Too Big To Fail: The Role for Antitrust and Bankruptcy Law in Financial Regulation Reform, Part II
financial regulation, financial regulatory reform, Treasury financial regulatory reform bill, Frank financial regulatory reform bill, implied repeal, credit suisse, trinko, antitrust and financial sector, antitrust
Chris Sagers presented the following written testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy on November 17, 2009. His testimony concerns the antitrust consequences and the risks to competition posed by the proposed financial regulatory reform package current pending in the House of Representatives - specifically, the package proposed by the Treasury and Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank. The testimony concludes that the package introduces certain serious antitrust risks, both by triggering the "implied repeal" doctrine, and by giving the FDIC certain powers to cause the "resolution" of failing financial holding companies with very little antitrust constraint on its disposition of the FHCs' assets. More generally, it concludes that there is a distressing lack of concern throughout the legislation with antitrust or competition, and a failure to see competition as any part of any solution to anything.
Sagers, Christopher L., "Too Big To Fail: The Role for Antitrust and Bankruptcy Law in Financial Regulation Reform, Part II" (2010). Law Faculty Articles and Essays. 327.