Abstract
The law frequently creates fictional concepts as a useful, if perhaps novel, means to a proper end. In creating the concept of the secondary labor boycott, the law has inadvertently created what in many instances is a legal fiction which distorts the situation, often leading to an improper and unjustifiable end. The term "secondarylabor boycott" is most frequently used in connection with Section 8 (b) (4) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, more popularly called the Taft-Hartley Act. The term "secondary labor boycott" is not easily defined; indeed, that is one of the predominant themes of this comment. Basically, it has come to mean a situation wherein employees of Company A have a grievance against Company A. Rather than present the grievance to Company A, the employees decide to pressure Company B, a firm dealing with their employer, so that Company B will pressure Company A to accede to the demands of the latter's employees. The term has been extended, as we will see, however, to cover any situation wherein labor organizations would apply illegal pressures (e.g. picketing) against one firm as a means of influencing another firm.
Recommended Citation
Note, Primary v. Secondary Labor Boycotts: Is There a Rational Basis for the Distinction, 22 Clev. St. L. Rev. 531 (1973)