Abstract
The purpose of this article is to determine the factors which currently persuade courts to set aside releases under the doctrine of mutual mistake. Therefore, cases involving fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching, or unilateral mistake are outside the scope, except as they shed light on the doctrine's application. We shall consider first those cases where there is thought to be no personal injury at the time of releasing, and then those where some personal injury is known, but where it could be said that there exists a material unknown injury. Let it be noted that, as will be shown, if the releasor knowingly intended to release unknown injuries, and the court is convinced of this, the application of the doctrine of mutual mistake becomes irrelevant.
Recommended Citation
Franklin Stafford Wearn II, Avoidance of P.I. Releases for Mutual Mistake: Recent Cases, 16 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 340 (1967)