Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-2016
Publication Title
Bioethics
Abstract
Proponents of the substance view contend that abortion is seriously morally wrong because it is killing something with the same inherent value and right to life as you or I. Rob Lovering offers two innovative criticisms of the anti-abortion position taken by the substance view - the rescue argument and the problem of spontaneous abortion. Henrik Friberg-Fernros offers an interesting response to Lovering, but one I argue would be inconsistent with the anti-abortion stance taken by most substance view theorists.
Repository Citation
Simkulet, W. "A Critique of Henrik Friberg-Fernros's Defense of the Substance View." Bioethics. 2016 Nov; 30(9):767-773. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12289. Epub 2016 Sep 30.
Original Citation
Simkulet, W. "A Critique of Henrik Friberg-Fernros's Defense of the Substance View." Bioethics. 2016 Nov; 30(9):767-773. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12289. Epub 2016 Sep 30.
DOI
10.1111/bioe.12289
Version
Preprint
Publisher's Statement
Copyright Wiley Online Library. This article first appeared in Bioethics. 2016 Nov; 30(9):767-773. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12289.