Document Type
Article
Publication Date
9-2016
Publication Title
Bioethics
Abstract
Recently philosophers have proposed a wide variety of interventions referred to as 'moral enhancements'. Some of these interventions are concerned with helping individuals make more informed decisions; others, however, are designed to compel people to act as the intervener sees fit. Somewhere between these two extremes lie interventions designed to direct an agent's attention either towards morally relevant issues - hat-hanging - or away from temptations to do wrong - hat-hiding. I argue that these interventions fail to constitute genuine moral enhancement because, although they may result in more desirable outcomes - more altruism, more law-following, and/or less self-destructive behavior, they ignore a person's intentions, and often what makes an action right or wrong is the intent behind it.
Repository Citation
Simkulet, W. (2016). Intention and Moral Enhancement. Bioethics, (9), 714. doi:10.1111/bioe.12284
Original Citation
Simkulet, W. (2016). Intention and Moral Enhancement. Bioethics, (9), 714. doi:10.1111/bioe.12284
DOI
10.1111/bioe.12284
Version
Preprint
Publisher's Statement
Copyright Wiley Online Library. This article first appeared in Bioethics, (9), 714. doi:10.1111/bioe.12284. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/bioe.12284/abstract
