Abstract
This paper will maintain that genuine protest boycotts are not anticompetitive because they do not restrict the economic freedom of either the participants or the boycotted entity; nor are they used to enforce an anticompetitive practice, such as collusion or horizontal exclusion. In Part II, cases dealing with unilateral and concerted refusals to deal will be examined to determine under which circumstances refusals to deal are illegal. Part III will analyze two recent protest boycotts cases: Crown Central Petroleum v. Waldman, and Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Service Station. The legal standards used in these cases will be rejected in Part IV as superfluous, and a clearer standard will be presented for determining the legality of protest boycotts.
Recommended Citation
Francis M. Allegra,
Protest Boycotts as Restraints of Trade under the Sherman Act: A Proposed Standard,
30 Clev. St. L. Rev.
221
(1981)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss2/7