1983

The Other European Community - Integration and Cooperation in Nordic Europe, by T. Turner and G. Nordquist

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Original Citation

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due to the strength of the Israeli lobby and the commitment of American Jewry; (3) the only viable way to reconcile interest in Israeli security with the other interests is through the creation of a Palestinian state in virtually all of West Bank-Gaza; (4) the United States can achieve this necessary reconciliation of interests only by changing its role from mediator to arbiter of peace; and (5) success in this effort requires the participation if not the partnership of the Soviet Union.

I find Tillman’s thesis flawless and irrefutable. For this reason, I also find his concluding chapter, “Peace and How to Get It,” very disappointing and profoundly depressing. The chapter is short, only 15 pages, and thin. Indeed, he has almost nothing to recommend. Tillman rightly sees the basis of the United States’ dilemma in the Middle East in its domestic politics. “If there is a remedy,” he writes in an earlier chapter (p. 71), “it would seem to lie . . . in the reintroduction of rationality, on which Madison counted heavily, into the American political process. This is essentially a matter of placing in office wiser, more competent leaders. . . . The remedy offered is perhaps a lame one. . . .” (p. 71). What depresses me is the gloomy thought that Tillman’s failure to offer more is due to the fact that sometime after 1973 we went beyond the point of no solution, and that Israel and United States interests in the Middle East are simply doomed. Still, the fine first 275 pages lead me to hope that Tillman would prove me wrong in a follow-up book on Middle East “peace and how to get it.”

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The Other European Community treats the five countries of Scandinavia (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland) that Turner and Nordquist term “Norden.” Although these five are separate and distinct with their own cultures, traditions, histories, and levels of economic development, Turner and Nordquist ably discuss the several strands of communalities—the growth of social democracy, the success of cultural and social interchange, the shared bedrock of political values, and the noninstitutionalized patterns of cooperation and consensus formation.

Norden does engage in international integration and cooperation, but it is on a very low level and quite noninstitutionalized when compared to the European Community structures in Brussels. It is unfortunate, however, that Turner and Nordquist only narrate some of these cooperative efforts without really attempting to analyze why these countries, after establishing a mechanism for intergovernmental cooperation (the Nordic Council), maintain a low level of policy harmonization. The narrative would have been strengthened by a discussion of the tension between the need for international organization and the fear of interdependence costs.

The governmental decision whether to organize multilaterally for the pursuit and satisfaction of particular interests depends on a large extent on a country’s political, economic, security, and technological capabilities and resources. If these are perceived to be sufficient to ensure the successful implementation of appropriate domestic and foreign policies, then international organization through establishing or joining IGOs may not be desirable. If, on the other hand, national capabilities are not regarded as adequate while IGOs appear to offer a more likely path to assuring the satisfaction of important national interests, then a state may be more inclined to encourage the performance of the necessary tasks multilaterally through the creation of appropriate IGOs. These are basically the circumstances forming the background for what John Ruggie calls a state’s “propensity for international organization” (“Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration,” American Political Science Review, 1972, 66, 874-893).

It would seem that Norden should have a high “propensity for international organization,” but the fear of “interdependence” costs has put limits on Norden’s institutionalized cooperation. William Coplin and Michael O’Leary (“A Policy Analysis Framework for Research, Education and Policy-Making in International Relations,” paper delivered at the 1974 International Studies Association Convention, St. Louis) describe interdependence as the existence of conditions in which the perceived needs of some individual groups in one state are satisfied by resources or capabilities that exist in at least one other state. The patterns of transnational interdependence thus are a product of the relationship between needs and capabilities across national boundaries. Other views of interdependence stress “sensitivity” or “vulnerability” to external events.

But it is this very inequality of capabilities within interdependence relationships that at times evoke fears of dependence on the part of the governments. Instead of producing perceptions of reciprocal dependence that might induce governments to treat the acts of other governments as though they were events within their own borders and might be seen within the context of con-
verging interests, unequal capabilities among states are likely to lead to suspicion, envy, and tensions. Norden all too frequently resorts to national means and solutions as a countervailing force against the threat of dependence, and such actions harm the prospects of useful collaboration among the states.

This book is not for the serious student. It is a broad, sweeping overview with very little analysis or theory-building (the dust jacket recommends it to tourists—it does have some of the travelogue in it). The absence of footnotes is a drawback, and both the bibliography and the index are rather skimpy. But the book will suffice as a general introduction to Norden’s surface characteristics.

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U.S. Influence in Latin America in the 1980s.

The premise of this collection is that the decline of U.S. hegemony in Latin America has been insufficiently related to factors of political culture and change that condition the intensity of outside influence. Although U.S. power remains predominant, “the desire to maintain a positive image and to assure the generally favorable disposition of the . . . republics” (p. 2) constrains United States actions.

Each of the contributions offers an illuminating account of U.S. policy over the last 10 years through syntheses of recent scholarship, Latin American journalism, and government documents. Controversies such as CIA complicity in Allende’s overthrow and the diplomatic maneuvering to displace Somoza are treated judiciously. The complex nuances of nongovernmental sources of influence—which extend, or sometimes diminish, normal channels of political power—are assessed carefully. Examples include Paul Sigmund’s analysis of the role of Chicago-trained economists in formulating social policy in Pinochet’s Chile, Thomas Anderson’s discussion of AFL-CIO activity within Salvadoran trade unions, and David Blank’s examination of the intellectual impact of Euro-socialism upon Venezuelan party politics.

A concluding chapter by Wesson amplifies several common themes including the counterproductive effects of withholding military aid, the decline of U.S. moral prestige since Vietnam, and the occasionally positive impacts of Carter’s human rights policies in moderating reactions toward dissidents in some regimes.

The articles on Brazil, Venezuela, Panama, Cuba, and Argentina most thoroughly link the variable of influence with the advent of political change by incorporating empirical data. Wesson contends that Brazilian aspirations “to a seat at the top” (p. 71) result in the pursuit of multiple foreign policies and opposition to U.S. pressures toward nuclear nonproliferation. Venezuela’s goals of defending democracy and equitably disposing of its oil wealth, notes Blank, has produced a philosophical eclecticism concerning the proper role of government in economic development. In both instances it is implied that such assertions of maturity benefit hemispheric stability, although they limit direct American influence.

Steven Ropp’s account of U.S. economic dominion in Panama suggests that declining influence has resulted from the eclipsed fortunes of U.S.-favored commercial elites whose power has been supplanted by nationalistic elements, including an increasingly Latin American-trained National Guard. Edward Gonzalez provocatively suggests that prospects for improved relations with Cuba may be greater than at any time since 1959, since overdependence upon Soviet largesse, internal party rivalries, and negative third-world repercussions resulting from a “maximalist” foreign policy have made Cuba a virtual hostage to Soviet interests. The absence of U.S. leverage is due to practical constraints: there is “simply no way that the United States could displace the USSR as Cuba’s economic patron and supporter” (p. 212).

Finally, Kenneth Johnson’s chapter on Argentina hints at one reason for the failure of Alexander Haig’s mediation efforts during the Malvinas crisis of 1982: “so sensitive are the Argentines in the matter of how one treats them” (p. 53) that they are easily flattered. Considerable evidence suggests that Argentina was led to mistakenly inflate its importance to U.S. security interests by Haig’s efforts. Other contributions on Colombia and Mexico discuss immigration, land reform, and narcotics trafficking.

The book’s only serious deficiency is the lack of a coherent conception of an appropriate object for U.S. influence. Wesson’s final prescription rests upon a disappointing geopolitical premise: “if the United States cannot make itself felt in Latin America, its position in the world will have sunk low indeed” (p. 225).

Although reinforcing critics’ contentions that U.S. actions in Latin America are responses to problems in other arenas, this aphorism is an inadequate point of departure for policymakers. Area specialists, however, can benefit from the book’s even-handed prognosis of U.S. capacity to direct recent events.

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