Public Requitals: Corrective, Retributive, and Distributive Justice

Bailey Kuklin
Brooklyn Law School

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PUBLIC REQUITALS: CORRECTIVE, RETRIBUTIVE, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

BAILEY KUKLIN*

ABSTRACT

The currently predominant view of public requitals for criminal behavior draws on the deontic guidance provided rather sketchily by Kant’s writings. He offers a broad, formal framework for the mandate to respect others and punish those who criminally violate the mandate. As ethical beings, people have the duty to avoid invading the “autonomy space” of others that is delineated by maxims designed to reasonably and fairly balance everyone’s equal liberty and security interests. Once society settles on a complete and coherent set of maxims that determines the reach of one’s autonomy space, it must then turn to maxims that address the requital repercussions for invasions of this space. In the private realm, our legal regime looks to corrective justice for guidance. In the public, criminal realm we turn to . . . . Well, here is where a deep debate resides. Might we think of punishment as corrective justice writ large? This does not seem promising since our intuitions and traditions emphasize the blameworthiness of the criminal autonomy invader, which corrective justice downplays. Instead, should we turn to conceptions of retribution, as Kant asserts? If so, what are the parameters of retribution? While this is more promising, I believe the prominent role of blameworthiness in our judgments of apt punishment are best situated by conceptions of distributive justice. Defending and developing this position is the primary burden of this Article. After explicating the key elements of autonomy space and requitals for its invasion, including “dignity,” “respect,” “responsibility,” “consent,” “harm,” “wrongful harm,” and especially “blameworthiness,” I turn to the process by which these elements may be integrated and implemented in a just penal regime centered on distributive justice.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The notion of autonomy is at the heart of the modern discussion of rights and duties. While consequentialist utilitarians, such as J.S. Mill, offer a basis for honoring autonomy claims, individualistic deontology dominates the current debate among commentators about the reach of the protections issuing from the obligation to respect a person’s autonomy. This debate involves two important questions. First, what is the justification for a person’s autonomy claims? Second, when there has been a violation of recognized claims, what is a proper requital? In prior articles, I addressed the first question, as well as the second question regarding requitals for invasions of private rights, such as torts. In this Article, I address requitals in the public, criminal context.

To arrive at the question of requitals for autonomy invasions, I will first summarize the reasoning in my prior work that led me to identify the reach of autonomy claims. This starts, of course, with Kant, the seminal deontologist. Kant places the right and duty to respect a person’s dignity at the center of practical reasoning. According to Kant, a person, by virtue of her capacity for rationality, is an ethical being whose autonomy is entitled to respect and who, likewise, is obligated to respect the autonomy of other ethical beings. Every moral agent is entitled to the maximum amount of freedom consistent with an equal freedom for others. Because a person’s exercise of her interest in freedom often is incompatible with the freedom interests of others, there must be a means of resolving these conflicts. Consequently, inconsistent exercises of liberty interests (positive freedom) and security interests (negative freedom) must be balanced by the adoption of norms or maxims of conduct.

Under Kant, the balancing process that produces adopted maxims must meet the constraints of the categorical imperative. The most important forms of the categorical imperative for our purposes are, first, that maxims are to be universalized, meaning that they must apply equally to all within the class of persons covered by the maxims.

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2 Bailey Kuklin, Private Requitals, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 965 (2016) [hereinafter Kuklin, Private Requitals].

3 Id.

4 Id. at 967–68.

5 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785), reprinted in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 37, 41 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) [hereinafter KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS].

6 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 381.

7 Id. at 390–91.

8 “[A]ct only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 5, at 73 (emphasis omitted). This mandate “can be called the Formula of Universal Law . . . .” PAUL GUYER, KANT ON FREEDOM, LAW, AND HAPPINESS 142 (2000).
Second, moral agents are to be treated as ends in themselves and not as a means only to another’s ends. As an aspect of exercising her autonomous freedom, each agent is to adopt maxims that govern her own conduct while respecting the equal autonomy interests of others. Since the constraints of the categorical imperative usually are seen as formal only, within these limitations, in principle, an agent may adopt any one of an infinite number of complete and coherent sets of deontic maxims. What, then, is to be done when the proper maxims adopted by one agent are inconsistent with the proper maxims adopted by another? From a private, entirely individualized perspective, this problem is intractable. Kant resolved this problem by finding a nonconsensual social contract that obligates everyone. One might argue that ignoring the consent of the governed is not very Kantian, at least in light of Kant’s deep concern for personal autonomy. Others have resolved this problem by basing political obligation on a social contract grounded on such propositions as hypothetical or tacit consent, or notions of fairness. From a personal autonomy perspective, I see much hand waving in these solutions, but I am relegated to hand waving myself. The foundational disagreements between Kantian liberals and Kantian libertarians, and others, are understandable. Therefore, I rely on a deus ex machina of sorts that grants a just government the power to adopt a complete and coherent set of legal maxims, as long as each maxim satisfies the categorical imperative. Likewise, a community may establish a set of non-legal, moral norms.

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9 “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 5, at 80 (emphasis omitted). This form or formulation is referred to as “the Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself . . . .” GUYER, supra note 8, at 142.


12 See generally Jens Timmermann, Kant’s Puzzling Ethics of Maxims, 8 HARV. REV. PHIL. 39, 43 (2000).


14 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 385–86.


16 See generally Jason Kuznicki, Kantianism, in ARGUMENTS FOR LIBERTY 87, 87–122 (Aaron Ross Powell & Grant Babcock eds., 2016).
With this shaky foundation in place, we are now ready for the business of adopting maxims. Maxims establish the extent of a person’s autonomy claims. I refer to this ambit, as have others, by using a spatial metaphor—autonomy space. The adoption of deontic maxims delineates a person’s autonomy space. For instance, “do not assault another person” protects a person from certain kinds of harms. Once these types of substantive, first-order maxims are adopted, the boundaries they establish may generally be adjusted by the consent of the protected party. In case there is a nonconsensual violation of these maxims, we must turn our attention to apt responses to the autonomy space invasion. This requires the adoption of requital, second-order maxims. In the private realm, the standard for Kantians is to look to Aristotle’s concept of corrective justice for guidance. In the public, criminal realm, we usually look to the concept of retribution, as did Kant.

The Kantian process of identifying autonomy space, and then protecting against invasions of it, is not simple and straightforward. A person’s material autonomy space, her freedom in practice, is demarcated not only by substantive maxims, but also by the maxims that are embraced to requisite invasions. Hence, if for no other reason, these requital maxims must also satisfy the categorical imperative. Corrective justice and retribution are up to this task in principle, but like the categorical imperative itself, they both have a formal quality. In other words, each of these two concepts have many deontically justifiable conceptions. For example, an invasion of the autonomy space delineated by an assault maxim may trigger an associated legal or moral requital maxim that, perhaps depending on the particularities of the assault, may call for general damages for harms, damages for only particular kinds or extents of harms, or simply for a sincere apology that acknowledges the invader’s disregard of the invadee’s protected dignity interest. An assaulter effectively has greater freedom under a requital maxim that requires an apology than one that exacts general

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17 Timmermann, supra note 12, at 39.
18 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 380.
19 Some boundary markers are, most commentators would argue, immutable or inalienable, such as the disallowance of slavery contracts. Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 394. Allowable consent does not simply serve as an excuse for autonomy invasions; instead, it readjusts the autonomy space boundary such that the consensual actions impacting on the consenter’s baseline, pre-consensual autonomy space, do not constitute invasions at all. Under the Consent Principle I favor, the greater the negative effect of the consensual conduct on the consenter’s baseline autonomy space, the deeper, more understanding, must be the consent. For further development of this principle, see infra text accompanying notes 489–93.
20 Kuklin, Public Requitals, supra note 2, at 972.
21 Id. at 979.
22 Frederick Rauscher, Kant’s Social and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 24, 2007), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/.
23 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 381.
24 Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 990.
25 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 388.
26 Id.
damages. The assaulter’s personal resources and future options are less at risk from her invasive conduct. Vice versa for the person assaulted.

In considering plausible maxims for adoption, we must attend to the harms, the setbacks to interest, that go onto the scales balancing liberty and security interests. As Kantians, the central harm is to one’s dignitary interest, the right to be respected and treated as a moral equal. Associated with dignitary harm are the standard types of harms recognized in legal and moral practice: physical, economic, and psychic. These four types of harms may be direct, immediate harms or indirect, reactive harms. A direct or immediate harm is the usual, quotidian sort, as where a battery causes physical injury, medical expenses, and pain and suffering. An indirect or reactive harm is a product of an awareness of an autonomy space invasion, as where the public responds to the knowledge of a crime spree by fright, expenditures for protective measures, and even physical illness from the psychic distress. Reactive harms may be convoluted. A targeted invadee may suffer them when, for example, she becomes aware that she is the object of an intended invasion before the invader even begins to carry out her planned incursion. As another instance, a person may silently suffer invasive abuse from her partner that begins to negatively affect her work. When she perceives that her coworkers have begun to question her abilities or work ethic, she may suffer reactive harms of all four types, which may increase her coworkers’ unfavorable perceptions, etc. The kin, kith, and supporters of an invadee and, for that matter, an invader, may suffer reactive harms from their perceptions of the interaction between the invader and direct invadee. Reactive harms are, I argue, a crucial, perhaps underappreciated element in a deontic realm, especially in the retributive context of criminal law.

A harm principle, such as those advanced by J.S. Mill or Joel Feinberg, establishes limits to the acceptable constraints on liberty, and reciprocally, the protection of security. For instance, some types of harms, deemed self-regarding

27 Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 974.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 For “harm” as a setback to interest, see JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 31–64 (1984) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS].
31 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 390, 427.
32 Id. at 427.
33 See id. at 433.
34 Id. at 430–32.
35 Id. at 433.
36 Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 1010.
37 See FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 30, at 10–14, 26–27; JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 134–67 (4th ed. London 1869) (“Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual”).
harm principle. With this in mind, when establishing a complete and coherent set of substantive and requital maxims within deontic constraints, the notion of culpability or blameworthiness traditionally and intuitively is seen as an important factor. As individualistic deontologists, we are concerned with the just deserts of the invader, and perhaps the invadee as well, especially when delineating conceptions of retribution. Therefore, acceptable meanings of desert must be identified. While we may find some room for truly strict liability, it makes most deontologists uncomfortable, particularly in the criminal law realm, for its failure to weigh in the actor’s blameworthiness.

The genus of blameworthiness has two species. First, “responsibility blameworthiness” harkens back to Aristotle’s position that fully responsible choices and actions must be free of unavoidable ignorance and coercion. At some point, depending on the situation, a person’s choice is too impaired to fairly hold her responsible for it, or at least, fully responsible. She has not adequately chosen, or “consented to” in some sense, her own conduct. Second, “disrespect blameworthiness” accounts for Kant’s insistence that one has the duty to respect the equal dignity of other rational, ethical beings. Disrespect blameworthiness must be distinguished from dignitary harm. Dignitary harm is judged from the invadee’s perspective, while disrespect blameworthiness is gauged from the invader’s perspective. An agent who beneficently paternalizes another person produces a dignitary harm by denying that person the liberty to choose for herself, even when such action produces no other harm and is prompted by love for the person. An agent who consensually assists another person to successfully diet is disrespect blameworthy when the motive for the aid, unbeknownst to the dieter, is to see her suffer during the process.

Both responsibility blameworthiness and disrespect blameworthiness may be adopted as factors in substantive maxims and associated requital maxims. For example, here are plausible high-level substantive and associated requital maxims (that need much unpacking): “[d]o not unreasonably harm another person through (responsibility) blameworthy conduct”; “[i]f one unreasonably harms another person through (responsibility) blameworthy conduct, then one is to compensate that person...”

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39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 446.
42 Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 969.
44 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 446.
45 Id. at 453.
to the extent of the harm and one’s (disrespect) blameworthiness.”\textsuperscript{46} In the course of working out a complete set of substantive maxims to establish autonomy space boundaries, some types of situational features are salient: intentional harm; truth-telling and promise-keeping; reliance and expectations; exploitation (advantage-taking); risk imposition; and the existence of established norms, such as statutes, customs, and mores.\textsuperscript{47} This Article mainly focuses on the plausible retributive requital maxims for violation of substantive maxims related to the aforementioned situations and others, all of which require balancing the liberty and security interests of moral agents.

As should be evident already, I have projected a rocky road to map. Commentators have not identified a way to apply the theory of retributive punishment to an actual measure of levels of punishment.\textsuperscript{48} The application of corrective justice has not generated as much complaint, but this lack of dissatisfaction is apparently because the concept largely has been narrowed to the single conception of returning an invadee to the position she occupied prior to the invasion.\textsuperscript{49} The invader’s blameworthiness plays a minor role in gauging the private requital.\textsuperscript{50} One may strongly argue against this position, however, for minimal negligence may ground enormous damage recoveries, or vice versa. The public realm of punishment is quite to the contrary when it comes to accounting for blameworthiness. Our legacies and feelings about punishment invoke the concept of just deserts, which puts blameworthiness on center stage.\textsuperscript{51} Once we put responsibility and disrespect blameworthiness into the limelight, and the means to accommodate these factors in measures of requital, all hope of clearly implied, mechanical applications in the private and public realms vanish. Thus, the rocky road will not reach a definitive final destination. Traveling that road will, I hope, show some of the potholes, gullies, and chasms that must be avoided or leaped.


\textsuperscript{47} See Kuklin, \textit{Private Requitals}, supra note 2, at 1020–25 (“Norms”).


\textsuperscript{49} Kuklin, \textit{Constructing Autonomy}, supra note 1, at 416.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Id.} at 439.

\textsuperscript{51} “Under a distributive principle of ‘deontological desert’ . . . , the sole criterion for punishment is the actor’s moral blameworthiness, a matter of moral philosophy. . . . The degree of an offender’s blameworthiness depends upon both the seriousness of the violation and the extent of the person’s moral accountability for it.” \textit{PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW} 11 (2008) [hereinafter ROBINSON, \textit{DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES}]. “Culpability, it should be noted, affects both questions of liability (‘Should the person be punished at all?’) and questions of allocation (‘How severely should he be punished?’”). \textit{ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE} 80 n.* (1976) [hereinafter VON HIRSCH, \textit{DOING JUSTICE}].
II. CORRECTIVE, RETRIBUTIVE, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

In a deontic regime, autonomy space is specified by adopted maxims. Invasions of autonomy space are requited by conceptions and applications of deontic justice. In the private sphere of tort, contract, and unjust enrichment, conceptions of corrective justice are invoked as requital standards. In the public sphere of criminal law, conceptions of retribution are commonly invoked. As Aristotle declares, conceptions of distributive justice also play a role in the public sphere. The interrelationship among these three forms of justice is not settled. Some commentators contend that retributive justice is simply corrective justice writ large. Corrective justice is said to account for wrongful harms to specific protected individuals, while retributive justice accounts for wrongful harms to the general public, though both forms of justice are gauged in a similar manner. While this view has attractive features, the usual, more

52 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 392.

53 Id. at 381.

54 Id.


56 In working out the relationship among the three forms of justice, “a number of conflicting solutions have been advanced . . .: (1) retribution makes part of distributive justice; (2) it is part of corrective justice; (3) it is a third form of justice; (4) it is a distinct idea that can be applied to the basic two forms of particular justice.” ENGLARD, supra note 55, at 9–10. As for the difference between distributive justice and corrective justice, Sadurski finds “the distinction is not as clear in actual social life as it is in theory . . . .” WOJCIECH SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE 25 (1985) [hereinafter SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE]; see id. at 25–36. “Because corrective and distributive justice are mutually irreducible structures of justificatory coherence, a single legal relationship cannot coherently partake of both.” Ernest J. Weinrib, The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 583, 589 (1993). For elaboration, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 84–93 (2003).


58 “[I]t is desired that a theory of punishment concern itself with corrective justice, as that is its principal aim. . . . [T]his is meant to caution against a theory of punishment’s placing considerations other than those of corrective justice (e.g., distributive justice) at the forefront of concern in punishment.” J. ANGELO CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT 22 (rev. 2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT]. “[A]ccording to Aquinas retribution is embedded in corrective justice: rectification of wrongful conduct must take into account the fact that injury has been caused not only to a private person, but also to the state or to the public at large through violation of their interest in individual security.” Ronen Perry, The Third Form of Justice, 23 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 233, 239 (2010) [hereinafter Perry, The Third Form of Justice] (citing ENGLARD, supra note 55, at 19–20 (citing Aquinas)). Perry states, “[i]n my view, applying the notion of retributive justice cannot be deemed as vindicating an independent state interest but as an attempt to vindicate the aggregate interest of law abiding citizens.” Id. at 241 n.67. Perry finds substantial differences between retribution and corrective justice. See id. at 239–42. “[T]here is now no danger of confusion or collision between the principle of Reparative and that of Retributive Justice, as the one is manifestly concerned with the claims of the injured party, and the other with the deserts of the wrongdoer . . . .” Henry
appealing, conceptions of corrective justice fail to satisfactorily incorporate the centrality of just deserts in conceptions of retributive justice. Moral luck, for instance, may crucially affect whether, and the extent to which, an invader’s obligations under corrective justice correlate to her degree of blameworthiness. As two examples, under (non)responsibility for moral luck, an invader’s outrageously evil motivation may produce little harm, as where a delivery accident destroyed the large shipment of drugs she poisoned. Alternatively, her minimal wrongfulness may cause enormous harm, as where she inadvertently rammed a school bus over a cliff. For the conceptions of retribution that I embrace, blameworthiness must always be kept under the magnifying glass. Corrective justice, in general terms, obligates an invader to restore the invadee to her position prior to the invader’s conduct. Retribution is to

Sidgwick, *Justice as Desert*, in *What Do We Deserve?: A Reader on Justice and Desert* 47, 52 (Louis P. Pojman & Owen McLeod eds., 1999). “[T]he problem is to explain the notion of a public wrong in a way which does not denigrate the wrong done to the individual victim . . . .” Duff, *Penal Communications*, supra note 48, at 79. “The wrong suffered by the mugging victim is ‘her’ wrong: but insofar as we identify ourselves with her, as we should, as a fellow member of the community, it becomes ‘our’ wrong too.” *Id.* I would say, we are also harmed.

While some argue that corrective justice subsumes retribution, a welfarist may turn this around. In discussing the notion of fairness, concerned with making the injurer pay for the harm he has occasioned. . . . [Kaplow and Shavell] find it convenient to refer to such a notion of fairness as one involving punishment, whether the motivation for the notion pertains to retribution, the desire to rectify the outcome created by the injurer’s action . . . or some other reason.


59 “Although in my own view, corrective justice is not this focused on wrongdoing to the exclusion of culpability, it remains true that wrongdoing, and not culpability, is the main trigger for corrective justice duties.” Michael S. Moore, *Prima Facie Moral Culpability*, 76 B.U. L. REV. 319, 331 (1996) [hereinafter Moore, *Prima Facie Moral Culpability*].


61 Perry, *The Third Form of Justice*, supra note 58, at 240.

62 “[E]ven where wrongful conduct results in harm, the extent of damages under corrective justice is determined by the fortuitous amount of the victim’s loss, which is usually a poor measure of the gravity of the wrong.” *Id.* at 240, 240 n.64. For more on moral luck, see infra text accompanying notes 333–34.

63 “Nowadays, the dominant tendency in criminal law theory is to derive the conditions of penal liability and of exculpation from a moral theory of inward blameworthiness for wrongdoing.” Alan Brudner, *Punishment and Freedom: A Liberal Theory of Penal Justice* 17 (2009) (citing exceptions).

64 “[T]ort law does not purport to provide remedies proportional to the injurer’s wrong: normally, compensation is the remedy, whatever the nature of the tort or wrong. . . . [T]he tort remedy usually does not vary with the culpability of the injurer.” Kenneth W. Simons, *The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives*, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719, 721
punish an invader in proportion to her just deserts irrespective of the fortuitous impact of her conduct on the invadees and her obligations to them under corrective justice.65

Some commentators argue that an interrelationship exists between corrective and distributive justice,66 or among corrective justice, distributive justice, and retribution.67 Some see an unbridgeable gap between corrective and retributive justice.68 I subscribe
to the view that retributive justice fits most comfortably within conceptions of distributive justice that place just deserts on center stage.69 This view requires specification of the idea of just deserts.70


69 “Some [retributivists] regard the punishment of wrongdoers as derivative from a fundamental axiom of justice that wrongdoers deserve to suffer. Other retributivists try to connect punishment with broader issues of distributive justice, or justice in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social life.” C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 5 (1987). “The literature rarely rationalizes punishment in terms of distributive justice.” Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1181, 1201 (1994) (footnote omitted). “With few exceptions . . . there has been no deliberate effort to propose a principle or set of principles which apply uniformly to the retributive and distributive aspects of ‘doing justice’. There has been no congruence between these two realms in modern literature, nor (I suspect) in most popular thinking.” Wojciech Sadurski, Social Justice and the Problem of Punishment, 25 ISR. L. REV. 302, 304 (1991) [hereinafter Sadurski, Social Justice] (citing ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978)). For a discussion of whether retribution is properly considered an aspect of distributive justice, see Perry, The Third Form of Justice, supra note 58, at 242–45, who finds more differences than alignments. Perry discusses whether retribution is an amalgam of corrective and distributive justice. Id. at 245–46. But, ultimately, he subscribes to the view that retribution is a third form of justice. Id. at 246–47. Sadurski, “suggest[s] that there is no reason to avoid the application of a principle of distributive justice (that is, justice in the distribution of good things) to retributive justice.” Wojciech Sadurski, Distributive Justice and the Theory of Punishment, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 47 (1985) (noting Rawls’s disagreement as well).

70 “Among the great ethical theorists of the past, Aristotle, Butler, Price, Kant and Hegel all made considerable use of the notion of desert, yet none of them, with the possible exception
The literature identifies two broad categories of desert, one that is based on equality values and the other on liberty values. Examples of equality-grounded

of Price, made any real endeavor to analyse [sic] the concept.” John Kleinig, Punishment and Desert 50 (1973) [hereinafter Kleinig, Punishment and Desert]. “By ‘punishment according to desert’ I mean punishment according to the offender’s personal blameworthiness for the past offense, which takes account not only of the seriousness of the offense but also the full range of culpability, capacity, and situational factors that we understand to affect an offender’s blameworthiness.” Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.I.’s Proposed Distributive Principle of ‘Limiting Retributivism’: Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other than Pure Desert?, 7Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 3, 5 n.5 (2003) [hereinafter Robinson, Limiting Retributivism] (noting that “all thoughtful desert advocates that I know essentially support the description I have offered here”). Robinson finds “at least three distinct conceptions of desert to be found in the current debates, typically without distinction being made between them. The three include what might be called vengeful desert, deontological desert, and empirical desert.” Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 Cambridge L.J. 145, 146 (2008) [hereinafter Robinson, Competing Conceptions]. “[T]he primary focus of vengeful desert remains the extent of the harm of the offence.” Id. at 147 (first citing Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values 17 (1994); then citing Ten, supra note 69, at 152). “The deontological conception of desert focuses not on the harm of the offense but on the blameworthiness of the offender, as drawn from the arguments and analyses of moral philosophy.” Id. at 148 (footnote omitted). “Empirical desert, like deontological desert, focuses on the blameworthiness of the offender. But in determining the principles by which punishment is to be assessed, it looks not to philosophical analyses but rather to the community’s intuitions of justice.” Id. at 149. While there are difficulties with all three conceptions, “it seems clear that the usefulness of the ongoing debate over desert as a distributive principle can only be enhanced by distinguishing these three conceptions of it.” Id. at 175. Scheid identifies three “contrasting notions of punitive desert as statements of desert principles,” none of which specifically focuses on the blameworthiness of the invader. Don E. Scheid, Davis, Unfair Advantage Theory, and Criminal Desert, 14 Law & Phil. 375, 399 n.52 (1995) [hereinafter Scheid, Davis] (noting that the traditional retributivist looks to the harm caused, compensation theories turn on the damages caused, and the unfair-advantage theory center on the illicitly gained advantage). “An adequate account of desert may grow rather complex.” Shelly Kagan, The Geometry of Desert 5 (2012). For some of the complexities, see id. at 5–12. Kagan grounds desert on a person’s virtue. Id. at 251.

conceptions of desert include the view that each individual is to receive according to her needs, rank, legal entitlement (society’s rules, e.g., statutory welfare), or “same thing” (as equals). This equality notion of desert relates to a person’s state of being. Under Kant, it is by virtue of having the capacity to be a rational, ethical being that one’s state of being entitles one to respect. Indeed, apparently because the requirements for meeting this notion of desert are so minimal, rather than saying one “deserves” the benefits of society’s rules, for example, saying that one is “entitled” to them is more common. Examples of liberty-grounded conceptions of desert, on the other hand, argue that each is to receive according to her merit, ability, achievement, virtue, effort, sacrifice, works, contribution, or agreements with others. This liberty notion of desert relates to a person’s conduct. A person who does praiseworthy or blameworthy conduct is to be requited accordingly.

This Article argues that the conduct, liberty-driven conceptions of distributive justice are the conceptions that best fit into a retributive calculus. While the basic impose onto this intuition philosophical vigor.” Alice G. Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727, 739 (2009). “We often claim that . . . punishment merely gives offenders what they deserve, but we have no coherent theory of deserts which justifies the claim.” Ten, supra note 69, at 164.


73 Id.

74 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 383–84.

75 See McLeod, Introduction, supra note 71, at 67–68; Owen McLeod, Desert and Institutions, in WHAT DO WE DESERVE?, supra note 58, at 186, 186; Kleinig, The Concept of Desert, supra note 71, at 88–89. Rawls, for example, writes that “what we can say is that, in the traditional phrase, a just scheme gives each person his due: that is, it allots to each what he is entitled to as defined by the scheme itself.” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 275–76 (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter Rawls, A Theory of Justice]. David Miller, holding that desert relates to conduct, objects to considering need or entitlement as a basis for desert. David Miller, Deserts, in WHAT DO WE DESERVE?, supra note 58, at 93.

76 Celello, supra note 72.

77 See, e.g., Sher, Desert, supra note 48, at 37–52.

78 Rawls has famously, and influentially, challenged the view that one’s desert should be based on conduct, because a person does not deserve her natural endowments or superior character that facilitate the cultivation of her abilities. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 75, at 87. Hence, “most contemporary political philosophy, especially liberal political philosophy, the dominant contemporary form, has renounced or greatly undermined the notion of desert.” Louis P. Pojman, Introduction to Historical Interpretations of Desert, in WHAT DO WE DESERVE?, supra note 58, at 1, 6 (footnote omitted). “The leading political philosophers of our time . . . reject or undermine the idea of justice as rewarding desert or merit as inegalitarian and/or based on false consciousness.” Louis P. Pojman, Does Equality Trump Desert?, in WHAT DO WE DESERVE?, supra note 58, at 283 (footnote omitted) (identifying thirteen philosophers “to name a few”). This aspect of the debate about justice will not be addressed here. Instead, I target the question of what desert-based justice, if embraced, should consider.

79 Thus, I reject the position that retributive punishment is to be gauged by the invader’s character. Character, as a state of being, would be relevant to an equality-based notion of desert. All persons with the same character deserve the same positive or negative requital. Instead, I
duty to respect others is grounded on an equality conception of desert, the reach of any breach of that duty is gauged by a liberty conception. More specifically, (de)meritorious conduct has overtones of Kant’s focus on the freedom interests of an ethical being. Adopted maxims that apply universally balance her liberty and security interests. When conduct that has been declared criminal by a properly adopted maxim disrupts this balance, the blameworthiness of that wrongful conduct provides the gauge for a just retributive requital. A wrongful criminal invasion of another’s established autonomy space is disrespectful of the invadee’s equal dignity. The blameworthiness of the dignitary wrong is, in its turn, gauged by the reaction of the knowing public as perceived by an objective observer representing the deontic views of society.

In light of this orientation of the three forms of justice, insofar as a person’s conduct wrongfully harms another person, corrective justice requires that she favor the position that retributive punishment is to be gauged by the invader’s conduct. This is grounded on a liberty-based notion of desert. I subscribe to Brudner’s view: “Not only is the character theory at odds with well-settled and defensible features of the criminal law; it is also intrinsically deficient as a theory of criminal desert.” BRUDNER, supra note 63, at 69; see infra note 346.

80 Dillon points out that our commonsense notion of personal worth has two aspects. “On the one hand, there is the intrinsic worth, which Kant called ‘dignity,’ that each of us has simply by virtue of being a person rather than a rock or a tree.” Robin S. Dillon, Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect, in DIGNITY, CHARACTER, AND SELF-RESPECT 290, 292 (Robin S. Dillon ed., 1995). “On the other hand, there is a kind of worth or merit we may earn through what we do and become, which individuals can have in varying degrees, and which some may lack altogether.” Id. Darwall refers to the first of these as “recognition respect” and the second as “appraisal respect.” Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, in DIGNITY, CHARACTER, AND SELF-RESPECT, supra, at 181, 183–84.

81 Johnson & Cureton, supra note 10.

82 “[A]n adequately justificatory account of a system of criminal law, trials and punishments must be founded on the Kantian principle of respect for individual autonomy . . . .” R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 11 (1986) [hereinafter DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS]. “On the question of just what it is that translates an action into one of ‘offense’ and the actor as ‘offender,’ it has been argued that crimes generically are acts of disrespect and therefore that punishment functions as a rectification.” DANIEL N. ROBINSON, PRAISE AND BLAME: MORAL REALISM AND ITS APPLICATIONS 181 (2002) [hereinafter ROBINSON, PRAISE AND BLAME].

83 Cf. Kenneth S. Abraham, Custom, Noncustomary Practice, and Negligence, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1784, 1820 (2009) (citing Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1195–96 (2001) (“[T]he jury is described as the conscience of the community in negligence cases.”); see generally DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 82, at 39–73 (“Criticism, Blame and Moral Punishment”). Relatedly, Robinson argues that the problems of gauging blameworthiness can be addressed by looking not at the philosophical analysis of deontological desert, but rather to empirical desert. Empirical desert looks “to the community’s intuitions of justice. The primary source of empirical desert principles . . . is not moral philosophy but empirical research into the factors that drive people’s intuitions of blameworthiness.” ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 51, at 139 (footnote omitted). In gauging empirical desert, Robinson would exclude bias from “political or social context or . . . other factors, such as race or class . . . .” Id.
compensate the invadee by, typically, restoring her to her prior, protected position. Insofar as a person’s conduct is criminally blameworthy, irrespective of whether restoration is implicated, her just deserts under distributive justice call for retributive punishment. Praiseworthy behavior, often forgotten in these discussions, may call for rewards granted by some organ of the government.

Respect the equal dignity of all ethical, autonomous beings. Do not sacrifice autonomous agents merely for the sake of social welfare. With these underpinnings in place, collectives, such as corporations and governmental entities, do not have independent claims. They are not ethical beings. While we may grant the state standing to bring claims against individuals as a representative of the general public,

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84 “Should we understand torts as moral wrongs or as legal wrongs? For sound doctrinal reasons, tort theorists have been disinclined to cast torts as moral wrongs. For a different set of jurisprudential reasons, they have instead treated torts as legal wrongs.” John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 930 (2010). Despite the authors’ examples of strict-liability type torts, among other reasons, as suggested in the later discussion of social norms as a source of moral duties, I doubt that moral and legal wrongs can be neatly separated. Goldberg and Zipursky also see an intricate intertwining. See id. at 947–53.

85 Alexander and Ferzan “argue[] that negative desert, the measure of just punishment, is solely a function of the culpability of the offender.” Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes: Retribution or Prevention?, in SEEKING SECURITY: PREEMPTING THE COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL HARMs 103, 103 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012) [hereinafter Alexander & Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes] (citing LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY (2009) [hereinafter ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY]). Culpability, in its turn, has two factors. First, “the risks to others’ legally protected interests that the actor believes his action is ‘unleashing’ beyond his ability to alter.” Id. Second, “the reasons the actor perceives in favour of and against imposing the risks.” Id. at 104. “In essence, we reduce[] all culpability assessments to that of recklessness.” Id.

86 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 375.

87 Id.

88 Rather than referring to crime as harm to the state, Murphy prefers “to think of crime as an invasion by an individual into an area of decision making and action that is properly reserved to the state as part of its necessary job that we, as its ‘clients,’ might think of ourselves as ‘hiring’ it to do.” JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Why Have Criminal Law at All?, in RETRIBUTION RECONSIDERED 1, 10 (1992) [hereinafter MURPHY, Why Have Criminal Law at All?]. “[I]n the case of retributive justice the State acts as an enforcer of the duties which precede it, and which obtain irrespective of the State’s existence.” Sadurski, Social Justice, supra note 69, at 321. “According to some, a so-called legal relation between an individual and a collectivity, like the state or a corporation, may be reduced to multiple legal relations between that individual and all other individuals composing the collectivity.” Ronen Perry, Correlativity, 28 LAW & PHIL. 537, 545 (2009) (citing Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 165 (1919)). “Richard Swinburne, in his recommendation of retributive punishment, indicated that the state only has authority to impose punishment for criminal harm where it serves as a proxy for the individual harmed.” Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 19, 25 (2003) (citing ROBINSON, PRAISE AND BLAME, supra note 82, at 183). Moreover, another problem with group rights is that they “consign individuals to dependence sustained by their conformity.” GEORGE KATER, HUMAN DIGNITY 12 (2011).

“Just because the offender might deserve punishment, it does not follow—without an appropriate theory of state power—that the state should assess the degree of deserved
as, arguably, for public nuisance, even a unanimously consented-to social contract cannot make the state into an ethical being with independent autonomy interests of a relevant type. The state may have independent claims against other collective entities, particularly other states, but any use of the idea of autonomy in this context is based on a different understanding of the term “autonomy”—one that is not based on moral agency in a germane, deontic sense.

From this viewpoint that the state has no independent autonomy claims of a relevant sort, the question again arises as to whether there is in principle a difference between corrective justice and retribution. The difference, arguably, relates to the punishment and use its power to impose it on the offender.” George P. Fletcher, 1 The Grammar of Criminal Law 153 (2007) [hereinafter Fletcher, Grammar of Criminal Law] (referring to the assumption that the state is entitled to punish criminals as “one of the unfortunate banalities of criminal law in our time”).

89 See Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 643 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (“No better definition of a public nuisance has been suggested than that of an act or omission ‘which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty’s subjects.’” (quoting R v. Price, [1884] 12 Q.B.D. 247 (Stephen, J.).)

Duff writes of crimes that “count as ‘public’ . . . simply because they wrong or harm the public collectively or the polity as a whole,” such as treason and tax evasion, as well as a crime that is a “kind of ‘public nuisance’: ‘which is so widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its effect that it . . . should be taken on the responsibility of the community at large.’” R.A. Duff, Answering for Crime 140 (2007) [hereinafter Duff, Answering for Crime] (quoting A-G v. P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd., [1957] 1 All E.R. 894, 908 (Can.) (Denning, L.J.)). I see all crimes based on deontic principles as offenses to the general public, not to the state in an independent capacity. In other words, the principles behind public nuisance apply to all so-called crimes against the state. But the relevant, key principles of public nuisance are driven by convenience, not deontic demands. There is nothing in deontic principle that would disallow every person harmed by a public nuisance from standing to bring an action against the tortfeasor. We choose otherwise if for no other reason than the relative administrative costs. Thus, arguably, the state is delegated authority to sue on behalf of individual harmed parties, as in a class action. “A liberty-protecting state, in short, will always establish a preference for protecting rights through private means; it will adopt criminal prohibition only in those cases where it seems reasonable to believe that private means will be insufficient.” Murphy, Why Have Criminal Law at All?, supra note 88, at 11. Kant has a somewhat different view of the role of the state and its officials. “Kant’s claim . . . is not that citizens actively entrust their affairs to the state, nor even that officials act for citizens considered separately. Instead, officials act for the citizens considered as a collective body.” Ripstein, Force and Freedom, supra note 11, at 195. For more elaboration, see id. at 194–98.

90 One commentator finds that Kant “assumes that states or nations are moral persons and, accordingly, fall under (his) moral rules.” Lloyd P. Gerson, Who Owns What? Some Reflections on the Foundation of Political Philosophy, 29 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y Found. 81, 84 n.8 (2012) (citing Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795), reprinted in Practical Philosophy, supra note 5, at 311, 318.

91 Analytically and normatively, “[i]t is notoriously difficult to give a clear and plausible account of the distinction between civil and criminal law, between ‘private’ and ‘public’ legal wrongs . . . .” Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil. (Jan. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Duff, Legal Punishment] [Legal Punishment] (citations omitted), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/legal-punishment/. “What is the essential difference between tort law and criminal law?” One important lesson of historical studies . . . is
fact that corrective justice traditionally has aimed exclusively at requiting the harms to what have been perceived as the private, direct, immediate victims of autonomy invasions; in contrast, retribution has been aimed (also) at requiting the harms to what have been perceived as collateral victims of autonomy invasions that were directed elsewhere—that is, the general public.\footnote{Coffee invokes Roscoe Pound’s “most important objection” to the standard distinction between crimes and torts: “events that cause private injuries also cause public ones, because public injuries are usually only private injuries writ large. For example, an individual’s private interest in the enforcement of a contract can also be described as the collective, public interest in the security of transactions.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal?”: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193, 221 (1991) (citing 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 23–24, 328–30 (1959)). “Historically, early English criminal law was compensatory in character. Tort and crime were not clearly distinguishable, and the making of a tariff payment of the ‘bot’ to the injured and the ‘wite’ to the King could atone even for a homicide.” Id. at 230 (citing 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 451 (2d ed. 1968)). Under the common law from 1200 to 1500, “[i]n most instances, the same wrong could be prosecuted either as a crime or as a tort. Nor was the distinction [between crime and tort] a difference between the kinds of person who could initiate the actions. Victims could initiate actions of both kinds.” David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U.L. Rev. 59, 59 (1996). For a symposium discussing the tort/crime interface, see Christopher J. Robinette, Symposium: Crimtorts, 17 WIDENER L.J. 705 (2008). Simons identifies salient differences between tort and criminal law. Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction, supra note 64. “The very idea of defining certain conduct as ‘criminal’ first arose approximately one-thousand years ago. Before that, the tort/crime distinction that today serves as the foundation of criminal law did not exist.” Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. Rev. 911, 921 (2007). “Tort actions were quasi-criminal until the late seventeenth century. For approximately five centuries, then, tort liability exclusively addressed situations in which the defendant wrongfully (criminally) injured the plaintiff and was required to compensate the plaintiff for that wrong. These situations are paradigmatic examples of corrective justice.” Mark Geistfeld, Economics, Moral Philosophy, and the Positive Analysis of Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 250, 253–54 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (footnote omitted). “Until the eighteenth century [victims of crimes] had to prosecute at their own expense; gradually the State took over this burden . . . .” MARTIN WRIGHT, JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 11 (2d ed. 1996). “Even the most serious crimes have been dealt with by civil procedures in some societies, and perpetrators required to pay damages rather than undergo punishment.” Id. at 19.} Under existing doctrine, the private law tort requital under corrective justice calls for full compensation for the invadee’s wrongful

fact that corrective justice traditionally has aimed exclusively at requiting the harms to what have been perceived as the private, direct, immediate victims of autonomy invasions; in contrast, retribution has been aimed (also) at requiting the harms to what have been perceived as collateral victims of autonomy invasions that were directed elsewhere—that is, the general public. Under existing doctrine, the private law tort requital under corrective justice calls for full compensation for the invadee’s wrongful
harms to direct victims. In principle, when balancing liberty and security interests, we could grant standing to each member of the general public to bring an action for the wrongful harms she suffers from an invader’s conduct, including her parallel, reactive harms produced by mere knowledge of the criminal act. We choose to do otherwise, partially for consequential reasons. In an Adam Smithian or Coasean world of zero information and administrative costs, we might be more open to grant standing to sue to all persons or, at least, to a wider range of harmed persons. I pursue this line of thought below. If every person that an invader’s wrongful conduct harms could fully recover for that harm, the question of whether there is any remaining work for conceptions of retribution comes into sharper relief. There is indeed work remaining. It is to account for the invader’s blameworthiness, which gets short shrift under corrective justice, at least as it is traditionally conceived.

In the private realm, we have traditionally adopted a conception of corrective justice that aims to restore the prior baseline position of the invadee. We are not concerned with whether the extent of the invadee’s prior resources is deserved or whether the invader’s level of resources is deserved. These are matters of distributive

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94 “But it remains controversial whether these duties [under the criminal law] are directed or not, that is, whether they correlate with claim-rights or not.” Gopal Sreenivasan, Duties and Their Direction, 120 ETHICS 465, 473 (2010) (citations omitted).

95 In terms of striking a balance between security and liberty interests, we choose to grant invaders of an individual’s autonomy space the liberty to impose certain costs on collateral agents without risk of private requitals. In Coasean, private law terms, it is a cost of living in today’s world that occasionally one will suffer collateral harm from wrongful conduct directed at others; it is not a cost to the actor that her conduct will produce collateral harm to the public. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960).

96 That deontological principles may consider the consequences of adopted maxims, see Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 427–28. “Thus whereas the primary retributivist justification for both the institution of punishment and particular punishments is that the offender deserves it, the secondary retributivist justification for both the institution of punishment and particular punishments may consider aspects of social utility.” CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 58, at 63.

97 See infra text accompanying notes 171–76.

98 Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 966.

99 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 43, bk. V, ch. 4, at 1008.
We further ignore what the invadee’s restoration does to the relative balance of resources between the invader and the invadee that had existed before the invader’s harmful conduct. Also neglected is whether the invader’s duty to restore the invadee to her prior position disrupts the invader’s relative balance of resources with the general public. For example, compensating a previously impecunious invadee may bankrupt a wealthy invader, as where the invadee’s medical expenses and psychic harms (pain and suffering) are enormous. Largely setting aside all other considerations, attention focuses on restoring the invadee’s original shielded position.

In the public realm of retributive punishment, attention very much shifts to the invader’s blameworthiness. This factor is not, however, entirely neglected under corrective justice. In contract law, blameworthiness plays a negligible role to the dismay of some. The law of restitution will take into account blameworthiness in

100 Id., bk. V, ch. 3, at 1007 n.4.
101 Id., bk. V, ch. 4, at 1008.
102 See id., bk. V, ch. 4, at 1008–10.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 760 (4th ed. 2004) (“No matter how reprehensible the breach, damages are generally limited to those required to compensate the injured party for lost expectation . . . .”). Despite supposed basic principles to the contrary, blameworthiness emerges in some contract doctrines. For example, while contract damages for mental distress is generally disallowed, some courts “have looked to the nature of the breach and allowed damages for emotional disturbance on the ground that the breach of contract was reprehensible . . . .” Id. at 810 (citing Lutz Farms Co. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1991)). Some courts “suggest[] that a wilful failure to perform is more likely to be regarded as material than a non-wilful breach.” JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 683 § 108 (4th ed. 2001) (footnote omitted). The Restatement agrees. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241(e) cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

106 It has been proposed that, owing to differences in fairness or blameworthiness, negligent breaches should be treated differently from (some) intentional breaches. See, e.g., Thomas A. Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, if at All, Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 425 (1981); Patricia H. Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 733 (1982). Two commentators argue in support of this proposal: “in contrast to conventional law and economics wisdom—that supercompensatory damages for willful breach are justified.” Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, An Information Theory of Willful Breach, in FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 174, 174 (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat eds., 2010). “Willful breach triggers extra resentment for what underlies it—for all the other bad things that the breaching party likely did, or, more basically, for the ex ante choice he made to engage in such a pattern of behavior.” Id. Insofar as an invadee’s resentment is a protected psychic harm, compensation for this would not be supercompensatory, and the supposition of other bad conduct is not necessary to justify the additional compensation. Relatedly, two other commentators argue for “a distinct measure of [contract] damages, vindicatory damages. These, we argue, are neither compensatory nor restitutionary, neither loss-based nor gain-based: they are a rights-based remedy.” David Pearce & Roger Halson, Damages for Breach of Contract: Compensation, Restitution and Vindication, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 73 (2008).
measuring recoveries to some degree. In tort law, negligence is grounded on a rather attenuated form of blameworthiness. Yet blameworthiness in producing wrongful harm may sometimes be significant in the private realm. This significance is seen, for instance, in the greater generosity toward invadees for intentional harms than for negligent harms. Relaxing the strictures of necessary causal linkage and the types or extent of harms recoverable implements this greater generosity. At times, we bring the invader’s blameworthy mental state onto the front burner, as when providing a warrant for the tort of malicious prosecution. The requital maxims associated with elevated blameworthiness harms may also be more expansive. But the degree of the invader’s blameworthiness usually drops out of the requital calculation once thresholds have been reached. One apparent exception is the doctrine of

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107 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 50, 51 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (distinguishing recoveries from innocent and blameworthy obligors).

108 “[N]egligence is out of kilter with notions of moral blameworthiness in several significant respects . . . [including,] first, that negligence involves a type of conduct while moral blameworthiness typically affixes to states of mind . . . .” James Goudkamp, The Spurious Relationship Between Moral Blameworthiness and Liability for Negligence, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 342, 349 (2004) (footnote omitted) (adding four more reasons).


110 See, e.g., id.; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 89, at 37.

111 See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 109, at 1223–25; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 89, at 882–84.

112 “Being in a particular state of mind may not only be a condition of liability but may also affect the quantum of liability. For instance, liability for making a fraudulent mis-statement is more extensive than liability for making a negligent mis-statement because fraud is considered more culpable than negligence.” Peter Cane, Retribution, Proportionality, and Moral Luck in Tort Law, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 141, 149 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1998) [hereinafter Cane, Retribution]. I would put it that the fraudulent misstatement produces a protected dignitary harm greater than does a comparable negligent misstatement.

While punitive damages may be granted for torts when the invader’s mental state is exacerbated, this is a quasi-criminal requital that directly relies on principles of punishment. See generally Bailey Kuklin, Punishment: The Civil Perspective of Punitive Damages, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Kuklin, Punishment]. “Punitive damages do not serve the function of supplementing the criminal law. The defendant is not charged with a wrong against society, but one against the claimant . . . .” ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 86 (2007). Some courts have justified punitive damages in terms of requiting dignitary harms. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1687 (1992) [hereinafter Hampton, Correcting Harms]. “Many punitive damages cases involve affront and dignitary interests, to which the criminal law pays relatively little regard.” Epstein, supra note 68, at 16.

113 “Tort law is not interested in the defendant’s culpability aside from the plaintiff’s entitlement to redress.” ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 155 (1995) [hereinafter WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW]. See Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 655, 673–75 (2014) [hereinafter Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws]. “A full account of torts as wrongs should explain why damage awards are only loosely tied to wrongfulness.” Id. at 674. For the suggestion that the mental state of the invader with respect to excuses and justifications should not be taken into account for a tort requital, but should be for
comparative negligence, which accounts for the blameworthiness of the invadee as well as the invader. Nonetheless, even under this exception, we judge the relative blameworthiness of the parties, not the absolute blameworthiness. On a blameworthiness scale of, say, 0.0 to 1.0, the invadee’s recovery is the same when her blameworthiness (negligence) is 0.2 and the invader’s is 0.4 as when hers is 0.5 and the invader’s is 1.0.

Retribution, to the contrary of corrective justice, weighs absolute blameworthiness. Furthermore, big pockets of strict liability remain in the private law such as products liability. Agents are sometimes held to standards that they personally are incapable of meeting, such as when the reasonable person standard for negligence is beyond the reach of subnormal or uninformed persons. In cases such as these, blameworthiness is diminished or absent, but the invadee is nonetheless returned to her prior protected position at the invader’s expense. While deontologists may be uneasy and even reject at least some of these areas of the private law that ignore the invader’s blameworthiness, they express discontent when blameworthiness is disregarded or discounted in the criminal realm, as in strict


114 See generally DOBBS, supra note 109, at 503–10; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 89, at 468–79.


116 “[A]lthough both tort and criminal law care about culpability, tort law only uses it to determine whether the defendant is liable, not how heavy that liability should be. . . . Criminal law, by contrast, uses culpability not merely to determine whether, but also to determine how severely, to punish.” LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS 152 (1996) [hereinafter KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS].


118 See Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 1011–20.

119 Existing tort and contract laws relating to strict liability still usually build foreseeability into the elements of proximate cause and damages, thus retaining a pinch of blameworthiness. See infra note 248.
criminal liability, absolute criminal liability,120 or criminal liability for negligent conduct.121

Sticking as much as possible to purely deontic considerations, this Article will explore what follows when conceptions of blameworthiness are the central pillar of retribution, leaving other factors and harms to the private realm of corrective justice.122 In turn, the central focus of blameworthiness is on the disrespectfulness that the invader manifested through his conduct. For purposes of retribution, disrespectfulness is gauged by the reactive response of the public, suitably trimmed of non-deontic biases or perceptions, to the choice of the invader to disregard the autonomy protections afforded the wrongfully harmed persons, including the immediate victim(s) and others.123 The proposition that requital stems from, and is measured by, society’s reactive judgment of disrespectfulness sharply sets this view of retribution apart from that of corrective justice. Once the relevant features of this reaction are identified, we will be in a better position to consider how to apply this conception in practice. Driven by first principles and not bound by historical detritus, we may see more clearly what is at stake. Problems, unsurprisingly, still remain.

III. RETRIBUTION

Corrective justice and retribution both underpin requitals for autonomy invasions. Because retribution pulls in the wider, more attenuated autonomy claims of the general public, and elevates the importance of conceptions of just deserts, neither of which commands much weight in the private sphere of corrective justice, it involves greater difficulties.124 Retribution is punishment, with all that entails in our common

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120 See infra text accompanying notes 281–285. Duff distinguishes strict liability from absolute liability: “[l]iability would be absolute if it required no proof of mens rea as to any aspect of the offence . . . . Liability is strict if it requires no proof of mens rea as to an aspect of the offence . . . . ” DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME, supra note 89, at 232 (footnote omitted) (including a taxonomy at 233–35).

121 “[N]egligence really isn’t quite a mental state . . . . It’s the absence of a mental state: to act negligently means not being aware of a risk of harm. But unlike strict liability, negligence at least makes some reference to a mental state—awareness—even if only in absentia.” MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 47 (2002) [hereinafter DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW]. Simons “argue[s] that conscious recklessness . . . is too high a threshold of criminal liability, that culpable indifference . . . is ordinarily an appropriate threshold, and that simple negligence . . . is ordinarily too low a threshold.” Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal Negligence, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 365 (1994) [hereinafter Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory].

122 For example, federal criminal law requires criminals to provide “full and timely restitution as provided in law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(6) (2009) (Crime victims’ rights).

123 Kuklin, Private Requitals, note 2, at 969, 981.

124 “Retributivists claim that the point of legal punishment, and the standard that ought to govern the construction of penal institutions, practices and rules, is that the guilty must be treated in the way that they morally deserve to be.” Russ Shafer-Landau, Retributivism and Desert, 81 PAC. PHIL. Q. 189, 189 (2000) [hereinafter Shafer-Landau, Retributivism and Desert] (arguing “that there is no plausible index for measuring moral desert . . . .”). Furthermore, “retributivists need to supply us with an account of why only certain immoralities merit legal
understanding, while corrective justice is not punishment, no matter how great the invader’s liability. Michael Moore provides a foundational understanding of the concept of retributivism: “[r]etributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who receive it. A retributivist punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves it.” When commentators refer to retributivism, punishment.” Russ Shafer-Landau, The Failure of Retributivism, 82 Phil. Stud. 289, 289 (1996) [hereinafter Shafer-Landau, The Failure of Retributivism].

H.L.A. Hart identifies five elements in the standard case of punishment. H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in Punishment and Responsibility 1, 4–5 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Hart, Prolegomenon]. Three of the elements are relevant to the discussion here: “(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant.” Id. at 4. “(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender. (v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence is committed.” Id. at 5.

Id.

they often mention Kant’s emphasis of it, even though some have found Kant’s arguments for punishment as not entirely within many notions of retribution,128 not entirely consistent with his general moral system,129 not fully based on just deserts,130 or exceedingly sketchy,131 among other complications.132

Retrieving Retributivism] (distinguishing positive and negative retributivism). For my earlier, somewhat different, analysis of retribution, see Kuklin, Punishment, supra note 112, at 23–85. Kenny throws up his hands. “The retributive theory of punishment is very difficult to state accurately . . . [and] it is impossible to state it coherently . . . .” ANTHONY KENNY, FREEWILL AND RESPONSIBILITY 69 (1978). That retribution as a general theory cannot fully answer any of the main questions about punishment, see ROBINSON, PRAISE AND BLAME, supra note 82, at 188.

128 For example, Corlett argues that his “model of punishment . . . renders problematic the construal of Kant as a pure retributivist . . . .” J. Angelo Corlett, Making Sense of Retributivism, 76 Phil. 77, 78 (2001) [hereinafter Corlett, Making Sense of Retributivism]. “Nevertheless, few would hesitate to place Immanuel Kant’s account of just punishment squarely in the retributivist camp.” Sarah Holtman, Kant, Retributivism, and Civil Respect, in RETRIBUTIVISM, supra note 127, at 107. Kant’s “underlying idea [of punishment] is simple, even if its application is complex: whenever someone acts in a way contrary to right, others are entitled to constrain the wrongdoer’s conduct. Such constraint is not an interference with freedom; it is the hindering a hindrance to freedom.” RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 82, at 27.

129 “I do not think Kant’s retributivist convictions are supported by any arguments he suggests on behalf of them. The theory of punishment that arises naturally out of Kant’s theory of right turns out not to be retributivist.” ALLEN W. WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS 206 (2008) [hereinafter WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS]. “Kant’s retributivism is even in serious tension with some of his most fundamental moral doctrines.” Id. For Wood’s argument, see id. at 206–23. “Some theorists believe that retributivism and deontology go hand in hand, in the sense that one requires the other. Yet deontology as such does not require retributivism to be true,” Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, Stan. Encyclopaedia Phil. (Nov. 21, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/ethics-deontological/.

130 Hill argues that “although Kant does endorse standards of punishment commonly associated with retributivist, his rationale for endorsing those standards is far from the familiar retributivist thought that evildoers inherently deserve to suffer.” THOMAS E. HILL, JR., PUNISHMENT, CONSCIENCE, AND MORAL WORTH, in KANT’S METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 233, 234 (Mark Timmons ed., 2002) [hereinafter Hill, Jr., Punishment]. For some main points of Kant’s theory of punishment, see id. at 235–37. Kant’s “principles are stern but not in the fullest sense retributive; and their avowed purpose is not to see that happiness and misery are proportionate to moral desert but rather to secure a system of fair laws that maximize liberty.” THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY 181 (1992) [hereinafter Hill, Jr., DIGNITY]; see Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment, 18 Law & Phil. 407, 409, 414 (1999) [hereinafter Hill, Jr., Kant on Wrongdoing].

131 “I am not even sure that Kant develops anything that deserves to be called a theory of punishment at all. I genuinely wonder if he has done much more than leave us with a random (and not entirely consistent) set of remarks—some of them admittedly suggestive—about punishment.” JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, in RETRIBUTION RECONSIDERED, supra note 88, at 31 [hereinafter MURPHY, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?]; see Holtman, supra note 128, at 107 (“Kant’s central discussion of punishment occupies only a few pages . . . .”).

132 For example, Brooks finds that Kant invokes two versions of punishment, one retributive-based and the other deterrent-based. Thom Brooks, Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and
Various justifications exist for the state’s claim to the right to impose retributive criminal punishment. The two most prominent justifications today are the fairness theory and expressionism. Under the fairness theory, which is akin to some theories of the social contract, the state responds to a criminal who has taken advantage of the benefits of the law but unfairly refused to pay the costs of it. She is a free-rider. In the words of H.L.A. Hart, “when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these


The state’s role in punishment is typically overlooked.

[A] question that is at least of equal importance [to the issue of the moral legitimacy of retributivism] has been almost totally neglected—namely, the question of whether retributivist goals, however morally admirable they may be, are legitimate state goals, goals that it is the state’s proper business to pursue.

Murphy, Retributivism, supra note 127, at 17 (footnote omitted); see Duff, Legal Punishment, supra note 91, at 16 (citations omitted) (“[E]ven if [the guilty] deserve to suffer, why should it be for the state to inflict that suffering on them through a system of criminal punishment?”).

See Murphy, Retributivism, supra note 127, at 17.

See supra text accompanying note 15.

“[T]he fairness theory . . . perceives punishment as a way of restoring a fair balance of benefits and burdens between the criminal and law-abiding members of the society.” Jesper Ryberg, The Ethics of Proportionate Punishment 6 (2004); see Scheid, Davis, supra note 70, at 375–76 (footnote omitted) (“According to unfair-advantage theories, a criminal gains a certain unfair advantage over law-abiding citizens whenever he breaks the law.”); Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 25, 50 (1992) (first citing Sher, Desert, supra note 48, at 91; then citing Sadurski, Giving Desert Its Due, supra note 56, at 225) (Under this view, “[a]n appropriate punishment is one that offsets this stolen advantage, and restores the original distribution.”).
restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their submission.”

Under John Rawls’s version, a person must comply with “the rules of an institution when two conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or fair) . . . and second, one has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to further one’s interests.” Many commentators subscribe to versions of this theory, while others remain critical. 

Under expressionism, Feinberg writes, “punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the punishment authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.” Jean Hampton’s famous view

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138 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 75, at 96. For Rawls’s duty of “fair play,” see Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 13, at 60.


140 See, e.g., Boonin, supra note 133, at 119–43; Duff, Trials and Punishments, supra note 82, at 205–17; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 90–95 (1974) [hereinafter Nozick, Anarchy]; Ryberg, supra note 136, at 36–43; Shafer-Landau, The Failure of Retributivism, supra note 124, at 301–04. “Thus, modestly put, I do not think that proportionality follows as easily from the fairness theory as its adherents usually proclaim.” Ryberg, supra note 136, at 43.

141 Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in Doing and Deserving, supra note 71, at 95, 98 [hereinafter Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment]. “That the expression of the community’s condemnation is an essential ingredient in legal punishment is widely acknowledged by legal writers.” Id. Punishment “is also a symbolic way of getting back at the criminal, of expressing a kind of vindictive resentment.” Id. at 100. “This symbolic function of punishment was given great emphasis by Kant, who, characteristically, proceeded to exaggerate its importance.” Id. at 103. “Punishment has its two salient features—the imposition of hard treatment and the visitation of censure—in order to serve these dual purposes [of ‘discourage[ing] conduct’ and ‘express[ing] disapproval of the conduct and its perpetrators’].” Andrew von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes 52 (1985) [hereinafter von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes] (footnote omitted); see Duff, Trials and Punishments, supra note 82, at 233–66 (“Expression, Penance and Reform”); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591, 594–605 (1996) (“The Expressive Dimension of Punishment”).

Related to expressionism are communication theories of retribution. Duff posits, “can we explain criminal punishment in retributive-communicative terms as a process of communication
of expressionism provides that an offender is punished to “vindicate the value of the victim denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the construction of an event that not only repudiates the action’s message of superiority over the victim but does so in a way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity.”

This theory has not escaped criticism.

One must determine how to “vindicate the value . . . denied . . . .” Doing so need not require punishment.

in which the offender, as well as the polity, is meant to be a participant?” Duff, Retrieving Retributivism, supra note 127, at 17. According to Duff, first, “[p]unishment communicates censure from the polity to the offender, with a view to persuading him to attend to that censure, to face up to the wrong he has done, and therefore also to recognize the need to mend his ways.” Id. “The second aspect of communicative punishment draws on an idea, prominent in recent penal theory, that punishment has to do with the kind of apology that offenders owe to their victims, and to the wider polity (whose values and relationships they have violated).” Id. (footnote omitted). “[P]unishment can be seen as a communicative process in which a perpetrator is, through the conveyance of an appropriate condemnatory message, held accountable for his misdeed . . . .” Ryberg, supra note 136, at 6; see Dan Markel, What Might Retributive Justice Be? An Argument for the Confrontational Conception of Retributivism, in RETRIBUTIVISM, supra note 127, at 49.


For discussion and criticism, see Ryberg, supra note 136, at 19–36; Duff, Penal Communications, supra note 48, at 31–56; Duff, Legal Punishment, supra note 91, at 18–21 (“Punishment as Communication”). “What these considerations highlight is the fact that not much has been done to make clear exactly how the communicative process actually takes place.” Ryberg, supra note 136, at 36.

“N or is retributivism to be confused with denunciatory theories of punishment. In this latter view punishment is justified because punishment is the vehicle through which society can express a condemnation of the criminal’s behavior. This is a utilitarian theory . . . justified by the good consequences it achieves . . . .” Moore, Moral Worth of Retribution, supra note 127, at 96 (citations omitted); see Sadurski, Giving Desert its Due, supra note 56, at 248–50.


Hampton agrees. “[T]he retributive response is broader than punishment. Or to put it another way, there are ways in which one can inflict retribution, but nonetheless not inflict punishment.” Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, supra note 142, at 16. “So long as there are nonpunitive means of conveying society’s disapproval of an offender’s behavior, the state’s right to denounce the offender cannot generate a right to punish her.” Boonin, supra note 133, at 178. We may “condemn without intending to make suffer . . . . [T]o condemn is not in itself to punish.” Geoffrey Cupit, Justice as Fittingness 139–40 (1996). “Expressive views need to explain why hard treatment is the appropriate vehicle for denouncing crimes. As T.M. Scanlon has asked, why not say it with flowers, or better still with weeds?” Ripstein, Equality, supra note 68, at 145 (footnotes omitted) (citing T.M. Scanlon, Jr., The Significance of Choice, in VIII THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 149 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1988)). Nozick discusses the difficulties in “showing” an offender that she was wrong. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 370–74 (1981) (“The Message of Retribution”).

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Both the fairness theory and expressionism are consistent with the idea that retribution must account for dignitary harms to immediate victims and the public.\(^{146}\) By free-riding or flouting the law, the criminal implicitly is asserting moral superiority,\(^ {147}\) as Hampton observes above.\(^{148}\) Similarly, expressionism aims at conveying social disapproval of the criminal’s conduct that also implicitly claims moral superiority.\(^ {149}\) The state, as representative of the public, seeks requital from the criminal for her improper rejection of the moral equality of all persons.

Moral agents, in sum, are not to manifest disrespect of another’s dignity by invading her realm of protected freedom.\(^ {150}\) In the private law of torts, contracts, and unjust enrichment, determining whose autonomy space has been invaded is largely, if not entirely, straightforward. Controversy under existing law arises over whether negligently causing another person a purely economic loss constitutes a tortious invasion of her autonomy space or, more generally, whether a particular class of persons suffers harms from another’s conduct sufficient to be declared wrongful.\(^ {151}\) Furthermore, we debate, among other things, the types and extent of harms that are requitable once there has been a recognized invasion.

\(^{146}\) “We are all familiar with these retributivist metaphors: punishment restores the moral equilibrium of the universe, it pays back a debt, it vindicates the norms flouted by criminals, etc. . . . [W]hen pressed for literal sense [these metaphors] never cash out to what you thought they would have meant.” Michael Moore, *Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher*, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 65, 84 (1999) [hereinafter Moore, *Victims and Retribution*].

\(^{147}\) “[I]f someone breaks the rules of a particular deal, it is not just that he has gained a particular advantage but that he has adopted an unjust superior position—infringed the rights or status of his fellows as equal negotiators and deal-makers.” John Wilson, *The Purposes of Retribution*, 58 PHIL. 521, 523 (1983).


\(^{149}\) This is suggestive of Ackerman’s justification for neutrality in the liberal state whereby, “[n]o reason is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert: . . . (b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his fellow citizens.” BRUCE ACKERMAN, *SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE* 11 (1980). Similarly, Dworkin advances the principle of equal concern and respect. RONALD DWORKIN, *TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY* 180–83, 272–78 (1977).


In criminal law matters, the persons harmed by disrespectful invasions of their autonomy space are, along with the direct victim and her supporters, the members of the public who are put at risk of harm at the time of the criminal act or in the future. Crimes are, generally, frightful to the public. They produce insecurity.

See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 115, 119 n.8 (1985) (“suffering of the victim’s relatives”). One commentator “takes a first look at this neglected issue of the role that more remote harms [to the family and friends of the victim] should play in sentenc ing and asserts that accounting for these more remote harms would better reflect the basic tenets of harm-based retributivism . . . .” Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOU S. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (2012). She “argues that a proximate causation analysis is essential to limit the harms considered in sentencing while recognizing the full array of harms caused by criminal conduct.” Id. at 1049–50.

Nozick asserts that many, but not all, crimes are frightful to the public, which justifies punishment beyond compensation to the direct victim. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at 65–71. Rawls imagines a father’s answer to his son’s question of why people are jailed. “‘To protect good people from bad people,’ or ‘To stop people from doing things that would make it uneasy for all of us; for otherwise we wouldn’t be able to go to bed at night and sleep in peace.’” Rawls, Two Concepts, supra note 127, at 107. “Surveys suggest that the fear of crime is widespread among members of many contemporary westernized societies.” Emily Gray et al., In Search of the Fear of Crime: Using Interdisciplinary Insights to Improve the Conceptualisation and Measurement of Everyday Insecurities, in SAGE HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH METHODS 268, 268 (David Gadd et al. eds., 2012). For an example of subscribers to the reaction (fright) theory of (some) crime, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 35–36 (1998) [hereinafter FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW]; RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS 26 (1979); Lucia Zedner, Reparation and Retribution: Are They Reconcilable?, 57 MOD. L. REV. 228, 243–44 (1994).

Fletcher criticizes Nozick’s “notion of generalized fear [because it] proves too much and too little.” Fletcher, Place of Victims, supra note 67, at 56. Because mass torts can “trigger widespread public anxiety” and “isolated crimes such as embezzlement . . . [may] engender no public fear at all, [i]t is not so easy . . . to distinguish crimes from torts.” Id. at 56–57. My focus on disrespect as key for criminal requitals offers, I believe, a reasonable means to distinguish the two realms. All fear is prima facie harmful, but not all harmful fear is wrongful. “An alternative approach to the public nature of crime might be simply to locate the public dimension of the crime in the extrapolation of the concrete harm to the general class of victims.” Id. at 57. This strikes me as remaining a matter for corrective justice.

“Whoever steals makes the property of everyone else insecure . . . .” KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 474. Regarding conspiracy and other crimes by multiple individuals, “the involvement of several people in an offence may create greater fear in victims and greater public alarm.” ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 451 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW]. Dagger refers to the “indirect” or “secondary harm” of those who merely hear of a crime. “Indeed, someone who never even hears about a particular crime may feel its effects if it creates a climate of fear and apprehension that leads to suspicion, distrust, or hostility.” Richard Dagger, Restitution: Pure or Punitive?, 10 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 29, 30 (1991). See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 152, at 1085.
Beyond these reactive, psychic harms, criminal behavior often induces the public at risk to respond by taking costly, protective measures.¹⁵⁶ These psychic and economic harms may also generate physical illness or increase susceptibility to such illness.¹⁵⁷ Psychic harms may ensue from dignitary harms, as where a group that a person identifies with is insulted or defamed.¹⁵⁸ While fright is a common reactive response of the public to criminal conduct,¹⁵⁹ the public also responds in many other negative, painful, destructive, psychological ways. These include fear, anxiety, insecurity, dread, terror, panic, alarm, dismay, suspicion, distrustfulness, consternation, concern, outrage, anger, ire, hostility, indignation, resentment, disgust, rage, and fury, among others.¹⁶⁰ These responses may or may not overlap with fright and one another. In

General reactive fear varies, of course, from crime to crime, to say nothing of person to person. For example, “people fear robberies more than securities frauds.” Scheid, Davis, supra note 70, at 394.

“Might someone not argue, with Ralf Dahrendorf, that increases in sanction levels would reassure the public and reduce fear—even if they did not actually affect crime rates?” Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth, Not Not Just Deserts: A Response to Braithwaite and Pettit, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 91 (1992) (citing RALF DAHRENDORF, LAW AND ORDER (1985)).

¹⁵⁶ A crime, such as a neighborhood robbery, may frighten neighbors, cause them to make expenditures for security systems, decrease property values, increase insurance rates, impose opportunity costs, and even deprive unknowing strangers of economic opportunities with the neighbors because of these costs, etc. See Boonin, supra note 133, at 225. “What I call the ‘secondary victims response’ to the harm to society . . . insists that in such cases the offender must make restitution to these people as well.” Id. at 226. The difficulty of doing this is discussed, id. at 227. See Alan Wertheimer, Victimless Crimes, 87 ETHICS 302, 311–13 (1977) (“Crime as a Social Phenomenon”).

¹⁵⁷ “Fear of crime is often seen to constitute a social problem in and of itself, reducing quality of life and public health, restricting movements, eroding social and neighbourhood bonds, and shaping the very organisation and zoning of a city.” Gray et al., supra note 154, at 268 (citations omitted).

¹⁵⁸ See Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 983.

¹⁵⁹ “[T]he participant reactive attitudes are essentially natural human reactions to the good or ill will or indifference of others towards us, as displayed in their attitudes and actions.” Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 59, 67 (Gary Watson ed., 1982); see JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL 6–7 (1998). “On [one] account we engage in ‘blame validation’: We make blame attributions spontaneously according to how strongly negative our gut reaction is then we validate our blame assessment by tuning evaluations of causation and intention accordingly.” Janice Nadler, Blaming as a Social Process: The Influence of Character and Moral Emotion on Blame, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 9 (2012) [hereinafter Nadler, Blaming as a Social Process]. “Reactive attitudes invariably concern what someone can be held to, so they invariably presuppose the authority to hold someone responsible and make demands of him.” STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT 17 (2006); see id. at 83–85.

¹⁶⁰ Feinberg refers to the “responsive attitudes typically expressed by reward and punishment—gratitude, appreciation, approval, ‘recognition,’ resentment, disapproval, condemnation . . . .” FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, supra note 71, at 70. “When we blame someone, we may feel—among other things—anger, resentment, irritation, bitterness, hostility, fury, rage, outrage, disappointment, contempt, disdain, or disgust. Although these feelings differ in important ways, each is always negative . . . .” GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF
either event, these reactions might also provide a basis for retributive claims.161 They are harms. Reasonable people prefer to be secure from suffering harms. As reasonable people, they would take practical measures to avoid them, if sensible. The categorical imperative does not, in principle, prevent psychic harms from being declared wrongful harms in themselves. Some reactive psychic harms, however, will not survive the filter of the categorical imperative, such as those that stem from disrespectful attitudes toward outgroups, or indeed, oneself.162 Once identified harms clear the deontic filter, society must decide whether to declare them wrongful by means of first-order, substantive maxims.

After the issue of the obligation to conform to established norms is favorably resolved (e.g., a social contract), moral agents have a duty to abide by criminal laws that are consistent with the categorical imperative. However, concerns for respecting the autonomy of moral agents may not be the driving factor of some laws, such as animal cruelty laws.163 Indeed, some laws may run afoul of the mandate under a harm

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162 “[T]he moral norms—on which the legal norms of the criminal law are based—protect each of us as individuals. . . . [E]ach of us, when the norm is violated, can claim a separate wrong was done to him, even if it’s the same act doing the violating.” Moore, Victims and Retribution, supra note 146, at 71–72.


164 Kant was against animal cruelty on the grounds that it would coarsen one’s feelings and relations with others. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 239–41 (Louis Infield trans. 1930) [hereinafter KANT, LECTURES]; KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 564. For discussion, see MATTHEW C. ALTMAN, Animal Suffering and Moral Character, in KANT AND APPLIED ETHICS 13 (2011); Christine M. Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals, in 25 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 77 (Grethe B. Peterson ed.,
principle to respect the freedom of people to make choices that are not harmful to others, as in, for instance, truly victimless crimes. Kant, however, insists that one must conform to the universalized laws of the state. One has a moral duty to obey the law. Like others, I question the political obligation said to come from social contracts that are not deeply consensual, such as Kant’s. Hence, I set aside this claim by Kant that one must meet laws regardless of whether deontic principles immediately justify them. I address requitals that are apt for violations of maxims directly consistent with the categorical imperative and not those stemming from a general duty to obey the law.

I have mentioned two categories of persons who are subject to invasions of their autonomy space. The direct victim, such as the object of a battery, is in the first category—immediate victims. She clearly suffers wrongful harm. Often she suffers wrongful physical, economic, and psychic harms, but even when she does not suffer these harms, she suffers at least a wrongful dignitary harm. The invader has disrespected her autonomy through nonconsensual, improper touching. Other individuals close to the victim may suffer similar harms resulting from the invader’s battery of the direct victim. Kin, kith, and other affiliates suffer when they empathize and sympathize with the direct victim, support her, depend on her, and so forth. Her pain is their pain. Therefore, we may adopt maxims that protect against these indirect harms in particular circumstances, thereby declaring that the autonomy space of these indirect victims encompasses this source of harm. The tort of the negligent infliction
of emotional distress is such a maxim. 171 This tort is limited to close family members,172 but not because other intimate supporters do not suffer substantial indirect harms, but rather, the limit is because of administrative and other concerns with spreading the legal protection more widely.173 When a family member is protected under this tort, she has a direct claim against the invader.174 She then is seen as a direct victim herself. As the connections to the immediate victim become more diluted,175 the harms to third parties typically dissipate until they are indistinguishable from strangers to the events. This is not to say that strangers suffer no harms themselves. They may pay to bar their windows from personal fright, for instance, to say nothing of their discomfort from sympathetic identification with the immediate victim. They constitute a second category of persons—the general public category. Thus, these two categories, immediate victims and the general public, are polar limits, not sharply distinguishable, to the field of those who might suffer harms from an agent’s conduct.

Before turning to the general public’s claims stemming from an autonomy invasion of an immediate victim, let us briefly look the possible effects of the autonomy invasion on the invader’s kin and kith. These individuals also may suffer harms.176 Psychic harm from seeing one’s loved one or friend endure the distress of a civil or criminal process and outcome is easy enough to imagine. Economic and physical harms to the supporters may follow. Even dignitary harms are likely, such as when others shun a criminal’s family members. We can also envision an invader’s kin and kith angrily thinking, if not saying: “You jerk, what did you think your wrongful conduct would do to me? Don’t you love (respect) me enough to protect me from these harms, such as the sympathetic distress and personal shame I feel?” Proper substantive maxims that protect against these types of harms, and requital maxims that offer relief, though extremely unlikely, would not run afoul of the categorical imperative. The security interest of the invader’s kin and kith may be declared to outweigh the liberty interest of the invader, especially since the invader’s supposed liberty entails the wrongful invasion of an immediate victim’s protected autonomy space.

171 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 (AM. LAW INST. 2012); DOBBS, supra note 109, §§ 308–09; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 89, § 54.

172 This tort is further cabined severely by doctrines such as the impact rule, the zone of danger rule, or a quite restrictive foreseeability rule. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 109, at 839–41; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 89, at 362–67.

173 One concern is not to “overpunish” the invader. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 89, at 366.

174 DOBBS, supra note 109, at 841.

175 An intricate web of harms may flow from an autonomy invasion. For example, while a person may not know the direct victim, she may be close to, and sympathize with, a family member of the victim who suffers from the victim’s invasion.

IV. DIGNITY AND HARM

The duty to respect the dignity of others sits at the dead center of Kant’s moral system.177 Breach of this duty produces a dignitary harm.178 There are two direct forms of dignitary harm.179 The first is insult harm.180 The invader offends the invadee by conveying a disrespectful message to her.181 The invader communicates, explicitly or implicitly, that she is morally superior to the invadee or, equivalently, that the invadee is morally inferior.182 Even when the invader and invadee are the only parties privy to this communication, the invadee still suffers an insult harm. She has reason to feel slighted. The invader herself may be unaware of the message she is communicating, as where her facial expression or body language inadvertently conveys the idea of disrespect, which the invadee, as a reasonable person, interprets accordingly. In this case, the invader may be marginally blameworthy, if at all, for producing the insult

177 “Respect (reverentia) is, again, something merely subjective, a feeling of a special kind, not a judgment about an object that it would be a duty to bring about or promote.” KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 531. “Dignity is an expressive value demanding that people’s behavior, physical and verbal, convey a certain attitude to other people, namely an attitude of respect. There are many ways in which respect can be conveyed and, correspondingly, many ways in which it can be withheld.” Meir Dan-Cohen, Basic Values and the Victim’s State of Mind, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 759, 771 (2000).

178 Historically, dignitary and reputational harms have been requited by apologies, shows of respect, seeking pardons, and compensation, among other means. See JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 222–30 (2006). “One can see a remarkable degree of continuity in the civil law. Rights to dignity and reputation have always been protected.” Id. at 230. The common law has been somewhat less protective. See id. at 233–39. Gordley opines: “[d]ignity and reputation belong to a person in much the way property belongs to him.” Id. at 242. Practical reasons argue for limits to their legal protection, such as “the public interest in the exchange of information. But otherwise, if they are rights which in principle should not be infringed, then what matters is their infringement, not whatever mental suffering it may or may not cause.” Id. “In the Aristotelian tradition, the rules of distributive justice constitute the structure of society. . . . If honor and reputation are rights accorded to an individual [as the late scholastics asserted], then they should be protected just as the law protects his property.” Id. at 243.

179 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Restatement, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 25 (1988) [hereinafter Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment].

180 Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, supra note 142, at 5–6.

181 Id.

182 Relying on Kant, Hampton identifies “what it is that makes an action wrong—i.e., the fact that it is an action that does not respect that person’s worth.” Id. at 5. “An immoral response to a person, whether or not it produces harm, carries with it a message, in particular, an insulting message. . . . [A]n immoral action is insulting in the sense that it sends a message which challenges the victim’s worth.” Id. at 6. Murphy ascribes the resentment from moral injuries not only to their tangible or sensible harms, but also to their “messages—symbolic communications. They are ways a wrongdoer has of saying to us, ‘I count but you do not,’ ‘I can use you for my purposes,’ or ‘I am here up high and you are there down below.’ Intentional wrongdoing insults us and attempts (sometimes successfully) to degrade us . . . .” Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, supra note 179, at 25; see Josh Bowers, Blame by Proxy: Political Retributivism & Its Problems, a Response to Dan Markel, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 135, 140 (2012).
harm. Aware that she has sent this false signal to others in the past, she may even have been careful not to do so this time, but she failed because of her quirky mannerisms.

She did not intend to be disrespectful nor did she believe she was being so. She may even believe that the invadee is morally superior to her.

The second direct form of dignitary harm is defamation harm.\textsuperscript{183} This type occurs when a third person is privy to and understands a message conveyed by the invader’s words or conduct as disrespectful to the invadee.\textsuperscript{184} The harm injures her reputation.\textsuperscript{185} This form of dignitary harm likewise may be manifested without the awareness or intention of the invader or, for that matter, the awareness of the invadee, as she may be inattentive, incapable of understanding, comatose, or deceased.\textsuperscript{186} Nevertheless, a third party gets the message. Again, the invader may not be blameworthy for evincing this message. Thus, we may say, direct dignitary harms come in two types: insultive and defamatory. We declare some of their permutations to be wrongful and subject to sanctions.

Closely associated with dignitary harms are the standard types of harms recognized in law and morals: physical, economic, and psychic.\textsuperscript{187} Their close association can be seen from two perspectives. First, in balancing the liberty and security interests of moral agents, protective boundaries are drawn around these three types of harms at the point where society perceives them to be unreasonable or unacceptable and

\textsuperscript{183} See Kuklin, \textit{Constructing Autonomy}, supra note 1, at 440–41.

\textsuperscript{184} “Most of us tend to care about what others (at least some others, some significant group whose good opinion we value) think about us—how much they think we matter. Our self-respect is social in at least this sense . . . .” Murphy, \textit{Forgiveness and Resentment}, supra note 179, at 25. “And thus when we are treated with contempt by others it attacks us in profound and deeply threatening ways.” \textit{Id.} “At their core, the torts of libel and slander enjoin us not to utter statements that attribute to others qualities or actions that ordinarily tend to lower them in the esteem of others.” \textit{GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, TORTS, supra note 117, at 310. “Both [defamation and privacy invasions] identify conduct as being wrongful and injurious for altering the way in which third parties view the victim and interact with her.” \textit{Id.} at 307 (emphasis omitted). On the “four types of losses which the law of defamation aims at compensating,” including both the insultive and defamation interests I mention, see Eric Descheemaeker, \textit{Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence}, 29 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 603, 612, 611–15 (2009).

\textsuperscript{185} “The interest in reputation . . . protects a good which is both non-pecuniary and immaterial. . . . As a result, in a system whose default and main remedy for violation of a right is the award of money damages, reputation is a very difficult interest to take into account.” Descheemaeker, \textit{supra} note 184, at 610. Kant objects to monetizing a dignitary harm, in some sense. Dignity “is exalted above any price . . . .” \textit{KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 557; see id. at 579; KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 5, at 84. I have suggested elsewhere a surrogate for monetizing a dignitary harm. If we look to a reasonable person’s psychic reaction to the disrespectful conduct, then we have an indirect means to put a price on, as Kant asserts, the priceless dignitary harm. See Kuklin, \textit{Constructing Autonomy, supra} note 1, at 439–42. While this gambit is debatable, at least it accommodates the intuition that dignitary harms vary greatly in degree, and this should be taken into account when requiting the invadee.

\textsuperscript{186} Kuklin, \textit{Constructing Autonomy, supra} note 1, at 443.

\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Id.} at 444.
therefore adopted maxims declare the harms as wrongful.\(^{188}\) A rational, sensible moral agent would forgo the liberty to impose these harms on others in exchange for the security from suffering them from others.\(^{189}\) Second, from another perspective, the material freedom an agent has to choose and conduct her life depends on her resources or wherewithal.\(^{190}\) At one extreme, where she has nothing, she can do virtually nothing. Accordingly, physical, economic, and psychic harms hinder her freedom, irrespective of her remaining resources.\(^{191}\) At some point and under certain circumstances, these harms are declared wrongful as invasions of an agent's autonomy space.\(^{192}\) For these reasons, a person's choice is blameworthy when she chooses to engage in conduct that wrongfully causes these three types of harms to another person.\(^{193}\) It disrespects the invadee's autonomy, her equal dignity as a moral agent, and her established freedom to conduct her life as she fairly chooses.\(^{194}\) The invader deserves to suffer a just requital, private or public, for her transgression.

In identifying apt requitals for disrespectful conduct, we must be careful to avoid confusion from the multiple meanings of “respect” and related terms such as “dignity,” for we may respect\(_1\) everyone equally as moral beings, but respect\(_2\) some persons more or less than others because of their (mis)achievements.\(^{195}\) The first meanings of respect and related notions are based on equality-oriented conceptions of desert.\(^{196}\) Let us identify them as respect\(_E\) or dignity\(_E\). They are based on what one is (e.g., a rational, moral being).\(^{197}\) The second meanings of these notions are based on liberty-oriented conceptions of desert.\(^{198}\) They may be denominated respect\(_L\) or dignity\(_L\). They are

\(^{188}\) Id. at 387–88.

\(^{189}\) At first glance, these three types of harms seemingly fall within the security domain. We wish to be secure from suffering them. They may, however, also be seen as falling within the liberty domain. A person may suffer one or more of these harms if she is denied a liberty, such as the right to buy a car. As for physical and psychic harms, these may also result from a person’s reaction to the denial of a liberty.

\(^{190}\) Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 389.

\(^{191}\) Id. at 429.

\(^{192}\) Id.

\(^{193}\) Id. at 446.

\(^{194}\) This argument is suggestive of the interest theory of rights, as contrasted to the will theory. See Leif Wenar, Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. § 2.2.2 (Dec. 19, 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/rights/.

\(^{195}\) See supra text accompanying note 80.


\(^{197}\) FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, supra note 71, at 58–59.

\(^{198}\) Id. at 61.
based on what one does.\textsuperscript{199} Kant’s imperative to respect others is equality based.\textsuperscript{200} As equal moral beings, persons are entitled to respect\textsubscript{E}. His standards for punishment are liberty-based.\textsuperscript{201} One deserves punishment for one’s blameworthy conduct.\textsuperscript{202} Therefore, the argument may go this way: we respect\textsubscript{E} an invader’s responsible choice and conduct to wrongfully harm another person by granting her the respect\textsubscript{L} she deserves by means of apt punishment.\textsuperscript{203} This resolves to a matter of distributive justice—that is, just deserts.\textsuperscript{204}

\textsuperscript{199} “If a person is deserving of some sort of treatment, he must, necessarily, be so \textit{in virtue of} some possessed characteristic or prior activity.” \textsc{Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, supra} note 71, at 58. On the positive side of the desert ledger where compensation is in the form of social benefits, “desert is relevant to justice in distribution only where it expresses an actual burden, that is, when in involves some effort, sacrifice, work, risk, responsibility, inconvenience and so forth, when it is linked with an expenditure of energy and time.” \textsc{Sadurski, Giving Desert Its Due, supra} note 56, at 116. “No benefits are ‘deserved’ when a proposed ground of ‘desert’ cannot be meaningfully described as a burden, and that is precisely the case of natural abilities, talents and skills.” \textit{Id.} at 130. However, distinguishing “genetic and environmental influence and the relative role of a person’s deliberate effort of self-development is probably doomed to failure because it is the dynamic interplay and mutual reinforcing of those factors that shapes the character, personality and behaviour of human beings.” \textit{Id.} at 141.


\textsuperscript{201} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{202} See, e.g., Hampton, \textit{Correcting Harms, supra} note 112, at 1667 (“Kant had \textit{two} theories of [human] worth . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{203} Likewise, ‘Hegel insists that when I have committed a crime, punishment is my ‘right,’ because it is something that I myself have willed. Not only is punishment ‘in itself just,’ he says, but ‘it is also a right posited in the criminal himself, in his existing will, in his action.’” \textsc{Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought} 113 (1990) (quoting Hegel’s \textit{Philosophy of Right, supra} note 11, § 100). For an introduction to Hegel’s retributivism, see Dubber, \textit{Rediscovering Hegel’s Theory, supra} note 132. The distinction between respect\textsubscript{E} and respect\textsubscript{L} is responsive to Ristroph’s accusation of inconsistency. “To many ears—including my own—these claims of respectful punishment ring hollow. It is difficult to see how we can simultaneously stigmatize an offender and show respect for him; stigma and respect seem fundamentally incompatible.” Alice Ristroph, \textit{Respect and Resistance, supra} note 196, at 627 (first citing Christopher, \textit{supra} note 127, at 967–70; then citing Dolinko, \textit{Three Mistakes, supra} note 127, at 1632–33, 1642–56). Her related points remain intact. After observing the conditions in prisons, Ristroph asks, “With respect like this, who needs insults?” \textit{Id.} at 628. “Other retributive arguments are simply circular: they assert that responsible agents must be punished, and that failure to punish is failure to recognize the criminal as a responsible agent.” \textit{Id.} (citing Dan Markel, \textit{Retributive Damages: A Theory of PunitiveDamages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 Cornell L. Rev.} 239, 260–61 (2009)). “In fact, judgments of responsibility and agency are independent of judgments of how to respond to a responsible agent.” \textit{Id.} (footnote omitted). I argue for punishment for autonomous choices, gauging such punishment by the degree to which the invader acts disrespectfully regarding the invadee.

\textsuperscript{204} As to the deontic justification for the community’s claim to impose punishment on invaders according to their just deserts, we are again relegated to the social contract. \textit{See supra text} accompanying note 19. The invader “consents” to the community’s authority to punish. The community as a collective declares that it has the duty to individual members of the
The distinction between equality and liberty conceptions of respect, dignity, and related notions is important in understanding the relevant dignitary harm to an invadee. The relevant harm is an equality-based conception. The dignitary harm from a murder is independent of who the invadee is. Murdering an elected president is no more of a dignitary harm to her than murdering a tyrant is to him. We may rightfully respect the president more, but as Kantians, we center our moral duty to respect others on dignity. While intuitively an appealing declaration is that the intentional murder of a person because she is president is more blameworthy, the other side of that coin is that the intentional murder of a person because he is a vicious tyrant is not very blameworthy, indeed, it may be laudable. These intuitions, however, invoke conceptions of distributive justice and of respect. Non-consensually requiting a person’s just deserts for what she has done, that is, desert, is a duty for the government, not private parties. Private parties may only judge and requite a person for her desert if she consents, as where she enters an agreement with a school that includes fair grading or with sponsors of a fair talent or athletic contest.

In gauging the degree of the invader’s blameworthiness for wrongfully harming the invadee and thus for imposing an indignity on her, we rely upon the judgment of the reasonable observer, suitably freed of biases toward the invader and invadee, as well as other distortions that would fail to survive the deontic filter of the categorical community to punish blameworthy wrongdoers as well as the right and duty to the wrongdoer herself to punish her.

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205 “[K]illing a saint is more heinous than killing a sinner (hence the well-known defense attorney’s ploy of ‘putting the victim on trial’).” Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Homicide 272 (1988).

206 According to H.L.A. Hart, as noted above, one of the five elements in the standard case of punishment is that “[i]t must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence is committed.” Hart, Prolegomenon, supra note 125, at 4–5; see supra note 125.

207 An offended person may reasonably deem another’s conduct as a substantial insult or defamation, though it falls outside a protective maxim, as where the person is not elected into a hall of fame after a judgment by an admission committee.

208 For difficulties with the concept and measurement of dignity, and caution about ignoring the dignity of the invader, see Ryberg, supra note 136, at 131–42.

209 “The only way to judge [criminal] responsibility for reckless and negligent risk-taking is to measure the actor’s conduct against community expectations. The choice to disregard the risk is not per se culpable; it is culpable only if it falls short of the community standard of reasonable [law-abiding] behavior.” Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, supra note 154, at 119. Wallace “postulate[s] a close connection between holding someone responsible and a central class of moral sentiments, those of resentment, indignation, and guilt. To hold someone responsible, [he] argue[s], is essentially to be subject to emotions of this class in one’s dealings with the person.” R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments 2 (1994). “[T]hese emotions are distinguished by their connection with expectations.” Id.; cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 19 (Am. Law Inst. 1977) (“A bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.”).
The reasonable observer focuses on the invader’s mental state. The observer’s judgment of the blameworthiness of the invader’s mental state is the gauge used to determine the invader’s just deserts. The actual consequences of the invader’s chosen conduct does not necessarily reflect her mental state with regard to the invitee at the time of her conduct. This implies that criminal attempts may be punished the same as completed crimes. Furthermore, the objective observer ignores the psychic and other reactions experienced by the particular invitee, as well as her own self-regarding reactions (e.g., “She might do that to me”; “I feel for the invitee.”). These are matters for corrective justice. In gauging the invader’s just deserts, we must stick to distributive justice.

The reasonable observer’s judgment of the blameworthiness of the invader’s mental state may partially stem from her objective, psychic reaction to the revealed facts and circumstances. Many such facts and circumstances are evidentiary of the degree of the invader’s disrespectfulness toward an invitee, whether the invitee experiences direct or indirect harm (e.g., a supporter or sympathetic observer of a directly harmed person). The invader’s foreseeability of the invasion and its repercussions on the invitee is of supreme relevance. Among the other considerations are: the duration of the invasion, as in false imprisonment for a short or long period; the foreseeable duration of the wrongful risk or invasive effects,

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210 Hurd and Moore identify Adam Smith, Rawls, Plowden, and Posner as among those who have been “helped in their ability to reach justified conclusions [about risk imposition] by asking what some epistemically idealized person would do or think.” Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 333, 358 (2002). “Holding someone to a community standard, therefore, is not necessarily a form of injustice. So long as the defendant is excused on the basis of objective, conduct-influencing factors, such as physical impediments, the standard of responsibility remains attentive to individual capacity.” FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 154, at 120. That it may be difficult to create an accurate filter, see KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 58, at 425–26.

211 For example, “the coolness of a scoundrel makes him not only far more dangerous but also immediately more abominable in our eyes than we would have taken him to be without it.” KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 5, at 50. “[T]he desire to commit a wrongful action for its own sake seems incrementally worse that intending to commit a wrongful act as a means to a generally permissible end. Killing or torturing, or disfiguring for the sheer joy of it seems paradigmatic of true evil.” Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, supra note 59, at 323. “Killing without a motive can usually be just as wicked as killing after detached reflection about one’s goals.” GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 254 (1978) [hereinafter FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW]; see JOEL FEINBERG, What Is So Special About Mental Illness?, in DOING AND DESERVING, supra note 71, at 272, 287.

212 Nadler, Blaming as a Social Process, supra note 159, at 14.

213 This issue is addressed below, see infra text accompanying notes 330–38.

214 ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY, supra note 85, at 264.

215 Id.

216 For a proposed culpability-based criminal code, Alexander and Ferzan “take into account the duration of the risk as the actor perceived it . . . . We propose that for every additional two minutes, the offense level be multiplied by the number of two-minute increments for which the risk continued.” ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY, supra note 85, at 283.
including whether a full recovery can be anticipated;\textsuperscript{217} the frequency of invasions, as where three false imprisonments occur either a week apart or a year apart; the continuity or intermittency of the invasion, thus distinguishing a single false imprisonment of four hours from four imprisonments of one hour each; whether the invader plans to repeat the invasion against the particular invadee or others;\textsuperscript{218} and the foreseeable resilience of the invadee.\textsuperscript{219} The reasonable observer may also factor in: the invadee’s known risk disposition because those who prefer risk are likely to respond to harmful risks differently from risk avoiders;\textsuperscript{220} the risk of an invader’s retaliation for reporting or litigating the invasion, or willingness to settle; the invader’s remorsefulness;\textsuperscript{221} the reaction of the invader’s cohorts, such as fellow gang members, to the invasion;\textsuperscript{222} peak and end considerations regarding the wrongful harms;\textsuperscript{223} the

\textsuperscript{217} “In our view, the anticipated duration of risk of harm also affects the actor’s culpability. . . . An actor who imposes a risk for a longer period of time imposes more risk than an actor who imposes a risk for a shorter period of time.” Id. at 243 (footnote omitted).

\textsuperscript{218} This ties in to recidivism. See infra text accompanying notes 345–68.

\textsuperscript{219} Bentham identifies some of these factors in discussing the “value of a lot of pleasure or pain.” JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. IV, at 38–41 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1789) (“Value of a Lot of Pleasure or Pain, How to Be Measured”).

\textsuperscript{220} The invadee’s foreseeable risk attitudes may require deeper analysis. For instance, she may have one attitude about putting herself at risk, as by mountain climbing, and another attitude about having others put her at risk.

\textsuperscript{221} “Joel Feinberg, Herbert Morris, and the late Jean Hampton . . . have all argued that the truly repentant criminal in general deserves less punishment than the unrepentant criminal . . . .” Murphy, Some Second Thoughts on Retributivism, supra note 139, at 94. Murphy cautiously embraces this position. Id. at 95. In Robinson’s view, “[g]enuine remorse, public acknowledgment of wrongdoing, and sincere apology can all . . . reduce an offender’s blameworthiness—and, thereby, the amount of punishment deserved.” Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Restorative Justice”, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 380 (2003) [hereinafter Robinson, Virtues of Restorative Processes]. In the attached footnote, Robinson states, “I do not know that retributivists as a group would agree with this . . . .” Id. at 380 n.12. Duff is one who does. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 82, at 289, 289–91 (“[S]he has recognised [sic] and repented her crime, and subjected herself to the pain of remorse . . . .”). This position regarding remorse has overtones of the character theory of punishment rather than the act theory. Holtman doubts that retributivism has the wherewithal to account for remorse, as well as victim reaction and other issues. Holtman, supra note 128, at 125.

\textsuperscript{222} See Kuklin, The Labyrinth of Blameworthiness, supra note 46, at 192–93.

\textsuperscript{223} “Summary assessments [of extended experiences] . . . tend to focus on only a few features . . . . [including] the intensity of the state at key instances, in particular the most intense (peak) and the final (end) moments.” Dan Ariely & Ziv Carmon, Gestalt Characteristics of Experiences: The Defining Features of Summarized Events, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 191, 191 (2000); see Daniel Kahneman, Evaluation by Moments: Past and Future, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 693, 694–702 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); Daniel Kahneman, Experience Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based Approach, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES, supra, at 673, 675–77.
publicity given to the invasion; and whether the invasion is of a liberty or a security interest.

The relevance of the psychic response of the reasonable observer differs from the fright theory of punishment, at least when we focus on fright and not other negative reactions. Under the fright theory, persons are concerned for the welfare of themselves and those they care for. The invader’s mental state suggests that she is willing to put others at risk of wrongful harm. Under the view explored here, the relevant emotional response of the observer is that which her empathy and antipathy (or sympathy) arouses toward the invader in light of the invader’s violation of substantive maxims and, perhaps, her ensuing corrective justice obligations. This reaction is other-regarding, not self-regarding. To highlight the difference between these two sources of harms, even those with enmity toward the immediate invadee and her supporters, who rejoice in their harms, may suffer fright harms from insecurity as they worry that the invader may direct her blameworthy conduct at the observer or her favorites. Contrariwise, those who are not the least bit frightened by a perceived risk from the invader’s willingness to wrongfully harm others may suffer from sympathy with the immediate invadee, her affiliates, and the invader’s affiliates.

In the end, there seems to be something deeply troubling about my position on how one gauges an invader’s just deserts. Apparently, I have dragged someone off the Clapham Omnibus to judge our invader. The difference between my bus rider and the one Lord Devlin looks to for judging whether conduct is sanctionable on the grounds of immorality is that I have put our bus rider through a short course in deontic morality. Our reasonable person’s values have been purified, if you will. Still, this


225 Violating a security interest may be perceived as worse than violating a comparable liberty interest under the common reaction of loss aversion that “losing hurts more than winning feels good.” See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* 283–86 (2011); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, *Choices, Values, and Frames*, in *Choices, Values, and Frames*, supra note 223, at 1, 3.


227 Kleinig, *Punishment and Desert*, supra note 70, at 128.

228 Id. at 125.

229 “Some have suggested that the public indignation or resentment caused by an act is a proper measure of wrongfulness.” Id. (first citing Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* 90 (G. Simpson trans., 1933); then citing 2 James Fitzjames Stephen, *A History of the Criminal Law of England* 81 (1883)). Kleinig worries that public “indignation is too easily affected by considerations . . . extraneous to the determination of desert,” such as “the face of the offender.” Id. To avoid this, I would insist that relevant reactions survive the deontic filter. Kleinig raises other concerns about determining wrongfulness by reliance “on some simple appeal to the amount of indignation or harm caused by some act.” Id. at 127. Without responding to his several concerns one by one, I believe my proposals survive his caution.


231 See id.
purification seems to leave some influences to chance and the normative breezes of the day. I think this is, unfortunately, unavoidable. Conceptions of responsibility and disrespect are socially constructed.\textsuperscript{232} Looking back to anthropology, sociology, world history, news sources, and the like demonstrates that what passes muster in one community, or at one time, may fail in another.\textsuperscript{233} The parameters of responsible and disrespectful conduct are not deducible from Kantian principles. They entail a double judgment. First, society must judge where to draw essentially contestable standards that balance liberty and security interests within the constraints of the categorical imperative and with an understanding of the human (mental) condition.\textsuperscript{234} For even where fuzzy lines are to be drawn in light of these considerations, reasonable people may differ. Second, agents of society must judge whether, or the extent to which, these standards or lines have been crossed.\textsuperscript{235} We ask our reasonable people, be they judges, juries, others, or some combination, to judge both aspects of individual cases because we have no useful, accurate data and algorithms to feed to ideal computers. As the Legal Realists and postmodernists have made clear, society has no hope in turning to a mechanical jurisprudence, be it legislative or judicial.\textsuperscript{236}

Since this section is central to my analysis of retribution, let me summarize how I got this far. The ordinary wrongful harms suffered by invadees are to be requited, if at all, by conceptions of corrective justice. Protected invadees might include the immediate invadee, her kin, kith, supporters, and onlookers. For that matter, this category might include those who suffer because of their linkage to the invader, such as the invader’s family members. But this principle does not mean that all harms are requited. Adopted maxims must still delineate whether a harm is requitable and, if so, the reach of permissible requitals. We may decide that some harms, such as those from crowd jostlings, are simply, in Coasean terms,\textsuperscript{237} the cost of living in the modern world, and thus are not wrongful. Once all the wrongful harms of each invadee have been allowably requited, at least in principle, by private law remedies aimed at returning an invadee to her prior protected position, a residual concern centered on the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{232} Hampton, \textit{An Expressive Theory of Retribution}, supra note 142, at 10.
\item \textsuperscript{233} “The type of behavior that counts as either respectful or insulting is a matter of social convention. What passes for acceptable conduct in New York will be regarded as outright rudeness in Iowa.” \textit{Id.} To give the point a communitarian grounding, “the notion of desert is at home only in the context of a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding both of the good for man and of the good of that community and where individuals identify their primary interests with reference to those goods.” \textit{ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE} 250 (3d ed. 2007). I would express this good mainly in terms of the security-liberty tradeoff.
\item \textsuperscript{234} For “essentially contestable concepts,” see \textit{WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE} 10–44 (3d ed. 1993); W.B. Gallie, \textit{Essentially Contested Concepts}, \textit{PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y} 167 (1956).
\item \textsuperscript{236} Frederick Schauer, \textit{Legal Realism Untamed}, 91 \textit{TEX. L. REV.} 749, 752–53 (2013).
\item \textsuperscript{237} Kuklin, \textit{Constructing Autonomy}, supra note 1, at 393 n.60.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
invader’s conduct remains. She was disrespectful to the direct and indirect invadees by wrongfully invading their autonomy space. A criminal requital under notions of distributive justice may be an apt means to treat the invader’s just deserts. This draws attention to the blameworthiness of the invader in the form of both responsibility and disrespect blameworthiness.

V. BLAMEWORTHINESS

Deontic blameworthiness has two foci. The first focus is responsibility blameworthiness, B_r, which reflects the invader’s degree of responsibility for making her choice to act or refrain from acting. The second, disrespect blameworthiness, B_d, refers to the invader’s mental state and conduct with respect to those who are put at risk by her act. In other words, the focus relates to the extent to which she violates her duty to other persons to respect their dignity. Despite the vagueness of the idea of blameworthiness, various key factors have been identified or advanced. Some of

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238 Id. at 446.

239 “[T]he study of culpability is [a] poly-dimensional enterprise. Not only does it include considerations on mens rea, but it also involves considerations of personal responsibility.” RYBERG, supra note 136, at 68. As Alexander analyzes it, “the two essential elements of culpable acts are the following: First, there is the defendant’s subjective assessment of the risk of harm to others his act presents . . . . Second, there is the defendant’s reason for acting in the face of the risk.” Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 3 (1994) [hereinafter Alexander, Crime and Culpability]. In his explication, Alexander omits reference to coercive forces on the agent. Id. at 3–5. “Two basic elements determine an offender’s degree of blameworthiness: the nature and seriousness of the harm caused or threatened by the crime and the offender’s degree of culpability in committing the crime.” Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 73 (2005) (identifying several factors to culpability: intent, capacity, motives, “and, for multi-defendant crimes, the defendant’s role in the offense . . . .”).

240 “Blameworthiness is not easy to define, but it would appear that a manageable approach would be to consider (1) the harm actually inflicted (or attempted) and (2) the mental state (culpability; mens rea) of the offender.” SINGER, supra note 154, at 34. Fletcher’s “General Framework of Retributive Punishment” recognizes various factors: “(1) the likelihood that the defendant’s act will result in the violation of a protected legal interest and (2) the harm, if any, represented by this violation.” George P. Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 54, 56 (1982) [hereinafter Fletcher, Recidivist Premium]. Additional factors are the defendant’s degree of responsibility, which has two dimensions, control and “the degree of awareness and knowledge.” Id. at 56. Furthermore, there seem to be “two theories of desert that interweave in the analysis of just punishment,” one stresses responsibility and the “other focuses on culpability . . . .” Id. at 56–57. “[I]f rationality [which “clearly ranges along a continuum”] is a criterion for responsibility, then responsibility, too, should in theory be a matter of degree which ranges along a continuum.” Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Capacity, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 239, 249 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Morse, Diminished Capacity]. “Responsibility or blameworthiness has two distinct dimensions and one presupposition that attaches to both. The presupposition is that any being who is held responsible must be sufficiently rational and autonomous to be a moral agent.” Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, supra note 59, at 319 (footnote omitted). “The first [dimension] is that one has done something morally wrong, something that violates one’s moral obligations. . . . The second dimension of responsibility requires that one must have done such wrong culpably.” Id.
the factors tend to decrease the invader’s relative blameworthiness (e.g., unforeseeability, duress), while others tend to increase it (e.g., malice, contempt). For any one wrongful action, there may be a combination of blameworthiness elements at work that, overall, either exacerbates or moderates the blameworthiness in relation to the threshold for wrongfulness.\footnote{241 For additional discussion of these two blameworthiness foci, see Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 446–57; Kuklin, The Labyrinth of Blameworthiness, supra note 46, at 175.}

\textbf{A. Responsibility Blameworthiness, B.}

As Aristotle instructs, for an agent to be responsible for her conduct,\footnote{242 “Active responsibility theories that relate a person to a harm via the properties of voluntariness, intentionality, causation, knowledge (absence of mistake), freedom (absence of compulsion), and rationality (absence of insanity, infancy) . . . . are the theories long enshrined in Anglo-American criminal law.” Moore, Placing Blame, supra note 170, at 40. “[T]hey all require some kind of action by a person before that person may be held responsible.” Id. (discussing “four distinct views of responsibility here” further).} the agent’s choice must largely be free of avoidable ignorance, B_{ri}, and coercion, B_{rc}.* 243 The factors of ignorance and coercion may be independent of one another, as where an actor is fully aware of the risks of her conduct but is coerced to act by a gun to her head, or where the risks are entirely unknown to her while she otherwise acts freely. Ignorance may have sources that are external (e.g., fraud, misleading bargain frames) or, as uncovered by cognitive and other sciences, internal (e.g., salience distortion, cognitive dissonance).\footnote{243 See Aristotle, supra note 43, bk. III, ch. 1, at 964.} An important aspect of ignorance is the degree of foreseeability of the potential consequences of considered actions.\footnote{Behind the voluntary act requirement of criminal law “is the idea that no one is blameworthy for his acts if his rational agency is sufficiently impaired at the time. The impairment might affect his will . . . [o]r it might affect his rationality . . . .” Alexander, Philosophy of Criminal Law, supra note 127, at 825. “It seems to be a logical rather than a normative matter that we can be morally responsible (i.e. properly held responsible) only for that over which we had or could have some control.” Duff, Answering for Crime, supra note 89, at 58; see, e.g., Corlett, Responsibility and Punishment, supra note 58, at 4–5; Fischer & Ravizza, supra note 159, at 12; Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1519 (1992); Holly Smith, Culpable Ignorance, 92 PHIL. REV. 543, 548–54 (1983).} The more foreseeable to her a risk of harm to others is, the more the agent is in a position to rationally choose (i.e., consent to, of sorts) her conduct,\footnote{244 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 399–400.} and thus the more that agent

\footnote{245 Id.}

\footnote{246 “Most crime has always involved some degree of conscious or unconscious risk-taking.” Pat O’Malley, Crime and Risk 53 (2010). To account for liability for omissions, Husak “submit[s] that the presence or absence of control, and not the presence or absence of choice or action, establishes the boundaries of deserved punishment and responsibility.” Douglas N. Husak, The Relevance of the Concept of Action to the Criminal Law, 6 CRIM. L.F. 327, 340 (1995) (book review).}
is responsible for her choice and the ensuing wrongful harm to invadees. Some commentators argue that every general element of a tort accommodates foreseeability, and contract and criminal law also emphasize foreseeability. Coercion, like ignorance, also may have sources that are external (e.g., force, economic duress, necessity, barriers) and internal (e.g., addiction, irresistible impulse, starvation), as Kant notes. For example, insofar as an invader lacks resources prior to an autonomy While the controversial doctrine of double effect may justify foreseeable harms, it generally does so by finding that persons are not being purposively harmed and circumstances allow for the harm. See infra text accompanying note 480.

Many fortuitous contingencies affect the direct invadee’s and the public’s reactive harms, including: the amount of publicity about the invasion, which may turn on the happenstance of the news cycle, other concurrent newsworthy events, the identity of the direct invadee, and so forth; the size of the public within the reasonable spheres of the risk of future wrongful risk; whether the invasion is one in a series by the invader or part of a crime wave; the socio-economic class of the invadee, and even the invader; ad infinitum. Some of these contingencies are foreseeable to some degree. When, then, are they declared wrongful? Some of the reactive harms (e.g., race-based) fail to clear the deontic filter.

A fortuity may be beneficial to an invader, as where an invasion is never made known either to the direct invadee (e.g., an undiscovered theft) or the general public (e.g., the direct invadee does not reveal it). Does the invader’s foresight of these contingencies make her conduct more blameworthy? She believes she will “get away” with her invasion. Her confidence in escaping punishment would seem to increase the risk of future wrongful risks.

For example, we do not see it as disrespectful conduct when a lost mountain hiker caught in an unexpected blizzard breaks into another’s cabin, consumes the food there, and leaves behind an apology on her business card. See Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 112, at 1686 (“[A] starving man’s theft of food . . . carries no insult, and therefore should not be punished.”). Even Barnett, the libertarian, would allow the hiker to break in to save herself, though she would be liable for damages. RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 170–72 (1998) [hereinafter BARNETT, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY]. Owing to necessity, the Model Penal Code rejects the criminality of the conduct. See DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 197.

“The degree of responsibility depends on the degree of freedom. . . . The greater the obstacles to action which we must overcome, the more accountable we are for the action; the less an action results from our freedom, the less responsible we are for it.” KANT, LECTURES, supra note 163, at 62–63. “If, for instance, a starving man steals something from the dining-room, the degree of his responsibility is diminished by the fact that it would have required great self-restraint for him not to do it.” Id. at 63; see KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 382. “[T]he violence of passion, or temptation, may sometimes alleviate a crime; as theft, in case of hunger, is far more worthy of compassion, than when committed through avarice, or to supply one in luxurious excesses.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *15. Taking this tack, Morse observes: “[c]ontrary to my earlier writing on this subject, I now believe
invasion seeking basic necessities, and thus has reduced opportunities for, say, legitimate economic activities, the more others may believe that coercive factors influenced her conduct.

As suggested by these observations, unavoidable ignorance and coercion may interrelate in complex ways. Both ignorance and coercion have scalar qualities, so we must determine at what degree the freedom from them suffices to hold an agent responsible. For purposes of retribution, once past the threshold, the reasonable observer judges the extent to which the heightened satisfaction of the requisites to responsibility also reflects the invader’s greater disrespect of the persons put at risk by her conduct.

A closer look at the scalar qualities of ignorance and coercion may be edifying. Under idealized standards, let us suppose that for an agent who is perfectly informed and capable of rationally processing information, \( B_{ri} = 1.0 \), and for an agent who is perfectly free of every form of coercion, \( B_{rc} = 1.0 \). Hence, \( B_{ni} \) and \( B_{nc} \) range from 0.0 to 1.0. At some point, the agent is sufficiently blameless to be considered not responsible for her harm to the invader, at which point the harm may be considered not wrongful. For the reasonable person of existing law, both aspects of that the law should adopt a generic partial excusing condition, ‘Guilty But Partially Responsible,’ based on diminished rationality [owing to coercive impairments].” Stephen J. Morse, *Rationality and Responsibility*, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 265 (2000) (footnotes omitted); see id. at 265–66.

251 For a discussion of the role of enablements in a deontic regime, see Kuklin, *Constructing Autonomy*, supra note 1, at 404–06.

252 A $1000 theft by a rich person seems more blameworthy than such a theft by a poor person. In Boonin’s view, it is wrong to assume that if a rich offender and a middle-class offender commit identical offenses, then the amount of harm they cause is identical. This assumption is mistaken because the objective insecurity and subjective anxiety caused to others will be much greater if the offender is rich than if he is of average means.


255 “The concept of responsibility involves being appropriately responded to in a certain way for a certain action. . . . The same point can be made more sharply with respect to blameworthiness.” Benjamin C. Zipursky, *Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and Moral Luck*, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 97, 122 (2008) [hereinafter Zipursky, *Two Dimensions of Responsibility*]. Our negative reactive attitudes toward a person’s harmful conduct are moderated by knowledge of the person’s shortfalls from fully responsible choice. See Strawson, supra note 159, at 64–67.

256 “In problematic cases . . . legal responsibility is something to be decided, not simply discovered.” Joel Feinberg, *Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals*, in *DOING AND DESERVING*, supra note 71, at 25, 27.
responsibility blameworthiness are satisfied somewhat short of the ideal, say, $B_{r0} \geq 0.5$ and $B_{c0} \geq 0.3$. This disparity in thresholds is supposed since existing law seems to be less sympathetic to coercion than to ignorance (e.g., unforeseeability). The minimum thresholds for the two aspects of responsibility blameworthiness may vary according to the type of conduct (e.g., battery versus the intentional infliction of emotional distress), whether the shortfalls stem from internal or external sources (e.g., irresistible impulse versus economic duress), whether the claim is criminal or civil, the type of harm in issue (e.g., physical versus dignitary harm), and other similar considerations.\footnote{See Morse, \textit{Diminished Capacity}, supra note 240, at 271.} Furthermore, an agent who is more skilled or knowledgeable than the standard reasonable person or better able to resist coercive pressures (e.g., a hardened stoic) may be found more blameworthy for a wrongful harm than an ordinary reasonable person, or may be found to have committed a harm that is wrongful because of her superior capabilities that would not be wrongful if done by the ordinary reasonable person. Because of her superior capabilities, the risk of harms may be more foreseeable and easier to avoid, perilous temptations may be easier to resist, and so forth. As we do for medical practitioners and other experts, we may hold her to a higher standard because, owing to her superior capabilities, doing so is not more personally demanding of her.\footnote{See \textit{RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM} § 12 (AM. LAW INST. 2012); \textit{RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS} § 299A (AM. LAW INST. 1977).} A particular agent may have a complex combination of qualities that relate to responsibility blameworthiness. She may have, for example, superior knowledge, ordinary reasoning skills, and subnormal resistance to coercive pressures or temptations.

\textbf{B. Disrespect Blameworthiness, $B_d$}

Disrespect blameworthiness, $B_d$, centers on the degree of the invader’s disrespectfulness toward an invadee at the time of the conduct in question. Under the categorical imperative, an agent must consider other persons as moral equals and must so treat them.\footnote{See, e.g., \textit{Hill, Jr., Dignity}, supra note 130, at 55; ROGER J. SULLIVAN, \textit{IMMANUEL KANT’S MORAL THEORY} 198 (1989); Allen Wood, \textit{Humanity as End in Itself}, in 2 DEREK PARFIT, \textit{ON WHAT MATTERS} 58, 62–63 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 2011); Kuklin, \textit{Constructing Autonomy}, supra note 1, at 449–54; Dillon, \textit{Respect}, supra note 200.} Thus, as with responsibility blameworthiness, there are two aspects of disrespect blameworthiness: disrespectful attitude, $B_{d_a}$, and disrespectful treatment $B_{d_t}$. In judging the first aspect of the invader’s disrespectfulness, her superior attitude, the observer must gauge the invader’s subjective mental state.\footnote{Kant holds that duties of respect are strict duties “classified according to the kinds of actions that would constitute violations of them: arrogance, defamation, and ridicule.” WOOD, \textit{KANTIAN ETHICS}, supra note 129, at 178 (citation omitted). While defamation and ridicule involve the failure to treat another person with respect, arrogance is a mental state that seems}
complicated evaluations, including the drawing of inferences from the invader’s manifested conduct, such as in the difference between recklessness and negligence. To what extent was the invader’s conduct a product of, even motivated by, a sense of moral superiority to those put at risk by her conduct? What was her intention or her purpose264 Was she indifferent to the risks to others, or did she believe other societal values outweighed the risks? Was the manifestation of disrespect a product of the invader’s ignorance, inadvertence, or insensitivity?265 While foreseeability is an important factor in gauging responsibility blameworthiness, it also bears on disrespectfulness. The more an invader knows or has reason to know of the nature or extent of the negative impact on the invadee’s autonomy space, or the harms that may well ensue, the greater the likely disrespectful mental state driving the conduct in question, ceteris paribus. Likewise, perhaps, in benefitting from an independent of conduct. Loving paternalism appears independent of all three of Kant’s specified forms of disrespect.

261 As one example, suppose that an invader knows she could request, and get, a gift of a book from the invadee, but chooses to steal it from her instead. Would we say that the additional (psychic) payoff from the theft over the gift reflects heightened disrespect of the invadee? Do we consider whether the invader obtains a perceived benefit from the invasion? What if an invader rubs the invadee’s nose in her harm, even if originally not a product of blameworthiness?

262 Brudner defends a subjectivism that “avoids the excessive empiricism of which critics complain, incorporating as it does the standpoint of an ideal thinking Agent whose inferences from the empirical agent’s choices are imputed to those choices.” BRUDNER, supra note 63, at 59.

263 “The difference between negligence and recklessness is entirely a matter of attitude. Recklessness implies a conscious disregard of the risk; negligence requires neither awareness, nor disregard, of the risk.” DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 76. Under negligence, “I should have been aware, but wasn’t.” Id. at 77.

264 Strawson “insist[s] on . . . the very great importance that we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us of other human beings, and the great extent to which our personal feelings and reactions depend upon, or involve, our beliefs about these attitudes and intentions.” Strawson, supra note 159, at 62.

265 “Jurisdictions should adopt aggravation doctrines [in criminal law] based on quality of contemplation or the opportunity for such.” Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Plotting Premeditation’s Demise, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 105 (2012) [hereinafter Ferzan, Plotting Premeditation’s Demise] (discussing “enhanced decisionmaking”); see id. at 103–08.

266 Id.

267 “Under the risk-based paradigm . . . [c]ulpability would be a scalar function of the various harms the actor believed he was putting at risk, the degrees of risk of the various harms he believed his act was imposing, and his reason(s) for undertaking the act.” Larry Alexander, Duff on Attempts, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ANTONY DUFF 215, 237 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Alexander, Duff on Attempts]. “The magnitude of dignitary harms is also [along with the invader’s (A) disregard of the invadee (S)] a function of the nature of legitimate interest on S’s part that A manifests himself as ready to abridge.” PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT 149 (2004) [hereinafter WESTEN, LOGIC OF CONSENT]; see H.L.A. HART, INTENTION AND PUNISHMENT, IN PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 125, at 113, 122 (opining that the difference between “direct and oblique intention” may be relevant to penalty judgments, though not conviction judgments); Adam Kolber, The
interchange that is disadvantageous to an invadee, the more the invader knows or has reason to know of the invadee’s shortfalls from full responsibility—that is, the coercive forces on her and her relevant ignorance—the greater the disrespect blameworthiness, whether or not the invader is the source of these shortfalls (e.g., exploiting the invadee’s lack of education). Knowledge of an invadee’s unusual sensitivity may not affect compensation under tort law (e.g., noise nuisance), but it is relevant to judging the invader’s disrespectful attitude and, for that matter, the second aspect of disrespectfulness, treatment, Bdt.

Knowledge of a person’s legal and moral rights to liberty or security is an obvious example of disrespectful treatment. Disrespectful treatment, however, may not correlate with disrespectful attitude, as disrespectful treatment requires an independent evaluation. For example, for paternalistic conduct driven by love for a susceptible invadee, an observer may judge that the invader was not (very) disrespectful even though she denied the invadee the freedom to choose for herself under the circumstances. By nonconsensually hiding the susceptible invadee’s candy while she is on a taxing diet, for instance, the invader’s disrespectful attitude may be minimal or nonexistent. Nevertheless, while the invader may have had a respectful attitude toward the invadee by considering her an equal (“I myself would prefer and benefit from this type of paternalism”), by denying her the freedom to choose whether to eat her own candy, the invader did not treat the paternalized invadee with (complete) respect. Yet, the invader was not using the paternalized person as a means only to her own ends. In some overall sense, perhaps, the invader was respectful of the invadee. As another instance, an observer may similarly view as minimally blameworthy, if at all, the invader who helps euthanize a rational, imploring invadee.

\[Experiential\ Future\ of\ the\ Law,\ 60\ EMORY\ L.J.\ 585,\ 627–31\ (2011).\ Nonetheless,\ we\ must\ take\ into\ account\ such\ considerations\ as\ the\ doctrine\ of\ double\ effect.\ See\ infra\ text\ accompanying\ note\ 480.\]

\[268\ \ See\ Kuklin,\ Private\ Requitals, supra\ note\ 2,\ at\ 1001–05.\]

\[269\ Id.\]

\[270\ Meyers\ identifies\ three\ components\ of\ respect,\ one\ subjective\ and\ two\ objective. \[T\]hese\ three\ components\ can\ be\ at\ odds.\ One’s\ respectful\ attitude\ may\ fail\ to\ find\ expression\ in\ one’s\ conduct;\ one\ may\ act\ respectfully\ despite\ an\ indifferent\ or\ disrespectful\ attitude;\ one’s\ respectful\ conduct\ may\ be\ addressed\ to\ an\ object\ unworthy\ of\ respect.”\ Diana\ T.\ Meyers, Self-Respect\ and Autonomy, in DIGNITY, CHARACTER, AND SELF-RESPECT, supra\ note\ 80,\ at\ 218, 224.\]

\[271\ Respectful\ paternalistic\ behavior\ may\ be\ quite\ extreme,\ as\ where\ an\ agent\ imprisons\ an\ invadee\ against\ his\ will\ to\ save\ him\ from\ himself\ (e.g.,\ drug\ addiction)\ or\ from\ others\ who\ have\ put\ him\ at\ risk\ (e.g.,\ threat\ of\ mob\ hit).\ This\ conduct\ may\ be\ costly\ to\ the\ agent\ and\ without\ any\ personal\ benefit,\ as\ where\ the\ agent\ is\ ambivalent\ about\ the\ propriety\ of\ her\ conduct.\ We\ might\ conclude\ that\ beneficent\ paternalism\ is\ a\ dignitary\ harm\ (an\ objective\ insult,\ of\ sorts),\ but\ not\ disrespectfully\ blameworthy\ (a\ subjective\ insult)\ in\ that\ it\ was\ done\ for\ the\ purpose\ of,\ and\ succeeded\ in,\ advancing\ the\ net\ interests\ of\ the\ invadee.\ Still,\ however,\ the\ agent\ did\ not\ treat\ the\ invadee\ with\ unqualified\ respect\ since\ she\ denied\ him\ the\ freedom\ to\ choose\ for\ himself.\]

\[272\ Could\ we\ say\ that\ the\ respectful\ attitude\ toward\ the\ paternalized\ agent\ outweighed\ the\ disrespectful\ treatment\ that\ denied\ the\ agent\ immediate,\ free\ choice\ under\ the\ circumstances?\]
with strong grounds for her insistence. As for the malicious invader out “to get” the invadee, this is disrespect of the first order.273

As with responsibility blameworthiness, B_r, the two aspects of disrespect blameworthiness, B_d and B_t, have scalar qualities, say, from 0.0 to 1.0.274 Regarding attitude, the disrespectfulness of an invader’s mental state may vary greatly.275 Kant asserts that the evil mental state of a criminal makes him worse.276 Existing law recognizes a wide range of mental states as sufficient for requitals, either privately under corrective justice or publicly under retribution or distributive justice.277 Requitals may ensue from strict liability, inadvertence, negligence, recklessness, wantonness, intention, purposiveness, willfulness, and malice. The latter part of this list easily implies disrespect, but even strict liability may suggest a degree of disrespect under some particulars, as where substantial statistical risk to product users (e.g., of cars without available, inexpensive safety devices installed) is known or knowable to producers. Criminal law invokes conceptions of mens rea to identify degrees of blameworthy mental states.278 The Model Penal Code resorts to four categories: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.279 Commentators debate the meaning and usefulness of these and other applied terms.280 A difficult deontic

273 Again, if the direct invadee or others suffer psychic and other harms from knowledge of the invader’s ill-will, this is a matter for corrective justice. Protected harm, if any, is based on the invadee’s reasonable reaction, generally not directly on the blameworthiness of the invader’s conduct. Corrective justice usually establishes thresholds of blameworthiness, after which this element typically drops out. The doctrine of comparative negligence is an exception. See supra text accompanying notes 113–14.

274 For example, B_d = 0.0 in the ordinary, arms-length, fully negotiated contract, where the autonomy of both parties is fully respected during the contracting process, neither one being used as a means only to the other’s ends. B_t = 1.0 where (bear with me) an invader tortures a baby for fun knowing that, and because, the parents, family, and others are looking on.

275 “The magnitude of dignitary injuries varies, depending upon the species of disregard an actor manifests.” WESTEN, LOGIC OF CONSENT, supra note 267, at 149. Thus, Westen asserts that the manifested purpose or desire to harm another is a worse indignity than simply a willingness to harm, just as harm from indifference is worse than harm from inadvertence. Id. “Even very tiny risk-impositions can be reckless if imposed for insufficient or misanthropic reasons, just as very large risk-impositions can be nonculpable if supported by weighty reasons.” Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 931, 934–35 (2000) [hereinafter Alexander, Insufficient Concern] (footnote omitted).

276 See KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 382.

277 Id.

278 Id.

279 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). “The states of mind found in tort law are deliberation, intention, and recklessness.” Cane, Retribution, supra note 112, at 149 (providing explications). For tortious recklessness (willful or wanton conduct), see, for example, DOBBS, supra note 109, at 51; JOEL FEINBERG, Sua Culpa, in DOING AND DESERVING, supra note 71, at 187, 193.

280 “Criminal statues have resorted to a bewildering variety of adjectives to characterize the mental states required by various offenses.” LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 186 (1987) [hereinafter KATZ, BAD ACTS]. “Recently, drafters have tried to limit themselves to four basic terms: intention, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. The meaning of these is superficially obvious. On closer inspection it becomes harder to grasp.” Id. at 209. For a taste of the breadth and depth of
issue is whether the law should have strict liability crimes.281 Some commentators insist not,282 others find in such crimes an aspect of mens rea,283 or sufficient defendant control,284 and still others are satisfied with the justifiability of strict outcome responsibility.285

the debate, see, for example, ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY, supra note 85, at 23—85. “I believe that these three culpable mental states—purpose, knowledge, and recklessness—all exhibit the single moral failing of insufficient concern for the interests of others.” Alexander, Philosophy of Criminal Law, supra note 127, at 828 (footnote omitted); see Alexander, Insufficient Concern, supra note 275, at 931. Despite the debate over the usefulness of delineated mental states, the studies of three researchers “show that people are able to make explicit distinctions about the states of mind of others that more or less correspond to legally relevant categories.” Pam A. Mueller et al., When Does Knowledge Become Intent? Perceiving the Minds of Wrongdoers, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 859, 859 (2012).

281 “Whatever one might think of strict obligations of repair, punishment in the absence of fault is generally considered extremely difficult to justify. And the more severe the punishment, the more difficult is the justificatory task.” PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 109 (2002) [hereinafter CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY]. Simons supports strict liability punishments, if not strict liability crimes. “Notwithstanding the demands of retributive desert, strict criminal liability is sometimes defensible when the strict liability pertains, not to whether conduct is to be criminalized at all, but to the seriousness of the actor’s crime.” Kenneth W. Simons, Is Strict Criminal Liability in the Grading of Offences Consistent with Retributive Desert?, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 445, 445 (2012) [hereinafter Simons, Strict Criminal Liability] (referring to “holistic culpability, attention to the degree of unjustifiability of the risk, and rough comparability in culpability.”).

282 “As far back as the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas pronounced that ‘a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an inflictive punishment.’” Christopher, supra note 127, at 904–05 (citing THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE II, part 2–2, quest. 108, 4th art.). “One important difference between tort and criminal law is that although a deontological account of tort can support an injurer’s genuine strict liability duty to a victim, a deontological account of criminal law does not support an injurer’s genuine strict liability duty.” Simons, Deontology, supra note 68, at 296. More generally, strict liability “may have its legal uses but seems irrational as a moral position.” THOMAS NAGEL, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24, 31 (1979); see generally PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 125.


284 “I maintain that there is an interpretation of strict-liability offences possible which does not violate the retributivist principle of punishment.” SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE, supra note 56, at 241. “[E]ven in the strict-liability cases, the defendant must have had at least some control (minimal as it might be) over his action and some means of reducing the risk.” Id. at 243. “Presumably, an actor is given a fair chance to arrange her circumstances so as to avoid any call for performing the knowing, intentional acts forming the predicate for the strict liability crime in question.” R. George Wright, The Progressive Logic of Criminal Responsibility and the Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 459, 460 n.4 (1994). Likewise, regarding strict tort liability, “[h]owever difficult it may be to refrain from [such] a tort, it is virtually never practically impossible,” as by “opting out of the profession or activity . . . .” Hanoch Sheninman, Tort Law and Corrective Justice, 22 LAW & PHILO. 21, 56 (2003); see GROSS, supra note 283, at 346–47, 357–58.

285 Christopher argues “that retributivism justifies punishment under a standard of liability—an extreme form of absolute liability—in which not merely many, but every, innocent
Blameworthiness, I have observed, may play a role at two points. First, harm may require a threshold level of blameworthiness (e.g., negligence) for a particular autonomy space interference to be considered wrongful, an autonomy invasion. This relates to first-order, material maxims. Second, once a protected harm occurs, blameworthiness then may be a factor in measuring the legal response (e.g., extent of damages or penalty). This relates to second-order, requital maxims.\(^{286}\) Mens rea plays, perhaps, a role in both types of penal maxims.\(^{287}\)

The harmed person’s conduct, which is presumably a manifestation of her mental state, may also be relevant to the observer’s calculus of the agent’s disrespectfulness. Her mental state may make the agent’s conduct (somewhat) justifiable, for example, as where she self-defensively reacts to the other person’s threats or provocation. This takes us to justifications and its sibling, excuses.

C. Excuses and Justifications

One may analyze the defenses of excuse and justification as denials of blameworthiness under the analysis presented here.\(^{288}\) Excuses, such as duress,\(^{289}\) provocation,\(^{290}\) irresistible impulse, diminished capacity, insanity, and infancy, generally center on the negation or reduction of responsibility blameworthiness.\(^{291}\) Moore’s analysis of excuses exemplifies this. Examining excuses, he separates them

defendant would be convicted and punished.” Christopher, supra note 127, at 908; see Ken Levy, The Solution to the Problem of Outcome Luck: Why Harm Is Just as Punishable as the Wrongful Action that Causes It, 24 LAW & PHIL. 263 (2005) (justification based on assumption of risk principles). For citations to those who accept and reject the retributive relevance of ensuing harms outside the actor’s control, see id. at 267 n.7 (“Equal Punishment Argument”). For more on outcome responsibility and moral luck, see infra text accompanying notes 334–38.

\(^{286}\) That lex talionis does not consider blameworthiness is cause for complaint. Among other problems, lex talionis “suffers from the defect that it makes no allowance for the mental state of the criminal or for the circumstantial aspects of the crime. In short, it simply ignores the other major component of seriousness, namely, the criminal’s culpability.” RYBERG, supra note 136, at 68 (footnote omitted).

\(^{287}\) See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)–(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (describing aggravating and mitigating circumstances for death penalty sentences); but see infra note 413.

\(^{288}\) “Think of justifications and excuses as having modes of culpability attached to their elements.” DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 191; see id. at 249 (opining that perhaps the Code’s common principle for justification and excuse is “the general, and unexplored, notion of blameworthiness”); see generally ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY, supra note 85, at 86–168 (“Defeaters of Culpability”). Fletcher and Moore see justification as negating wrongdoing, while excuse negates blameworthiness. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 154, at 85; MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 170, at 482–83.

\(^{289}\) For the confusions and complexities of the excuse of duress under the Model Penal Code, see DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 251–59; see generally Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (1989).

\(^{290}\) See DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 265–71. “Provocation is a partial, rather than a complete, excuse because it mitigates the actor’s blameworthiness, rather than precluding it.” Id. at 267.

\(^{291}\) See, e.g., id. at 247–51.
into three sets: mislabeled (“called”) excuses, true excuses, and status excuses.\(^{292}\) First, the set that are not true excuses “are simply ways of showing the absence of voluntary action . . . , intentionality . . . , or causation . . . .”\(^{293}\) “[T]rue excuses,” the second set, “are conditions of mistake . . . or of compulsion . . . .”\(^{294}\) Finally, Moore refers to the third set as “status excuses—infancy, insanity, perhaps involuntary intoxication.”\(^{295}\)

Justifications, such as self-defense, largely spring from a denial of disrespect blameworthiness.\(^{296}\) For example, the key provision in the Model Penal Code, “Justification Generally: Choice of Evils,” begins, “[c]onduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: [it is a lesser evil and not otherwise excluded] . . . .”\(^{297}\) Conduct motivated by the necessity to protect oneself or another is not normally disrespectful of others harmed by the defensive response. As with excuses, however, creating rigid categories of justifications is questionable.\(^{298}\) Scholars have also questioned the distinctiveness of excuses versus justifications.\(^{299}\) But the bottom line for our purposes is the top line above: both excuses and justifications are denials, in one way or another, that the agent’s conduct was blameworthy.\(^{300}\)

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\(^{292}\) Other commentators, on the other hand, have challenged the definitiveness of particular excuse categorizations. “The search for a unifying theory of excuses has been less productive, partly because different authors set out to rationalize different groups of defences (some including denials of capacity, others excluding them),” \textit{Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law}, supra note 155, at 235 (citing Peter Westen, \textit{An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse}, 25 \textit{Law \\& Phil.} 289, 300 (2006)). Wallace, for instance, analytically divides excuses “into four broad classes: inadvertence, mistake or accident; unintentional bodily movements; physical constraint; and coercion, necessity, and duress.” \textit{Wallace}, supra note 209, at 136 (footnote omitted).

\(^{293}\) \textit{Moore, Placing Blame}, supra note 170, at 42.

\(^{294}\) \textit{Id.}

\(^{295}\) \textit{Id.} (footnote omitted).

\(^{296}\) \textit{See id.}


\(^{298}\) \textit{See supra} note 292 (noting excuses). “Yet the situations that may justify an actor in doing something otherwise criminal are so various that no set of specific justificatory defenses can describe them all—‘fact is richer that diction’, as one ordinary language philosopher once put the point.” \textit{Moore, Placing Blame}, supra note 170, at 675.

\(^{299}\) Duff contends that “needless confusion has been bred by attempts to fit all defences into a simple two-part schema of ‘justification’ and ‘excuse’.” \textit{Duff, Answering for Crime}, supra note 89, at 263–64. “With only a little legerdemain, you can turn any justification into an excuse (and vice versa).” \textit{Katz, Bad Acts}, supra note 280, at 65 (following with examples). “All this fanciful arguing is not meant to deny that there is a tremendous difference between a justification and an excuse, one that’s a lot more profound than most others the law hangs its hat on.” \textit{Id.} at 66.

D. Overall Blameworthiness

In some cases, the invader’s disrespect blameworthiness cuts one way while her responsibility blameworthiness cuts the other way. More specifically, complicated differences and interconnections may exist among the four aspects of blameworthiness: \( B_{ri}, B_{re}, B_{da}, \) and \( B_{dt}. \)\(^{301}\) For instance, suppose an invader consciously acts with complete indifference to whether her conduct puts others at wrongful risk of harm, or, if she did know of the risk, she would act with malice toward potential invadees. This exacerbates her disrespect blameworthiness. At the same time, the invader is acting under partial economic coercion and is reasonably ignorant that her conduct actually will put another person at risk. This decreases her responsibility blameworthiness. These sources of blameworthiness offset one another to some degree.\(^{302}\)

How these two components of blameworthiness are to be combined in an overall judgment of blameworthiness is not obvious.\(^{303}\) Suppose we measure each component on a scale of 0.0 to 1.0. Are they to be multiplied? That is, to simplify, \( B = B_r \times B_d. \) Or should we combine them in some other more complex manner, as by partial addition and partial multiplication depending on the particularities of the invasion? As a society, we must resolve this question in adopting detailed, retributive, requalit maximis.\(^{304}\) Standing back, I think this scenario presents many reasonable possibilities that would satisfy the categorical imperative. Let us adopt one or more of them.

It is particularly troublesome to our objective observer if, after considering both the invader’s responsibility and disrespect blameworthiness, she concludes that the invader is liable under private, corrective justice and adopted public sanctions much beyond her just deserts. The observer may be sympathetic to the invader who she perceives must unduly suffer for conduct that has been declared wrongful. Still, there is normally sympathy for the invitee who suffers from the invader’s conduct.\(^{305}\) She did nothing to deserve her harms. Our observer prefers to see that, in the end, the invadee is not left to suffer and the invader is not made to suffer unduly. Both preferences may not be achieved at the same time.\(^{306}\) The two (relatively) innocent parties conundrum arises. Yes, the invitee should happily be returned to her ex ante

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301 Id.

302 Deeper analysis would call for an explication of how the two components of blameworthiness relate to the wrongful harm of particular crimes. For example, Ryberg finds a “serious challenge which mens rea generates: the challenge of absolute comparison. . . . [W]hat exactly does it imply to say that a person is more culpable if a harm is caused intentionally than if it is the result of recklessness?” Ryberg, supra note 136, at 70.

303 “Here is what I mean by doing justice: Giving a wrongdoer punishment according to what he deserves—no more, no less—by taking account of all those factors that we, as a society, think are relevant in assessing personal blameworthiness.” Robinson, Virtues of Restorative Processes, supra note 221, at 380 (footnote omitted).

304 “In so far as proportionalists accept that there are not one but several factors which affect the culpability of a criminal, it needs to be explained how these factors should be combined.” Ryberg, supra note 136, at 76. Ryberg summarizes the problems of comparing and combining various aspects of culpability. Id. at 83–84.


306 See id.
position, but one may not find quite right the fact that the invader is entirely responsible to return her to that point in light of the nature of the invader’s blameworthiness and, perhaps, the extent of her civil and criminal liability to the particular invadee, other wrongfully harmed parties, and the state. 307 Usual conceptions of corrective justice and retribution cannot resolve this quandary. Perhaps the state, dispenser of distributive justice, should provide a (partial) resolution. 308

To further pursue this deep moral dilemma, recall that under existing legal doctrines blameworthiness plays a subordinate role in corrective justice. 309 We may establish blameworthiness as a threshold requirement for protected harms, as in tortious negligence, but, even here the legally competent person physically or mentally incapable of completely satisfying the standard of the reasonable person may be liable for harms resulting from conduct for which she is not responsibility blameworthy in any significant material sense. 310 She is effectively strictly liable as in various explicit pockets of strict liability, such as products and enterprise liability. 311 Once even a fully reasonable person is held liable for negligence, she may be responsible for harms unforeseeable to her, such as under the thin-skull rule and a conception of moral luck, 312 in which case her responsibility for these unforeseeable harms falls short of Aristotle’s requirement that responsible choices be substantially free of unavoidable ignorance. 313 Corrective justice here is driven by the aim to restore an invadee to her prior protected position irrespective of the invader’s actual level of blameworthiness

307 Smith offers justifications. First, even if incapable of complying with the norm, the injurer is a beneficiary of a society which observes such a norm; second, the victim’s reliance on the norm will “falter” if she cannot recover for violations; and third, “the norm will lose some of its force and value if society tolerates violations—even violations committed by subjectively incompetent individuals.” Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the ‘Crisis’: A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 794 (1987).

308 Coleman’s abandoned annulment theory of corrective justice may offer some guidance. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 66, at 303–28 (“The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice”). “[T]he core principle of [Coleman’s theory] was the moral demand that wrongful losses be eliminated or annulled . . . . The annulment theory did not insist, however, that the annulment of the wrongful loss was necessarily the responsibility of the agent who had brought it about.” Perry, The Distributive Turn, supra note 66, at 315 (citing Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands for Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349 (1992)). For criticism of Coleman’s retreat from the annulment theory, see Gardner, Corrective Justice, supra note 67. “While Coleman recognizes that corrective justice is distinct from distributive justice, he does not, unlike some other contemporary corrective justice theorists, regard the two as completely independent of one another.” Perry, The Distributive Turn, supra note 66, at 317 (referring to COLEMAN, supra note 66).

309 See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 109, at 277–81.


311 See supra text accompanying notes 105–14.

312 On moral luck, see infra text accompanying notes 333–44.

313 See generally MURPHY & HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 179.
with respect to an established objective threshold. Retribution, on the other hand, as grounded on distributive justice, should arguably always keep blameworthiness on the scales. Consequently, the applications of these two forms of justice in particular cases may further lead to disquieting results. The criminally responsible invader, for example, may be tortiously liable for an enormous recovery for a minor offense much beyond her relative blameworthiness, her just deserts, in which case we are tempted to declare, “that’s not fair to the invader! She has suffered enough.” Choosing to reduce her punishment for this reason is not a matter of distributive justice for penal behavior. Private liability, no matter how great, is not punishment and is not gauged by the degree of just deserts. Instead, any reduction in punishment is based on other normative considerations, such as mercy.

VI. RISK AND HARM

The identification of most harms is straightforward, like a punch in the nose. From intentional, nonconsensual touching to the disappointment of reasonable expectations, society supports a common view as to what constitutes a harm, a setback to interests. While room for debate exists on whether particular types of conduct produce harms at all, such as the creation of certain kinds of minimal, nuisance-like externalities, the main debates center on whether or when a recognized type of harm should be declared wrongful by means of an adopted maxim. When considering harms that derive from the imposition of a risk alone, the complexities grow, especially in the context of retributive punishment. In the criminal realm, for instance, particularly knotty are questions about apt requitals for the wrongful harms, if any, from the risks ensuing from inchoate crimes, such as attempts, and from the risks relating to recidivism. Therefore, attention to some of the complexities relating to whether particular risks are harms, or should be declared wrongful harms, is necessary before one can focus on acceptable requitals for such identified harms.

314 Id.
315 Id.
316 An example may be where an invader commits a minor criminal battery and, because the invadee has a “thin skull,” causes enormous, unforeseeable harm.
317 On mercy, see id.; Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong to Commute Death Row? Retribution, Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319 (2004); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421 (2004). “With regard to crimes of subjects against one another it is absolutely not for [the sovereign] to exercise [the right to grant clemency]; for here failure to punish . . . is the greatest wrong against his subjects.” KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 477. “But that mercy by the state can ever be justified is unclear to the retributivist, at least the Kantian sort of retributivist who holds that punishment is both the state’s right and perfect duty of justice to punish wrongdoers.” Corlett, Making Sense of Retributivism, supra note 128, at 106 (footnote omitted).
318 Some commentators have recommended that harms from risks that do not come to fruition should be punished according to the severity of the risked harm discounted by its likelihood of maturing at the time of the conduct. See Don E. Scheid, Constructing a Theory of Punishment, Desert, and the Distribution of Punishments, 10 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 441, 487 (1997) (identifying suggestions by Paul Robinson and Douglas Husak).
Scholars have not reached a consensus on whether an imposed risk is a wrongful harm in itself, or even a harm in itself.\footnote{See Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 1005–13 (“Risk Imposition”).} Criminal prohibitions almost always require more than the creation of a risk. In traditional terms, both actus reus and mens rea must be met.\footnote{Dubber identifies “the Model Penal Code’s complete scheme of criminal liability: A person is criminally liable if he engages in 1. conduct that a. inflicts or threatens b. substantial harm to individual or public interests 2. without justification and 3. without excuse.” DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 29. “The Model Penal Code defines conduct as encompassing both [actus reus and mens rea]: conduct is ‘an action or omission and its accompanying state of mind.’” Id. at 30 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(5) (AM. LAW INST. 1962)). “The analytic schemes of the Model Penal Code and the common law are more or less interchangeable . . . .” Id. One commentator “argue[s] that this most basic organizing distinction is not coherent.” Paul H. Robinson, Should the Criminal Law Abandon the Actus Reus—Mens Rea Distinction?, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 240, at 187, 187. For the slipperiness of mens rea, see Kuklin, Punishment, supra note 112, at 58–72.} Thus, criminal sanctions require risk “plus.”\footnote{“One of the usual reasons for requiring mens rea in the criminal law but not in private law is . . . that the seriousness of criminal sanctions means they should be directed only at the morally most heinous conduct.” WILLIAM LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 392 (2007) (citation omitted).} Once this “plus” is satisfied, attention returns to whether the risk imposition should be sanctionable—that is, whether the risk imposition is wrongful.\footnote{Alexander and Ferzan provide an answer: “An actor who culpably imposes a risk to others’ legally protected interests should be punished for that risk-imposition whether or not any harms to those interests result from the act.” Alexander & Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes, supra note 85, at 105.} As a prelude to this discussion, I must say a few words about the temporal relationship between a risk and the types of harms that may ensue.

Risks can be analyzed as falling into three temporal categories: past, present (occurrent), and future.\footnote{See Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 1011–13.} Different categories may give rise to different types, manners, or degrees of harms. Harms from occurrent risks exist between the time a risk is created and the time at which the risk either comes to fruition or dissipates.\footnote{Id.} When an individual throws a shoe at another person, an immediate, occurrent risk results, from which physical and other harms may eventuate.\footnote{We may wish to play this invasion in slow motion to give the invadee time to contemplate the meaning of the approaching shoe. Otherwise, some of the harms may be retrospective only.} Many of the harms from the occurrent risk depend on the invadee’s knowledge of it at the time, such as those that arise from her reaction to the unfolding risk.\footnote{Id.} But at least one harm does not require the invadee’s knowledge of the risk at the time. If third persons are aware of the occurrent risk to the invadee, they may perceive it as defamatory and as expressing the invader’s disrespect, which is a dignitary harm to the invadee.\footnote{Id.}
Similar observations can be made about harms from past and future risks. As an invadee looks back at a risk, whether or not it ripened, all four types of harms may ensue from the retrospection, such as from reactive illness, work interruption, trauma, and insult. On the other hand, retrospection may reduce an invadee’s continuing reactive harms, as where she comes to understand that the invader’s conduct occurred with minimal responsibility or disrespectfulness. Turning to the future, another array of the four types of harms may arise from prospection. The invadee, whether or not she was the direct object of the past wrongful conduct, may suffer physical harm (e.g., illness from feelings of insecurity\(^{328}\)), economic harm (e.g., expenditures for protective measures), psychic harm (e.g., anxiety), and dignitary harm (e.g., ongoing insult and defamation).\(^{329}\) The immediate wrongful harms from future wrongful risks often dominate the justification for the claims of the general public for requitals. For inchoate crimes, harms from past and present risks may be particularly prominent. For recidivism considerations, present harms from future risks take center stage.

With the temporal categories of risks in place, let us turn to the harms from inchoate crimes\(^{330}\) particularly attempts.\(^{331}\) Once sufficiently targeted by an invader, the knowledge of the invadee and third parties of an ongoing or past inchoate crime may produce physical, economic, and psychic harms, but the dignitary harm may predominate. The inchoate crime manifests disrespect of the invadee, whether or not any risk ripens. At the very least, the inchoate crime produces a wrongful dignitary

\(^{328}\) That burglary victims suffer ongoing worries of vulnerability and other negative emotions, see Frederick M. Lawrence, Comment: The Limits of Domination, 76 B.U. L. REV. 361, 368 n.33 (1996) (citing many examples in the footnotes).

\(^{329}\) Id.

\(^{330}\) “An inchoate crime . . . is a crime that occurs while the actor still has the ability to choose to refrain from imposing the risk.” Alexander & Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes, supra note 85, at 105. See Michael T. Cahill, Attempt by Omission, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1123–20 (2009) [hereinafter Cahill, Attempt by Omission] (“What Is an ‘Inchoate’ Crime?”). “Inchoate offenses not only create a risk of harm, they are harms in themselves. Thus the debate surrounding inchoate offenses . . . focus[es] . . . on whether the harm from inchoate offenses is substantial enough to merit prohibition and punishment by the criminal law.” Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 269 (1975). Regarding an unsuccessful attempted crime, “even when no one is made aware of the failed attempt, a would-be offender does cause wrongful harm to his intended victim. He does so by exposing his victim to a risk of harm.” Boonin, supra note 133, at 251 (footnote omitted). I would also say that he causes a dignitary harm, at least. Not all commentators note or agree with my dignitary harm analysis. Cf. Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 727 (1988) [hereinafter Ashworth, Criminal Attempts]; Cahill, supra 330, at 1209; Epstein, supra note 68, at 17; Heidi M. Hurst, What in the World Is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157 (1994).

\(^{331}\) “The Model Penal Code . . . has a large number of substantive offences defined in the inchoate mode—for example, assault, false alarms, indecent exposure, forgery, deceptive business practices, self-abortion, perjury, hindering apprehension, disrupting meetings, and many bribery offences.” Ashworth, Criminal Attempts, supra note 330, at 765 (footnotes omitted). While the Model Penal Code lists the four “inchoate offenses” of attempt, conspiracy, solicitation, and possession, it is the inchoate offense of attempt that is of particular interest in our context. See Dubber, Criminal Law, supra note 121, at 141.
harm.\textsuperscript{332} At some point, we may adopt maxims under corrective justice to grant
invadees private requitals for some or all of the four types of ensuing harms, more so
as the relative administrative costs diminish. We might even grant the state standing
to bring suit on behalf of the harmed public, as in the public nuisance context.

The centrality of the two components of blameworthiness to the conception of
retribution that I champion implies that punishment for attempts and other inchoate
crimes should not turn on whether they are successful.\textsuperscript{333} Whether the individuals
succeed in executing these crimes is often a matter of moral luck.\textsuperscript{334} In the debate over
moral luck, a Kantian would likely come down on the side that believes consequences
outside the reasonable foreseeability or control of an actor should not count against

\textsuperscript{332} “[B]ecause the magnitude of dignitary harms is a function of the readiness of a person to
act with \textit{mens rea}, it does not depend upon whether \textit{A} commits a completed crime or attempts
to commit a completed crime.” \textsc{Westen, Logic of Consent}, supra note 267, at 149. When the
agent’s conduct has not yet focused on a specific invadee or an identifiable group of potential
invadees, the dignitary harm to any one individual may be minimal, perhaps not wrongful with
respect to that individual. Here, the state, as in public nuisance, has a role to play to protect
against these diffuse harms.

\textsuperscript{333} “When an actor knowingly risks harm to others, she manifests her respect (or lack
thereof) for others and their interests. In our view, this theory of culpability sets forth not only
the necessary conditions for blameworthiness and punishment but also the sufficient
conditions.” \textsc{Alexander & Ferzan, Crime and Culpability}, supra note 85, at 171
(disagreeing with the current law insofar as it considers resulting harm as a factor in deserved
punishment). See \textsc{Alexander, Crime and Culpability}, supra note 239, at 3. The Model Penal
Code “propos[es] that with one exception punishments for attempts should be equal to those for the
completed crime attempted.” Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of
Wrongdoing, 5 \textsc{J. Contemp. Legal Issues} 237, 239 (1994) (citing \textsc{Model Penal Code} § 5.05(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1962)). “Since then many criminal law theoreticians who have
addressed the issue have concurred . . . .” \textit{Id.} (identifying twelve concurring theoreticians). A
thirteenth theoretician argues, “[t]he result of one’s completed attempts—whether it turns out
to be a successful crime—is out of one’s control once one has completed the attempt. [The
outcome is a matter of luck.] Luck cannot affect culpability. And culpability is all that affects
negative desert.” \textsc{Alexander, Philosophy of Criminal Law}, supra note 127, at 834. Moore
“think[s] the standard educated view to be mistaken.” Moore, supra at 240. In Moore’s view,
“culpability and wrongdoing are two independent desert-bases—and the only two, at that . . . .
[\textit{E}ach is an independent determinant of how much punishment an offender deserves, given the
presence of the other.” \textit{Id.} at 237. For commentators who believe that attempts should normally
be punished less than completed crimes, see, for example, \textsc{Anthony Duff, Criminal Attempts
350–54, 398 (1996); Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law}, supra note 211, at 362, 472–81;
963, 963–64 (2003). My prior view put me in this latter camp. See \textsc{Kuklin, Punishment}, supra
note 112, at 77–79. “Desert . . . . contains within itself internally contradictory values:
the question whether an attempt truly deserves less punishment because it caused no harm generates
the subcategories of harm-retributivism and intent-retributivism.” Marc O. DiGirolami, The
Choice of Evils and the Collisions of Theory, in Retributivism, supra note 127, at 192, 201.

\textsuperscript{334} Broadly speaking, the moral luck principle “provides that whatever culpability an actor
displays in act \textit{A}—intention, knowledge, recklessness, negligence, strict liability—that actor
deserves greater censure or punishment if \textit{A} results in consequence \textit{B} or occurs in circumstance
\textit{C} (even though whether \textit{B} or \textit{C} occurs is ‘fortuitous’ in the relevant sense).” \textsc{Simons, Strict
Criminal Liability}, supra note 281, at 459. “Retributivists who support increased punishment
due to moral luck have said very little about how large that increase should be . . . .” \textit{Id.}
her in a deontic regime.335 She is not disrespectful to those put at risk by her conduct when she cannot reasonably control or foresee the relevant consequences of the conduct.336 Her reasons for acting cannot fairly weigh in the unforeseeable or uncontrollable.337 She is disrespectful to those put at substantial risk when she can reasonably control and foresee the relevant consequences of her risky conduct.338 For

335 “Kant believed that good or bad luck should influence neither our moral judgment of a person and his actions, nor his moral assessment of himself.” Nagel, supra note 282, at 24. “[T]he seriousness of the crime [is] determined by the amount of harm it generally causes and the degree to which people are disposed to commit it.” Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, supra note 141, at 118.

Justice in punishment takes a broader perspective [than the thin skull rule of tort recoveries pursuant to corrective justice]. Because crime is considered a public as well as a private wrong, victims must be understood as representatives of the public as a whole. It is not the particular victim who matters, but the typical victim of homicide, rape, or mugging.

Fletcher, Grammar of Criminal Law, supra note 88, at 261 (footnote omitted). For considerations of moral luck in criminal law, see, for example, Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, supra note 155, at 77–78; Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, supra note 281, at 65–78; Tony Honore, Responsibility and Luck. The Moral Basis of Strict Liability, in Responsibility and Fault 14 (1999); Nagel, supra note 282, at 31; Cane, Retribution, supra note 112, at 141; David Enoch & Andrei Marmor, The Case Against Moral Luck, 26 Law & Phil. 405, 406 (2007); Goldberg & Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, supra note 64, at 1123; Stephen J. Morse, Reasons, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 363; Norvin Richards, Luck and Desert, 95 Mind 198 (1986); Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility, supra note 255. Some commentators are not unduly troubled by moral luck. See, e.g., Tony Honore, Introduction, in Responsibility and Fault, supra, at 1, 9; Cane, Retribution, supra note 112, at 142 (“[T]aking responsibility for conduct and outcomes, even those outside our control, is essential to having a sense of ourselves as moral agents rather than mere victims of fate.”); Nicola Lacey, Book Review (reviewing Alexander & Ferzan, Crime and Culpability, supra note 85), 121 Ethics 633, 636 (2011). Zipursky estimates “that there is substantially greater support among leading criminal theorists for the view that an asymmetry in punishment based on whether a crime is an unsuccessful attempt, as opposed to a successful attempt, is indefensible than there is for the view that a completion asymmetry is defensible.” Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility, supra note 255, at 107 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).


337 “The requirement that the class of plaintiffs and type of injuries be foreseeable reflects the law’s role in articulating standards of conduct. Those standards can only guide conduct if they tell people what to do, and no standard can tell people to avoid an unforeseeable consequence.” Id. at 663. “The intuitive idea is straightforward: you are only answerable for, and so potentially liable for, the consequences of your acts if it makes sense to include those consequences among your deeds.” Id. at 664; see, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 109, at 277.

338 “[F]or completed attempts at least, attempts are essentially mental crimes, constituted by the beliefs and desires of the attempter.” Alexander, Duff on Attempts, supra note 267, at 217. In discussing attempts versus completed offenses, Fletcher notes, “[t]he culpability-centered theory focuses exclusively on the actor who has formulated a criminal intent and has started to act upon it.” Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, supra note 154, at 173. “The harm-centered conception of crime focuses on the victim. The evil of the offense lies . . . in bringing
corrective justice, on the other hand, we may be more expansive in holding an agent liable for harms to others from such risks.\textsuperscript{339} Even when the agent is minimally blameworthy, the invadee usually is even more relatively free of blameworthiness.\textsuperscript{340} Under current legal principles, the aim of corrective justice—to restore the invadee’s prior protected condition once the invader meets a threshold for liability—overwhelms the concern for the degree of the invader’s responsibility and disrespect blameworthiness.\textsuperscript{341} The “two innocent persons” principle, among others, also obtrudes, as well as welfarist considerations such as cost internalization, risk avoidance, loss spreading, and moral hazard.\textsuperscript{342} Proposals to account for the invader’s relative blameworthiness in measuring requitals under corrective justice generally have been rejected.\textsuperscript{343} Doctrines of comparative negligence are an exception.\textsuperscript{344}

Let us turn to the nature of the harms from the prospect of recidivism.\textsuperscript{345} One can characterize these harms as stemming from a present risk of a future wrongful risk.\textsuperscript{346}

\textsuperscript{339} NEIL MACCORMICK, The Obligation of Reparation, in LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 212, 214 (1982).

\textsuperscript{340} MacCormick struggles with the notion that a blameless invader must compensate the invadee. Though the invadee, since she did not trigger the loss, has a comparative desert claim against the invader, this is a thin, troublesome reed. \textit{Id.} The twists from doctrines of comparative negligence complicate this statement.

\textsuperscript{341} Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 382–83.


\textsuperscript{343} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{344} See supra text accompanying note 114.

\textsuperscript{345} “What proportionalists who defend the importance of prior record will have to assert is that previous convictions affect either the harm or the culpability of the current crime or that it in itself constitutes a further dimension contributing to the seriousness.” RYBERG, supra note 136, at 77.

\textsuperscript{346} Punishment based on the risk of future wrongful risk is akin to, but different from, punishment for character flaws. An invader with an exceedingly evil character who, during her criminally invasive action, becomes a quadriplegic is not much of a present risk of a future wrongful risk. Some commentators assert that character should be a factor in punishment, and some even advance it as a factor in describing the underlying crime. \textit{See} FLETCHER, GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 88, at 35–37. Fletcher distinguishes three systems of criminal law: (1) “act-based criminal law,” which centers on criminal acts; (2) “attitude-based criminal law,” which “focuses exclusively on the guilt or subjective disposition of the offender, regardless of any action that he or she has performed”; and (3) “actor-based criminal law,” where “punishment is inflicted on the suspect because of the kind of person he or she is (say, a dangerous offender) . . . .” \textit{Id.} at 27–28 (footnote omitted). “The argument for a criminal law based on acts, and not on guilt or character, is ultimately one of political theory.” \textit{Id.} at 37 (footnote omitted). “If the basis [for retributive desert] is character, and only derivatively culpable choice, then chosen acts are only evidentiary, not constitutive of desert, and choice may be sufficient, but it is not necessary, for assessing desert.” ALEXANDER &FERZAN, CRIME
When proscribed by a substantive maxim, the present risk becomes a present wrongful risk of a future wrongful risk. See Barbara H. Fried, The Limits of a Nonconsequentialist Approach to Torts, 18 LEGAL THEORY 231, 239 (2012) (“[I]mposition of risk and imposition of harm are not distinct forms of conduct. They are identical conduct viewed from an \textit{ex ante} and \textit{ex post} perspective, respectively.”). The law often protects against the harms of \textit{ex ante} risks alone. See id. at 242–44. Among the deontic explanations for this protection are: “1. Harm Includes Expected Harm; . . . 2. Risk Creation Is a Completed Harm; . . . [and.] 3. Risk Creation Violates a Different Right from the Right to Be Free from Harm.” Id. at 244–48.

“An offender who has shown himself capable of committing an offence is, at least in the actuarial sense, more likely to commit another one than someone who has not. ‘Nothing predicts behaviour like behaviour’, even if its predictions are often wrong.” Nigel Walker, Why Punish? 40 (1991) (footnotes omitted). “If our concern is with future dangerousness, we do not need the outcome harm to occur in order to know that the offender is dangerous.” Finkelstein, supra note 333, at 988 (discussing risky conduct that does materialize). Wright cites rather alarming statistics. One study showed that fifty-four percent of robbery suspects had prior convictions, eleven percent of which having had ten or more. R. George Wright, Criminal Law and Sentencing: What Goes with Free Will?, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 28 (2012). About forty percent of released prisoners return to prison within three years. Id. In the case for preventing future crimes, Barnett invokes “the principle of self-defense, which permits persons to use force
the immediate moment, however, as where she is imprisoned or temporarily disabled. Depending on the degree and nature of the future risk, a retributive requital maxim may call for immediate or enhanced punishment. Some examples will point to the complexities of this position. If a person enters an illegal gambling contract with another individual, she is subject to punishment, but this conduct implies a limited wrongful risk to others in the future. She may be a recidivist, but the harm from this risk is attenuated since the criminal conduct was (presumably fully) consensual. The situation presents no necessary disrespect of the other party insofar as she knowingly consented. On the other hand, the taste for illegal gambling may be statistically

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linked to other future criminal behavior, as where gambling habits or addictions lead to property crimes. Similarly, entirely noncriminal behavior may be linked to future crimes. A person who drives recklessly on her own property may be more likely to later drive recklessly on public roads. For that matter, a person with a genetic disposition for risky behavior may be more likely to commit future crimes. We certainly would decline to penalize some of these present risks of future risks, but not because the risks are necessarily insubstantial. It is not because others do not react to the present risks in ways that are harmful to them as, for example, by inducing them to reallocate some of their resources toward protective measures. Rather, we decline to penalize some of these risks because other considerations, such as those behind the requirements of actus reus and mens rea, predominate in our weighing of the balance between liberty and security interests. Punishment for dangerousness alone challenges these fair limitations.

against a consenting victim imply an increased risk that the actor will commit a comparable act against another, nonconsenting person? Might this turn on the nature of the criminal act?


Coleman and Ripstein mention that one may violate her duty and “cross” her own boundary but, from luck, not cross another’s boundary (i.e., not harm anyone). Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 McGill L.J. 91, 109 (1995). Duff makes a similar observation. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME, supra note 89, at 125. A future risk or harm empirically linked to the boundary crossing is a harm.


As always, we must judge the reactions to make sure they survive the deontic filter. For example, suppose a recidivist Christian-American commits a robbery and an equally recidivist Muslim-American commits a like robbery. Because of the fears generated by the 9/11 attack, the general public’s perceived future risk and reactive harms may be greater in the latter case. Even though the Muslim-American could have foreseen the increased reactive harms, she is not blameworthy for them, it would seem, because they ensue from the general public’s disrespectful attitude towards her. Likewise, an invader who randomly robs someone who unforeseeably turns out to be famous, resulting in greater publicity that increases the public’s perceived future risk and reactive harms, is not blameworthy for the heightened harms.


Many commentators have discussed issues relating to punishment for dangerousness. See, e.g., ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 51, at 109–33; VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 87, 126; VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 141. R.A. Duff, Dangerousness and Citizenship, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY, supra note 165, at 141, 150–63; Ferzan, BEYOND CRIME AND COMMITMENT, supra note 348, at 163; Hessick, supra note 142, at 1158–59; Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 Crime & Just. 1 (1985); Morse, Blame and Danger, supra note 348, at 113; Stephen J.
Tracing out this theme that particular conduct implies various statistical future risks leads to some curious points. For example, a person who kills her spouse, though highly disrespectful, may not be much of a recidivist risk.\textsuperscript{358} Likewise is an embezzler of an employer’s assets.\textsuperscript{359} Once aware of this criminal conduct, others are in a good position to protect themselves by avoiding a financial relation with the criminal invader. This is not to say that the invader is less disposed to commit a future crime than other convicted criminals, but only that the opportunity to commit a comparable future crime is diminished owing to the specifics of the past one. To the contrary, a theft of a petty amount from a stranger, though less disrespectful of that person than the spouse killing or embezzlement, may signal greater future risks to others.\textsuperscript{360} All four types of harms may immediately ensue. Individually, we usually have more to fear from a thief than an embezzler. Another likely factor in the chances of recidivism is the attitude of the caught or punished criminal, such as remorse or defiance.\textsuperscript{361} The present risk of a future risk, then, is itself a harm, or produces harms.\textsuperscript{362} When the future risk is proscribed by a proper substantive maxim, the ensuing harms are thus wrongfull.\textsuperscript{363} The associated moral or legal requital maxims pursuant to corrective justice may, as usual, vary greatly from extensive restraints (e.g., protections from prospective spousal abuse) to minimal apologies (e.g., for careless crowd jostling). My preferred conception of retribution, however, does not turn on wrongful harms alone. My conception turns on the blameworthiness of disrespectful conduct. Greater

Schulhofer, \textit{Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws}, 7 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 69 (1996). The Model Sentencing Act of 1962, “makes available, for the first time, a plan that allows the sentence to be determined by the defendant’s make-up, his potential threat in the future, and other similar factors, with a minimum of variation according to the offense.” \textit{MODEL SENTENCING ACT}, Introduction 1, 2 (2d ed., 1972). “There is no reason to suppose . . . that either preventive detention or a deterrence theory of punishment must at some point violate the Kantian formula of ends.” Wright, \textit{Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves, supra} note 132, at 290.

\textsuperscript{358} “[S]econd degree murders are typically intra-family killers who are highly non-recidivist, so on incapacitation grounds this class of criminals should be punished least.” MOORE, \textit{PLACING BLAME, supra} note 170, at 29.

\textsuperscript{359} \textit{See, e.g., id}.

\textsuperscript{360} Similarly, “a record of lesser offenses may be as good a predictor of recidivism as a record of more serious crimes. It may, in fact, be a better predictor—since lesser crimes typically are repetitive and serious crimes have low recidivism rates.” Andrew von Hirsch, \textit{Desert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing}, 65 MINN. L. REV. 591, 621 (1981) (footnote omitted).

\textsuperscript{361} \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{362} The risk of a future wrongful risk applies to the private law also—for example, a future battery, a future conversion, or a future breach of contract. This is seen in the rationale for the contract right to reasonable assurances of a future promised performance. \textit{See} U.C.C. § 2-609 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). Relatedly, that a present risk should be compensable without the occurrence of actual injury, see Glen O. Robinson, \textit{Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk}, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985). “The argument for recognizing risk as a sufficient basis for liability is as strong from corrective justice norms of fairness as from norms of efficiency.” \textit{Id} at 789.

\textsuperscript{363} Kuklin, \textit{Private Requitals, supra} note 2, at 1011–20.
wrongful harms imply greater disrespect, *ceteris paribus*. This observation brings the wrongful harm in through the side door. I reserve the front door for blameworthiness, disrespect, and indignity in themselves. For ordinary crimes, we have little trouble identifying the person who is substantially disrespected—the direct invadee. For criminal attempts and some other inchoate crimes, the substantially disrespected person is the targeted invadee or range of persons substantially at risk from the invader’s conduct. Under responsibility blameworthiness, the greater the foreseeable, uncoerced, wrongful harm to the invadee, the greater is the implied disrespect.\(^{364}\) Under disrespect blameworthiness, the more egregious the invader’s attitude and conduct with respect to the invadee’s harmed dignity interest, the greater the disrespect.\(^{365}\) Bringing considerations of recidivism to bear, the question then arises, in what sense or degree is the present risk of a future risk to others disrespectful to them?

In addressing this issue regarding recidivism, I set aside responsibility blameworthiness. The context of recidivism does not produce unusual complexities for responsibility blameworthiness as it does for disrespect blameworthiness. Let us assume that the invader is completely free of coercion and perfectly informed of the risks her conduct raises with respect to her future wrongful risks to others. With this established, the question becomes, when is this future wrongful risk disrespectful to others? Well, future wrongful risk does knowingly harm others by inducing insecurity in them and causing an array of possible reactive responses, including ones to ameliorate that insecurity.\(^{366}\) But how disrespectful is that to another individual in the community? For a committed terrorist, very disrespectful. For a serial killer, seemingly somewhat less so. For an ordinary petty criminal, usually hardly at all. If she preys only on a specific small group or community, the disrespect to each member of that community is more significant because the risk to each specific one of them is accordingly greater. At some point, we should consider granting these individuals at risk relief under corrective justice. Yet enhancing this petty criminal’s retributive punishment for recidivism seems odd if it simply is because she preys on a small community rather than a large one.\(^{367}\) I am not, however, the judge of this. Instead, we turn this question over to our reasonable observer, who reflects deontic social values in judging when, and how much, criminal standards have been abridged by disrespectful conduct. In some communities, disrespectful conduct of certain types to neighbors may be sufficiently worse than the same type of conduct directed at more distant persons so as to warrant a requital or a requital enhancement.\(^{368}\)

\(^{364}\) *Id.* at 969–70.

\(^{365}\) *Id.* at 970–71.

\(^{366}\) *Id.* at 1013.

\(^{367}\) In some sense, the invader’s net disrespect may be mathematically independent of the size of the community preyed upon. For instance, if a recidivist will commit one crime per month, the overall, total disrespect to community members is the same whether the community has one hundred or one thousand members insofar as the degree of disrespect considers the likelihood of any one person being victimized each month. In these and related situations, when deciding whether an agent’s disrespect of others warrants a prohibiting maxim or requital, is her overall disrespect somehow aggregated or averaged?

In sum, then, we allow our reasonable observer to consider community values regarding future risks if the overarching deontic duty to respect the risk-producing actor is met. Here, the questions come down to when the actor’s duty to respect others, and society’s duty to respect the actor, support the justifiable standard of an adopted maxim and, when such legitimate standard is violated, the nature of the allowable requital. If the manifest disrespect to others from future risks to them is minimal, we may choose to reject a legal requital in favor of a moral one (e.g., an apology), or none at all.

VII. ASPECTS OF AUTONOMY SPACE AND INVASIONS

To reconnoiter, retributive punishment under deontic conceptions is gauged by disrespectfulness. Disrespectfulness stems from either a blameworthy attitude or conduct. It is manifested by an invasion of another’s autonomy space, delineated by a complete and coherent set of substantive and requital maxims that is adopted to balance a moral agent’s interests in both liberty and security. An invasion produces wrongful harms of one or more of the four types of harms. As already posited, the disrespect blameworthiness of an invader’s conduct is partially judged by the foreseeability to her of the consequences of her invasion and her purposiveness—factors that also relate to responsibility blameworthiness.

In light of this deontic foundation, in considering apt retributive requitals for invasions, the extent of the invasion of the invadee’s autonomy space seems, at first glance, an important factor. The greater the invasion’s foreseeable harms or disrespectful purposiveness, the greater the blameworthiness. Examining more closely the notions of autonomy space and invasions of it is useful before going further with this intuition. In gauging these, one must first determine a baseline. To do this, I begin by looking at three aspects of autonomy space: hypothetical, formal, and material. I then turn to three types of effects from the loss of security or liberty from autonomy space invasions: operative, preferred, and felt losses.

Autonomy space comes in three types or modes. The first is hypothetical autonomy space. This type is the autonomy space of a person with the capabilities of the ideally rational and responsible person. Not only is she presumed to have the capabilities to make fully rational choices, but also she is presumed to have the wherewithal to implement them. She has sufficient resources to engage fully in the activities of civic and private life, and the demands or limitations of an unjust social

utilitarian,

For Kantians, it directs attention to the generalization-universalization distinction. How general are maxims to be?

Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 455.

See id. at 455.

Id. at 446–47.

See id. at 408–14 (“Types of Autonomy Space”).

Id. at 409.

Id.

Id.
environment (e.g., undue prejudice) do not unreasonably constrain her.\textsuperscript{376} This is the default gauge of wrongful harms for invasions of public, political rights.\textsuperscript{377} Examples of such invasions are where an agent of the state wrongfully denies a private person the democratic right to run for office, or wrongfully denies her a driver’s license. This type of invasion does not include violations of every established political or legal right.\textsuperscript{378} Denying a person the right to exercise a nondeontic law, such as one that requires or allows injurious discrimination on the basis of race or religion, is not cause for complaint that one’s hypothetical autonomy space has been invaded.

Formal autonomy space is exemplified by a person with the capabilities of the law’s reasonable person.\textsuperscript{379} She is presumed to have normal capabilities.\textsuperscript{380} Her resources and social environment suffice for usual quotidian activities.\textsuperscript{381} For wrongful harms from interactions between private parties, this is the default baseline.\textsuperscript{382} As noted before, this may differ from the standard for existing legal wrongdoing, under which some types of harms (e.g., pure economic harms) are not legally protected in various circumstances.\textsuperscript{383}

Material autonomy space is that of the specific agent in question based on her actual capabilities, resources, and social environment.\textsuperscript{384} For example, the denial of an individual’s protected freedom to buy a yacht is a material autonomy invasion for a sufficiently wealthy person who attempts to do so, but only a formal autonomy invasion for a person without the necessary resources. Likewise, the wrongful denial of a person’s freedom to go to a movie is a material autonomy invasion for a person planning to do so, but only a formal invasion for a person with no such plans.

\textsuperscript{376} Id.
\textsuperscript{377} See id.
\textsuperscript{378} See id. at 410.
\textsuperscript{379} Sugden summarizes the social choice literature on the measurement of opportunity. One main approach “measures the ‘pure quantity of choice’ offered by a set of options, independently of preferences.” Robert Sugden, Opportunity as a Space for Individuality: Its Value and the Impossibility of Measuring It, 113 ETHICS 783, 784 (2003). The other main approach aligns with the proposal here. It “assesses the extent of opportunity offered by a set of options by considering how well it caters to the range of ‘potential’ preferences that is in some sense normal, reasonable, or eligible for the relevant type of person.” Id. Opportunity matters, in one view, because “being able to choose how to live one’s life is an aspect of individual well-being in its own right.” Id. at 785. Sugden concludes, “no measure of opportunity can fully capture the scope that a person has to develop and express his or her individuality.” Id.

\textsuperscript{380} Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 411.
\textsuperscript{381} \textit{Id.} at 410.
\textsuperscript{382} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{383} Examples of harms not legally cognizable under existing law are economic harms within the economic loss doctrine, dignitary harms for wrongful imprisonment in some jurisdictions when the imprisonment is unknown to the invitee, dignitary harms from depriving a poor person of the protected freedom to buy a yacht or disallowing a rich person from buying a yacht who neither desires or attempts to, and breach of contract causing no legal damages.

\textsuperscript{384} Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 412.
As some of these examples show, autonomy invasions may have differing types of impacts on specific individual or classes of agents. For particular agents and circumstances, autonomy space varies in its functionality. Accordingly, invasions may produce various kinds or flavors of realized harms. Psychic and dignitary harms are particularly contingent. To categorize some of these salient variations, we may distinguish operative, preferred, and felt losses of security or liberty.

Operative autonomy space is the part of a person’s autonomy space that is actively used. It refers to her delineated range of liberty and security that is regularly exercised or needed. For example, the psychic harm from denying a person the liberty to ski likely is less for nonskiers than for regular skiers. Even if an agent has a strong desire to ski, she may have other, greater interests or duties that induce her not to do so, thus perhaps making the psychic harm from the wrongful denial accordingly less.

Preferred autonomy space refers to the conative value that a person ascribes to a particular aspect of her sphere of liberty and security, whether for present use (operative), future use, future options, or from principle alone. Persons vary in the

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385 If freedom is thought of as a range of choice, “what would make one range of choices larger or smaller than another?” GORDLEY, supra note 178, at 27 (citing WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 113, at 73, 83). Gordley rejects two potential standards: “the number of alternatives among which a person might choose, whether he wants them or not”; and “the extent to which a person can choose what he wants since, then, the scope of each person’s freedom would depend on the extent of his desires.” Id. (citing WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 113, at 212–13).

386 See MARTIN RHONHEIMER, NATURAL LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 219 (Gerald Malsbary trans., 2000).

387 Sen agrees with Hayek “in distinguishing between (1) the derivative importance of freedom (dependent only on its actual use) and (2) the intrinsic importance of freedom (in making us free to choose something we may or may not actually choose).” AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 292 (1999). Is a reduction of options always a loss of freedom? “[Gerald] Dworkin has, in an influential article, defended the view that the question ‘Is more choice better than less?’ may well be answered in the negative.” RYBERG, supra note 136, at 174 (citing Gerald Dworkin, Is More Choice Better than Less?, in 7 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 47 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1982)). “[The question remains] whether the mere formal burden of reduced options is what we should focus on rather than some sort of experienced burden.” Id. Ripstein observes that “[y]our entitlement to the means that you have does not depend upon the particular purposes to which you might wish to put them,” including whether you leave them unused or even that they are useless. Arthur Ripstein, As if It Had Never Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1966–67 (2007). Nonetheless, the degree of the harms ensuing from an autonomy invasion may relate to whether the entitlement is operative.

388 See Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 393. Kant argues that preventing a person from exercising a free choice that is undesired is a restriction on freedom nevertheless. See Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Kant on the Right to Freedom: A Defense, 120 ETHICS 791, 810–12 (2010). Hayek contends that the importance of a specific freedom is unrelated to the likelihood of it being exercised. “It might even be said that the less likely the opportunity to make use of freedom to do a particular thing, the more precious it will be for society as a whole.” F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 31 (1960); AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 604 (2002) [hereinafter SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM] (quoting HAYEK, supra, at 31). Dignitary and even psychic harms, at the least, likely are produced by the restriction of such an unused freedom.
strength of their preferences for particular liberties and securities, whether or not they are within reach. The desirability of a liberty or security may range from the agent’s willingness to die for the interest on principle to total indifference, or even a preference that it not exist (e.g., access to certain irresistible, fatty treats). For example, an ascetic may be indifferent to the right to the material goods of life, while a hedonist feels quite to the contrary. Personality dispositions affect the desirability of aspects of autonomy space. An aggressive, egocentric person, for instance, may strongly desire the liberty to take advantage of other people’s foibles while a passive, benevolent person does not. A person may presently wish to preserve an unused liberty or security for a future exercise (e.g., in case she wins the lottery) or simply out of principle. A person also must make room for the fact that preferences change, perhaps owing to changes in relevant capabilities, resources, or opportunities.

Finally, felt autonomy space looks to the extent to which an autonomy invasion actually impacts on the invadee, psychically or otherwise. Usually the protection against dignitary and psychic harms can account for many of these variations. An insult of a stoic, for example, produces the same dignitary harm as it would to anyone else, but her psychic harm is muted. Likewise are some of the harms to those who have prior damage to their nervous system. Furthermore, studies have shown that extremely harmed (and benefitted) parties typically return to their prior state of

“Whether we would prefer to have one set of opportunities rather than another is an obvious question to ask in evaluating freedom, and in this evaluation, it would seem natural to include, inter alia, our preferences over those options.” Id. at 596. Sen “argues for an interpretation of effective freedom as ‘a person’s ability to get systematically what he would choose no matter who controls the levers of operation.’” Sugden, supra note 379, at 790 (quoting AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 65–69 (1992)); id. at 790 n.15 (citing additional criticism of Sen’s arguments). Hobbes takes the position “that being externally hindered in the choice of a given option takes from your freedom only if you have ‘a will to’ do it; only if you prefer that option.” Philip Pettit, The Instability of Freedom as Noninterference: The Case of Isaiah Berlin, 121 ETHICS 693, 696 (2011) (quoting Hobbes). Berlin disagrees with Hobbes: “Freedom is . . . ‘the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities.’” Id. at 698 (quoting ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY xxxix (1969)).

389 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 401.

390 “Many authors have drawn attention to the similarity between the relevance of multiple preferences related to a person’s autonomy and the preference for flexibility with uncertainty of future tastes.” SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra note 388, at 618.

391 One commentator sees that justice depends on the value a person places on elements of his life (e.g., a beloved pet killed by a hooligan). Wilson, supra note 147, at 526.

392 Tadros discusses “limitations on the intrinsic value of freedom”: “Firstly, the freedom to do something which Peter does not wish to do is not very valuable where Peter already has plenty of choices: there is a law of diminishing return when it comes to the intrinsic value of choice.” VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 202 (2005); see Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 414–16 (“The Declining Marginal Increase of Autonomy Space”). “Secondly, there is no support for the position that the coerced actions always lack the full value of comparable voluntary choices. The argument that freedom is intrinsically valuable in some circumstances is compatible with the claim that it is intrinsically invaluable in others.” TADROS, supra, at 202 (emphasis omitted). See the discussion below, infra note 397, about “The Tyranny of Choice.” “Thirdly, the argument provides no support for the claim that the existence of entirely valueless choices is intrinsically valuable.” TADROS, supra, at 202.
wellbeing within a few years of the causative event. Some invadees are quick to forgive; others hold a grudge forever. A relatively minor invasion may produce great lasting harm, while a major invasion soon fades into the invadee’s past. A pickpocket, for example, may prevent the invadee from ever pursuing her educational dreams, whereas a nasty battery may leave no lasting traces.

Felt autonomy space invasions become even more curious when an invasion produces not (only) harms, but psychic or other benefits to the invadee. Beneficent paternalism appreciated by the invadee may produce benefits for her that outweigh dignitary and other harms, as where an addictive personality is denied her irresistible, deleterious wants. Some persons may welcome certain painful invasions, even more so than if they had been consensual. The benefits an invadee obtains from her supporters after an invasion may more than offset the harms she suffered from it. A person who is denied her favored activity, say skiing, may come to discover that a previously ignored alternative activity gives her even greater satisfaction. For the maximizer who insists on, or cannot resist, the substantial effort to make the “very best” choice available, denying her the liberty of such a wide range of options may be psychically beneficial to her. The businessperson or industrialist who would be competitively disadvantaged if she pursues her desire to “do the right thing,” as by environmental protections or consumer disclosures, may be psychically benefited by a government regulation that limits a business’s liberty to do otherwise.

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393 See infra note 460.

394 Perhaps one must not be too quick to forgive. One commentator interprets Murphy as arguing, “readiness to forgive—or even refusal initially to display resentment—tends to reveal one’s lack of respect, not just for oneself, but for others as well.” Savolainen, supra note 161, at 119 (citing Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in 7 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 387, at 505). Savolainen disagrees. See id. at 124–25. Murphy has further developed his position that one should not be too quick to forgive. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN (2003). “What are the values defended by resentment and threatened by hasty and uncritical forgiveness? I would suggest three: self-respect, self-defense, and respect for the moral order.” Id. at 19. Should we distinguish between harms that are primarily immediate (e.g., temporary physical injury) from those that are future-oriented (e.g., disruption of marriage or career plans)?

395 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 443.

396 See Barry Schwartz, The Tyranny of Choice, SCL AM. 71 (Apr. 2004). The research made “a distinction between ‘maximizers’ (those who always aim to make the best possible choice) and ‘satisficers’ (those who aim for ‘good enough,’ whether or not better selections might be out there).” Id. at 71. “We found . . . that the greatest maximizers are the least happy with the fruits of their efforts.” Id. at 72. “[T]he presence of an enormous variety of options can, in some circumstances, have a somewhat dazzling effect on a chooser, so that a person may actually prefer to have a small range of options.” SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra note 388, at 606. “[S]ometimes we seek ‘a freedom of second order: freedom from decision.’” Id. (quoting W.V. QUINE, QUIDDITIES 68 (1987)). You may do your own study the next time you are in a large drugstore. See how many of the myriad toothpastes and cold remedies by a single manufacturer have the same ingredients but are differently packaged and promoted. Was it worth the effort of getting exactly the right one? And did you?

examples turn on benefits to the invadee, but do not simply resolve into a social welfare calculus. Restricting the range of choices of people in the marketplace, though beneficial to some maximizers, may be costly overall to consumers as a class, most of whom are, say, simply satisficers. The issue here is whether the psychic or other benefits to an invadee should ever be considered when she seeks a private requital or when retributive punishment is at stake. I leave this issue to another day.

The invader’s foreseeability of the functionality of the autonomy space invaded affects our perceptions of her blameworthiness. It is one thing to knowingly interfere with an unused, undesired right and another if the right is understood as central to the invadee’s identity. The same may be said in distinguishing knowing invasions of material, formal, or hypothetical autonomy space, the actual harms from which may vary according to the extent to which they are within the reach of the invadee.

There are, then, three aspects of autonomy space: hypothetical, formal, and material. The functionality of the particular type of autonomy space also comes in three flavors: operative, preferred, and felt. The disrespectful blameworthiness of an invasion varies according to which of these types and flavors of autonomy space the invader foreseeably or purposively invades. In gauging an apt requital for these invasions, these aspects and flavors of the invader’s autonomy space may thus be found relevant.

VIII. REQUITAL GAUGES

It is time to cash out the standard of retributive punishment based upon the just deserts of an invader for her blameworthy conduct that invades the autonomy space of one or more other people. The invasion was proscribed by a substantive maxim that triggers a criminal requital maxim. The invader is responsible for her conduct that wrongfully disrespects an invadee. Distributive justice calls for her punishment. On the one side of the scales of justice we place the amount that an objective observer quantifies the blameworthiness of the invader for her harmful conduct. To right this imbalance, we place on the other side of the scales . . . . Well, this is where controversy rages. First, how does one quantify the observer’s judgment of blameworthiness or,

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399 Id. at 651–52.

400 See Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 455.

401 Sunstein points out how difficult it is to gauge capability losses. “First,” he asks, “[w]hat kinds of capability losses are legally cognizable? Second, how can capabilities be translated into monetary equivalents? At first glance, a notion of normal human functioning would seem to provide the baseline from which to measure capability losses . . . .” Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S157, S178 (2008) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted); see id. at S178–81 (exploring answers to the two questions beyond the first glance suggestive of some of the distinctions drawn above).

402 To recall the meaning of the subscript, see supra text accompanying notes 195–202.

403 “[R]etributivism, which adopts a backward-looking perspective focusing on the moral duty to punish past wrongdoing, is a justificatory theory, but seemingly not a prescriptive one. It offers retribution as a justifying ideal but does not explain how legal institutions are supposed to make retribution real.” Cahill, Retributive Justice, supra note 48, at 818 (footnotes omitted); see LUCY, supra note 321, at 414. “The problem of matching crime with punishment has occupied philosophers for centuries, and any theory of punishment that offered a simple formula
for that matter, any other adopted standard of retribution? Second, how does one balance the invader’s requiting punishment? Even if we can sensibly gauge the amount that the observer’s pan sinks with apt disapproval, no evident way can offset this with like for like.404 There is no apparent coin of this realm. We are comparing apples to smoke.405 While Kant and others commonly advance the imposition of pain or suffering on the invader,406 this coin has several significant flaws, as will be discussed. Whether suffering is a fit response to blameworthiness may even be questioned.407 I

404 Under retributive principles, “determining moral desert becomes a matter of correlating punishment, typically incarceration, with something that is usually very different from it [such as embezzlement or rape]. . . . The drastic differences in kind between punishment and offense should make us suspicious about moral desert’s ability to do what retributivists require of it.” Shafer-Landau, The Failure of Retributivism, supra note 124, at 308. Corlett proposes a “Matching Principle of Proportionate Punishment” whereby “[a]s far as humanly possible, criminals ought to be punished in ways which match the harm they caused to others.” CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 58, at 86 (emphasis omitted). “Considerations that might vitiate against this mode of punishment would include cases of extortion, or embezzlement, and the like where treating criminals in ‘tit for tat’ ways seems ludicrous, if not impossible.” Id. at 87.

405 “There is no ‘natural’ measure of punishment, that is to say, no rationally determinable and uniquely appropriate penalty to fit the crime.” John Finnis, Retribution: Punishment’s Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 103 (1999) [hereinafter Finnis, Retribution]. “The severity of the punishment can be made proportionate to the seriousness of the crime only if degrees of seriousness can be distinguished. However, the judgement that one crime is more or less serious than a very different crime seems much like dealing with apples and oranges.” Husak, Desert, supra note 165, at 189. “The difficulty posed by this problem [of incommensurables] has led many legal philosophers to despair about the prospects of applying desert theory to the real world.” Id. at 190. “The problem of incommensurables is compounded because the seriousness of crime is a function of two variables . . . , ‘the degree of harmfulness of the conduct, and the extent of the actor’s culpability.’” Id. (quoting ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 29 (1993)). “Even Hegel himself, along with Kant the most influential retributivist, concedes retributivism’s inability to determine the just punishment for any particular offense . . . .” Christopher, supra note 127, at 893.

406 See supra text accompanying notes 125–27, infra notes 426–32. “Retributivists, in general, reply [to utilitarians] that it is morally necessary that wrongdoers be made to suffer. Those I call deep retributivists held this is as a fundamental moral principle, which can serve to justify retributive policies of punishments.” Hill, Jr., Kant on Wrongdoing, supra note 130, at 411–12 (footnote omitted). For Hill’s distinctions among mixed retributive theories, derivative retributive policies, basic retributive principles, the intrinsic desert thesis, and related notions, see id. at 412–14. “[Retributive] punishment is essentially a matter of humbling a criminal’s will—it is in this sense that punishment must make her suffer.” DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 82, at 196; see, e.g., JACOB ADLER, THE URGINGS OF CONSCIENCE: A THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 80 (1991) [hereinafter ADLER, URGINGS OF CONSCIENCE]; FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, supra note 141, at 98; HART, PROLEGOMENON, supra note 125, at 4; KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS, supra note 116, at 155; von Hirsch, Doing Justice, supra note 51, at 35; Ryberg, supra note 136, at 6, 14–19; Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, supra note 142, at 3.

407 Rather than suffering as the object of desert, “[i]t might be held that a fitting response to wrongdoing would be reproach, blame, reproof or criticism; in which case it would no longer
will examine a few other plausible coinages as well. None of the possibilities is fully satisfactory. There is no gold standard for our penal legal tender. Blind trust in the fairness of socially promised, or threatened, IOUs is inevitably somewhat necessary, unfortunately.

Compounding the difficulties with identifying the coin of the realm of retributive punishment is the commonly articulated position that a fair punishment is to be proportionate. It is not to be one for one as in lex talionis, an eye for an eye. Even more certainly, it is not to be based on vengeance, which may demand more-than-one for one. Calculating one for one is hard enough. After determining what “proportionate punishment” means, further twists and turns await if we adhere to it be obvious that punishment would be the appropriate instrument.” Ryberg, supra note 136, at 16. Even if suffering is intended, punishment may not cause it in particular instances. See Adler, Urgings of Conscience, supra note 406, at 80. “[A] punishee may want[] to submit to punishment [because she] believes that she can achieve reconciliation, atonement, expiation, renewed innocence, greater moral knowledge, or some other good by undergoing the punishment.” Id. at 91; see Kleinig, Punishment and Desert, supra note 70, at 23. “But while I do not think it to be a necessary characteristic of punishments that they be experienced as impositions, I would insist that they be intended as impositions.” Id. at 24.

Shafer-Landau summarizes ten “candidates for commensurating punishment and moral desert,” including “the same kind of treatment,” “the same amount of suffering,” “the degree of responsibility . . . multiplied by [the] wrong” (Nozick), what “is necessary and sufficient for nullifying the message of inferiority” (Hampton), similar “suffering or hard treatment” (Waldron), that which “is authorized by a democratically enacted sentencing rule,” proportional treatment within “a set of proportional punishments,” “equal treatment,” “that amount of liberty that [was] unfairly gained,” and that which “is efficacious in achieving some valuable goal.” Shafer-Landau, Retributivism and Desert, supra note 124, at 208–09. I will not explore all of these candidates.

Justice cares about amount, not method of punishment. Thus, one could impose deserved punishment through any variety of alternative methods without undercutting justice—fine, community service, house arrest, curfew, regular reporting, diary keeping, and so on . . . .” Robinson, Virtues of Restorative Processes, supra note 221, at 386 (emphasis added). “[O]nce the punishment amount is determined, one could look to any number of non-desert purposes to determine how that fixed amount of punishment is to be imposed.” Robinson, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 70, at 11 (footnote omitted).

See, e.g., Frase, supra note 239, at 73. “Some theorists, I believe, simply take this principle [of proportionate retributive punishment] as an elementary intuition.” Scheid, Davis, supra note 70, at 397 (footnoting his interpretation of Kant as among these theorists).

Kant’s meaning of proportional punishment is not clear. See Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, supra note 131, at 58. Without argument, Kant “seems to think that the claim [for proportionality] is self-evident or intuitively obvious . . . .” Id. at 60. In this regard, one commentator identifies two accounts of culpability, one being proportionate culpability. “This principle states that punishment must be in accord with or in proportion to culpability, and it is sometimes endorsed by courts and overwhelmingly by scholars.” Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of Culpability’s Relevance, 75 Law & Contemp. Probs. 109, 110 (2012) (footnotes omitted). The other account is threshold culpability, the apparent favorite of courts and legislatures. “On this view, proof of mens rea is
as the standard.414 Among those twists and turns are, for one, that we must consider whether there is a lower limit to a just proportion. If criminal sanctions are too low, it would seem to be disrespectful of the invadee who was wrongfully harmed by the invader. Another twist is that we must determine whether a set proportion is to apply equally to all types of harms and crimes. Rather, since my preferred conception of retribution centers on the blameworthiness of the invader, and only indirectly looks to the nature of the harms to the invadee, this second issue may morph into the question of whether a proportional punishment may vary according to the degree of blameworthiness, as in progressive or regressive taxation. For blameworthiness just beyond the threshold for retributive punishment, the proportion may be, say, 0.4, and as the blameworthiness increases, the proportion may likewise increase or decrease, though not necessarily in a linear fashion.

Let us step back for a moment to consider whether proportionate punishment should directly consider the nature and extent of the various types of wrongful harms, and even the class of the invadees or other factors, rather than simply lumping together these aspects of an invasion under a broad gauge of blameworthiness. Recall that harms are the focus for our judgment of where to strike the balance between one’s liberty and security interests. The propriety of restrictions on liberty and disruptions of security are evaluated by the physical, economic, psychic, and dignitary harms they produce.415 Harms, by curtailing an invadee’s resources, also usually reduce her wherewithal to exercise her range of freedom established by the baseline balance struck by adopted maxims.416 Blameworthiness springs from an invader’s attitude and conduct in causing wrongful harms.417 This suggests that greater refinement in gauging apt retributive punishment may be facilitated by looking through the blameworthiness element to the features of the wrongful harms behind it. We may decide, for instance, that wrongful physical harms are more blameworthy than equally monetized, wrongful economic harms. Or we may decide that, say, economic harms accompanied by physical harms, or face-to-face frightful confrontations, are worse than equally monetized economic harms alone. For example, a purse snatching that causes minimal or no physical harm but causes an economic loss of $100 may be worse than an online

needed only to determine whether one is innocent or blameworthy for some offense. . . . [I]t plays no necessary role in setting the magnitude of a sentence nor places an upper limit on punishment.” Id. at 111. Strict liability crimes and sentencing indifference to moral luck reflect this second view. See id. at 111–12, 128–29. Ryberg represents this latter account. He contends “that the proportionality principle does not constitute a plausible candidate as to how punishment should be distributed.” RYBERG, supra note 136, at 8. Ryberg’s view is based on his conclusions that the justification of the proportionality principle is morally doubtful, it has difficult theoretical problems, and, finally, “the principle faces problems once we take the step from the ideal spheres of penal theory to actual penal practice.” Id. On what is proportionalism, see id. at 12–14. “[I]t is difficult to elucidate with any confidence the principles of proportionality that the most defensible retributive theory requires.” Simons, Strict Criminal Liability, supra note 281, at 446 (exploring a “bottom-up analysis” of proportionality).

414 See, e.g., Dolinko, Three Mistakes, supra note 127, at 1636–37; Duff, Penal Communications, supra note 48, at 57–61.

415 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 452.

416 Id. at 382.

417 Id. at 452.
scam that produces an economic loss of $10,000, even when the full tort recovery under corrective justice for the snatching would be considerably less than for the $10,000 scam. We seem to punish white-collar crime proportionally less than comparably monetized, blue-collar crime. If differences such as these are accepted, there may be a few ways of getting there. On the one hand, we could judge that committing the purse snatching is more blameworthy and disrespectful than the scam, and hence greater punishment is appropriate. More specifically, face-to-face invasions producing direct physical or psychic harms are more disrespectful, perhaps especially if weapons are involved, than are comparable economic harms alone.

Alternatively, we could judge that both crimes are equally blameworthy but that we punish crimes involving direct confrontations proportionally more than other crimes. If we take this second route, we should come up with a justification for the distinction. I do not have one to offer. The better route, I believe, is the first one that simply declares that certain types or combinations of harms—depending on the particularities—are more blameworthy than are others, irrespective of the corrective justice monetization. The umbrella of dignitary harm could encapsulate this notion. For instance, cultural norms can hold direct, immediate physical or insulting harms to produce greater overall associated dignitary harms than do equally monetized, economic or nonconfrontational insulting harms. They are more offensive, insulting, defamatory, disrespectful, and assertive of moral superiority when holding all else equal. Under this tack, the proportion in punishment could remain the same for all crimes, the gauge of blameworthiness for producing a dignitary harm incorporating any distinctions based on features of the other underlying harms.

When considering possible distinctions based on the classifications of the invadees, lines of reasoning like the ones above may apply. When calculating the apt proportion of the punishment, we could, for example, explicitly differentiate among autonomy invasions of family members, friends, neighbors, associates, clients, strangers, and the like, and we could finely subdivide each general category. We could even adopt permutations depending on the types of harms combined with the class of

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418 Does use of a weapon imply the invader’s assertion of greater moral superiority than do other types of crimes?

419 I say “direct physical or psychic harms” to suggest another category for these harms that stem from an invadee’s reaction, as where she becomes physically ill from being scammed.

420 Because we are focusing on retributive punishment for the wrongful harms to the direct invadee, we must set aside the fright these invasions may produce in the general public. I have pushed requitals for these types of societal reactive harms mainly into the bailiwick of corrective justice. Insofar as these reactive harms are disrespectful to third parties, retributive considerations would, in principle, arguably focus on each invadee separately.

421 We must consider, of course, other factors, as where the holdup is from desperation while the economic crime is from greed.

422 Kolber notes that “[c]ulpability seems to be a continuous variable . . . . So if the pertinent continuous input (culpability) yields a proportional continuous output (punishment severity), then retributivists who subscribe to the widely held principle of proportionality should seek laws that support this smooth relationship.” Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, supra note 113, at 670–71 (footnote omitted).
Or, we may lump these differences into our overall judgment of blameworthiness, again under the umbrella of dignitary harm. We may declare physically harming a loved one more or less a dignitary harm as compared to, say, an equal physical harm to a neighbor. Being wrongfully harmed by an associate seems a greater insult than by a stranger.

Many hurdles hinder the commensuration of an objective observer’s judgment of an invader’s blameworthiness with an apt retributive punishment. In what follows, I examine some of the plausible currency. The most obvious place to turn first is to the four types of harms that are the focus when adopting maxims to balance liberty and security interests. In light of their sufficiently close affinity and the standard practice of commentators to not distinguish among them in this context, I here discuss physical, psychic, and economic harms together, leaving dignitary harm for separate attention.

Before discussing plausible requital harms, let us take a quick look at Kant’s observations, which are representative of the views of many other commentators as well. Kant cashes out retributive punishment largely in terms of the invader’s pain and suffering, as do others. At the same time, Kant does not dwell on the pain and suffering of the victim as the basis for retribution. Kant, and often other

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423 We might go even further by declaring that the threshold for finding a harm to be wrongful varies among the harms and the class of invadees. For example, the monetized threshold for a wrongful dignitary harm may be $0 for strangers and $100 for family members and other permutations for the other three types of harms. Aggregation of some sort may also be embraced.

424 Many other permutations are possible within the confines of the universalization form of the categorical imperative. For instance, one may adopt maxims imposing greater duties to one’s family than to strangers, so long as duties to strangers meet the respectfulness threshold. This is a matter of adopted generalization, not universalization.

Within any one classification, circumstances would affect our judgment of the dignitary harm. An equal economic loss wrongfully imposed on a commercial client, for example, may produce a greater dignitary harm on the client who dropped her guard because of nonbinding assurances by the invader than a client who maintained arm’s distance.

425 “Oregon has implemented a system of punishment units. . . . One problem, however, with this approach is that it is very difficult for commissions or sentencers to reach a conclusion about exchange rates, i.e. what amount of community service is really equal to X days in prison.” Karen Lutjen, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 389, 437 (1996) (footnote omitted). Morris and Tonry struggle with penal commensurability. NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 37–108 (1990).

426 “[P]unishment is a physical harm . . . .” KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 235, at 170. “[F]or Kant, punishment is a physical harm, properly understood. Psychological punishments or non-painful punishments are not seriously considered for most varieties of crime . . . . The criminal ‘pays’ for the crime she committed by experiencing a certain amount of, potentially lethal, pain.” Brooks, supra note 132, at 565–66 (footnotes omitted).

427 See supra text accompanying notes 125–27, 406.

428 Corlett identifies a “Harm-Based Principle of Proportional Punishment”: “Punishment is justifiably inflicted on an offender only if it ‘weighs’ the same for the offender on a scale of
commentators, are not clear as to whether the invader’s retributive suffering is to be from one or more of the four types of harms, or some combination of them, or even from other types of harms.429 Some aspects of Kant’s discussion of punishment do not necessarily entail painfulness. For example, he favors capital punishment, castration for rape and pederasty, and “expulsion from civil society” for bestiality, none of which are, somewhat imaginatively, necessarily painful (overall), at least in modern times.430 Perhaps he should be read as holding that punishment involves the deprivation of the criminal, irrespective of her suffering. Others have taken this position.431 Kant gets to his currency for retribution by, essentially, hand waving.432 He is far from alone in this

suffering as the offence ‘weighs’ (or would ‘weigh’ on such a scale if the victim is incompetent or dead) to the victim on a scale of suffering . . . .” Corlett, Responsibility and Punishment, supra note 58, at 85 (emphasis omitted); see Mirko Bagaric & James McConvill, Giving Content to the Principle of Proportionality: Happiness and Pain as the Universal Currency for Matching Offence Seriousness and Penalty Severity, 69 J. Crim. L. 50, 50 (2005).

If the pain and suffering from the invader’s requital is somehow to be gauged by the pain and suffering caused the invadee, the following discussed problems with identifying the appropriate sources and forms of suffering would be further exacerbated, for now the discomfort of two (or more) persons must be independently evaluated. We might decide, say, that the invadee’s psychic and dignitary harms are to be requited with the invader’s suffering from physical and economic harms. Furthermore, the invasion may not induce any real suffering by the invadee, as where she is beneficently paternalized. For formulas to compare the invader’s and invadee’s discomforts, see Kuklin, Punishment, supra note 112, at 23–85.

429 See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Alternatives to Punishment—or Alternative Punishments, in Retributivism and Its Critics, supra note 142, at 43 (“Punishment must involve the imposition of some kind of suffering, pain, restriction, or burden: but that imposition can take a variety of material forms.”). “[I]t is not entirely clear whether the desert principle calls for wrongdoers to experience punishment or suffering. . . . [I]t has been noted recently that the desert-as-suffering claim seems to generate some troubling or dubious results.” Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Pluralism, in Retributivism, supra note 127, at 15, 28–29 (footnotes omitted).

430 See Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 13, at 474–76, 498.

431 “The essence of punishments, as Aquinas clearly and often explains, is that they subject offenders to something contrary to their wills—something contra voluntatem. This, not pain, is of the essence.” Finnis, Retribution, supra note 405, at 98 (footnote omitted). One of the elements in Rawls’s definition of the institution of punishment is: “a person is said to suffer punishment whenever he is legally deprived of some of the normal rights of a citizen on the ground that he has violated a rule of law . . . .” Rawls, Two Concepts, supra note 127, at 111; see, e.g., Boonin, supra note 133, at 6–7 (“making her worse off in some way”); Brudner, supra note 63, at 53 (“interferences with liberty”); Kleing, Punishment and Desert, supra note 70, at 22–25 (“restriction of his freedom”); Richard L. Lippke, Retribution and Incarceration, 17 Pub. Aff. Q. 29, 34–35 (2003) (“interfere commensurately with the capabilities of offenders to live decent lives of their own choosing”); C.W.K. Mundle, Principles of Law 287 (1987); Alan H. Goldman, The Paradox of Punishment, 9 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 42 (1979); see generally Wellman, supra note 133.

432 “Kant’s theory . . . accounts only for the imposition of some kind of deprivation on the offender to offset the ‘advantage’ he obtained in violating others’ rights. It does not explain why
leap. Furthermore, Kant does not discuss how to measure criminal violations against penal pain, suffering, or deprivations.\textsuperscript{433}

\section*{A. Physical, Psychic, and Economic Harms}

Cashing out retributive punishment in terms of the imposition of physical, psychic, and economic harms may seem rather straightforward. One simply gauges the extent of these harms that an invader would suffer from various forms or degrees of punishment and imposes an apt punishment accordingly. Even in principle, however, certain issues loom. Are all three of these types of harms to be summed, or only some of them, totally or partially? Should the particularities of the invasion or the requital maxim affect the answer to this last question? Even more troubling are issues relating to whether the harms are to be gauged against a hypothetical or reasonable invader or the actual invader. Before addressing these issues, let us first look at some principles relating to the possibility of cashing out punishment in terms of the fourth type of harm, dignitary harm.

\section*{B. Dignitary Harms}

Since dignity is central to deontic principles, exacting punishment by the imposition of dignitary harms on an invader in proportion to the dignitary or other harms the invader imposed on the invadee may seem appropriate. Even in principle, however, this retributive coin raises considerably more complex issues than do those of physical, psychic, and economic harms. To begin with, Kant cautions that even criminals have a dignity that is entitled to respect.\textsuperscript{434} At first blush, this principle would seem to push the possibility of dignitary harm requitals off the table. Yet we must remember that this Kantian concern for dignity and respect refers to egalitarian underpinnings. All persons by virtue of their capacity for rationality are ethical beings with a dignity\textsubscript{E} that entitles them to respect\textsubscript{E}. This leaves on the table the liberty conceptions of these and related concepts. While everyone’s dignity\textsubscript{E} is entitled to equal respect\textsubscript{E}, we also respect\textsubscript{L} individuals to the extent that they have developed their talents, contributed to society, etc. They have earned and deserve their dignity\textsubscript{L}. Hence, we treat them with commensurate respect\textsubscript{L}. As for those who have wrongfully

\textsuperscript{433} See KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 473, 580. According to Kant “moral virtue is not a prerequisite of dignity; even the grossly immoral have it.” THOMAS E. HILL JR., Social Snobbery and Human Dignity, in AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT 155, 169 (1991). Hence, “punishments degrading to humanity are prohibited.” Hill, Jr., Punishment, supra note 130, at 236 (citing MS6:328–370). “In punishing a criminal, we must always respect humanity in the criminal’s person, and this makes it wrong to inflict forms of punishment that humiliate or degrade.” ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT’S ETHICAL THOUGHT 134 (1999) [hereinafter WOOD, KANT’S ETHICAL THOUGHT] (citation omitted). “[H]ow can we punish people without humiliating them? . . . What is more, the humiliating message expressed by punishment is not an unwanted side effect. It is part of the punishment itself.” MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY 74 (2012).
harmed others by blameworthy conduct, they have earned our disrespect for their lack of dignity, or alternatively, their indignity.435

It is useful to distinguish one’s earning of respect for one’s dignity from our recognition of that increased dignity. For instructive purposes, let us first look at the positive side of the dignity ledger at those who have earned increased respect. Courageous, socially beneficial conduct, for instance, entitles one to respect, even before society recognizes this conduct as such.436 How might society recognize, repute, this heightened dignity? Setting aside the complexities of posthumous recognition, we may turn to the opposites of physical, psychic, and economic harms, that is, rewards or benefits.438 As for physical benefits, the possibilities seem limited. We may grant medical care, as we do for military veterans.439 This care may extend to physical trainers and facilities as well as therapies and other services that increase

435 Hampton emphasizes the need to be respectful of the person being punished. “Hence the construction of retributive punishment is an art, which involves the satisfaction of two demands: first, that the wrongdoer be diminished; and second, that the diminishment not represent him as lower in value than the victim.” Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, supra note 142, at 14.

436 See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107 (2011) (suggesting the difference between dignity and the recognition thereof). “Dignity in this sense [of Waldron’s] is not something one simply has, but rather is earned through hard work on the self, and is fully settled only once it has been recognized by another.” Katherine Franke, Dignifying Rights: A Comment on Jeremy Waldron’s Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1177, 1178 (2011).

437 Because I explore the recognition of increased dignity for insights on how to deal with the decreased dignity of a criminal, posthumous acknowledgments become uninstructive. Deceased invaders are not punished. Most commentators argue that persons cannot be harmed posthumously. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2003); Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 440 n.222.

438 Kant takes a counterintuitive position on rewards. “The rightful effect . . . of a meritorious deed is reward (praemium) (assuming that the reward, promised in the law, was the motive to it) . . . .” KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 382. Goodin contends “that notions of positive desert ought not play any important role in social policymaking.” Robert Goodin, Negating Positive Desert Claims, in WHAT DO WE DESERVE?, supra note 58, at 234, 235. For questions about the symmetries between benefits and harms, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 120–25 (1999). Fletcher calls for caution in looking at one side of the ledger for help on the other. He argues for “an asymmetry between positive and negative desert.” GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 98 (1996); see id. at 96–99. On the other hand, Kagan writes: “At a minimum, it is not at all obvious what there is about the difference between virtue and vice that might justify asymmetrical treatment.” KAGAN, supra note 70, at 224.

physical wellbeing. For psychic benefits, we have hero parades, medals, award ceremonies, and positive publicity. Therapies, such as massages, may be granted for their hedonistic pleasures even when not medically beneficial. Turning to economic benefits, these loom large. Financial rewards are common. Education benefits, such as under the GI bill, and mortgage subsidies fall into this category. Free passes and reduced rates for events and institutions do too. Economic rewards come in many possible forms.

The fourth category, dignitary harm or, on the credit side of the ledger, dignitary benefits, poses interesting prospects. This category draws our attention to the liberty-security balance that, pursuant to the recognition of everyone’s equal dignity, is struck by the adoption of deontic maxims designed to grant all persons the fullest freedom consistent with the equal freedom of others. The wrongful invasion of a person’s autonomy space that has been delineated by adopted maxims is a dignitary harm to the invadee irrespective of whether the invasion produces any of the other three types of harms. The invasion denies the invadee her full autonomy, her freedom to choose and act within the adopted limits of her equal liberty, and her equal security from wrongful impacts by others. While typically an invasion produces one or more of the other three types of harms, it may not, as where an invadee is beneficently paternalized or is unknowingly battered (e.g., kissed), such as during sleep. The dignitary harm remains in place.

Using invasions of the adopted liberty-security balance as the focus for determining pure dignitary harms offers aids in looking at the other side of the ledger—pure dignitary benefits. How might liberty-security benefits be granted to reward earned respect and heightened dignity? Looking first at liberty, is expanding a deserving person’s liberty without, at the same time, unfairly truncating another person’s security plausible? As a reward, we certainly cannot allow our heroes to batter others. On the other hand, we might consider allowing them priority seating at events or public transportation and the right to move to the fronts of lines. We could grant them priorities or weighted advantages for government employment or contracts, or admission to public institutions such as schools. When attending next to honorees’ security interests, the possibilities seem few or questionable. Might we allow them greater fire and police protection? Free or reduced insurance, as is the case for veterans? Advantageous standards when bringing defamation claims or, for that matter, other tort or contract claims?

A difficulty with at least some of these considered tacks is that the expanded liberty or security freedoms of the rewarded beneficiaries can be seen as curtailments of the correlative liberty or security interests of those persons who experience setbacks from

440 Id.
441 Id.
442 See Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 380.
443 See id.
444 See id.
445 See id. at 387–89.
446 More accurately, we would not redefine a wrongful battery in such a way as to truncate the security interests of others with respect to the heroes.
the granted dignitary's benefits to others. Some of the controversies over affirmative action reflect this. Consider how easy moving to the front of a line in your hometown would be unless, perhaps, you are a well-recognized hero. Mine is New York City where strangers predominate. Forgettaboutit. When we turn to the other side of the ledger to the dignitary harms that may be imposed on blameworthy wrongdoers in recognition of their just deserts, the objections of third parties are more muted, though not silenced. Yes, an invader’s dependents, kin, kith, associates, and supporters may suffer harms from her punishment, but these indirect harms likely would not be protected by adopted maxims when balancing overall liberty and security interests. They probably did not deserve to have a criminal in their lives, but their claims seem outweighed by the invadec’s claims, her affiliates’ claims, and the retributive aim of punishing the invader according to her just deserts. The invader’s affiliates may be harmed, but we would assert they are not wrongfully harmed. The deterrent effects of the punishment, moreover, generally protects or even expands the liberty and security interests of third parties, including the invadec and her affiliates and, perhaps, partially even the invader’s own affiliates, depending on the circumstances and whether they have also been the targets of the invader’s hostilities.

To avoid many of these complexities, an apt means of recognizing an invader’s indignity, of meting out her just deserts, is restricting her liberty, as by imprisonment, house arrest, probation, and protection orders. These constrain her liberty interest irrespective of whether they cause her any physical, psychic, or economic harms. Even the measure of an economic harm, such as a fine, may be determined by its effects on the invader’s liberty and not directly on any sort of economic suffering. An invader’s security interest may also be constrained. She may be subject to searches and surveillance and other actions that are normally treated as invasions of privacy or otherwise proscribed. Although these types of security constraints have been consequentially justified by the needs of penal institutions, they have a desert grounding as well. Punishment entails the curtailment of the punishee’s liberty and security.

C. Requitals in Principle, Requitals in Practice

There are various means to punish a criminal invader by imposing physical, psychic, or economic harms on her. Similarly, regarding dignitary harms, there are various ways to truncate an invader’s freedom, to dock her liberty and security

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447 See, e.g., Sadurski, Giving Desert Its Due, supra note 56, at 213–20 (“‘Victims’ of Preferential Treatment”).

448 I take these up below. See infra text accompanying notes 483–86.

449 An offender “arrogates to himself or herself excess liberties; the scheme of equal rights is upset. In order to restore it, the person’s basic rights must be restricted in an equal but opposite way. This restriction is the punishment.” Adler, Urgings of Conscience, supra note 406, at 121. Under Adler’s “rectification principle,” “[w]hen a person has arrogated excess basic liberties by committing an offense, that person must then forgo an equivalent body of basic liberties by way of punishment.” Id. at 124. By “liberties,” Adler refers to what I have been calling liberty and security. See id. at 125–26. I would find a place for proportion in his principle. In gauging “an equivalent body of basic liberties” while avoiding the preferences of the punishee, one can ask, “[w]hat quantity of rights would a reasonable person willingly forgo in order to gain the right to do what the offender did?” Id. at 137.
interests. Even in principle, however, aptly gauging the freedom curtailments is problematic.\textsuperscript{450} For one, we should consider whether a restriction is measured by the invader’s hypothetical, formal, or material autonomy space. As we move from the first to the last, the curtailments tend to pinch harder.\textsuperscript{451} Additionally, we should decide whether to consider the functionality of the invader’s liberty and security constraints. The effects of curbs may vary from invader to invader depending on how they impact on her operative, preferred, or felt freedoms.\textsuperscript{452} More problems still exist in practice, such as the sensitivities of the punished invader. These variables also play out when directly gauging the physical, psychic, and economic harms produced by punishment, which I address first.

In practice, similar physical and psychic harms as requitals certainly vary effectively from invader to invader. Irrespective of this, any pains or pleasure put on the scales must survive the deontic filter. As examples stemming from unacceptable disrespectfulness, an invader’s additional suffering from being imprisoned by agents from a disfavored religion or sharing close quarters with such persons are kept out of the balancing pans. Past this preliminary, we must consider whether to account for the special sensitivities or insensitivities of the invader,\textsuperscript{453} as where the invader is happy-

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\textsuperscript{450} “[T]o measure opportunity in a real-world situation . . . requires us to locate options in some conceptual space in which relations of similarity and difference can be defined. But there are many such spaces, none of which is uniquely privileged.” Sugden, \textit{supra} note 379, at 803. Kolber objects to a “liberty-deprivation calibration” gauge of punishment. Adam J. Kolber, \textit{The Comparative Nature of Punishment}, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1598 (2009) [hereinafter Kolber, \textit{Comparative Nature of Punishment}]. “First, it is not at all clear how we measure amounts of liberty.” \textit{Id.} (footnote omitted). “I doubt we can compare the value of liberties without surreptitiously examining experiential facts.” \textit{Id.} at 1598–99 (footnote omitted).

\textsuperscript{451} In discussing the gauge of punishment, Kolber directs attention to the invader’s “liberty-in-fact,” “liberties-under-law,” and her “idealized liberties,” which track my material, formal, and hypothetical autonomy space. Kolber, \textit{Comparative Nature of Punishment}, \textit{supra} note 450, at 1585–94. Though doubting these conceptions of liberty profitably “identify[,] the underlying disvalue of punishment, even if they did a good job, punishment severity would still have to be determined comparatively, because people differ in their baseline levels of all three notions of liberty.” \textit{Id.} at 1594 (footnote omitted). As I analyze the differences, hypothetical and formal liberties do not differ from person to person, while material liberty does. For further elaboration of his “limited subjectivist position,” see \textit{id.} at 1595–600. For much more, see Adam Kolber, \textit{The Subjective Experience of Punishment}, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009). This subjectivist complaint would also apply to dignitary benefits (i.e., rewards).

\textsuperscript{452} \textit{See} Kolber, \textit{Comparative Nature of Punishment}, \textit{supra} note 450, at 1585–94.

\textsuperscript{453} Commentators have noted the variations in the sensitivities of prisoners. Bentham lists thirty-two “circumstances influencing sensibility.” \textit{BENTHAM, supra} note 219, at 52. Ryberg refers to this as “the sensibility challenge.” \textit{RYBERG, supra} note 136, at 102–09. “A morally plausible account of punishment severity cannot avoid counting in features the strength of which to some extent will be conditioned by the sensibility of the individual perpetrator.” \textit{Id.} at 108. “[T]he sensibility is obviously determined by various factors to which there is no simple access for the punisher and, even if some knowledge is available, the risk of calibrating punishment severity in a way which observes proportionality will indeed be a complicated task.” \textit{Id.} at 108–09. Complicated or not, “[w]hen we know about prisoners’ sensitivities to punishment, we should try to take them into account at sentencing.” Adam Kolber, \textit{Unintentional Punishment}, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1, 29 (2012) [hereinafter Kolber, \textit{Unintentional Punishment}]. On the other
go-lucky or hardened,\textsuperscript{454} or imprisonment triggers her claustrophobia or claustrophilia. The invader may be a masochist who likes punishment or prefers imprisonment because her friends are there, because it provides for necessities otherwise unobtainable,\textsuperscript{455} or because she sees punishment as a means to expiate her sins.\textsuperscript{456} Some of these factors relate to the functionality of the invader’s autonomy space that her punishment curtails. The suffering one feels from confinement relates to whether it impacts on her operative, preferred, or felt freedoms.\textsuperscript{457} The couch potato, for instance, suffers less from being kept from the wild than does an outdoorsperson.\textsuperscript{458} The invader’s feelings of guilt or shame affect the psychic costs of her punishment.\textsuperscript{459} Her resilience may soon or eventually diminish the discomfort of her punishment.\textsuperscript{460}

\textsuperscript{454} There may be a “‘hardening to punishment’ effect observed in animals, in which an escalating series of punishment, if it begins at a level that is ineffective in controlling the initial transgression, simply conditions the person to tolerate the increasing punishments, without reducing the rate of transgressions.”\textsuperscript{455} The invader may be “the happy-go-lucky person who tends to make his peace with his surroundings . . . [rather than] the melancholic person who is miserable no matter where he is.”\textsuperscript{456} Katz, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS, supra note 116, at 155–56. Hence, Katz argues, “certain kinds of [penal] harms are to be objectively rather than subjectively judged.” Id. at 156.


\textsuperscript{458} See supra note 407.

\textsuperscript{459} See NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at 41.

\textsuperscript{460} Studies of those suffering egregious injuries (e.g., paraplegia) or gaining great benefits (e.g., lottery winners) have shown that a person’s level of well-being typically returns to or near
She may suffer from her reactive response to the harms her punishment causes her supporters. Sources of suffering other than the state may impact the invader, such as a threatening vigilante committee, bad publicity before, during, or after the trial, or self-triggered injuries during the course of the crime and its ensuing events. The

its ex ante level as time passes. See Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978). As Bagaric and McConvill note, in the context of crime, this cuts two ways. With respect to the harmed victim, “[p]eople are extremely resilient and adaptable. It follows that most criminal offences are unlikely to have a lasting significant negative impact on well-being. This suggests that so far as the principle of proportionality is concerned, it is inappropriate to impose sanctions that have long-term effects.” Bagaric & McConvill, supra note 428, at 73. With respect to the punished criminal, this resilience cuts the other way. Since, as research has shown, prisoners adapt to their conditions (see what follows), “a long period of detention may be necessary to inflict [] even a moderate level of pain.” Id. Studies have revealed a “hedonic treadmill.” “The essence of the notion is that over time, people who move to a markedly better, or markedly worse, situation that initially produces great pleasure or discomfort, will adapt to that new set of circumstances and return to seeing it as a neutral state.” ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 51, at 39; see Robinson & Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?, supra note 455, at 187–89 (describing two kinds of prisoner adaptations). Does the hedonic adaption of the invader during imprisonment correspond to the invadee’s hedonic adaption to her harm from the crime? Kant mentions the impossibility of predicting future pleasure. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 235, at 186. Hence, he discounts pleasure as the goal of duties. See id. at 186–93. Does this argue for a similar discount for a suffering standard for punishment?

Several studies supporting this human adaptability to conditions “suggest that our society’s major means of modulating the punitive bite of punishment felt by a convicted individual, which is by manipulating the duration of the prison sentence, is not going to be as effective as what one might call the ‘naïve calculation system’ assumes.” ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 51, at 40. Referring to the “peak and end” rule in the context of deterrence, Robinson finds that recent work “suggest[s] that duration does not play anything like the major role that intuition gives it in determining punishment amount. Instead in these experiments, the amount contributed by duration to the remembered experience of pain was small.” Id. at 41 (footnotes omitted). “New approaches to punishment are necessary to achieve proportionality in light of the challenges posed by adaptation.” John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (2009).

Should the suffering of the invader’s supporters or sympathizers be considered? For some of these harms, see Ryan, supra note 152, at 1085. Contrariwise, should we weigh in the satisfactions of third parties from the invader’s punishment? “The social welfare evaluation also includes the satisfaction of any tastes that individuals might have for correct punishment: For example, the gratification they experience when guilty parties are appropriately punished . . . .” KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 58, at 292.

Adverse publicity may be a state vehicle for punishment, particularly for corporations. “[A] program of adverse publicity, sometimes to be coupled with fines, . . . would take the form of a court-ordered, institutionalized form of adverse publicity of the guilty corporation the cost of which is paid by the guilty corporate-collective by order of the state.” CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 58, at 140.

Alexander poses a hypothetical in which, as a criminal “leaves the scene [of the crime], he is struck by lightning and suffers X amount of pain as a consequence. Should the lightning strike affect and perhaps reduce to zero the amount of punishment imposed for the crime?” Alexander, Philosophy of Criminal Law, supra note 127, at 819 (citing Douglas N. Husak, Already Punishment Enough, supra note 224, at 79). Most commentators argue that non-state
state itself may be an additional source of variable impacts on prisoners, as where incarceration conditions differ within a particular prison or its wider system. The stigma of punishment may have negative physical and psychic repercussions on the invader and her supporters long after the imprisonment has ended, these varying from person to person. In sum, the same formal punishment may have widely variable, physical and psychic impacts on affected parties.

Sources of suffering should not count as punishment. See, e.g., Husak, Already Punishment Enough, supra note 224, at 83 (referring to a “school of thought”); but see Sadurski, Giving Desert Its Due, supra note 56, at 230–31; Shawn J. Bayern, The Significance of Private Burdens and Lost Benefits for a Fair-Play Analysis of Punishment, 12 New Crim. L. Rev. 1, 23 (2009); Husak, Already Punishment Enough, supra note 165, at 231 (making out “inconclusive” support for the proposition). “Interestingly enough, judges and juries, as the case may be, do tend to take the wrongdoer’s suffering into account in sentencing.” Id. at 231. “This idea, referred to as ‘poena naturalis’, or ‘natural punishment’, seems to reflect something deeply embedded in our moral sense.” Id. Defense lawyers, unsurprisingly, have argued that adverse publicity causing great humiliation to a previously respected member of the community should constitute “punishment enough.” See Ryberg, supra note 136, at 17.

464 Kolber argues that we need to “justify those aspects of punishment that are neither intended nor foreseen” as well as “aspects of punishment that are augmented by offenders’ baseline characteristics.” Kolber, Comparative Nature of Punishment, supra note 450, at 1602. “When we harm people knowingly, we need to have a justification for doing so. Retributivists who claim that they can ignore the full, comparative range of harms to inmates simply because those harms are unintended have failed to fully justify those punishments.” Id.; see Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 453. “Similarly, focusing on retribution, judges could factor in likely sexual victimization in determining ‘just deserts.’ . . . If a likely collateral consequence of imprisonment is rape, or even fear of rape, some lesser sentence may be retributively appropriate.” Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 1259, 1302 (2011) (footnote omitted). This is a major problem. One observer “describes prison conditions in the United States as ‘unspeakably barbaric.’” Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 Md. L. Rev. 87, 95 (2010) (footnote omitted). “Our prisons in particular are theaters of appalling human degradation. Outside prisons, too, American criminal justice humiliates offenders in ways unique in the Western world . . . .” James Q. Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2698, 2699 (2005) (reviewing Nussbaum, supra note 160) (footnote omitted).

465 Ryberg mentions the negative long-term effects of job loss and the difficulty of obtaining a new job after release, losing one’s spouse and other social ties, and psychological after-effects. “Moreover, a punishment may have an impact on the lives of other persons, most obviously on the close relatives of the punished.” Ryberg, supra note 136, at 109–10. “Prisoners are often abandoned by their spouses and friends, face difficulty finding and keeping employment, and may suffer from incurable diseases contracted during their incarceration.” Bronsteen et al., supra note 460, at 1038.

466 “When we recognize the comparative nature of punishment, we see that, by putting two equally blameworthy offenders in prison for equal durations, the offender with the better baseline condition is likely punished more severely than the offender with the worse baseline condition.” Kolber, Comparative Nature of Punishment, supra note 450, at 1566 (emphasis omitted). “If we insist on giving both of these offenders equal prison terms, we cannot justify doing so on the grounds of proportional punishment.” Id. (emphasis omitted). “We would argue that fairness requires a recognition that the same sentence may have a disproportionately severe impact on certain offenders, and that only if one adopts a principle of equal impact can this problem be minimized.” Andrew Ashworth & Elaine Player, Sentencing, Equal Treatment, and the Impact of Sanctions, in Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory, supra note 165, at 251, 255. “Equality of impact is widely accepted as a strong principle of fairness in the calculation
As for economic harms, fines are one imposition that produce them. They provide a common means to punish business enterprises. Under the notion of the declining marginal utility of wealth, equal fines may have disparate impacts that hinge on the wealth of the fined invaders. Wealth effects aside, the preference for wealth is a variable matter of taste, as evident from the attitude manifested by religious ascetics. Imprisonment in itself also produces economic harms, as it precludes most gainful employment. The preclusion of gainful employment during imprisonment, or afterwards from the stigma of a criminal record, has differing economic impacts owing to the variations in the market value of the invader’s skill set, experience, and other factors. In other words, her opportunity costs may differ. We can even imagine eventual economic gains from imprisonment, as where a prisoner turns away from a life of crime, obtains a valuable education in prison, or hone her commercially valuable creative talents.

Psychic harms especially, but also physical harms associated with economic harms, may vary from invader to invader. The invader’s temperament and preferences affect her reactions to economic harms. Again, a crucial factor is the functionality of the invader’s reduced autonomy space, that is, the amount that her economic loss impacts her operative, preferred, or felt freedoms.

of financial penalties.” Id. at 256. “The same principle has, however, been less rigorously applied when calculating the length of custodial sentences.” Id. Furthermore, “insofar as the conditions in prison establishments vary, over and above the minimum, there is the question of whether, and, if so, how, to take account of those variations when calculating sentence length.” Id. at 262.

Perhaps these problems can be avoided by adjusting the purpose or meaning of retributive punishment. “It would be foolish to deny that persons experience punishment differently. However, what we deny, in the main, is that this variance in the experience of punishment is critically relevant to the shape and justification of retributive punishment within a liberal democracy.” Markel & Flanders, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 148, at 909. “A key point of our disagreement is the common and, for the most part, apparently unreflective conflation of punishment with suffering.” Id. at 911 (footnote omitted). “If retributive punishment is not about matching pain for pain but rather serves as an attempt to communicate to the offender society’s condemnation by means of a deprivation of an objective good such as liberty, then the idiosyncratic experience of the offender will hardly matter—if at all.” Id. This last point turns on what is meant by “liberty.”

“Although it has escaped almost everyone’s attention, fines have long operated as the principal technique of governing crimes through risk. In most jurisdictions outside the US, fines make up about [seventy percent] of court dispositions.” O’Malley, supra note 246, at 84 (citation omitted).


“Subjective factors, [Kant] grants, are sometimes relevant in assessing the severity of punishment (e.g. the rich man’s indifference to a small fine).” Hill, Jr., Kant on Wrongdoing, supra note 130, at 436 (footnote omitted).

See id.

See infra text accompanying note 477.
The significance of all these variations among punished invaders may be finessed altogether if we objectify the impacts of punishment, as we might also consider doing with respect to the impacts of invasions on the invadees. But this calls for justification. Should society take into account the knowledge that equal forms and degrees of punishment have disparate impacts on invaders?

For edification, let us again turn to the positive side of the ledger—grants of benefits for those we wish to reward. Suppose a community has established a prize designed to reward persons in proportion to their just deserts for beneficial conduct that reflects the honorees’ extraordinary beneficence and respect for fellow citizens. Over the years, a designated group of civic leaders has granted such rewards by means of free passes and services at the municipal sports and cultural institutions. For a heroic, highly risky rescue of the community from an impending disastrous flood, the leaders granted the honoree and her immediate family lifetime passes and free services at every municipal facility. For a modest rehabilitation of a local ball field, the leaders granted the honoree a one-year pass to municipal swimming pools. Now, let us assume that the leaders believe an appropriate reward for an honoree’s exceptional conduct is a lifetime pass to either a municipal golf course or ice skating rink. They discover that this person is an avid golfer but indifferent to skating. It seems unimaginable that the leaders would grant her the pass to the skating rink instead of the golf course. What if the honoree is known to be indifferent to all sports and cultural activities or incapable of enjoying them? Is it incumbent on the community to come up with an alternative reward, if possible? If so, what are the standards of “if possible”? Does this turn on the size or wealth of the community? The effort and expense required to find and implement an alternative reward? Suppose the community wishes to reward two persons for the same beneficial conduct, the leaders considering as appropriate for each the grant of a lifetime pass to one of the municipal facilities. It turns out that one of the honorees is twenty years old and the other is sixty. Should the community supplement the award to the older honoree? Again, the “if possible” issue arises.

472 “The assessment of severity, as the assessment of the harmfulness of the offense, should be standardized: the focus should be on how unpleasant the punishment characteristically is. Such standardization is necessary as a limit on discretion . . . . It is also needed as a safeguard against class justice.” Von Hirsch, Doing Justice, supra note 51, at 89–90. It “assures that the severity of penalties is knowable in advance.” Id. at 80. “[T]he criminal law, with its general rules and its emphasis on foreseeable harms, is mainly equipped to deal with standard cases.” Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis, 11 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 13 (1991). Nonetheless, “the living-standard analysis would explicitly allow for cultural variation.” Id. at 14.

473 For example, we might base impacts, or the pain and suffering from impacts, on a reasonable person experiencing a like formal (hypothetical? material?) autonomy space reduction.

474 See supra note 464.

475 I use the reward side of desert as an “intuition pump,” as coined by Daniel Dennett. Intuition pumps, which are subject to misuse, are “not arguments, they’re stories. Instead of having a conclusion, they pump an intuition.” Daniel Dennett, Intuition Pumps, in The Third Culture 181, 182 (John Brockman ed., 1995).

476 “Often it may happen that the social costs of legal enforcement of justice based on desert are too high and then the attempt should be abandoned without, however, changing the criteria of what is desert.” Sadurski, Giving Desert Its Due, supra note 56, at 121.
On another side of the coin, suppose the civic leaders believe a lifetime pass to a municipal golf course is an apt reward for a person’s conduct, but then learn that the honoree is an avid golfer who had to give up the activity because she could no longer afford the green fees. Hence, she will become ecstatic by such a reward. The honoree’s psychic and other benefits, therefore, would much surpass the gauge of her just deserts for her conduct. Should the leaders then cut back on the length of the golf course pass, offer merely a discount, give her a pass to a skating rink instead, etc.? What if the heroic honoree is so wealthy that even free lifetime access to all the municipal facilities will strike her as a mere token?

In discussing the quandaries these hypotheticals raise, let me set aside some possible responses: first, that the award is meant to be merely symbolic, and hence its value to the honoree is not a controlling consideration; and second, that the award is akin to a contest in which the contestant who satisfies the rules earns a pre-established prize irrespective of its benefit. In discussing retributive just deserts, I have dismissed both of these standards and all other standards but this: the invader is to suffer punishment in proportion to her just deserts. If a proportional standard is to apply to the honorees, attention to the honorees’ known conditions and dispositions when determining an appropriate reward seems important—if this consideration is reasonably possible. This last clause is a significant hooker. When is the standard of reasonability met? Substantially past this point it would seem to be an insult, and disrespectful, to grant an honoree a reward that is foreseeably inferior in the honoree’s eyes to an easily granted alternative.

To return to the debit side of the just deserts ledger, let us look at some arguments that have been accepted as a means of discounting foreseeable, but unintended, harmful effects or factors. To focus this inquiry, let us assume the favored requital maxim centers on dignitary harm and is, say, to “reduce an invader’s freedom in proportion to her blameworthiness.” To end the conversation, we could simply declare that, under this adopted maxim, foreseeable harms beyond those that would be suffered by a reasonable person from the freedom restrictions in themselves are not wrongful. Harms, yes, wrongful harms, no. But this is too quick. First, limitations on freedom, dignitary harms, cannot be neatly separated from the other three types of harms. Imprisonment, for example, often inextricably intertwines with physical, psychic, and economic harms, and occasionally benefits, as well. Likewise, a requital focus on any one or more of these latter three types of harms often involves the other types of harms also. Economic or physical harm, and even psychic harm, typically restricts a person’s freedom.

Second, even if we grant that a requital focus on one or more types of harm to the exclusion of other foreseeable harms meets the mandates of the categorical imperative, we must also then acknowledge that a significant range of other requital maxims, or applications thereof, would also meet Kant’s standard. In adopting one or another of these acceptable maxims, we usually expect a deeper justification than, “we put all the possible maxims on a board and adopted the one hit by a thrown dart.” Yes, reason alone will not lead to a single, uniquely acceptable requital maxim, but it will go some of the way even when, as here, we are struggling with moral issues bristling with

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477 The punishment, for example, “could ultimately benefit the wrongdoer by healing the sickness of soul or mending the defects of character that had propelled her toward, or found expression in, her criminal deeds.” David Dolinko, *Morris on Paternalism and Punishment*, 18 *Law & Phil.* 345, 348 (1999).
essentially contestable concepts. We found a comparable problem when searching for standards by which to judge an invader’s just deserts. For this difficulty, we brought in our reasonable person, suitably deontically disciplined, to judge an invader’s degree of blameworthiness. Similarly, we may ask our reasonable person, as a representative of the entire community, to pick an apt requital maxim for adoption or application. In doing so, we should ask her to justify her choice. As postmodernists have instructed, she cannot be expected to justify her choice beyond debate all the way down to bedrock principles, but our questioning should push her to consider as many relevancies as reasonably possible, including consequential and aretaic normative factors that are not inconsistent with deontic principles. At the end of the line of analysis there is a leap of faith, such as “I choose this deontic maxim simply because I think it properly balances the many divergent values I have deeply contemplated, weighted, and weighed.” But the shorter the leap, the less likely are slips. As much as reasonably possible, our representative of the community must clear out the underbrush. She must justify as well as one can the adopted balance of the liberty and security interests of the invader and others. After all, the punished invader can claim that punishment that does not aptly account for her foreseeable requital harms does not respect her autonomy and her dignity, to say nothing of her dignity.

How, then, might we justify ignoring foreseeable harms to an invader produced by her punishment? Let us first turn to the community’s penal agent and ask her to justify her conduct that foreseeably punishes the invader beyond her just deserts. The agent’s situation is suggestive of moral quandaries that invoke the doctrine of double effect. The doctrine, roughly, is “that we may do what will cause a bad outcome in order to cause a good outcome if and only if (1) the good is in appropriate proportion to the bad and (2) we do not intend the bad outcome as our means to the good outcome.”

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479 See Kuklin & Stempel, Foundations of the Law, supra note 342, at 23–24.

The classic example is the wartime bombing of a munitions factory located in a residential neighborhood.\footnote{See, e.g., Thomson, supra note 480, at 292–93.} Harm to innocent bystanders because of the bombing is foreseeable. Under the doctrine, if the overall benefits toward ending the war and reducing casualties (substantially?) outweigh the harms to innocents, bombing the factory is not immoral.\footnote{See id.}

In scrutinizing the doctrine of double effect in the punishment context, first consider the invader’s innocent supporters. The invader’s punishment causing harm to the innocent supporters is foreseeable even though they did nothing to deserve it. Nevertheless, as a matter of deontic justice, we arguably do not fully recognize their claims. We are not foreseeably harming the supporters as a means to punish the invader. The invader’s blameworthiness is not any less because her supporters will suffer from her punishment, her just deserts. Indeed, the invader’s blameworthiness seems even worse insofar as she can foresee her supporters’ ensuing harms from her conduct. But we are not unsympathetic to the supporters’ pleas. In punishing the invader, we may consider their harms as a matter of mercy,\footnote{For the legitimacy of mercy to an invader in a deontic realm, see supra note 317. Whether mercy to an invader’s supporters should reduce the invader’s punishment is an even more perplexing issue.} or consequentialism,\footnote{The consequences of plausible maxims are considered in a deontic regime. See supra note 96.} and accommodate them to some extent accordingly,\footnote{In sentencing, the Model Penal Code would consider the “excessive hardship to [the defendant’s] dependents.” \textsc{Model Penal Code} § 7.01(2)(k) (\textsc{Am. Law Inst.} 1962) (quoted infra note 498).} though these are not deontic principles fundamentally. Yet a deontic consideration remains. The supporters’ foreseeable harms should at least be a consideration in implementing the invader’s punishment when a range of possible requitals is apt. Parallel to the reward side of the desert ledger, an adopted maxim should protect against easily avoidable, gratuitous harms. If, for example, the punisher has equal options to imprison the invader within convenient visiting reach of the supporters or at an inconvenient distance, the first option reduces the foreseeable harms to those supporters. Insisting upon the nearby prison is reasonable.\footnote{The punisher should not choose the distant prison in order to reduce the number of visits from supporters, thus psychically harming the invader along with the supporters. This tactic uses the supporters as a means only.} As accounting for the supporters’ harms becomes more costly for the punisher, at what point does it become unreasonable to require the accommodation? Just as we queried the strength of the demands on a community when rewarding a person for her beneficial conduct to make reasonable efforts to accommodate the honoree’s preferences, so are we raising these demands in the context of punishment. The word “reasonable” does the easy work of denominating the standard. The difficult implementation of this standard involves a multitude of considerations. When balancing the various liberty and security interests, at some
point the harms to others that might occur (for example, from onerous administrative burdens or the expensive need to build more convenient prisons) may outweigh the foreseeable harms to supporters.

As applied to invaders themselves, the underlying quandaries of the doctrine of double effect take us down a path like the one for supporters’ foreseeable harms. Is adopting a requital maxim that excludes consideration of one or more of the invader’s four types of harms when foreseeable the proper option? If, say, we adopt a requital maxim that focuses only on dignitary harms from an invader’s freedom restrictions, may we ignore the foreseeable, disparate physical, psychic, or economic harms to various invaders from application of the maxim? Let us begin this inquiry at the far end of the slope. While we began with easy cases when discussing the foreseeable disparities in effects from rewards, and the harms to an invader’s supporters (i.e., a more convenient prison is equally available), let us start here at the opposite extreme. That is, assume incarceration of an invader will foreseeably produce great physical, psychic, and economic harms to her vastly beyond the norm for prisoners and her just deserts, and these harms would be extremely difficult, even practically impossible, for the punisher to avoid. The invader rightfully says, “because of my heightened sensitivities, if you imprison or otherwise punish me for my battery, it will destroy me.”

Our first response to the punishee’s point that normal punishment will harm her much beyond her just deserts might be, “you should have thought of that before you battered that invadee while knowing of the risk of criminal sanctions. Under these circumstances, your criminal conduct constitutes consent to the legal consequences.” This rebuttal, based on the notion of hypothetical, implied, tacit, constructive, or formal consent, is often seen in moral, political, and legal argument.\footnote{Mikko Wennberg, \textit{Modeling Hypothetical Consent}, 17 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 17, 17 (2003).} I mention this analysis above as the main way that political theorists have justified a deontic basis for the social contract underpinning a government’s claim to legitimacy.\footnote{See supra text accompanying note 15.} There are real teeth in this type of consent argument. But the argument is often used to bite off more than it can swallow. One can invoke this argument to justify an unjust government or law, for example, or to justify an egregious remedy for a minor breach of contract that is buried in a nonnegotiable, complicated document. On the other hand, an orderly, efficient legal system would seem practically impossible if every defendant could deny liability by proving that she did not truly understand or explicitly consent to particular norms, laws, or contract provisions. To strike a fair balance, I have proposed a Consent Principle.\footnote{See Kuklin, \textit{Private Requitals}, supra note 2, at 977–78.}

Under the Consent Principle, the richness or depth of a person’s required consent to limitations on her autonomy space is proportional to the extent to which such consent truncates her baseline freedom, that is, constitutes curtailments of her liberty and security interests.\footnote{See id. at 976–77.} For instance, the consent required for a social hug is much shallower than is the consent required for sexual relations. Likewise, the consent needed to forgo a nominal legacy is weaker than that to decline a substantial estate. In

\footnote{Mikko Wennberg, \textit{Modeling Hypothetical Consent}, 17 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 17, 17 (2003).}

\footnote{See supra text accompanying note 15.}

\footnote{See Kuklin, \textit{Private Requitals}, supra note 2, at 977–78.}

\footnote{See id. at 976–77.}
line with Aristotle’s notion of responsibility blameworthiness, full consent must be free of avoidable ignorance and coercion, but the imperfections of the human condition do not allow us to always demand full consent to hold someone responsible for their choices and conduct.\footnote{See id. at 977.} In deciding where an apt line is drawn for sufficiently finding responsibility, the Consent Principle urges consideration of the likely impact of the finding on the purported consenter.\footnote{See id.}

Among the impacts on a person’s autonomy space, criminal punishment must surely rank among the most extensive. Hence, to counter the claim that the criminal invader “consents” to punishment that negatively impacts on her more than called for under the proportional standard of retributive just deserts, the invader’s agreement under the Consent Principle must be rich and deep. Some may doubt that this is often the case. Criminals generally have but a vague notion of the potential consequences of their sanctionable conduct.\footnote{See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, \textit{Does Criminal Law Deter?}, supra note 455, at 175–78; \textit{id.} at 174 (“Potential offenders commonly do not know the legal rules, either directly or indirectly, even those rules that have been explicitly formulated to produce a behavioural effect.”).}

Even when criminals are completely aware of all the risks they assume by illegal conduct, their “consent” to the sanctions may not be enough to justify punishment beyond their just deserts. As Kant points out, even full consent has limits.\footnote{See \textit{Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice} (1793), \textit{reprinted in Practical Philosophy}, supra note 5, at 273, 293–94 [hereinafter \textit{Kant, On the Common Saying}].} One cannot consent, he claims, to actions that are disrespectful to oneself, such as self-slavery, mutilation, or suicide.\footnote{See \textit{Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals}, supra note 13, at 431, 471–72.} Because persons, by virtue of their rational capacity, are moral beings entitled to be treated with respect, one cannot disrespectfully treat even oneself under the categorical imperative.\footnote{See \textit{Kant, On the Common Saying}, supra note 494.} It seems that “consent” to punishment significantly beyond that which is mandated by one’s just deserts is disrespectful of oneself. While this line drawing is difficult, clearly that limit is often violated in our current penal system.\footnote{See generally \textit{Susan Kuklin, No Choirboy: Murder, Violence, and Teenagers on Death Row} (2008); \textit{Bryan Stevenson, Just Mercy} (2014).} A principled deontic regime would not tolerate this.

Our second, somewhat more sympathetic, response to the sensitive punishee who claims she will be “destroyed” by imprisonment might be, “because we don’t want you to suffer beyond your just deserts, we would like to avoid (most) of your harms from your special sensitivities, but doing this would require shifting substantial resources to your case which we simply cannot afford in light of the community’s other pressing needs. Our only plausible accommodation would be to set you free. But we must do our duty to you by punishing you.\footnote{Kant notoriously claimed that the state has the duty to punish all criminals, just short of the heavens falling, in order to show respect for the criminal and her autonomous choices (otherwise, she is being treated as an incompetent). \textit{Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals}, supra note 13, at 474–75. “Retributivism in other words, is truly a theory of justice such that, if it is}
and those who are put at risk of your future wrongful risks to punish you.” Moore, Moral Worth of Retribution, supra note 127, at 96; see Moore, PLACING BLAME, supra note 170, at 91, 154. Moore “defend[s] the purely moral claim that the obtaining of retribution is an intrinsic good.” Id. at 160; see Michael S. Moore, Responsible Choices, Desert-Based Legal Institutions, and the Challenges of Contemporary Neuroscience, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 233, 235 (2012) (“[A] freestanding, intrinsic good”). Brudner distinguishes legal retributivism from moral retributivism. Unlike legal retributivists, “all moral retributivists believe that the state should punish for the sake of the good inherent in punishing the morally guilty.” BRUDNER, supra note 63, at 20. But, “[t]o say that punishment has intrinsic value would imply that the committing of an offence has instrumental value, but surely no-one would embrace this paradox!” Mundle, supra note 431, at 223. The Model Penal Code is not so strict. Among the considerations to “be accorded weight in favor of withholding sentence of imprisonment” is that “the imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his dependents.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(2)(k) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). In the private law context, however, we often do not think that we are disrespecting obligors or tortfeasors by allowing them to escape their obligations. Contract obligees and tort invadees have no duty to sue their obligors. Indeed, we often think we are honoring obligors by waiving their obligations.

From the other side of the Hohfeldian correlative—that is, the invader’s rights rather than the state’s duties—Morris argues that the fundamental, natural, inalienable, and absolute human right to be treated as a person entails the right to punishment. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 127, at 74, 74–75. “[T]he denial of this right implies the denial of all moral rights and duties.” Id. at 75. Duff agrees that “[a] sane criminal has a right to be punished,” otherwise she is disrespected. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 82, at 263. Feinberg questions whether a criminal has a right or entitlement to be punished. FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, supra note 71, at 72 (“Of all those modes of official treatment for which a person might qualify under some institutional rules, only punishment seems resistant to the language of rights . . . .”). Why shouldn’t the criminal’s right or the state’s duty be waivable by the right-holder, as are most other rights and duties? See, e.g., ADLER, URGINGS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 406, at 19; SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE, supra note 56, at 245–47. The exceptions to waivable duties are those based on self-disrespect (e.g., mutilation), which, arguably, is not the case here. “[A] renounced right ceases, sooner or later, to be a right, and the criminal’s ‘right’ to be punished is well-nigh certain to be renounced.” FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, supra note 71, at 73 (footnote omitted). Kant denies that a criminal has a duty to accept punishment. KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 476 (“the social contract contains no promise to let oneself be punished . . . .”). While Morris and Duff argue that a person is disrespected if the state denies her the right to be punished, this does not seem to be the normal reaction in the private law context where, say, an obligee declines to accept her obligor’s contract or tort obligations.

499 If the state declines to punish, does this show disrespect of the invadees and the public put at risk of future wrongful risks? “Of course Kant regards externally wrongful (illegal) conduct as deserving punishment, and the state not only may but must use such coercion to protect people’s rightful freedom.” WOOD, KANT’S ETHICAL THOUGHT, supra note 434, at 134 (citation omitted). What if invadees consent to the invader’s nonpunishment? “[A] retributivist should urge punishment on all offenders who deserve it, even if no victims wanted it.” MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 170, at 89; Moore, Moral Worth of Retribution, supra note 127, at 95. Moore objects to Fletcher’s “rights-based retributivism” whereby a victim can waive the right to demand the criminal be punished, seeing this approach as an engine of vengeance and neglectful of equal punishment concerns. Moore, Victims and Retribution, supra note 146, at 75–79. Yet since an invadee can usually consent ex ante to what would otherwise be an autonomy invasion, why can she not consent, in effect, ex post? Is it partially because the
be rectified by providing her warmer clothing, we would expect the foreseeable harm to be avoided. At what point do we cross from the “ought” to the “can’t”?

The deontic duties of respect may help us draw lines when resource trade-offs are necessitated. Three types of parties with interests in the trade-offs are identified above: the invader (punishee), whether or not she is particularly sensitive; the invadee and those put at future wrongful risk by the invader’s possible ensuing conduct; and, other members of the community who will be denied sufficiently respectful treatment by the government if resources are reallocated to meet the invader’s claim of unjust punishment. In this latter category, we can imagine the need to take money from schools, welfare, policing, and other public institutions to treat punishees fairly according to their just deserts. This may become a deontic problem. When schools, for example, are substantially substandard, the children denied a reasonable opportunity to hone their talents are not being treated with respect$E$, especially when other schools in the system are not substandard. The same can be said about some other public services. Indeed, we can imagine a sufficiently impoverished community such that virtually all its members are denied their entitlements to respect$E$ and dignity$E$, which is due them simply by virtue of their rational nature. On top of this, they may also be denied their just deserts for their conduct, thus denying them their rights to respect$E$ and dignity$E$.

So what is a community to do when it cannot meet all of its deontic duties because of its lack of resources? Is it to disrespect some persons (e.g., invaders) to fully respect other persons (e.g., invadees)? Is it to (dis)respect all persons to an equal extent, thus requiring everyone to share in a denial of their rights? Is this denial to be proportional? On what would such proportion be gauged? These are among the myriad of issues that remain for a community that wishes to “do the right thing” according to Kant. Let the debate among reasonable, just people continue.

invadee’s ex post consent largely leaves in place the risk of future wrongful risks by the invader to the public? For some invasions, this is highly attenuated (e.g., problematic theft of spouse’s assets). How does prosecutorial discretion relate to these concerns?

500 More generally, if conceptions of retribution stumble in principle or practice, at some point do they run afoul of the Kantian principle that “ought implies can”? See generally Robert Stern, Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does?, 16 UTILITAS 42 (2004). If we cannot properly retributively punish an invader, ought we give up any attempt?

501 I speak here and elsewhere of a community’s deontic duties while, at the same time, I have denied that a community or a state is a moral being under the categorical imperative. Thus, a collective does not have independent deontic status. The reference to community rights and duties, then, must resolve back to the individual rights and duties of each member of the community. See supra note 88. This complicates the analysis. For example, impoverished or disabled members may have different duties from those not so disadvantaged. They may not be able to afford to give more for the penal system without depriving their children of a fair upbringing. Other characteristics of each community member may also go into the calculus of their duties. I leave these complications aside.

502 That “equal” is a loaded, controversial standard, see DOUGLAS RAE, EQUALITIES (1981).