This Article will analyze whether the post-Crawford decisions have been consistent in their treatment of statements that qualify as excited utterances in light of the Confrontation Clause principles and various definitions of testimonial in Crawford. Part II of this Article will provide a discussion of the Crawford decision itself and an analysis of Crawford's treatment of earlier cases in this area. Part III of this Article will provide a discussion and analysis of court decisions that have applied Crawford in the context of excited utterances. It will do this by examining the factors that these courts have considered and emphasized in their analysis of whether an excited utterance qualifies as a testimonial statement, which would implicate the Confrontation Clause protections set forth in Crawford. Part IV of this Article will discuss Crawford's impact on the admission of excited utterances by analyzing the various factors from the cases under the different formulations of "testimonial" set forth in Crawford. Part IV will then propose a composite definition of "testimonial" that will take into account the three definitions from Crawford and the application of those definitions in the cases. Part V of this Article concludes that the intended positive impact of the Crawford decision will be realized only if courts refrain from applying its protections to situations that the Supreme Court neither intended nor contemplated.

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