Abortion, Property, and Liberty
Journal of Ethics: An International Philosophical Review
In ‘‘Abortion and Ownership’’ John Martin Fischer argues that in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist case you have a moral obligation not to unplug yourself from the violinist. Fischer comes to this conclusion by comparing the case with Joel Feinberg’s cabin case, in which he contends a stranger is justified in using your cabin to stay alive. I argue that the relevant difference between these cases is that while the stranger’s right to life trumps your right to property in the cabin case, the violinist’s right to life does not trump your right to liberty in the violinist case.
Simkulet, William, "Abortion, Property, and Liberty" (2015). Philosophy & Comparative Religion Department Faculty Publications. Paper 22.
The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10892-015-9201-x/fulltext.html
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