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"Only a Sufficient Cause:" Bram Stoker's Dracula as a Tale of Mad Science and Faustian Redemption

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“ONLY A SUFFICIENT CAUSE”: BRAM STOKER’S *DRACULA* AS A TALE OF MAD SCIENCE AND FAUSTIAN REDEMPTION

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Bachelor of Arts in Classical Civilization

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at

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THIS THESIS IS HEREBY APPROVED FOR

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4 April 2017
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“ONLY A SUFFICIENT CAUSE”: BRAM STOKER’S DRACULA AS A TALE OF
MAD SCIENCE AND FAUSTIAN REDEMPTION

LEAH DAVYDOV

ABSTRACT

While present Dracula scholarship has made an extensive examination of the ways in which the novel reflects apprehensions about late Victorian scientific advances, little work to date has been done to link these anxieties to fin de siècle fiction involving mad scientists or to Bram Stoker’s lifelong interest in the story of Dr. Faustus. In this work, I argue that the primary menace within Dracula is not actually the threat posed by the novel’s vampires but rather the threat posed by the biologically determined, materialist, and potentially “mad” science practiced by the characters of Dr. John Seward and his patient, R. M. Renfield, who may both be read as Faust figures. I further assert that the existence of vampires, which demonstrates the reality of bodies without souls, also affirms the reality of bodies with souls, repudiating the viewpoint represented by Seward and Renfield, and in the course of the novel, both characters may be understood as moving from a dogmatic, aspiritual model of scientific inquiry that allows for callous and unethical experimentation to a compassionate, empiricist model of scientific inquiry as modelled by the characters of Jonathan and Mina Harker.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. iv

CHAPTERS

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1

II. BACKGROUND: STOKER’S CONNECTIONS TO FAUST AND THE MEDICAL SCIENCES ................................................................. 7

III. JOHN SEWARD AS FAUST DISTRAUGHT: VIVISECTION, CORTICAL LOCALIZATION, AND CHLORALISM .................................................. 18

IV. THE TRAGEDY OF LUCY WESTENRA: VAMPIRES’ SOULLESSNESS AS PROOF OF THE SOUL ................................................................. 30

V. R. M. RENFIELD AS FAUST TEMPTED: THE NON-DETERMINED BRAIN AND THE MIRACLE OF MINA HARKER .............................................. 40

VI. THE HARKERS’ TRIUMPH IN CONTRAST TO THE SEWARD/WESTENRA TRAGEDY ................................................................................. 49

VII. CONCLUSION: THE RIDDLE OF DRACULA’S MORAL MESSAGE ....... 58

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................... 61
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

While Bram Stoker’s 1897 novel Dracula exists in the popular consciousness as a narrative predominantly concerned with the supernatural, numerous scholars have recognized it as a work deeply engaged in the discourses of late nineteenth-century science. There are numerous academic explorations of the novel’s references to Nordau’s degeneration theory, Lombrosian criminology, Charcotian medical hypnotism, and the use of what would have been cutting-edge technological devices, medical techniques, and chemical drugs (Aikens 41; Feinstein 96; Halberstam 338-9; Hoelever; Senf, Science and Social Science 23), and since the 1980s, academics have discussed Dracula’s uneasy relationship with materialist science. Burton Hatlan has examined the dehumanizing ways in which materialist thought is reflected in the vitalist experiments of R. M. Renfield (88-90), and John Greenway has pointed out the ways in which Stoker challenges entrenched scientific dogma via the incompetence of the skeptical Dr. Seward (229-30); other authors, such as Rosemary Jann, have attempted to reconcile Stoker’s seeming distrust of materialism in the sciences with the high value Dracula’s protagonists place on scientific rationality (283), and as Carol A. Senf observes in her overview of the sciences throughout Stoker’s works, “Stoker seems genuinely torn
between acceptance of the promises that science and technology seemed to offer human beings and reservations that the world was simply more inscrutable than scientists and social scientists believed” (10).

Despite this ongoing discussion of science’s role within the novel, _Dracula_ is seldom perceived as a work _principally_ concerned with science and its applications or misapplications, and it is not regularly classed among the narratives of mad science that populate the late gothic revival of the _fin de siècle_. This is understandable, given that, at first glance, the antagonist of the story is far from being a scientist, and the scientists in the story, however clumsy they might be, seem to be very clearly aligned with the forces of good. Recently, however, in her work regarding previously underexplored references in the text to pro-vivisection sentiments and to late nineteenth-century cortical mapping experiments, Anne Stiles has introduced the notion that Dracula himself may be understood as a mad scientist, using his powers of mesmerism to functionally vivisect the brains of his victims, reducing them to human automata in the course of his predations (_Popular Fiction_ 51). By demonstrating how the menace of scientific materialism previously observed by other critics may be linked to issues relating to the functioning of the brain, Stiles provides means to link _Dracula_ to late Victorian apprehensions regarding human agency, the construction of the mind, and the reality of the soul.

What Stiles and prior critics have yet to do, however, is to examine the scientifically-charged text of _Dracula_ in conjunction with one of Stoker’s major influences: the Faust narrative. In fact, little of substance has been written at all about the link between _Dracula_ and what many have deemed to be the first mad scientist, despite ample evidence that the story of Faust and, in particular, W. G. Wills’ 1882 stage adaptation of
Faust, played an important role in the novel’s genesis. By examining the structure of Dracula at various stages in its development and its parallels to Goethe’s and Wills’ plays, we may understand it as a slightly different narrative than the one posited by Stiles. In this Dracula, the oft-neglected character of Dr. John Seward and his patient and foil, R.M. Renfield, may be understood as both narrowly redeemed proto-mad scientists and as tragic heroes. Furthermore, the primary menace in Dracula, rather than being the racially ambiguous Count or the sexually transgressive female vampires, is revealed to be the sterile reality of materialism itself, in which man is shown to be a mere biological machine, stripped of free will. It is, in fact, the soulless nature of Dracula and his creations that redeems Seward and Renfield, as they demonstrate the reality of the soul by showing its absence from vampiric bodies.

John Seward, rather than being the “minor character” Greenway claims him to be (213), is actually the most prominent narrator in the text, and his experiences are closely connected to the overarching moral message of the novel. The arc involving Seward and the doomed object of his affections, Lucy Westenra, exists in parallel to the surrounding story of Jonathan and Mina Harker, with the contrasts between the two heroes and two heroines serving to highlight the qualities that Bram Stoker wished to paint as desirable or undesirable. Seward, the hero of what Stoker identified as the “tragedy” of the novel, exists as an object lesson in the perils of a scientific outlook that cannot make room for the reality of the metaphysical. Harker, on the other hand, acts as the hero of the typical Stokerian romance framing Seward and Lucy’s story, and his ability to adapt to the demands of a reality outside of the realm of scientific explanation proves to be the salvation of both him and his wife. In contrast to the Harkers’ various self-determined
acts of heroism, Seward's admiration of the cortical mapping experiments of David Ferrier and the vivisectionist operations of John Burden-Sanderson positions him as being dangerously close to denying the reality of the soul altogether, and his dogmatic adherence to generally accepted scientific models hamstring him as he and Van Helsing attempt to uncover the root of Lucy’s illness. Furthermore, Seward’s pronounced depression, his repeated desire to transform his life via “a good, unselfish cause” (71), and his self-medication with the dangerous sedative chloral hydrate all echo elements of *Faust*, particularly Wills’ version of the story, positioning Seward as similar to the despondent and suicidal Faust who appears in the play’s first act. His callous treatment of Renfield as a subject whose behavior has some manner of set “key” exemplifies both his materialist leanings and his Faustian quest to imbue his life with meaning, and it is only by witnessing the vampiric Lucy that Seward can correct his worldview, eventually coming to repudiate skeptics as those “who can see nothing but a travesty of bitter truth in anything holy or emotional” (288).

Critics have attributed much more significance to R. M. Renfield, with authors such as Hatlan identifying his vitalist experiment of ingesting increasingly larger animals as a materialist project (89-90). Much as Seward flirts with a worldview that reduces mankind to organic machines void of free will, Renfield posits a universe in which physical life takes primacy over any spiritual existence. For most of the novel, Renfield’s sole concern is to obtain and absorb as much vital energy as possible in the hopes of infinitely prolonging his own life, and Dracula, who is clearly connected to the figure of the devil, and more specifically to Mephistopheles, seems eager to oblige him in this endeavor. Despite the seeming religious nature of his mania, his concern for metaphysical matters is
non-existent or minimal throughout much of the text, and the object of his worshipful adoration, the Count, is a being without a soul, existing purely on the material plane. It is only after Renfield has made his Faustian pact, exchanging free entry into the asylum for the promise of eternal life, that he begins to worry about the spiritual well-being of himself and others, nearly breaking down as the now reformed Seward needles him over the distinction between “lives” and “souls,” and he eventually sacrifices himself in an attempt to preserve the soul of the imperiled Mina, whose almost saintly presence has the effect of driving Renfield to confront and embrace the spiritual reality absent from his project of flies and spiders. In renouncing his allegiance to Dracula and betraying his master, not only does he reject the materialism of his own experiments, but he also further affirms the wrongness of Seward’s early views, showing that he is a lunatic for which there is no “key” and that he is a free actor whose behavior cannot be reduced to the biological machinery of Ferrier’s “brain science” (71).

Re-evaluating Renfield and Seward by showing that Dracula is a Faustian narrative not only serves to underscore the Victorian apprehensions present in Dracula regarding fin de siècle science, but it also sheds new light on the heroic qualities of the Harkers. Whereas Seward’s insufficiency as a hero hinders the protagonists’ ability to save Lucy from death and transformation, the Harkers’ shared adaptability allows Jonathan to escape his imprisonment by the Count and allows Mina to outmaneuver Dracula in the later chapters of the novel. Similarly, where Seward’s failings as a man of science and alienist galvanize Renfield’s own destructive materialist qualities, it is Mina’s compassionate outlook that redeems Renfield from his bondage to the devil figure that is the Count. By recognizing how the shortcomings of Dracula’s two “Fausts” shed light on
the enigmatic “moral lesson” Bram Stoker claimed that his novel taught, we can not only gain a deeper appreciation for the way in which Dracula’s overlooked heroes contribute to the text but also develop a new understanding of how the characters typically thought of as the novel’s protagonists are framed as heroic by their author. Furthermore, we can begin to recognize the scientific discourse long observed within Dracula as being integral to the novel’s intended moral, rather than being supplementary to a text ultimately concerned with other issues.
CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND:

STOKER’S CONNECTIONS TO FAUST AND THE MEDICAL SCIENCES

Stoker’s connection to the sciences is well-documented, and many of his literary productions are deeply concerned with new sciences and technology. His first novel, the 1890 Snake’s Pass, goes into great detail concerning the particulars of new surveying and mining techniques; his 1903 The Jewel of Seven Stars involves the merging of modern scientific inquiry with ancient Egyptian magic; his 1908 Lady Athlyne and his 1909 The Lady of the Shroud both focus, at points, on new modes of transportation (the motor car in the former and the aeroplane in the latter); and his final novel, the semi-coherent 1912 Lair of the White Worm returns to the themes of Dracula by featuring an archaic evil force being subdued by a band of technologically and scientifically literate heroes. In addition to these overt references to technology, there are ongoing references throughout Stoker’s works to two of his lifelong pseudo-scientific fascinations: mesmerism and physiognomy, which he regarded as valid and established medical facts. Identifying himself as a “practicing physiognomist” in an early 1876 letter to his idol Walt Whitman (Traubel 183-4), Stoker routinely uses prominent facial features or other physical traits to signal the personal qualities his characters, and in addition to employing mesmerism as a
major feature of both *Dracula* and *Lair of the White Worm*, he makes an extensive exploration of the topic in his 1910 non-fiction work, *Famous Impostors*, in which he mentions the practice as being “accepted as a contribution to science” (95). Even though physiognomy has been discredited and the therapeutic use of hypnosis came under increasing skeptical scrutiny during the later half of the twentieth century, Stoker’s passion for these two topics nevertheless reveals him to be a man not only concerned with the sciences in general, but more specifically concerned with a system (physiognomy) by which a man’s psychological tendencies are directly linked to immutable facets of his biology and with a process (mesmerism) by which human beings’ mental functioning can be altered by outside forces.

In addition to this interest in both scientific and pseudo-scientific topics, Stoker also hailed from a family tied to medicine and had at least one relative with a detailed knowledge of the science of the human brain. His brother-in-law Sir William Thomson was a well-respected surgeon who oversaw a field hospital in South Africa ("Obituary: Sir William Thomson" 1502). George, his younger brother, served as a Turkish volunteer military doctor during the Russo-Turkish War of 1878 and eventually went on to introduce and advocate for oxygen-based treatments for a variety of illnesses (Murray 109), and it has been suggested by Jimmie E. Cain that George’s accounts of his years in the Balkans, which Bram helped to edit, influenced the portrayal of *Dracula’s* Transylvania (Cain). The family member who appears to have been most influential on Bram’s work, however, was his older brother William Thornley Stoker, who worked as a surgeon for thirty-seven years at Richmond Hospital (Murray 175), served as the Inspector for Vivisection in Ireland from 1879 through the early 1900s (Stiles, *Popular*
Fiction 61), and wrote multiple papers on the topic of brain surgery. In both Stoker’s research notes for Dracula and in the novel’s typescript, there are contributions by Thornley regarding the proper depiction of medical procedures and physical injuries, and in Thornley’s own publications, one can find material that clearly parallels the prose and narrative of Dracula.

In addition to offering commentary on the mechanics of blood transfusions and autopsies (Klinger 198, 203, 248), Thornley gave his brother a two-page description of the effects of a brain injury on the motor cortex, complete with a chart depicting where a cranial fracture would have to occur to produce the effects he described (Notes for Dracula 178-185). The memorandum clearly figures into the description of Renfield’s head injury in Chapter 21, in which the madman suffers from a “a depressed fracture of the skull, extending right up through the motor area” (242), which leaves the right side of his body paralyzed. Furthermore, Renfield’s medical condition appears to have been directly drawn from one of Thornley’s own case studies. In his 1888 article, "On a Case of Subcranial Hæmorrhage treated by Secondary Trephining," Thornley’s description of the craniectomy he performed on a man named Patrick Rourke matches closely with the details of the trephination that Van Helsing and Seward perform upon Renfield. Both Rourke and Renfield suffer paralysis on one side of their body; both are initially unconscious at the time when treatment begins; both are in their fifties; both are listed in the opening case notes as having a “sanguine temperament”; and both awake from their initial coma complaining of thirst (B. Stoker 62, 243; W. Stoker 401-2, 406). It is abundantly clear that Stoker drew very directly from his brother’s work in writing what is one of the climactic scenes of the novel. In addition to this, one of Abraham Van
Helsing’s more memorable pronouncements, “We learn from failure, not from success!” (112), appears to have its origins in another work of Thornley’s. In “Contribution to the Surgery of the Brain,” written by Thornley in conjunction with other physicians, it is stated early in the text that “Our failures in surgery are generally more instructive than our successes, for calamity is a more direct guide to danger than it is to success” (292). We can see then that *Dracula*, in both its technical detail and its philosophical content, owes a heavy debt to not only Bram Stoker’s scientific hobbyhorses but also to the knowledge and expertise of an experienced brain surgeon.

This combination of Stoker’s personal “scientific” interests and Thornley’s knowledge of brain science underscores the ways in which *Dracula* concerns itself with the seeming limitations of human free will and the extent to which our mental actions may or may not be a determined product of our biology. Renfield’s paralysis, as will be shown later, is a stark illustration of a late nineteenth-century understanding of the mind informed by early cortical mapping research, and it demonstrates how control of one’s body is linked to discrete, mappable areas of the brain. Similarly, Bram Stoker’s implicit endorsement of physiognomy and the text’s explicit insistence on the reality of hypnotism support a model in which traits of one’s personality and even one’s own freedom of action could be read as byproducts of physiological realities beyond one’s control. Such sentiments were certainly not unknown in the late nineteenth century. Physiognomy clearly posits a reality in which people’s personalities are bound up in certain “types” that remain as immutable as their facial features, and the reality of hypnosis led many to the conclusion that the inner workings of the brain could be likened to a machine, available to be puppeteered by entities other than the owner. In his 1891 *The Insanity of Genius*, for example, John
Ferguson Nisbet claims that human beings are ultimately incapable of independent action, using the example of implanted hypnotic suggestions to argue that it is a "common delusion that will is an integral part of our mental equipment" (31). As we shall explore later, numerous late nineteenth-century pieces of fiction employing hypnosis refer to those under its influence as being non-living objects to be controlled by their mesmerists, describing them as musical instruments to be played (Du Maurier 457-8), as shells to be filled (Doyle 68), or as beasts bred for service and meat (De Maupassant 28), emphasizing how what Stoker claims as a supposedly scientific process strips one of the ability to direct one’s body, or even more chillingly, one’s thoughts.

However, a closer look at Stoker’s views upon and descriptions of these systems indicates that his work may not endorse the view of biological determinism to which so much of the novel’s “science” seems to point. In his *Personal Reminiscences of Henry Irving*, he makes it clear that “types,” both material and psychological, allow for infinite individual combinations, discussing how one may discern the “endless variants and combinations of the same [type]” (2:7). Stoker manages to believe each human being is unique while simultaneously believing this individuality inscribes itself in physical features. Similarly, while there were certainly individuals such as Nisbet who took the effectiveness of hypnosis to be indicative of a lack of human agency, there did exist early brain scientists who could acknowledge the efficacy of hypnosis while still maintaining belief in the reality and independence of human will. William Benjamin Carpenter, for example, who popularized the term “unconscious cerebration” that Stoker uses throughout his works (*Lady Athlyne* 126, 250; *Gates of Life* 69; *Personal Reminisces* 1:265; *Snake’s Pass* 128) and who numbers among the cortical localizationists that will
be discussed later, admits that hypnotic suggestion is possible and discusses how it functions in his *Mesmerism, Spiritualism, Etc: Historically and Scientifically Considered* (33-5), but he emphatically affirms the reality of human agency in his “On the Doctrine of Human Automatism” (942-3). Even though Stoker is fascinated with sciences that flirt with the edges of human agency, this fascination does not necessarily mark him as a determinist, and — as we shall see — the way in which he writes about science allows for the possibility that mankind has free will even if it can be supplanted and — more terrifyingly — removed.

In addition to having a well-documented fascination with sciences that might explain or minimize human agency and an interest in incorporating up-to-date scientific knowledge about the brain into *Dracula*, Bram Stoker also had a decided interest in the Faust narrative, both before and during his work on the novel. He appears to have been fascinated with the story of Faustus since at least 1875, when he published his first novel-length work, a pro-temperance serial entitled *The Primrose Path*. In this work, Stoker depicts the downward spiral of an Irish immigrant named Jerry O'Sullivan after he comes under the sway of the conniving bartender and moneylender Grinnell. With its mawkish fixation on the real-world perils of alcoholism and domestic violence, this text may initially seem to be unrelated to *Dracula* and to the horror genre; however, as Carol Senf has observed, the novella makes two forays into the realm of the Gothic (*Science and Social Science* 8). First, it describes Grinell in macabre terms, stating that his face resembles “the ghastly front of a skull [more] than the face of a living man” (52). Secondly, it explicitly links Jerry's descent into alcoholism to the figure of Mephistopheles, as the actor who first entices him to have a drink is dressed as the
character at the time that he offers his invitation (51). While *The Primrose Path* is by no means a supernatural text, it nevertheless includes elements of the Gothic mode and the Faustian narrative. Jerry, who is seduced into the evils of both alcoholism and debt, brutalizes and eventually murders his saintly, uncomplaining wife Kate: an innocent who like, *Faust’s* Margaret or Stoker’s Lucy, is immolated because of unchecked appetites. Furthermore, the story demonstrates how even a noble or morally neutral undertaking — Jerry’s desire to pursue experience outside of the constraints of Dublin life by immigrating to London — can end disastrously when carried out unwisely, just as Faust’s pursuit of knowledge and sensation only becomes truly catastrophic in the absence of spiritual pursuits and with the assistance of a tempting devil.

In addition to possessing at least some interest in *Faust* at the time of his earliest literary productions, Stoker was directly involved with one of the more notable renderings of *Faust* in the late nineteenth century: the immensely popular 1882 stage version which starred Stoker’s employer, Henry Irving. Written by Irish playwright W.G. Wills, this simplified adaptation of Goethe’s play was a piece of spectacle, derided by Henry James as “horror cheaply conceived, and executed with more zeal than discretion” (Belford 181). The production, however, was immensely successful in attracting large crowds with its over-the-top, immensely complex rendering of the witches’ Sabbath on Brocken and with such state-of-the-art stage effects as Mephistopheles and Valentine fighting with electrically charged swords between which visible sparks would fly (*Personal Reminisces* 1:176). In the months following *Faust’s* debut, over ninety-thousand copies of Goethe’s original poem in translation were sold, and merchandise such as *Faust*-themed hats, shoes, pipe tobacco, and crackers appeared on the market.
(Belford 187). Stoker, in his own words, describes the play as a “wonderful scene of imagination, of grouping, of lighting, of action, and all the rush and whirl and triumphant cataclysm of unfettered demoniacal possession” (Personal Reminiscences 1:146).

Interest in the Faustian narrative, and particularly Wills’ rendering of it, is evident in the typescript Stoker prepared for Dracula. While Faust merits no word in the novel, Leslie Klinger, in his examination of Dracula’s typescript, found a passage mentioning Faust in Chapter 21 that was omitted from the book as it was published. During the climactic blood exchange scene, where Seward narrates the spectacle of the Count’s assault upon Mina Harker and watches as the holy symbols wielded by the heroes cause him to retreat, a line present only in the typescript reads:

> Even then at that awful moment with such a tragedy before my eyes, the figure of Mephistopheles in the Opera cowering before Margaret’s lifted cross swam up before me and for an instant I wondered if I were mad (Klinger 390).

Here the Count is explicitly equated with Mephistopheles, a move in keeping with other elements in the text that align him with the devil. In Chapter 20, for example, he takes on the pseudonym of “De Ville” (239), a play on the word “devil,” and if one looks at Stoker’s working notes for the novel, it becomes clear that he assumed that the name “Dracula” itself was another term for “devil.” Looking at the passages Stoker copied from one of his sources, William Wilkinson’s An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, we find the following:

> Dracula in the Wallachian language means Devil. The Wallachians were, at that time, as they are at present, used to give this as a surname to any person who rendered himself conspicuous either by courage, cruel actions, or cunning (19).
As Elizabeth Miller has observed, there is very little in Wilkinson’s book to give readers further insight into this Dracula, save for a brief mention of his treacherous brother (incorrectly given as “Bladus”) and his campaigns against the Turks, and despite the popular claim that Dracula was specifically based on the historical Wallachian prince, Vlad III, the available evidence indicates that the character was merely lent Vlad’s patronym as means of further connecting him to the figure of the devil (Miller).

This connection to the devil is made even more evident by the supernatural qualities Stoker chose to attribute to his vampire. While there are numerous prior examples of literary vampires being repelled by holy objects and prayers, such as Carmilla’s disdain for funerary prayers (Le Fanu 392-5) and Clarimonde’s dissolution by holy water (Gautier 242-3), the vampires in *Dracula* appear to be the first to be immediately, physically repelled by upraised crucifixes and Eucharistic hosts. As affirmed by Seward’s words in the typescript, this property of vampires is identical to one of the features of Mephistopheles, although it is important to note that the scene Seward cites, in which Margaret is repelling Mephistopheles with an upraised cross, does not actually appear in Gounod’s opera or even in Goethe's original; it does, however, appear in Wills’ stage play (390). In addition to this, the limitations that Dracula encounters regarding thresholds mirror similar limitations illustrated in *Faust* and, in particular, Wills’ version. According to Van Helsing, vampires may not enter into a dwelling without an invitation (211), a ban similar to that experienced by Wills’ Mephistopheles in Act I, scene 1, in which he must be invited into Faust’s home thrice before he may enter (6). Elsewhere, in Stoker’s notes for the novel, it is indicated that Dracula “has to be brought or aided across a threshold” (24-5) in a fashion similar to how he may only cross running water if he is
carried over it (266). While it may initially appear that this vampiric trait did not carry over into the final novel (Van Helsing never mentions it), I would argue that it manifests in the episode in which the Count penetrates Lucy’s bedroom after her window has been broken by the wolf, Berserker, and that this incident is comparable to one in Wills’ play in which Mephistopheles summons a horde of rats to free him from Faust’s binding circle (6). The Berserker incident, which has long baffled annotators (Klinger 220-1; Wolf 186-7), makes sense if one understands previous instances of Dracula’s predation of Lucy to have been carried out on the ledge of her window, as evidenced by Mina’s observations in Chapter 8:

I threw a glance up at our window, and saw Lucy's head leaning out. I opened my handkerchief and waved it. She did not notice or make any movement whatever. Just then, the moonlight crept round an angle of the building, and the light fell on the window. There distinctly was Lucy with her head lying up against the side of the window sill and her eyes shut. She was fast asleep, and by her, seated on the window sill, was something that looked like a good-sized bird (91).

Despite the popular assumption that Dracula enters Lucy’s room to feed on every occasion, which would require him to enter both the rental property on the Crescent and the Westenra household at Hillingham in violation of the invitation rule, there is no indication that he crosses the threshold of his victim’s window until the night when he lures Berserker from the zoo.

While, on its surface, Dracula does not seem to be a text primarily concerned with either scientific discourse or with a Faustian narrative, an examination of Stoker’s life and the notes and typescript for the novel reveal that Stoker was concerned with both of these topics when he composed Dracula. Through his brother Thornley and his employer Henry Irving, Stoker had a direct connection to both cutting-edge medical information
regarding the science of the brain and to the latest popular iteration of *Faust*, and it should not surprise us that these two influences should come to bear upon one another within the novel. Faust, which in virtually all its forms concerns itself with the limits of human knowledge and experience, is a fitting narrative through which to examine not only issues of scientific inquiry but also vampirism itself. By depicting both the downfall of a man obsessed with investigation and the corruption of an innocent faced with Satanic powers, Faust provides ample fodder for multiple elements of Stoker’s vampire. As Paul Féval, an earlier author of vampire stories, writes in his 1865 *La Vampire*:

> What is Goethe’s masterpiece, after all, if not a splendid exposition of the eternal fact of vampirism - which, since the beginning of the world, has emptied and dried up the hearts of so many families? (Stableford’s translation) (*The Vampire Countess* 38)

Just as Faust’s Mephistopheles preys upon the victimized Faust, offering him terrestrial power, knowledge, and experience at the forfeit of his soul, and just as Stoker’s Grinell tempts young men into the spiritual degradation of alcoholism, fattening up his purse in the process, the vampire throughout literature parasitically assails its victims, leaving them creatures that gorge themselves on men’s physical vitality at the doom of their metaphysical well-being. As we shall additionally see, there also existed late nineteenth-century scientific paradigms following this same pattern: emphasizing the earthly at the cost of the divine.
CHAPTER III

JOHN SEWARD AS FAUST DISTRAUGHT:

VIVISECTION, CORTICAL LOCALIZATION, AND CHLORALISM

While Stoker gives clear indication that the character of the Count may be linked to the figure of devil, there are aspects of his story that also link him to the character of Faust, namely that his supernatural powers are rooted in his training at the mysterious Scholomance near Lake Hermannstadt, where scholars of the black arts give themselves over to the devil (Dracula 263; Notes for Dracula 123). Although there is little to no information in the novel regarding the Count’s past, having his origins involve a dark form of scholarship is fitting given the ways other characters in the text manifest Faustian qualities. Just as the Count sought dangerous knowledge as a disciple of the devil and seeks to facilitate his conquest of England by means that Van Helsing terms “experimenting” (263-4), Renfield and Seward carry out scientific inquiries of dubious ethicality, putting them both at risk of exhibiting the same degree of monstrosity embodied by the Count and by vampires in general.

In the case of Seward, a long neglected character who has often been dismissed as having limited bearing on the plot (Greenway 213), the first warning that something is
amiss regarding his science is made manifest in his first diary entry, in which he confesses to seeming “to wish to keep [Renfield] to the point of his madness” a thing that he claims he should wish to avoid with patients as he would “the mouth of hell” (61). This behavior, in which Seward admits to treating Renfield as an experimental object to be examined rather than as a patient to be cured, comes in the wake of Seward’s despair over having his proposal rejected by Lucy, an event that leaves him with marked symptoms of depression: namely insomnia, decreased appetite, and an inability to find satisfaction in day to day tasks. His first words as a narrator, in fact, are a list of such symptoms, and he opens his initial diary entry saying

Ebb tide in appetite to-day. Cannot eat, cannot rest, so diary instead. Since my rebuff of yesterday I have a sort of empty feeling. Nothing in the world seems of sufficient importance to be worth the doing...” (61).

This despondency and complete dissatisfaction with life mirrors that of Faust at the beginning of Goethe’s version of the story and its adaptations by Gounod and Wills, in which the despairing Faust laments that his years of study and experience have given him no satisfaction (Barbier and Carré 5-6; Goethe 28-32; Wills 1-2). Like Faust, Seward attempts to supply his life with meaning via scientific inquiry, and like Faust, he grapples with the risk of hell in attempting to finally attain this meaning denied to him. While Seward does not immediately express the suicidal ideation that Faust does (an aspect of the character that was very much highlighted in Gounod and Will’s productions, given that both drastically truncate Faust’s initial monologue in Goethe), his melancholy has a decidedly self-destructive undertone. In addition to his bitter remark asking “Under what circumstances would I not avoid the pit of hell?” which carries with it the implication that he is to some degree complacent about the possibility of his own damnation, the entry he
makes on September 20 in Chapter 13, which he claims will be his final recording, opens with the words:

Only resolution and habit can let me make an entry to-night. I am too miserable, too low-spirited, too sick of the world and all in it, including life itself, that I would not care if I heard this moment the flapping of the wings of the angel of death (144).

While this indifference to his own death is not as striking as Faust’s suicide attempt, this moment in the novel, at the point when Lucy is dead and when Seward claims to have no ties keeping him attached to life, speaks to a similar type of despairing emptiness as experienced by Wills’ version of the doctor, who complains that:

Must I live on from nothingness to nothingness
From yesterday to struggle to forget
Unto to-morrow, which I'll meet with loathing — (1)

Despite the different trajectories of their stories, both men are faced with a bleak and meaningless world, and their scientific inquiries, their attempts to supply themselves with “sufficient cause,” ultimately fail to inject their lives with purpose.

While Seward does not have quite the catalog of previous scholarly endeavors that Dr. Faust has, the thrust of his scientific studies may be linked directly to the lack of significance that he finds in day to day life. As has been discussed above, Stoker’s interest in the sciences clearly influences his work with Dracula, and examining the text, we find just what sort of scientific work it is with which Seward aligns himself. During another one of his morose musings as to how to supply himself with a worthy, purposefully task, Seward contemplates allowing Renfield to complete his plan to eat increasingly more complex orders of life, stating:
It would almost be worthwhile to complete the experiment. It might be done if there were only a sufficient cause. Men sneered at vivisection, and yet look at its results today! Why not advance science in its most difficult and vital aspect, the knowledge of the brain?

Had I even the secret of one such mind, did I hold the key to the fancy of even one lunatic, I might advance my own branch of science to a pitch compared with which Burdon-Sanderson's physiology or Ferrier's brain knowledge would be as nothing. If only there were a sufficient cause! I must not think too much of this, or I may be tempted. A good cause might turn the scale with me, for may not I too be of an exceptional brain, congenitally? (71)

Here, Seward mentions the names of both David Ferrier, a Scottish neurologist and psychologist who conducted numerous animal tests examining experimental lesions and electrical stimulation of the cerebral cortex ("Ferrier, Sir David"), and James Burdon-Sanderson, an English physiologist who did extensive work in the field of pathology. Both individuals were targeted by the anti-vivisectionist movement in the late nineteenth century, with Burdon-Sanderson attracting criticism following his establishment of a physiology laboratory at Magdelen College, Oxford (MacNalty 747) and Ferrier coming under fire for allegedly vivisecting a monkey without a lawful research license ("The Charge Against" 838). As Stiles has observed, Stoker’s evaluation of vivisection was influenced by the work his brother did in his capacity as Inspector for Vivisection in Ireland (“Bram Stoker’s Brother” 198-9; Popular Fiction 61-4). Thornley, like Seward, appears to advocate for the use of experimental vivisection in the article from which aspects of Renfield’s brain injury derive, starting that his ability to save the man upon whom he operates depends on

[T]he humane and benevolent investigations of those biologists whom weak, credulous, mistaken people are actively pelting with the verbal filth of prejudice and ignorance — people who would prefer that this man, formed in the image of his Maker, should die rather than their feeble sentiment be offended by a painless experiment on an ape (“Subcranial Hæmorrhage” 407-8).
However, it is important to note that Thornley eventually went on record opposing the use of vivisection in an educational setting, that he became a darling of the anti-vivisectionist movement, and that, at the opening of the twentieth century, he refused to grant licenses for vivisection in an instructional setting or for experiments involving dogs or monkeys (Stiles, “Bram Stoker’s Brother” 208). Stiles claims that by portraying Seward, the novel’s explicitly pro-vivisectionist character, as incompetent and inept, Stoker is making a pointed condemnation of the practice that aligns with his brother’s later views on the subject. Furthermore, she identifies Dracula himself as the ultimate vivisector and mad scientist within the text, a being who uses psychic means to manipulate the brains of his victims (70-1). Given Stoker’s fascination with mesmerism, it is not inconceivable that he came to similar conclusions about the practice as those voiced by Wells in his own story of mad science, *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, wherein the titular character comments that

> [T]he possibility of vivisection does not stop at mere physical metamorphosis [...] in our growing science of hypnotism we find the promise of a possibility of superseding old inherent instincts by new suggestions, grafting upon or replacing the inherited fixed ideas. (132)

By invoking Ferrier’s name, Seward does more than align himself with vivisectionist science; he also links himself to early cortical mapping experiments performed on animals. Ferrier, in addition to generating considerable controversy over the allegation that he violated the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act (“The Charge Against” 836; Stiles 67), was well known for his development of early maps of the motor cortex based on his experiments on dogs, which is what Thornley cite in his early justifications for
experimental vivisection (“Subcranial Hæmorrhage” 403-4). The notion that portions of the brain could be mapped to bodily processes generated its own brand of controversy, even outside of the objections to Ferrier’s work based on his use of animals. Localizationists like Ferrier, by connecting discrete regions of the physical brain to behaviors previously thought to fall under the domain of the soul, challenged the dualistic mind/body divide that had dominated the conception of human psychology in the early nineteenth century (Stiles Popular Fiction 51-2). Rather than adhering to the notion of a separate spiritual consciousness governing a material, temporal body — a metaphysical paradigm of human agency often thought to underpin Christian morality — (Jones vi) the biological determinism of a mapable brain may be easily allied with a purely material view of reality. The selfsame decade during which Ferrier's most famous experiments took place, the 1870s, saw the rise of the philosophical concept of epiphenomenalism: the idea that all mental actions are the result of physical actions within the brain and that they have no causative power in and of themselves (52). The implications of this emerging belief in human automatism, in which mankind might be reduced to mere biological machines, drew considerable backlash from those who felt that this model of brain functioning threatened the notion of human free will (54-6).

In addition to his admiration of Ferrier, there are numerous other pieces of evidence to mark Seward as a potential materialist. In his commentary on Renfield’s cognitive processes, he suggests that there is a “secret” to his patient’s mind and a “key” to his fancy (71), indicating that he believes that there is some means by which the human brain can be assessed, decoded, and potentially (as Ferrier proves) mapped. Furthermore, he makes the chilling assessment that there may be abnormalities present in his own brain
like those present in Renfield’s. In wrangling with his desire to allow his patient to continue devouring living animals in the hopes of deciphering his mania, Seward considers whether a sufficiently good cause would tempt him into such unethical experimentation, stating that “[it] might turn the scale with me, for may not I too be of an exceptional brain, congenitally?” (71) While Seward’s claim to possess an “exceptional” brain has been used by annotators such as Klinger to argue for the young doctor’s arrogance (Klinger 132-3), it must be noted that “exceptional” is not a word that necessarily designates a positive deviation from the norm. In fact, as Stiles has observed, there existed theorists such as the previously mentioned Nisbet, who claimed that any deviation from normal mental functioning should be regarded as diseased (Popular Fiction 125-6). Even if Seward means to claim superiority to Renfield, the language in which he does so serves to underscore their similarities. In a world in which minds and fancy are dictated by set, discoverable secrets and keys, the elements that would result in Seward’s genius are but an elementary rearrangement of the ones that lead to Renfield’s insanity.

This combination of pro-vivisectionist sentiment, materialist leanings, and possible mental abnormality connects Seward to the emerging figure of the mad scientist. Ferrier, in fact, was already the prototype for two mad scientists elsewhere in literature — Wilkie Collins’ Dr. Benjula, and Wells’ Dr. Moreau — and numerous other mad scientists of the era exhibit traits that make it clear that their genius is coupled with some manner of congenital defect or perversity (Stiles, Popular Fiction 69). As a Faust figure, not only does Seward fail to find fulfillment in his scientific ambitions, but his ambitions, like Faust’s, lead him to the mouth of hell. While it is tremendously easy to ignore the
underlying dangers of Seward’s scientific curiosity in a book where the threat of vampirism looms so large, were we to witness Seward’s actions in isolation, not realizing that he was a character in a supernatural mystery, it would be easy to assume that his narrative would unfold in a manner like that of Stevenson’s socially conflicted Jekyll or Wells’ misanthropic Griffin. The lack of meaning in his life, which he is tempted to cure by engaging in unethical and fantastical experiments in which he would allow one of his patients to devour live animals, could easily spill into a horror narrative in which no vampire is necessary.

Seward is further connected to both the specter of materialism and the figure of the mad scientist in his use of the addictive sedative chloral hydrate. In a fashion similar to Griffin, who abuses strychnine (145), and Jekyll, who abuses something much worse (107-9), Seward resorts to a chemical solution to personal problems arising from his social isolation. Furthermore, Gordon Stables’ 1875 Belgravia article on chloral hydrate use, “Confessions of an English Chloral-Eater,” links chloral use to materialist thought. The author, in describing the nadir of his experience with the drug, explains that:

I felt quite convinced that nothing could exist independent of matter; that height and depth, and up and down, the points of the compass, weight, sight and sound, thought itself, and every principle or so-called fundamental truth, had no existence in the abstract, or “beyond an earth” (186).

While Seward's chloral habit is not as severe as Stables’, his use of the drug nevertheless lends a sinister dimension to the character, particularly given that Mina’s use of chloral that Seward gives her renders her vulnerable to Dracula's attacks. It also further confirms

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1 It should be noted that Stoker was an acquaintance of Mary Elizabeth Braddon, who was the editor of Belgravia at the time that “Confessions of an English Chloral Eater” was published (Belford 275).
him as a man aligned with the dangerous, materially-focused science that is more directly condemned in other pieces of popular fiction around the fin de siècle.

Looking at Stoker’s relationship to the sciences and to his research sources, we find that he appears to have been clearly positioned in opposition to the dogmatic skepticism of materialist science. Despite his interest in seemingly determinist “sciences” such as physiognomy, he appears to have been in the process of consulting sources that would back a philosophical rejection of the self-limiting, narrow approach to knowledge that Seward upholds. In his notes, he lists William Spottiswoode’s A Tarantasse Journey Through Eastern Russia in the Autumn of 1856 as a potential source for consultation (175). While this specific text does not appear to have been used to provide setting material for the finished novel, an examination of Spottiswoode’s life provides evidence as to why Stoker might have seen him as a valuable source to consult. In the 1878 December edition of the Dublin University Magazine, (the official publication for Stoker’s alma mater), there is an article offering a recounting of the “famous” inaugural address that Spottiswoode gave to the British Science Association of Dublin the year, which is characterized as "a protest against that contraction of the range of thought, which, under a plea of scientific exactitude, leads to dogmatism" and is lauded for making his audience appreciate "that the world is not yet so compressed as to be wholly shut up in the bottle of scientific materialism” (671). While we have no direct evidence that Stoker heard this address or read this article, its connection to the university that Stoker attended would make it likely that Stoker was aware of it, and the fact that Spottiswoode was a professor in the field of Stoker’s major — Mathematics — provides
an additional reason that it might have attracted the interest of the young author (Murray 33).

In addition to this, Stoker’s use of terminology popularized by Carpenter might well align him with Carpenter’s views, which as mentioned above, clearly included the belief that humans were in possession of free will and agency, regardless of the physiology or biological workings of the brain. In his “On the Doctrine of Human Automatism” he argues that human choice is a reality and that it “necessitates the conception of an Ego as something unconditioned by material states and forces” (943). Additionally, Stoker’s listed sources on phenomena relating to consciousness — Herbert Mayo, John Jones, and Frederick Lee — connect him further to anti-materialist sentiment. Mayo laments that physiological materialists will oppose his theories regarding ghosts and vampires as being a result of the soul’s travel outside of the body, given that “[t]hey hold that the mind is but a function or product of the brain” (69-70). Lee dedicates an entire chapter to his treatise on the supernatural to repudiating materialist thought, claiming that “the advance of Materialism and the consequent denial of the Supernatural must be the cause both of alarm and sadness” (1) and arguing that this trend is incompatible with Christian thought. Jones does much the same, offering a biting critique of modern materialists that almost seems a more vitriolic version of Van Helsing’s jabs at scientists in Chapter 14, stating:

[T]he pedant, whose brain-organ of self-esteem is so large as to lead him to imagine that he possesses the wisdom of God bodily, that all nature must be material and visible, that there is no power beyond the seen material, that the mountains have been, are, and will continue, and that no animated intelligence can live without the physical organization it has been accustomed to; or who, in other words, practically declares that "at death I become as if I had not been" (vi)
Lastly, while much is still inconclusive about the relationship between Stoker’s *Dracula* as it was published in 1897 and the strange Icelandic adaptation of the narrative published by Valdimar Ásmundsson in 1901 as *Makt Mykranna* (*Powers of Darkness*), Stoker’s great-grandnephew Dacre has voiced his belief that Ásmundsson’s additions to *Dracula*’s text are the result of him having received unused drafted material from Stoker himself (10). While this claim will doubtlessly be tested with more rigor given that the first English translation of *Makt Mykranna* has only recently been published, there exist parallels between Stoker’s notes and Ásmundsson’s adaptation, such as the presence of a deaf and mute woman as the Count’s retainer (Ásmundsson 85; Stoker, *Notes for Dracula* 25), that bolster Dacre’s assertions. If there is any connection between Stoker’s ideas for *Dracula* and the expansions on the novel made in *Makt Mykranna*, they could further confirm the anti-materialist sentiment embedded in *Dracula*. In Ásmundsson’s version, the Count explicitly identifies himself as a scientist and refers to the antechamber of the sciences as a space in which “líf og dauði liggja í efnishrúgum [life and death lie in piles of material]” (223), which as Hans De Roos observes in his notes for the English translation, is a peculiar turn of phrase that has been used repeatedly in Icelandic refutations of materialist thought.2 Much as Stiles suggests, it seems that the Count could have been interpreted in at least one of his incarnations as a materialist scientist, and Ásmundsson’s Dracula seems primed to exacerbate the same anxieties that the biologically determined view of the brain evoked, speaking frequently of human beings

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2 Much thanks to Mr. De Roos for sharing with me an unpublished manuscript version of the annotated translation of *Makt Mykranna* (version of 8 February 2016) in which his notes regarding the term “efnishrúgum” are more extensive than in the final publication.
as animals who are fit or unfit according to Darwinian law as he seeks to justify his predatory excesses (Ásmundsson 117, 125).

Against this backdrop of anti-materialist sentiment in the sources and adaptations surrounding Dracula, Seward may be easily read as a sinister figure rather than as merely a buffoonish incompetent. While the extent of the threat he poses is eclipsed by that of the novel’s vampires, readers familiar with contemporary stories of science gone wrong would have ample reason to read him as a possible antagonist. With materialism in the sciences being a present and pressing concern at the fin de siècle, a troubled, pro-vivisectionist doctor singing the praises of a localizationist might be more immediately disturbing to Stoker’s audience at first glance than a marauding vampiric nobleman, given that unethical experimentation such as Seward wishes to perform with regards to Renfield was a more realistic and realizable horror than the supernatural machinations of the Count.
CHAPTER IV

THE TRAGEDY OF LUCY WESTENRA:

VAMPIRES’ SOULLESSNESS AS PROOF OF THE SOUL

Seward’s identity as both a Faustian figure and a proto-mad scientist affect the extent to which he can intervene with regard to the object of his affections, the doomed Lucy Westenra. While many scholars have framed Lucy’s arc within Dracula as contrasting the one involving Mina Harker, claiming that the two women’s fates diverge because of their adherence or non-adherence to Victorian ideals of femininity, few authors have examined the contrast that exists between the triumphant heroism exhibited by the novel’s protagonist, Jonathan Harker, and the failed heroism embodied by Seward. By shifting our assessment of Lucy’s decline, death, resurrection, and impalement to focus on Seward’s insufficiencies as a hero rather than on Lucy’s supposed failure as a Victorian woman, we can come to a clearer picture of the metaphysics of the vampiric condition in Dracula and how they serve to reinforce the distrust of materialism evident throughout the text. The vampiric Lucy, rather than being — as is commonly claimed — a manifestation of her mortal counterpart’s unacceptably libidinous subconscious desires, may be read as a legitimately separate entity from her human counterpart, providing
chilling evidence of the ultimate reality of the human soul by showcasing the horror of its absence.

As has been extensively discussed above, Seward evokes both the despondency of the suicidal Faust and the menace of the fin de siècle mad scientist, given his connections to vivisection, cortical mapping, chloralism, and the scientific materialism associated with these topics. As Greenway and Stiles have pointed out, he is also phenomenally inept at navigating the mystery narrative in which he finds himself — a fact not lost on his contemporary audience. An 1897 review of Dracula in Punch lampooned Seward with regards to his oft-observed incompetence, stating that:

One character must never be absent from the dramatis personæ, and that is The Inquiring, Sceptical, Credulous Noodle. The Inquiring Noodle of Fiction […] [is] the devoted, admiring slave of the philosophic astute hero, ever ready to question, ever ready to dispute, ever ready to make a mistake at the critical moment, or to go to sleep just when success depends on his remaining awake. "Friend John" is Mr. Bram Stoker's Noodle-in-Chief (Baron de B.-W. 57).

It is perhaps Seward’s almost comical shortcomings as a hero that have led so many critics to regard him as a secondary character despite his prominence in the text. There is little Seward can be relied upon to do other than to fail at whatever task or thought exercise Van Helsing assigns him. Not only does he bungle direct interventions with regards to Lucy’s health, such as the order that she not sleep unattended, but he also draws a complete blank when asked to make any logical inference with regards to Lucy’s case. Because her condition, which has a supernatural cause, exists outside of the bounds of recognized science, Seward is incapable of curing, diagnosing, or even intellectually engaging with her ailment. When Van Helsing asks him pointed questions about the course of their patient’s sickness, such as requesting his analysis of the pinpricks on
Lucy’s neck (115), Seward not only fails to provide answers by also fails to make educated guesses or meaningful inferences. It is not insignificant that Quincey Morris, who is far from being characterized as a man of science, manages to remark on the logical incongruities of Lucy’s anemia before Seward does, pointing out that Lucy's body should not be able to hold the amount of transfused blood she has received over a ten-day period and that something must have caused her to lose the blood given her (138).

Perhaps even more so than Dracula's machinations, it is Seward's skepticism and limited scope of imagination that hinders the heroes most in their efforts to rescue the dying Lucy. Van Helsing, who admits that he himself had initial doubts as to the reality of vampires (209), cannot openly act on what appears to be unproven superstition so long as his incredulous pupil is the primary social link between himself and those closest to his patient. Just as both doctors must navigate around Mrs. Westenra's illness, leaving her in ignorance as to the extent of her daughter's plight, Van Helsing must navigate around Seward, leaving him in ignorance as to the nature of Lucy's affliction.

It is only when Seward is confronted with the vampiric Lucy in person that his beliefs change, and this shift in belief, I argue, lies at the philosophical heart of the text. Seward is only convinced of the weight of Van Helsing's convictions when he is in physical proximity to Lucy as a vampire and can recognize that she is no long the Lucy he knew and loved. While he is able to brush off his mentor's accounting of scientific oddities in Chapter 15 and the initial absence of Lucy's body from her tomb, it is when he beholds the mysteriously undecayed body of his former beloved that he first begins to entertain the thought that she might really be UnDead. There is something perceptibly different
about Lucy that elicits unease in him, softening his prior, seemingly rational opposition to
Van Helsing's claims. He states:

It made me shudder to think of so mutilating the body of the woman whom I had
loved. And yet the feeling was not so strong as I had expected. I was, in fact,
beginning to shudder at the presence of this being, this Un-Dead, as Van Helsing
called it, and to loathe it (179).

Later, when he sees the vampiric Lucy mobile, awake, and in the process of abducting a
child, this feeling of revulsion reaches its peak, and Seward's feelings toward the animate
corpse pass from conflicted disgust into outright hatred:

When Lucy – I call the thing that was before us Lucy because it bore her shape –
saw us she drew back with an angry snarl, such as a cat gives when taken
unawares; then her eyes ranged over us. Lucy's eyes in form and colour; but Lucy's
eyes unclean and full of hell fire, instead of the pure, gentle orbs we knew. At that
moment the remnant of my love passed into hate and loathing; had she then to be
killed, I could have done it with savage delight (188).

Critics continually assert that Seward’s reaction reflects the prudish outrage that
Victorian men would display when faced with an overtly and aggressively sexual
vampiress and that Lucy's decline and transformation are an extension of her allegedly
improper behavior as a living woman who entertains the thought of possessing three
husbands. As I have previously observed, however, this interpretation is not supported by
Stoker's larger body of work or by contemporary reactions to the text (11-8). I would
argue that in examining Seward's refusal to identify the entity he is confronting as Lucy,
we ought to allow for the possibility that he is right: that Lucy as a vampire is not an
extension of Lucy as a human being. When Seward describes the vampire as a “the foul
Thing which had taken Lucy's shape without her soul (190) and Van Helsing proclaims
of the being that “it is her body, and yet not it (190),” they may — in fact — be speaking
to a metaphysical truth. It is common to read the dual consciousness that Lucy displays throughout her illness as a manifestation of some subconscious impulse within Lucy. Senf, for example, claims that we must assume that Lucy is assisting the Count in his attacks on her and that doing this is an expression of her sexual frustration and desire to defy convention (“Response to the New Woman” 42-3). However, given that the Count uses the power of mesmerism as a means to carry out his attacks, an argument can be made that the vampiric Lucy is not Lucy at all, but rather a parasitic consciousness brought about by the Count's “psychic vivisection” of his victim.

As has been mentioned above, Stoker appeared to have a keen interest in mesmerism and hypnosis, and the way he describes hypnotic trances in Dracula corresponds to mesmerism as it appears in contemporary fiction regarding psychic vampirism, such as Arthur Conan Doyle's The Parasite or George Du Maurier's Trilby. In these works, the psychic process described follows Franz Anton Mesmer's theories of animal magnetism, in which a subject is placed under control when their vital energy field is infected by the vital energies of the mesmerist. This model is distinctly different than the one eventually championed by physicians such as James Braid who held that hypnotism was merely the process of assisting a subject into a highly suggestible state of relaxation (Carpenter, Mesmerism 14-5). In the two texts mentioned above, it is also worth noting that the entranced subject is illustrated as being a separate person from the unentranced subject. In The Parasite, it is clear that the unconscious actions Austin Gilroy performs under the psychic direction of mesmerist Helen Penclosa should be read as an extension of Penclosa herself, who is able to insert herself into Gilroy as a “hermit crab does into the whelk's shell” (68). In Trilby, this divorce between the mesmerized and unmesmerized
self is taken a step further, with Svengali creating a secondary persona for Trilby who operates independently of her original self:

I will tell you a secret. There were two Trilbys. There was the Trilby you knew, who could not sing one single note in tune. [...] with one wave of his hand over her—with one look of his eye—with a word—Svengali could turn her into the other Trilby, his Trilby—and make her do whatever he liked (457).

Stoker's descriptions of hypnosis clearly correspond to the vitalist, mesmeric model employed in the texts above. As Leslie Klinger has pointed out in his *New Annotated Dracula*, Van Helsing's use of hypnosis on Mina involves making physical gestures known as “passes,” which are employed in mesmeric practices as a means of directing vital energy and which serve no purpose in hypnosis as described by Braid (424). More tellingly, in Chapter 27, Van Helsing attempts to hypnotize his subject even when she is unconscious, a feat that would prove impossible if one were operating within a hypnotic paradigm in which one guides a patient into a trance (318). Dracula, when he attacks his victims, likewise employs his mesmeric powers on them while they are asleep, and it seems safe to assume that he too operates per Mesmer's model rather than Braid's. This position is bolstered by the fact that Stoker’s source Mayo, in his *Letters on the Truths Contained in Popular Superstitions*, describes topics such as mesmerism, somnambulism, trance states, and vampirism in terms of the vitalist theory of Odic forces proposed by Baron Carl von Reichenbach (1-19). While there is presently no definitive evidence that Stoker consulted Mayo (no notes suggesting such have been found), the mechanics by which mesmerism and related phenomena operate within *Dracula* coincide with the way those processes are described by him. Jones' *The Natural and the Supernatural*, and Lee's *The Other World* address similar topics and describe them as operating, loosely, under
the same paradigm. Dracula, in his assaults of Lucy and Mina, works within a model of hypnosis alien to our contemporary understanding of the process: one that has substantially more to do with the will of the mesmerist than with the subconscious of the mesmerized.

If we accept the Count as a disciple of Mesmer's then, we allow for the possibility that, like Penclosa or Svengali, he is capable of either directly seizing control of his victims or of creating a secondary, “parasitic” personality within them, and there is evidence for both possibilities with regards to the case of Lucy Westenra. In Chapter 8, for example, Lucy describes being psychically ejected from her body during her first assault, stating that “my soul seemed to go out from my body and float about the air” (94), indicating that in the contest of vital wills between her and her mesmerist, the Count can control her body to the extent that she no longer inhabits it. This is further evidenced by the fact that, after encountering the gaze of her mesmerist and assailant's red eyes, she seems to have no recollection of anything that may be directly connected to the physical particulars of the Count's attack. While authors such as Senf have read Lucy's description of the event as hinting at some manner of subconscious desire to be “seduced” or “vamped” (Senf “Response to the New Woman” 43, 47) by the Count, claiming her alternating sensations of bitterness and sweetness (Stoker, Dracula 94) as corresponding to erotic fancy (Smith 134), it seems probable that what Lucy is describing has nothing to do with the subconscious or the dreaming mind but is rather a literal account of the physical movement of her soul. Stoker, in fact, revisits psychic projection in his 1902 novel, The Mystery of the Sea, in which the protagonist Archie Hunter, in an episode like that described by Lucy, uses his powers of second sight to project his consciousness such
that he can view the interior of a ship. In this instance, the movement of his projected
mind is confirmed to be a literal occurrence, given that his observations of the ship
correspond to the reality he finds upon traveling there in his physical body (423-7).

With the abundance of evidence that Dracula operates in the fashion of a classical
mesmerist and that Lucy's soul is being literally removed from her body during the
Count's initial assault, it becomes evident that the secondary, vampiric Lucy that emerges
during the character's illness may be considered an entity wholly separate from the
human Lucy to whom we are introduced in Chapter 5. The vampiric Lucy is, in fact,
Lucy's shape without her soul, and this transformation is what makes the protagonist's
confrontation with her so terrible. As Stiles observed in a 2010 talk about vampires and
the mind/body problem at Washington State University, nineteenth-century readers, who
were still caught amid their fears about biological determinism, would have found the
idea of vampires such as Stoker presents as uniquely horrifying. These vampires are
animate corpses that still possess their original hosts' memories and thoughts but not their
souls. They are not people merely transformed, but people replaced and subsumed. While
modern audiences, hailing from an era in which the notion of consciousness as being
purely material has lost its proverbial bite, typically have little trouble rationalizing
vampires as being functionally the same as their human counterparts (Stiles, “Mind-Body
Problem”), the separation between Lucy's physical but still animate body and Lucy's
presumably non-physical soul would have been deeply disturbing.

This division is immediately visible and identifiable for those who encounter the
changed Lucy Westenra, and their disgust and terror upon seeing the woman they

3 Much thanks to Dr. Stiles for kindly sharing the materials accompanying her presentation.
formerly knew transformed should be read not merely as an example of Victorian men's apprehensions about female behavior and sexuality but as a testament to the horror inherent in seeing an entity so clearly void of the characteristic that should make it human. Seward, in witnessing this spectacle, is not only confronted with the awful sight of seeing the former object of his affections reduced to an animalistic predator; he is also confronted with the ultimate end of his materialist science made manifest. Lucy the vampire is a human being operating per the mechanics of vivisection (Stiles, *Popular Fiction* 70-2): a mere conglomeration of biological machinery operating without any higher spiritual existence. In beholding her, Seward not only may understand the repugnant horror inherent in his philosophical leanings, but he also witnesses their repudiation. Seeing the innate soullessness of a vampire serves, in a roundabout way, to confirm the existence of the soul.

For Seward then, the episode in which the vampiric Lucy is encountered, subdued, and destroyed proves to be his salvation, offering him a visible refutation of materialism such that his descent into the monstrous, “mad” science is checked. While his natural skepticism as to the reality of vampires is never quite extinguished, as evidenced by his musing that he and his companions may “be all mad and [...] shall wake to sanity in strait-waistcoats” (240), Seward appears to reform his inclination towards unyielding, skeptical scientific dogma in the later portions of the novel. In Chapter 25, the moving scene of Mina's pre-emptive funeral service brings him to denounce skeptics who “can see nothing but a travesty of bitter truth in anything holy or emotional” (288), and later, he states that, “I suppose that nature works on such a hopeful basis that we believe against ourselves that things will be as they ought to be, not as we should know that they
will be” (293). This is a stark departure from his reluctance before Lucy's impalement to heed Van Helsing's plea to believe “in things that you cannot” and “in things which we know to be untrue” (172). Seward's conversion, subdued and largely silent as it may be, is a turning point in which the menace he poses as a blossoming materialist is neutralized. At the moment that the vampiric Lucy appears, with her very presence testifying to the reality of the immaterial soul, the source of horror shifts from the threat of the soul's unreality to the threat of its corruption or supplantation.
CHAPTER V

R. M. RENFIELD AS FAUST TEMPTED:

THE NON-DETERMINED BRAIN AND THE MIRACLE OF MINA HARKER

If Seward's materialist scientific aspirations are quelled after a confrontation with a woman whose soul is visibly absent, Renfield's philosophy is repudiated by a confrontation with a woman whose soul is most evidently abundant. Renfield, who serves as both Seward's mirror and foil throughout the novel, spends most of Dracula putting into action the materialism with which Seward only flirts, and it is only when he can see the results that his deeds have regarding Mina Harker that he can overcome his lust for material lives and focus his concerns of the preservation of souls. Mina, who shows Renfield the unconditional compassion that his conflicted and dangerously amoral doctor does not, serves to break the dynamic in which both Seward and Renfield participate in dehumanizing and alienating experiments involving one another. Here, the Faust narrative underlying the novel diverges from its source material: unlike the passive and doomed Margaret of Wills' play or the hapless Lucy of Dracula's earlier chapters, Mina is saved through Renfield's actions as he defies the devil with whom he has made a pact. In forcefully resisting the Count, Renfield embraces the reality of the human soul at the
sacrifice of his own life, sets the stage for Mina's redemption, and further refutes the biologically determined science through which Seward initially attempts to define his madness.

Renfield, like Seward, may be read as a materialist, despite the religious wording with which he dresses up his mania. The project upon which he embarks, attempting to prolong his life infinitely through ingesting the vital force of living things, is fundamentally detached from the notion of eternal life that prevails in actual Christianity. As Seward observes, Renfield's prayers that he be furnished with the “distribution of good things” by his master show him to be ultimately concerned with “loaves and fishes” rather than any deeper spiritual reality (98). Later, in Chapter 20, this distinction is made explicit through Renfield and Seward's discussion of lives and souls. Renfield, who is glad to absorb the lives of the animals that he has ingested, and who seemed more than content at one point to absorb Seward's own life, become agitated when he is confronted with the reality of being responsible for the souls of his victims (235-9). This episode, in addition to showing the preliminaries of Renfield's conversion, further establishes the truth illustrated by the soulless Lucy: that the soul is something distinct from the physical body and its vital energies.

Prior to his encounter with Mina, however, Renfield is possibly even more enmeshed in materialism than Seward is. As he confesses during one of his interviews, he has come to the conclusion that life is “a positive and perpetual entity” (206), a belief that strongly echoes that of Gables in his account of the nadir of chloral addiction. Furthermore, one may understand his actions in the earlier portions of the novel as the enactment of the terrible experiments Seward only ponders. While Seward, invoking Ferrier's cortical
mapping experiments, implicitly compares Renfield to a vivisected animal in trying to rationalize allowing him to progress in his zoöphagous behavior, Renfield more decisively equates Seward to an experimental animal by trying to murder him and ingest his blood and vital energy. This dynamic, in which both men dehumanize one another within their materialist paradigms, can only be disrupted once the reality of the soul is made evident, which is precisely what occurs for Renfield when Mina provides a human face to the Count's crimes.

Prior to this moment, Renfield, anxious to consume and absorb as many lives as possible, proves an active and willing participant in the Count's predation and murder of Lucy, even if his attempt at assistance ultimately fails. Renfield's complicity in Lucy's death, however, has gone largely unrecognized by critics, owing to the obtuse and often confusing chronology of Dracula's narrative, particularly in Chapter 11, in which documents alternate between events prior to the Count's final attack on Lucy on the night of September 17 and events following the assault. A clue as to Renfield’s participation, however, is revealed in his initial reaction to meeting Mina, whom he mistakes momentarily for Lucy. While Seward questions him as to how he is aware of Lucy and his own courtship of her and appears to receive an answer, Renfield does not actually provide one. He indicates that the asylum's patients have a deep interest in Seward's personal affairs; however, he never definitively indicates that this is how he attained his knowledge of Lucy Westenra and Seward's interest in her. He leaves Seward to make this connection on his own and ultimately says nothing definitive about the source of his knowledge. His comment that “some of [the asylum's] inmates lean towards the errors of non causae and ignoratio elenchi” (206), is not meant, in fact, to describe the behavior of
his fellow patients; rather, it is meant as a jibe at Seward, who as an “inmate” of his own asylum, takes Renfield's non-cause for a cause and follows a statement unrelated to his initial inquiry.

This sly evasion on Renfield's part hides the truth of his knowledge about Lucy and his complicity in Dracula's final assault upon her. If one examines Chapter 11, evidence appears that Renfield's attempt on Seward's life was instigated by the Count to secure his access to Lucy, as on the night of the 17th, Seward is supposed to be keeping watch over her. While the actual course of events that interferes with Seward carrying out this duty may be traced to Van Helsing's misdirected telegram, Dracula — to our knowledge — has no means of interfering with telegraph addresses and no knowledge as to whether telegrams reach their final destination. He does, however, have knowledge of Van Helsing's intent to assign Seward to watch over Lucy, given the indication that he is present in bat form around the time that Van Helsing leaves Lucy on the 17th (125), assuring her of Seward's arrival (130-1). Renfield's attempt to murder Seward appears to be an action undertaken at the Count's behest with the aim of eliminating Seward and assuring Dracula's access to Lucy. The progression of zoöphagy he has demonstrated thus far is not one in which the consumption of human life would be the next logical step in the course of his own delusions, and the hemophagic behavior he demonstrates after injuring Seward points firmly to the Count as an instigator. To understand how Renfield functions as a Faustian parallel to Seward, it is crucial to understand that it is through this event that he learns about Lucy through his dealings with Dracula and that the reason for his initial, shocked reaction to Mina is the result of him, after a fashion, seeing for the first time the living woman whom he helped to condemn.
By understanding Renfield's interactions with and eventual defense of Mina as a direct extension of Seward's experiences with Lucy, we are offered a continuation that not only reaffirms the failings of materialism but that also models the redemptive empathy that one can experience upon wholly accepting the necessary reality of the soul. Mina, whose goodness is routinely described in beatific, almost inhuman terms serves as a catalyst to transform Renfield's selfish, destructive actions as a lone materialist scientist into the heroic deeds of a man fully convinced of the soul and its importance. More important than the fashion in which Dracula's “light of all lights” serves beacon of hope to Van Helsing and the other protagonists, is the manner in which Mina serves as a reconfiguration of the dead Lucy for Renfield, allowing him another chance to do what is right with regards to the Count's victim. Unlike Lucy, who was abstracted, unknown, and distant, Mina's is immediate, present, and tangible, giving a human face to the atrocities that Renfield previously helped to facilitate.

This immediacy of Mina’s plight allows Renfield to break with what should be his Faustian downfall. Unlike the doomed Margaret, who appears to Faust as an image both before his pursuit and after his abandonment, Mina is alive and present as her life is drawn away because of Renfield's betrayal and Seward's ignorance. Mina, whose spiritual power is felt so sharply by every character whom she encounters, disproves by her existence as a living font of empathy the same materialist paradigm that the undead Lucy disproves by her existence as a body and mind devoid of the soul's divine spark. Renfield, after encountering her, is no longer able to treat human beings as mere animal matter as he was when his only real companion was the equally lost, despondent, and egocentric Seward, who treated Renfield with callousness equal to his own. After encountering
Mina, Renfield — as Seward is quick to discover — must weigh the souls with his victims alongside their lives (235-8). Burdened with this, he takes the actions that Seward could not take with regards to Lucy; he defiantly rescues the Margaret figure with whom he is associated.

While neither Mina nor Lucy is an exact analogue to Margaret as she appears in Goethe, Gounod, or Wills' plays, both are focal points with regards to the moral decisions that must be made by Dracula's two Faustian characters. The influence of Margaret can, of course, be seen most clearly in Lucy, who shares the character's tragic fate and who is placed under a similar shadow of questionable salvation until her redemption is made clear. This connection is underscored by the episode in which Lucy's mother must be removed in order that Dracula may mount his final assault upon her, and it is probably no coincidence that both Wills' adaptation of Faust and Stoker's novel emphasize the use of sleeping draughts and sleep-inducing drugs in the ruination of their respective heroines (Stoker, Dracula 132; Wills 35). Lucy, while she was likely not intended to have been read as sexually suspect prior to her death (Davydov 9-18), nevertheless comes to be guilty, in death, of the same sins as the doomed Margaret. Dracula's assault upon her, while clearly nonconsensual, colors the vampiric Lucy with the same stain of sexual impurity as the seduced Margaret, and Lucy's predation of child victims may be read as analogous to Margaret's infanticide. The stark image of the red thread around Margaret's neck additionally finds its equivalent in Lucy's pinprick marks (Stoker, Dracula 115; Wills 54).

Mina also suffers from a similar sexual stain and visible mark as Margaret, only unlike Lucy, she is innocent of any assault upon children and her case is not beyond hope by the
time it is recognized. Unlike Faust, who abandons Margaret and only makes a cursory attempt to save her once alerted to her situation, and Seward, whose constrained, narrow-minded outlook makes aiding Lucy impossible, Renfield can consciously reject his philosophy of infinite life and his pact with the devilish Count to save Mina from death and perdition, and he proves in this act to be selfless enough to sacrifice the very life he hoped to indefinitely prolong. Just as Seward's encounter with Lucy shields him from falling into the same errors as the despairing Faust, Renfield's encounter with Mina allows him to act as the pact-bound Faust does not — or at least, does not in the narrative that comprises Goethe's *Faust: Part I*, Gounod's opera, and Wills' play. His desperate attempt to stop the Count, in which he wrestles with Dracula while the vampire is in the form of a misty cloud has been observed by *Dracula* annotator Clive Leatherdale to be analogous to Jacob's wrestling with the angel in Genesis (Note 2610). Renfield matches his strength against a supernatural force that he cannot possibly hope to overcome, despite his “madman's strength.” The act of confronting his Satanic master is an act of faith. It is a desperate attempt to do what Van Helsing exhorts his pupil to do when he requests that he believe in things that he cannot (172). Most importantly, however, it is proof that Renfield is capable of free and independent action despite his insanity.

As has been observed above, Seward's early statements about Renfield's mania are inseparable from the young doctor's own materialist leanings. His hope that he can discern a “key” to the mind of a lunatic is mentioned in the same breath as his praises of Burdon-Sanderson and Ferrier, and it seems evident that Seward believes Renfield's mental processes work in such a fashion that they may be comprehensively decoded. While Seward does not go as far as to say that Renfield's behavior is pre-determined by
his illness, his focus on analyzing his patient's zoöphagy rather than treating it seems to indicate that he holds out little hope that Renfield will act outside of the course that the abnormalities of his brain have determined. This view is consistent with the growing medical pessimism regarding mental illness in the late nineteenth century, in which an increasingly large number of asylum cases were deemed to be incurable, with the predominant theory of insanity's origins being that madness originated from physical lesions on the brain (Scull 237-9). Renfield, however, by acting so clearly outside of bounds dictated by his manic delusions, proves that, in some respect, his lunacy is curable and that he is capable to freely act regardless of the physical makeup of his brain.

In crossing the Count, he not only resists the materialism of his own philosophy, but he disproves the biological determinism of Seward's science.

Ultimately, Renfield's redemptive sacrifice serves as a reversal of his own materialism, a short-circuiting of the novel's underlying Faustian narrative, and a final repudiation of the dangerous scientific paradigm to which Seward initially seems to subscribe. It illustrates a move from an egocentric, selfish fixation on the material world to a selfless, empathetic focus on the spiritual nature of man. It is this shift — the progression from the material to the spiritual and from isolation to empathy — that forms the moral core of Dracula's narrative, and this philosophy finds echoes throughout the book. Mr. Swales, for example, is initially introduced to us a man interested in the “truth” regarding dead men's physical remains, offering up complaints about the hypocrisy of erecting tombstones to those whose bodies have been lost at sea and writing hopeful epitaphs for a suicide (65-8). Like Renfield, however, his actions shift once he is directly confronted with the question of the human soul. When he feels his own death is at hand
and he must confront whatever spiritual existence there is in the hereafter, his attitude dramatically softens and he recants his past harsh behavior towards Mina and his impious remarks regarding the dead (73-4). In a mini-narrative that mirrors Seward and Renfield's own, he illustrates this shift so crucial to Stoker's novel, demonstrating that men ought ultimately to be concerned with the life of the soul even in a universe where the perpetual life of the body is possible.
CHAPTER VI

THE HARKERS’ TRIUMPH IN CONTRAST TO THE SEWARD/WESTENRA TRAGEDY

The morality tale that Stoker tells through the figures of Seward and Renfield allows the reader to understand materialism's dangers and see demonstrated the conversion and salvation of materialists. The adventure/romance story that serves as Dracula’s backbone, however, is that of the Harkers, who are heroic in that they never fall under materialism's shadow in the first place. Jonathan Harker, despite some early doubts as to the reality of his situation, can adapt to the supernatural peril in which he finds himself without any outside prompting: a feat that contrasts with Seward's failure. Similarly, Mina Harker, in addition to providing a foil to Lucy Westenra as an alternate Margaret figure, models a balance between scientific/technological acumen and spiritual awareness that allows her to be an active participant in her own salvation. Together, the Harkers illustrate the ideological flexibility that Seward and Renfield lack, and their happy ending shows the boons to be reaped by those who never succumb to the temptation of scientific dogmatism.
In recognizing Seward's centrality to the text as its Faustian tragic hero, it becomes intuitive to compare his actions regarding Lucy to Jonathan Harker's actions regarding his wife. As William Hughes has observed, Stoker's work tends to idealize a highly gendered, chivalric worldview (56), and within this worldview, the fate of women may be understood to rest not entirely upon their own conduct but also upon the merits of the men responsible for their protection. While many Stokerian heroines prove capable of mustering their own defense, the plots of many of Stoker's novels, including *The Snake's Pass*, *The Mystery of the Sea*, *The Lady of the Shroud*, *The Lair of the White Worm*, and *Dracula* itself, feature the rescue of a woman from the threat of death or rape by a man. These narratives often include numerous, overblown invocations of the triumphant masculinity of their heroes, with talk of how “manhood must assert itself” (*Snake's Pass* 187) or how “a woman's distress touches a strong man in direct ratio to his manliness” (*Water's Mou* 41). Such sentiments speak to the importance of Stokerian men meeting certain specifications of masculinity just as Stokerian women must model virtuous femininity. By examining the ways in which Seward and Harker succeed or fail to fulfill these specifications, we arrive at a reading of *Dracula* in which it is Seward's failures as a man, rather than Lucy's failures as woman, that necessitate Lucy's tragic end.

While Stoker's limited range as an author makes many of his protagonists read as similar, a crucial difference exists between the ways in which Harker and Seward operate as *Dracula's* male heroes. In a text featuring a clear conflict between the skeptical, scientific materialism of the “nineteenth century up to date with a vengeance” (41) and the reality of the supernatural, Jonathan Harker can adjust his conception of reality based on the empirical evidence available to him, while John Seward spends much of the novel
inflexibly holding to what he considers to be the truths of modern science. Although he initially disregards the superstitious actions of the Transylvanians and the apotropaic gifts they give him, Harker can shed his biases when facing the truth of his imprisonment by the Count. Although he doubts the reality of his early experiences in the castle, believing himself to have imagined things in his sleep (21) or to have begun to sink into madness (41), he quickly accepts that something outside the range of his experience is occurring and takes care to document what he observes empirically, “entering accurately” in his journal in the hopes that it will calm him and offer him “new lights on certain things that have puzzled [him]” (41). Later, once his experiences are validated by Van Helsing (167-8), he wastes no time before devoting himself to the destruction of the Count. Seward, on the other hand, records that he observes the strange events that befall Lucy during her decline, but he is ultimately unable to draw any meaningful conclusions from them, ignoring Van Helsing's early hints as to the truth and refusing to consider the supernatural after his mentor introduces it. Even after witnessing Lucy's transformation and destruction, Seward's belief in the existence of vampires remains unstable, and he never rises to the same level of triumphant masculinity that his counterpart Harker does.

*Dracula* is structured such that the Harkers' narrative bookends that of Seward and Lucy, opening and closing the novel in such a way as to contrast with the story of Lucy's decline into vampirism. Throughout Stoker's plot outlines for the novel, this central section of *Dracula* is given the header “the Tragedy” (29), marking it as being different from the archetypal adventure/romance of the Harkers whose story structurally parallels a number other Stokerian novels in its narrative of the heroic rescue of a woman by her beloved. We, as readers, move from Jonathan's initial handling of his own doubts to
Seward's mishandling of evidence before coming back to the Harkers who, reunited with one another and guided by Van Helsing, conduct inductive research and compile available evidence such that they may better understand the threat they face. This undertaking sets the stage for the protagonists' eventual triumph, and it forms the literal text of Dracula. The stark shift in narration that occurs at the beginning of Chapter 5, where Jonathan's final descent from the castle segues into Mina and Lucy's exchanges regarding courtship, is arranged such that the reader may believe that Seward is replacing Harker as the novel's hero, as Jonathan's fate is uncertain and Lucy positions the similarly named John as potentially taking his place when she asserts to Mina that he is “a man that would just do for you, if you were not already engaged” (56). While decades of Dracula being widely read and frequently adapted has doubtlessly led audiences to anticipate Jonathan's survival, it is probable that Stoker was attempting to create the illusion in Chapter 5 that Harker had perished and that Dr. Seward was to replace him both in combating the Count and in courting Mina. Anticipating this outcome, the novel's intended audience would be drawn into a critical comparison of how the two heroes approach both the menace of the novel's vampires and the care of the novel's women.

Jonathan, of course, does not die. After the death of Lucy, an event that is clearly facilitated by Seward's insufficiency, we are reintroduced to the Harkers as they grapple with the reality or unreality of Jonathan's experiences. Rather than mirroring Seward's uncomprehending skepticism, however, Mina takes up Jonathan's original work and continues it, re-recording, analyzing, and compiling her husband's firsthand observations. In doing so, she draws on the open-minded empiricism that Stoker saw as at being at odds with the scientific establishment of his era: specifically, the medical scientific
establishment. In his *Famous Impostors*, Stoker writes that “[t]rue medical science has always been suspicious of, and cautious regarding empiricism” (100), and in *Dracula* itself, Van Helsing clearly chastens Seward and the science in which he engages for this quality, saying:

> You do not let your eyes see nor your ears hear, and that which is outside your daily life is not of account to you. Do you not think that there are things which you cannot understand, and yet which are; that some people see things that others cannot? But there are things old and new which must not be contemplate by men's eyes, because they know – or think they know – some things which other men have told them. Ah, it is the fault of our science that it wants to explain all; and if it explain not, then it says there is nothing to explain (170-1).

In contrast to this myopic approach to inquiry, the collaborative efforts of the Harkers model the methods and behavior that could have prevented Lucy's decline and death. Even though Seward and Lucy are not a couple in the finalized text, many of their interactions parallel those imagined by Stoker at the points in his planning process in which he envisioned them as an engaged couple (Davydov 19-20). In this context they may be read as a failed version of the Harkers, with Seward, the man who should rightly be taking on the task of protecting Lucy, failing to appropriately inquire into and intelligently examine the forces placing her in danger. Harker's seeming death at the break between Chapters 4 and 5 ultimately allows readers to understand the correctness of his actions both within the castle and following his recovery. By removing the heroic empiricist Harker from the picture and temporarily replacing him with the tragically dogmatic Seward, Stoker illuminates the consequences of the latter's incompetence in stark contrast to the productive analysis performed by both Harkers.
In the case of Lucy, while the factor that her own behavior plays in her fate has been grossly overstated by previous critics, her passivity stands in stark contrast to Mina's active participation in decoding and compiling the information available regarding the Count. Lucy, who “loathe[s] talking about herself” (105) and makes no inquiry as to her medical condition or the numerous transfusions performed on her behalf, is almost as ill-equipped as Seward to determine the cause of her ailment. Her contribution of a detailed narrative regarding the events of the night of October 2 ultimately proves valuable in piecing together the reality of her experiences as a victim, but unlike the more fortunate Harker, she becomes an empirical observer too late to save herself, and she only diverts from her relative lack of inquisitiveness at a moment of absolute crisis. Mina, on the other hand, is even more proactive in her observations than her husband, taking the lead in unsealing Harker's diary, repeatedly copying out and distributing relevant information, and reaching conclusions about Dracula's behavior based on both historical and personal observations. While she does, like Seward, rely to some degree on scientific authority, using the writings of Lombroso and Nordau to profile Dracula’s criminal behavior (296), her work with regards to the case is always grounded in observable evidence or in experimentation, such as her reversal of the telepathic connection between her and the Count.

With her “man's brain [...] and woman's heart” (207), Mina complements and completes the observational work carried out by her husband in the novel's early chapters, harmoniously working together to unearth information in a way that the materialist Seward and the passive Lucy cannot. While Stoker's misogynist views regarding women's social roles are well-recorded, with him deriding the suffrage
movement in multiple works (*Lady of the Shroud* 316; *Lair of the White Worm* 206) and penning an entire novel on the topic of women's innate submissiveness making them unsuitable to initiate proposals of marriage (*The Man*), Mina is exemplary of his heroines, who are typically highly competent, skilled in traditionally masculine pursuits, and frequently depicted as more adept at handling their respective novels' conflicts than their male counterparts. While his female protagonists universally comply or are brought to comply with Stoker's gender politics, their active participation in whatever endeavor is central to their narrative is of utmost necessity. *The Snake's Pass* 's Norah Joyce (332-3), *The Shoulder of Shasta*'s Esse Elstree (77-8), and *The Man*'s Stephen Norman (285) invert typical stories of rescue in physically saving their male counterparts; *The Lady of the Shroud*'s Teuta Vissarion, despite revoking her claims to political power, demonstrates her worth as a woman skilled in the use of arms, technology, and politics (319); and *The Lair of the White Worms*'s Mimi Salton, a character clearly patterned after Mina, shares her predecessor's unique ability to resist the psychic capabilities of others and takes an active role in confronting the supernatural monsters that populate her world (368-9, 406-8). While the actual “New Woman,” with her disbelief in marriage and her aims at supplanting male societal roles, is thoroughly vilified elsewhere in Stoker, Mina, as an active, inquiring helpmate to her husband, not only serves as an alternative to women like Lucy, whose morally neutral passivity places them in danger, but as part of the complementarian ideal couple of Stokerian fiction in which both man and woman unify industriously in the face of danger or difficulty.

The necessity of Mina's active participation is underscored by the calamity that follows Van Helsing's attempt to remove her from the assembled vampire hunters. When
allowed to act upon her natural inclinations to record, observe, and organize information related to the Count, Mina serves as a catalyst through which her husband may recover his manly vigor and renew his empirical examination of the events in Castle Dracula.

When she is prevented from serving this function, with her sources of information being consciously limited for her ostensible “safety,” she almost immediately falls prey to the same pattern of covert violence that was enacted against Lucy, succumbing to Dracula’s attacks as the men ignore the warning signs of her predation. Even her connection to the more robust Jonathan, who unlike Seward, is not burdened with a dangerously narrow perspective regarding matters of inquiry, is insufficient to save her. It takes Renfield, a character who not merely abandons materialist thought but comes to actively repudiate and combat it, to intervene such that the Count may be intercepted and Mina's ultimate salvation may be secured.

The final chapters of the novel serve to rehabilitate and reunify the novel's primary couple, whose dedication to unselfish, empirically-rooted action allows them to emerge triumphant and revivified where Seward and Lucy could not. While both Harkers face critical afflictions of a gendered nature, with Mina's femininity endangered by her spiritual corruption via the Count's blood and Jonathan's masculinity sapped by witnessing an assault that leaves his hair white and his features unnaturally aged (252, 263), the conclusion of the novel sets all to right. Mina, allowed once more to act in conjunction with the male vampire hunters, takes her observational methodology to extreme ends, using the mechanics of her own tainted blood to telepathically retrieve data regarding the Count's location. Jonathan, impassioned by the trauma of Mina's “baptism” further develops the “true grit” and “volcanic energy” observed in him during the
Harkers' initial meeting with Van Helsing (202), finishing out the novel as a triumphant hero different not only from the morose and ineffectual Seward but also from the hesitant solicitor to whom the reader is introduced in the first chapters of the novel. By doing the precise things that Lucy and Seward do not: acting on inferences, compiling and analyzing information, and allowing observational experience to trump entrenched knowledge, the Harkers are able to effectively hunt and slay the Count, allowing for the removal of Mina's curse, the reaffirmation of Jonathan's virility, and the ultimate union of the couple as an ideal, childbearing familial unit.

Whereas the narrative arc consisting of Lucy's decline, death, re-arising, and ultimate destruction serves to highlight the perils of masculine insufficiency and feminine passivity, the narrative of Jonathan and Mina that surrounds the central tragedy showcases Stoker's vision not only of ideal gendered behavior, but also of robust, inquiry-driven exploration. Seward comes to the end of his skepticism too late to save the object of his affections and Renfield has his moment of conversion too late to save his own life, but the Harkers — whose doubts are brief and whose actions always propel them towards the very means of seeking knowledge that the novel's two tragic heroes reject — ultimately triumph. As with virtually every other Stokerian couple that meets with a happy ending, they serve as an unsubtle object lesson in the beliefs of their author, modeling appropriate scientific inquiry and the ways it ought to be pursued by both sexes.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION:

THE RIDDLE OF DRACULA'S MORAL MESSAGE

In his interview with the British Weekly's Jane Stoddard in July of 1897, Bram Stoker explained in response to a question regarding Dracula's intended moral that, “I suppose that every book of the kind must contain some lesson […] but I prefer that readers should find it out for themselves” (63). That Dracula should, from Stoker's perspective, contain a definite and quantifiable moral should be unsurprising to anyone familiar with his other literary productions — most of which are didactic to the extreme. Even if the exact intended moral of Dracula has been lost to time, it was clearly written with moral intent, and given the vast body of evidence tying the actions and characters in Dracula to the dangers of scholastic dogmatism, biological materialism, and Faustian temptation, it is fair to imagine that this repudiation of irresponsible science was a part of its message.

There is one source in Stoker's notes for the novel that, while garnering very little attention from critics, appears to touch more directly on the novel's underlying philosophy than the myriad of sources concerned with folklore, exotic locations, and psychic phenomena. On two separate pages, Stoker compiled lists of quotations from Thomas Browne's Psuedodoxia Epidemica and Religio Medici. This content partly deals
with such topics as necromancy, the nature of the devil, and the relationship of sleep and death, all of which fit with his general pattern of research. However, among the passages he copied from the *Psuedodoxia* are the following:

“For many things secret are true; sympathies and antipathies are safely authentick unto us, who ignorant of their causes may yet acknowledge their effects.” p. 41

“Many secrets there are in Nature of difficult discovery unto man, of easie knowledge unto Satan.” p. 42

“Whereof having once begot in our minds an assured dependence, he makes us relie on powers which he but precariously obeys, and to desert those true and only charms which Hell cannot withstand.” p. 42

“But of such a diffused nature and so large is the Empire of truth, that it hath place within the walls of Hell, and the Devils themselves are daily forced to practice it ... as well understanding that all community is continued by Truth, and that of Hell cannot consist without it.” p. 49 (177)

These fragments connect the attainment of knowledge and the figure of the devil: two topics which, as we have seen, run deeply throughout *Dracula*. While Browne's copied words do not deliver us a satisfying connection between materialist scientific dogmatism and spiritual damnation, they indicate that many extraordinary things are true, that the devil has access to truths not easily deciphered by man, and that — bound by certain truths as he might be — the devil ensorcelles people such that they forget the truths best positioned to defeat him. Edward van Sloan's *Van Helsing*, some 285 years later — seems to tap into this same line of thought when he proclaims “The strength of the vampire is that people will not believe in him” (*Dracula*)

Enmeshed as it is in both scientific discourse and tales of Faustian temptation, *Dracula* is a text about knowledge, methods of handling knowledge, and knowledge's misapplications. Both Seward and Renfield show their audience that — even in a story whose antagonists are supernatural in nature — experimentation and thought within the
realm of the natural and known world has a menace all its own. Stoker’s vampires, horrifying as they are, cannot compete with the materialist world that ignorant science would fashion: in which the soul — rather than being imperiled — does not exist at all. While Stoker’s motivations regarding the novel cannot ever be fully discerned, the narrative he creates is one in which his villains do not emanate horror so much as they redirect it; they show both the terrible reality of what biologically determined humanity might look like while simultaneously refuting humanity’s soullessness through their own inhumanity. Although there is no affirmation of the afterlife in Dracula, even with its musings on Lucy’s heavenly visage or Quincey’s possible metepsychosis, it is nevertheless a book that offers, as a 1900 review in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle put it, “a light of faith” (109). Even if he will not produce a Christian God for us, Stoker gestures towards heaven by revealing to his readers the face of the devil.
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