleveland News, Oct. 7, 1918.

\(^{288}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 16, 1918.

\(^{289}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 16, 1918. In 1917, circa 513,000 -about 70 percent - of Cleveland's 730,000+ residents were either of foreign birth or had at least one foreign-born parent. By 1920, there were at least thirty-nine different foreign groups in Cleveland. Thirty-two non-English newspapers were published in the city in a total of twelve different foreign languages. Cleveland was clearly a very hetero-cultural and hetero-lingual city. See City of Cleveland, Statistical Records, 1916-1924, 10; Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 8, 672; Cleveland Press, Oct. 19, 1918; David C. Hammack, "Identity, Conflict, and Cooperation. Central Europeans in Cleveland, 1850-1930" in Identity, Conflict, & Cooperation. Central Europeans in Cleveland, 1850-1930.
be used to educate the populace in two main ways. Firstly, they could educate the pupils who in turn could pass on the information to their families. Secondly, they could pass out leaflets that the school children could bring home with them. Both these approaches should be able to reach both English-speaking and foreign-language-speaking families alike. It is unclear whether the pamphlets that were handed out in the schools turned out to be in multiple languages or not. Even so, the pupils who were present - part of an immigrant family or not - would still be able to bring back knowledge to their families. Whether by delivering pamphlets to pupils' families, educating the school children, or both, Dr. Rockwood and his helpers managed to use the schools to educate a large part of the city's population until the schools were finally closed. Once the schools closed, they had to rely on other modes of communication and publication.

The schools were not only important because of their educational qualities. They were also used for the extremely important task of tracing the spread and prevalence of the epidemic in the city. Reporting and recording data about communicable illnesses was a tried and true public health tactic in Cleveland and elsewhere. As shown in numerous secondary works dealing with epidemic disease, as well as examples from annual reports and a myriad of newspaper articles describing the process, creating statistics and maps about diseases had risen along with other modern medical theories and practices. By 1912, Cleveland even had a separate Bureau of Vital Statistics under the Department of Public Health and Sanitation, along with a Bureau of

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290 See for instance City of Cleveland, Annual Reports 1878, 1882, 1902, 1912; City of Cleveland, Statistical Records, 1916-1924; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 9, 1903; Jan. 25, 1911; Jan. 25, 1911; Aug. 17, 1911.; Evans, Death in Hamburg; Johnson, The Ghost Map; Kraut, Silent Travelers; Shah, Contagious Divides; Willrich, Pox.
Communicable Disease. The perhaps greatest example of the practice is found in the annual mortality statistics made by the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Bureau of the Census, where maps and statistics became the central means by which the nation’s health was interpreted and determined. In Cleveland, Dr. Friedrich had used tracking and mapping tactics during both the 1902 smallpox epidemic and the 1903 outbreak of typhoid fever. The city had also been gathering information about death rates and all sorts of death causes for decades. During the Spanish Influenza epidemic, keeping track of the number of sick and dead became a main part of the overall strategy of federal, state, and local health authorities alike. Throughout the nation, people were told to contact a health professional if they were sick, and physicians were required to faithfully report cases of flu to the appropriate authorities. In Cleveland, Dr. Rockwood told doctors and hospitals to report all new cases and all deaths every day of the week except on Sundays. The state and federal governments in turn told the health commissioner to pass on his findings to them. Health officials recognized several problems with the practice. For starters, many physicians found it difficult to accurately diagnose influenza amongst many other respiratory diseases, especially when given minimal time to reach a diagnosis. The problem was later reflected in both local and national mortality statistics. Most explicitly, writers of the 1919 federal report stated that

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291 City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1912.
293 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 09, 1903; April 15, 1903.
294 See for instance City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1882; City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1902; City of Cleveland, Annual Report, 1912.
295 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 14, 1918; Sept. 19, 1918; Oct. 6, 1918; Oct. 15, 1918; Oct. 21, 1918.
296 City of Cleveland, Statistical Records, 1916-1924, 42-5; Cleveland News, Oct. 9, 1918; Oct. 10, 1918; Nov. 1, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 31, 1918; Nov. 3, 1918.
297 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 21, 1918; Oct. 31, 1918; Nov. 14, 1918; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Mortality Statistics 1918.
in the case of the Spanish flu epidemic, "doubtless[ly] many cases were returned as influenza when the deaths were caused by pneumonia, and vice versa. More crucially than misdiagnosis, there simply were not enough physicians available to visit or examine every person who showed signs of illness, and the doctors who were around were extremely overworked. At the height of the epidemic, Cleveland doctors worked practically around the clock and were still unable to keep up with the workload created by the Spanish Flu. The need for doctors eventually became so great that Dr. Rockwood saw no way out but to force a number of medical students from Western Reserve University to volunteer their services. Finally, it was a well known fact that many people, despite the health commissioner's insistence and admonitions, chose to not report their illness to either doctors or health officials. Throughout the epidemic, Dr. Rockwood therefore operated with two different lists; one for reported, official cases, and a markedly larger one for unofficial, estimated cases. On October 5, during the very early days of the epidemic in Cleveland, Dr. Rockwood listed the number of reported cases of influenza in Cleveland at under forty. At the same time, he estimated there to be another 450 unreported cases present in the city, making the ratio of estimated cases more than eleven times higher than the reported cases. The doctor changed his estimates a bit over the next two days, stating that by noon on Monday the

299 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 27, 1918; Oct. 31, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 26, 1918.
300 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 27, 1918.
301 Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 10, 850; Cleveland News, Oct. 5, 1918; Oct. 16, 1918; Nov. 1, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918; Oct. 7, 1918; Oct. 19, 1918.
303 Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.
7th, there were a hundred official cases of influenza in the city and about 500 unofficial ones.\textsuperscript{304} A week later, the numbers had grown to about 2,000 official cases and an estimated 10,000 or more unreported sick.\textsuperscript{305} As the epidemic progressed and the number of sick exploded, Rockwood eventually stopped posting unofficial estimates. His last estimate posted in the \textit{Cleveland Press} came on October 19, showing a total of 8,366 sick in Cleveland, with 4,264 of these listed as official cases.\textsuperscript{306}

It is unclear how the doctor made any of these unofficial estimates. What is certain is that mapping and tracking the epidemic was not an easy task. It did not help that the city's Bureau of Vital Statistics had not kept up with the improvements seen in many of the other sections of Cleveland's health department. In fact, in the Health and Hospital Survey of 1919-20, the bureau was pronounced sub-par, with appropriate and thorough vital statistics considered to be "to all intents and purposes non-existent."\textsuperscript{307} Faced with the challenge of mapping the proliferation of the epidemic, Dr. Rockwood therefore quickly turned to the schools. The idea was that just as the schools could be used to send information to homes and families, they could also be used to receive information from homes and families. First of all, absences served as a starting point of inquiry. It was quite obvious that not all absences were because of Spanish Flu though, making it necessary to investigate the homes of the absent children. Through the cooperation of the city's school medical director and acting school superintendent, Dr. Rockwood secured the authority to recruit the services of Cleveland's 3,500 teachers. The teachers

\textsuperscript{304} Cleveland Press, Oct. 7, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{305} Cleveland News, Oct. 15, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{306} Cleveland Press, Oct. 19, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{307} Cleveland Hospital Council, \textit{Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 2}, 165.
were all ordered to help the thirty city school nurses in visiting the homes of 12,500 absent children and report the reason why the children were not in school. In cases of disease, the teachers were to find out who the attending physician was and report this back to their superiors who in turn would pass the information on to Dr. Rockwood.  

Later in the epidemic, teachers were used to survey not just the homes of the absent pupils, but to canvas the entire city, "to see how many students are actually suffering from the [flu]." Although far from providing official diagnoses, the teachers provided the health commissioner with important information about the nature and spread of the epidemic throughout the city. The acting superintendent of the schools, Mr. Jones, emphasized the importance of the teachers’ work, stating that checking up on the absentees was a great "aid in combating the disease." Before the end of the epidemic, Dr. Rockwood had come to rely heavily on the city's teachers both in tracking the epidemic and in providing desperately needed help working as nurses.

Clamping Down the Flu Lid.

The importance of keeping track of the spread of Spanish flu is easily overlooked. After all, simply knowing the number of sick and dead does not seem to provide any direct effect on fighting epidemic disease. However, for Dr. Rockwood, knowing the extent, nature and development of the scourge significantly influenced his actions in the
war against it. Crucially, the health commissioner used the number of sick in the city as the reason for both implementing and eventually lifting flu regulations. This gave the doctor a quantifiable, scientific argument, backed by expert advice, to legitimize flu regulations that affected people throughout the city in economic, social, cultural, political, and personal ways. It also gave him a powerful argument for moving from the ideal of voluntary participation to introduce forced cooperation through regulations.

On October 8, more than 300 Clevelanders were officially sick with the flu. Of these, at least fourteen had died. In order to make the best possible decision during a situation that was growing increasingly serious, Dr. Rockwood formed an advisory committee within the city's health department, and also met with the chief health officers from Lakewood, Cleveland Heights and East Cleveland. The health officers had two main tasks to take care of that day. Firstly they wanted to establish close coordination and cooperation among the area's health departments. Secondly, believing that close human interaction was instrumental in spreading the malady, they sought to limit public gatherings and crowding. Using the hundreds of new cases reported daily as an indicator of the seriousness of the situation and therefore a reason for their decision, the health officers soon agreed to issue a ban on indoor meetings. On the very next day - not giving up on the ideal of voluntary cooperation quite yet - Dr. Rockwood called for the "[s]crupulous observation by the public of voluntary restrictive measures, to save Cleveland from disastrous conditions such as [seen] in the eastern cities."312 Meeting with his advisory board, Rockwood explained that "various measures of a voluntary nature were decided on in the hope that general compliance with them would render

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312 Cleveland News, Oct. 8, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 9, 1918.
more drastic steps unnecessary. The effect of his admonitions were almost immediately seen as insufficient. The call for voluntary action had not been entirely rejected by the public, as evidenced by the cooperation of numerous groups and people, including employers sending sick employees home, nurses volunteering their services, Boy Scouts offering to help, city and suburb officials cooperating and coordinating their efforts, and so on. In fact, Dr. Rockwood appreciated these voluntary efforts very much.

Unfortunately, the Spanish Influenza proved to be a foe that required even more powerful measures.

As evidenced by the growing number of sick, the Spanish flu eventually required the public to sacrifice some of their freedoms for the sake of public health, safety, and function. Public cooperation became paramount, making voluntarism less important than obedience. On October 10, a mere day after stressing the importance of public adherence to his lists of advice, Dr. Rockwood lamented that "[i]t had been hoped that effective work in coping with the disease might be done by voluntary action of those holding public gatherings in refusing admittance to persons with symptoms of influenza. Developments have convinced me, however, that more radical steps are needed." The doctor stated that the rapid spread of Spanish Flu in Cleveland had caused the disease to reach "the epidemic stage" in the city. The quick proliferation of the malady highlighted the very real threat that the "grippe" represented, and emphasized the importance of people obeying the health board's instructions in order to curtail the scourge. Just as importantly, by categorizing the illness as having reached the epidemic stage, Rockwood

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313 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 9, 1918.
314 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct.6; Cleveland Press, Oct. 8, 1918; Oct. 9, 1918.
315 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 10, 1918.
placed Spanish Flu in a category of disease that allowed for more comprehensive and stringent public health measures, including banning public assemblies. This point needs to be given some serious consideration, as words are very powerful in matters of public health.

For centuries, certain words have had the power to legitimize or even force strong public health responses. For example, the reported presence of plague could lead to various public and private responses in Europe in the centuries following the Black Death outbreak. The responses were not without consequences. A quarantine may have been an appropriate response to a plague crisis, but it nonetheless brought with it tremendous economic, commercial and social repercussions.316 Words such as 'cholera', 'yellow fever', and 'plague' have a long history of causing significant public health reactions in the U.S. as well. In San Francisco, the mere suspicion of plague was used to implement a tremendously intrusive and discriminatory measure as the entire Chinatown area of the city was placed under quarantine. The presence of plague was not even confirmed, but the word had enough power for racially motivated officials to implement extremely stringent and dubious regulations.317 The presence of yellow fever in several U.S. states in 1878 also led to quarantine measures, resulting in tremendous personal hardships, and great commercial and economic losses in many areas.318 These words were made powerful by the scourges they represented. The word "influenza" did not

318 Nuwer, Plague Among the Magnolias, 48-74, 88, 113, 131-4.
have a similar track record or established power. "Epidemic", on the other hand, did. Crucially, Cleveland's health department had the legal power to enforce quarantines, isolations, closings and vaccinations during times of crisis and epidemic disease.\footnote{\textit{Cleveland Board of Health}, in \textit{Encyclopedia of Cleveland}, 205-6.} However, to be effective, the use of governmental power had to be legitimate both in legal terms and in the eyes of the populace. People had to understand the seriousness of the situation, or they would not easily comply with stringent regulations. During the Spanish Influenza period, "epidemic" was the magic word that established the situation as a crisis and therefore allowed for crisis measures and regulations.

Dr. Rockwood thus used the number of sick and dead to declare the situation an epidemic. By doing this, the health commissioner successfully labeled the disease an obvious and present threat to the safety and welfare of the city. He then used the threat of epidemic flu to legitimize official regulations and, if necessary, coercion. In this way, freedoms and voluntarism were only sacrificed for the sake of essential need and necessity. Having officially established the Spanish Flu as an epidemic crisis, Dr. Rockwood set about implementing stricter rules. This was not without problems though, as he immediately had to consider the various needs and interests of society. For example, the doctor believed that many places of public assembly simply had to be shut down during the epidemic in order to limit person-to-person spread of the disease. At the same time, just as both cultural norms and wartime considerations made it impossible to implement broad quarantines, certain needs of society made it either difficult or impossible to shut down a number of places where people congregated.\footnote{Cleveland Hospital Council, \textit{Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 2}, 137.} For instance,
the city government, the police, and the hospitals could not shut down even in the midst of an epidemic, as these parts of society were seen as essential for the safe and proper functioning of the city. If nothing else, these institutions were needed in order to organize the city's fight against the influenza epidemic. Telephone companies, newspapers, and the war industries were also high on the list of essential enterprises.\footnote{321}{Cleveland Press, Oct. 23, 1918; Oct. 29, 1918.} But, Rockwood assured the public, even less "essential" places would only be closed if it became "absolutely necessary."\footnote{322}{Cleveland Press, Oct. 11, 1918.} This meant two things. First of all, it became very important to determine what parts of society were "essential" and which ones were less so. Secondly, it became very important to identify the point where extreme actions became absolutely necessary.\footnote{323}{Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 10, 1918.}

The point of absolute necessity was largely determined by considering the number of new cases every day. A major threshold was quickly reached. With 300 new cases reported on Friday the 11th, Dr. Rockwood, with the support of both Mayor Davis' and the mayor's war advisory board, declared that dance halls, theaters, movies, churches, and "other public meeting places, excepting schools and Liberty Loan meetings" would be closed starting Monday, October 14. The closing bans were to be in effect for two weeks, or until conditions improved and the epidemic abated.\footnote{324}{Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 6, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 11, 1918; Oct. 12, 1918.} Rather than implementing the bans immediately, the delay until Monday the 14th allowed places of entertainment to fulfill their weekend schedule. This provided amusement for the public and, just as importantly, limited the inevitable financial hardship for the theaters a little
One of the shows that was allowed to run as scheduled was a war play by famous French actress Sarah Bernhardt at the Keith Hippodrome. The same venue also held a large concert on Sunday evening in honor of wounded American and Italian soldiers, completing a weekend-long celebration of war-heroes. The celebration centered around a number of visiting Italian soldiers who had all been wounded in their fight against the dreaded "Huns". The festivities included parades that drew enormous crowds and a mass meeting in the Hippodrome that "packed the playhouse to the doors." More than 9,000 proud Italian Clevelanders also arrived to show their enthusiasm and support. These forms of mass gatherings were obviously not in line with the health department's recommendations concerning crowding. Even so, whether for economic, social, political, or any other reasons, Dr. Rockwood allowed it all to transpire.

The health commissioner also allowed church congregations to meet and pray "for abatement of the epidemic" before closing their doors. Importantly, this gave the pastors and priests an opportunity to educate their congregations in proper influenza-prevention measures, and implore their flocks to follow the directions given by the city's health department. Church leaders quickly responded in a cooperative manner. Bishop John. P. Farrelly of the Cleveland diocese sent out a set of regulations to all the Catholic priests under his supervision, telling them to comply fully with the health commissioner's orders, including the closing of churches, schools and other buildings.

325 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 14, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 12, 1918.
326 Cleveland Press, Oct. 12, 1918.
328 Cleveland News, Oct. 11, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 11, 1918.
329 The most likely reason for this is the extraordinary demands that the world war placed on the American people and society. This factor will be discussed in depth in chapter IV.
330 Catholic Universe, Oct. 18, 1918; Cleveland News, Oct. 12, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 14, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 12, 1918.
To make sure that both priests and parishioners got the message, the bishop even posted the order in local newspapers.\textsuperscript{331} A pamphlet that was supplied by national health officials was also read throughout the city's Catholic churches, and "the parishioners were urged to carry out its instructions."\textsuperscript{332} In addition, to help alleviate public and clerical opposition towards the ban on public funerals, the bishop told the priests that dead bodies would be blessed privately for as long as the flu regulations were in effect. The important funeral masses would be said once the bans were lifted.\textsuperscript{333} Most of the city's protestant leaders also chose to cooperate with the health commissioner. Following a meeting with Dr. Rockwood, the president and the religious work committee of the Federated Churches - an organization that consisted of the vast majority of the city's various Protestant congregations - promised that their pastors would "warn congregations to adopt preventive measures."\textsuperscript{334} Indicating a widely held belief in voluntary public cooperation, the religious work committee expected extra large numbers of people to show up in their churches on Sunday morning, as the people would "wish to receive the information which has been furnished the pastors in order that they may co-operate to the fullest extent in stamping out the influenza in Cleveland."\textsuperscript{335} Following this weekend of prayer and influenza prevention education, leaders of all the city's faiths stated their support of the public health cause by declaring a halt to public services until the flu regulations were lifted.\textsuperscript{336} This included the area's Protestant churches and clubs, Catholic churches and schools, and Jewish temples, lodges and

\textsuperscript{331} Catholic Universe, Oct. 18, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 16, 1918.
\textsuperscript{332} Catholic Universe, Oct. 18, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 14, 1918.
\textsuperscript{333} Cleveland Press, Oct. 16, 1918.
\textsuperscript{334} Cleveland News, Oct. 12, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 9, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 12, 1918.
\textsuperscript{335} Cleveland News, Oct. 12, 1918.
\textsuperscript{336} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 14, 1918.

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schools. Reluctantly or not, just about all religious congregations closed down their meetings during the four weeks of the flu ban.\footnote{Catholic Universe, Oct. 18, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 14, 1918; Jewish Independent, Oct. 18, 1918; Jewish Review and Observer, Oct. 25, 1918.} By using religious leaders to educate and encourage public cooperation, Dr. Rockwood reaped tremendous benefits by delaying the point of absolute necessity and postponing official flu bans until Monday, October 14. However, despite all the possible benefits of postponement, the hour of official flu closings drew inevitably closer.

In addition to the worsening situation in the city, on Friday, October 11, Doctor Rockwood found himself under pressure from the Ohio State Health Department, as it ordered all communities threatened by the epidemic to close not just churches and theaters but schools as well.\footnote{Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 11, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 11, 1918; Oct. 12, 1918.} As with the earlier federal recommendations, Rockwood chose to respond to the state officials' order in his own way. First of all, although he declared numerous closings, these would only go into effect on the following Monday. Showing an even greater degree of independent action, and holding on to the idea that places should only be closed when absolutely necessary, Rockwood declared that any given school would only close if attendance was eighty percent or less on Monday the fourteenth. Alternatively, a general closing of all of Cleveland's schools would be ordered if ten percent of all pupils in the city were absent.\footnote{Cleveland Press, Oct. 12, 1918; Oct. 14, 1918.} Once again, the health commissioner used quantifiable scientific methods to determine and legitimate his actions, even in the face of State health officials. Not everybody appreciated his approach. The editorial page of the \textit{Cleveland Press}, for instance, criticized the health
commissioner for being too slow with closing the schools, stating that "[i]nfluenza is no trifling ailment[,]" and that "[a]ny advantage to be gained by keeping schools open will not justify sacrificing the life of a single child." The surrounding suburbs of East Cleveland, Lakewood, Bratenahl and Cleveland Heights apparently agreed with both the State Board of Health and the Press editor, and closed their schools starting Monday, October 14. Sticking to his original plan, Rockwood chose to keep the schools open on Monday the fourteenth, and met instead with Cleveland school officials to discuss the possibility of comprehensive closings. Noting that the total number of absent school children in the city was over ten percent, the health commissioner stuck to his stated approach. Together with the school medical supervisor and the school board Dr. Rockwood decided to close all public, private, and parochial schools, starting Tuesday morning, October 15. According to a member of the school board, the closings did not come a second too soon. "Spanish Influenza is a crowd disease", Mr. E. W. Williams said. "It would be little less than criminal to keep the schools open another day."

Even though he was criticized for being slow in closing the schools, the health commissioner could not be accused of downplaying the seriousness of the situation. Defending his ban on public gatherings and once again highlighting the importance of public compliance, he told the newspapers that "[t]he epidemic is the most serious menace that has confronted Cleveland in years, and if people would just realize that, our efforts would be materially aided." To Rockwood, his delay in closing the schools had

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340 Cleveland Press, Oct. 12, 1918.
341 Cleveland Press, Oct. 15, 1918.
342 Cleveland Press, Oct. 15, 1918.
343 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 14, 1918.
less to do with the seriousness of the situation and more to do with his desire to use the schools for educational purposes. His approach also reflects the doctor's decision to deal with the epidemic from a scientific perspective and base his actions on quantifiable information. Furthermore, the health commissioner also had to consider the consequences and undesirable nature of enforcing any type of flu closures. Specifically, the closing of schools would have a dramatic impact on society in general as more than 100,000 children would go from attending school to being at home.\textsuperscript{344} What would such a significant part of the city's population do when not in school? Some advice was given. For instance, the city's school medical director Dr. Childs told the pupils' mothers to keep their children outdoors as much as possible, and to "keep them away from parties and other gatherings."\textsuperscript{345} Dr. Rockwood held a similar opinion, stating that Cleveland would adopt the same policies as Cleveland Heights, Lakewood and other suburbs, and have the school children "stay in their own back yard[s]" if the schools were closed.\textsuperscript{346} What the children should do while being outside was not discussed. In the end, although closing the schools for an extended period of time was certainly possible it was not something to be done lightly. Basing his decisions on numbers and statistics, Dr. Rockwood established a scientific reason for his actions and also created a measurable point of absolute necessity. When this particular point was reached, closing the schools could be seen as a smaller sacrifice than keeping them open. Once the line was crossed, the necessary sacrifice was implemented. The health commissioner must have had these things in mind when he stated that "[c]losing the schools would be a drastic step," but,

\textsuperscript{344} See Cleveland News, Nov. 18, 1918 for more on the number of pupils in Cleveland schools who were affected by the flu closings.  
\textsuperscript{345} Cleveland News, Oct. 15, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{346} Cleveland Press, Oct. 14, 1918.
recognizing the danger of Spanish Flu, "it would be a calamity to allow them to remain open if a considerable number of the pupils are affected." On Tuesday October 15, he finally ordered all schools to close. The ban would remain for four long weeks.

As already seen, the flu bans did not end with the schools. Instead, Dr. Rockwood expanded the flu time restrictions according to the spread of the disease and the number of new cases in the city. In addition to the dance halls, theaters and churches that were closed on Monday the fourteenth, Rockwood ordered several other places to close starting on Tuesday the fifteenth. The new list included pool halls, cabarets, bowling alleys, libraries, movie houses, Sunday schools, night schools, meetings at lodges, meetings of organizations in general, and the art museum. These places may technically have been included in the Monday fourteenth ban but were now stated explicitly. One of the reasons for this was that the banning of "unessential meetings" was confusingly vague. For instance, eager to do whatever was asked of them in order to fight the epidemic, groups of women contacted the health commissioner and asked if their clubs and parlor meetings were in the non-essential category. Answering them that the main objective of the ban was to avoid crowding, Rockwood told the women that they could still meet if there were only a few of them and if none of them were ill. However, if the epidemic worsened he would have to curtail even those types of meetings. Reflecting their desire to cooperate with the health commissioner, several women's organizations and clubs voluntarily cancelled their meetings for the duration of

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347 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 14, 1918.
348 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 14, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 15, 1918; Oct. 18, 1918.
Many other women's clubs also responded favorably to the more specific October 15 bans by willfully obeying Dr. Rockwood's wishes. The explicit orders were probably not meant to simply clarify matters for the willful and cooperative though. It is very likely that specific meeting places were named so that nobody could claim that they had miscomprehended the perimeters of the ban. Even so, some of the vagueness remained through October 14 as Dr. Rockwood also banned "all indoor public gatherings." Intriguingly, these indoor gathering places did not include factories, saloons, restaurants, department stores, downtown offices, grocery stores and hardware stores. Clearly, some meeting places were more essential than others. Some of the less important meeting places included public weddings and funerals, which Rockwood also banned on October 15. Restaurants and saloons were threatened with closing if the situation deteriorated further. In short, all places and activities that were considered in one way or another to be less essential were liable to officially sanctioned closure. The more essential ones were more likely to simply receive requests and words of advice. For instance, although he allowed them to remain open, Dr. Rockwood still asked owners of stores, shops and factories to prevent loitering and group formation among patrons and employees. Amazingly, the health commissioner stated that even some of the more essential endeavors could technically be closed, but that this would only happen if the epidemic developed into truly cataclysmic proportions. This did
not happen in Cleveland, and it is rather unlikely that certain parts of the city would have been forced to close even if things had deteriorated further. After all, factories, shops and stores were essential for the city's economy and, just as importantly, also for the nation's war effort. The latter point becomes especially clear when considering that Cleveland was the fifth most important industrial city and the forth most important financial city in the U.S. at the time. More than anything, the October 14 and October 15 bans show that economic considerations and the war effort were considered more important than religious, social and cultural matters. Some things were simply more essential than others.

Voluntarism, Cooperation, and Coercion

As with the war on spitting and dust clouds, adherence to the new flu regulations was to be enforced, if necessary, by the police. Even so, Dr. Rockwood held on to the ideal of voluntary cooperation, and also recognized the importance of public compliance and willful participation in combating the Spanish Influenza. In fact, the health commissioner kept promoting and stressing the importance of cooperation throughout the crisis. Importantly, Dr. Rockwood saw the flu regulations more as necessary sacrifices than as coercive government actions created to force public cooperation. The closings were certainly ordered by the city government, but Dr. Rockwood hoped that people would recognize the danger posed by Spanish Flu and voluntarily follow the flu

357 The Cleveland Association of Building Owners and Managers, "Cleveland, The City That Cooperates", in NARD Journal, 1024.
358 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 14, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 15, 1918.
regulations. After all, the regulations were created for the sake of saving lives and limiting the damage to the economy and the war effort. The temporary loss of certain freedoms and liberties was an unfortunate sacrifice made necessary by the dangerous nature of the epidemic. Essentially, the flu orders were there for the sake of the people, the city, and the nation. Therefore, people may not have liked the restrictions, but if they understood the necessity of the measures they would still be likely to cooperate. In this way, many Clevelanders voluntarily cooperated with the health commissioner, even if they did not necessarily like the type of cure he was prescribing.

This form of unenthusiastic yet obedient cooperation was certainly present in Cleveland, especially as the epidemic wore on and the flu restrictions tightened even further. On October 23, Dr. Rockwood expanded the flu bans in two significant ways. First, he banned most outdoor meetings, to go along with the former ban on indoor meetings. The new ban affected local politicians who were suddenly almost completely prohibited from using any indoor or outdoor meetings in their election campaigns that year.\textsuperscript{359} Their obvious but annoying solution was to fill people's mailboxes with election "propaganda", and cover the city with posters.\textsuperscript{360} A writer in the \textit{Plain Dealer} described the result in the following colorful manner:

One brilliant candidate, barred by influenza regulations from gassing the voters into delivering the required number of X marks at the polls, hit on the plan of spending his money on printed matter. "I'll plaster this town with my picture," he said. 'I'll have my face on every telephone pole and in every barroom. I'll not let the dear public forget I need the votes." So he did. The only flaw in his plan, however, was that every other candidate thought of the same thing. And they did. And so these are happy days for the printer and the billposter and most unhappy days for all but the blind.

\textsuperscript{359} Cleveland Press. Oct. 21, 1918.\textsuperscript{}\textsuperscript{360} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 22, 1918; Nov.3, 1918.
Even more importantly than inconveniencing politicians and voters, Dr. Rockwood also implemented a new system of closing hours for downtown businesses, restaurants, cafés, stores, arcades and saloons. The new closing hours made the different establishments close down over the span of an hour and a half instead of more or less simultaneously. This was done in order to minimize crowding in the streetcars as people would be made to leave their different work places in intervals rather than in one big rush. The order also forced restaurants and saloons to close between 8 pm and 5 am, with one telling exception: the restaurants that served night workers were allowed to stay open if they obtained special permits from the health commissioner. This exception was put in place so that work in essential industries would not be so heavily affected. The importance of excluding a number of restaurants became immediately clear, as the city suddenly faced the problem of thousands of hungry night workers. During the first night of the ban no restaurants had yet received special permission for night-service from Dr. Rockwood. This resulted in closed doors and "[g]reat throngs [that] hunted Wednesday night and early Thursday for places to satisfy their hunger." Responding to the situation, two downtown restaurants established outdoor bread lines where they served coffee and sandwiches to the half-starved crowds. Many other workers sought out all-night drugstores "to stave off hunger pangs." The food lines and crowding of drug stores certainly did not support the health commissioner's plan to limit crowding. The decision to allow some restaurants to stay open was therefore based on the need to feed

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361 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 3, 1918.
362 Cleveland News, Oct. 22, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 23, 1918.
workers, for the sake of productivity and public order, and to reduce crowding. The exceptions quickly became confusing and unmanageable though, as some restaurants were allowed to stay open while others were not. On October 25, Dr. Rockwood revoked all the special night permits and declared that all saloons and restaurants had to be closed between 8 pm and 5 am. It was unnecessary for them to be open during the night, he said. As an alternative solution to the food issue, the health commissioner simply urged night workers to bring lunches with them instead of relying on restaurants.\footnote{Cleveland Press, Oct. 25, 1918.}

The tightening of the flu bans were far from universally popular. Some, reflecting greater trends in society, were even contentious and divisive. The saloon closings is a prime example of this. The various members of the city's Anti-Saloon League were not surprisingly in favor of closing down bars and saloons. In fact, they kept on a relentless campaign throughout the epidemic, urging both Mayor Davis and Dr. Rockwood to shut down the drinking holes completely. Framing their arguments in epidemic terms, they praised the health department for closing down "nonessential places of gathering", and stated that, "in evidence of [their] good faith," they had complied with the health commissioner's wishes. "[However]", they strongly declared, "saloons are not an essential business or industry[.]" Therefore, these places should not only have restricted hours but be shut down.\footnote{Cleveland News, Oct. 25, 1918.} The saloons were actually extra dangerous, they argued, as all other places of recreation and amusement had been closed, leading to huge groups of
men and women gathering in saloons instead. Was this not in clear contradiction of the health commissioner's intention to avoid crowding?\textsuperscript{367}

The "Drys" were certainly intent on closing down their perennial foes. However, the bars also had their supporters. For instance, the vast crowds that both pastors and city officials witnessed in the saloons show that far from every Clevelander favored bar closings.\textsuperscript{368} The city's various labor unions were among the strongest supporters of open saloons, or at least the strongest opponents of Prohibition. The labor oriented newspaper The \textit{Cleveland Citizen}, periodically disparaged the value of Prohibition, calling the ideology a "blight" and a "menace to industry", and referring to Prohibitionists as "self-righteous sycophants[.]"\textsuperscript{369}

Saloons and alcohol consumption were clearly sensitive issues in the city, as they were throughout the state and the nation. The Spanish Influenza epidemic simply brought some additional ammunition to the combatants. A Methodist pastor in the Cincinnati area, for instance, refused to close his church for Spanish Flu reasons unless the saloons were also closed. In the end, he and sixteen of his followers went to prison for their protest. The reverend still got to preach to the members of his church though, as some five hundred of them showed up outside his prison cell and listened as he preached through the cell window.\textsuperscript{370} In Cleveland, Dr. Rockwood apparently did not share "the Drys'" conviction that saloons were entirely nonessential businesses. Perhaps the doctor recognized the role that these establishments played in workers' morale and therefore in

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 25, 1918; Oct. 30, 1918; Nov. 8, 1918.
\bibitem{} Cleveland News, Oct. 25, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 25, 1918
\bibitem{} The Cleveland Citizen, Oct. 19, 1918.
\bibitem{} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 17, 1918.
\end{thebibliography}
productivity and - almost ironically - civic order. Or maybe he considered the economic role that saloons played in a city that was desperately in need of revenue. Whatever the reason, the health commissioner allowed the watering holes to keep operating. He was not entirely deaf to the opposing view though. After all, the crowding in saloons was a real issue that had to be addressed. In the end, Dr. Rockwood decided to follow a course somewhere between the Drys who wanted the saloons closed and the saloon owners and patrons who wanted them to stay open. On October 25, he simply stated that the saloons would be allowed to stay open, but that they had to close their doors by 6 pm. Neither side saw this as a satisfactory situation, as evidenced by the persistent calls on one side to shut down the saloons, and a number of blatant disregards of the closing orders on the other. Some members of the latter group were especially unwilling to abide by the health commissioner's rules. In fact, although most store owners and saloons abided by his orders Rockwood still had to rely on the help of the police to enforce universal closings in the downtown area.

The outright resisters were a minority. Most Clevelanders willingly and obediently followed the flu bans. Many of them even cooperated with Dr. Rockwood in making sure that the regulations were kept. For instance, hundreds of businessmen and restaurateurs actively protested to the health commissioner whenever they saw saloon

371 Newspapers repeatedly printed articles stating that "Cleveland is Broke" etc. By November 12, the city was so far "into the hole" that it was seeking to loan a million dollars from bankers simply to make it to until 1919. In January, 1919, the Plain Dealer stated that lack of money was the biggest problem of 1918. The city's finance director, Clarence J. Neal, even called 1918 the "darkest page in [Cleveland's] financial history." It seems therefore very likely that financial concerns affected many of Dr. Rockwood's decisions. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 5, 1919; Cleveland Press, Nov. 7, 1918; Nov. 9, 1918; Nov. 12, 1918.
372 Cleveland News, Oct 26, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 25, 1918.
373 Cleveland News, Oct. 25, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 25, 1918; Oct. 30, 1918; Nov. 8, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 29, 1918.
owners or barber shop owners disobey the closing orders.\textsuperscript{375} Others lamented the
insufferable boredom that the flu closings created, but still decided to abide by the rules.
A wonderfully honest article in the \textit{Cleveland News} bemoaned the many closings that
made it impossible to buy smokes after 5 pm and drinks after 6. After 8 pm there was no
eating out, no shows, no movies, no parties, no fun. All that was left was "just a big
vacuum, a great monstrous wad of nothing." Capturing the sentiment of many
cooperative but bored Clevelanders, the writer stated that

Saturday night in Cleveland will be the gloomiest since the first log cabin was built
on the banks of the old Cuyahoga. But for the occasional footfall of a belated
pedestrian and the rumble of a street car now and then, the little old town will be as
noisy as the middle of the Sahara desert. It will be so quiet that a man talking to
himself will be in peril of having a riot call turned in. The Saturday nighter, armed
with his week's pay, will have nowhere to spend it...... Gosh darn the flu!\textsuperscript{376}

This boredom and longing for amusement and fun is further evidenced by the fact that
Clevelanders of every age simply could not wait to "blow [the] flu lid entirely off".\textsuperscript{377}
The \textit{Cleveland News} reported that the city "was preparing itself.... for one grand
celebration" as the "long stay-at-home-for-there's-nothing-to-do period is expected to
bring a reaction of wildest indulgence."\textsuperscript{378} The \textit{Cleveland Press} wistfully stated that the
lifting of the flu ban would mean a lifting of gloominess and boredom. More practically,
the newspaper celebrated the fact that laundry would no longer pile up on Saturday
evenings, and that men no longer would have to shave themselves on Sunday
mornings.\textsuperscript{379} People's impatience is also reflected in the multiple times Dr. Rockwood

\textsuperscript{375} Cleveland News, Oct. 25, 1918.
\textsuperscript{376} Cleveland News, Oct. 25, 1918.
\textsuperscript{377} Cleveland News, Nov. 9, 1918.
\textsuperscript{378} Cleveland News, Nov. 9, 1918.
\textsuperscript{379} Cleveland Press, Nov. 9, 1918.
had to tell the public that conditions were still not good enough to lift the bans.\footnote{Cleveland News, Nov. 1; 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 23, 1918; Oct. 25, 1918; Oct. 29, 1918; Nov. 6, 1918.} He would not have had to re-state this had it not been for various people asking, pressuring, and pestering him about it. In the end, Rockwood used a marked decrease in the number of new reported cases of flu as his reason for lifting the bans.\footnote{Plain Dealer, Nov. 8, 1918; Cleveland News, Nov. 7, 1918.} Once the bans were lifted, people partied, danced, and formed parades with great enthusiasm and glee. The fact that the flu bans ended up being lifted on the same day as the end of the Great War certainly did not curtail the celebrations. Celebrating the combined news of peace and lifting of flu bans with a "[t]hree cheers and a tiger!", the \textit{Plain Dealer} promised that "with the lifting of the influenza ban and the wonderful peace news to celebrate all at once, the dance tonight promises to be unusually joyous."\footnote{See for example Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 12, 1918; Nov. 13, 1918; Cleveland Press, Nov. 11, 1918; Jewish Independent, Nov. 15, 1918; Jewish Review and Observer, Nov. 22, 1918.} And joyous they were. In fact, the peace celebrations in particular were so joyous and exuberant that accidents began to happen. Pretty soon, hospitals that were already overworked due to the epidemic had to fix broken legs and perform emergency surgeries on broken skulls.\footnote{Josephine Robertson, \textit{Saint Luke's Hospital. 1894-1980} (Cleveland, OH: Saint Luke's Hospital, 1981), 110.} 

Despite the eagerness for entertainment and a return to normal life, most Clevelanders remained remarkably compliant with the flu bans. They may not have been happy about it and their cooperation may have been based more on necessity than desire, but most still followed along with the health commissioner's orders.\footnote{See for instance Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 10, 1918.} Furthermore, a lack of enthusiasm, or complaints about the bans, should not be mistaken for a lack of voluntary cooperation. After all, the flu regulations were not anybody's ideal reality, and
no one in his right mind ever longs for epidemic disease, crisis situations, or the need to implement certain societal restrictions. However, when these situations do happen, willful cooperation is not the same as enjoying or loving the regulations. Instead, it is much more like stepping up to the plate and doing what needs to be done. Or, it can be like agreeing to take an unpleasant medicine and deal with various negative side effects for the sake of defeating a greater threat. It may be to sacrifice comfort for the sake of survival. Or it may be to expose parts of a body to pain for the sake of the saving the body as a whole. In other words, willful cooperation can be to choose an unpleasant course of action out of necessity, or if this action increases the chance of a positive overall outcome. In this way, there are two main types of voluntary, or willful, cooperation when talking about epidemics and public health regulations. First of all, willful cooperation can be to recognize the danger of the situation and to sacrifice individual desires or concerns for the sake of public health and safety. Sacrifices are never enjoyable or fun. But they are by definition voluntary. It is the willful act of placing somebody else or something else before oneself. Not everybody were willing to do this during the Spanish Flu epidemic in Cleveland, but a great number of people evidently were.\textsuperscript{385} Others were probably just as inspired to cooperate by the other main impetus for voluntary cooperation: the desire to preserve their own lives. Presented in these sorts of terms, obeying the flu bans could be seen as good for the self, the public, the city, and the nation. As previously discussed, when Dr. Rockwood prepared for and

\textsuperscript{385} This is seen throughout the epidemic, and will be explored in detail later in this chapter and in chapter IV. For a couple of quick references to the degree of voluntary cooperation in Cleveland, see Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 10, 1918; Nov. 15, 1918.
responded to the crisis, he cleverly appealed to both these forms of motivation. The degree of public cooperation may be a reflection that his approach was largely successful. We could argue that parts of the public cooperation was forced rather than voluntary, seeing how the city abandoned their entirely voluntary approach and implemented flu regulations in order to deal with the crisis. From this perspective, people were pressured and forced to toe the line. Although this may have been true for a number of Clevelanders, it is equally possible to view the flu regulations as another set of instructions that people could choose to obey or not. Individuals and groups may have responded in various degrees of cooperation or resistance, but unless they blatantly disobeyed the flu orders, or were forced by legal actions or the police to cooperate, they still chose to follow along with the new rules. In other words, for one reasons or another, they chose to cooperate.

Voluntary cooperation limited the need to use blatant coercive methods to secure general compliance. From this perspective, Dr. Rockwood's flu regulations were not all that different from his lists of advice. In both cases, he sought an educated populace that would willfully follow his instructions. Still, the major difference was that unlike the lists of advice, the flu regulations could place a legal penalty on people who failed to cooperate. Voluntarism was suddenly less voluntary. If education failed to produce the desired response, threats and outright force were there to compel cooperation. The coercive threat of police force and criminal prosecution was therefore an attempt to balance a genuine call for voluntary cooperation with whatever was needed to secure obedience during a time crisis. This was a clear recognition of the obvious fact that in

any given society, and in any given situation, one hundred percent voluntary cooperation is simply not possible. The balancing act became very clear on October 18 when Rockwood managed to place voluntarism and coercive power almost in the same sentence. He first recognized that the cooperation of "every man, woman and child in Cleveland" was fundamentally important to control the epidemic. In the next sentence, he threatened that any undertaker who held a public funeral would be subject to an arrest warrant.\(^{387}\) He also used "softer" forms of coercive, or persuasive, powers in order to encourage public compliance and cooperation. Calling once again on people's sense of duty and patriotism, Rockwood appealed to "everyone to exercise every precaution to prevent further spread of the disease so that industries engaged in war work shall not be crippled.\(^{388}\) Drawing on traditional Cleveland ideals and recognizing the power of the patriotic argument during the World War, the doctor continued to focus on patriotism and public responsibility as reasons for cooperation throughout the epidemic. His approach resulted in statements such as the following: "The OFFICIAL health officer is doing what he can. But the real burden of the situation falls upon the UNOFFICIAL health officers - which means each and every one of us. Each of us must constitute himself an UNOFFICIAL health officer charged with the responsibility of protecting our own health and the health of those about us."\(^{389}\) All told, Dr. Rockwood used education, persuasion, strategic cooperation with powerful factors in the city, and coercion in order to acquire as much cooperation and compliance in the war against Spanish Flu as

\(^{387}\) Cleveland Press, Oct. 18, 1918.  
\(^{388}\) Cleveland Press, Oct 19, 1918.  
\(^{389}\) Cleveland Press, Oct. 26, 1918.
possible. In regards to the flu regulations, Cleveland's cooperation during the 1918 epidemic was certainly both voluntary and coercive.

The City That Cooperates

Cleveland once again has answered 'present' in time of need[.]\(^{390}\)

Voluntarism encompasses much more than simply obeying rules. In fact, the most important part of Cleveland's cooperation during the epidemic came in the form of people and organizations volunteering their services in the fight against the flu. For example, numerous groups and organizations such as various parts of the city- and county governments, private organizations like the Chamber of Commerce, the Welfare Federation, the Associated Charities, and the Red Cross, private employers, hospitals, community leaders such as priests and pastors, and individuals, quickly joined in the fight against Spanish Influenza.\(^{391}\) Their cooperation appears to have been largely voluntary, and they used their resources, power and influence to both encourage voluntary cooperation and to force compliance in cases where people proved unresponsive. Many also helped provide essential aid and services such as nursing, funding, coordination, and crisis relief services. Most crucially, they cooperated. The Chamber of Commerce, for instance, was very much involved in coordinating relief efforts in the city, and also worked closely with the Red Cross and the different branches

\(^{390}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 25, 1918.
\(^{391}\) See for example Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 14, 1918; Nov. 10, 1918; Nov. 15, 1918; Jan. 25, 1919; Cleveland Press, Oct. 16, 1918; Oct. 22, 1918; Nov. 8, 1918.
of the city government. The Welfare Association and the Associated Charities joined with numerous other charitable organizations in taking care of flu-orphans and helping the sick. The mayor and his war advisory board, along with the Red Cross, provided much needed funding for hospital beds and also organized soup kitchens in schools throughout the city. The city also helped the health commissioner by opening all the fire hydrants in the city several times a day in order to flush away what was believed to be bacteria-infested dust. A number of employers provided specific aid forcing sick workers to go home and by offering flu-ban-unemployed actors and actresses temporary manufacturing jobs. Even the American Protective League helped in the fight against Spanish Influenza by lending several of its automobiles to a number of nurses who made house visits. Others helped by working to boost and preserve the public's morale. Catholic priests helped provide spiritual guidance by posting special prayers such as "The Prayer to St. Roch in Time of Pestilence" and writing historical articles showing that quarantines, isolation and other public health measures were part of a proud Catholic tradition. They also arranged outdoor masses until the epidemic became so prominent that even outdoor meetings were banned. Protestant denominations also found creative ways to deal with the situation. The idea that the individual church members and their families should worship in their own homes during the epidemic was

393 Cleveland Press, Oct. 22, 1918.
394 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 16, 1918; Oct. 26, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 18, 1918.
395 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 15, 1918; Oct. 26, 1918.
396 Cleveland Press, Oct. 14, 1918; Oct. 15, 1918; Oct. 24, 1918; Nov. 6, 1918.
397 Cleveland Press, Oct. 25, 1918.
398 Catholic Universe, Oct. 11, 1918; Nov. 8, 1918.
399 Cleveland News, Oct. 21, 1918.
a central part of the solution. To preserve the sense of unity amongst the believers, the members were often instructed by their pastors to hold service in their individual houses but at the same time and with the same order of worship.\textsuperscript{400} Many pastors and churches used newspapers to spread the information about what hymns to sing and what passages from the Bible to read. These instructions also tended to include specific prayers that addressed the flu situation.\textsuperscript{401} Some pastors even mailed sermons to their followers, while others posted bulletins providing instructions, prayers and information.\textsuperscript{402} Although their actions varied wildly, all these groups and organizations shared the common traits of cooperation and voluntarism. Together with numerous other organizations and uncountable individuals, these volunteers provided the most powerful, profound and comprehensive response that Cleveland could muster against the flu epidemic.

In his book on the Spanish Flu pandemic in the U.S. Alfred Crosby singles out publicity and organization as the two largest challenges that a city government faced during the influenza crisis.\textsuperscript{403} Cleveland's ability to organize and coordinate its response is clearly seen in the city's extremely broad and comprehensive system of cooperation. The close cooperation between Dr. Rockwood, the various departments of the city government, the Chamber of Commerce, the Red Cross, the city's hospitals, they city's religious groups, and the many charitable organizations and volunteers shows that Cleveland came together to fight the scourge. Even so, Dr. Rockwood did not consider

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{400} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 2, 1918.
  \item \textsuperscript{401} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 2, 1918.
  \item \textsuperscript{402} Cleveland News, Oct. 31, 1918.
  \item \textsuperscript{403} Crosby, \textit{America's Forgotten Pandemic}, 50.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the level of coordination to be optimal. In fact, after the worst crisis had passed, but still in the midst of the epidemic, the doctor likened an epidemic to a "state of siege" and suggested that the city should create stronger public health legislation, specifically giving the health commissioner absolute control over the city's hospitals during an epidemic crisis.\textsuperscript{404} Despite this call for increased centralized power over public health coordination, the health commissioner still considered the degree of organization and cooperation in the city as praiseworthy.\textsuperscript{405} Other medical leaders joined him in this praise. Mt. Sinai hospital, for instance, stated that it was the hospital's duty to publicly recognize "those who during these trying times have so nobly helped us to carry on the work assigned to us." Among the great and noble helpers were the Red Cross, the city's health department, Dr. Rockwood, people from the Ursuline Academy, various Jewish organizations, and scores of private volunteers.\textsuperscript{406}

Organization and coordination does not work well without communication though, and although Dr. Rockwood and leaders of the different groups could clearly get together or converse over the phone, it was just as important to get information and instructions to their subordinates, to volunteer workers, and to the masses. Several of the city's newspapers provided invaluable help in this by faithfully printing the health commissioner's and various organizations' instructions and orders. The \textit{Cleveland Press} led the way among newspapers, using a significant amount of both front page and in-paper space for coverage of the epidemic. This included specific instructions from health officials, information about the epidemic's progress, multiple calls for public

\textsuperscript{404} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 3, 1918.
\textsuperscript{405} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 10, 1918; Nov. 15, 1918; Jan. 25, 1919.
\textsuperscript{406} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 25, 1919.
involvement and cooperation, flu statistics, and a tremendous poster that told the public exactly what the city had done so far to fight the scourge, along with thoughts about what more could be done.\textsuperscript{407} Other papers like the \textit{Plain Dealer}, the \textit{Cleveland News}, the \textit{Catholic Universe}, and the \textit{Jewish Independent} also provided the public with vital information about the epidemic.\textsuperscript{408} The newspapers were also used to call on volunteer nurses, and get information to teachers.\textsuperscript{409} For instance, due to the difficult circumstances caused by the epidemic, the acting school superintendent declared newspaper communications from his office to be official orders, and instructed all teachers who read the orders to pass them on to their coworkers.\textsuperscript{410} The newspapers did not only convey orders and instructions though. Contrary to what has appears to be a common conception about American newspapers during the first world war, several of the city's newspapers printed rather honest, accurate, and remarkably un-censored articles about the epidemic in Cleveland. As previously shown, the \textit{Press} even publicly criticized the health commissioner in his handling of the schools. The papers were also very blunt about the tremendous impact of the disease, faithfully recording numbers of dead and recounting horrendous stories of people suffering and dying.\textsuperscript{411} Although this can conceivably be interpreted as hurtful to morale, it can more easily be seen as a way to educate the public about the seriousness of the situation and the importance of cooperating in fighting the scourge. The important point remains that so many

\textsuperscript{408} See for instance Catholic Universe, Oct. 25, 1918; Cleveland News, Oct. 5, 1918; Nov. 1, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 9, 1918; Jewish Independent, Dec. 13, 1918.
\textsuperscript{409} Cleveland News, Oct. 26, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 31, 1918; Nov. 1, 1918.
\textsuperscript{410} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 16, 1918. Cleveland Press, Oct. 29, 1918; Oct. 31, 1918.
\textsuperscript{411} Cleveland News, Oct. 26, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 24, 1918; Nov. 26, 1918; Dec. 6, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 12, 1918; Oct. 28, 1918.
newspapers cooperated and participated in the fight against Spanish Flu. For Dr. Rockwood and his allies, the press remained a great helper not least in informing and educating the public.

The health commissioner did not rely exclusively on the cooperation of community leaders and the press to deal with the crisis, nor did he rely just on the kinds of hard or soft coercive or convincing powers that these helpers supplied him with. In fact, Dr. Rockwood relied just as much on the voluntary cooperation of individuals. And although the doctor worked hard to persuade and convince people to help him, many Clevelanders never even had to be convinced. In fact, a tremendous amount of Cleveland residents enthusiastically joined in the fight against the flu. For instance, the vast majority obediently followed the flu regulations, which in itself can be seen as participating in the fight. Even so, many Clevelanders fought far more actively than that. Throughout the epidemic, the first and most notable volunteers were women, especially those who volunteered to work as nurses and/or for the Red Cross. On October 5, as the first official cases of Spanish Flu appeared in Cleveland, three of the city's women answered a desperate call from the influenza-riddled Camp Sherman and left the city to fight influenza at the military base.\textsuperscript{412} They were quickly followed by many other nurses, including ten from Cleveland's Lakeside hospital, along with a number of mothers.\textsuperscript{413} The military authorities saw the mothers who arrived at the camp "[to] look after their boys" as especially helpful, as they "in most instances [ended up] nursing half

\textsuperscript{412} Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.
\textsuperscript{413} Cleveland News, Oct. 11, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 9, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 9, 1918.
a dozen of their comrades, too.⁴¹⁴ Thousands more went on to look after sick family members, make house calls, serve as nurses, work as hospital assistants, prepare food for the needy, staff food stations, take care of orphans, and produce an absolutely incredible amount of flu masks.⁴¹⁵ Hundreds of Catholic Sisters also volunteered their services to Dr. Rockwood through Bishop Farrelly. The sisters went on to serve the city in the most admirable and faithful ways; nursing, making house calls, cooking and cleaning for the sick, and generally "proving a wonderful help."⁴¹⁶ Several women's organizations also cooperated by deciding to "keep the spirit rather than the letter of health Commissioner Rockwood's decree against crowds[]." As a result, numerous women's groups and associations, including suffrage groups, women's civic rights' clubs, and parts of Cleveland's Federation of Women's Clubs decided to suspend their meetings voluntarily.⁴¹⁷ Thousands of school teachers helped out by working as nurses and with charitable aid through the epidemic.⁴¹⁸ The importance of all these women workers and volunteers cannot be exaggerated. For example, the work of the school teachers and Catholic Sisters was so important that Dr. Rockwood singled out the loss of their services as the only great drawback in re-opening the schools.⁴¹⁹ The health commissioner also gave special recognition to the Red Cross and the "Catholic sisterhoods", describing the actions of the latter during the epidemic as "beyond

⁴¹⁴ Cleveland Press, Oct. 9, 1918; Oct 10, 1918.
⁴¹⁵ Some of the many examples can be found in Catholic Universe, Oct. 25, 1918; Cleveland News, Oct. 5, 1918; Oct. 11, 1918; Oct. 26, 1918; Nov. 7, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 6, 1918; Oct. 27, 1918; Nov. 5, 1918; Nov. 10, 1918; Dec. 8, 1918; Jan. 10, 1919; Jan. 25, 1919; Cleveland Press, Oct. 23, 1918; Oct. 24, 1918; Oct. 25, 1918; Oct. 31, 1918; Nov. 21, 1918.
⁴¹⁷ Cleveland News, Oct. 12, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 18, 1918.
⁴¹⁸ Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 26, 1918; Nov. 5, 1918; Nov. 15, 1918.
⁴¹⁹ Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 5, 1918.
praise." Cleveland's women were certainly among the health commissioner's best helpers. The work they did for a city in need is worthy of both recognition and remembrance.

The tendency of the city's women to cooperate can also be seen in a less profound but still telling way. Specifically, Cleveland's women were much more likely than the men to follow the advice of wearing flu masks. A number of men also wore the masks. They wore them in courtrooms, for instance, or if they worked as elevator operators, dentists, barbers, doctors, or other jobs where close proximity to other people was involved. But even in these high-risk situations, and even after being ordered by Dr. Rockwood to wear them, a notable number of men chose to not don the mask. Furthermore, when the general manager of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company requested that all employees wear flu masks, it soon became evident that men required a lot more convincing and coercion than women. "The girls like them," a female employee charged with implementing the rule declared, "but I have more difficulty in convincing the men they ought to wear them." Perhaps the men were more reluctant to wear the mask because the press repeatedly made fun of the device or described it in rather feminine terms. One newspaper, writing about the situation in Washington D.C., not only did all of this but even made the face masks sound un-American. The writer stated that the masks made "the town [look] as if American women had suddenly been taken away and inmates of a Turkish harem put in their places." The face masks thus reminded the writer

420 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 15, 1918.
422 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 26, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 18, 1918.; Oct. 24, 1918.
423 Cleveland Press, Oct. 23, 1918.
of a culture that was not only seen as inferior to American culture, but of a country that the U.S. was at war with. Other articles were far kinder in their descriptions. Even so, they still tended to make light of the masks and presented them as a feminine type of garment. An otherwise supportive article about a young Cleveland woman who embraced the advice to wear the mask still managed to draw some unfavorable comparisons to the practice. Stating that "[i]f one ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, a one-quarter ounce handkerchief ought to be worth four ounces of cure[,]" Rosilda Splittorf wore the mask with pride. Even so, the article opens by stating that "[n]o, it is not a picture of a Turkish lady", clearing connecting the practice of wearing masks not only to an enemy country in the war, but even more shockingly to un-American behavior.

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Flu masks were not only made fun of for being feminine in style. In a number of cases, the masks were portrayed as symbols of weakness in the form of fear, suggesting that people who wore the masks were unduly scared of influenza. The fear of looking frightened, foolish or weak in the face of flu was particularly evident in newspaper comic strips, some of which poked fun at people who were overly afraid of people sneezing or coughing.426

Whether because the masks were seen as a sign of weakness or as a feminine type of garment, some men who wore the masks were simply made fun of. A comic strip printed in the Cleveland Press shows a man laughing at another man who is wearing a flu mask.

426 Cleveland Press, Oct 29, 1918; Nov. 4, 1918.
As comics typically draw on reality in one way or another, this comic strip suggests that such teasing was not entirely uncommon.427

427 Cleveland Press, Nov. 8, 1918.
Not wanting to look foolish, fearful or feminine were not the only reasons why some people chose to avoid the flu masks. Some honestly questioned the usefulness of the masks, wondering how the "coarse meshes of a flu mask" could protect against an influenza germ that "is so small that it cannot be seen with a microscope." Others refused to wear it for religious reasons. A pastor in Alliance, Ohio, for instance, refused to wear the mask during church services, as it would "make a reverent spirit impossible." On the flipside of all this, some men allegedly chose to wear the masks for all the wrong reasons. For example, three Chinese men in San Francisco were reported to have worn the masks as disguises during a robbery. It is possible that the story was either a fabrication or influenced by anti-Chinese sentiments. Even so, it shows some of the associations that people had with the masks. This is also the case with the almost certainly fabricated story claiming that about 1,300 "negro draftees" were scared witless by the sight of a few white soldiers wearing flu masks, thinking that the soldiers welcoming them were members of the Ku Klux Klan. Again, especially considering the ridiculing tone of the article, the story is very possibly made up. Even so, it still shows that people associated flu masks with other things, like crime and the KKK. The flu masks were clearly not without controversy. Even so, they were officially recommended by health boards throughout the country, and many people chose to wear them. Dr. Rockwood strongly recommended them in Cleveland as well, as is

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428 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 18, 1918.
429 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 22, 1918.
430 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 12, 1919.
431 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 20, 1918.
evidenced in numerous newspaper articles and posters. But although he eventually ordered the masks to be used in certain areas where close contact was inevitable, such as in elevators and court rooms, he never ordered them to be universally worn. This was probably a wise decision, as it seems unlikely that the order would have been universally obeyed.

Although they may not have been too enthusiastic about the flu masks, a number of Cleveland men still volunteered and cooperated in the fight against flu. Numerous male doctors worked tremendously hard during the epidemic, as did police officers, fire fighters and sanitary policemen. Others volunteered in much more personal ways. County Prosecutor Samuel Doerfier, for instance, showed private initiative by organizing a "fight the flu' club." The goal of the club was for car owners to help relieve streetcar congestion by driving workers to and from work. It is unclear how effective the club was, but it is certainly proof of men volunteering in the fight against influenza. At least one of the volunteers paid the ultimate price for his efforts. Father Martin O.Malley, pastor of St. Columbkil's Catholic Church suffered a "physical collapse brought on by [his] untiring work in the recent influenza epidemic." He died on New Year's Eve, 1918. On the whole however, it is much harder to find direct, specific evidence of men volunteering to fight the Spanish Flu. Most of the men who are

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433 See for example Cleveland Press, Oct. 17, 1918; Oct. 18, 1918; Oct. 24, 1918. Although newspaper articles made fun of the flu masks, they also expressed support for the use of them, stating that the masks "are approved by the medical men as the best preventive against the flu." Cleveland Press, Oct. 17, 1918. The multiple views about the masks highlight the
434 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 26, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 17, 1918; Oct. 18, 1918.
436 Cleveland Press Oct. 25, 1918.
437 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 1, 1919.
mentioned in newspaper articles, annual reports, historical works and various minutes were leaders of companies, organizations, churches, or heading up the various branches of the city and county governments. A number of others were workers who were simply carrying out orders, such as the mentioned firemen and policemen. The great need for men to fill various jobs and positions both in the city and abroad may be one of the reasons why men are mentioned less frequently than women in voluntary flu-fighting work. In the midst of the flu crisis, the help-wanted sections of the city's newspapers were packed with more or less desperate calls for manpower. On October 25, for instance, thousands of "[f]ighting men, nurses, mechanics, accountants and individuals qualified in practically every line of endeavor" were needed for the war effort. A few days later, the assistant federal employment director for Ohio, Wilbur F. Maxwell, asked Cleveland's Community War Labor Board to immediately provide 8,681 men for various war industries. These men were to be taken from various "nonessential" Cleveland factories and other work places, including construction workers, car manufacturers that were not involved in war work, and makers of anything from bricks and tiles to brushes, paper boxes, wagons, cutlery, furniture, paint and spring beds. In short, the available workforce in Cleveland was so small that men had to be drawn from less important work places to fulfill essential war needs. The need for workers is also shown by the proliferation of women in the work force. Although the greatest call for women was for nursing or Red Cross work, thousands of women also worked in various other jobs, including manufacturing. For instance, Mr. Maxwell asked the war board to supply

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438 Cleveland Press, Oct. 25, 1918.
439 Cleveland Press, Oct. 29, 1918.
Cleveland with 1,500 women to fill in for some of the eight thousands men who were to be relocated.\footnote{Cleveland Press, Oct. 29, 1918.} On November 12, the same man highlighted the importance of women in the workplace by saying that "[w]omen in industrial war work will be in even greater demand in peace work." On the same day, Mr. Maxwell also re-emphasized the tremendous need for workers by stating that "[a] conservative estimate of the labor needs in Cleveland today would be 50,000 men and women."\footnote{Cleveland Press, Nov. 12, 1918.} With such tremendous pressure on men to fill needed work spaces, it may not be surprising that fewer of them were able to partake in voluntary flu-fighting activities. One great exception was the Red Cross, as Cleveland men and women alike raced to enroll with the organization.\footnote{This is for instance evidenced by the tremendous number of industrial workers who enrolled in the Cleveland chapter of the Red Cross. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 5, 1918.} The role of the Red Cross in Cleveland during the world war and during the Spanish Flu epidemic is discussed in depth in chapter IV.

There may have been other reasons why women appear more often as volunteers in the sources than men do. For instance, much of the volunteer work that was needed appear to have been divided by gender roles and gender lines. Women may have been able to enter the work force in new ways during the war, but it seems very unlikely that men would be asked to volunteer their time to knit or make flu masks. In fact, they were not explicitly asked to do so. Instead, more often than not the calls for volunteers appealed specifically to women. For example, a call for volunteers to make flu masks stated that "[t]eachers and high school girls are particularly urged to give their Saturday to this work."\footnote{Cleveland Press, Oct. 18, 1918.} Women were also implicitly, and often times even explicitly addressed
whenever the city or the nation called for nurses, midwives, and hospital attendants to enroll in various surveys or volunteer their services. Although boys and girls alike were invited by the city's settlement houses and the Y.M.C.A. to learn about tuberculosis prevention and social hygiene, girls and women were specifically targeted by the Red Cross for learning health care and nursing skills. In the Cleveland Health and Hospital Survey of 1920, the Red Cross is praised for being an "agency which is bringing the message of health to large numbers of women and girls[.]") The organization not only received women at their training centers, but also sent their nurses to "factories, schools, settlements, department stores and churches" to teach girls and women about health care and nursing. Nursing and first aid was also largely considered women's work in the schools. Throughout Cuyahoga County, around 97,000 high school girls were involved with different forms of domestic training. Parts of this training included nursing and home care skills. Furthermore, when Cleveland's Junior Red Cross considered offering first aid and home nursing classes to high school seniors, they only considered girls to be eligible. This is not surprising at all, for American society at the time viewed girls and women as responsible for the home and therefore also for the health of the home. Women were therefore more often asked to volunteer as nurses and for other flu-related tasks. Men were needed for other things. High school boys, for example, did not have to make flu masks. They were asked instead to help dig trenches for a huge, patriotic event called the War Expo. The trenches were part of a plan to mimic conditions at the

Western Front. For anyone who has had to dig a trench it is not surprising that very few

446 Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 2, 187.
447 Cleveland Press, Nov. 6, 1918.
boys responded to the call.\textsuperscript{448} A number of male medical students from the Western Reserve University were asked by Dr. Rockwood to volunteer to work as doctors.\textsuperscript{449} Although the health commissioner had to resort to threats to get the students to volunteer, he eventually ended up praising their efforts in the fight against flu.\textsuperscript{450} However, as a rule, most of the men's work in the epidemic took place within formal institutions and positions.

Cleveland's women and men clearly served different purposes and performed different tasks during the Spanish Influenza epidemic. The key point remains that although their tasks and actions varied, they were all part of a greater system that responded to a crisis during extraordinary conditions. In the end, they were all needed. The various tasks and efforts came together as the people of Cleveland contributed their unique roles and efforts in a common fight against the flu. Surely some contributed more directly than others, but that does not negate the fact that Cleveland's men and women cooperated in their war on influenza. In fact, considering the numerous organizations, churches, employers, city government departments and officials, newspapers, schools and so on that also participated in the fight, it becomes clear that practically the entire city of Cleveland fought together against the scourge. It was not a one-gender response, nor was it solely an official response, or a private one. It was a collective response,

\textsuperscript{448} Cleveland Press, Nov. 12, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{449} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 27, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{450} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 27, 1918; Nov. 15, 1918.
organized by a few but fought by many. Faced with a public health crisis, Cleveland largely lived up to its ideal of being a city that cooperates.\textsuperscript{451}

A five-day period provides a great example of the tremendous interplay and cooperation between the city's many various groups and organizations. During the height of the epidemic, Cleveland experienced some issues that were reminiscent of east coast cities and military camps. Specifically, with anywhere from seventy to more than a hundred and sixty people dying of flu and pneumonia every day, some cemeteries began having problems digging graves fast enough.\textsuperscript{452} The deaths that were attributed to the epidemic came in addition to deaths from other causes, as the other causes obviously did not take a Spanish Flu vacation. As a result the daily number of funerals increased markedly. For instance, in the five city-owned cemeteries, funerals went from an average of fifteen a day to an average of forty. With regular grave diggers overwhelmed, cemetery foremen, watchmen, and even superintendents picked up shovels to help out. Increasing their work hours from eight hours a day to eleven, and also digging on Sundays, the city cemeteries managed to keep up with the great influx of dead bodies, and prevented the corpses from being temporarily placed in vaults.\textsuperscript{453}

Other cemeteries faced worse. The most desperate situation was found in Calvary Cemetery, a Catholic cemetery that had never before experienced more than thirty funerals in a day. Then Spanish Flu hit and suddenly the cemetery had to provide a resting place for thirty-six bodies one day, forty-seven another, then fifty-one, sixty-

\textsuperscript{451} The Cleveland Association of Building Owners and Managers, "Cleveland, The City That Cooperates", in NARD Journal, 1024-8.
\textsuperscript{452} City of Cleveland, Statistical Records, 1916-1924, 42; Cleveland Press, Oct. 24, 1918; Oct. 25, 1918; Oct. 26, 1918; Oct 29, 1918.
\textsuperscript{453} Cleveland Press, Oct. 24, 1918.
seven, and finally eighty-five. Before the numbers had even reached fifty, the man in charge of Calvary - Father Martin O'Malley - described the situation as "the most serious in the history of this cemetery." By the time they reached eighty, it was almost catastrophic. The cemetery regularly employed twenty-six grave diggers but these were quickly overwhelmed. The city's utilities director Farrell quickly assigned twenty-five workers from the waterworks department to help dig graves. The move produced a profound statement of gratitude from the chancellor of the Cleveland diocese and also enabled the cemetery to deal with the situation for a little while. However, as more people died, the fifty workers proved woefully insufficient. Before long, Father O'Malley found it necessary to use a steam-shovel to dig graves. The city also responded by ordering another 100 waterworks employees to help dig graves in the various cemeteries in the city. To speed things up further, Calvary Cemetery even began digging mass graves, "large enough to receive a number of caskets placed side by side." On Monday October 28, Father O'Malley ordered a second mass grave to be dug, large enough to hold eighty-five bodies. The steam shovel also helped out, digging a long trench grave at the speed of two hundred feet per day. On Tuesday the 29th, Utilities Director Farrell recognized that the help of 125 waterworks employees was not enough to keep up with the number of dead bodies waiting for burial. He therefore called for volunteer grave diggers to help ease the situation. A number of people had

455 Cleveland Press, Oct. 24, 1918. Father O'Malley had been in charge of the city's Catholic cemeteries since September, 1913. He died in December, 1918, reported to have perished due to overwork during the epidemic. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 1, 1919.
457 Cleveland Press, Oct. 25, 1918.
460 Cleveland Press, Oct. 29, 1918.
already volunteered. In some cemeteries, friends and family members of the diseased had even dug the graves for their dearly departed. This was the case for Mr. Abram Niri Turk whose body arrived at Highland Park Cemetery so late in the day that the workers there were unable to dig the grave. In the end, four of Abram's friends grabbed some shovels and provided the dead man with a final gesture of respect and friendship.\footnote{461 Cleveland Press, Oct. 24, 1918.} The city also helped deal with the grave emergency by having workhouse prisoners dig graves and by recruiting the services of people who were usually in charge of landscaping and gardening. Thankfully, the crest of the epidemic passed swiftly, and Cleveland never got to experience the truly horrendous scenes described in Philadelphia and Fort Devens, et cetera. The city was also spared from the indignity of running out of caskets. Fortuitously the home of The Cleveland Burial Case Company, the city was actually producing an excess of caskets and was daily shipping anywhere from 3,000 to 4,000 caskets to the east coast cities.\footnote{462 Cleveland Press, Oct. 23, 1918.} Even so, the sudden, tremendous pressure on the city's cemeteries was a significant challenge. The city solved it by cooperating and working hard.

During this same time, the city's fight against influenza was also helped by numerous other groups, businesses, organizations and individuals. On October 24, the Cleveland Press helped in the dissemination of information by posting a huge, front-page poster detailing the city's fight against the epidemic and what were the symptoms and treatment of the disease. The city's undertakers were doing their share by working long and exhaustive hours. Mr. John I Nunn reported that he had worked for twenty-two hours
one day, whereas Mr. Paul P. Wright said that he had hardly slept for three days straight. The city helped by having the streets flushed regularly, while police officers were busy coordinating transportation of the very ill to the city's many hospitals. Linen for emergency hospital beds was acquired from boats serving the Cleveland-Buffalo route, and private companies volunteered their automobiles to Catholic sisters who had volunteered to work as visiting nurses.\textsuperscript{463} It was also during this period of time that Samuel Doerfier organized his "fight the flu" club and that downtown restaurants created bread lines for hungry workers.\textsuperscript{464} The American Protective League followed the example of private businesses and loaned several of their cars to visiting nurses. Not surprisingly, the Red Cross was also highly engaged, providing nurses, serving at food centers, helping stricken families financially, and making flu masks.\textsuperscript{465} The list goes on. In fact, a quick read through three of the city's leading newspapers shows that at least thirty-two different city departments, organizations, hospitals, groups, and businesses provided their unique contribution during these five days alone. The actual number is even higher than that, as several of the thirty-two contributors I identified include broad categories such as "catholic institutions", "settlement houses" and "manufacturers/industry".\textsuperscript{466} In addition, these are only the cooperators that are mentioned in the newspapers. When Dr. Rockwood eventually expressed gratitude to everyone who had helped out during the crisis, he emphasized the roles played by the Red Cross, the Police Department, the city's hospitals, the Welfare Federation, a number of doctors, the newspapers, several Western Reserve University medical students, and

\textsuperscript{463} Cleveland Press, Oct. 24, 1918.
\textsuperscript{464} Cleveland Press, Oct. 25, 1918.
\textsuperscript{465} Cleveland Press, Oct. 26, 1918; Oct. 29, 1918.
\textsuperscript{466} See Appendix.
the Catholic sisters.\textsuperscript{467} A representative of Mount Sinai Hospital also offered his thanks to everyone who had contributed greatly, naming the Red Cross, Dr. Rockwood and the Health Department, Catholic volunteers, a number of Jewish organizations, and individuals who volunteered to help at the hospital.\textsuperscript{468} Amazingly, even these long lists of volunteers and cooperators fail to describe the true width of cooperation and voluntarism that characterized Cleveland's war on Spanish Influenza. Expanding the newspaper search to include the whole months of September, October and November, 1918, the list of contributors, volunteers and cooperators becomes truly vast, easily eclipsing one hundred and twenty different groups and categories of people.\textsuperscript{469} However, although this list clearly shows that a tremendous number of Cleveland's residents and organizations participated in the flu fight, it still provides a woefully incomplete picture of the overall level of cooperation in the city. In fact, the list is best seen as a starting point that establishes a general overview and encourages further inquiry.

One of the main problems with the list of cooperators based on newspaper articles is the many organizations, groups and individuals that are curiously absent in the sources or that received much less attention than they were due. For example, the newspaper sources are surprisingly silent about Cleveland Foundation. Established in 1914, the Cleveland Foundation's stated purpose was "to provide a means to distributing funds for assisting charitable institutions, for promoting educational and scientific research and to provide for the sick, elderly, or helpless." This included to "aid in the mental, physical,

\textsuperscript{467} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 15, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{468} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 25, 1919.  
\textsuperscript{469} See Appendix.
and cultural improvement of Cleveland's citizens. In the years leading up to the Spanish Flu crisis, the foundation had been actively involved in Cleveland, especially performing surveys of schools and workplaces. However, during the epidemic, this groundbreaking organization simply vanished from the public eye. The foundation's own records do not provide much help in illuminating the issue, as the available sources start in 1919 and make no mention of the epidemic. It is possible that the Cleveland Foundation did not play an official role during the epidemic, but for an organization with such a stated purpose, it seems more likely that it was involved in one way or another. Still, as there is no clear evidence to support the idea, the foundation's involvement remains largely speculative.

What is certain is that the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce was more deeply involved in the fight against flu than both newspaper and archival sources explicitly report. The newspapers hardly mentioned the organization in connection with the epidemic. Just as surprisingly, the Chamber's own minutes and annual reports make very few references to the epidemic, if any at all. On the face of it, the sources thus seem to suggest that the Chamber of Commerce was little involved in the fight. However, in reality few things could be further from the truth. After all, the Chamber of Commerce was intrinsically and powerfully involved in the coordination and workings of most aspects of the city at this time. Through its myriad committees, the Chamber worked closely together with practically every major group or interest in Cleveland. The span

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and variety of the committees is incredible, ranging from the River and Harbor Committee, the Foreign Trade Committee, and the Special Committee on Passenger and Freight Terminal, to committees that were involved in coordinating and organizing the city's war efforts during the Great War. Through its Military Committee, for example, the Chamber of Commerce worked closely with Mayor Davis' War Advisory Committee and also worked with the War Chest Campaign and the War Savings Stamp Committee. The organization was also deeply involved in arranging parades, entertaining allies, helping with war time recruitment, and aiding the Liberty Loan campaigns.\textsuperscript{472} Crucially, the organization had traditionally also been very involved in public health matters, including, as we have seen, during epidemic crises.\textsuperscript{473} Being so widely involved in city activities, and having a tradition of involvement in matters of public health, it seems logical and likely that the Chamber of Commerce was also involved in Cleveland's fight against Spanish Influenza. Again, the newspaper evidence is not very direct or conclusive, but the circumstantial evidence mounts very quickly. In April of 1919, the Chamber of Commerce's Board of Directors released an annual report for the fiscal year ending on April 1, 1919. Informing its members on the organization's many achievements that year, the report is strangely free of any mention of the Spanish Flu epidemic. However, not finding a mention of the epidemic is a matter of failing to find a specific key word in a sea of supporting evidence. In fact, the report is brimming with tales of close cooperation with the Red Cross and with "the relief work carried out


\textsuperscript{473} Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 19, 1895; June 23, 1895; Sept. 6, 1902; March 18, 1903; March 4, 1905; April 11, 1905.
through many agencies". "[A]ll of these movements and others", retiring president
Myron T. Herrick wrote, "have found their strongest and most effective support in the
Chambers of Commerce." 474 Although the report was largely framed in a wartime focus,
it seems clear that the organization was also involved in anti-influenza work, even if it
was not often explicitly stated. In fact, the failure to mention the epidemic has more to
do with the extreme importance of the war effort than with anything else. In their own
words, the Board of Directors stated that during "one of the most interesting years in [the
Chamber's] history... [i]t was necessary at all times to emphasize the war activities." 475
This emphasis on the war made the Spanish Flu epidemic disappear from mention in the
report. It also makes it even more likely that the Chamber of Commerce was deeply
involved in fighting the scourge. After all, the epidemic quickly proved its ability to
negatively impact the war effort by affecting soldiers, sailors, workers, industry,
transportation, and even by halting the draft and slowing down Liberty Loan
activities. 476 One of Dr. Rockwood's stated goals for fighting the epidemic was for the
purpose of limiting and even preventing any negative effects on the war effort. 477 In
fact, newspapers even reported that the health commissioner was "directing the medical
forces in an attempt to prevent crippling of Cleveland war plants." 478 It is extremely
unlikely that the Chamber of Commerce would not partake vigorously in this fight to
limit the negative impact of the epidemic. Therefore, when the Chamber's Board of
Directors stated that "[i]t goes without saying that no written report can do justice to the

475 The Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, *Cleveland Chamber of Commerce Minutes*, 55.
476 Cleveland News, Oct. 4, 1918; Oct. 7, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 27, 1918; Oct.9, 1918; Oct.
11, 1918; Oct. 16, 1918; Oct. 18, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct.5, 1918; Oct. 11, 1918; Oct. 19, 1918; Oct.
25, 1918.
477 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 16, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918; Oct. 19, 1918.
numerous detailed services performed by the Chamber, the aggregate result of which is considerable[,]” they were certainly also alluding to anti-flu efforts.\textsuperscript{479}

Another big problem with the newspapers is the fact that they obviously fail to mention the reactions among thousands of private individuals. In particular, at least as far as the English language newspapers go, they fail to portray the sentiments and actions of the city's various immigrant groups. Certain information can be gleamed by combining the newspaper sources with other documents. For instance, the makers of Cleveland's Hospital and Health Survey of 1920 stated that many immigrants were afraid of hospitals and of ambulances.\textsuperscript{480} From this we can induce that many immigrants were probably not likely to tell the health officials that they were sick with flu. On the other hand, the patriotic spirit that many of the city's immigrants and immigrant groups exuded at the time suggests that they may have also been likely to abide by the health commissioner's regulations, especially as the war on flu became more and more tied to the Great War.\textsuperscript{481}

In the end, we do not know the true extent of cooperation or dissent in Cleveland. However, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the city indeed lived up to its ideal of being a city that cooperates. The cooperation came in many forms, as many different people, organizations, and groups participated in various and often times unique ways. With Dr. Rockwood leading the way, a tremendous part of Cleveland's city government, private organizations, charities, businesses, employers, churches, synagogues, hospitals,

\textsuperscript{479} The Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, \textit{Cleveland Chamber of Commerce Minutes}, 55.
\textsuperscript{480} Cleveland Hospital Council, \textit{Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 10}, 850-4.
\textsuperscript{481} See for instance Cleveland Press, Oct. 19, 1918; Oct. 25, 1918; Oct. 28, 1918. This aspect of the war on Spanish Flu is covered in chapter IV.
schools, women and men all fought the scourge together. This chapter has explored some of the complexities that existed in such a vast and varied public health response, including the role of education, the ideals of voluntarism and civic duty, the need to balance public and societal needs and interests, and the health commissioner's use of modern scientific methods to make and legitimize unpopular decisions. It shows that although some Clevelanders clearly opposed the flu regulations, most people agreed to "swallow the pill" and carry on with life. Furthermore, Cleveland's response to the epidemic was much more than the health commissioner's regulations. It also included a tremendous amount of work, coordination and cooperation, such as raising funds, organizing the hospitals and medical staffs, transporting the sick, mapping the developments of the epidemic, nursing and treating the sick, digging graves, making flu masks, establishing and manning food centers, disseminating information, taking care of infants, and much more. The amount of cooperation and voluntarism that was evident in these activities is truly monumental, highlighting the large degree of success that the city experienced in terms of fighting the flu together.

This chapter has also attempted to tie the multiple ways that Cleveland responded to the epidemic with the city's past and with its ideals. To speak of a city's ideals is clearly a way to generalize a very varied and complex populace. Even so, certain ideals are often generally held in a society, and also often affect decisions, actions and reactions. In Cleveland's case, the ideals of an educated populace, voluntarism, civic duty, and cooperation, were above all present among the people who took charge of the situation and led the city through the Spanish Influenza crisis. This includes various leaders and helpers such as Dr. Rockwood and the Health Department, the Board of Education, the
Red Cross, the Chamber of Commerce, various charitable organizations, religious leaders, hospitals, doctors, nurses, Catholic nuns, and an unknown number of volunteers. The city's long traditions of cooperation in matters of public health, especially on the level of city government, private organizations, and community leaders also played an important role in the fight. Ideals and traditions, along with the identification of the more or less essential needs of society, and tailoring flu responses and regulations accordingly, greatly influenced and even largely dictated the city's response. There was another exceptionally important factor that influenced the city's response though, and that was the Great War. It has only been alluded to up to this point, but the almost incomprehensible importance and impact of the war on American society can hardly be overstated. This was clearly the case in Cleveland as well, as life began to revolve more and more around the war and the war effort. In such a context, it is only natural that the Great War also affected the city's war on Spanish Flu. The next chapter will explore this tremendously important factor in depth.
CHAPTER IV

FIGHTING THE GERMANS. FIGHTING THE GERMS.

MAKE WAR
ON GERMS AND GERMANS

It is as important to safeguard ourselves against preventable diseases and keep ourselves in condition for service for our families and the nation as to do many other things we are learning so nobly to do. We will fight more ably against the Hun "over there" if we at the same time wage war upon filth over here.\textsuperscript{483}

An epidemic has the power to turn the most ordinary of times into a most extraordinary event. 1918 was anything but ordinary. The world war made it so. Firmly embroiled in the Great War since April, 1917, the United States had suspended many of its hallowed ideals for the sake of the war effort. Free speech and the right to disagree or dissent had been replaced by almost incomprehensibly powerful and fundamentalist forms of Americanism and patriotism.\textsuperscript{484} The war effort also resulted in an astounding degree of social, economic, industrial, and ideological mobilization throughout the

\textsuperscript{482} Part of an advertisement for vitrified pipes in Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 20, 1918.
\textsuperscript{483} North Carolina health official Dr. E. F. Long, quoted in Cleveland Press, Sept. 28, 1918.
\textsuperscript{484} Kennedy, \textit{Over Here}, 13-36, 42-4; Capozzola, \textit{Uncle Sam Wants You}, 10, 54, 144-172.
nation. The times were so extraordinary that even a remarkable and devastating event like the Spanish Influenza epidemic faded in comparison. Essentially, the Great War defined and dictated American life in 1918. Other factors had to be judged and determined accordingly, including responses to the Spanish Flu crisis. Spanish Flu did not define its time. It arrived into a historical context that not only influenced its spread, but powerfully affected the many ways that people fought back. In Cleveland, the war on Germans affected and materially aided the war on germs. The many unique war-time needs affected the city's responses markedly, at times making it impossible to implement recommended public health measures. However, the city's health officials also found ways to use the Great War to their benefit. By declaring the Flu War a part of the Great War, the city managed to recruit much of the war time fervor, cooperation, loyalty, mobilization, organization, sacrifice, funding, and voluntarism in the public health battle. More than any other group, the Red Cross proved a natural and extremely powerful unifier of the two wars. Intrinsically linked to the U.S. war effort against Germany, and fundamentally involved in the gospel of American patriotism, the humanitarian organization became one of Cleveland's greatest helpers in the war on germs.

Mobilizing the American People

What had been tolerated became intolerable now.
What had been wrongheadedness was now sedition.
What had been folly was now treason.\textsuperscript{485}

\textsuperscript{485} Columbia University President Nicholas Murray Butler, June 1917, quoted in Kennedy, \textit{Over Here}, 74.
May God have mercy on [war opponents], for they need expect none from an outraged people and an avenging government.  

Ever since the outbreak of fighting in Europe in 1914, the U.S. populace had been very divided in regards to American involvement in the war. The division over the war issue followed at the heels of more than half a century of intensive social and political conflicts in the nation. Anti-immigration sentiments began during the antebellum era, as Irish and Chinese immigrants experienced increasing degrees of dislike and even hatred from the American old stock. Temporarily overshadowed by the enormous sectional conflict that was the Civil War, anti-immigrant feelings continued up to 1918 and beyond, culminating in the anti-immigration bills passed by the U.S. Congress in 1921 and 1924. The country also experienced a tremendous amount of labor conflicts, including what amounts to endemic labor strikes and violent strike-breaking in various coal and steel regions. The social division was made worse by the emergence of vast corporations and the concentration of money and power in a number of "trusts". The world war issue thus found a United States that was anything but united in opinion, sentiment or conviction. Not surprisingly, when discussing the war, the nation once again found itself very much divided.

The conflict and debate over U.S. involvement in the war is highlighted by a number of telling events. One of the most famous examples took place in 1915 as German U-

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488 Kennedy, *Over Here*, 11.
boats torpedoed and sank the British ocean liner *Lusitania*. The ship was carrying almost 2,000 passengers and crew at the time. Of these, 1,195 were lost to the sea. Importantly, more than one hundred of the dead were U.S. citizens. The loss of Americans lives to German torpedoes caused an uproar in the nation, as people, newspapers, the U.S. Congress, and the President debated the topic thoroughly. In Cleveland, the *Lusitania* tragedy dominated the newspapers for weeks, with mentions and discussions of the issue appearing daily from May 8 well into June. Many of the articles and opinions expressed popular outrage, and several urged the public to "keep cool" and allow the President and the government to handle the situation. The local outrage may not have been as fierce as some feared or believed. A local coal company conducted polls to gauge public opinion on the matter, concluding that only one out of 265 workers in the city's coal, ore, and vessel businesses favored using force against Germany as a response to the *Lusitania* sinking. However, as Mark Twain famously stated, there are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics. In short, it is utterly uncertain whether the poll was an accurate presentation of Cleveland's sentiment or not. The numerous calls in newspapers asking people to simmer down and leave the issue to President Wilson and the U.S. Congress suggest that more people may have been visibly upset than the poll claimed. Regardless of this, the company sent their result to Wilson. If he ever saw the poll, the numbers must doubtlessly have encouraged the president, who feared that the sinking would upset the "calm manner in which Americans are viewing the European struggle[.]" Hoping to keep the nation out of the war, Wilson feared that the

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489 Kennedy, *Over Here*, 5-6.
490 See for example Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 8, 1915 - June 18, 1915.
491 See for instance Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 8, 1915; May 9, 1915.
492 Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 11, 1915.
loss of lives with the *Lusitania* would cause "a decided restlessness over the country... complicating the efforts of the administration to keep the United States out of the European mix up." With the president still seeking to keep the nation out of the war, the *Lusitania* debacle eventually passed without any drastic measures being taken. Even so, the incident was not forgotten.

Even more than the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the 1916 presidential election strongly reflected the importance of the European war in the United States. Although labor issues and Americanization were highly discussed matters, nothing received quite as much attention as the war question. By the end of the campaign, the war had risen to such importance in the public awareness and psyche that many observers attributed Wilson's narrow victory to his campaign slogan "He Kept Us Out of War." Different opinions on the matter existed throughout society. For example, many of the country's progressive reformers and practically all its socialists were against the war, whereas many on the conservative side of politics favored U.S. involvement. The immigrant nature of the American people inevitably provided a variety of opinions and feelings as well, as groups hailed from various areas and countries that were now locked in devastating war. Despite the deep-seated divisions and the great resistance to war, the president eventually caved in to the historical context. On April 2, 1917, pressured by the deteriorating conditions in Europe, by numerous German provocations, and by pressures at home, President Wilson asked the U.S. Congress to "formally accept the status of

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493 Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 8, 1918.
494 Quoted in Kennedy, *Over Here*, 12.
495 Kennedy, *Over Here*, 16-36, 41, 45-92.
496 Kennedy, *Over Here*, 14.
497 German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare was key to this decision.
belligerent which has thus been thrust upon [us]." Congress responded, war was declared, and the United States quickly changed into a very different being.

Believing that the war effort required the involvement of every aspect of the country, the president recognized the need for a strong central government and the cooperation of the people. Wishing to avoid the use of blatant coercive power, Wilson and his administration "turned instead to voluntaristic[5ic] means, to persuasion, propaganda, and the purposeful fueling of patriotic fires." The president thus led the nation in a comprehensive campaign against Germany by seeking to win the hearts and minds of the public. Much of this campaign revolved around extolling the virtue of patriotism, and emphasizing the civic and patriotic duties that came with being an American. The idea of civic obligations was already a familiar part of American culture. The wartime propaganda took this ideal, distorted it, and used it for its own purposes. In wartime America, a good American was a whole-hearted patriot. As such, he or she was loyal, obedient, cooperative, and voluntarily supportive of the war effort. Intrinsically, a good American also accepted sacrifice. Patriotism, voluntarism, cooperation and sacrifice thus became manifestations of loyalty. U.S. leaders and their wartime propaganda apparatus demanded that American men, women, and children should live according to these ideals. Disloyalty, on the other hand, was to be punished. Crucially, the U.S. government and the propaganda machine also re-defined disloyalty in war terms.

Whereas disagreements and various opinions had been accepted previously, these things

498 Quoted in Kennedy, Over Here, 13.
499 Kennedy, Over Here, 143.
500 Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 8, 10, 17-8, 30, 39-42, 43, 54, 81, 149, 175-7, 197. For a great discussion on the obligation to volunteer, see chapter 3.
were now considered un-patriotic and punishable. With the nation's leaders elevating the Great War to the position of supreme and essential importance, any resistance or failure to cooperate became a threat or even an attack against the nation itself. Cooperation, collaboration, one-mindedness, efficiency and sacrifice became synonymous with the war effort. Everything else was unpatriotic, un-American, and therefore punishable, whether by the government or by an incensed public.  

Tennessee Senator Kenneth McKellar brilliantly summarized the sentiment in April, 1917, stating that "[f]rom now on there can be but two classes of people in the country - Americans and traitors."  

The message of patriotism, loyalty, cooperation and sacrifice was hammered into the American public by force, intimidation, propaganda, and persuasion. The federal government was clearly the main force behind these efforts, but many other actors contributed as well. The semi-official, private organization The American Protective League, for instance, went to great extremes to enforce public compliance with the new ideals. Armed with a sort of quasi-legal authority, the League organized raids against draft dodgers, spied on people to look for anti-American or anti-war sentiments, and even made arrests. In Cleveland, the League organized a "slacker hunt" to create a "dragnet" for catching more than 2,500 draft dodgers. Armed with the slackers' names, a thousand A.P.L. members, together with people from the police, the immigration services, the U.S. Marshalls, the Secret Service, and "a host of unorganized patriotic citizens", scoured the city for unpatriotic elements.  

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501 Kennedy, Over Here, 88-92, 148.  
502 Quoted in Goldberg, Discontented America, 149.  
503 Kennedy, Over Here, 81-3, 165-6.  
504 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Aug. 20, 1917.
persons in Cleveland and adjacent territories suspected of disloyalty”, the Cleveland branch of the League quickly grew to be about 1,200 members strong. Many of them were businessmen or members of the Cleveland Rotary Club. By 1918, the A.P.L. had established a truly significant presence in the city and was carrying out actions that can send uncomfortable shivers down anybody's spine. In an article ominously entitled "Eyes That Never Close Guard Cleveland", complete with creepy drawings, a Plain Dealer journalist described the League's activities and declared the League members to be loyal, patriotic heroes. In one of the most chilling paragraphs, the writer stated that "[t]he 'eye and ear squad' of the A.P.L. is always on the job - in the street car, in restaurants, in the streets, school, church, homes, every public assembling place. In no time your misdemeanor or folly will go tinkling over the wire to some ear in 309 Federal Building, and though you may never know it, you will be under surveillance." In this highly charged, coercively patriotic, Big-brother-like context, the article even encouraged readers to spy on each other, saying that "[t]he safety of the country is everybody's business".

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505 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 2, 1917.
506 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 14, 1918. Image text says "Raids on employment agencies never fail to bring results - slackers, alien enemies, et al."
Patriotism was not only used as an excuse to catch draft dodgers. At the hands of U.S. leaders and thousands of volunteer educators and enforcers, the very concept of patriotism and cooperation became infused with incredible coercive force and public fervor. The tactics proved remarkably successful. Combining efforts to force loyalty with "the deliberate mobilization of emotions and ideas", President Wilson managed to form public opinion to the point where "[t]he people of the United States [became] stark
raving patriotic[.]

As a result, the American society and public became incredibly dedicated to the war effort. The U.S. also became a place where un-patriotic behavior was culturally and socially unacceptable, and where ordinary people made sure that their neighbors and co-workers lived up to the patriotic duties and sacrifices that were expected of them. Anybody who wished to avoid trouble had to toe the line. An event as essential as the Great War left no room for disobedience or dissent. In a supreme case of irony, engaged in a global "war for human liberty", the world's greatest democratic nation readily rescinded a number of its own freedoms and liberties. Americanization, already a great ideal and concern among old stock Americans and reformers, went from being mainly implemented over time to being instantly demanded. In an exceptionally heterogeneous nation, the "longing for a unanimous spirit" and unity led to the establishment of "correct" opinions and behavior, specifically forcing Americans and residents of all backgrounds to obey the tenets of wartime patriotism.

This new, extreme form of Americanism clearly revealed itself in the rejection of all things German. In its propaganda campaign to ensure the voluntary cooperation of the American people, the Wilson administration also created what one of the president's advisors, Walter Lippman, called "a newspaper campaign of manufactured hatred" against Germany. This created a dichotomy of good versus evil where the U.S. was presented as the beacon of civilization, liberty and democracy, whereas Germany and everything German were denigrated and demonized to the point of caricature.

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507 Crosby, America's Forgotten Pandemic, 46; Ekirch, Progressivism in America, 259, 268-9; Kennedy, Over Here, 14, 20, 25-6, 46.
508 Kennedy, Over Here, 62-70, 77; Robertson, Saint Luke's Hospital, 102.
509 Kennedy, Over Here, 151.
Reminiscent of the later American obsession with rejecting all things communist, American leaders of the Great War era convinced the American public to fiercely reject every single aspect of their declared enemy. The German Kaiser Wilhelm was described as "the arch-demon of this world...who shed[s] the blood of millions" and who sits on a "blood drenched throne". Clearly favoring the big stick to soft speaking, Theodore Roosevelt eagerly joined in the chorus, stating that "[t]he only way to make a Hun friendly is to knock him out." The former president also added fuel to the fire by declaring that all who held anti-war sentiments or "declare[ed] inopportune the effort to arouse the spirit of Americanism" should be referred to as "shadow huns", and viewed as enemies of the United States. German soldiers did not escape the propaganda machine. Instead, they were accused of plunder, rape, enslavement, and murder in the occupied areas. Sometimes, the Huns were even accused of killing off people for some concocted reason, or as a matter of routine, as if this was the most natural thing for the German psyche to do. One of the most gut-wrenching stories was allegedly reported by a soldier who had partaken in the liberation of a village in France. Upon entering a hut, the soldier had found the following gruesome scene.

Against one wall was the dead body of a woman, her hands crossed above her head and nailed to the wall by a spike. There were no other wounds on her body - she must have been left there to die from torture. Opposite her, against the other wall, was a little three-year old child, with its head impaled on a sharp hook and its limp little body hanging down. The two had doubtless been crucified at the same time and left alone to watch each other's death agonies.

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510 Cleveland Press, Sept. 28, 1918.
511 Quoted in Robertson, Saint Luke's Hospital, 102.
512 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 1, 1917.
513 Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 17, 1918.
514 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 15, 1917; Feb. 22, 1918; May 15, 1918; Oct. 29, 1918.
515 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 6, 1918.
It is not certain whether this story was a true account of a horrendous, vicious deed, or if it was simply another part of war time fabrications. Either way, the story shows the kinds of language and propaganda that was used to create an image of the evil Huns that had to be stopped.

The Kaiser and his kin were thus described as butchers and oppressors of men, who "reek with the blood of the innocent."516 Not surprisingly, the distaste of Germans seamlessly extended to all things German. In this way, anything that had even the most cursory connection with Germany was rejected as evil and contrary to United States ideals. The propaganda quickly led to an incredible spike in anti-German sentiments in the U.S, causing a series of notions and actions ranging from the peculiar to the outrageous. In an action reminiscent of the more recent nonsense of re-naming French fries "Freedom Fries", sauerkraut was temporarily dubbed "liberty cabbage".517 A number of beer gardens and breweries were forced to close down because of the association of beer with Germans, and several schools decided to drop German lessons from their curriculums.518 Amazingly, many Americans even began rejecting German toys, books, and music.519 Far more destructively, the anti-German sentiment virtually destroyed German-American cultural life in the U.S. during the war by shutting down numerous German organizations and institutions. The previously very rich German-American culture never truly recovered. 520 More eerily, people began blaming the Germans for spreading epidemic disease. On September 13, 1918, newspapers reported

516 Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 21, 1918; Aug. 4, 1918.
517 Engs, The Progressive Era's, 367; Robertson, Saint Luke's Hospital, 102.
518 Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 6, 1918; Engs, The Progressive Era's, 367.
519 Cleveland Press, Nov. 1, 1918; Goldberg, Discontented America, 149.
520 Goldberg, Discontented America, 149.
that a shipment of food stuffs had arrived from Madrid, Spain, and was "known to have been infected with diphtheria germs by German agents there." Soon thereafter, newspapers once again blamed the Huns for spreading disease, this time declaring that the release of Spanish Flu in the U.S. was of German origin and "quite in keeping with German tactics and kultur." Creative minds developed numerous theories on how the Huns had carried out their diabolical biological attack. Some stated that flu germs had been placed inside aspirin, seeing how aspirin was manufactured by the German pharmaceutical company Bayer. Others held that German agents had snuck ashore in some east coast harbor - whether from a ship or a U-boat - and had released the scourge upon an unsuspecting populace. The common denominator was a deep suspicion and hatred for all things German, and a glorification of all things American.

Patriotism and anti-Germanism found its way to America's pulpits as well. Cleveland reverend Minot O. Simons led a crowd in shouting "Who prescribed the medicine for the world war? Germany. Who's going to take it? The Hun. When are Germans good? When they're down and dead." Reverend Charles Stelzle highlighted the difference between the two nations by creatively likening the U.S. to the compassionate organization the Red Cross while likening Germany to the symbol of its army and to a German military distinction medal; the Iron Cross. Between the two, Stelzle stated,

there's all the distance between heaven and hell! The Red Cross stands for mercy – the Iron Cross stands for 'shrecklichkeit', for terrorism. The Red Cross destroys disease – the Iron Cross spreads corruption. The Red Cross gives life and hope - the Iron Cross brings worse than death. The Red Cross rehabilitates crippled men,
making them over - the Iron Cross tortures crushed bodies, driving them mad. The Red Cross comforts women and children - the Iron Cross curses mothers and babies, and outrages all womankind. The Red Cross serves all - the Iron Cross tyrantizes[sic] over all. The Red Cross is the symbol of sacrifice - the Iron Cross is the sign of supreme selfishness. All the forces of light are behind the crimson-red cross, dyed by the blood of martyrs - all the powers of darkness are arrayed under the cruel iron cross, made hideous by a history because of which its wearers will one day stand disgraced and dishonored."

The Germans were evil. The Americans were good. Even the clergy said so.

Patriotism, loyalty, cooperation, and sacrifice was therefore also good, whereas disloyalty was wrong and evil. Clearly, the propaganda campaign was a success. And, by creating such a tremendous degree of patriotic emotion and fervor, Wilson and his compatriots also succeeded in ensuring loyalty and cooperation without relying primarily on blatant governmental force. This does not mean that force and coercion was not rampant. The emotions ran so strong through much of the U.S. that freedoms were sacrificed at the altar of patriotism, and people were forced to cooperate and sacrifice for their nation lest they be prosecuted or persecuted for their failure to be good Americans. The consequences of failure could be harsh. In Holland, Ohio, three men accused of being "outwardly pro-German and refusing to purchase Liberty bonds" were taken from their beds at night, dragged outside, stripped of their clothes, and then had hot, greasy pitch poured over their bodies. Suffering horrible burns from the pitch, the men had insult added to their injuries as they were first tarred and feathered and then, terribly injured and ridiculed, brought to Liberty Court in nearby Toledo where they were made to kiss a large American flag. The three men ended the night in police custody, where they were held for government agents.526 Speaking one's mind could be positively

525 Cleveland Press, Oct. XX, 1918.
526 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 15, 1918.
dangerous. In Youngstown, Ohio, a German sailor was imprisoned and held for questioning, charged with speaking disparagingly about President Wilson and the U.S. armed forces.\textsuperscript{527} Many places, people were even lynched for failing to express the proper degree of patriotism.\textsuperscript{528} If a person managed to avoid the mobs or the police, they still had to contend with the A.P.L. and their menacing presence and practices. Anyone who uttered a seditious or treasonable word, who supported Germany, or who acted in a seditious of treasonable way were liable to be investigated by the League. As one newspaper article stated: "The A.P.L.'ll git you, ef you don't watch out."\textsuperscript{529}

Cleveland at War

Under the impulse of the unifying motive growing out of the war, Cleveland, in common with many cities, built up very strong organization which, through united effort, gathered money for the various purposes connected with the war..... these experiences revealed to the community itself a fuller measure of satisfaction and achievement in cooperative effort than the city had ever known before.\textsuperscript{530}

The war years were truly an extraordinary time in U.S. history. But how did this affect Cleveland? And how did it affect the city's response to the Spanish Flu epidemic? First of all, Cleveland was certainly not exempted from the intense patriotism that ruled the day. As was the case in most of the country, this almost mad patriotism was manifested both in cases of genuine, eager and voluntary patriotism, and in coercion

\textsuperscript{527} Cleveland Plain Dealer, April. 15, 1918.
\textsuperscript{528} Capozzola, \textit{Uncle Sam Wants You}, 12, 15, 33, 63-4, 117, 136-8, 156-0, 208; Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 3, 1918.
\textsuperscript{529} Cleveland Plain Dealer, April. 14, 1918.
\textsuperscript{530} Cleveland Hospital Council, \textit{Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 2}, 106.
against the disloyal or subversive. Patriotism thus came to engulf both voluntary cooperation and coercive cooperation. Both these sides of wartime patriotism in Cleveland can be seen in the city's fourth Liberty Loan campaign.

The three week long fourth Liberty Loan campaign began in Cleveland on Saturday, September 28, 1918. At noon, preluded by five minutes of church bells ringing and factory whistles howling, Cleveland mayor Harry L. Davis declared the start of the largest fundraising campaign in the city's history. Already dubbed "the quota campaign", participation in the liberty loan event was anything but voluntary. Or, although voluntary in theory, it was very coercive in practice. The national leaders of the campaign had decided that the national quota was an astounding six billion dollars. Of this, Cleveland was expected to raise $113,000,000. The city, in turn, passed on quota expectations to its citizens. Anyone making five dollars a day was told that he had a quota of contributing a day's pay every week for twenty-six weeks. People making more were expected to contribute more. Individual factories and businesses were also assigned quotas. The Liberty Loan organizers, which included city officials and members of the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, exhorted everybody to do their part. "To win the war" they stated, "the spirit shown by the army must fire the whole nation. Each must be like a soldier. Each must have the will to accomplish the impossible." Although appealing to the monetary returns that people could expect from their liberty bonds, the organizers held that the loan had a much stronger appeal than simple economic gains. Instead, they wrote, "[the Loan's] strongest appeal is to loyalty. Buying Liberty Bonds is a duty every
loyal American owes to the United States[.]” Leaning heavily on the virtues of patriotism and sacrifice, the Loan organizers went on to declare the opening day of the campaign as that generation's Fourth of July, only "[i]t is a new and greater Independence Day," they proclaimed, "for it means independence not only for the United States, but for every people, every nation that values the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Their calls for cooperation were followed by long lists of businesses and companies that were already cooperating and contributing. Other Clevelanders, including individual workers, were also supportive and even enthusiastic about the campaign and quickly contributed above and beyond their assigned quotas.

The very next day, the city held a grand Liberty Loan parade, complete with John Philip Sousa and his 305 piece Great Lakes Band. It was a monumental affair. Commenting on the vast number of participants, Liberty Loan directors who witnessed the spectacle stated that "[o]ne half of the city seems to be parading and the other half to be watching." Ohio's governor James M. Cox joined in the choir of praise by declaring Cleveland's parade to be the most spectacular parade he had ever witnessed. Thoroughly impressed he said that "[i]f the organization and spirit I have seen manifested today do not mean that Cleveland is determined to subscribe its quota in record time, then count me a mistaken and surprised man[.]" It is very understandable that the governor and other spectators were impressed as some 40,000 Clevelanders walked in the parade. Among these were almost forty bands who certainly helped keep noise levels and spirits up. The most noticeable part of the parade, however, was that more than half the

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531 Cleveland Press, Sept. 27, 1918.
532 Cleveland Press, Sept. 28, 1918.
533 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 28, 1918.
participants were women. Their presence was hailed as proof of the city's patriotic women who worked with the Red Cross, in factories, and everywhere else where their presence was needed.\textsuperscript{534} Another notable aspect of the display were the crowds of men, women and children who witnessed the parade. Many places, the masses of people grew so thick that it became entirely impossible for people to pass by.\textsuperscript{535} A vast affair, the parade was heralded as proof of the depth of Cleveland's loyalty and willingness to make sacrifices for the war effort. The Plain Dealer raved that this "demonstration of loyalty, of determination to 'keep faith with the boys overseas', has no precedent even in a city boastful of its traditions." The parade was therefore Cleveland's pledge to do "everything in the power of human beings to crush autocracy and light the lamp of liberty in every land." Curiously, the newspaper, along with government officials, private citizens, men, women and children, appeared to believe that the size and splendor of the parade was an indicator of the city's pledge and loyalty. However, it quickly became evident that many Clevelanders were far quicker to show patriotism by attending parades than by opening their wallets.

With patriotic expectations running high after the successful Loan parade, the campaign organizers were shocked and dismayed to find Cleveland "lagging far behind" a number of other cities in bonds purchases. One week into the campaign, the Cleveland Press reported that the city had raised less than half of what Boston and Baltimore had managed to do in three days. One third into the campaign, Cleveland had not even filled thirty percent of their quota. This was a big problem and great shame for a city that

\textsuperscript{534} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 30, 1918.
\textsuperscript{535} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 30, 1918.
prided itself for its spirit of civic duty. It was in fact unacceptable. Highlighting the tremendous sacrifice and duty showed by American troops in the trenches, the Press lamented that the same spirit was not shown in Cleveland. "Americans here held back", the front page article cried. "Their spirit was slack. Their lines sagged. They seemed to hope that the war will win itself, somehow, without much sacrifice." Such lack of duty and sacrifice was not only deplorable, but proof that the public had their priorities completely wrong. In a sign of the depth of sacrifice that the war effort wished for, the article declared that "[w]e must meet our quota, if we have to sell shirts off our backs to do it. A shirt is not absolutely necessary. But it is absolute necessary that the bond quota be reached and topped." The Great War essentially created a hierarchy of needs that was quite unlike Maslow's later pyramid, declaring that the war effort was America's most important challenge, duty, and responsibility. "It won't be easy", the Cleveland Press said, "[b]ut it must be done. Patriotism isn't shouting. Loyalty isn't measured by cheers. But it can be measured. It can be measured by sacrifice." A huge parade was evidently not a true sign of patriotism and loyalty. Sacrifice was. And if people could not be moved by either shame or love of country to make sacrifices voluntarily, then they simply had to be forced.

Mr. C. D. Bradley was the vice president of Cleveland's Executive Committee for the Liberty Loan campaign. On October 5, as it was evident that Cleveland was lagging behind on its quotas, Mr. Bradley decided to add threats to the mix. A vital part of the Loan Committee's tactics to reach all Clevelanders was to send special ward salesmen

536 The Cleveland Association of Building Owners and Managers, "Cleveland, The City That Co-operates ", in NARD Journal, 1024; Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.
537 Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.
throughout the city. These salesmen even went from door to door to look for proof that people had contributed to the cause. To ensure that every man in the city contributed in the campaign, Bradley told every bond subscriber to report their bond activities to the ward salesmen, disclosing both the amount of investment that each family had done so far, and through whom the subscription had been made. By doing this, Bradley said, "we will have a check on every man in the city."538 A couple of days later, the threats became even more explicit. Responding to reports from ward salesmen that some Clevelanders had made "flagrant attempts to shirk the national duty", Loan officials strongly declared that "[n]o man earning from $7,000 to $10,000 a year can buy a $100 or $200 bond and think he can get away with that[.]" To boost the contributions further, the Loan officials even ordered the ward salesmen to make subsequent visits to people's homes to find out whether further contributions could be made.539 Ideally, people should sacrifice twice the amount that they felt comfortable investing.540 It is not known whether any Clevelanders experienced the terrors of tar and feathering or lynching that took place in numerous other locales during the Liberty Loan campaigns.541 What is certain is that there was a tremendous amount of pressure on everybody to contribute. The city's 335 Chinese residents, for instance, must have felt both a sense of pride and a sense of relief as they declared that "Cleveland's Chinese Have Gone Over the Top in the Fourth Liberty Loan!" Even better, every single Chinese Clevelander had contributed to the campaign, and almost every single one had doubled up on their subscription after the

538 Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.
539 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 8, 1918.
540 Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918.
541 Acts of blatant force and mob-style coercion took place at least as close to Cleveland as Canton, Ohio. See Capozzla, *Uncle Sam Wants You*, 10. I have not been able to find any specific proof for these things taking place in Cleveland, but as we all know, the absence of proof is not a proof of absence.
"double up" call. At least the city's Chinese could not be accused of being Loan slackers.

The fourth Liberty Loan campaign was clearly characterized by coerced forms of cooperation and patriotism. Even so, it is important to remember that there was also a tremendous amount of genuine patriotism, with thousands of Clevelanders lining up to do their part in defeating the Huns. For instance, the newspapers printed numerous lists of big contributors as companies lined up to prove their patriotic zeal. Some of these lists read much like a who's who of Cleveland commerce and industry, including McKinney Steel Company, Sherwin Williams, the Cleveland Electric illuminating Company, White Company, M.A. Hanna & Company, Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company,

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542 Cleveland Press, Oct. 19, 1918. The photo is from the same article in the Cleveland Press.
Standard Oil Company of Ohio, and numerous other businesses and banks. One of the city's great industrialists and philanthropists, Samuel Mather, responded very specifically to the Loan campaign's call to "double up" on loan subscriptions and increased his purchase from $500,000 to a million. Many others followed suit, even if their totals were smaller. A great number of the city's men made their contributions through their places of employment, as evidenced by newspaper listings. For example, on Wednesday October 9, "Van Dorn Iron Works Co. employees" and "Lakewood Engineering Co. employees" were listed among the greatest subscribers of loans for that day. Much of the men's prescriptions went rather unnoticed in the media though, making it very difficult to determine the degree of voluntarism or coercion that was involved in each pledge or purchase.

This was not the case with Cleveland's women. Volunteering in great numbers to help with the campaign, the women even formed their own Liberty Loan committee and organized a number of Loan events. For example, led by the president of the Ohio Woman Suffrage Association, Mrs. Harriet Taylor Upton; wife of former Cleveland mayor and in 1918 the U.S. Secretary of War, Mrs. Elizabeth L. Baker; Mrs, Elizabeth Miller of the Cleveland Women's Liberty Loan Committee; and Miss Lavinia Engle of the National Women's Liberty Loan Committee, Cleveland's women organized both a four day speaking and selling tour and a gigantic fund raiser in the city's B. F. Keith's Hippodrome. The event at the Hippodrome even had famous French actress Sarah

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543 Cleveland Press, Oct. 12, 1918; Oct. 17, 1918.
544 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 13, 1918
545 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 13, 1918; Oct. 17, 1918.
546 Cleveland Press, Oct. 9, 1918.
Berhardt contribute in the program.\footnote{Cleveland Plain Dealer, 6, 1918; Oct. 13, 1918.} For once though, the French star was outshined. Enjoying a "sympathetic atmosphere" created by a naval band, a number of speakers, and communal singing, Mrs. Harriet T. Upton took the stage to call for bond pledges. After an initial subscription for fifty dollars, a man in the audience made a call for $1,000. This was immediately followed by a woman shouting out twice that amount. "I never knew the time when a woman couldn't match the best any man could do," the suffragist leader declared. Another woman immediately called out the tremendous pledge of twelve thousand dollars, obviously pleasing the vast crowd. Soon thereafter, a man promised a $5,000 investment, to which Mrs. Upton answered, "That's from a tenor's voice - where's the soprano to match it?" Not surprisingly, the five thousand dollar pledge was matched by women not once, but twice shortly thereafter. By the time all was said and done, the Hippodrome event raised over half a million dollars for the Liberty Loan, making the \textit{Plain Dealer} conclude that "Women Enthuse [the Loan] Rally."\footnote{Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 13, 1918.} This opinion was seconded by Mr. Bradley. At the end of the campaign, as it became evident that Cleveland had in fact gone above and beyond its quota, the vice president of Cleveland's Loan Committee stated that although much thanks should be given to bond subscribers and the many patriots who also volunteered their time and energy, most of the credit for a successful campaign belonged to the city's many women's organizations.\footnote{Cleveland News, Oct. 21, 1918.}

1918 Cleveland was a city largely defined by the Great War. The city and its residents had learned to make sacrifices, to cooperate -willingly or not- , and to
wholeheartedly embrace Americanism, loyalty and patriotism. The war effort was of the utmost importance and life in the city was dramatically affected by this. It was therefore natural and even inevitable that all aspects and functions of society were influenced by the war in one way or another. Public health measures were no exception, even during the Spanish Flu crisis.

War Against Germans. War Against Germs.

The army and navy are fighting and conquering Germans.
We must fight and conquer germs without taking anything away from the army and navy.  

Avoid crowds, coughs and cowards, but fear neither germs nor Germans.  

The war affected Cleveland's response to the Spanish Flu in a number of ways. First, the war significantly reduced the number of doctors and nurses who were available to deal with the scourge, as many were either overseas or serving elsewhere in the nation. As mentioned in chapter II, this included the city's original health commissioner Dr. Bishop and a number of his close co-workers. The war also helped the disease spread. For example, just around the time the Spanish Flu arrived in the U.S., about thirteen million young men - more than ten percent of the entire population -

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551 Advertisement for Dr. Pierce's Pleasant Pellets in Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 7, 1918.
552 Cleveland News, Oct. 2, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 9, 1918; Dec. 23, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918; Barry, The Great Influenza, 143.

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gathered in halls and buildings throughout the country to sign up for the draft. The ones who got called up had to travel from their homes, congregate in crowded barracks in overflowing military bases, and then ship off to Europe. An astounding 1.5 million of them went overseas between June, 1918 and the end of the war alone. With a disease that for some reason preferred the young and strong to the old and infirm, this massive mixing of young men was extraordinarily unfortunate, causing intense suffering in military installations throughout the country. Furthermore, cramming thousands of young men together, and moving them from base to base, helped the epidemic spread like wildfire. This was the way the disease originally spread to many areas, including Ohio where the first case was reported in Camp Sherman, near Chillicothe. In Cleveland, the war aided the spread of the Spanish Flu because influenza is a crowd disease and the war effort inspired and required many public gatherings. The immense Liberty Loan parade on September 29 is a prime example, as are the daily Liberty Loan gatherings in Public Square, the Loan rally at the Hippodrome, the parade to celebrate Italian war heroes, another parade to honor women who had lost sons in the war, and so on. Although both these factors certainly played a role in Cleveland's Spanish Flu experience, there were three main ways that the Great War most notably and profoundly affected Cleveland response to Spanish Flu. First of all, the war created an atmosphere

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557 Cleveland News, Oct. 11, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 28, 1918; Sept. 30, 1918; Oct. 11, 1918; Oct. 13, 1918; Oct. 14, 1918; Oct. 15, 1918; Oct. 16, 1918; Oct. 18, 1918.
and a historical context that allowed Dr. Rockwood and the other city leaders to tie the
war on flu to the war on Huns. Secondly, the nation and its leaders were incredibly
dedicated to the war effort. In terms of a hierarchy of importance, the war remained the
most essential part of U.S. life even in the midst of an epidemic. Dr. Rockwood and the
city's public health response existed within this context and had to both act and make
decisions accordingly. Thirdly, the war effort required a tremendous amount of
organization, mobilization, cooperation and voluntarism. All these elements connected
brilliantly and extensively with the public health sphere through the Red Cross. The City
of Cleveland and its health commissioner doubtlessly enjoyed the benefit of this during
the fight against flu.

As seen in chapter III, when fighting the flu, Dr. Rockwood and the city's health
department preferred the voluntary help and cooperation of the public. This cooperation
ideally extended into every aspect of the city, including private companies and
organizations, churches, various government departments, newspapers, schools, homes,
and work places. Traditionally, public health regulations had been very difficult to
enforce on a city-wide basis, and typically required the help of organizations such as the
Chamber of Commerce and the School Board to be successful. Generally speaking,
many people were simply not willing to abide by regulations that required personal
sacrifice, especially if the regulations appeared unnecessary, too stringent, or dangerous.
The amount of persuasion, education, and coercion that was sometimes required to
implement public health measures could be very large. However, in the Great War
context, much of the language, attitude and mentalité required to execute an effective
public health campaign was already in place. In short, the public was utterly primed for
calls to volunteer, cooperate and make sacrifices. From the very beginning, Dr. Rockwood wrapped his response in typical war time imagery, rhetoric and exhortations, and also tied the fight against flu to the war effort. On October 5, the health commissioner pointed out that the epidemic had hampered Liberty Loan campaigns and war work in other cities. This, he stated, should not be allowed to happen in Cleveland.\textsuperscript{558} To fight the flu was to support the war effort. To fight germs was to fight Germans. Voluntary cooperation with the health commissioner was therefore a matter of loyalty and patriotism, much like investing in Liberty bonds.

The connection between the Great War, the war on flu, voluntarism and patriotism saturated Dr. Rockwood's Spanish Flu education campaign. The city's newspapers gave him invaluable assistance in this. Nurses who volunteered to treat flu victims were portrayed as war heroes.\textsuperscript{559} In similarly bellicose terms, "war to the hilt" was declared on flu-spreading practices such as spitting, and the city was quick to launch an "open campaign to free [the] city of flu."\textsuperscript{560} Once again stressing the importance of the flu fight in the context of the Great War, the health commissioner told the public that it was "their patriotic duty" to follow his instructions.\textsuperscript{561} The war-like language also continued as Rockwood called for a ban on meetings as part of the "flu war", and recruited 3,500 teachers to help "combat influenza."\textsuperscript{562} On November 3, the doctor took the war

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\textsuperscript{558} Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918. Dr. Rockwood made the same call two weeks later, asking Clevelanders to take every possible precaution to limit the impact on war industries in the city. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 16, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 19, 1918.
\textsuperscript{559} Cleveland News, Oct. 11, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918; Oct. 9, 1918.
\textsuperscript{560} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 6, 1918; Oct. 9, 1918.
\textsuperscript{561} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 9, 1918.
\textsuperscript{562} Cleveland News, Oct. 22, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 10, 1918, Oct. 16, 1918.
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metaphors even further by likening the epidemic situation to a siege.\textsuperscript{563} To further cement the connection between the war on Germans and the war on germs, and to legitimize the health commissioner's authority, the \textit{Cleveland Press} declared that Dr. Rockwood "is directing the medical forces in an attempt to prevent crippling of Cleveland war plants."\textsuperscript{564}

With such noble motives attached to his leadership and actions, the health commissioner was able to implement wartime language to encourage, persuade and even coerce cooperation. As early as October 10, the health commissioner had lamented the shortage of doctors and nurses, stating that the lack of personnel was seriously hampering the "fight against the 'flu".\textsuperscript{565} As the epidemic worsened in the city, the need for nurses and doctors became increasingly desperate. In a call for volunteer nurses, Rockwood once again appealed to wartime ideals and language by stating that volunteers would be "performing a patriotic service in a time of unusual stress."\textsuperscript{566} As days went by and the number of volunteers proved insufficient, the language became more explicit. By October 28, large notices in the local newspapers told women with any type of nursing training that it was not only their "privilege" to cooperate, but also their "patriotic duty"\textsuperscript{567} By November 2, the same group of women were even told to not be among those "Who Have Shirked Their Duty to Their Country and Their Community."\textsuperscript{568} Volunteers were patriots. The ones who shied away from service were not. In similar fashion, the doctor accused landlords who refused to provide proper

\textsuperscript{563} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 3, 1918.
\textsuperscript{564} Cleveland Press, Oct. 19, 1918.
\textsuperscript{565} Cleveland Press, Oct. 10, 1918.
\textsuperscript{566} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 21, 1918.
\textsuperscript{567} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 28, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 28, 1918.
\textsuperscript{568} Cleveland Press, Nov. 2, 1918.
heating for their tenants of being unpatriotic.\textsuperscript{569} Even more harshly, Rockwood declared nurses who chose to stay with wealthy families rather than help treat the masses to be "as much 'slackers' as men who attempt to evade service in the army."\textsuperscript{570} Although exasperated with these "hundreds of 'luxury' nurses in the city", the doctor was clear in stating that "[t]he nursing profession as a whole... has shown that it is patriotic."\textsuperscript{571} In Cleveland's fight against influenza, cooperation was a sign of patriotism; selfishness and disobedience were signs of disloyalty.

By making the flu fight a part of the war effort, Dr. Rockwood was able to call on the power of patriotism, duty, and loyalty to aid in the war on Spanish Influenza. This allowed him to use patriotic language and arguments in his calls for volunteers and cooperation. It also lent additional legitimacy to his actions so long as they could be presented as part of the war effort.\textsuperscript{572} Making the epidemic a war issue also allowed the health commissioner to seek funds for flu hospitals from the Mayor Davis' War Advisory Board.\textsuperscript{573} Finally, it provided Dr. Rockwood with a way to establish and defend a hierarchy of importance and need. Public health regulations that force members of the public to sacrifice freedoms, money, social desires, and so on can be hard to implement during any epidemic crisis, as people may choose to resist or disobey the orders. In 1918 Cleveland, war conditions made it much harder for people to disobey. For instance, if there was ever a doubt that the city's churches and church leaders would rally around the health commissioner, the Great War provided the necessary "spirit" to

\textsuperscript{569} Cleveland Press, Oct. 11, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{570} Cleveland News, Oct. 26, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{571} Cleveland News, Oct. 26, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{572} Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918; Oct. 19, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{573} Cleveland News, Oct. 16, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 16, 1918.
ensure their cooperation. In the same way, if for some reason the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce had proved uninterested in the Spanish Flu during ordinary times, the war context made its involvement virtually certain. Considering the tremendous amount of patriotism, both voluntary and coerced, that existed in the U.S. and Cleveland during the Great War, it is very likely that similar claims can be made for greater parts of the general populace. At the very least, making the war on germs part of the war on Germans brought the epidemic into a realm where it was much more difficult for people to disregard the flu fight.

The connection between the war on flu and the Great War was not only by design, but also by default. In 1918, the war against influenza was not only a part of the greater war, but was essentially subordinate to the war effort. This was due to the simple fact that in 1918, everything was subordinate to the war effort. The war on germs was important, but not nearly as important as the war on Germans. After all, the Spanish Flu epidemic could never have inspired such a profound and society-wide mobilization, propaganda machine, and amount of patriotism, cooperation, voluntarism, persuasion, coercion and sacrifice as the Great War did. Granted, epidemic diseases often have the power to unite certain groups and force others to comply.\footnote{See for instance Nuwer, \textit{Plague Among the Magnolias}, and Willrich, \textit{Pox. An American History}.} Even so, diseases simply do not have the same power, influence, and impact on a society as the Great War did, with practically all of U.S. society fighting the war for democracy and liberty together. The Cuyahoga County War Savings Committee, for one, was very explicit about the hierarchy of importance. As the various flu bans forced people to stay home and consequently save money, the war savings committee urged them to invest in the Great
War as this investment would help keep people safe "from things far worse than the flu." The war on flu was important, but Dr. Rockwood made it even much more important by connecting it to the Great War effort. By focusing on the connection between the two fights, the health commissioner managed to use the most important war effort to help the less important public health effort.

This tactic posed one unintended drawback. Although officials were able to lean on the authority of the war effort in the fight against flu, once the war with Germany was over, most of the people's interest in the war on germs appears to have evaporated. In fact, with the end of the Great War, many somehow decided that the Flu War was also over. The day after Armistice Day, on November 12, 1918, the Cleveland News declared the "Flu Peril Over". Theaters were filled to the brim and almost all the moving picture theaters were packed as well. The very same week, notices for dances and for the great War Exposition also began to appear in the newspapers. Just as importantly, mentions of the Spanish Flu practically disappeared, going from taking up significant space, especially in the Plain Dealer and the Cleveland Press, to getting only an occasional mention. Focus shifted to festivities and celebration. A big dance was scheduled at Zimmerman's Dancing Arcadia for November 17 to celebrate that both the war and the flu were over.

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575 Cleveland Press, Oct. 25, 1918.
576 Cleveland News, Nov. 12, 1918.
577 Cleveland Press, Nov. 12, 1918.
578 Cleveland Press, Nov. 13, 1918; Nov. 15, 1918; Nov. 16, 1918; Nov. 18, 1918; Nov. 21, 1918; Jewish Independent, Nov. 15, 1918; Jewish Review and Observer, Nov. 15, 1918.
579 Jewish Independent, Nov. 15, 1918.
The War Expo, originally designed as a way to raise and retain public morale during the war, was re-packaged as a tremendous victory celebration. "No one in this city, or within suburban car ride, can afford to miss seeing this great patriotic show in the nine days it is here", the Cleveland Press said, declaring that "Buffalo Bill's Wild West was a sideshow by contrast." The Jewish Review and Observer emphasized the involvement of numerous Jewish organizations in the Expo and declared that it was "The Greatest Event of the Greatest Week in All History." With torch-lit parades, mock battles, exhibits of war relics and weaponry, miles of trenches and barbed wire, a community chorus of 50,000 Clevelanders, and a chance to see how the war was won, it is not

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580 Cleveland Press, Nov. 13, 1918.
581 Jewish Review and Observer, Nov. 15, 1918.
surprising that people young and old flocked to the event.\textsuperscript{582} Clevelanders crowded together to watch eight hundred "dough boys" charge across a mock no-man's land on the city's lakefront. The untold thousands of spectators revelled in the authentic feel of the scene as their heroes pretended to attack an equal number of men dressed in the grey-blue color of the enemy, while smoke and the sounds of rifles and guns filled the air. Big cannon, warplanes, and even three tanks even showed up, dropping dummy-bombs and spewing flame and smoke. A night-time display saw parts of downtown blacked out, only to be illuminated by searchlights, flares, and flumes of fire erupting from numerous artillery pieces and airplanes.\textsuperscript{583} By the end of the week, hundreds of thousands of people had visited the event, celebrating that the war was over.\textsuperscript{584} One the final day alone, around 200,000 people showed up, packing the downtown area with a huge, flowing human mass.\textsuperscript{585} Throughout the nine-day-long Expo, the crowds grew so great and congested that soldiers and police had to work all day long to prevent serious accidents. Often people had to stand in line for an hour or more simply to get in or out of buildings or bleachers.\textsuperscript{586} In the end Expo officials estimated that more than seventy percent of the city's residents had visited the event.\textsuperscript{587} The Great War was over, and people celebrated by crowding together in unprecedented ways. And this was happening despite the fact that people were still dying from Spanish Flu and pneumonia at the rate

\textsuperscript{582} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 14, 1918; Nov. 17, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 22, 1918; Nov. 14, 1918; Nov. 16, 1918; Jewish Independent, Nov. 15, 1918.
\textsuperscript{583} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 17, 1918.
\textsuperscript{584} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 27, 1918; Nov. 18, 1918; Nov. 19, 1918; Nov. 21, 1918; Nov. 23, 1918; Nov. 24, 1918; Cleveland Press, Nov. 23, 1918; Jewish Review and Observer, Nov. 22, 1918.
\textsuperscript{585} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 25, 1918.
\textsuperscript{586} Cleveland Press, Nov. 23, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 25, 1918.
\textsuperscript{587} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 25, 1918.
of anywhere from twenty to sixty a day.\textsuperscript{588} And although Dr. Rockwood posted very subtle warnings about crowds following the Armistice Day celebration, all calls against public assembly quickly disappeared.\textsuperscript{589} The Great War was over, so Clevelanders simply decided that the flu crisis was over as well. From this point on, it was handled much like any other flu situation, receiving very little public attention and very few official public health measures.

There is a very good reason why the people of Cleveland may have jumped to the conclusion that the flu crisis was over. Under significant pressure, on November 6 Dr. Rockwood declared that if flu conditions improved steadily and markedly, he would lift the bans on November 13. However, if conditions did not improve significantly, the bans would stay. In the health commissioner's opinion, the flu danger was still very much there.\textsuperscript{590} Then suddenly, on the next day, reports arrived from the United Press that Germany had capitulated. This prompted the \textit{Cleveland Press} to print an extra night edition, practically shouting "WAR'S OVER".\textsuperscript{591} The \textit{Press} and the \textit{Plain Dealer} went on to describe scenes of wild celebration. Harry Vail, the secretary of Mayor Davis' War Board, asked all Clevelanders "to stop work at 4 p.m., meet on City Hall grounds and give three great cheers" for the president, for the United States, and for General Pershing. People went nuts. Forming impromptu parades, Clevelanders from all parts of the city crowded together in celebration; singing, yelling, cheering, shaking hands, weeping, hugging, and kissing. Factories, boats, and locomotives shrieked their whistles.

\textsuperscript{588} City of Cleveland, Ohio, Statistical Records, 1916-1924, 43.
\textsuperscript{589} Cleveland News, Nov. 12, 1918.
\textsuperscript{590} Cleveland Press, Nov. 6, 1918.
\textsuperscript{591} Cleveland Press, Nov. 7, 1918.
and people joined in the cacophony by banging pans together and using any noise maker available to add to the choir. Places that sold flags, "horns and noise makers" quickly sold out. It was a tremendous party: an exuberant patriotic celebration. Strangers became friends. The city stopped. Shops, stores, factories and businesses emptied of workers as "tens of thousands of men and women were moved to a state of delirious joy" and joined the throng in the streets. Thousands of the people were foreign born, but in this grand celebration, they all became American. At 6 o'clock "a man with a voice that compared favorably to a fog-horn" appeared in the streets, loudly announcing that the war was in fact not over. The crowds chose to overlook him. The excitement of ending the war, and having a valid reason to blatantly disobey the flu bans against public assembly, was simply too much to give up.592 The Great War was not over, but the false armistice proved the bane of the flu regulations, and by extension the flu crisis.

On Friday, November 8th, the day after his orders had been entirely disregarded by people and government officials alike, Dr. Rockwood suddenly declared that because of "[s]udden improvement yesterday in the influenza situation", he had tentatively decided to lift the flu bans at 6 p.m. on Monday, November 11th. Using an extremely creative form of interpreting statistics, the health commissioner stated that the 273 new cases on November 7th was only about a quarter of daily cases at the height of the epidemic.593 What Dr. Rockwood failed to state was that the 273 new cases on November 7th was not a significant drop compared to the preceding week, and actually lined up very well with conditions that the doctor had recently referred to as insufficient for lifting the bans. He

592 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 8, 1918; Cleveland Press, Nov. 7, 1918.
593 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 8, 1918.
also failed to remind the public of an earlier statement in which the doctor had said that he would not consider lifting the bans until the number of new cases in a 24 hour period dropped to around 120.\textsuperscript{594} The numbers did line up with the conditions around October 12th when the flu bans were first presented to the public. Even so, the drop between November 4th and November 7th was certainly not a sudden and vast improvement, at least not according to the health commissioner's own statistics.\textsuperscript{595} It is much more likely that shifting conditions in the Great War effort convinced Rockwood that conditions in the Flu War, although far from great, were good enough for him to lift the bans. He may even have realized that as the world war drew to an end, there was no way he would be able to successfully uphold the closing orders much longer. This becomes even clearer when considering the other ways that the war effort influenced and in many ways dictated the city's flu response. By tying the germ war to the German war, Dr. Rockwood had opened the door for ending the bans. By declaring the situation statistically promising, and thus giving a quantifiable, scientific reason to lift the closing orders, he opened the door even further. The popular response was that given an inch, they went for the mile. Ready to "blow [the] flu lid entirely off", Clevelanders looked forward to Monday, November 11th with great excitement and enthusiasm. Even if the Great War effort had continued on beyond that day, it would have proven extremely difficult to hold back the tide of people who longed to put an end to four weeks of the excruciatingly boring "stay-at-home-for-there's-nothing-to-do" flu bans.

\textsuperscript{594} Cleveland Press, Oct. 30, 1918.
\textsuperscript{595} City of Cleveland, Ohio, Statistical Records, 1916- 1924, 42-3.
The Great War effort did not continue past November 11th. Instead, the effort was replaced with even greater celebrations than what had taken place during the false armistice day. The War was over and Clevelanders could not be bothered to wait until 6 p.m. to lift the flu bans. Instead, they blew the lid off with vigor. Once again, the city stopped working as stores and factories and any other place of employment suspended work. People formed numerous parades and, joining in with factory sirens, church bells, and fire station bells, made an indescribable amount of noise. By 9 a.m., Public Square was already overrun with people who arrived from points throughout the city. Whole neighborhoods emptied out and moved downtown in steady streams. Mayor Davis proclaimed the day a holiday and ordered the courts closed. In the words of the Cleveland Press, "[t]he city was given entirely over to celebration."\(^{596}\) One man, drawing loud cheers from the crowds, expressed his celebration by carrying an effigy of ex-Kaiser Wilhelm stuck atop a bayonet.\(^{597}\) Another used his car to make gas explosions with his muffler. Lost in excitement, he ended up blowing the muffler straight off his car. This did not seem to faze him the least. "What's a muffler on an occasion like this?" he said.\(^{598}\) And he was right. What was a muffler on the day the war was won? What was the Spanish Influenza on the day the war was won? It turned out that in the context of Armistice Day, neither muffler nor flu mattered much at all.

The health commissioner was very much answerable to the Great War, both during the war effort, and during the victory celebration. The false victory celebration, the real

\(^{596}\) Cleveland News, Nov. 11, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 11, 1918; Cleveland Press, Nov. 11, 1918.
\(^{597}\) Cleveland News, Nov. 11, 1918.
\(^{598}\) Cleveland Press, Nov. 11, 1918.
Armistice Day, and the War Expo all show this. During the earlier parts of the epidemic though, nothing showed this factor better than the fourth Liberty Loan campaign. For example, when Dr. Rockwood called for a ban on all meetings, he expressly excepted Loan rallies. Instead, he simply asked the Loan organizers to limit the size of their meetings.\(^{599}\) He also postponed the ban on all indoor meetings, which would include Loan meetings, until Monday, October 14th. This allowed the campaign to properly welcome, parade and celebrate visiting Italian war heroes, and to carry out the vast fund-raising mass meeting at Keith's Hippodrome.\(^{600}\) Dr. Rockwood also postponed the ban on evening and late-night outdoor meetings until after the Loan campaign was over. This allowed the campaign to arrange a number of large parades, hold daily outdoors meetings, and even organize an evening of "noisy celebration in downtown streets and Public Square."\(^{601}\) Once the Loan was over, Rockwood declared that there would be no more outdoor gatherings without special permission. He emphasized the importance of the order by stating that "[t]he epidemic will get beyond control unless people stop gathering in crowds" and that violators would be arrested. Even more importantly, the health commissioner shows the subordination of the flu war to the Great War by blatantly stating that "[t]his action is advisable now that the Liberty Loan Campaign is ended."\(^{602}\) The Flu was important enough to warrant closings and arrests, but not important enough to infringe on the war effort. People may have been answerable to Dr. Rockwood in matters of public health. But the health commissioner was answerable to

\(^{599}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 10, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 10, 1918.
\(^{600}\) Cleveland News, Oct. 11, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 11, 1918; Oct. 13, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 11, 1918.
\(^{601}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 14, 1918; Oct. 16, 1918; Oct. 18, 1918; Oct. 20, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 21, 1918.
\(^{602}\) Cleveland Press, Oct. 21, 1918.
the war effort. In the hyper-patriotically charged, Great War focused city of Cleveland, the war on germs surely mattered for the sake of saving lives. However, from a broad, social perspective, the greatest purpose of the flu fight was to prevent Spanish Flu from interfering with the war effort.

In one case Dr. Rockwood managed to impose his opinion upon the war effort. Amazingly, on November 1st, the health commissioner told the city's and county's War Expo organizers to postpone the exposition from the week of November 9 to the week of November 16. The doctor reasoned that the great influx of visitors that the Expo would bring could prove detrimental for the flu situation. Although he may have had the authority to keep visitors from coming to Cleveland, Rockwood still had to answer to the mayor, the mayor's War Advisory Board, the Chamber of Commerce, and more. If these groups had decided that the Expo was essential for the war effort, it is very unlikely that the health commissioner would have managed to delay the event. In the end, Dr. Rockwood got his will. The sources do not state how or why he was successful in postponing the Expo. Still, the example shows that in some cases, flu restrictions were even applied to war effort matters.603 The postponement of the Expo was not alone in this. For example, the Great War was placed under Flu War limitations when the draft was halted in Cuyahoga County for a month and a half for the sake of preventing further spread of the disease. This order did not come from Dr. Rockwood, but arrived instead from Ohio's selective service.604 Importantly, the draft was halted for the sake of limiting

603 Cleveland Press, Nov. 1, 1918.
604 Cleveland News, Oct. 7, 1918; Oct. 12, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 2, 1918.
the damage to the war effort. It is possible that the War Expo was postponed for similar reasons.

In the end, the war on Germans and the war on germs were intricately linked. One dominated over the other, as the germ war was fought largely for the sake of helping the German war. Dr. Rockwood managed to use the Great War context as a way to fight the Flu War. He did this by embracing the patriotic power and propaganda of the Great War in order to raise and strengthen city-wide support for the public health fight. This was not the only way the Great War helped Cleveland combat the Spanish Influenza epidemic. Crucially, the world war refashioned American and Cleveland society into a highly mobilized and organized machine that functioned on patriotism, loyalty, cooperation, and sacrifice. Many people, groups and organizations made up this tremendous war-time machine. However, in regards to the Spanish Flu crisis, none proved more important than the Red Cross.

The Red Cross Goes to War on Spanish Flu

In war time - next to our American army and navy - there is no other institution so important, so necessary, so useful. In peace time it helped the workers when disaster came, notably in the mining regions, where it quickly furnished nurses, doctors, food, clothing and shelter, and th[e]n saw to it that the widows and orphans were properly and permanently care for. It is... a patriotic duty to be of assistance to this most altruistic organ[i]z[ation][].

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605 Poster in a local labor union paper, The Cleveland Citizen, praising the Red Cross and asking workers and wage earners to join the organization. Cleveland Citizen, Dec. 14, 1918.
In his book on how war and warfare has influenced the development of the Red Cross, John F. Hutchinson states that during World War I, "[t]he logical conclusion of the militarization of charity was that working for the national Red Cross society became both an outlet for, and a measure of, a citizen's patriotic enthusiasm."606 This was certainly the case in Cleveland. As early as February, 1917, the Plain Dealer reported that "Patriotism Booms Applications for Membership in Local [Red Cross] Chapter."607 By October of the same year, more than 100,000 volunteers had enrolled in the local chapter. That same fall, Mr. J.A. Hawken and others formed the local Junior Red Cross program. The program was designed to mobilize the city's school children for the war effort. By the time the war ended, 125,000 pupils were enrolled in the organization.608 An article in the National Association of Retail Druggists' journal highlights the connection between patriotism and Red Cross involvement even further. When proclaiming that Cleveland was "The First City in American Spirit", the author based the claim on two things: the city's oversubscription in Liberty Loan campaigns, and the number of donations and enlistments in the Red Cross.609 This included men, women, and children. By the end of 1918, reports from the local chapter suggested that more than 460,000 Clevelanders were enrolled in the Red Cross. The chairman of the roll call committee, Mr. George B. Harris attributed much of the success to "the patriotism of Cleveland's industrial workers." That was certainly part of the explanation. Several firms and companies in the area, such as Cleveland National Bank, Halle Bros., Westinghouse

607 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 23, 1917.
608 Duffy, Kissel, and Birkhold, History of the Greater Cleveland Chapter, 16-7.
609 The Cleveland Association of Building Owners and Managers, "Cleveland, The City That Co-operates ", in NARD Journal, 1024.
Electric, and many more, boasted of the fact that one hundred percent of their workers were members of the Red Cross.\textsuperscript{610} The patriotic nature of the Red Cross was not limited to Cleveland though. By January 2nd, 1918, an incredible one fifth of the American populace was already enrolled in the organization. This huge achievement was commented on by Henry P. Davidson, chairman of the national war council, who stated that "[t]he Red Cross is not merely a humanitarian organization separate and distinct from others - it is the mobilized heart and spirit of the whole American people."\textsuperscript{611} This point was driven home in horrifying fashion in Richmond, California, where a mob of fifty white robed men abducted German immigrant Guido Poenisch and charged him with disloyalty for failing to purchase Liberty Loan bonds. The abductors became judge, jury, and executioner, and punished Mr. Poenisch with tar and feathering. They only let him go after he promised to purchase a hundred dollars worth of bonds and join the Red Cross.\textsuperscript{612}

Far from all patriotism or Red Cross involvement was coerced. Just like the war effort in general, the Red Cross proved a great place where different groups and different people could volunteer their time, resources, and services for a common cause. For instance, the Red Cross cooperated closely with Cleveland's Church Women's War Committee, which consisted of women from three hundred of the city's protestant, catholic and Jewish congregations, and was organized in an effort to "unify and systemize" these congregations' war programs.\textsuperscript{613} The Red Cross also cooperated with

\textsuperscript{610} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 25, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{611} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 2, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{612} Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 3, 1918.  
\textsuperscript{613} Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 20, 1918.
various local hospitals, the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. Military, the Associated Charities, the city schools, the city and state health departments, and many more, expanding into virtually every group and section of the city.614

The Red Cross provided a great link between the Great War and the war on Spanish Influenza. Prior to the arrival of the "grippe", Red Cross nurses were often referred to as "war nurses", and typically served in war related positions. In fact, at the end of the war, around 20,000 Red Cross war nurses were serving somewhere away from home.615 In short, the Red Cross was first and foremost playing the patriotic role of providing humanitarian and medical aid to the U.S. military and its allies. Once Spanish Flu arrived though, it quickly became evident that no other organization was better organized and equipped to help in the situation. After all, the Red Cross was already cooperating closely with large parts of U.S. and Cleveland society because of the war effort. Furthermore, they were well organized, well funded, and the public had become familiar with the Red Cross through school programs and the years-long struggle against tuberculosis. In public health terms, the Red Cross was a godsend. Dedicated to providing aid in disasters and fighting diseases, and fueled by a monumental wave of patriotism and voluntarism, the organizations became an invaluable ally in the fight against Spanish Influenza.


615 Cleveland News, Oct. 2, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 23, 1918.
When Dr. Rockwood and various health workers summed up the most important helpers in the Spanish Flu crisis, they invariably listed the Red Cross.616 There were many reasons for this. First of all, the Red Cross was ready and willing to fight. For example, from the very beginning of the flu epidemic in Cleveland "[e]very available city and state health official and nurse of the lake division of the Red Cross combined forces to battle the Spanish Influenza epidemic in the city."617 This readiness for anti-flu service was exemplified by nurses who volunteered to fight flu in Camp Sherman, and also by nurses who fought flu in Cleveland.618 Crucially, nurses were among the most desperately needed helpers both in the Great War and in the Flu War, and the Red Cross played an essential role in training, locating, and organizing them.619 Although the nursing part of their involvement was extremely important, the Red Cross contributed to the flu fight in many other fundamental ways as well. The organization disseminated education publications, cooperated with government specialists to find solutions to the flu crisis, helped coordinate Cleveland's flu response with state and national efforts, donated funds for hospital beds, purchased ambulances and gave these to the police for transporting the sick, paid wages for volunteers, made flu masks, cooperated with various charitable organizations, organized and manned food centers, helped with the flu-orphan crisis, supported charity patients financially, and helped contact, organize and coordinate the city's nurses. The Red Cross also provided help and volunteers to the city's health department, the Visiting Nurse Association, babies' dispensary

616 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 15, 1918; Jan. 25, 1919.
617 Cleveland News, Oct. 5, 1918.
618 Cleveland News, Oct. 8, 1918; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 4, 1918; Oct. 27, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918; Robertson, Saint Luke's Hospital, 107-9.
619 See for instance Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 27, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 28, 1918; Oct. 31, 1918.
organizations, hospitals, doctors, and many more. The organization even appointed health commissioner Rockwood chairman of the Red Cross Influenza Committee for Cuyahoga County, "empower[ing] him to provide hospital facilities wherever they are needed in the county", and gave him $20,000 to use in the fight. In the process, they also gave Dr. Rockwood a greater ability to organize and coordinate the city's response. In short, the Red Cross was one of Cleveland's most important soldiers in the war against Spanish Flu. Thanks to war time mobilization and patriotism, the organization was able to not only provide invaluable aid and services, but also helped bridge the gap between the Great War and a public health war.

Conclusion

The Great War deeply affected Cleveland's response to the Spanish Flu epidemic. 1918 U.S. society was largely defined by the war effort, and practically every aspect of life was seen and judged in this context. During a time of incredible social and economic mobilization, the U.S. government also embarked upon an equally extraordinary mobilization of people's minds and emotions. Seeking to establish an American population that was unified in purpose, belief, and dedication, President Wilson released an official propaganda campaign that succeeded in raising patriotic sentiments to

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620 See for instance Cleveland News, Oct. 10, 1918; Oct. 18, 1918; Oct. 19, 1918; Oct. 28, 1918;
621 Cleveland Press, Oct. 17, 1918; Duffy, Kissel, and Birkhold, History of the Greater Cleveland Chapter, 17. By the end of the epidemic, the Influenza Committee had spent twice that amount on various equipment, hospital expenses, and nurses' salaries. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb 28, 1919.
incredible heights. Patriotism ran so wild, wide, and deep that it became a mark of proper American conviction and behavior. In this context, cooperation, voluntarism, sacrifice, obedience, loyalty, Americanism, and patriotism were not only desired behavior but demanded behavior. Where the government failed to attain or enforce these ideals, pseudo-official groups like the A.P.L., and entirely unofficial mobs stepped in to teach their neighbors proper behavior. Certainly, in innumerable cases people were simply convinced, persuaded, or harassed into embracing the dominating war time mentalité and behavior. The people of Cleveland lived in a time that was dominated by the war effort and by war time priorities and sentiments. The Spanish Flu epidemic was simply another aspect that fell into the far more important world war context. This allowed the health commissioner and other leaders in the Flu War to tap into the wartime spirit, cooperation, organization, and mobilization, and use these factors to form the city's public health response. However, as the war on germs was always less important than the war on Germany, Dr. Rockwood had to tailor his measures and regulations accordingly. It was, for instance, quite impossible to shut down war related industries, or prevent Liberty Loan parades and events. Finally, the Red Cross serves as a wonderful example of how the war against Germans and the war against germs were intricately entwined. Straddling both wars, the organization was greatly bolstered by the Great War, and was able to use its great advancements in organization and mobilization to help in the fight against flu. In the end, the Spanish Flu epidemic in Cleveland must be seen as an event that took place during the first world war. Although wildly important in its own accord, the epidemic fades in comparison to its much more important, all-encompassing historical context. If anything, the Spanish Influenza epidemic in
Cleveland, and the city's response to it, shows us the extent to which the Great War dominated life in the city and the nation in 1918.
CHAPTER V

THE END OF THE WAR

How beautiful upon the mountains
Are the feet of the messenger of good tidings
That announceth peace, the harbinger of good tiding.
That announceth salvation;
That saith unto Zion:
"They God reigneth!"

Isaiah 52: 7

The Great War ended on November 11, 1918. The Flu War ended in Cleveland on the same day. The Spanish Flu was still there, and the public health effort continued, but it was no longer a war. Instead, the flu fight began to follow a much less aggressive path. In fact, after Armistice Day, the health commissioner's actions became more reminiscent of traditional Cleveland responses to epidemic disease. The crisis was over, and crisis tactics were left behind. Quarantine signs were still placed on houses, but enforcement was more or less left up to the quarantined themselves. Few complied with the rules, even after being reminded of the meaning of the quarantine cards. In fact, observers later stated that official attempts at quarantines in the city were futile. Reports from

622 Printed on the front page of The Jewish Independent, Nov. 15, 1918.
"[r]esponsible physicians and nurses" showed that "keeping of quarantine in Cleveland is so unusual that a family who does keep it is cause of much comment and no little surprise." Dr. Rockwood does not seem to have been concerned enough to attempt stricter enforcement. Nor did he attempt to prevent crowding around Thanksgiving, as "record crowds" filled the city's churches and restaurants, and hotels were packed "to capacity" to celebrate Thanksgiving dinner. Following the rules he established during the crisis part of the epidemic, the health commissioner did close a number of the city's schools for a very short while in December. The closings were based on surveys that showed that more than ten percent of the pupils were absent from these schools. The closing of a dozen schools for a short period of time was not a particularly drastic measure though, and Dr. Rockwood appears to have taken the whole situation in stride. Although the number of new influenza cases had increased a bit again, the health commissioner remained positive and relied largely on the disease "burn[ing] itself out." There were no more general flu bans, no more large closings. In the grand scheme of things, some schools taking a day or two off was not unlike typical bouts of epidemic diseases, and certainly not a crisis-like measure.

The Spanish Influenza epidemic remained in Cleveland until March, 1919. However, Dr. Rockwood declared the crisis stage to be over at the same time as the Great War ended. By November fifteenth, the doctor officially expressed his gratitude to the numerous groups and organizations "whose co-operation in combating the disease made

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623 Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 2, 137; Jewish Independent, Dec. 13, 1918.
624 Cleveland Press, Nov. 29, 1918.
625 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 18, 1918; Dec. 19, 1918.
626 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 19, 1918.
possible its practical elimination before its ravages were as great as in some other parts of the country.\textsuperscript{627} The crisis was over. Regular public health work, as seen during less dangerous, routine-like epidemics, could commence. Between November eleventh and March, 1919, most of the Spanish Influenza work in the city thus consisted of taking care of those who were hospitalized, providing for and finding homes for hundreds of flu orphans, continuing the mapping and charting of the disease, pontificating about why this bout of "grippe" had been so deadly, reflecting on the epidemic, and looking for signs of pneumonia or tuberculosis in people who had suffered from Spanish Flu.\textsuperscript{628}

Cleveland's response to the epidemic varied markedly from a number of other places in Ohio. In Warren, for instance, the flu bans lasted for eight long weeks, and were only lifted after "one of the most heated arguments" and "hardest fought battles in the history of the city."\textsuperscript{629} In Chardon, the bans stayed in place even longer. Reaching the thirteen week mark around Christmas, Chardonites lamented that "Santa's visit to Chardon this year will be curtailed... all on account of the celebrated flu." For the first time in the city's history, churches were closed on Christmas, and pastors were forced to share their Yule-tide messages through the newspapers.\textsuperscript{630} Marion, Ohio, saw flu bans lifted and then forced back in place by state health officials.\textsuperscript{631} Residents were not pleased. Faced with new closing restrictions, a number of merchants and business owners openly defied the board of health's orders. In order to enforce the ban, Marion officials were forced to

\textsuperscript{627} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 15, 1918.
\textsuperscript{628} City of Cleveland, Statistical Reports, 1916-1924, 42-5; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 24, 1918; Dec. 8, 1918; Dec. 11, 1918; Dec. 15, 1918; Jan. 10, 1919; Jan. 25, 1919; Feb. 2, 1919; Feb. 16, 1919; Feb. 28, 1919; March 7, 1919; Cleveland Press, Nov. 21, 1918.
\textsuperscript{629} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 14, 1918.
\textsuperscript{630} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 19, 1918.
\textsuperscript{631} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 15, 1918.
send a number of policemen to record the names of the violators. The disobedient residents were subsequently taken to court for their defiance. Members of St. Ann's Catholic Church in Cleveland Heights were not excited about flu bans either. When the city re-implemented closings in December, the church took Mayor Cain and Cleveland Heights' chief health officer to court in an attempt to lift the ban. Judge Vickery was apparently sympathetic enough to their plight to allow the church special permission to be open for Christmas services. Even so, it was the judge's opinion that "health regulations and police powers are paramount in emergencies such as exist during the influenza epidemic." The ban was to stay in place for as long as the health officials and mayor deemed necessary.

Lorain, Ohio, and Erie, Pennsylvania provide two of the best examples of places that varied markedly from Cleveland in their Spanish Flu responses. First of all, referring to orders from the state board of health, officials in Erie decided to use the flu epidemic as an excuse to make the city dry. That is, by closing down all saloons, bottling houses and liquor stores, the only place to get alcohol in Erie after October 9th was by doctor's prescriptions. Furthermore, although the city lifted its flu bans around the same time as Cleveland, Erie soon found itself in the unenviable position of being ordered by state officials to re-implement the restrictions. This was too much for the city's saloon keepers, who went to the county courts and obtained an injunction against the closing orders. The Plain Dealer reported that "[t]he Spanish Influenza quarantine will not be placed upon Erie again unless the state finds some manner of overriding the county

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632 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 17, 1918.
633 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 29, 1918.
634 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 10, 1918.
courts." State officials were not amused and wired Erie's mayor and health board, ordering them once again to enforce the bans. The city balked. A week later, the bans were still not in place. In the end, it took a meeting between county and city officials, local manufacturers and businessmen, the local chapter of the Council of National Defense, and numerous other citizens to find a solution, which was to leave the matter in the hands of the local health officials. The local health officials and the mayor decided to side with the city's commercial and economic factors. Rejecting a "united demand" from local churches to make the city dry again, the mayor declared that he and the health officials found no reason to implement general quarantines, and, even more damning, stated that they could not find any evidence to support that general closings even helped prevent the spread of flu. In the midst of conflict and controversy, Erie, Pennsylvania kept the flu lid off.

Lorain, Ohio differed widely from Cleveland in two particular ways. In Cleveland, the Spanish Flu fight was led by their own health commissioner. In Lorain, the fight was led by an outsider; Dr. Henry E. Koch of the United States Health Department. Arriving on October 22nd, Dr. Koch, although working closely with the local health department, still had the final say in Lorain's flu time actions. Although many of the measures were similar to Cleveland's, such as closing stores, prohibiting public assemblies, working with the Red Cross, and establishing emergency hospitals, one of the measures was very different. One of the medical field's great quests throughout the epidemic was

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635 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 27, 1918; Nov. 28, 1918.
636 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 5, 1918.
637 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 22, 1918; Oct. 23, 1918.
to find a working vaccine or serum to help combat the scourge.\textsuperscript{638} Cleveland's acting chief bacteriologist, Dr. G. E. Harmon was one of many who actively sought an effective serum for curing the "grippe". However, in Cleveland, Dr. Rockwood clearly stated that no flu serums would be used "until their worth have been proven."\textsuperscript{639} Dr. Koch was not as cautious. On October 26th, some six thousand steel workers at the National Tube Company in Lorain were inoculated with an influenza antitoxin.\textsuperscript{640} On October 28, encouraged by the low flu rates among the vaccinated steel workers, the doctor opened a free public inoculation center that offered the same serum that was being used at Camp Sherman to prevent pneumonia.\textsuperscript{641} On November 1, Koch and Lorain health officials began the process of vaccinating every single Lorain resident at the rate of 3,000 per day.\textsuperscript{642} Inoculations remained a primary tactic in Lorain even after the flu bans were lifted on November 18.\textsuperscript{643} Although some private institutions in Cleveland, such as St. Luke's hospital, decided to vaccinate their workers, inoculations and vaccinations never became a primary weapon against flu in Cleveland.\textsuperscript{644}

The various examples of other responses to the flu epidemic highlights the fact that Cleveland's response to the scourge was greatly influenced by a number of factors. The long tradition of public health work in the city, and the increased organization and professionalization of the health department, enabled Dr. Rockwood to launch a broad

\textsuperscript{638} This topic is comprehensively covered throughout Barry, \textit{The Great Influenza}. It is also shown in various newspaper articles from the time, including Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 6, 1918; Oct. 17, 1918; Oct. 21, 1918; Oct. 23, 1918; Dec. 11, 1918; Jewish Review and Observer, Oct. 25, 1918
\textsuperscript{639} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 17, 1918.
\textsuperscript{640} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 27, 1918.
\textsuperscript{641} Cleveland Press, Oct. 28, 1918.
\textsuperscript{642} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 1, 1918.
\textsuperscript{643} Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 19, 1918.
\textsuperscript{644} Cleveland News, Oct. 5, 1918.
and organized attack against the disease. American cultural values and progressive
ideals played a big role in placing education, voluntarism and cooperation in the
forefront of the response. Cleveland's great traditions of private charitable organizations,
cooperation and coordination among hospitals and public health nurses, the active
involvement of various government departments and the Cleveland Chamber of
Commerce in public health matters, and the experience of broad societal cooperation
during previous bouts of communicable disease, meant that the city was not new to
epidemic crises. In fact, when Spanish Influenza struck the city, Cleveland already had a
series of well established responses to react with, not least a tradition of broad and
profound cooperation. Education was seen as paramount in the fight, as it was in any
and every public health matter. Voluntarism and cooperation were likewise seen as
cornerstones in the city's response, whether these were obtained through education,
persuasion, or force. However, coercion and force were seen as last resorts, only to be
used when the situation made cooperation an absolute necessity. The city also had a
tradition of distrusting vaccines. This most likely explains why Dr. Rockwood chose a
very different approach to inoculations than Dr. Koch did.

In responding to the epidemic, Dr. Rockwood also had to consider the various
interests, needs and desires of the city. Business owners clearly did not want to lose
money by closing their stores. People would certainly like to be able to go to church.
Campaigning politicians would obviously prefer to be able to hold mass meetings. In
order to implement various regulations, Dr. Rockwood therefore had to identify what
were essential parts of life and what were not. These conclusions had to be legitimate
and acceptable to both the public and to other city leaders. If they were not, Dr.

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Rockwood could not count on their cooperation. The health commissioner also had to explain to people why they should adhere to his recommendations and orders. The doctor decided to rely heavily on educating the public in an attempt to convince them of the need to accept his "prescriptions", no matter how undesirable they might be. He also depended heavily on appealing to people's sense of civic duty and patriotism. Civic duty was a firmly established tradition in the city, and it was only magnified by the arrival of the Great War.

The Great War provided an extraordinary context for the fight against Spanish Flu. By organizing and mobilizing the nation, and the city of Cleveland, for war effort, the world war created a situation where Dr. Rockwood could lean extra heavily on the civic duty element in the flu fight. Framing the war on germs as part of the war on Germans, the health commissioner made the city's response to the epidemic part of the overall war effort. This allowed him to demand the same kind of patriotic zeal, or at least the same kind of loyalty and cooperation, that existed in other great social endeavors such as the Liberty Loan campaigns. It also allowed him to recruit the help of various groups in the city that were engaged in the war effort, such as the mayor's War Advisory Board, and the Chamber of Commerce. The Great War also provided great extra help to the flu effort by increasing the size, resources, and power of the Red Cross. Saturated with patriotic purpose and voluntarism, the organization provided invaluable help to Cleveland in the fight against Spanish Influenza.

The war effort placed some restrictions on Dr. Rockwood's flu fight as well. Clearly the most important element of life in 1918 America, the Great War effort could not be markedly restricted by the Flu War. Instead, the effort against "grippe" existed largely for the sake of preventing negative effects on the greater war effort. The health
commissioner could therefore not implement closings of various industries and businesses, even if he had been able to do so over economic considerations. In the same fashion, he could not very well prohibit war related parades and celebrations, even if these events caused tremendous crowding - the very thing Dr. Rockwood sought to avoid with his other flu closings.

It is unclear whether Cleveland's efforts against the Spanish Influenza epidemic made much difference in terms of preventing people from getting sick or dying from the disease. However, the purpose of this thesis is not to determine the value, virtue or effectiveness of the city's response. Instead, the purpose of this thesis is to explore the many reasons why cities and people believe certain things, or behave in certain ways, at certain times. Effective or not, Cleveland's response to the 1918-19 Spanish Flu epidemic was shaped by the city's past, by its American and progressive ideals, and by the unique historical context that made sure that Spanish Flu arrived on the shores of Lake Erie in the midst of one of the most astounding, unusual, and extraordinary moments of U.S. history.
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Secondary Sources


APPENDIX

The following list shows various examples of cooperation in Cleveland during the 1918-19 Spanish Flu epidemic. It lists some of the persons, groups, associations, etc. that cooperated in the flu fight, and the newspaper editions where instances of cooperation were reported. It is important to note that the list is not comprehensive. For example, Dr. Rockwood is not listed, as he was obviously involved in the public health response. Furthermore, I have not listed every single time that the various people or groups were mentioned in the newspapers, as this would make the list far too large. Also, as mentioned earlier, the newspapers did not record every case of cooperation, nor every person, organization, or groups that offered their help and services to fight Spanish flu. Therefore, rather than an all-encompassing list, the following is simply a quick overview and indication of the rich variety of Clevelanders who cooperated and partook in the public health response during the Spanish Influenza crisis. In addition, some categories can conceivably be seen as overlapping, such as "women" and "women's committee". I chose to include such variations in order to show that people volunteered their services in various ways. Some served within organizations and were recognized as such, whereas others simply volunteered as individuals.
Cooperation in Cleveland:

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<th>Person/Association/Etc</th>
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<td>Orphanages/Orphan Care</td>
<td>Nov 21</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>Oct 11</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Patriotic League of Ohio</td>
<td>Oct 31</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Poolrooms, bowling alleys, cabarets</td>
<td>Oct 15</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Popular/General Obedience</td>
<td>Sept 25, Oct 27</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 25, Nov 9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Publicity Committee</td>
<td>Oct 31.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Red Cross</td>
<td>Oct 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, Nov 2, 6 9, 23.</td>
<td>Oct 4, 6, 22, 27, 30.</td>
<td>Oct 2, 5, 10, 11, 18, 19, 21, 22, 28.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Merchants' Board</td>
<td>Oct 26.</td>
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<tr>
<td>School Children</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 15.</td>
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<tr>
<td>School Medical Supervisor Dr. Childs</td>
<td>Oct 8, 14, 15, 17.</td>
<td>Oct 10, 14, 16, Nov 7.</td>
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<tr>
<td>School Doctors and Nurses</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 15, 16.</td>
<td>Oct 16,</td>
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<td>Telephone Companies</td>
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<td>Oct 31.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Undertakers</td>
<td>Oct 24.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Visiting Nurses</td>
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<td>Oct 6.</td>
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<tr>
<td>War Department</td>
<td>Oct 28, Nov 2.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The War Exposition</td>
<td>Nov 1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Waterworks Department</td>
<td>Oct 24, 26, 29.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welfare Association of Cleveland</td>
<td>Oct 22.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Reserve Medical Students</td>
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<td>Nov 15.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Association</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Oct 28.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women's Committee</td>
<td>Oct 24, 31.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women's Hospital War</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 6.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relief Assoc.</td>
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