Document Type
Article
Publication Date
4-2024
Publication Title
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Keywords
noncompete agreements, labor market, Italy, collective bargaining
Abstract
Noncompete agreements limiting the mobility of workers have been found to be widespread in the United States, a flexible and lightly regulated labor market. We explore the use of noncompete agreements in a rigid and highly regulated labor market, where labor mobility is low, and the labor market is highly regulated via legislation and collective bargaining. Based on a novel survey of Italian workers and an analysis of the regulatory framework, our study shows how trends and patterns in the use of noncompete agreements are not specific to a flexible labor market. Even in a rigid and highly regulated labor market, noncompete agreements are widespread, and often do not comply with the minimum legal requirements, and yet workers are not aware of their enforceability. This suggests that institutions and labor market regulations are not enough per se, especially when targeted groups are not properly informed, and incentives to comply are minimal.
Repository Citation
Boeri, T., Garnero, A., & Luisetto, L. G. (2024). Noncompete agreements in a rigid labor market: The case of Italy. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, ewae012
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewae012
Included in
Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons