inside debt, capital structure, shareholders’ desired leverage, speed of adjustment (SOA), managerial conservatism, risk-shifting
Business | Corporate Finance | Finance and Financial Management
Debt-type compensation (inside debt) exacerbates the divergence in risk preferences between the chief executive officer (CEO) and shareholders and, in turn, affects capital structure decisions. An excessively risk-averse CEO tends to use less debt than the shareholders desire, reduce debt
quickly when the firm is overlevered, but is reluctant to increase debt when the firm is underlevered. We find that higher CEO’s inside debt ratio (i.e., inside debt as a percentage of total incentive compensation) is associated with lower firm leverage and faster (slower) leverage adjustments toward the shareholders’ desired level for overlevered (underlevered) firms. The CEO’s inside debt ratio most conducive to capital structure rebalancing is around 10% of the firm’s market debt ratio.
Brisker, Eric and Wang, Wei, "CEO’s Inside Debt and Dynamics of Capital Structure" (2017). Business Faculty Publications. 285.
"This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Brisker, E. & Wang, W. (2017). CEO's inside debt and dynamics of capital structure. Financial Management, 46 (3), 10.1111/fima.12169, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12169. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.