The Confrontation Clause: Statements against Penal Interest as a Firmly Rooted Hearsay Exception
This Article will explore why these types of confessions, called self-inculpatory statements, should be admissible under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Part IIA of this Article will discuss the two-part test set forth in Ohio v. Roberts. Part IIB will address Lilly v. Virginia, the Supreme Court's first attempt to resolve whether statements against penal interest are sufficiently reliable to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause. Part IIB will also explore the distinction between self-inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory statements, what constitutes a "firmnly rooted" hearsay exception, and also the policy concerns behind creating a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception. Part III will then conclude why statements against penal interest qualify as a firmly rooted hearsay exception under the first prong of the Roberts test, and thus warrant dispensing with cross-examination.
Amy N. Loth,
The Confrontation Clause: Statements against Penal Interest as a Firmly Rooted Hearsay Exception,
48 Clev. St. L. Rev.
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss2/5