Document Type
Article
Publication Date
7-2012
Publication Title
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Abstract
Silence suppression, an essential feature of speech communications over the Internet, saves bandwidth by disabling voice packet transmissions when silence is detected. However, silence suppression enables an adversary to recover talk patterns from packet timing. In this paper, we investigate privacy leakage through the silence suppression feature. More specifically, we propose a new class of traffic analysis attacks to encrypted speech communications with the goal of detecting speakers of encrypted speech communications. These attacks are based on packet timing information only and the attacks can detect speakers of speech communications made with different codecs. We evaluate the proposed attacks with extensive experiments over different type of networks including commercial anonymity networks and campus networks. The experiments show that the proposed traffic analysis attacks can detect speakers of encrypted speech communications with high accuracy based on traces of 15 minutes long on average.
Repository Citation
Zhu, Ye; Lu, Yuanchao; and Vikram, Anil, "On Privacy of Encrypted Speech Communications" (2012). Electrical and Computer Engineering Faculty Publications. 221.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/enece_facpub/221
Original Citation
Ye Zhu, Yuanchao Lu and A. Vikram, "On Privacy of Encrypted Speech Communications," Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 9, pp. 470-481, 2012.
DOI
10.1109/TDSC.2011.56
Version
Postprint
Publisher's Statement
© 2012 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
Volume
9
Issue
4
Comments
This work was supported in part by the US National Science Foundation (NSF) under grant No. 1144644.