Abstract
Although harming people is generally wrong, it is exceptionally justified as the lesser evil when it is done to prevent sufficiently more serious harm. The two aspects of this moral truth should be reflected in the law. This is not always an easy task and is especially difficult with respect to the powers of the executive branch of government concerning emergencies. In such situations, there may be strong reasons to confer wide powers to the executive branch to perform harmful actions as the lesser evil. However, strong reasons exist to curb and check such powers. However, this problem is especially relevant in the context of the struggle against terrorism, where radical means are often suggested, and sometimes used, to confront what are considered to be, and sometimes are, grave dangers on lesser evil grounds. The paper explores this problem and offers a partial solution
Recommended Citation
Re'em Segev, Moral Justification, Administrative Power and Emergencies, 53 Clev. St. L. Rev. 629 (2005-2006)